1

A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES
BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.
Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.
Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.
Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM:
This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed
on August 20, 1991 by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and
Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center (hereafter "St.
Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical practitioners. The
respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection
with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material
evidence in a damage suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed
doctors and St. Luke's.
Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we
observed in In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil
nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court
and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re
Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 588), or to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney
(Ledesma vs. Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA
338).
Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987,
he was disbarred for his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a
judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and Chinese business firms which had
the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank vs. Judge
Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155
SCRA 604).
Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for
compassions and his promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the
profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August 20, 1991, he was back
before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical practice.
Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him
did not effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the
Court to Deputy Court of Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation,
report and recommendation. The following are Judge Bernad's findings:
The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was
admitted as a patient at St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She
complained of dizziness, hypertension, and abdominal pains with vaginal
bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St. Luke's,
Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined
Mrs. Aves and diagnosed her problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo).
Five (5) days later, on Christmas day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was
discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas with her family.
However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26,
1990. On December 27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child.
Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso
B. Aves, along with his three (3) minor children, brought an action for
damages against the hospital and the attending physicians of his wife. Their
counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint entitled:
"Attorney Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs.
Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the
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Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided over by Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in
court by St. Luke's, as requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were
entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles.
On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving
in court for another hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from
Mrs. Robles the folder containing the medical records of Mrs. Aves.
While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2)
pages of the medical records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs.
Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They saw Grecia crumple the
papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He immediately
returned the folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered
speechless by his audacious act) and left the office.
Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73"
missing. She ordered Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia
near the canteen at the end of the building, calling a man (presumably his
driver) who was leaning against a parked car (presumably Grecia's car).
When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers which he
took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what
she had seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge
Capulong. The three of
them Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico went downstairs.
Ms. Sandico pointed to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given
the papers which he had filched from medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge
Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber. On the way back to
chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and St.
Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to
her office.
In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico,
and a visitor, Judge Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give
her the papers which Grecia had passed on to him. The man at first denied
that he had the papers in his possession. However, when Sandico declared
that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly took
them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the
crumpled pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico,
she identified them as the same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the
man.
After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs.
Robles collapsed in a dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital
where she later regained consciousness.
In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits,
no one thought of ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were
recovered. Judge Capulong belatedly realized this, so she directed the
Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also ordered Sandico to
submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.
A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of
Grecia's driver who was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in
Quezon City. Although he was not allowed to enter the premises, he was
able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a cousin of "SID" and
asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home
to his province by Grecia.
He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver
named "SID."
PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street.
The neighbor confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".
The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge
Capulong's court, so much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the incident, Judge Capulong
inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.
On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.
At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves,
the surviving spouse of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case
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No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu Castro, counsel of the
defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the
medical folder which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting
Branch Clerk of Court Robles. When he allegedly went outside the
courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro
come out of the building and walk toward a man in the parking lot to whom
he handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered the
courthouse.
Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the
Aves case. He alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the
detached pages of the medical record was actually "planted" by his
adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.
He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on
July 16, 1991, so he was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the
latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the
morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second floor of the
building. He did not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since
it was allegedly a very warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a
business suit. He branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute
falsehood. He alleged that he would not have done the act imputed to him,
because the medical chart was the very foundation of the civil case which
he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered why the man,
alleged to be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of
the medical chart, was neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even
established.
He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a
fabrication for he had never seen him before.
He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any
of the court personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the
medical record and he alleged that the unidentified man remained in the
courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's chamber.
In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court
employee, Maria Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina
Robles entirely credible and "without any noticeable guile nor attempt at
fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of cross examination"
(p. 11, Judge Bernad's Report).
That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a
lawyer, and her lowly clerk, Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and
cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the medical record, was
understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature.
Nevertheless, they had the presence of mind to immediately report the
matter to their Judge who forthwith took appropriate steps to recover the
exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro had absolutely no motive to
testify falsely against the respondent.
While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of
Attorney Grecia's "driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting
him led to the recovery of the stolen pages of the medical chart.
Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro
into identity of the man was fruitless for he was never seen again.
Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro,
not Grecia, who stole the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to
an unidentified man, is an incredible fabrication. Not only is it directly
contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly, Attorney
Aves failed to mention it during the confrontation with the man inside
Judge Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.
His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is
not credible for he would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who,
he knew, had been looking for the man to ascertain his identity.
In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly
disregarded by the investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth
and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge Bernad noted that while Grecia
was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court (9:15
A.M.) on July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a
dark blue barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was
not sharp when he was cross-examined regarding more recent events. For
instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was absent on August 4, 1992, but
the truth is that a hearing was held on that date as shown by the transcript.
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When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an
issue of the absence of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in
court. He forgot that it was he who asked that the chart be left with the clerk
of court.
His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of
the medical chart for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is
specious. As a matter of fact, the entries show that after Mrs. Aves was
readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the doctors were able to
stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.
On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is
convinced that the charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By
stealing two pages from Linda Aves' medical chart and passing them on to
his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of Professional
Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:
Canon 1. . . .
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin,
60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner of "dirty tricks," like
Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance
the ends of justice."
The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's
equipment in the practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court
repeatedly.
. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing.
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end,
nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C.
No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)
. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires
that he shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession
is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the
exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross
misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related
to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the
bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
(Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)
. . . public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only
to those possessing tested qualifications and who are
sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the
profession, a s well as being subject for judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients and
the public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions
[PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42
SCRA 302, 305.)
By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has
demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his
moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of
lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
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character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, or an unfit
or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to manage the
business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for
conduct which tends to bring reproach on the legal
profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the
public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248,
September 18, 1992, p. 15.)
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer.
Considering that this is his second offense against the canons of the
profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme
penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is
hereby CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his
name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 3721 August 17, 1994
JULIAN C. DINOY, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JESUS ROSAL, respondent.
Batiquin & Batiquin Law Office for respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

FELICIANO, J .:
Mr. Julian C. Dinoy sent the Secretary of Justice an unverified letter dated
23 August 1991, charging Atty. Jesus Rosal with having notarized a Special
Power of Attorney dated 8 May 1989 in favor of one Estela Gentacutan, at a
time when some of the principals (i.e., Cesaria Bacalla and Jose
Gentacutan) mentioned in the document were already dead. The letter was
indorsed to the Court which in turn referred it to the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("Committee") for
investigation, report and recommendation.
A series of communications were then exchanged between Mr. Dinoy and
the Committee, among which was another unverified letter from Mr. Dinoy
dated 9 March 1992 containing evidence tending to support his charge
against Atty. Rosal. Such evidence included: (a) a xerox copy of a death
certificate issued by the Parish Church of San Nicolas, Cebu City indicating
that one Cesaria Bacalla died on 10 February 1981; (b) a photograph of a
headstone indicating that Jose Gentacutan died on 2 April 1974; and (c) a
xerox copy of a certification issued by the Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Cebu City indicating that the skeletal remains of Jose Gentacutan have been
interred in the Calamba Roman Catholic Cemetery, Cebu City. When the
investigation was already
well under way, Mr. Dinoy submitted a "Supplementary Affidavit" dated
25 September 1993 wherein he declared that the act complained of "is
illegal and unlawful and he (Atty. Rosal) should be punished for this act
(by) disbarment from (the) practice of law."
Meanwhile, the Committee, through Commissioner Presbitero J. Velasco,
issued an order dated 18 June 1992 inquiring if the parties desired a change
of venue to Cebu City, since both are residents thereat. Complainant Dinoy
agreed; respondent Rosal gave no response.
In an order dated 3 February 1993, the Committee, this time acting through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, required Atty. Rosal to submit his
answer to the complaint. Respondent filed a verified answer dated 23
February 1993 to the complaint. Respondent asserted that notwithstanding
the heavy workload of documents to be notarized which he faced on the day
he dealt with the document in question, he was able to interview each of the
persons who executed the Special Power of Attorney regarding their
personal circumstances and the consequences of their act; he was satisfied
the persons who signed the document were the ones who represented
themselves to be such. Respondent asked that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit.
Complainant filed a reply thereto as well as a motion to transfer venue. In
an order dated 13 April 1993, the Committee finally designated Cebu City
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as the venue of the investigation and authorized the local chapter president
thereat, Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, to receive the evidence of the parties and
submit a recommendation thereon.
A hearing was set by Atty. Legaspi on 19 August 1993, but it was reset to
24 September 1993 because the respondent was unavailable. The record of
this case contains no indication that a hearing was actually held on this
subsequent date; although Atty. Legaspi in his report mentioned a hearing
being conducted on 7 October 1993.
Atty. Legaspi eventually promulgated a resolution dated 14 December 1993
finding that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the
identities and capacities of the individuals who executed the document
dated
8 May 1989. Atty. Legaspi reasoned that the volume of documents
respondent declared having notarized (e.g., sixty-five [65] documents on 5
May 1989, eighty-seven [87] documents on 8 May 1989 and eighty-nine
[89] documents on 10 May 1989) before, during and after the date in
question would render it unlikely that respondent conducted a carefull
interview of the individuals who executed the questioned document.
Atty. Legaspi observed, however, that the complainant presented no proof
that respondent acted with malice, ill-will or bad faith in committing the
negligent act complained of; complainant cannot therefore insist upon the
disbarment of the respondent.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 April 1994, the Committee
adopted Atty. Legaspi's report and recommended respondent's suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. This disposition was
adopted by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
("IBP") on
26 May 1994 by way of Resolution No. XI-94-077.
Deliberating upon the present administration case, after a careful review of
the evidence of record, the Court finds that the conclusions of the IBP in its
Report are supported by substantial evidence. The findings of the IBP's
Report are hereby adopted by the Court as its own.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public
one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity; courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be
able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public and
appended to a private document.
1
Consequently, it is the duty of the
notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his presence by the
real parties thereto; the notarial officer must observe "utmost care" to
comply with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties.
2

