APUSH

Chapter6TheConstitution

Name:________________________________Group:________________Date:9/23/13

WastheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesWrittentoProtectthe
EconomicInterests oftheUpper Classes?
1

YES:HowardZinn,fromAPeople'sHistoryoftheUnitedStates(HarperCollins, 1999)

NO: Gordon S.Wood, from "Democracy and the Constitution," inRobertA.Goldwinand

WilliamA.Schambra,eds.,HowDemocraticistheConstitution?(American Enterprise Institute
forPublicPolicyResearch, 1980)

Learning Outcomes

Afterreadingthisissueyou shouldbeableto:

Gain an understandingof the political,philosophical, andsocial differences

between the Federalists(Cosmopolitans)andtheAntiFederalists(Localists).
Gainanunderstanding ofeconomicsasaforceinhistoryandwhether or not
economics was the primary motivating forcein writing the Constitution.

ISSUE SUMMARY

YES: According to radical historian Howard Zinn, the FoundingFatherswereanelite

groupof northern moneyinterestsandsouthern slaveholderswhoused Shays'Rebellion
inMassachusetts asapretext tocreateastrongcentral government, which protected
theproperty rights of the rich totheexclusion of slaves, Indians, andnonproperty
holding whites.

NO: Professor of history Gordon S.Wood views the struggle foranew constitution in
17871788asa social conflict betweenupperclass Federalists whodesiredastronger
centralgovernment andthe "humbler"AntiFederalists who controlled the state
assemblies.

1
Madaras,LarryandSoRelle,James.TakingSides:ClashingViewsinUnitedStatesHistory,Volume1:TheColonialPeriodto
Reconstruction.15thed.Vol.1.McGrawHillHigherEducation.Print

TheUnitedStatespossessestheoldestwrittenconstitutionofanymajorpower.The 55 men who

attended the Philadelphia Convention of 1787could scarcelyhave dreamed that 225 years later the
nation would venerate them as the most"enlightened statesmen"of their time.James Madison, the
principal architect ofthe document,may have argued that the Founding Fathers had created asystem
thatmight "decideforeverthefateof Republican Government whichwewishtolastforages,"but
MadisonalsotoldThomasJeffersoninOctober1787thathedidnot think thedocumentwouldbe
adopted, andif itwas, itwould notwork.
The enlightenedstatesmenview ofthe FoundingFathers, presentedbynineteenthcentury
historians likeJohn Fiske, became the accepted interpretation among the general public until the
ProgressiveEra. In 1913, ColumbiaUniversityprofessor CharlesA.Beard'sAnEconomicInterpretation ofthe
ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates(FreePress,1913,1986)causedastormofcontroversybecause it
questioned the motivations of the Founding Fathers. The architectsofthe Constitution supportedthe
creationofa stronger central government,arguedBeard, notfor patriotic reasonsbutbecausethey
wantedto protecttheir own economicinterests.
Beard'sresearchmethodwasfairlysimple.Drawinguponacollectionofold,previously
unexamined treasuryrecordsintheNationalArchives, hediscoveredthatanumber ofdelegates
tothePhiladelphia Conventionand,later,to the state ratifyingconventionsheldsubstantial
amounts ofcontinentalsecuritiesthatwould sharplyincreaseinvalueifastrongnational
governmentwere established. In addition to attributing economic motives to the Founding
Fathers,BeardincludedaMarxistclassconflictinterpretationinhisbook.Thosewhosupportedthe
Constitution, hesaid,represented "personaltyinterestswhich had been adversely affected under
the Articles of Confederation:money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and shipping."
Thosewhoopposed ratification of theConstitutionwerethesmallfarmersanddebtors.
Beard's socioeconomic conflict interpretation of thesupporters andopponentsofthe
Constitution raisedanotherissue:HowwastheConstitutionratifiedifthemajorityofAmericans
opposedit?Beard'sanswerwasthatmostAmericans could notvotebecause they did not own
property.Therefore, theentire process, from the calling of the Philadelphia Convention to the
stateratifying conventions, wasnonrepresentative andnondemocratic.

AnEconomicInterpretation wasaproduct ofitstimes.Economists, sociologists, and political scientistshad

been analyzingtheconflicts that resulted fromthe IndustrialRevolution,which the UnitedStates had
beenexperiencingattheturn of thetwentiethcentury.Beard joined agroupof progressive historianswho
were interested in reforming the society inwhich they lived and who alsoshared his discontent with the
oldfashioned institutionalapproach. The roleof the new historians was to rewrite history and discover
the real reason whythings happened. For theprogressive historians, realityconsisted of uncoveringthe
hidden social and economic conflicts within society. In the years betweenthe world wars, the general
public held steadfastly to the "enlightened statesmen" view of the Founding Fathers, but Beard's
thesis became the new orthodoxy in most college texts onAmerican historyandgovernment.

