BEHAVI OR THERAPY 8, 678- - 681 ( 1 9 7 7 )

Reinforcing and Punishing Thoughts:

A Rejoinder to Ellis and Mahoney
HOWARD RACHLI N
State University of New York at Stony Brook
To Ellis
When comment s on a paper in psychol ogy are al most the length of the
original paper it is probable t hat the aut hor and comment at or di ffer in
f undament al assumpt i ons about psychol ogy itself. I will confine mysel f, in
this repl y, to an at t empt to isolate t hese f undament al di fferences so t hat
the reader can j udge for hi msel f whi ch he agrees with.
But , before sayi ng what the di fferences are, let me point out some
things t hey are not. They are not " ha r d- nos e d" versus " s of t - nos e d"
di fferences and t hey are not " pur e ps ychol ogy" versus "appl i ed psy-
chol ogy" di fferences. I assume t hat Ellis want s to be as hard-nosed as I
do when exami ni ng the logic of the argument s and as soft -nosed as I do
when consi deri ng their possible appl i cat i ons in the alleviation of human
suffering. I also assume t hat f undament al principles shoul d be pure in the
sense of "f r ee from er r or , " and t hat in t hei r application t hey must be
consi st ent l y mai nt ai ned. I did not mean to di ct at e to applied psychol ogi st s
(from the vant age point of " p u r e " psychol ogy) how t hey shoul d do t hei r
j ob. What I did mean to say was t hat cogni t i ve-behavi or t herapi st s are
maki ng a cat egor y mi st ake when t hey talk about reinforcing and punish-
ing t hought s. Some of their procedures may i ndeed be effect i ve but i f
cogni t i ve-behavi or t herapi st s wish to retain bot h procedures and certain
assumpt i ons about t hought shared by cognitive psychol ogi st s and be-
havi ori st s alike t hey should change the way the procedures are descri bed.
It was, perhaps, a fault of my original article to concent r at e on what I
t hought were obvi ousl y false implications of unconsi der ed use of cogni-
tive t erms. The falsity of t hose implications does not seem to be obvi ous
to Ellis. I shoul d have concent r at ed on the semant i cs. Let me t ry to
illustrate the point now.
Request s for repri nt s should be sent to Howard Rachlin, Depart ment of Psychology, State
Uni versi t y of New York, Stony Brook, NY 11794.
678
Copyright ~ 1977 by the Association for Advancement of Behavior Therapy.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN 0005-7894
R E J OI NDE R TO E L L I S AND MAHONE Y 679
Suppose two observers are looking at a locked car. They might agree on
the following properties of the car: (1) two headlights, (2) four fenders,
(3) six windows; and they might also agree on a fourth property: (4)
stylish design. But, the fourth property, even though it is directly observ-
able, is different from the other three. It is the way the other three
properties (and still others like them) are organized. Now, I believe (and,
I argued, most cognitive psychologists also believe) that observations of
the thoughts of other human beings are like observation No. 4, and that
observations of behavior of other human beings are like observation Nos.
1, 2, and 3. I had assumed that most of the readers of this journal would
readily agree with this view. If they did they would also agree that
operations on item Nos. 1, 2, and 3 might not be appropriate with item
No. 4. For instance, one could kick the headlights, fenders, and windows
of a car, but not its stylish design (although one might ruin the stylish
design by kicking the headlights, fenders, or windows). Analogously, one
can reinforce or punish individual acts (i.e., operants) but not thoughts
(although one could alter thoughts by reinforcing or punishing individual
acts).
Ellis' view of what thoughts are like, as expressed in his comments on
my article, is fundamentally different from this. He believes that thoughts
have similar properties and are subject to the same operations as overt
behaviors but are located somewhere inside the person. To return to the
car example, the observers might agree on: (5) one carburetor, even
though they could not actually see it. Here they might be reasoning from
analogy to their own cars. 1 One can kick a carburetor so in this sense one
can reinforce or punish thoughts. I believe that there are great difficulties
with this view of the relation of human thought to human behavior both
logically and heuristically (regarding the sort of experimental and practi-
cal operations it implies), but I will not argue further against it here. It is
more important to understand the fundamental argument than to come
down on one side or the other.