In this case, respondent's failure to observe the required standard of care
was not only evident from his inconsistent admissions as noted by
Atty. Legaspi, but also from the documentary evidence submitted by the
complainant which demonstrated that two (2) of the eight (8) co-owners of
a parcel of land who executed the special power of attorney dated 8 May
1989 were already deceased well before the time respondent notarized the
document in question.
Furthermore, although the Court agrees with the IBP's recommendation that
the respondent be administratively sanctioned for his negligence, we find
the recommended penalty of six (6) month's suspension from the practice of
law to be unduly harsh, considering that complainant had not shown that the
respondent had deliberately acknowledge and recorded a falsehood when he
notarized the document dated 8 May 1989,
3
and considering further that the
present complaint relates to the notarization of one (1) document only.
4

ACCORDINGLY, Attorney Jesus Rosal is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months for negligence in the performance of
his duty as a notary public with the WARNING that repetition of the same
or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. Copies of
this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. Copies shall also
be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the
Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney.
Bidin, Romero, Melo and Vitug, concur.
A.C. CBD No. 190 January 28, 1998
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CORAZON T. REONTOY, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LIBERATO R. IBADLIT, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

BELLOSILLO, J .:
This is a complaint filed by Corazon T. Reontoy for the disbarment of her
counsel, Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, for having been negligent in handling her
case for partition, accounting and reconveyance then pending with the RTC-
Br. 4, Kalibo, Aklan.
1

Respondent lawyer admits that he was the lawyer of complainant Corazon
T. Reontoy in Civil Case No. 2805 which was decided by the RTC against
his client. He likewise admits that he received copy of the adverse decision
on 19 June 1989 and filed his notice of appeal only on 17 July 1989 when
the expiry date to appeal was 4 July 1989.
2

Respondent alleges in his defense that after he received the adverse decision
he immediately contacted complainant's brother Proculo Tomazar and
requested the latter to inform complainant that they lost the case and that
after going over the decision he (respondent) was convinced that appeal was
futile. He also requested Proculo to tell complainant to communicate
immediately with respondent if complainant disagreed with him on his
position not to appeal the RTC decision anymore. Confident that Proculo
had conveyed the message to complainant and having failed to receive any
advice from her respondent intentionally did not file the corresponding
notice of appeal. But after Proculo informed him later in his office that
complainant wished to appeal the decision, he forthwith filed a notice of
appeal, in the interest of justice, on 17 July 1989.
The notice of appeal having been filed beyond the reglementary period, the
trial court on 16 August 1989 denied the appeal and granted the Motion for
Execution of Judgment of the prevailing parties.
In the investigation conducted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant presented her brother Proculo Tomazar to deny, as he did, that
he was authorized by her to communicate with respondent regarding the
case, claiming in fact that he had no knowledge whatsoever of subject civil
case.
3

The testimony of Proculo Tomazar corroborated complainant's testimony
that she had never authorized him to be her representative either to the court
or to communicate with her counsel for the reason that Proculo was
unlettered. Complainant further testified that when she went to see
respondent in September 1989 to check on the status of her case the latter
merely told her that the period to appeal had already elapsed and then
returned the case records to her.
We hold respondent administratively liable. Indeed it was his fault in not
appealing within the reglementary period in the belief that appeal would be
useless. It was highly improper for him to adopt such opinion without any
clear instruction from his client not to appeal the adverse verdict.
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client,
warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning
and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client
except in accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law in support of his client's cause,
regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to
his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public.
4

A lawyer has no authority to waive his client's right to appeal. His failure to
perfect an appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and
malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable."
5

Had respondent filed the appeal on time he could have easily withdrawn the
case later so that he could have the time to confer meticulously with his
client and then decide whether to pursue the case to the appellate court; or,
he could have withdrawn his services and advised complainant to look for
8

another lawyer before the period to appeal lapsed to give his client a chance
to ventilate her case on appeal.
Respondent claims that he nonetheless filed a notice of appeal in the interest
of justice. Notably, respondent filed the notice of appeal on 17 July 1989, or
only after the period to appeal had already expired. The belated filing of the
appeal cannot in any way mitigate respondent's liability; on the contrary, it
would show ignorance on his part. As a lawyer, he ought to know that his
notice of appeal, having been filed beyond the reglementary period, would
surely be struck down for late filing.
In sum, respondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities
faithfully and well as to protect the rights and interests of his client. The
record shows that complainant lost the case and suffered the corresponding
loss of her real property in Kalibo, Aklan, consisting of her undivided share
or interest in five (5) valuable parcels of land. Certainly, complainant paid
dearly for respondent's ignorance, laxity, if not incompetence, by failing to
appeal on time.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1708 July 23, 2002
CYNTHIA RESNGIT-MARQUEZ, SHIELAH J. RAMOS,
ROSALINDA L. ROQUILLAS and VICKY F. RAMOS,complainants,
vs.
JUDGE VICTOR T. LLAMAS, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 56,
San Carlos City, Pangasinan,respondent.
PER CURIAM:
A magistrate has to live by the example of his precepts. He cannot judge the
conduct of others when his own needs judgment. It should not be "do as I
say and not what I do." For then the court over which he is called to preside
will be a mockery, one devoid of respect.
1

We are called upon to reiterate this dictum in the administrative matter
before us.
In an affidavit-complaint
2
dated March 27, 1998, complainants court
employees Cynthia Resngit-Marquez, Shielah J. Ramos, Rosalinda L.
Roquillas and Vicky F. Ramos charged respondent Victor T. Llamas, Jr.,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, with immorality and gross misconduct. They alleged that
respondent judge, though married, maintains an illicit relationship with a
married woman, Lourdes Muoz-Garcia, and both are living together as
husband and wife under one roof; that the court sala of respondent Judge, as
well as the office of his personnel, have been utilized as dancing halls and
drinking wine rooms on office hours; that respondent Judge is drunk almost
everyday; that respondent Judge is living a highly immoral and disgraceful
life, and this is of open and public knowledge, and his mistress fondly calls
him "Daddy", thereby trumpeting their affair in open view; that the
complainant have been subjected to the intimidation and harassment by
respondent Judge.
In his Answer
3
, dated July 30, 1998, respondent Judge emphatically denied
the accusations against him.
In a Resolution dated June 16, 1999, the affidavit-complaint was referred to
Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Justice Brawner, after conducting the necessary investigation, submitted his
Report and Recommendation dated September 14, 2001. Lengthy hearings
were conducted on the case. Complainants Cynthia Resngit Marquez and
Shielah J. Ramos and their witnesses Angelito Dixon Dispo, Engr. Librado
C. Moises, Manuel Marquez, Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr., Atty. Omega
Lacandola Moises and Mario Resultan testified in support of the complaint.
On the other hand, respondent Judge himself testified as well as Lourdes
Garcia, Angelica Muoz, Joseph Muoz, Gaudencio Sabangan, Benigno
9