The"enlightenedstatesmen" interpretation reasserted itself during thecold war in the

1950s and 1960s withthe methodological critiques of Beard'swork byRobertE. Brownin
Charles Beardandthe Constitution (PrincetonUniversity Press, 1956)and Forrest McDonald's
manyworks, the earliest ofwhichWethePeople (University of Chicago Press,1958)argued that
numerousinterest groupsinthe states ratified the Constitution fora variety of politicaland
economic reasons

Inthefirstessaythat follows, thelate Howard Zinn offersaneoBeardianinterpretation ofthe

Constitution oftheUnitedStat es fromhis bestsellingtextA People's History of the UnitedStates
(Harper Collins, 1999).An avowedMarxist and radical leftist, Zinn was apolitical activist who served

in abombing squadron in the Army Air Corps in World War II, was an early memberofthe Student
Nonviolent CoordinatingCommittee (SNCC), anda staunchpeace activist opposing theU.S. foreign
policy inSoutheastAsia, CentralAmerica, and the Middle East. He believed that history should be
studied andwritten primarilyfor the purposeof eliminatingAmerica'sviolentpastandmoving it in a
more peaceful, equitable direction. In this context, Zinn arguedthat Shays' Rebellion, anuprising of
western Massachusetts farmers who wereunable to pay their taxes to the Massachusetts'
government,was the catalystthat inspired the men at Philadelphia in1787to draft a new
constitution.

Inthesecondessay,ProfessorGordonS.WoodagreeswiththeclassconflicttheoriesofBeard
andZinnregardingthesupportersandopponentsoftheConstitution,buthestressessocialand
ideological,noteconomic,motivations.WoodarguesthattheFederalistswereupperclassaristocrats
whobelievedthatthenationalgovernment,whichtheycontrolled,providedamorecosmopolitanand
enlightenedoutlookthanthelocalandprovincialinterestsofthe"humblersort"whoranthestate
assemblies.AccordingtoWood,theFederalistsatboththe Philadelphia and the state ratifying
conventions employed "democratic"languagetoarguecleverlyandfalselythatthenewnational
governmentwasasdemocraticastheConfederationgovernmentitwouldreplace

YES:HowardZinn

APeople'sHistoryoftheUnitedStates
2

Tomany Americans overtheyears, the Constitution drawnupin 1787hasseemedaworkof

geniusputtogetherbywise,humanemenwhocreatedalegalframeworkfordemocracyandequality.
Thisviewisstated,abitextravagantly,bythehistorian GeorgeBancroft, writing intheearly
nineteenth century:

The Constitution establishes nothing that interferes with equalityandindividuality.It

knowsnothingofdifferencesbydescent,oropinions,offavoredclasses,orlegalizedreligion,
orthepoliticalpowerofproperty.Itleavestheindividualalongsideoftheindividual....As
theseaismadeupofdrops,Americansocietyiscomposedofseparate,free,andconstantly
movingatoms, everinreciprocal action ...sothat theinstitutions and laws of the
country rise out of the massesofindividualthoughtwhich,likethewatersoftheocean,
arerollingevermore.

Anotherviewofthe Constitutionwas putforwardearly in the twentieth century by the

historian CharlesBeard (arousingangerand indignation,includingadenunciatory editorialin the New
YorkTimes). He wrotein hisbookAnEconomicInterpretationoftheConstitution:

Inasmuch as the primary object of a government, beyond the mererepressionofphysical

violence,isthemakingoftheruleswhichdeterminethepropertyrelationsofmembersof
society,thedominantclasseswhose rights arethustobedetermined mustperforce obtain
fromthegovernment suchrules asareconsonant with the larger interests necessary to the
continuance of their economic processes, or they mustthemselves controltheorgansof
government.

In short, Beard said, the rich must, in their own interest, either controlthegovernment directly
orcontrolthe lawsbywhich government operates.Beard applied thisgeneralideatothe
Constitution, bystudyingthe economicbackgrounds and political ideas of the fiftyfive men who
gathered inPhiladelphia in 1787to draw up the Constitution. He found that a majorityofthem
werelawyersbyprofession, thatmostofthemweremenofwealth,inland,slaves,manufacturing,
orshipping,thathalf of themhad moneyloanedoutatinterest,andthatfortyofthefiftyfiveheld
governmentbonds,accordingtotherecordsoftheTreasuryDepartment.

Thus,BeardfoundthatmostofthemakersoftheConstitutionhadsomedirecteconomicinterestin
establishingastrongfederalgovernment:themanufacturersneededprotectivetariffs;the
moneylenderswantedtostoptheuseof paper money topayoff debts; the land speculators
wanted protection astheyinvadedIndianlands;slaveownersneededfederalsecurityagainstslave
revoltsandrunaways;bondholderswantedagovernmentabletoraisemoneybynationwide
taxation,topayoffthosebonds.
Four groups, Beard noted, were not represented in the ConstitutionalConvention:slaves,
indenturedservants,women,menwithoutproperty.AndsotheConstitutiondidnotreflectthe

2
From A People's History of the United States by Howard Zinn (HarperCollins, 1999). Copyright
1980byHowardZinn.Reprinted bypermission ofHarperCollins Publishers.

interestsofthosegroups.
He wanted to make it clear that he did not think the Constitution waswritten merely to
benefit the Founding Fathers personally,a l t h o u g h onecould not ignore the $150,000 fortune of
Benjamin Franklin, the connectionsof Alexander Hamilton towealthy intereststhrough hisfatherin
law andbrotherinlaw, the great slave plantationsof James Madison,the enormouslandholdings of
George Washington. Rather, it was to benefit the groups theFoundersrepresented, the"economic
intereststhey understood andfeltinconcrete, definite form through their own personal
experience."
Not everyone atthe Philadelphia Convention fitted Beard's scheme.Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusettswas a holderoflanded property,and yethe opposed the ratificationof the
Constitution. Similarly, Luther MartinofMaryland, whose ancestors had obtained large tracts of
land in New Jersey,opposed ratification. But,with afewexceptions, Beard foundastrongconnection
between wealth and support of the Constitution.
By1787therewasnot onlyapositive need forstrongcentralgovernment
toprotect thelargeeconomicinterests, but alsoimmediate fearof rebellion bydiscontented farmers.
Thechief event causing this fearwas anuprising in thesummer of 1786inwestern Massachusetts,
known asShays'Rebellion.
In thewestern towns of Massachusetts there was resentment against thelegislature in
Boston. The new Constitution of1780had raised the propertyqualifications for voting. No one
could hold state office without being quitewealthy. Furthermore,the legislature was refusing to
issue paper money, ashad been done in some other states, like Rhode Island, to make it easier
fordebtridden farmerstopay off their creditors

