AND SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 1 Noa Shein INTRODUCTION Any serious attempt to understand Spinozas metaphysics requires an understanding of Spinozas theory of attributes. It might seem a simple task to understand what attributes are since Spinoza provides a denition for the term attribute at the very beginning of the Ethics: By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence (1D4). 2 However, in spite of this, it is not clear from the denition alone what Spinoza believes attributes to be. In a very inuential article, Haserot nds no fewer than eight ambiguities in this denition. 3 The two ambiguities that are most signicant concern the terms intellectus and tanquam as they appear in the denition: Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens. The term intellect can refer either to the nite intellect or the innite one, and tanquam can mean either as in fact or as if (but not in fact). The famous debate among scholars whether attributes are objective or subjective can be 1 I am very grateful to Alan Nelson for his guidance and assistance on this paper and the dissertation chapters upon which it is based. I am grateful as well to Michael Della Rocca for his generous help and comments. I would also like to thank Nicholas Jolley, Paul Homan and Amihud Gilead for their comments and observations. I would also like to acknowledge the support of The University of Haifa for its support through a post-doctoral fellowship. Finally, I am grateful to Miriam Shein for her much appreciated editorial suggestions. 2 All the Spinoza references are from Spinoza, The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. I, translated by Edwin Curley, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. I have used the following common abbreviations to refer to Spinozas writings: EEthics, Ep Correspondence (epistolae), TdIETreatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. When referring to the Ethics I have used these common forms and abbreviations: ax. axiom, Cor. corollary, dem. demonstration, Pproposition, Schol. scholium, and so, 2P47, for example, refers to Part Two of the Ethics, Proposition 47. 3 Haserot, Spinozas Denition of Attribute, in Studies in Spinoza, Critical and Interpretive Essays, 4367. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17(3) 2009: 505532 British Journal for the History of Philosophy ISSN 0960-8788 print/ISSN 1469-3526 online 2009 BSHP http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/09608780902986631 seen as a debate on which combination of meanings of the dierent components of the denition should be adopted. Briey, the subjective interpretation, traditionally conceived, takes the intellect in question to be the nite one, and tanquam to mean as if (but not in fact). The denition, according to this type of interpretation, should be understood as saying that attributes are what the nite intellect perceives of substance as if (but not in fact) constituting its essence. The objectivist interpretation, on the other hand, favours rendering intellect as the innite intellect and tanquam as in fact. Objectivists, therefore, take the denition as stating that attributes are what the innite intellect perceives of substance as in fact constituting its essence. Wolfson characterizes the dierence between the two positions as follows: According to the former interpretation [subjectivism], to be perceived by the mind means to be invented by the mind, for of themselves the attributes have no independent existence at all but are identical with the essence of the substance. According to the latter interpretation [objectivism], to be perceived by the mind means only to be discovered by the mind, for even of themselves the attributes have independent existence in the essence of substance. (Wolfson, 1934: 146) The driving force behind the subjectivist interpretation is what I shall call the Simplicity Requirement, while the objectivists are guided by what I shall call the Perfect Knowledge Requirement. As we shall see, the main objection, or class of objections, that is raised against the subjectivist interpretation (by the objectivists) is that the attributes turn out to be, for the subjectivists, illusory. 4 In its simplest form, the objection states that since the attributes are only as if (but not in fact) what constitutes the essence of substance, they only seem to express the essence of substance but, in fact, do not do so. In consequence, the true essence of substance is, in principle, unknowable. In great part, for this reason, the subjectivist interpretation has fallen into ill repute and most commentators have been persuaded to adopt versions of the objectivist interpretation. I will show, however, that the objectivist interpretation itself is subject to a version of the objection it raises against the subjective interpretation, and therefore cannot be seen to have the clear advantage over the subjectivist interpretation as many are convinced it does. To do so, I will rst briey present Wolfsons interpretation, since it is taken by the secondary literature to be the paradigmatic example of a subjectivist interpretation and against which the objections against subjectivism are often raised. 5 Second, I will 4 The main proponent of this view is Gueroult Spinoza I Dieu (Ethique, I) 50 and Appendix 3. 5 This can be seen, for example, in Bennett, Della Rocca, Haserot and Lennon. Jonathan Francis Bennett, A Study of Spinozas Ethics, 146; Michael Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind Body Problem in Spinoza, 157; Haserot. Denition of Attribute, 39; and Thomas M. Lennon, The Rationalist Conception of Substance. A Companion to Rationalism, edited by Alan Nelson, 1230, 20. 506 NOA SHEIN present in fuller detail the objections that are raised and are considered as fatal to this interpretation. 6 Third, I will present several alternative objectivist interpretations and point out their essential features. Finally, I will show why, in principle, the objectivist interpretation can do no better than the subjectivist regarding the Illusory Knowledge Objection. This will show some fundamental aws that are at the heart of the objectivist interpretations. The aim of this paper, then, is to show that an objectivist interpretation is not the best response to the problems raised against the subjectivist interpretation, on the one hand. On the other, I will point towards the direction in which I believe a solid interpretation of the theory of attributes should go, one that is not vulnerable to objections that are raised against both subjectivist and objectivist interpretations, that is, show that the perceived dichotomy between the subjectivist and objectivist interpretations is a false one. WOLFSONS SUBJECTIVIST INTERPRETATION Wolfsons main claim is that Spinoza, on the whole, follows traditional medieval Jewish rationalist doctrine and, in particular, Spinozas treatment of the relationship between substance and attribute is in this respect no dierent (ibid.: 142). The problem the medieval rationalists faced was how to reconcile Gods absolute simplicity with the divine attributes in such a way that the divine attributes would not imply any multiplicity in God (ibid.: 143). The solution to this problem, in broad terms, is to maintain Gods absolute simplicity (the Simplicity Requirement) and locate all the apparent multiplicity in the human or nite mind. On this view, it is a feature of the human mind that it must conceive God under attributes in such a way that they seem to imply a multiplicity in the object. However, the apparent multiplicity in the object is only due to the nature of human cognition and not due to the nature of the object itself. Since the nite mind must conceive God under attributes (which seem to imply a multiplicity in the object), God, as simple or in His essence, is thus rendered unknowable to the nite mind (ibid.: 142). Applying this to Spinoza, Wolfson claims rst that there is an identication of the attributes with the substance, for of themselves the attributes have no independent existence at all but are identical with the essence of the substance (ibid.: 146); and second, that an attribute is a description of the manner in which substance, unknowable in itself, manifests itself to the human mind (ibid.: 145). Wolfsons Spinoza, then, identies the attributes with the substance (in the sense that the attributes do not have an independent existence in the substance), and although there 6 Alan Donagan, Spinoza, 70; Della Rocca, Representation, 157 n4; Bennett, Spinozas Ethics, 146; and E. M. Curley, in Spinoza, The Collected Works, 409, n2. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 507 seems to be a multiplicity of attributes, in reality they are all identical. Wolfson takes 1P10Schol to be an expression of this: . . . although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two dierent substances. Wolfson claims: The implications of this passage are these: The two attributes appear to the mind as being distinct from each other. In reality, however, they are one. For by Proposition X, attributes, like substance, are summa genera (conceived through itself). The two attributes must therefore be one and identical with substance. (ibid.: 156) GUEROULTS OBJECTIONS TO WOLFSONS INTERPRETATION As I mentioned earlier, Gueroults objections to Wolfsons interpretation have usually been taken as decisive and many have fashioned their own objections after his. 7 His main objection concerns the apparently illusory nature of the attributes under the subjectivist interpretation. I will present rst Gueroults set of objections that I have called the Illusory Knowledge Objections and present a further objection raised by Delahunty and Haserot that can be classied in this category. I will then show how the objectivist impetus to maintain the real distinction between the attributes makes objectivist interpretations vulnerable to an objection analogous to the Illusory Knowledge Objection. Illusory Knowledge Objections There is a cluster of objections raised by Gueroult that target the apparently illusory nature of the attributes under the subjectivist interpretation that are guided by what I have called the Perfect Knowledge Requirement. As Gueroult understands Wolfsons position, there is a gap between the substance and its attributes. This gap is created because attributes are contributions of the nite mind; that is, they are something the nite mind adds to its conception of the substance. Once this gap is established, there seems to be a discrepancy between knowing the substance as it is in itself, so to speak, and knowing it through the attributes. Another way of expressing the illusory nature of the attributes in the subjective interpretation is the following: attributes give the illusion that the substance has a multiplicity of essences, when in fact it has only one simple essence. 7 Donagan, Spinoza, 70; Della Rocca, Representation, 157 n4; Bennett, Spinozas Ethics, 146; and Curleys note in Spinoza, The Collected Works, 409 n2. 508 NOA SHEIN Gueroult raises three dierent objections that can be classed under Illusory Knowledge Objections. The rst has to do with the role and nature of adequate knowledge in Spinoza. The second involves Spinozas claim in 1P10Schol that the attributes are really distinct. Finally, the third objection centres on Spinozas apparent identication of the substance with its attributes. First Objection: The Finite Mind Perceives the Substance Adequately Gueroult claims that attributes cannot be illusory in any way because Spinoza insists that the mind perceives the substance adequately under the dierent attributes (Gueroult, 1968: 50 and Appendix 3: 428). In support of this claim, Gueroult points to 2P44dem as important evidence: It is of the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by 2P41), namely (by 1A6) as they are in themselves, that is (by 1P29), not as contingent but as necessary. 8 Second Objection: There is a Real Distinction between the Attributes The second objection Gueroult raises is based on the scholium to 1P10 which, as we have already seen, states the following: From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e. one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two dierent substances. Recall that Wolfson had claimed that this scholium was evidence that all the attributes were identical outside the intellect, i.e. in reality. Gueroult, on the other hand, claims that this scholium makes it clear that the distinc- tion between the attributes cannot be only a rational distinction (i.e. a distinction that holds only in the mind but not in reality), but it must be a real distinction, i.e. a distinction that holds in reality. 9 For Gueroult, then, attributes must express essences which are dierent from each other in re. 8 Delahunty agrees here with Gueroult: R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza, 117. Donagan, Haserot and Parkinson raise similar considerations: Alan Donagan, Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinozas Metaphysics in Spinoza, a Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Marjorie Glicksman Grene, 16481, 173; Haserot. Denition of Attribute, 32; and G. H. R. Parkinson, Spinozas Theory of Knowledge, 85. 9 Della Rocca and Haserot raise a similar objection based on this scholium. Della Rocca, Representation, 157 and Haserot, Denition of Attribute, 38. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 509 Many understand Spinozas use of the terms rational distinction and real distinction as explicitly adopting the Cartesian denition or they interpret Spinozas use of them along Cartesian lines even if they do not state this explicitly. The important element that these interpretations share is that they understand a real distinction in Spinoza to imply that the source, or what gives rise to the distinction, are the objects themselves. 10 As shall become clear later on, interpreting Spinozas notion of real distinction along these lines will make it dicult, paradoxically, to maintain an objectivist interpretation. Third Objection: Identication of the Substance with its Attributes Finally, Gueroult points to Spinozas identication of the substance with its attributes as an objection to the subjectivist account. As we have seen, Gueroult takes the subjectivist interpretation necessarily to imply a gap between the substance and its attributes. Gueroult, then, thinks it is a problem for the subjectivist view that Spinoza seems to identify the substance with its attributes in many places. One such example is the demonstration to 1P4: Therefore, there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except substance, or what is the same (by 1D4), their attributes, and their aections (italics added). Fourth Objection: Gods Knowledge is Illusory There is yet another objection which is raised and can be included in the class of Illusory Knowledge Objections. This objection is raised by Delahunty and Haserot, among others. 11 The objection can be stated as follows. On the subjectivist interpretation, not only are the attributes illusory for the nite mind, but it turns out that the attributes are illusory with respect to the innite mind as well. Since what gives rise to the attributes are projections of the nite mind, the innite intellect is forced to perceive through these nite-mind projections as well, and in that sense is dependent on the nite mind. It seems then, that not only is the nite minds knowledge of God illusory, but Gods knowledge of himself is illusory as well a seemingly rather unwelcome result. In light of all these objections, it seems that we can nd some important points on which proponents of the objectivist interpretation agree, even 10 Some salient examples are Donagan, Delahunty, Gueroult and Haserot. Donagan, Essence, 173; Delahunty, Spinoza, 120; Gueroult, Spinoza I, 430; and Haserot, Denition of Attribute, 40. 11 Haserot, Denition of Attribute, 315, and Delahunty, Spinoza, 117. 510 NOA SHEIN though their fully developed positive accounts dier quite a bit. The most important point on which they agree is that the attributes are not projections of the mind (either nite or innite), but really do pertain to the substance. Second, they agree that the attributes are really distinct, not merely rationally distinct, from each other. Third, they seem to agree that it is the innite intellect that is doing the perceiving referred to in 1D4 having the innite intellect do the perceiving is supposed to ground objectivity and the possibility of perfect knowledge in the system. Finally, they hold that the subjectivist account is committed to holding that there is a gap between the attributes and the substance. As I mentioned earlier, these commitments on the side of the objectivist interpretation resurrect a version of the Illusory Knowledge Objection which I will presently address. A NEW ILLUSORY KNOWLEDGE OBJECTION The subjectivist account, then, takes the Simplicity Requirement to be fundamental. The burden for this type of interpretation is to reconcile this with the apparent diversity of attributes. On the other hand, since the objectivist interpretation does not want to accept a mere rational distinction among the attributes, it insists that the distinction between the attributes is real. 12 It is clear that the objectivists want to maintain that there is a distinction in the object (the innite substance) which gives rise to or is the ground or reason for, the distinction among the attributes. The danger, however, that the objectivist interpretation faces is that by insisting on the distinction between the attributes the resulting multiplicity of essences threatens a multiplicity of substances. 13 The tension between holding onto the objectivity of the attributes, on the one hand, and maintaining the unity of the substance, on the other, manifests itself in the literature in several much discussed debates. One important example of a debate that arises from the tension between the objectivity of attributes and the unity of the substance is the debate on the kind of unity that ought to be attributed to modes of parallel attributes. The problem can be stated as follows: modes depend on, are conceived through, and follow from their attributes. Since the attributes are really, and not merely rationally, distinct, it seems that a mode of attribute X ought to be really distinct from a mode of attribute Y. However, Spinoza claims in 12 In this section I am mainly discussing the relation among the attributes and not so much the relation between any given attribute and the substance. Bennett, for example, although he can be classied as an objectivist with respect to the latter, cannot be classied as such with respect to the former (Bennett, Spinozas Ethics, 602 and Eight Questions About Spinoza in Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind: Papers Presented at the Second Jerusalem Conference (Ethica II), edited by Yirmiahu Yovel and Gideon Segal, 1126. 