Abalos, Jr., Dolores Daligdig, Maura Doctolera, Andrew Mapanao and Rica
Cabaccan.
We reproduce the following findings of fact and conclusions of the
Investigating Justice:
"Complainant Cynthia Resngit-Marquez is the Court Interpreter
of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch
57 until she requested for a transfer sometime in 1994. The
presiding judge of Branch 56 at the time she was the Interpreter
was respondent Judge. During that time, respondent Judge already
had a drinking habit that started sometime in 1991.
"In February 1997, after his assignment in Dagupan City
respondent Judge went back to San Carlos City. In March 1997,
she saw respondent Judge again resume his drinking habits and he
was always seen with a glass of wine in his hands roaming the
Justice Hall premises even during office hours. He usually drank
with lawyers and litigants and he would force his staff to drink
with them. Should his staff refuse to join him, he would harass
them. He loved drinking Carlsberg beer as he claims that it made
him feel his young urges again.
"When complainants husband was in Saudi Arabia, respondent
Judge would insinuate that it was better for her to have an old car
she could use everyday rather than a new car that she could not
use. Aside from the drinking, respondent Judge would also engage
in singing and dancing in the courtroom even during office hours.
The complainant identified the pictures (Exhibits "D", "E", "F" and
"G") showing the recreation area behind the Justice Hall and the
corridor leading to the courtroom where respondent Judge
conducted his drinking sessions.
"After respondent Judges return to San Carlos City, complainant
saw Lourdes Muoz Garcia almost everyday, as respondent Judge
would drop her at her place of work at City Hall every morning.
Lourdes Muoz Garcia would usually appear again every
lunchtime to join respondent Judge and would come back again in
the afternoon after office hours and they would leave walking side
by side with their arms sometimes touching each other. During the
occasions that Lourdes Muoz Garcia was in the office of
respondent Judge, she would address him as Daddy or Masiken
(Pangasinense for old man).
"All the time that respondent Judge had been assigned in San
Carlos City, he resided near the cemetery in Karaengan, San Carlos
City then near the school in Bulingit, San Carlos City and after his
stint in Dagupan City, he stayed at Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
In all these places, respondent Judge lived with Lourdes Muoz
Garcia.
"During her cross-examination, she admitted that a previous case
was filed against respondent Judge charging him for the same
offenses as this present case. Although she states that she had
nothing to do with the case it appears that the Motion to Dismiss
said case (Exhibit "14") was signed by her and her father, which
motion paved the way for the dismissal of Administrative Matter
No. 95-3-88 (Exhibit "15").
"Angelito Dixon Dispo is employed as Clerk III in the Office of
the Clerk of the Regional Trial Court in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan since October 3, 1993. Almost everyday, part of his
duties included buying liquor for respondent Judge at the nearby
grocery that the judge and some lawyers partook of in the
courtroom. Aside from his drinking, there was singing with the use
of the sing-along machine in the courtroom of RTC Branch 56
where the respondent Judge was presiding. Some private
practitioners and prosecutors would join in the merrymaking that
happened as often as thrice a week in the courtroom of respondent
Judge. During these times, the noise emanating from his courtroom
could be heard downstairs.
"At that time, respondent Judge was residing at Barangay Kariinan,
San Carlos City. There was a time that the house of respondent
Judge was flooded and Angelito Dispo was ordered to go there to
pile sandbags. At respondent Judges residence, he came upon
Lourdes Muoz Garcia attired in shorts and undershirt (sando)
supervising the piling of sandbags.
10

"On December 1, 1994, he was again at the house of respondent
Judge butchering a goat in preparation for the birthday celebration
of Lourdes Muoz Garcia the following day. That afternoon, while
he was washing the dishes, respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz
Garcia were embracing and kissing each other on the lips.
"It was March 28, 1995 or a day before respondent Judges
birthday party that found Angelito Dispo again at his (Judge)
residence where he was helping in the preparations for the birthday
celebration. Again, Lourdes Muoz Garcia was present and again
she was attired in her shorts and undershirt without anything
beneath her shirt. He noticed that the respondent Judge and this
woman were very sweet with one another.
"He would always see Lourdes Muoz Garcia in the office of
respondent Judge at RTC Branch 56 almost four times every week
and they would intimately refer to each other as Daddy and
Mommy.
"At the time he testified in this investigation on September 14,
1999, Angelito Dispo stated that respondent Judge lives in
Barangay Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan with Lourdes Muoz
Garcia and the latters daughter.
"On September 3, 1999, respondent Judge went to Angelito
Dispos house and told him not to testify against him (Judge) in
this case. Angelito had this incident recorded in the police blotter
(Exhibit "B").
"Engr. Librado C. Moises took up the tale and testified that
sometime in December 1997, he went to the house of respondent
Judge in Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan to attend a party held there
in honor of some sisters of respondent Judge who had just arrived
from the United States. He was with some court personnel as Clerk
of Court Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises is his wife. At the party,
it was Lourdes Muoz Garcia, attired in a housedress, who was
attending to their needs and serving as hostess for respondent
Judge. When they left, Lourdes Muoz Garcia stayed behind.
"Manuel Marquez testified that while he was in the employ of the
Central Pangasinan Electric Company from 1995 to 1998, he
would often visit his wife, complainant Cynthia Marquez, in the
court where she was working and he would see respondent Judge
singing and dancing with some of his female staff as early as 3:00
or 4:00 oclock in the afternoon for as many as 4 times a month.
Pointing to the picture marked Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "1," he
described that the benches were moved towards the table of the
Presiding Judge in the courtroom thus creating more space for their
dancing.
"As stenographer of RTC Branch 57 in San Carlos
City, complainant Shielah Ramos stated that she has known
respondent Judge since 1989 when she first entered the courts
employ. Since 1996 she has seen respondent Judge and Lourdes
Muoz Garcia together both in the old building housing the
courtrooms as well as in the new Justice Hall. She would see them
eat their meals together at lunchtime and go home together after
office hours. During the singing and dancing sessions conducted
by respondent Judge in the courtrooms almost everyday and during
special occasions, Lourdes Garcia would always be with
respondent Judge.
"Sometime in January 1998, she saw them together at respondent
Judges rented house in Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Respondent
Judge was with his dog while Lourdes Garcia was dusting his car.
Confronted with pictures of the rented house, the two cars and the
dog (Exhibits "3-A" to "3-C"), Shielah Ramos pointed to the new
car as the one being dusted by Lourdes Garcia when she happened
to pass by.
"Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan, Sr. took the witness stand and
manifested that as law practitioner with an office in San Carlos
City, he knows respondent Judge ever since he came to preside
over RTC Branch 56. Sometime in 1995, there was what he called
a happy hour every Thursday in the courtroom of respondent
Judge. Proceedings would be suspended and all lawyers then
appearing would be invited to a drinking spree right in the
courtroom. The lawyers would contribute to buy wine and finger
food. There would be singing with even the court personnel
11

participating. This practice stopped when respondent Judge was
transferred to Dagupan City. However, when he returned to San
Carlos City in 1997, the drinking and singing sessions resumed.
This time there was even dancing and these all happened
sometimes once or twice a week.
"On one birthday occasion of respondent Judge, a Vice-Governor
Llamas of Tarlac was present. Two ladies were requested to give a
number and they were both introduced as Mrs. Llamas and Mrs.
Llamas, one of them was the lady companion of Vice-Governor
Llamas and the other was Lourdes Garcia.
"When respondent Judge went back to San Carlos City in 1997,
Atty. Tulagan often saw Lourdes Garcia going to his courtroom for
as many as five or six times a week. Further, on several occasions,
he saw them together in respondent Judges car as the Judge would
bring her to City Hall where she was employed and fetch her again
in the afternoon.
"In an earlier case filed by Atty. Antonio Resngit and complainant
Cynthia Marquez, Atty. Tulagan executed an affidavit (Exhibit
"C") before the National Bureau of Investigation supporting the
allegations of the complainants.
"Atty. Omega Lacandola Moises, another witness for the
complainants testified that sometime in November 1993, Lourdes
Muoz Garcia fetched her and together they went to respondent
Judges house in Karaenan, San Carlos City. Again, during an
office day in May 1994, she went to respondent Judges rented
house as there was a celebration of some sort and that was where
she had lunch. Respondent Judge had just arrived from the United
States and Lourdes Muoz Garcia who was also there gave her
pasalubong.
"On December 2, 1994, she again went to respondent Judges
house and had lunch there, as it was the birthday celebration of
Lourdes Muoz Garcia. Present during the occasion were the
relatives of Lourdes Garcia as well as her officemates and wife of
former San Carlos City Mayor Douglas Soriano. Sometime in June
1997, she, her husband and her brother went to respondent Judges
house in Gabon, Calasiao as the latter had just arrived from another
trip to the United States and Lourdes Muoz Garcia was again at
the house.
"In December 1997, she was invited to respondent Judges house,
as it was the birthday celebration of Lourdes Muoz Garcia as well
as a welcome for respondent Judges brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces who had just arrived from the United States for a visit. As
they arrived early, Lourdes Muoz Garcia was still in her
housedress but she eventually changed into something suitable for
the occasion. Pictures (Exhibits "N" and "O" also "Exhibits "18"
and "19") of the persons present at the occasion were presented to
her and she identified them.
"Another birthday party for Lourdes Muoz Garcia took place in
an apartment rented by respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia in
Bonoan, Dagupan City. Atty. Moises together with Atty. Geraldine
Baniqued and Geraldines husband were in attendance but as it was
a workday, they only stayed long enough to finish their lunch.
"On the occasion of respondent Judges birthday on March 29,
Lourdes Muoz Garcia fetched her at lunchtime and brought her to
that same rented apartment in Bonoan. She soon left after lunch but
she went "back alone, Lourdes remaining behind to attend to the
guests of respondent Judge.
"Mario Resultan testified that as sheriff of RTC Branch 56 at San
Carlos City presided by respondent Judge, he is aware and knows
that Judge Llamas and Lourdes Garcia have been living together as
husband and wife since 1990 up to the present. They first stayed at
Valerio Hall, Mabini Street then they transferred to Balingit Street,
followed by Kareanan Street, all in San Carlos City. They also
stayed together in Calasiao, Pangasinan and Dagupan City.
"In all these places of residence, Mario Resultan was usually
invited by respondent Judge and they would drink and sing. During
these sessions, Lourdes Garcia would always attend to their needs,
sometimes in her street clothes but oftentimes in her house clothes.
12