at courthouses in Worcester and Athol, farmers with gunspreventedthecourtsfrom

meetingtotakeawaytheirproperty,andthemilitiaweretoosympathetictothefarmers,or
toooutnumbered, toact.InConcord,afiftyyearoldveteranoftwowars,JobShattuck,leda
caravanofcarts,wagons,horses, andoxenontothetown green,while amessage wassent
tothejudges:

The voice of the People of this county is such that the court shall notenterthiscourthouse
untilsuchtimeasthePeopleshallhaveredressofthe grievances they labor under atthe
present.

Thegovernor andthepolitical leadersofMassachusetts became alarmed.Samuel Adams, once

looked on as a radical leader in Boston, now insistedpeople act within the law. He said "British
emissaries" were stirring up thefarmers.People inthetown of Greenwich responded:You in
Boston have themoney, and we don't. And didn't you act illegally yourselves in the Revolution?
The insurgents were now being called Regulators. Their emblem was asprigofhemlock.
Theproblem went beyond Massachusetts. In Rhode Island, the debtors hadtakenover the
legislatureand were issuing papermoney.In NewHampshire,severalhundred men, inSeptember of
1786,surrounded the legislature inExeter,asking that taxesbe returned and paper money issued; they
dispersed onlywhenmilitary action was threatened.
Daniel Shays entered the scene in western Massachusetts.A poor farmhand when the
revolution broke out, he joinedthe Continental army, foughtatLexington, Bunker Hill,andSaratoga,
andwaswounded inaction.In 1780,not being paid, he resigned from the army, went home, and
soon found himself in court for nonpayment of debts. He also saw what was happening to
others: asickwoman, unable topay, had herbed taken from under her.
Shaysorganized sevenhundred armedfarmers, mostof themveteransofthewar, andled
themtoSpringfield.Theretheyfoundageneralwithninehundred soldiers and acannon.Shaysasked
thegeneral forpermission toparade,which the general granted, soShays and his men moved
through the square,drumsbanging andfifesblowing.Astheymarched, their ranksgrew.Someofthe
militia joined,and reinforcements began coming in fromthe countryside.The judges postponed
hearings for aday, then adjourned the court.

Confrontationsbetweenfarmersandmilitianowmultiplied.Thewintersnowsbegan to
interferewith thetripsof farmerstothecourthouses.WhenShaysbegan marching athousand
menintoBoston, ablizzard forced themback,andoneofhismenfrozetodeath.
An army came into the field, led by General Benjamin Lincoln, onmoney raised by
Boston merchants. In an artillery duel, three rebels werekilled. One soldier stepped in frontof
his own artillerypiece and lostbotharms. The winter grew worse. The rebels were outnumbered
and on the run.Shays took refuge in Vermont,and his followers began to surrender. Therewere a
few more deaths in battle, and then sporadic, disorganized, desperateacts of violenceagainst
authority: the burningof barns,the slaughterofageneral's horses. One government soldier was
killed in an eerie nighttimecollision of two sleighs

It wasThomasJefferson,inFranceasambassadoratthetimeofShays'Rebellion, who
spokeof suchuprisings ashealthy forsociety.In alettertoa friend he wrote: "I hold it that a
little rebellion now and then is a goodthing....Itisamedicine necessaryforthesoundhealth
of government....Godforbidthatweshouldeverbetwentyyearswithoutsucharebellion....
Thetreeoflibertymustberefreshedfromtimetotimewiththebloodofpatriotsandtyrants.Itisits
naturalmanure."
But Jefferson was far from the scene. The political and economic elite
ofthe country were notso tolerant. They worriedthatthe examplemightspread. A veteran of
Washington'sarmy, General Henry Knox, founded anorganization of armyveterans, "TheOrder of
the Cincinnati," presumably (asone historian put it) "for the purpose of cherishing the heroic
memories ofthe struggle in which they had taken part," but also, it seemed, to watch outfor
radicalismin the new country. Knox wrote to Washingtonin late 1786aboutShays'Rebellion, and
indoingsoexpressed thethoughts of manyof thewealthy and powerful leadersof the country:

The people who are the insurgents have never paid any, or but verylittletaxes. Butthey
seetheweakness of government; theyfeelatoncetheir own poverty,compared with the
opulent, and their own force,and they are determined to make use of the latter, in order to
remedythe former. Their creed is "Thatthe property of the United States hasbeen protected
from theconfiscations of Britain bythe joint exertionsof all, and therefore ought to be the
common property of all.And hethat attemptsopposition tothis creed isanenemytoequity
and justiceand oughttobe swept from off thefaceof theearth."

Alexander Hamilton, aidetoWashington duringthewar, wasoneof themostforceful and

astuteleadersof thenew aristocracy. Hevoiced hispoliticalphilosophy:

Allcommunitiesdividethemselvesintothefewandthemany.Thefirstaretherichand
wellborn,theotherthemassofthepeople.Thevoiceofthepeoplehasbeensaidtobethe
voiceofGod;andhowevergenerallythismaximhasbeenquotedandbelieved,itisnot
trueinfact.Thepeopleareturbulentandchanging;theyseldomjudge ordetermine
right.Givethereforetothefirstclassadistinctpermanentshareinthegovernment.... Can
ademocraticassemblywhoannuallyrevolveinthemassofthepeoplebesupposed
steadilytopursuethepublicgood?Nothingbutapermanentbodycancheckthe
imprudence of democracy....