13 Lennon brings up this point as an objection to Gueroult: Lennon, Rationalism, 25. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 511 2P7Schol that mode X under the attribute of Thought and mode X under the attribute of Extension are one and the same. Since the objectivist interpretation wants to insist on the real distinctness (as something grounded in the substance), it has to account for the apparent unity expressed in 2P7Schol. The subjectivist interpretation, of course, does not have to face this problem, since it holds that in reality the attributes are identical. When facing the problem of accounting for the unity of modes, some claim that any given mode in an attribute is numerically identical to its counterparts in other attributes. 14 Others, however, insisting on the cognitive and causal separation between the attributes, argue that the modes cannot be numerically identical. 15 By insisting on the real distinction between the attributes, the objectivist interpretation nds itself, then, having to supplement Spinozas texts by supplying an explanation for the unity (or apparent unity) of the modes of really distinct attributes. One way of addressing this issue that is now popular is to posit trans- attribute features in one capacity or another that might preserve some kind of unity of the modes. As we shall see, however, the positing of these trans- attribute properties will revive a version of the Illusory Knowledge Objection which the objectivists raised against the subjectivists. These trans-attribute properties or features cannot be perceived as such, since everything, for Spinoza, must be perceived under an attribute (1P10Schol). It seems, then, that what accounts for one of the most fundamental features of Spinozas metaphysical system, namely the unity of the modes of dierent attributes, is rendered unknowable in principle on the objectivist inter- pretation. Positing these trans-attribute properties or features renders Gods true nature unknowable. The objectivist interpretation is therefore, in this respect, in no better position than the subjectivist interpretation. Although objectivists take themselves to be oering a radically dierent interpretation, it is important to note the unacknowledged common core shared with their opponent. To conrm this, I have chosen to look at four very inuential interpretations and show rst how their mechanisms for treating the problem of the unity of modes are in fact diverse. Then I will show how this new Illusory Knowledge Objection, nonetheless, can be raised against each of them. This will show not only how this objection can be raised against these specic accounts, but also more generally how it can be raised against any interpretation which shares their commitments regarding the grounds for the distinction among the attributes. 14 Della Rocca, for example, argues for such a view: Della Rocca, Representation, 11840. Others include Henry E. Allison, Benedict De Spinoza: An Introduction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) 86, and E. M. Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinozas Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988) 689, 82. 15 Bennett, Spinozas Ethics, 1439; Delahunty, Spinoza, 121; and Martial Gueroult, Spinoza 2 Lame (Ethique, 2), 86. 512 NOA SHEIN Accounting for the Unity of Modes and Substance In 2P7Schol, after reminding us that the Thinking Substance and the Extended Substance are one and the same substance, Spinoza goes on famously to claim: So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. At rst glance, Spinoza seems to be claiming here that, in the same way that we have only one substance which is comprehended under or expressed in dierent attributes, any given mode is one thing but can be regarded under dierent attributes. Commentators have, however, tried to argue that this prima facie reading cannot be correct, since it seems to violate the real distinction between the attributes or the causal and explanatory barrier between the attributes. Della Rocca expresses this traditional diculty in the following way (although in the end he oers a solution according to which the modes can be taken to be numerically identical); if we were to take mode X of Thought to be the same one, i.e. numerically identical to, mode X in Extension, the following inference would hold: 1. Mode of Extension 1 causes Mode of Extension 2 2. Mode of Thought A Mode of Extension 1 3. Mode of Thought A causes Mode of Extension 2 16 This conclusion, namely (3), is unacceptable, since Spinoza claims over and over again that modes of Thought cannot be the cause of modes of Extension (cf. for example 2P6). Della Rocca maintains both a causal and a conceptual gap between the attributes, and holds that a mode expressed in Extension can be, nonetheless, numerically identical to its counterpart in the attribute of Thought. As we shall see, however, Della Rocca invokes quite a bit of machinery in order to hold this position. Bennett and Donagan maintain that a mode of one attribute cannot be numerically identical to its parallel counterpart in another attribute. Rather than stressing the causal gap between the attributes, as Della Rocca does, they stress that the modes of one attribute cannot be conceived through the other. They claim that if we were to take modes of Extension and modes of Thought to be identical, we would be forced to conceive one through the other. 17 Gueroult, as well, addresses the unity of modes while explaining 2P7 in general. Gueroult points to 1P28 (the innite chain of causes) to solve this problem and draws a distinction between modes of substance and modes of an attribute. 18 16 Della Rocca, Representation, 122. 17 Bennett, Spinozas Ethics, 141; Bennett, Eight Questions, 18. Alan Donagan, Spinozas Dualism, in The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, edited by Richard Kennington, 89102, 967. 18 Gueroult, Spinoza 2, 86. In an as yet unpublished paper titled Causation as Determination and the Innite Series of Finite Modes I argue for an alternative reading of 1P28, according to which the structure of the causal relations expressed in 1P28 is not linear or chain-like, but SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 513 At this point, I would like to focus our attention on Della Rocca, Bennett, Donagan and Gueroult to see how each accounts very dierently for the unity associated with modes of dierent attributes. As I mentioned, this is a problem that only arises for the objectivists precisely because of their insistence on the real distinction among the attributes. My nal aim, however, is to show that the machinery, no matter how dierent and diverse, invoked in order to account for this unity renders these objectivist interpretations vulnerable to a kind of Illusory Knowledge Objection, and therefore, in this regard, an objectivist interpretation is on no better footing than a subjectivist one. Della Roccas Position Della Rocca (as opposed to Bennett and Donagan) claims that the identity that ought to be associated with parallel modes is numerical identity. In order to argue for the numerical identity, Della Rocca draws the familiar distinction between intensional properties and extensional properties: . . . a property is an intensional property if (and only if) contexts involving the attribution of that property to objects are opaque. I will call all other properties extensional properties (Della Rocca, 1996: 129). A context is referentially opaque if the truth value of the sentence resulting from completing the context does depend on which particular term is used to refer to that object (ibid.: 122). A common example of such contexts are contexts involving beliefs. To review that these contexts involve referential opacity, Della Rocca suggests we consider the dierence between these two cases: 1. The spy is a spy. 2. The spy is Johns brother. 3. Therefore, Johns brother is a spy. and 1. John believes that the spy is a spy. 2. The spy is Johns brother (but John does not know this). 3. Therefore, John believes that Johns brother is a spy. Although the inference in the rst case is valid, it is not in the second. In the second case, it seems to be relevant, i.e. aects the validity of the inference, whether the object is picked out as Johns brother or the spy. rather, an all-inclusive network of inter-determining nite modes, and that the causation alluded to must be conceived of primarily as determination sub specie aeternitatis. 