"On February 19, 1994, Mario Resultan went along with
respondent Judge to Manila to confirm his flight as Judge Llamas
was leaving for the United States the following day. With them on
this trip were Lourdes Garcia and respondent Judges sister,
Evelyn Llamas. They spent the night in the house of the brother of
respondent Judges sister-in-law. He slept in the living room while
respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia shared one room.
"As he would be out of the country, respondent Judge executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Mario Resultan authorizing
him to receive all his checks covering his salaries and allowances,
encashing these and delivering the money to Lourdes Garcia. He
did what was asked of him and each time he would deliver the
money to Lourdes Garcia, he would indicate the dates and the
amounts in his diary (Exhibit "P").
"Against all these evidence, respondent Judge denies the charge.
"Judge Llamas claims that complainant Cynthia Resngit Marquez
has an ax to grind against him for objecting to her application as
Legal Researcher of his court, RTC Branch 56, and instead
endorsing Aldrin Lee who was eventually appointed to the
position. Because he did not accede to her request, complainant
and his father filed several charges against him ranging from
immorality to harassment of court employees to high-handedness
and arrogance. However, these cases were eventually dismissed by
the Supreme Court (Exhibit "15") on motion of complainant
Cynthia Marquez and her father, Atty. Antonio Resngit (Exhibit
"14"). But the trouble between respondent Judge and complainant
did not stop there as could be seen in several cases filed by
complainant against him before the Office of the Ombudsman.
These cases were again dismissed (Exhibit "20-A"). He therefore
considers this present charge as another form of harassment
employed by complainant in her avid desire to oust him from his
present position.
"Further, he denies ever drinking and dancing in his courtroom as
he claims there are several restaurants outside the office equipped
with the necessary facilities for his pleasure. Besides if ever he
drinks with a visitor, it was part of his hospitable nature and it was
always done after office hours.
"As to the charge of immorality, he emphatically denied that he
has an amorous relationship with Lourdes Garcia. He is a married
man and his family lives in Dagupan City. However, he is
estranged from his wife due to irreconcilable differences in the
rearing of their children. This does not mean however that he
maintains an illicit relationship with Lourdes Garcia. He does
admit that he knows the woman as she is an employee at the City
Legal Office and it is her responsibility to look into the status of
cases filed by San Carlos City pending in the courts.
"Respondent Judge claims that all the testimonies of the
complainants and their witnesses in so far as they saw him and
Lourdes Garcia always together on several occasions, either
walking side by side or riding in his car together or him dropping
and fetching her at her place of work are all impossible and
figments of their fertile imagination. They did not live together in
all the places mentioned and definitely he would not be celebrating
Lourdes Garcias birthdays for her in his own residence. If ever he
was seen in the company of the woman, it was on social occasions
when they would either be guests or she was a guest at a party he
tenders.
"His emphatic denial is supported by his witnesses, Lourdes
Garcia, Angelica Muoz, Joseph Muoz, Gaudencio Sabangan,
Benigno Abalos, Jr., Dolores Daligdig, Maura Doctolera, Andrew
Mapanao and Rica Cabaccan.
"Lourdes Garcia states that she first knew respondent Judge
when she was detailed at the City Prosecutors Office and it was
her responsibility to get the court calendars for the guidance of the
Court Prosecutors.
"It was Gaudencio Sabangan who introduced respondent Judge to
her formally on November 30, 1990 during the occasion of the
birthday of Normida Sabangan, Lourdess niece and Gaudencio
Sabangans granddaughter. They were both guests at the party and
13

from then on whenever they would see each other they would
engage in casual conversations.
"Aside from this, it was respondent Judge who helped her get her
permanent appointment as Administrative Officer in the City Legal
Office at San Carlos City. Respondent Judge being close with then
Mayor Soriano, he paved the way for her being detailed at that
office where she was given a permanent position.
"In 1993 respondent Judge asked her whether she could
recommend somebody to do his laundry. She volunteered her
mother and thus the relationship between her family and
respondent Judge became closer. When her mother became sick
and could not do the laundry anymore, her younger sister and
brother stayed with respondent Judge and did the household chores
for him in exchange for allowances and tuition fee.
"Lourdes Garcia further stated that she is a married woman who
has stayed all her life in Barangay Roxas, San Carlos City except
for that year in 1982 when she went to live in Victoria, Tarlac, her
husbands place but when she was about to give birth, she went
back to San Carlos "City and has remained there. She absolutely
denies living with respondent Judge and states that the only time
she went to respondent Judges place was when she tagged along
with her superior to attend the party given by the Judge in honor of
his nephews and nieces who arrived from the United States.
"As for her presence at the Justice Hall, she admits going there but
her visits are all in connection with her work and since she has a
lot of friends there, she drops on them for a chat before going back
to the City Hall where she has her office.
"She states that she was likewise charged with immorality at the
Civil Service Commission in May 1998 but the case was dismissed
in April 1999.
"Her mother Angelica Muoz confirms her story and states that
she did the laundry of respondent Judge but subsequently turned it
over to her younger daughter. Also, she says that indeed her
daughter Lourdes always stayed at their house and never lived with
respondent Judge. She claims that her daughter is married to a
soldier but admits that her son-in-law does not stay with his family
as in fact she has not seen him for a long time now.
"Amidst all these conflicting testimonies given by all those who
took part in these very lengthy proceedings, it behooves upon the
Investigating Justice to determine whether or not the complainants
have been able to prove their charges against respondent Judge.
"Respondent Judge is charged with Immorality and Gross
Misconduct. According to the complainants and their witnesses,
his misconduct consists in his drinking, singing and dancing with
lawyers and court personnel in his courtroom during office hours
almost everyday.
"The Investigating Justice believes that indeed respondent Judge
used his court to indulge his drinking, singing and dancing habits
to the detriment of the other courts within the building who were
disturbed by all the noise coming from his courtroom. This
conduct unbecoming of a Judge deserves a reprimand but this
administrative misdemeanor may be relegated to the background in
the face of the more serious charge of Immorality.
"The complainants and their witnesses all gave positive
testimonies of how respondent Judge flaunted his mistress in the
eyes of the public. Bringing and picking her up from work,
dancing and singing with her in public, living with her in different
places, celebrating her birthdays with parties in her honor,
authorizing her to receive his salaries and being seen around with
her and behaving as if they were husband and wife are all
manifestations of how respondent Judge acted towards Lourdes
Garcia as seen in the eyes of the complainants and their witnesses.
"What more proof would one need to show an immoral
relationship other than these straightforward statements of the
complainants and their witnesses? Both respondent Judge and
Lourdes Garcia admit being married to other persons but the way
14

they behaved in front of the public is as if they were married to one
another.
"Against these positive testimonies is respondent Judges denial.
But it is axiomatic in the law of evidence that positive statements
prevail over negative statements.
"A look at the denials of respondent Judge and his witnesses
remain denials. Although they would attempt to explain that the
presence of respondent Judge and Lourdes Garcia together on
several occasions were due to circumstances or plain coincidences,
it would appear to the Investigating Justice that these coincidences
are one too many.
"In his Memorandum, respondent Judge questions the motives of
the complainants and their witnesses stating that all of them had
something against him and would lie through their teeth just to
oust him out of his position.
"Respondent Judge claims that the testimony of Atty. Omega
Moises Lacandola is biased and fraught with exaggerations and
distortions. He traces Atty. Lacandolas prejudice against him to
the fact that she was getting back at him for his act of filing an
administrative case against Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada.
"Judge Estrada was her Presiding Judge when she was a Branch
Clerk of Court. Now that Atty. Lacandola is the Clerk of Court,
Judge Estrada is the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
San Carlos City.
"Respondent Judge claims that as Judge Estrada and Atty.
Lacandola have a very close working relationship, the latter would
go to all lengths to destroy him (respondent Judge) including
fabricating stories against him just because he filed an
administrative case against Judge Estrada.
"This theory is too far-fetched to be believed. First, the case filed
by respondent Judge against Judge Estrada came after this case had
already been filed. If at all, it appears that respondent Judge in
filing the case against Judge Estrada after this case was filed was
the one who was trying to even the score between him and the
latter.
"Second, the testimony of Atty. Lacandola does not appear to be
improbable or impossible despite what respondent Judge believes.
She testified on what she saw and observed and she may have been
hostile and stubborn at times but this does not mean that she was
making up a story.
"As far as the testimony of complainant Cynthia Marquez is
concerned, respondent Judge in his Memorandum claims that it
was polluted by hate, desire for revenge, and for personal gain.
"It appears that respondent Judge filed an administrative case
against her for dishonesty and falsification of daily time record in
1994 but he himself had it dismissed in 1995. Not only that.
"Respondent Judge did not indorse Cynthia Marques for the
position of Legal Researcher of his court and instead
recommended somebody else. Her displeasure at respondent
Judges actions and her desire to get back at him motivated
Cynthia Marquez to weave an incredible story against him.
"But respondent Judges conclusion seems to be illogical. Since
respondent Judge himself had the case dismissed, why would
Cynthia Marquez still be bent on getting back at him?
"In fact, it is respondent Judge himself who got back at Cynthia
Marquez by filing another administrative case against her while
this case was being heard. That case stemmed from the earlier case
and this time respondent Judge was charging Cynthia Marquez
with falsification of her personal data sheet and procuring her
appointment as Interpreter under false pretenses.
"As far as her non-endorsement is concerned, the Investigating
Justice believes that this is not sufficient ground to doubt the
testimony of Cynthia Marquez. She gave her story replete with
details and events that showed the immoral acts of respondent
15