AttheConstitutionalConvention,HamiltonsuggestedaPresidentandSenatechosenforlife.
The Convention did not take his suggestion. But neither did it provideforpopularelections,except
inthecaseoftheHouseofRepresentatives,wherethe qualifications were set by the state
legislatures (which required propertyholding for voting in almost all the states), and excluded
women,Indians,slaves.TheConstitutionprovided forSenatorstobeelectedbythestatelegislators,
for the President tobe electedby electors chosen by the state legislators,and for the Supreme Court
tobe appointed by the President.

The problemof democracy in the postRevolutionary society was not,

however, theConstitutional limitationsonvoting. Itlaydeeper, beyond theConstitution,inthe
divisionofsocietyintorichandpoor.Forifsomepeoplehad great wealth and great influence; if
they had the land, the money, thenewspapers, thechurch,theeducationalsystemhowcould
voting,howeverbroad, cut into such power? There was still another problem: wasn't it the
nature of representative government, evenwhen most broadly based, tobeconservative,to
preventtumultuouschange?

Itcame time to ratify the Constitution, to submit to a vote in state conventions, with
approval of nine of the thirteen required to ratify it. In NewYork, where debate over ratification
was intense, a series of newspaper articles appeared,anonymously,and they tell us much about
the nature of theConstitution. These articles, favoring adoption of the Constitution, were written
by James Madison, AlexanderHamilton,and John Jay, and came to beknown as theFederalist
Papers (opponents of the Constitution became knownasantiFederalists).
InFederalistPaper #10,JamesMadison arguedthatrepresentative government was needed to
maintain peace in a society ridden by factional disputes.These disputes came from "thevarious and
unequal distribution of property.Thosewhohold andthosewho arewithout property haveever
formed distinctinterests in society." The problem, he said, was how to control the factional
struggles that came from inequalities in wealth. Minority factions could becontrolled,he said, by
the principlethat decisions would be by vote of themajority.
Sotherealproblem,accordingtoMadison,wasamajorityfaction,andherethe solution
was offeredbythe Constitution, tohave "anextensiverepublic,"thatis,alargenationranging
overthirteenstates,forthen"itwillbemoredifficultforallwhofeelittodiscovertheirown
strength,andtoactinunisonwitheachother....Theinfluenceoffactiousleadersmaykindlea
flamewithintheirparticularStates,butwillbeunabletospreadageneralconflagrationthroughthe
otherStates."
Madison's argument can be seen as a sensible argument for having agovernmentwhich
canmaintainpeaceandavoidcontinuousdisorder.Butisittheaimofgovernment simplyto
maintainorder,asareferee,betweentwoequallymatched fighters?Orisitthatgovernment has
somespecialinterestin maintaining a certain kind of order, a certain distribution of power and
wealth, a distribution in which governmentofficialsarenotneutral refereesbut participants? In that
case, the disorder they might worry about is the disorder of popular rebellion against those
monopolizing the society'swealth.Thisinterpretationmakessensewhenonelooksatthe
economicinterests,thesocialbackgrounds,ofthemakersoftheConstitution.
As part of his argument for a large republic to keep the peace, JamesMadison tellsquite
clearly, inFederalist #10,whose peace hewants tokeep: "Arage forpaper money, foran abolition of
debts, foranequal division of property,orforanyotherimproperorwickedproject,willbelessaptto
pervadethewhole body of the Union than aparticular member of it."
When economic interest is seenbehind the political clauses of the Constitution, then the
document becomes not simplythework of wise men tryingtoestablish adecentandorderly society,
but thework of certain groups tryingto maintain their privileges, while giving justenough rights
and liberties toenough of the people to ensure popular support.
In the new government, Madison would belong to one party (theDemocratRepublicans)
along with Jeffersonand Monroe.Hamiltonwouldbelong totherival party (theFederalists) along
with Washington andAdams.But both agreedone a slaveholder from Virginia, the other a
merchant fromNew Yorkon the aims of this new government they were establishing. Theywere
anticipating the longfundamental agreement ofthe two politicalpartiesintheAmerican system.
Hamilton wrote elsewhere intheFederalistPapersthatthe new Union would be able"to repress
domestic factionand insurrection." He referred directly toShays' Rebellion: "Thetempestuous
situationfrom which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged evinces that dangers of thiskind arenot
merely speculative."