514 NOA SHEIN The dierence between the two, then, is that in the rst case the context of the linguistic phrase . . . is a spy is referentially transparent, that is, the truth value of the sentence resulting from completing the context with a term that refers to a particular object does not depend on what particular term is used to refer to that object (ibid.: 122). In the second inference the context John believes that . . . is a spy is referentially opaque; that is, the truth value of the sentence resulting from completing the context does depend on which particular term is used to refer to that object (ibid.: 122). In addition, Della Rocca makes a distinction between the intensional and neutral properties that a mode can have. An intensional property is one which involves an attribute, such as being of a certain volume. Having a certain volume is an intensional property because it presupposes that the thing which has a certain volume has the property of being extended. On the other hand, neutral properties are those which do not presuppose being of any particular attribute (and all of these properties are also extensional, i.e. properties which do not involve opacity in their attribution to objects). One very important implication of this view, as we shall see, is that contexts involving attributes are referentially opaque. Della Rocca outlines his argument as follows: Since all extensional properties must, for Spinoza, be neutral, I will investigate what kinds of properties Spinoza would regard as neutral. By eliciting these neutral properties, it will become evident that, for Spinoza, mind and body share all their neutral properties. From this fact, it follows that mind and body share all their extensional properties and are thus identical. (ibid.: 133) Della Rocca claims that the parallelism lays the ground for the neutral properties, since it not only ensures a one-to-one correspondence between ideas and things, but also that the order and connections of modes in the two series is the same. So, an example of a neutral feature that is shared by parallel modes is the feature of having ve immediate eects (ibid.: 133). Della Rocca argues that if two modes share all their neutral properties, they are identical. Modes cannot be identical in virtue of their intensional properties, since intensional properties are those which involve the attribute. Since intensional properties presuppose their attribute, they cannot be conceived one through the other, and so, with regard to intensional properties, my mind and my body, say, are incommensurable. Neutral properties, Della Rocca claims, contribute by situating the modes in the order and connection between modes, that is, in the innite causal chain. The position of each mode in the order and connection of things is unique. Therefore, if two modes share all their neutral properties, they are situated in the same place in the order and connection of things, and are therefore SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 515 identical. A mode of Thought, e.g. my mind, and a mode of Extension, e.g. my body will be identical, according to Della Rocca, i they share all of their neutral properties (ibid.: 1338). 19 Bennetts Position 20 Bennett, unlike Della Rocca, argues that a mode of Extension P 1 cannot be numerically identical to a mode of Thought M 1 because they belong to dierent attributes, and therefore one cannot cause or be conceived through the other. However, since the identity of P 1 and M 1 is what grounds the parallelism, Bennett introduces a thesis that, he admits, is far from being explicit in the text, but one he believes helps to explain Spinozas argument for the parallelism. Bennett claims that Spinoza is not arguing for numerical identity between modes of dierent attributes, but rather, he is arguing only for an identity of properties: his [Spinozas] thesis about the identity of physical and mental particulars is really about the identity of properties. He cannot be saying that physical P 1 mental M 1 ; that is impossible because they belong to dierent attributes. His thesis is rather that if P 1 is systematically linked with M 1 , then P 1 is extension-and-F for some dierentia F such that M 1 is thought-and-F. What it takes for an extended world to contain my body is exactly what it takes for a thinking world to contain my mind. (Bennett, 1984: 141) The suggestion is that there is a neutral or trans-attribute mode x, which can be combined with either Thought or Extension to become either a mode of Thought or a mode of Extension. As Bennett says: in our present context I must suppose him to be thinking of modes or things, as he calls them as having their attributes peeled o, i.e. as 19 A related interpretation which antedates Della Roccas is presented by Gilead, who claims that the unity of mind and body is due to the location of the nite modes in the imminent chain of causes. Gilead argues that the essence of each mode is its location in this chain which is the same throughout the attributes. He contrasts the essence of a mode with its properties, which are not trans-attributional. As he says: understanding the attribute as a total chain of causes and eects and the principle of individuation which is adequate causation mind and body are the very same essence, the very same link, in this chain, be their properties in each attribute what they may [my translation]. (Gilead, Amihud. The Way of Spinozas Philosophy Toward a Philosophical System. (Jerusalem: Mosad Byalik, 1986, 177) 20 In this context Bennett can be categorized as an objectivist since he claims that the attributes are really distinct. He may not be as easily classied as an objectivist with respect to the relationship between any given attribute and the substance (cf. discussion below.) 516 NOA SHEIN consisting in the F which must be added to extension to get my body or to thought to get my mind. (ibid.: 142) These trans-attribute modes (or dierentiae) lie deeper in the metaphy- sical structure than the attributes. Therefore, trans-attribute modes or dierentiae cannot be conceived as such, not even by an innite intellect, since everything that is conceived must be conceived under an attribute. I will return to this odd claim in more detail in what follows. Bennett thinks that this helps to explain some of the mystery surrounding the denition of attribute. More specically, he believes it aids in understanding why Spinoza claims that attributes are only what the intellect perceives as the essence of substance and not that it is the essence of substance. Spinoza, according to Bennett, claims that attributes are only conceived as the essence of substance and not that they are the essence of substance, because there are features that are more basic than the attributes, namely the trans-attribute mode or dierentiae, which, nonetheless, cannot be perceived as such. Therfore, Bennett claims: . . . 1d4 implies that there is something in the nature of an illusion or error or lack of intellectual depth or thoroughness in taking an attribute to be a basic property (ibid.: 146). Bennett, however, is careful to distinguish the type of illusion he associates with the attributes from the one Wolfson is said to associate with them: Spinoza certainly thought that there are at least two attributes, each of which really is instantiated. But the gunre aimed at Wolfsons interpretations goes wide of mine. I say that Nature really has extension and thought, which really are distinct from one another, but that they are not really fundamental properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect. (ibid.: 147) Bennetts claim, then, is that there is no illusion regarding the distinctness of the attributes, as Bennett claims Wolfson holds, but only in taking the attributes to be fundamental properties of the one substance. For our purposes, it is important to note that Bennett insists on holding onto the objectivity of the distinctness between the attributes, i.e. what he takes to be their real distinction one from another. In addition to the objection I shall raise against objectivist interpretations in general with respect to the Illusory Knowledge Objection, I would now like to raise another objection to Bennetts position. As we saw, there are two separate issues surrounding the objectivity or subjectivity of the attributes. The rst is the relation of any given attribute to the substance, and the second is the relation among the dierent attributes. In this section I have been dealing only with the relationship between the attributes, i.e. in SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 517 what their real distinctness consists. 