To Ma h o n e y
Aside from the accusation that I am beating a moribund horse (con-
tradicted by Ellis' reply), Mahoney' s short piece consists of a defense of
cognitive psychology and an attack on behavioral models. This attack,
like the more extended arguments to which Mahoney refers, is based on a
misunderstanding of S-R theory and of operant psychology. Skinner is not
an S-R psychologist, nor am I, nor are other operant conditioners. On the
contrary, cognitive psychology is the logical heir to the S-R tradition. The
I El l i s s a y s , "" . . . we d o d i r e c t l y o b s e r v e o u r o wn t h o u g h t s . " Bu t , i n t r o s p e c t i o n h a s l o n g
b e e n d i s c r e d i t e d a s a l e g i t i ma t e p s y c h o l o g i c a l d a t u m. I d o u b t wh e t h e r El l i s s e r i o u s l y i n t e n d s
t o r e s u r r e c t i t n o w.
680 HOWARD RACHLIN
critical question here has to do with inference. When behavior is observed
with no apparent current cause, one must infer a cause. The S-R model of
thought tends to direct its inferences to the interior of the behaving
organism. S-R psychologists assume that unobserved current responses
inside the organism are the causes of current behavior. Cognitive psy-
chology employs a similar tactic. Cognitive psychologists assume that
unobserved current cognitive events are the causes of current behavior.
From a modern perspective, the r g- Sg' S of Hull and Spence and the
cognitive maps and expectancies of Tolman are seen to be equivalent
concepts, mutually translatable. In neither case has the tactic of inferring
events inside the organism paid off in coherent prediction or control of
behavior or in useful theraputic techniques. Both Hull' s and Tolman' s
models are S-R in the sense that cause and effect are taken from the
nineteenth century physical model of contiguous forces acting on each
other like so many billiard balls. More modern information-processing
cognitive inferences couched in computer terminology ("encoding, "
"st orage, " "readout , " etc.) are better formulated than Tolman' s, but no
different in principle. They are still S-R theories. Despite Mahoney' s
claim that analysis of cognitive processes in behavior change is "strong
and salient," to my knowledge, there has been no attempt to apply any
information-processing theory in a therapeutic setting. If by "cognitive
behavior therapy" Mahoney is referring to the use of loosely cognitive
language in articles and speeches about behavior therapy, then I suppose
the cognitive movement in behavior therapy is strong and salient. But, if
he refers to the application of a coherent cognitive model to therapeutic
situations, the cognitive movement, far from being strong and salient,
does not exist.
Operant conditioners, on the other hand, are not S-R theorists. When
confronted with behavior with no apparent current cause, inferences are
drawn about past overt events (a reinforcement history) rather than from
current unobserved events inside the head, mind, or spirit of the behaving
organism. No S-R connections such as r g- Sg' S, expectancies, or push-
down storage bins need intervene. The relation between current behavior
and previous reinforcement history can explain behavior of a complexity
equal or greater than that explained by the cognitive models and has the
virtue of a terminology that refers to observable events. 2
To answer Mahoney' s italicized question, I would abandon my non-
mediational position when it proved inadequate to predict and control
z With respect to causation, I readily concede that it is not a priori impossible for verbal
behavior to cause other behavior, but I urge the reader to take any concrete instance and
apply Mahoney' s own criteria (for instance, the utterance of the word " Ouch! " and
withdrawing one' s hand from the fire). In every case I can think of, only criterion (a),
co-occurrence, is satisfied. The rest are not.
REJOINDER TO ELLIS AND MAHONEY 681
behavi or and when a medi at i onal posi t i on was shown to be: (a) at l east as
coher ent , (b) at l east as appl i cabl e in the l abor at or y, (c) at l east as
appl i cabl e in ever yday life, (d) at l east as appl i cabl e in t her apy. So far,
none of t hese has occur r ed.
RECEIVED; June 10, 1976
ACCEPTED; June 13, 1976