Judge. If her testimony were contrived, she would be one great
storyteller.
"Respondent Judge also states in his Memorandum that the reason
why Atty. Leopoldo C. Tulagan testified against him is because
said lawyer wanted his pound of flesh as he lost several cases in
respondent Judges court. This is incredible. Following this
reasoning we will come to the conclusion that all lawyers who lost
their cases before judges would readily testify against them at the
expense of committing perjury. The Supreme Court would be
clogged with administrative cases against judges filed by lawyers
who take offense for the defeat of their cases.
"All told, respondent Judge attacks all the testimonies of the
complainants and their witnesses as improbable and motivated by
ill will and desire for revenge. He states that they could not have
seen what they claim to have seen because it was impossible to see
through a closed window, the parking spaces for jeeps was not
located at a place where the Justice Hall or the City Hall could be
seen, or that goats are not butchered nor fishes cleaned a day
before cooking.
"But if we look closely at what respondent Judge calls impossible
stories, these are minor, even inconsequential details that do not
detract from the truth of what the complainants and their witnesses
saw and testified on.
"Not contented with accusing complainants and their witnesses as
telling improbable stories, respondent Judge states that all of them
were prejudiced against him as they all had their respective reasons
for wanting to get back at him. This encompassing conclusion is
more imagined than real. Respondent Judge would like to portray
that he is the victim of an "elaborate plot concocted by the
complainants to get him out of office. But using as defense this
delusion of persecution is not enough to overthrow the persuasive
and convincing evidence mounted against respondent Judge.
"Respondent Judge readily concludes the motives of complainants
and their witnesses as suspect. But could not their motives also be
the desire to tell the truth? Much as respondent Judge would like to
portray them all as pathological liars, their lies border more on
the truth and appear to be more convincing than respondent
Judges bare-faced denials.
"As the Investigating Justice heard this case personally from the
beginning to its conclusion, he has observed the demeanor of all
those who swore to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth.
And while this oath may have appeared to be meaningless for
some, it was clearly noticeable that the complainants and their
witnesses were the ones who valued its meaning and honored their
oath to tell the truth.
"From the evidence presented, there can be no denying that indeed
respondent Judge and Lourdes Muoz Garcia are maintaining an
illicit relationship. The details of such relationship are clearly and
unequivocally outlined by the complainants and their witnesses,
who have nothing to gain by pitting themselves against a powerful
figure.
"Moreover, Lourdes Garcia admitted herself that she owes her
present position to respondent Judge who helped her secure a
permanent appointment at the City Legal Office in San Carlos
City. Why would respondent Judge do that for her if according to
both of them they were merely casual acquaintances? What motive
would respondent Judge have in helping her get that position were
it not for the fact that they had an intimate relationship?
"Admitting that he is estranged from his wife, respondent Judge
himself has made possible the circumstances that could have led to
his present situation. He may be a judge but he is still a man with
the same feelings and urges as any other man. Lourdes Garcia is a
married woman who appears to be also estranged from her
husband as nowhere in her testimony can be seen what happened
to her husband except for the testimony of her own mother who
stated that she never saw her son-in-law for a long time now.
"Hence, we have here a man and a woman both living away from
their respective spouses and being thrown together has brought out
16

in them the fulfillment of their desires not to be alone. True it may
be human nature to feel needed and not be alone but in this case
the man happens to be a Judge.
"A judge is expected to be above himself, to transcend basic
human urges if it is in conflict with the responsibility he swore to
uphold when he took his oath.
"xxx xxx xxx
"In his Memorandum, respondent Judge states that he has been
previously charged with Immorality by complainant Cynthia
Marquez but she herself had it dismissed. Also, Lourdes Muoz
Garcia had already been charged with immorality before the Civil
Service Commission in 1998 but the charges were dismissed in
1999. Citing the case of Felicisimo San Luis, et. al. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-80160, June 26, 1989, respondent Judge now
claims that the dismissal of the first case against him operated as a
bar to this instant case because of res judicata and that he would be
twice in jeopardy of being convicted of the same offense.
"The case cited by respondent Judge finds no application to his
case. The fact that the previous charges were dismissed against
both him and Lourdes Garcia should not be taken to mean that they
have been exonerated entirely. Immorality is a continuing offense
and the first charge should have at least warned him to mend his
ways. But he failed to do so and now that there is another charge
he labels it an act of persecution. Further, the complainants and
their witnesses testified on acts of immorality of respondent Judge
from 1991 until this present charge was filed in 1998. Angelito
Dispo even went to the extent of stating that at the time he testified
in this case on September 14, 1999, respondent Judge and Lourdes
Muoz Garcia were living together under one roof in Barangay
Gabon, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
"Thus, granting that there was a previous charge of immorality in
1994 but was dismissed in 1995, this dismissal would only operate
to absolve him of immoral acts until 1995. As this case was filed in
1998, it shows that despite the dismissal in 1995, respondent Judge
continued his illicit relations with Lourdes Muoz Garcia for
which he faces this present charge of Immorality.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent Judge has shown that he is not worthy to don the robe
of justice much less dispense justice when he himself transgresses
the law which he has sworn to uphold. His blanket denial of the
charges has not served to cause a dent in the positive evidence
against him, neither has it portrayed him an innocent victim of
malicious persecution, as he would want the Investigating Justice
to believe.
"As the evidence presented definitely shows a lack of
circumspection and delicadeza on the part of the respondent judge
in displaying before the public his immoral relationship, the
extreme penalty of dismissal is believed to be in order.
"Immorality is a very serious charge that cannot be penalized by a
mere fine or even suspension, as these light penalties would be
tantamount to a tacit approval of the immoral act.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Respondent Judge has failed to live up to these exacting
magnitude of how a judge should behave. His disregard for
common decency and morality has made him unfit to discharge his
present position "and thus his dismissal is in order. His retirement
benefits should likewise be forfeited but his wife who has never
appeared on the scene should now be his saving grace against such
forfeiture.
"Indeed it is the wife of Judge Llamas who is the aggrieved party
in the infidelity of her husband but she was not the one who
initiated this complaint nor did she participate in its prosecution.
This factor should be considered in respondent Judges favor and
therefore he should be spared the forfeiture of his earned
benefits."
4
[emphasis supplied]
17

Justice Brawner thus recommended that respondent Judge be dismissed
from service but without forfeiture of his earned benefits.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required. We find no room to accommodate doubts
on Justice Brawners findings of facts, which we find to be a result of a
meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the
complainants and the respondent as well as their respective witnesses. Thus,
we adopt Justice Brawners recommendation of dismissal.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
5
He should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary,
6
and avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
7
His personal behavior, not only while in the
performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond
reproach, for he is, as he so aptly is perceived to be, the visible
personification of law and of justice.
8

Regrettably, respondent Judge failed to live up to these standards. He
brazenly flouted judicial ethics and betrayed judicial standards by using his
court to indulge his drinking, singing and dancing habits to the detriment of
the other courts within the building who were disturbed by all the noise
coming from his courtroom"; and, especially, by maintaining an illicit
relationship with Lourdes Muoz Garcia, a married woman. A judge suffers
from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality in public office
when he labors under the delusion that he can be a judge and at the same
time have a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community.
9

A judge traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price
one has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond
which he may not freely venture.
10
No position is more demanding as
regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on
the Bench.
11
Thus, a judge ought to live up to the strictest standard of
honesty, integrity and uprightness. Certainly, keeping a mistress is not an
act one would expect of a judge who is expected to posses the highest
standard of morality and decency.
12

Respondent Judge shamelessly mocked the dignity of his office and tainted
the image of the entire judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation
to keep it at all time unsullied and worthy of the peoples trust. Respondent
Judge has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe and the place of
honor reserved for the guardian of justice in a civilized community. On this
occasion, therefore, the Court metes upon respondent Judge the severest of
administrative penalties. He is hereby stripped of his judicial robe.
However, we are unable to agree with the reservation of Justice Brawner on
the forfeiture of earned benefits due respondent Judge based on the fact that
respondent Judges wife was not the one who initiated this complaint nor
did she participate in its prosecution. The non-participation or non-
appearance of the wife in the administrative proceedings for immorality is
not a factor in the imposition of penalty. Neither should it be beneficial to
respondent Judge.
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on
October 1, 2001, gross misconduct and immorality are classified as serious
charges, each of which carry with it a penalty of either (a) dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Carina Agarao vs. Judge Jose J. Parentela, Jr.,
13
we dismissed
respondent judge on ground of immorality and we ordered the forfeiture of
one-half of all the retirement benefits of respondent Judge, excluding the
monthly equivalent of his accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Victor T. Llamas, Jr. guilty of the
charge of immorality, he is herebyDISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of 50% of all his retirement benefits excluding any earned leave
credits; and, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of
the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
18

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional
Trial Court, Antique, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY.
NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
HAS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY
JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES TO OFFICIAL
DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has
no jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs.
Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and
supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part
of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that
would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally
liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE
RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY
SUPREME COURT; REASON. However, We agree with petitioner that
in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted
by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY
OMBUDSMAN REGARDING COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR
OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the Ombudsman
should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status
of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make
such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge
or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this
Court for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME
COURT AND ITS PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman cannot
compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its
records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the
foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the
question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this
Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these cases in
his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the
present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
D E C I S I O N
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or restraining order is whether the Office of the
Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme
Court.
19

Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of
the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991
denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's
Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated
February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have
been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have
been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth
and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5)
civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July
and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September
1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this
Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said
case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties,
which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision
over all inferior courts.
The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There
is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses
committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies
his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for
serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code
for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative
action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs
counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory
powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but
likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court
has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to
submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as
suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.
Administratively. the question before Us is this: should a judge, having
been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him,
report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet
been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the
Ombudsman resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the
resolution of said question?
20

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee
arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action
on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination
whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman
is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty.
Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate
action.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 219 September 29, 1962
CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO
P. PATALINGHUG, respondents.