ItwaseitherMadison orHamilton (theauthorshipof theindividualpapersisnotalwaysknown)

whoinFederalistPaper #63argued thenecessityofa"wellconstructed Senate"as"sometimes
necessary asadefensetothepeopleagainst their own temporary errors and delusions" because
"there areparticular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular
passion, orsomeillicitadvantage, ormisled bytheartfulmisrepresentations of
interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwardsbe the most ready to
lament and condemn." And: "In these critical moments,how salutarywill bethe interference of
sometemperate and respectable bodyof citizens in order to check the misguided career, and to
suspend the blowmeditatedby the peopleagainst themselves, until reason, justice, and truthcan
regain their authority over the public mind?"
The Constitution was a compromise betweenslaveholding interests ofthe South and
moneyed interests of the North. For the purpose of uniting thethirteen states into one great
marketfor commerce,the northern delegateswanted lawsregulating interstate commerce, and
urged that suchlaws requireonly a majority of Congress to pass. The South agreed to this, in
return forallowingthetradeinslavestocontinuefortwentyyearsbeforebeingoutlawed.
CharlesBeard warnedus that governmentsincluding the governmentof the UnitedStates
are not neutral,that they representthe dominant economic interests, and that their constitutions
are intended to serve these interests.Oneof hiscritics (Robert E.Brown, CharlesBeard and the
Constitution)raises an interesting point. Granted that the Constitutionomitted the phrase"life,
liberty and the pursuitof happiness," whichappeared in the Declaration ofIndependence, and
substituted"life, liberty, or property"well,whyshouldn't the Constitution protect property? As
Brown saysaboutRevolutionaryAmerica, "practically everybody was interested in the protection of
property"because somanyAmericans owned property.
However, thisismisleading.True,thereweremanyproperty owners.Butsomepeople had much
more than others.A fewpeople had great amounts ofproperty;many peoplehadsmall amounts;
others had none. JacksonMainfoundthat onethird of thepopulation inthe Revolutionary period
were smallfarmers, while only 3percent of the population had truly large holdings andcouldbe
considered wealthy.
Still, onethird was a considerable number of people who felt they hadsomething at stake in
the stability ofa new government. This was a largerbase of support for government than
anywhere in theworld at the end of theeighteenthcentury. In addition, the city mechanicshadan
importantinterest in a government which would protect their work from foreign competition. As
Staughton Lynd puts it: "Howisit that the cityworkingmen all overAmerica overwhelmingly and
enthusiastically supported theUnited StatesConstitution?"
ThiswasespeciallytrueinNewYork.Whentheninthandtenthstateshadratified the
Constitution, four thousand New York City mechanics marchedwith floats and banners to
celebrate. Bakers, blacksmiths, brewers, ship joiners and shipwrights, coopers,cartmen and tailors,
all marched. What Lyndfound was that these mechanics,whileopposingelite rule in thecolonies,
werenationalist. Mechanics comprised perhaps half theNewYorkpopulation.Somewerewealthy,
somewere poor, but allwere better off than the ordinarylaborer, the apprentice, the journeyman,
and their prosperity required a government that would protect them against the British hats and
shoes and othergoodsthatwerepouring intothecolonies aftertheRevolution. As aresult, the
mechanics often supported wealthy conservatives at the ballot box.

The Constitution, then, illustrates the complexity of the Americansystem: that it serves the
interests of a wealthy elite, but also does enough forsmall property owners, for middleincome
mechanics and farmers, to build abroad base of support.The slightly prosperous people who make
up this baseof support are buffers against the blacks, the Indians, the very poor whites.They
enable the elite to keep control with a minimum of coercion, a maximum of lawall made
palatable by the fanfare of patriotism and unity.
The Constitution became even more acceptable to the public at largeafterthefirst
Congress,respondingtocriticism,passedaseriesofamendmentsknownastheBillofRights.These

amendmentsseemedtomakethenewgovernmentaguardian ofpeople'sliberties:tospeak,to
publish, toworship, topetition, toassemble,tobetried fairly,tobesecureathomeagainst
officialintrusion.Itwas,therefore,perfectlydesignedtobuildpopularbackingforthenew
government.Whatwasnotmadeclearitwasatimewhenthelanguageof freedom was new and
itsreality untestedwas the shakiness of anyone'slibertywhenentrustedtoagovernmentofthe
richandpowerful.
Indeed, the sameproblem existed fortheother provisions of the Constitution, like the clause
forbidding statesto "impair the obligation of contract,"orthat givingCongress thepower totaxthe
people andtoappropriate money.They all sound benign and neutral until one asks:Taxwho, for
what? Appropriate what, for whom? To protect everyone's contracts seems like an act offairness,
of equal treatment, until one considers that contracts made betweenrich and poor, between
employer and employee, landlord and tenant, creditor and debtor, generally favorthe more
powerful of the two parties. Thus, toprotect these contracts is to put the great power of the
government, its laws,courts, sheriffs, police, on the side of the privilegedand to do it not, as in
premodern times, asanexerciseofbruteforceagainsttheweakbutasamatteroflaw.
TheFirstAmendment oftheBillof Rightsshowsthatqualityof interest hiding behind
innocence. Passed in 1791by Congress, it provided that"Congressshallmakenolaw ...
abridgingthefreedom of speech,orof thepress...."Yet, sevenyears after the First
Amendment became part of theConstitution, Congress passed a lawvery clearly abridging the
freedom ofspeech.
This was the Sedition Act of1798, passed under John Adams's administration, at a time when
Irishmen and Frenchmen in the United Stateswerelooked on asdangerous revolutionaries because
of the recent French Revolution and the Irish rebellions. The Sedition Act made it a crimeto sayor
writeanything "false, scandalous andmalicious" against thegovernment, Congress,or the President,
with intent to defame them, bring them into disrepute,orexcite popular hatreds against them.
This act seemed to directly violate the First Amendment. Yet, it wasenforced.Ten
Americanswereputinprisonforutterancesagainstthegovernment, and every member of the
Supreme Court in 17981800, sittingas anappellatejudge,helditconstitutional

Are the economic provisions in the Constitution enforced justas weakly?