21 As we saw, in this latter respect Bennett is an objectivist since he wants to hold, in opposition to Wolfson, that: . . . Nature really has Extension and Thought, which really are distinct from one another, but that they are not really fundamental properties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect [italics added] (ibid.: 147). As a result of the distinctness of the attributes, Bennett argues, as we have just seen, for a deeper layer trans-attribute modes in order to account for the identity of parallel modes in Thought and Extension. This last claim seems dicult to reconcile with Bennetts earlier account in his book regarding the relation between any given attribute and the substance. In Section 16, Bennett makes the following claim: I think that here [Ep. 9] he is saying that substance diers from attribute only by the dierence between a substance and an adjectival presentation of the very same content. If we look for how that which is extended (substance) diers from extension (attribute), we nd that it consists only in the notion of that which has . . . extension or thought or whatever; and that, Spinoza thinks, adds nothing to the conceptual content of extension, but merely marks something about how the content is logically structured. As I did in x12.7, he is rejecting the view that a property bearer is an item whose nature qualies it to have properties, in favour of the view that the notion of a property bearer, of a thing which . . . is a bit of formal apparatus, something which organizes conceptual content without adding to it. According to this view, there is an emptiness about the dierence between substance and attribute. (ibid.: 623) Bennett then, seems to be claiming that there is an important sense in which there is no dierence between an attribute and the substance. The dierence does not seem to be in the things themselves, i.e. the attribute, on the one hand, and the substance, on the other, but merely somehow in the way the content is logically structured. However, he insists that there cannot be an absolute identity between an attribute and the substance since Spinoza clearly holds that there are at least two attributes and only one substance (ibid.: 64). Although there is textual evidence for equating attributes with substance, Bennett claims that in some places Spinoza has simply gone too far by implying that attributes are substances (ibid.: 64). No matter which text Bennett wishes to deny concerning the question of the identication of the attribute with the substance, the important point is that he claims that there is an emptiness about the dierence between substance and attribute. It is this last claim that seems dicult to reconcile with his claims later on regarding trans-attribute modes, as we shall presently see. 21 In my dissertation, The Structure of Spinozas Metaphysics: Attributes, Finite Minds and the Innite Intellect (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2006), the second chapter is dedicated to treating the latter relation, namely, the relation between any given attribute and the substance. 518 NOA SHEIN Bennett claims that there is an important sense in which there is no dierence between an attribute and the substance, by stating that an attribute is just a bit of formal apparatus (ibid.: 63). On the other hand, when explaining the nature of trans-attribute modes, he asks us to consider them as having their attribute being peeled o from them (ibid.: 162). In this context Bennett seems to be claiming that attributes are something that can be added or combined with the trans-attribute mode to result in an attribute-mode (i.e. either a mode of Extension or a mode of Thought). It is not clear, however, how this view, namely that of treating attributes as something that can be peeled o or combined with a trans-attribute mode, can be reconciled with the view that attributes are just a bit of formal apparatus. The dierence between an attribute and the substance cannot be as empty as Bennett rst suggests, if attributes can be peeled o or combined with trans-attribute modes. To give a coherent interpretation, then, Bennett must either modify what he takes to be the relation between any given attribute and the substance, or conversely the distinctness of the dierent attributes from each other. Donagans Position Donagan agrees with Bennett that a mode of Extension cannot be numerically identical to a mode of Thought. The reason he provides for this is that a mode of thinking is not extended and a mode of extension is not thinking: it is Spinozas position that nothing can believe, desire, hope, fear, or love except as it is considered under the attribute cogitatio. None of these modes can intelligibly be said to be in a res extensa. And for the same reasons, none of the modes involving motion and rest nothing in what Spinoza called the facies totius universi, which constantly changes according to the same unchanging physical laws can intelligibly be said to be in a res cogitans (cf. EI, P10; EI, P6). (Donagan, 1989: 967) Since the attributes are conceptually independent, one cannot be conceived through the other. However, the numerical identity thesis seems to require that we be able to do precisely that, namely, conceive a mode of Thought through Extension, and vice versa. Although Donagan does not argue independently for a theory regarding the type of identity we ought to associate with modes of dierent attributes, by looking at what he thinks accounts for the unity of substance we can gather some important points that are pertinent to the present discussion. The problem Donagan sets out to solve is how we can prove that we have one substance with an innity of attributes, rather than an innity of SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 519 one-attribute substances, given that each of the attributes is conceptually independent. 22 Donagan follows Bennett, in a way, by establishing something more fundamental than the attributes to account for the unity. For Donagan, rather than positing trans-attribute modes, he argues for a trans-attribute set of laws of immanent causation (from which the modes follow along with the set of laws of transient causation which govern the interaction between the modes) (ibid.: 87). The claim, then, is that when several attributes share the same set of trans-attribute laws of immanent causation, together with the notion that these attributes are projections of each other, then they are attributes of the same substance. In conclusion Donagan claims the following: Two or more attributes constitute the essence of the same substance if and only if it is a law of nature that whatever has either can neither be created nor destroyed, and that it immanently causes modes both in the same order as whatever has the other, and with the same interconnections, although insofar as it is constituted by one, its kind is distinct from what is insofar as it is constituted by the other. (ibid.: 88) The trans-attribute laws of nature, then, together with the set of laws of immanent causation, account for the unity of substance and, to use Bennetts expression, lie deeper than the attributes. Donagan, of course, concedes that these laws of nature cannot be conceived as trans- attributional since they must be conceived under any one of the attributes. Gueroults Position While giving a general explanation of 2P7, Gueroult claims that what accounts for the unity of the modes is established in 1P28. 23 This proposition states that: Every singular thing, or any thing which is nite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an eect unless it is determined to exist and produce an eect by another cause, which is also nite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to produce an eect unless it is determined to exist and produce an eect by another, which is also nite and has a determinate existence, and so on, to innity. 22 Donagan, however, expresses this slightly dierently, posing the problem as having to account for more than one attribute expressing the essence of substance (Donagan, Spinoza, 87). 23 Gueroult, Spinoza 2, 86. 520 NOA SHEIN Gueroult argues that this innite chain of causes follows from the substance, that is, the innite series of nite modes. 24 In his account of 1P28, Gueroult makes the distinction between modes of substance and modes of attributes, and claims that 1P28 concerns modes of substance and not modes of attributes. 25 Since the chain concerns modes of substance, the chain is unique. If it were to concern modes of attributes, there would be an innite number of these chains corresponding to the dierent attributes. Gueroult then argues, regarding 2P7, that the one and the sameness is pointing to modes of substance, i.e. the one in the unique innite chain of modes established in 1P28. He further claims that this one unique innite chain of nite modes is expressed in all the dierent attributes. The Re-emergence of the Illusory Knowledge Objection While trying to reconcile the real distinctness of the attributes with the unity of parallel modes, we see how Della Rocca, Bennett, Donagan and Gueroult, each in their own way, invoke an attribute-neutral structure to account for the unity. Although they dier as to what kind of unity they believe attaches to the modes, they all assign a seemingly deeper or super layer to the metaphysical structure, namely an attribute-neutral one, to account for the unity. Furthermore, by their own admission this layer cannot be conceived as such, since everything must be conceived under one attribute or another. The reason why this level is unknowable is not merely because Spinoza claims that everything must be conceived under an attribute, but it can also be seen to have a Cartesian rationale. I do not believe this last point is appreciated by commentators, although they all invoke Spinozas outright claim that everything must be conceived under an attribute. It is worthwhile to go back to Descartes and examine this consideration. In Article 63 of Part One of the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes claims the following: Thought and extension can be regarded as constituting the natures of intelligent substance and corporeal substance; they must then be considered as nothing else but thinking substance itself and extended substance itself that is, as mind and body. Indeed, it is much easier for us to have an understanding of extended substance or thinking substance than it is for us to understand substance on its own, leaving out the fact that it thinks or is extended. For we have some diculty in abstracting the notion of substance from the notions of thought and extension, since the distinction between these notions and the 24 Cf. n18. 