LABRADOR, J .:
This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents
with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing
against a brother lawyer, and praying that respondents be dealt with
accordingly.
The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May,
1952, petitioner was retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her
case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled
"Testate Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner had
contemplated the closing of the said administration proceedings and
prepared two pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare Nieves
Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir and order the delivery to her of the
residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of final
accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to countersign these two pleadings
and instead advised petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner
found in the records of said proceedings that respondent Atty. Fortunato
Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a written appearance as the new
counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner
voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On
February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue,
entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955.
Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were
unethical and improper for the reason that they had nursed the desire to
replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the administratrix and,
taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the
final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to
petitioner's decision to close the administration proceedings; that before
their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to their law office and
there made her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of Power of
Attorney" and sent the same by mail to several corporations and
establishments where the Estate of Macario Barrera is owner of certificates
of stocks and which documents purported to disauthorize the petitioner
from further collecting and receiving the dividends of the estate from said
corporations, when in fact and in truth the respondents fully knew that no
power of attorney or authority was given to the petitioner by his client, the
respondents motive being to embarrass petitioner to the officials, lawyers
and employees of said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and
no longer trusted by his client all with the purpose of straining the
relationship of the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera;
and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to
petitioner.
In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his
appearance on January 11, 1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de
Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, the herein petitioner, and
had in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11, 1955, entitled
"Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty.
Casiano Laput", which she herself had filed with the court.1awphl.nt
21

In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his
appearance on February 7, 1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as
counsel.
After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court
referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Solicitor General recommended the complete
exoneration of respondents.
It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent
Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow
administratrix had already filed with the court a pleading discharging the
petitioner Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a
copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug but that
of the said widow. It appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera dismissed
petitioner as her lawyer was that she did not trust him any longer, for one
time she found out that some dividend checks which should have been sent
to her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being
cheated by petitioner. Moreover, she found that withdrawals from the
Philippine National Bank and Bank of the Philippine Islands have been
made by petitioner without her prior authority.
We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato
Patalinghug as counsel for the widow; much less can we consider it as an
actual grabbing of a case from petitioner. The evidence as found by the
Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were
contracted by the widow, a written contract having been made as to the
amount to be given him for his professional services.
Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs.
Barrera after Atty. Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his
(petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of
his attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of
respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. This should estop
petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug
was unprofessional.
Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of
unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance, dated
February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year, after Mrs. Barrera had
dispensed with petitioner's professional services on January 11, 1955, and
after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance on February 5,
1955.
With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of
power of attorney as complained of by petitioner, the Solicitor General
found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended
to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the
administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was hurt by the issuance of
these documents, and felt that he had been pictured as a dishonest lawyer;
for he filed a case before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug
and the widow for libel and falsification. It was shown, however, that the
case was dismissed.
No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these
are hereby dismissed and the case closed.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG,
petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE
V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC.,intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA
CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION

SARMIENTO, J .:
22

The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J.
Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda
Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other
things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language."
1
On March 2,
1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration,
reproduced as follows:
. . .
This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case
reads more like a Brief for Ayala ...
2

... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own
integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own
campaign against graft and corruption undeniably
pervading the judiciary ...
3

...
The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and
admitted facts not put in issue, such as those summarily
ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts exerted to
justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and
unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom, are
unparalleled in the history of this Court ...
4

...
... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally
constructed for the exclusive benefit of the residents of
Bel- Air Village, or rule that respondent Court's
admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel
himself would like to do but did not even contend, is a
manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to Ayala
and puts to serious question its integrity on that account.
5

...
[i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious
reflection on the Court's competence and integrity and
exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It is a
blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and
uncontroverted factual findings of the trial court fully
supported by the records and the true significance of those
facts which both the respondent court and this Court did
not bother to read and consequently did not consider and
discuss, least of all in the manner it did with respect to
those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable to
Ayala.
6

To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application
for special membership in BAVA which clearly state that
such membership is necessary because it is a new
development in their relationship with respect to its
intention to give its commercial lot buyers an equal right
to the use of Jupiter Street without giving any reason
therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance ...
7

...
... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness
above suspicion? Will the current campaign of this Court
against graft and corruption in the judiciary be enhanced
by such broad discretionary power of courts?
8

disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court
might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are
not only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault upon the
Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to
the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences,
much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former
judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one
23

party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the
other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done
an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the
stability of the administration of justice in general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound
by the findings of the trial court (in which his clients
prevailed).lwph1.t But if we did not agree with the findings of the
court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because,
precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior
court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to
insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad
hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor
and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession."
9

We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the
interests of his clients. As we held inLaureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to
his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success
is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics."
10
And while a lawyer must
advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he
can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and
innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but
to ... challenge the thinking in the Decision,
11
comes as an eleventh-hour
effort to cleanse what is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation.
Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask for
reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should not "'think that
they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words' ".
12
As we
indicated (see Decision denying the motions for reconsideration in G.R.
Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No.
60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new arguments
to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with inflammatory
language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with
and accept with grace criticisms of my decisions".
13
Apparently, he does
not practice what he preaches. Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to
comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and
dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for
which he deserves this Court's rebuke.
In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in
contempt, specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to
disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of
the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as
the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as follows:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01...
Rule 11.02...
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts.
Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05...
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional
misconduct or malpractice.
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months effective from receipt hereof, and (2)
24

ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a
copy of this Resolution be entered in his record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.
March 3, 1923
I n resuspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,
Juan Sumulong for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
MALCOLM, J .:
Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First
Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year, the case has been elevated to
this court as provided by law, for full investigation of the facts involved,
and for the rendition of the appropriate order.
The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing
at Cebu, Cebu. On March 20, 1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor
Gracia Cabrera. As such guardian, he came into possession of certain
property, including twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten
shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian
of the minor, he borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine
National bank. Shortly thereafter, to guarantee the loan, Pelaez, without the
knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, deposited with
the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the shares of stock
corresponding to the guardianship. On April 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a
written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National
Bank, pledging, without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
the shares of stock in question, to guarantee the payment of the loan above
referred to.
These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this
court on behalf of the respondent, which caused the judge of First Instance
to suspend him from the legal profession. To quote counsel for the
respondent, "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty
consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee the
payment of his personal debt."
Two questions present themselves for the resolution. The first question is
this: Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a
lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second
questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-
professional misconduct?
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme
Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. It will be noticed that our
statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the
revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that
these shall constitute the only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may
not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons.
It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of
disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the
court in this respect. Even where the Legislature has specified the grounds
for disbarment, the inherent power of the court over its officer is not
restricted.
The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the statute is so
phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a
lawyer.
Passing now to the second point as a general rule, a court will not
assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged
to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule
25

with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the
attorney has shown, through misconduct outside of his professional
dealings, a want of such professional honesty as render him unworthy of
public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal
business of others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is
because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court
requires for such admission the possession of good moral character.
The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel.
vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill., 474). Here it was held, by a divided court,
that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his
professional advice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a
sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the
trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the
sale to his own use, the relation of client and attorney not being created by
such trust, his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the
position of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of
him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but
the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. The Illinois
court, however, admits that although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-
law will not be disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity,
but as an individual, there are cases forming an exception where his
misconduct in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to
require his disbarment.
The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906],
73 Kan., 743). In the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Johnston, it was
said:
It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not
fall within the cause for disbarment named in the statute. As will
be observed, the statute does not provide that the only cause for
which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are
those specified in it, nor does it undertake to limit the common-law
power of the courts to protect themselves and the public by
excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the
law. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed
sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license.
(Gen. Stat., 1901, sec. 398.) In the early case ofPeyton's
Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that this statute is not an
enabling act, but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and
unworthy members of the profession is inherent; that "it is a
necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; that it
may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all
proper cases, unless positively prohibited by statute; and that it
may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be
disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.' If there is
authority in the Legislature to restrict the discretion of the courts as
to what shall constitute causes for disbarment, or to limit the
inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial,
it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is
clearly expressed. It is generally held that the enumeration of the
grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of the court, but that attorneys may
be removed for common-law causes when the exercise of the
privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due
administration of justice . . . .
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney, uniformly
require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character.
If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be
equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession,
but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of
Kansas are sound.
The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual
maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the
ward. The bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the
estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward, and
faithfully to discharge his trust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not
escaped our attention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez, asking the court
26