WehaveaninstructiveexamplealmostimmediatelyinWashington'sfirstadministration,when
Congress'spowertotaxandappropriatemoneywasimmediatelyputtousebytheSecretaryofthe
Treasury,AlexanderHamilton.
Hamilton, believingthatgovernmentmustally itselfwiththe richestelementsofsocietyto
makeitselfstrong,proposed toCongressaseriesoflaws,which itenacted, expressingthisphilosophy.
A Bank of theUnited Stateswasset up as a partnershipbetweenthe governmentand certain
bankinginterests.Atariff was passed tohelpthemanufacturers. Itwas agreedtopaybondholders
most of the war bonds were now concentratedin a small group ofwealthy peoplethe full value
of their bonds. Tax laws were passed to raisemoney for this bond redemption.
Oneof these tax lawswas theWhiskeyTax,which especially hurt smallfarmers who raised
grain that they converted into whiskey and then sold. In1794the farmers of western Pennsylvania
took up arms and rebelled againstthe collection of this tax. Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton led
the troopsto put them down. We see then, in the first years of the Constitution,thatsome of its
provisionseventhose paraded most flamboyantly (like the FirstAmendment)mightbe treated
lightly. Others (like the power to tax) wouldbepowerfully enforced.
Still,themythology aroundthe Founding Fatherspersists.Tosay,asonehistorian (Bernard
Bailyn) hasdonerecently, that "thedestruction ofprivilegeand thecreation of a political system that
demanded of itsleaders the responsible and humane use of power were their highest aspirations"
is to ignorewhat really happened intheAmerica of these Founding Fathers.
Bailyn says:

Everyoneknewthebasicprescriptionforawiseandjustgovernment.Itwassotobalancethe

contendingpowersinsocietythatnoonepowercouldoverwhelmtheothersand,unchecked,
destroythelibertiesthatbelonged toall.Theproblem washowtoarrange the institutions
ofgovernmentsothatthisbalancecouldbeachieved.

Were the Founding Fathers wise and just men trying to achieve a goodbalance? In fact,they
did notwant abalance, except onewhich kept things asthey were, a balance among the dominant
forces at that time. They certainlydid not want an equal balance betweenslaves and masters,
propertylessandproperty holders, Indians and white.
As many as half the people were not even considered by the FoundingFathersasamong
Bailyn's "contendingpowers" insociety.Theywerenotmentioned in the Declaration of
Independence, they were absent in the Constitution, theywere invisibleinthenewpolitical
democracy.TheywerethewomenofearlyAmerica.

NO:GordonS.Wood

Democracy andtheConstitution
3

TheDebateovertheConstitution

Thehistorical debate over the Constitution anddemocracy continues, forthedebateisrootedin

theoriginalcontroversythatsurroundedthecreationoftheConstitution in 17871788. In fact, all
the historical debates over the democraticnature of theConstitution areessentiallyreverberations
of thisoriginaldisputeatthetime of the framing.Thecreatorsandsupportersof the Constitution,
the Federalists asthey called themselves, argued strenuously that theConstitution was a
fulfillment, not a repudiation, of the Revolution and thatit provided for a thoroughly republican
and popular government. The opponents of the Constitution, the Antifederalists,charged that
the Constitutionwas a denial of the principles of 1776and that it was an aristocratic document
calculated to create anundemocratic government benefiting the few atthe expense of the many.
Itis essentially these two contrasting viewpointsof17871788that have been echoing through
our historical writing on theoriginsoftheConstitution eversince.Weareforevertryingtodecide
inthesedebates who was more right in their interpretation of the Constitution, theFederalists
ortheAntifederalists

From the vantage point of1776,which was generally the perspective oftheAntifederalists, the
Constitution of 1787loomsasan extraordinary, evenunbelievable, creation.None of the
revolutionary leadersatthetime of independence even contemplated, let alone suggested, the
possibility of erectingover allAmerica such a strong, overarching national government asthe
Constitution provided. Such a powerful central government operating directly onindividuals was
diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution.More than anything else, the Revolution
intendedto reduce the overweening powerofthe government,particularlyfarremovedcentral
governmentassociated with the British imperial system. Any revolutionary in 1776 suggesting a national
governmentresembling the one eventually created by theConstitution of 1787would have been
branded a lunatic or, worse, a Britishmonarchist.

TheArticles ofConfederation

Ofcourse,some Americans in1776 wanteda stronger central governmentthan that provided by

the Articles of Confederation. But even the most fervent advocatesin 17761777 of astronger
confederation, like John Dickinson, never envisioneda national government like that of1787. For
mostrevolutionaries, the confederation was a simplepolitical response tothe needfor union
against Britain. They were interested less in creating an enduringnationstate than in legitimizing
the resistance movement and the activity oftheContinental Congress. Atmost, theywanted a
strongunion of the separatestates that would have substantial authority over matters of general
concernsuch aswar, trade, interstate disputes, andwestern lands
Ofcourse,manyhistorianshavedescribedtheaccumulatingproblemsoftheconfederationin
ordertoexplainthewritingoftheConstitutionIninternational affairs,theconfedration washard
pressed tomaintain itsterritorial integrity. GreatBritainrefusedtovacatetheNorthwestposts;
SpainclaimedahugechunkoftheSouthwestandclosedtheMississippitotraffic.TheBarbary

3
FromHowDemocraticistheConstitutionbyGordonS.Wood(AmericanEnterpriseInstituteforPublic
PolicyResearch, 1980).Copyright 1980byAmerican Enterprise InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch.
Reprintedbypermission.