25 Gueroult, Spinoza I, 3389. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 521 notion of substance itself is merely a conceptual distinction. A concept is no more distinct because we include less in it; its distinctness simply depends on our carefully distinguishing what we do include in it from everything else. 26 (CSM, I: 215, AT30) Of relevance to the present discussion is Descartes claim that our conception of substance on its own is more confused than our conception of either extended substance or thinking substance. The reason for this is that since thought (and extension) are only rationally distinct from their substance (i.e. they are identical in re), abstracting substance from thinking substance or extended substance is tantamount to abstracting something from itself. It is no accident, then, that the notion of substance is more confused than either extended substance or thinking substance. This diculty is analogous to trying to abstract an attribute-neutral property or mode in Spinozas metaphysics from modes of Thought or modes of Extension. The way we would go about this would be to consider modes of Thought and then modes of Extension and then try to leave out the fact that it thinks or is extended. However, we cannot adequately leave out the fact that it is thinking or extended and so conceiving an attribute-neutral property or mode is less adequate than thinking an attribute-mode. Not only is it less adequate, but in a way it is literally impossible, since any given mode is conceived through its attribute. A trans-attribute structure is inconceivable in principle by its very nature as beyond the attributes. It seems to be a curious result of the objectivists interpretation that what they take to be one of the most fundamental features of Spinozas metaphysical system is thus rendered unknowable in principle. It is at this point that an analogous objection to the Illusory Knowledge Objection that was raised against the subjectivist interpretation begins to emerge. Recall that the objection to Wolfson was that if attributes are what the nite intellect contributes to its perception of substance, God in His true nature (i.e. without the attributes) is unknowable. This is what seemed to go against the Perfect Knowledge Requirement, that is, that what is conceived through the attributes is conceived as it truly is. It now seems, however, that by insisting on the real distinction between the attributes as something that is grounded in the substance, we are forced to introduce a level into Spinozas metaphysical system that is unknowable by its very nature as 26 All Descartes references, unless otherwise noted, are from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stootho, Dugald Murdoch (vols. I and II) and Anthony Kenny (vol. III). I have also noted the pagination from the standard edition of Descartes writings edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. I have used the following common abbreviations, e.g. CSM, I: 210, AT25, indicates the rst volume of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 210, and page 25 in the Adam and Tannery edition. 522 NOA SHEIN neutral or trans-attributional. 27 Paradoxically, then, by trying to ground the objective nature of the distinction between the attributes in order to ensure true and perfect knowledge, the objectivist interpretation renders knowledge through attributes illusory. Knowledge through the attributes is rendered illusory because there is a level in the system which remains inaccessible. The super true nature of the modes, on the objectivist interpretation, is trans-attributional or attribute-neutral. Not only does the introduction of this trans-attribute or attribute- neutral level to Spinozas metaphysical system land us back in an Illusory Knowledge Objection, it has no textual basis. Bennett admits outright that by positing this trans-attribute level, he is signicantly extrapolating from the text, and it is no secret that nowhere in the text is there a clear statement that there is such a level in the metaphysical system on the contrary, the text seems to deny the possibility of such a level. 28 Commentators believe that this is legitimate as they see no other way of holding onto the real distinction among the attributes, on the one hand, and the unity of modes of parallel attributes, on the other. As I have intimated earlier, I believe the source of the problem is these commentators misunderstanding of what a real distinction is for Spinoza. This misunderstanding can be tracked back to a misunderstanding of what a real distinction (and a rational distinction) are for Descartes. I think it is worthwhile to look more closely at Descartes denition of these distinctions and to emphasize that there is a very important respect in which they are not applicable to Spinozas metaphysics and therefore make these objections suspect. 29 In The Principles of Philosophy, I x60 Descartes denes a real distinction as follows: Strictly speaking, a real distinction exists only between two or more substances; and we can perceive that two substances are really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other. (Principles, I, 60, CSM, I: 213, AT 28) 27 Della Rocca claims that the trans-attribute identity is intelligible in the sense that there is nothing preventing it (Della Rocca, Representation, 150). However, this seems like a dierent kind of knowing than the one that is attached to having ideas of modes, that is, through an attribute. It seems then, that Della Rocca will have to admit that there is another sense of knowing that is being associated with knowing the unity. This knowledge, however, seems to require the kind of abstraction invoked in knowing substance regardless of its attributes that as I showed, is to a degree confused. 28 Bennett, Spinozas Ethics, 142. 29 I draw here mainly on Nolans interpretation of rational distinction in Descartes: Lawrence Nolan, Reductionism and Nominalism in Descartess Theory of Attributes in Topoi, 16 (1997). For two other alternative interpretations of this distinction, cf. Paul Homan, Descartess Theory of Distinction, and Justin Skirry, Descartess Conceptual Distinction and its Ontological Import. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 523 Descartes main claim here is ontological; that is, a real distinction is one which holds between two dierent substances. Evidence of this ontological dierence is the epistemological fact that we can clearly and distinctly conceive the substances apart from each other. A rational distinction, on the other hand, is dened by Descartes as follows: 30 Finally, a conceptual distinction [read rational distinction] is a distinction between a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction between two such attributes of a single substance. Such a distinction is recognized by our inability to form a clear and distinct idea of the substance if we exclude from it the attribute in question, or, alternatively, by our inability to perceive clearly the idea of one of the two attributes if we separate it from the other. (Principles, I, 63, CSM, I: 214, AT 30) A rational distinction for Descartes, then, is one which holds between an attribute and its substance or between two attributes of the same substance. In a letter to an unknown correspondent, Descartes elaborates on this distinction: Thus, when I think of the essence of a triangle, and of the existence of the same triangle, these two thoughts, as thoughts, even taken objectively dier modally in the strict sense of the term mode; but the case is not the same with the triangle existing outside thought, in which it seems to me manifest that essence and existence are in no way distinct. (CSM, III: 280, AT 350) For Descartes, then, an attribute and its substance or two attributes of the same substance, in re, i.e. outside our thought, are in no way distinct. It is only in our thought that these two are separable. As we saw, in Principles, I x63, this ontological fact, i.e. that in re they are in no way distinct, is recognized by our inability to form a clear and distinct idea of the substance excluding the attribute, or to completely exclude from each other the ideas of two attributes of the same substance. For the present discussion all that is necessary to realize is that Spinoza must adjust these notions quite signicantly in order for them to t his ontology. His use of real distinction is the one which will suer the most change. Again, for Descartes a real distinction is one that holds between two substances. Spinoza, of course, cannot adopt this as a denition for a real distinction, since for him there is ultimately only the one innite substance. What he does adopt is the epistemological implication of 30 The translation in CSM is a bit misleading here. CSM translate distinctio rationis as conceptual distinction rather than the preferable rational distinction. In what follows, I shall use the latter term to refer to this type of distinction. 