to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he begins his petition in this
manner: "El abogado que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc."
(The undersigned attorney, appointed testamentary guardian, etc.) which
indicates that petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this
particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer.
Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been
suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. "It forms," he says, "the
only blot upon the escutcheon." We feel, however, that the trial court has
been extremely considerate of the respondent, and that were we sitting in
first instance, we would probably incline to a more severe sentence.
Judgment affirmed. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Avancea, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 3216 March 16, 1992
DOMINGA VELASCO ORDONIO, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPHINE PALOGAN EDUARTE, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine
Palogan-Eduarte originally filed with this Court on April 18, 1988. On
August 10, 1989, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, to which the case was referred for investigation,
submitted a report confirming in substance the charge of violation of Art.
1491 of the Civil Code and part of the Oath of Office of a lawyer and
recommending the suspension of herein respondent.
The evidence discloses that on July 18, 1983, Antonia Ulibari filed with the
RTC, Branch XXII, Cabagan, Isabela, Civil Case No. 391 for annulment of
a document (known as Affidavit of Adjudication of the Estate of Felicisimo
Velasco and Quitclaim Thereof) against her children. The case was handled
by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his
appointment as RTC judge on October 26, 1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine
Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision in Civil Case
No. 391 was rendered in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga
Velasco-Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in
the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal. On June 13, 1987,
while Civil Case No. 391 was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals,
Antonia Ulibari conveyed some parcels of her land to her children in the
form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by herein respondent.
Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also conveyed 20 hectares
of land to herein respondent and her husband as their Attorney's fees for
legal services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of
absolute sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the name of
Antonia Ulibari.
On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for
disbarment against herein respondent on the basis of an affidavit executed
by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant never
conveyed the subject parcel of land to respondent as her attorney's fees and
that the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children were not
known to her (and that she received no consideration therefor).
On August 10, 1989, the Investigation Commissioner submitted a report
finding the charges to be true and recommending a one-year suspension of
the respondent from the practice of law.
The first issue to be resolved is whether Antonia Ulibari was defrauded into
signing the Deed of Conveyance transferring to her lawyer (herein
respondent) the subject parcel of land containing 298,420 square meters as
the latter's attorney's fees. It is clear from Antonia Ulibari's affidavit and
deposition that she never conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorney's
fees.
Even granting for the sake argument that Antonia Ulibari knowingly and
voluntarily conveyed the subject property in favor of the respondent and her
husband, the respondent, in causing the execution of the Deed of
Conveyance during the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the
27

said property, has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits
lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights which may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession."
In the case at bar, the property (which includes the more than 20 hectares of
land allegedly conveyed to the respondent) was already in actual litigation
first in the lower court and then in the Court of Appeals. Whether the deed
of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by financial
necessity or of the lawyers is of no moment (In re: Atty. Melchor E. Ruste,
70 Phil. 243). "In either case, an attorney occupies a vantage position to
press upon or dictate his terms to a harrased client, in breach of the rule so
amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist
between attorney and client, and of the rights of both." The act constitutes
malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased the property in litigation.
(Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775; In re: Calderon, 7 Phil. 427). We
agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition
applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was
merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time
when the property is still the subject of a pending case.
For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing
circumstances, respondent has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that
"the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the
litigation which he is conducting."
The last issue to be resolved is whether respondent violated any law in
preparing and notarizing the deeds of absolute sale in making it appear that
there were considerations therefor, when in truth there were none so
received by the seller. In her answer, respondent admitted that Antonia
Ulibari did not actually sell the parcels of land to her children for the
considerations stated in the deeds of sale and that she (respondent) "utilized
the form of deed of sale as the most convenient and appropriate document
to effect the transfer of the parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari's children in
accordance with her wish that said parcels of land be given to them.
In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as a
lawyer that she shall not do any falsehood. Not only that. In preparing the
documents which do not reflect the true transaction, respondent has likewise
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall be mislead
or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
ACCORDINGLY, for having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
respondent is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, and, for having stated falsehoods in the four (4)
deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in violation of the
lawyer's oath and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent is also ordered suspended from the practice or law for a period
of another six (6) months, resulting in a total period on one year, effective
from the date this judgment becomes final.
SUSPENSION ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981,
complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member
of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of
contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the
complaint.
1
Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a
28

copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one
place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged
place of employment or residence.
2
On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3)
years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted
respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's
Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan
Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer
to the complaint against him" in the instant
case.
3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to
Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred
that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June
1977 upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently
learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla
sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior
marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy
had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla
and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of
Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was
null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at
Dasol, Pangasinan.
4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of
Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of respondent
Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical
resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had
given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of
Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid
risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech
position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay
for the medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension
Order and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the
complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of
the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice
to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and
presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear.
6
The
Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August
1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent
once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally
offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another
hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence
with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be
deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October
1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have
waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for
resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective
memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent
Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its
"Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized the
testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and
testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met
for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school
classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986,
p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while
respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her
marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship
(ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and respondent] moved to
Manila were they respectively pursued their education,
respondent as a law student at the Lyceum University
(tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued
courting her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11);
she decided nothing would come of it since she was
married but he [respondent] explained to her that their
marriage was void ab initiosince she and her first husband
were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his
explanation and having secured favorable advice from her
mother and
29

ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid,
12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her
[complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single"
as her status explaining that since her marriage was
void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare
it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge
Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14,
1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason
Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit
B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state
up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the
allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid, pp.
19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his
disappearance until she found out later that respondent
married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn,
July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for
abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City
(ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch
II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No.
816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise
filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, where a prima faciecase was found to exist
(Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally,
complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for
being moot and academic when respondent was
considered automatically separated from the service for
having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29).
7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and
respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before Judge
Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May
1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol,
Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior
marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been
initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had
believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant Dorothy
Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration
of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a
spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted
complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith
of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same
argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her
prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab
initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she
was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds
that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract
a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. 8Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely,
that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result
will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first
marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is
shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the complainant that
her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was
still legally single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent
had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while
being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's
parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without
support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a
hospital.
30

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by
his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to remain as a
member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution.
9

In Pomperada v. Jochico,
10
the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed
to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys,
said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of
moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or
a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does
not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent
had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects (Article 216,
Civil Code).
11

In Bolivar v. Simbol,
12
the Court found the respondent there guilty of
"grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant, living
on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . .
." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a
member of the Bar."
13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in
inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage with
him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him
and supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the
safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina
Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was
subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for
disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to
the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre
and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this
decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre
in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized
to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2361 February 9, 1989
LEONILA J. LICUANAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by Leonila J.
Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator on 5 February 1982
against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics,
alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed
against her tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by respondent
on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to
her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from
actual receipt that respondent turned over his collections to complainant
after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment
and had demanded the same.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received the
payment of rentals from complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the
complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for
the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals.
31

We forwarded the case to the Office of the Solicitor General, for
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were conducted and the
parties presented their respective evidence.
After investigation, the Solicitor General submitted the following Findings
and Recommendation:
Findings:
The issue to be resolved is whether there was
unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in
accounting for the funds collected by him for his former
client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional
conduct respondent should be disciplined.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any
man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself
with all good fidelity to his clients. Under paragraph 11 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report
promptly the money of client that has come to his
possession and should not commingle it with his private
property or use it for his personal purpose without his
client's consent viz:
Money of the client or other trust
property coming into the possession of
the lawyer should be reported promptly,
and except with the client's know and
consent should not be commingled with
his private or be used by him.
And paragraph 32 of the Canons of Legal Ethics further
requires a lawyer to maintain a reputation for honesty and
fidelity to private trust:
... But above all, a lawyer will find his
highest honor in a deserved reputation
for fidelity to private trust and to public
duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic
and loyal citizen.
In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath
of office. It is undisputed that the relation of attorney and
client existed between Licuanan and Melo at the time the
incident in question took place. The records disclose that
on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's attorney,
obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Aida
Pineda whereby the latter was directed by the City Court
of Manila to pay Licuanan all her monthly rentals from
October, 1978 and succeeding months thereafter.
When several months had elapsed without them hearing a
word from Pineda, respondent decided to send her a letter
on February 4, 1980, demanding that she pay the monthly
rental of her apartment otherwise he will be constrained to
take the necessary legal action against her to protect the
interest of his client (Exhibit "A", p. 8, record). On
February 11, 1980, Pineda yielded to the demand of Melo.
She went to respondent's office and paid him P3,060.00
for which respondent gave her a receipt for the said
amount representing her rental payments for October,
1978 to February, 1980 at the rate of P180.00 per month
(Exh. "B", p. 9, Ibid.) At the end of March 31,1980,
Pineda again went back to respondent and paid the rentals
of her apartment for the months of March and April, 1980
in the sum of P360.00 (Exh. "C" p. 10, Ibid.). Not only
that, respondent again received from Pineda on June 30,
1980 rental payments covering the months of May, June
and July, 1980 in the total sum of P540.00 (Exh. "D" p.
11, Ibid.). And, on September 29, 1980, he received and
issued Pineda a receipt for P540.00 covering rental
payments for the months of August, September and
October, 1980. (Exh. "E", Ibid.). After four months had
elapsed, or on January 23, 1981, he collected again from
Pineda the total sum of P720.00 covering the months of
October, November, December, 1980 and January 1981
(Exh. "F", p. 12, Ibid.).
32