pirateswereseizingAmericanshipsandcrewsbecauseCongresshadnomoneytopaythenecessary
tributes.Lackinganytaxingpower, theUnitedStatesgovernmentcouldnotevenpaytheinterest
onitsdebttoitscreditorsathomeorabroad.Congresshadnoauthoritytoregulatecommerceand
thushadnowayofforcinganyopenings intheEuropean mercantile empiresforAmerican traders.
Effortstogetevenlimitedtaxingandcommercialregularitypowersfounderedon the requirements
fortheunanimous consent of allthe statesfor amendmentoftheArticlesofConfederation.
Pressing and serious as these problems of the confederation were, theycannot by themselves
explainthe formation of the Constitution. The Constitution createda nationalgovernment whose
strengthand character wereout of proportionto the obvious and acknowledged weaknessesof
the confederation. Indeed, by1787 almost everyone recognized the debility oftheArticles andwas
prepared to grant additional powers to Congress. Theywerenot preparedfor what came out ofthe
Philadelphia Conventionof 1787arevolutionary transformationof the entire American political
system including a radical diminishing of the independence and power of the states

TheProblem ofDemocracy intheStates

Somethingbesidestheobviousdebilityoftheconfederationlaybehind sucha radical political

transformation.Only political conditions in the statespolitical conditionsof themost
threatening kindcan ultimately explain thecreationoftheConstitution.Thereinthestates,the
politicalentitiestherevolutionariescaredaboutmost,theproblemofdemocracywasrevealed;and
itisthatproblem theConstitution soughttosolve

In1776Americansasyetdidnotcalltheirnewgovernmentsdemocracies;itisimportant for
ourunderstanding of the Constitution's relationshiptodemocracytoknowwhytheydidnot.Itis
truethat thenewstategovernments were very popular, more popular surely than any other
governmentintheeighteenthcenturyworld.IntheAmericanstates,agreaterproportion
of people couldvoteandagreaterproportion of government officialswereelected than in any
other country. The most popular part of the state governments, thelowerhouses of the
legislatures, weregiven anextraordinaryamountofpower, includingmanyprerogatives, likethe
grantingofpardonsandtheappointmentofjudges,thatweretraditionallyexercisedonlybymag
isterial authority in other countries. Still, these new governments were notcalleddemocracies
because,astheeighteenthcenturycommonlyunderstoodtheterm,theywerenotdemocracies

By the 1780s, many Americanleaders realized that these state assemblieswereabusing their extraordinary
powers.The annually electedlegislatures,besetbyhostsof variousinterests, wereconstantly changing
their membershipandweremakinglegislationchaotic.AsJamesMadisonpointed out,morelawswere
enacted by the states in the decade following independence than in theentirecolonialperiod. Manyof
theselawswereunjust:paper money acts, staylaws, and other forms of debtor relief legislation hurt
various creditor groupsinthesocietyandviolated individual property rights.Tosome,thelegislatures
seemed more frightening than the former royal governors. Itdid not matterthatthelegislatorswere
supposedlytherepresentatives ofthepeople andannuallyelectedbythem."173despotswould surelybe
asoppressiveasone,"wroteJefferson."Anelectivedespotismwasnotthegovernmentwefoughtfor."

These legislative abuses, many American leaders believed, flowed from

too much democracy. The legislators were too susceptible to various narrowandparochial
interestsandhad become merely spokesmen for theirlocalconstituents. "A spirit of locality" in
the state legislatures, said Madison, wasdestroying "theaggregate interests of the Community," and
this localist spiritwas "inseparable" from elections by small districts ortownsInshort,the
representatives of the peoplethe democratic parts of the mixed constitutionswere
respondingtooreadilytothewishesofthepeopletheyrepresented

American leaderstried several approaches to these democratic abuses inthe states. Some

attempted to reform the revolutionary state constitutions byreducing the power of the popular
assemblies and enhancing that of the governors and senates. The Massachusetts constitution of
1780embodied manyof these second thoughts, and during the 1780sother statessought to
remaketheir constitutions in Massachusetts' image. Others tried to use the judiciaryagainst what
were thought tobeunconstitutional actsof thelegislatures; therewere scattered and rudimentary
expressions of what would become judicialreview.Manyleaders,however,thoughtsuch judicial
overturningsoflawenactedbypopularly electedlegislatures smacked of despotism andwere con
trary to republican government

An Enlarged and Elevated Republic

The evidence is strong thatMadison and other nationalists who thought like him wanted greater
consolidation and a correspondingly greater weakening of the states than they got.Madison
wanted a national government that not onlywould have "apositiveand compleat authority in all
cases where uniform measures are necessary,"as in commerce and foreign policy, but would have
"a negative in all caseswhatsoever on the Legislative Acts of the States asthe King of Great Britain
heretofore had." Thisvetopower over all statelegislation seemed to Madison"tobe absolutely
necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on theState jurisdictions." Without it, he
believed, none of the great objects whichledto theconventionneither theneed for morecentral
authoritynorthedesire to preventinstabilityand injustice in state legislationwould be met.When
the convention eventually set aside this national veto power, Madisoninitially thought that the
Constitution was doomed to failure.

Although deeply disappointed with the Constitution Madison and othernationalists aimed to
make the best of what they had, a greatly enlarged andelevated republicMadison did not want
the new national government tobe anintegrator andharmonizer of different interestsinthe
society;instead hewanted ittobe a "disinterested and dispassionate umpire indisputes"between
these different interests. In other words, Madison was not as modern as weoften make him out
to be. He hoped the national government might play thesamerole the British king had been
supposed toplay in the empire.