524 NOA SHEIN Descartes denition, namely, that attributes (belonging to dierent substances in Descartes) cannot be conceived one through the other. Thus, in IP10Schol, as we have seen, Spinoza says: From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two dierent substances [italics added]. When Spinoza says that attributes are really distinct, he is saying only that one cannot be conceived through the other and does not imply that one can exist without the other; that is, he adopts the epistemological implications of the distinction but not the ontological ones. Lennon in his article expresses this as follows: In short, Spinoza takes the inevitable step of denying the conceivability-apart principle. He does so for the reason that, while some things are conceivable apart, nothing can exist apart (Lennon, 2005: 24). Nonetheless, some commentators, as we have seen, claim that Spinoza uses the term real distinction to have ontological implications; that is, that there is some distinction in the object which gives rise to the distinction among the attributes. This, in turn, leads quite directly to what I called The New Illusory Knowledge Objection. A FALSE DICHOTOMY What gives rise to the Illusory Knowledge Objection for the subjectivist and objectivist interpretations is that they establish, albeit in dierent ways, a gap between the substance and its attributes. The subjectivist account, as traditionally conceived, introduces this gap by claiming that attributes are something the nite mind adds to its perception of substance. For the objectivists this gap forms when introducing a trans- attribute structure into the metaphysics, which they believe they are forced to do in order to maintain the real distinction among the attributes, on the one hand, and the unity on the other. One way to avoid this type of objection would be to stay clear of introducing such gaps, which is, I suggest, precisely what Spinoza does in fact do. There are three places in the Ethics where Spinoza strictly identies the attributes with the substance. The rst appears in the demonstration to Proposition Four of Part One: Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by A1), i.e. (by D3 and D5) outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their aections. Therefore, there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what is the same (by A4), their attributes, and their aections, q.e.d. [emphasis mine]. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 525 The second piece of evidence occurs in the statement of 1P19: God is eternal, or all Gods attributes are eternal. Finally in the second corollary to 1P20 Spinoza phrases the identication similarly to the way he does in 1P19: It follows second, that God, or all of Gods attributes, are immutable. The talk of an attribute as constituting a substance in the scholium to 1P10 can also be read as implying an identity: From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e. one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two dierent substances. These texts are problematic for both camps. As Gueroult points out, they are problematic for the subjectivist because they seem to deny the possibility of attributes being something added to the substance (Gueroult, 1968: 430). The objectivists, on the other hand, cannot read them literally either, since they are committed to the real distinction between the attributes. The reason this poses a problem is, as Bennett states: Spinoza clearly holds that there are at least two attributes and only one substance (Bennett, 1984: 64). 31 Commentators have tried to solve this apparent problem in dierent ways, none of which are very satisfying. For example, Bennett claims that these texts are simply exaggerations of Spinozas view (Bennett, 1984: 624), while Curley claims the identication ought not be understood as holding between any individual attribute and the substance, but rather between the totality of attributes and the substance (Curley, 1988: 30). A Cartesian Solution In what follows I would like to suggest an outline for an account which does not introduce a gap between the attribute and substance, and takes these crucial pieces of text literally. A fully articulated account would require addressing issues that are beyond the scope of the present paper (such as the structure of the innite intellect). 32 The key here is to begin with Descartes and his theory of distinction and to see how he construes the relationship between the substance and its attributes. Although I have argued above that Spinoza diers in important ways from Descartes in his understanding of 31 Bennett, Curley, Gueroult, Donagan and Gram all argue that the identication cannot be complete. Bennett, Spinozas Ethics, 64; Curley, Geometrical Method, 13; Gueroult, Spinoza I, 50; and Alan Donagan, A Note on Spinoza. Jarrett, however, argues for dierent reasons than my own that attributes and substance are identical. Charles Jarrett, The Logical Structure of Spinozas Ethics. Gram on the other hand argues that this problem has in principle no solution: Moltke Gram, Spinoza, Substance and Predication in Theoria. 32 I do, however, provide such an account in Chapter Three of my dissertation: The Structure of Spinozas Metaphysics: Attributes, Finite Minds and the Innite Intellect. 526 NOA SHEIN what a real distinction is, i.e. adopting only its epistemological implications and not its ontological ones, I want to suggest that he has quite a bit in common with Descartes on how he construes the relation between an attribute and the substance. 33 As we saw earlier, Descartes claims that the distinction between an attribute and its substance (or between two attributes of the same substance) is only a rational distinction. Nolan explains this by claiming the following: part of what it means to say that two things are merely rationally distinct is that they are identical in reality, that they are not two things but one (Nolan, 1997: 130). To support his claim he points to two pieces of text. The rst is Article 63 of Part I in the Principles of Philosophy, which we have already seen and immediately follows the denition of rational distinction: . . . there is some diculty in abstracting the notion of substance from the notions of thought or extension, which of course dier from substance merely by reason [emphasis mine]. What one knows clearly and distinctly is thinking substance and not substance or thinking. In reality there is just thinking substance, but when we abstract, in reason, from this clear and distinct perception, we seem to separate the thinking from its substance. From the fact that we can separate the thinking from its substance in thought, we must not conclude that in reality these two can be separated. The second textual evidence that Nolan oers is from the beginning of the same article: Thought and extension . . . ought to be conceived as nothing other than thinking substance itself and extended substance itself, that is, as mind and body (emphasis mine). 34 Since Thought and Extension are the principal attributes which Descartes identies as the essence of substance, the text implies that the substance just is its essence. This is why Thought is nothing other than the thinking substance itself. These two texts show that Descartes holds that any given attribute and its substance are strictly identical in reality. Recall, however, that Descartes also claimed that a rational distinction holds between attributes of the same substance. Nolan argues that the letter to an unknown correspondent from 1645 or 1646, shows that Descartes holds that attributes of the same substance are identical in reality as well: Thus, when I think of the essence of a triangle, and of the existence of the same triangle, these two thoughts, as thoughts, even taken objectively dier modally in the strict sense of the term mode; but the case is not the same with the triangle existing outside thought, in which it seems to me manifest that essence and existence are in no way distinct [Italics added]. (Descartes, CSMK, III: 280 AT350) 33 As I mentioned, I am drawing here mainly on Nolans understanding of this relationship. Nolan, Descartess Theory of Attributes. 34 Nolans translation. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 527 Descartes here is claiming that the essence of the triangle one of its attributes and the existence of the triangle another of its attributes are, outside of thought, identical, even though in thought we can distinguish between them; that is, we can have an idea of the essence of the triangle and a separate idea of the existence of the triangle. These ideas, in so far as they are distinct ideas, are modally distinct. However, to repeat: simply because we have two ideas of the essence of the triangle and of the existence of the triangle does not mean that in reality the essence and the existence of the triangle are distinct. On the contrary, they are in no way distinct. What is peculiar about the rational distinction, as opposed to real and modal distinctions, is that in some sense it is not a distinction at all. As Nolan says, there are no two things that bear a relation to each other, because substance and attribute are in re the same, i.e. it is only in reason that they can be taken apart and seen as two things. 