During the entire twelve-month period that respondent
had been receiving the said rental payments of Pineda, he
did not bother to inform or report to complainant about
the said payments and instead unnecessarily retained the
money. He allowed the money to accumulate for a year
and kept complainant in the dark as to the progress of the
case. He did not even attempt to tell her about the money
that had come into his possession notwithstanding the fact
that complainant used to call him and inquire regarding
the case (pp. 14-15, tsn., Sept. 10, 1985).
It was only when Atty. Ponciano B. Jacinto, the new
counsel retained by complainant, wrote respondent a letter
on May 4, 1981, advising him to surrender the money to
complainant that he accounted for it (Exh. "H", p. 15,
Ibid.). But this was rather late because as early as April
27, 1981, complainant, not knowing that respondent had
been receiving the rental payments of Pineda, instituted
an administrative case against her (Aida Pineda) before
the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing
her of "moral turpitude" arising from her alleged failure to
pay the rent of her apartment as ordered by the City Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. 037276 and claiming that she
has ignored and refused to pay her just obligation (Exh.
"G", p. 14, Ibid.).
This led therefore Pineda to bring an action against her
(Licuanan) for damages before the then Court of First
Instance of Manila, for she allegedly suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
social humiliation arising from the unfounded
administrative case Licuanan filed against her (Aida
Pineda), since as borne out by the records, she had been
paying her obligation religiously to the lawyer of
Licuanan, herein respondent (pp. 48-52, record). Clearly,
this unfortunate incident would not have happened had
respondent been only true to his oath as a lawyer, i.e., to
be honest and candid towards his client.
Thus, we find it hard to believe respondent's defense that
he kept the money of complainant for a year merely
because he wanted to surprise her with his success in
collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On the
contrary, it is very much discernible that he did not
surrender immediately the money to complainant because
he was using it for his own benefit. Common sense
dictates that by unnecessarily withholding the money of
complainant for such length of time, respondent deprived
her of the use of the same. It is therefore too credulous to
believe his explanation, which is flimsy and incredible
Respondent's actuation casts doubt on his honesty and
integrity. He must know that the "highly fiduciary" and
"confidential relation" of attorney and client requires that
the attorney should promptly account for all funds and
property received or held by him for the client's benefit,
and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct,
as succinctly held by the Honorable Supreme Court in the
case of Fermina Legaspi Daroy, et al., vs. Atty. Ramon
Chaves Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65
SCRA 304, to wit:
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges
himself not to delay any man for money
or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. He is obligated to report
promptly the money of his clients that
has come into his possession. He should
not commingle it with his private
property or use it for his personal
purposes without his client's consent.
He should maintain a reputation for
honesty and fidelity to private trust
(Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal
Ethics).
Money collected by a lawyer in
pursuance of a judgment in favor of his
clients is held in trust and must be
33

immediately turned over to them (Aya
vs. Bigonia, 57 Phil. 8, 11).
xxx xxx xxx
A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in his office as attorney or for any
violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).
The relation between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential in character, requiring a high degree of
fidelity and good faith (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In view of that
special relationship, 'lawyers are bound to promptly
account for money or property received by them on behalf
of their clients and failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien
for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients
does not relieve him from the duty of promptly
accounting for the funds received. (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, we are convinced that respondent is guilty of
breach of trust reposed in him by his client. Not only has
he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has
besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In
re Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627;
Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29,
1965, 15 SCRA 131). By his deceitful conduct, he placed
his client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a
damage suit; thus, instead of being a help to his client, he
became the cause of her misery. He, therefore, deserves a
severe punishment for it. (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8,
11; In re Bamberger, April 17, 1924, 49 Phil. 962; Daroy,
et al., vs. Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi, supra.)
Clearly, respondent is guilty of professional misconduct
in the discharge of his duty as a lawyer.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, we respectfully recommend that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of not less than one (1) year, and that he be
strongly admonished to strictly and faithfully observe his
duties to his clients. (pp. 78-85, Rollo)
We find the foregoing findings well considered and adopt the same but
differ with the recommendation.
The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a
one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his
client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding
information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a breach
of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident
transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics particularly:
11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for
his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage
of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client of other
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly, and
should not under any circumstance be commingled with
his own or be used by him. *
Indeed, by his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the trust
reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence
and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the
practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was compelled to file a
groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of rentals thereby
exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit filed by
said tenant against her By force of circumstances, complainant was further
compelled to engage the services of another counsel in order to recover the
amount rightfully due her but which respondent had unjustifiedly withheld
from her.
34

Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we are constrained to
find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He
has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his
oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an
honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed
in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest
punishment.
WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the high
traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve
undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to
DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all Courts of the country and
spread on the personal record of respondent Atty. Manuel L. Melo.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5713. June 10, 2002.]

(Adm. Case No. 99-634)

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, v. Atty. ALBERTO C.
MAGULTA, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N


PANGANIBAN, J .:


After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both
cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client
relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
The Case


Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other
disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by Dominador P.
Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a
Sworn Statement alleging the following:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
x x x


"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, sometime in September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio,
Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St.,
Davao City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and
possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract;

"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for
me the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services I have
accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of
the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint,
which he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached as Annex A, the
filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on
January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that
I needed the case filed immediately;

"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the
complaint had already been filed in court, and that I should receive notice of
its progress;

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or
from Atty. Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in my case, such that
I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to
wait;

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait
35

[every time] I asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25,
1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for
my satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at
Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of
the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while
he personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon,
within the hour, he came back and told me that the Clerk of Court was
absent on that day;

"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided
to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magultas
complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that
there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my
behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the following day; May 28, 1999,
where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused
by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit
that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for
the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999,
in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which
are attached as Annexes D and E;

"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I
wish to complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation,
dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"

x x x. 1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, 2 respondent filed his Answer 3 vehemently
denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and
baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of
the formers law partners. After their meeting, complainant requested him
to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. a service for
which the former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business
partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the latter requested that
another demand letter this time addressed to the former be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer,
complainant asked the process server of the formers law office to deliver
the letter to the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour
meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for the purpose of
compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise
agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainants wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by
complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on
withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However, when no
settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for
breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by
complainant until this time, told the latter about his acceptance and legal
fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill
claim was almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment
basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to
respondents secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the
Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately
called the attention of complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay
the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be filed.
Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the
acceptance fee, and that he should give the filing fee later.

Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the
meantime the filing of the complaint because the former might be paid by
36

another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had
offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The
negotiations went on for two months, but the parties never arrived at any
agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his
interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more of the
acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be
filed first before payment of respondents acceptance and legal fees. When
respondent refused, complainant demanded the return of the P25,000. The
lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because their
law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office
personnel were not reporting regularly. Respondents checks were accepted
and encashed by complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived
complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the undesirable
events, it was he.

The IBPs Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) opined as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the
Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainants deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was
to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his
client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation
due to his misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest
conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession: The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited
by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the
gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year." 4
The Courts Ruling


We agree with the Commissions recommendation.

Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Misappropriation of Clients Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a)
his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his
appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the
Regwill complaint; hence, the formers failure to file the complaint in court.
Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his
office on January 4, 1999 was for attorneys fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in
the prosecution or the defense of the clients cause. They who perform that
duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client,
but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help
maintain the respect of the community for the legal profession. 5 Members
of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the
profession. 6

Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship
existed between him and complainant, because the latter never paid him for
services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents
as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very
first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice regarding the
formers business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the
case for which his service had been sought.

37

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a
lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established. 7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close
personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the formers fees. 8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre,
the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare
and had actually prepared at the soonest possible time, in order to protect
the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up
the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. 9 They owe entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the
defense of the clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and
abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by
the rules of law legally applied. 10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt
issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The
IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office
personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt
erroneously indicating payment for something else. Moreover, upon
discovering the "mistake" if indeed it was one respondent should have
immediately taken steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in
calling complainants attention to the matter and should have issued another
receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law
is a profession and not a business. 11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to
be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a
professional but a secondary consideration. 13 Duty to public service and to
the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which emolument is a
byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much
money. 14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant as
evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent the latter
also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to them in their professional capacity. 15 Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients
funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their
possession; that they may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the
satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations
do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the moneys they
received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In
any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest
within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege
to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but
also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18 Respondent fell short of
this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to
him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact
that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach
of duty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar
respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a
penalty. 19
38


WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules
16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts
as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a
copy in respondents file.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., abroad, on official leave.