CASE DIGEST:

DIMAPORO VS MITRA

Dimaporo v. Mitra
FACTS:
Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections.
Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House
excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo
lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress.
Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress.
Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in
the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.
Grounds may be termed to be shortened:
1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality there
of.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior
3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest
4. Voluntary renunciation of office
ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government position

HELD: No.
In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it was
provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity.
If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the
one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon
him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned.
The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people
and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.
QUINTO VS COMELEC
QUINTO vs. COMELEC, 1 DECEMBER 2009
Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369, amending the previous act.

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,4 the
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.-

a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on regular days, from November
20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which shall be until midnight.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections,5 filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.

ISSUES:

1. Do petitioners have locus standi?
2. Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal protection clause?

HELD:

1. The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling state interest
involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and
hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent
and irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's
manpowerfurther dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so
as to expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues.

The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged
measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials.

The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the petitioners and the COMELEC, the
body charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner
that they would engage in the very acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provisionthey would file their CoCs
and run in the 2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the filing of the
CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to petitioners' candidacy.

2. It is noteworthy to point out that the right to run for public office touches on two fundamental freedoms, those of
expression and of association.

Here, petitioners' interest in running for public office, an interest protected by Sections 4 and 8 of Article III of the
Constitution, is breached by the proviso in Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates
against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions
and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it is not germane to the purpose of the
law. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad. First, the provision pertains to all civil
servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.

PUNDAODAYA VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections. Pundaodaya filed
a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification. Pundaodaya claimed that
Noble is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and disqualified Noble from
running as mayor.

Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime, he garnered the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed the winning candidate. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation. The COMELEC En
Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position. Pundaodaya filed
the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: Should residence and domicile be construed as referring to dwelling? Did Noble effectively change his domicile?

Held:
The Court found that Noble failed to convince that he successfully effected a change of domicile. To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only
such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode.

In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

AQUINO VS COMELEC
The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1
st
) and Second Legislative Districts (2
nd
) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such
Reapportionment.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has
divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be
composed of 176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of
250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well
by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance
with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via
the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
RULING:
It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was explained under
the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a
population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation
of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during
the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.
With regards to the dissenting opinions, it was stated by Justice Carpio that R.A. 9716 was unconstitutional for being utterly
repugnant to the clear and precise standards prescribed in Section 5, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
On the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio-Morlaes expressed dissent and concurred with the ponencias
discussion on the preocedural issue.
MARIANO VS COMELEC
Facts:
Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati , as unconstitutional.
Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation
of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the return of every
census. Also, the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as
of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

Held:
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati s
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new
city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable
situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.

AQUINO VS COMELEC
FACTS

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned
district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later
issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on
Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.


ISSUE

Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.


HELD

The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquinos
certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquinos connection to the Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and
the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.