35 If the things, i.e. the attributes among themselves or the attribute and the substance are identical in reality, for Descartes, the question is where can the diversity arise from? If there is only one thing, how or why does it appear as two? To answer this, Nolan points back to the letter to the unknown correspondent: [We] understand the essence of a thing in one way when we consider it in abstraction from whether it exists or not, and in a dierent way when we consider it as existing; but the thing itself cannot be outside our thought without its existence. (CSMK III: 280 AT350) The diversity emerges, then, because we regard the singular substance in dierent ways we can regard the thing either in abstraction from its existence or as existing. From our ability to regard the thing in dierent ways, we come to think of the existence as distinct from the thing. Descartes, then, believes that, strictly speaking, the attribute and the substance are identical; that is, only a distinction of reason holds between them. He posits the same regarding the relationship between two attributes of the same substance. As I mentioned earlier, Spinoza adopts Descartes 35 In the letter to the unknown correspondent Descartes says the following: I call it a conceptual distinction that is, a distinction made by reason ratiocinatae. I do not recognize any distinction made by reason ratiocinantis that is, one which has no foundation in reality because we cannot have any thought without a foundation. This might make it seem as though Descartes is claiming that a rational distinction has a foundation in reality. However, all he is claiming here is that the idea of things that are said to be rationally distinct have a foundation in reality, not that the distinction has a foundation in reality; that is, the foundation in reality of the essence of the triangle is the triangle in reality, and the foundation for the idea of the existence of the triangle is the same triangle. However, there is no foundation in reality for the distinction between the two, because there are no two things essence and existence that exist as distinct in reality. 528 NOA SHEIN position regarding the so-called relationship between attributes and substance, but at least terminologically will not call the distinction between the attributes of the same substance a rational distinction. In 1P10Schol Spinoza claims that the attributes of the one substance are really distinct from each other. Spinoza uses the term really distinct because, as I have said, he takes on only the epistemological implication that Descartes associates with this distinction, namely that the attributes are conceived apart or one cannot be conceived through the other. Spinoza does not, however, assume the ontological implications Descartes associates with this distinction; namely, that what is conceived apart actually exists apart, or more importantly that what gives rise to this distinction is something grounded in the object itself. To see that Spinoza adopts Descartes view regarding the relationship between any given attribute and the substance, one need only look at those places in the Ethics where he explicitly identies the attributes with the substance, which we saw earlier (1D4, 1P10Schol, 1P19 and 1P20). Applying Descartes to Spinoza In order to do justice to these texts and not dismiss them as an exaggeration, on the one hand, or commit Spinoza to holding that the one substance is a super union of attributes, on the other, I propose the following: rst, to adopt Descartes interpretation of the relation between attribute and substance and apply it to Spinoza, i.e. hold that there is only a distinction of reason between the two; second, not to take real distinction in Spinoza to have ontological implications. This will allow us to maintain a literal reading of the text while maintaining the simplicity of the one substance; that is, each attribute is strictly identied with the substance. Furthermore, 1P10Schol ts with this interpretation, since the real distinction which holds between attributes claims not that there is something in the substance on account of which they are separated, but only that each attribute must be conceived through itself and is not conceived through another. The same question that arose for Descartes arises for Spinoza: if the attributes and substance are identical in re, where does the diversity arise from? Here as well, I would like to suggest, without fully arguing for this, that Spinoza follows Descartes and holds that the multiplicity arises from the fact that we, nite minds, can conceive the substance in dierent ways. 36 The nite intellect regards the substance in two fundamentally dierent ways, either as Thought or as Extension. That the nite mind can regard the substance in these two dierent ways is established axiomatically in 2A2 and 2A4; that is, it is because [m]an thinks [NS: or, to put it dierently, we know that we think] (2A2) and that [w]e feel a certain body [NS: our body] is 36 Cf. n31. SPINOZAS THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES 529 aected in many ways (2A4) that the nite mind conceives the substance as thinking or as extended. As I mentioned, a full argument for it being the nite intellect that perceives would require treating topics that are beyond the scope of the present paper. What is important to keep in mind is that this suggestion stays clear of the problems raised for both the subjective and objective interpretations. These conceptions of the nite mind are not something added to the conception of substance; nor is there a gap between our conceptions of the substance and the substance itself. As we have just seen, the reason why there is no gap or anything illusory about the conception of attributes is that attributes are only rationally distinct from the substance; that is, in re they are the same. To conceive the attribute is to conceive the substance. Since I am claiming that attributes are only rationally distinct from the substance, it seems that perhaps one can conclude that attributes are only rationally distinct from each other. This potential objection can be expressed, somewhat crudely, as follows: Thought is identical to God (or the substance) and Extension is identical to God (or the substance). Therefore, by transitivity, Thought is identical to Extension. This last step, however, seems to contradict 1P10Schol, where Spinoza claims that Thought and Extension are really distinct; that is, not identical. This objection can be partly addressed by noticing its similarity to the case made famous by Frege of the Morning Star and Evening Star. With respect to their referent, the Morning Star and the Evening Star are identical. However, they are not identical with respect to their sense. They each pick out, so to speak, the referent dierently. Expressed in Cartesian terminology, which we saw above, we can say that in re the Morning Star and the Evening Star are identical, but only distinguished from each other in reason (namely, by picking out the referent in dierent ways). Similarly, in re Thought and Extension are identical. As I have suggested, the multiplicity of attributes arises from the multiple ways in which the mind can regard the substance. As to the relation between the two attributes, we can follow what we have just said about the case of the Morning and Evening Star; that is, Thought and Extension are, in Cartesian terms (not Spinozistic terms) rationally distinct, i.e. identical in re but distinguished from each other by reason. Spinoza, of course, does not adopt here the Cartesian terminology. In 1P10Schol he says that Thought and Extension are really distinct. As I have emphasized earlier, however, one must not take it that Spinoza here is using the term real distinction in the way that Descartes does. For Spinoza, claiming that Thought and Extension are Cartesianally rationally distinct (i.e. identical in re and distinguished only by reason) does not conict with claiming that they are Spinozistically really distinct (i.e. one cannot be conceived through the other). The distinction (the Spinozistically real distinction) between the attributes is not something that is grounded in the object. Thought and Extension, then, are identical in re since they arise from dierent ways of regarding one and the same thing. Nonetheless, Thought 530 NOA SHEIN and Extension are Spinozistically really distinct, since one cannot be thought through the other. CONCLUSION The main aim of the present paper, then, was to show that although the subjectivist interpretation, as traditionally conceived, is problematic, the alternative objectivist interpretations are no less so. If nothing else, this shows the need for a radically new understanding of the theory of attributes whose guidelines I have suggested above. Furthermore, one of the most important conclusions I wish to draw in this paper is that the subjectiveobjective dichotomy is a false one. One of the reasons that lead to this apparent dichotomy is that commentators have failed to appreciate that the answers to the following questions are separate: Which intellect is it that perceives the essence of substance? and Do attributes really pertain to the substance or are they only falsely perceived to pertain to it? Commentators have wrongly assumed that to say that it is the nite intellect necessarily implies that there is some kind of illusion in perceiving the attributes as constituting the essence of substance. 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