Cosmopolitanism vs. Localism

Ifthe new government were tobe monarchlike with itsown "dispassionateanddisinterested"

authority, howwas ittowork inrepublican America? "Itmaybeasked,"Madison said,"how
privaterightswillbemoresecureunderthe Guardianship of the General Government than under
the State Governments, sincetheyareboth founded ontherepublican principle which refersthe
ultimate decisiontothewillof themajority."What, inotherwords,wasreally different about the
new federal Constitution from the state constitutions that would enable it to lessen the effects
of tyrannical majorities andkeep it from succumbing to the same popular pressures besetting
the stategovernmentsinthe1780s?
The answer the Federalists gave to these questions cut to the heart ofthenewsystemand
revealsclearlytheproblemoftheConstitution'srelationtodemocracy.TheFederalists,Madison
included,werenotasmuchopposedtogovernmental power per seastothecharacter and
outlook of thepeoplewielding it.Theythought that thevices of the stateassemblies inthe 1780s
flowedessentiallyfromthekindsofpeoplebeingelectedtotheseassemblies.Suchlegislatorswere
toooftentoomuchlikethepeopletheyrepresented.
The Revolution had democratized the state assemblies by increasing thenumber of
representatives andby altering their social character. Men of morehumble, more rural origins, less
educated, and with more parochial intereststhan those in the colonial legislatures became state
representatives after 1776.Madison and other gentlemen believed thatthese ordinary men
lacked the "enlarged" and "liberal" outlooks of the morecosmopolitan "natural aristocracy"that

Jefferson, forone, hadexpectedtodominate government. These ordinary men were the ones
winning electionstothe statelegislatures and enacting most of what the Federalists described asthe
confused, unjust, and narrowly basedlegislation of the 1780s. What theFederalists wanted from
the Constitution was a structure of government thatwould inhibit such localist kinds of men from
gaining power.
They proposed to do this by enlarging the arena of politics. Raisingimportant
governmentaldecisionmakingtothenationallevelwouldexpandtheelectorateandatthesame
timewouldreducethenumberofthoseelected.

This expanded electorate and elevated government would then act as a kindof filter, refining the
kind of men who would become national leaders. In alarger arena with a smaller number of
representatives, only the most notableand most socially established were likelytogainpolitical
office.If thepeopleof a state, New York, for example, had to select only ten men to the federal
Congress in contrast to the sixtysix they elected to their state assembly, theywere more apt in the
case of the few representatives in the national government to ignore obscure ordinary men with
local reputations and elect thosewhowerewellbred, well educated, andwell known. Electionby
thepeople inlarge districtswould inhibit demagoguery and crass electioneering and wouldtherefore,
asMadison's closest allyintheconvention,JamesWilson, said, "bemost likely to obtain men of
intelligence and uprightness."

ARepublicanRemedyforRepublicanDiseases

Whether such cosmopolitan efforts to create political structures that deliberately excluded the
ordinariness of ordinary people areundemocratic was precisely the issue raised at the framing of
the Constitution. The Antifederalists,speaking for a populistlocalist tradition,certainly thoughtthe
Constitutionwas undemocratic

By the end of the debate over the Constitution, it was possible for theFederalists to describe the new
national government, even with its indirectlyelected presidentand Senate, as "a perfectlydemocratical
form ofgovernment." Already by 17871788 democracy had come to be identified by someAmericans
simply as a representativegovernmentderivedfrom the people.In other words, republicanismand
democracy were becoming equated

They[theFederalists] thought and actedmore creatively than anyother generation inAmerican

history. Theynot onlyconvinced the country to accept a national government inconceivable a
decade earlier buttheydidso without repudiatingthe republicanism andthepopular basis of
government that nearly all devoutly believed in They remainedconfident that, ifonlythe people's
choice could be undisturbed by ambitious local demagogues andcrass electioneering, the people
would "choose men of the first character forwisdomand integrity," men very muchlike
themselves

EXPLORING THEISSUE

WastheConstitution oftheUnitedStatesWrittentoProtecttheEconomic
Interests oftheUpper Classes?

CriticalThinkingandReflection(MUSTreferencepagenumberinallyouranswers)

1. BrieflystatethetheoryofCharlesA.BeardregardingthemotivationsoftheFoundingFathers.
2. WhywasBeard'stheorysocontroversialatthetimeitwaswritten?WhatevidencedidBearduse
tosubstantiatehistheory?
3. Critically analyzeJames Madison's argument inFederalist Paper #10that aRepublican formof
government functionsbetter inalargeterritory rather than a small one.
4. Distinguishbetweenarepublicanandademocraticformofgovernment.
5. According to Zinn, the majority of the population was poor whenthe Constitution was written.
If this was true and the Constitutionallowsthe elitetocontrolthe masses, how didthe states
ratify it inthefirstplace?Explain.
6. Critically analyze Wood's argument that the new Constitution waswritten because of an excess of
democracy in the state legislaturesandthelackoftaxingandcommercepowersinthe
Confederationgovernment.Whatkindsofdetailsdidheprovidetosupportthisargument?
7. Did the Federalists lie when they argued that the Constitutionwithits strongercentral
governmentwasa fulfillment oftheAmerican R evolution?
8. Compareand contrastthe differinginterpretationsofWoodandZinn regarding the events that
took place at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787.Is there anyway in which the two
interpretationscanbeblended together?
9. According toProfessor Wood: "Weareforevertrying todecideinthedebates who was more right
in their interpretation of the Constitution, the Federalists or the Antifederalists."Critically discuss.
10. Could the United Stateshave survived todayunder arevisedArticlesofConfederation?