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RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO v. EMILIANA M.

ROJAS
G.R. No. 167120 April 23, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: Emiliana M. Rojas is the widow of the late Jose Rojas, while the other respondents are
the children of the spouses. On the other hand, herein petitioner Rodolfo V. Francisco is one of
the the applicants for registration in Land Registration Case No. 95-0004. Subject of the
controversy is a portion of the 3,181.74 hectares of a vast track of land, known as the Hacienda
de Angono which used to be owned by one Don Buenaventura Guido upon whose death left
said portion to his two (2) sons Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido.

Decreto No.6145 covering the subject land was issued in favor of the brothers Francisco and
Hermoenes. Original Certificate of Title No. 633 was then issued in their name but was
subsequently cancelled several years later and was replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2337. Nine (9) years later, the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes adjudicated among
themselves the same land and transferred the one-half (1/2) portion thereof to Jose A. Rojas.
Allegedly, the adjudication was formalized by the heirs of the brothers only when they
purportedly executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Quitclaim.
Meanwhile, Alfredo Guido, Sr. filed a petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377, alleging that
the original of the same title could not be located in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
when he and his co-heirs sought the registration of their aforementioned [Extra]-Judicial
Settlement of Estate With Quitclaim. The petition was supported by the owners duplicate copy
of the title sought to be reconstituted which was granted.
Subsequently, the entire parcel of land covered by Decreto No. 6145 was subdivided into
twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of title were issued in lieu of the
reconstituted TCT No. 23377.
The heirs, who executed the aforesaid document of extra-judicial settlement, including spouses
Jose Rojas and Emiliana Rojas, sold the property to Pacil Management and new titles were
issued in its favor. Three (3) months later, Pacil reconveyed all the 21 lots to the former owners.
Fourteen (14) of the 21 lots were exchanged for shares of stock of Interport Resources
Corporation and all the named heirs in the same Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate With
Quitclaim renounced their rights over the remaining portion of the 3,181.74 hectares in favor of
their co-heir Alfredo Guido, Sr., in exchange for monetary considerations.
It appears, however, that barely five (5) months from the time Alfredo Guido, Sr. filed his
petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377, an Application for Registration of Title over four
(4) parcels of land (Lots 1, 2, 3, 4) which are presently alleged by the respondents to be
"overlapping a portion of the area covered by TCT No. 23377," was filed with the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 10, by petitioner Rodolfo Francisco about which petition the
respondents now claim to be unaware of.
The court issued an Order of General Default premised on the fact that despite notice which
was duly published, posted and served in accordance with law, "no person has appeared as
respondent in the case or filed an answer within the time for that purpose allowed declaring
the applicant Franciscos "the true and absolute owners of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4.
The Republic of the Philippines then filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Decreto No.
6145, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377 and all titles derived from said decree
alleging that said titles are false, spurious and fabricated, and were never issued by virtue of
judicial proceedings for registration of land, either under Act No. 496, as amended, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, or any other law. However, the same was dismissed both
by the CFI and CA, and subsequently by the Supreme Court denying its prayer that recognition
of the authenticity of Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 shall not affect and prejudice the
parcels of land already possessed and owned by bona fide occupants therein with lengths of
possession which had ripened to ownership, the latter to be determined in an appropriate
proceeding.
ISSUES: 1) What is the appropriate proceeding that was contemplated by this honorable
court in the Guido Case?
2) Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition may be entertained despite being
admittedly filed exceedingly beyond the mandatory and jurisdictional 60-day period.
RULING: 1) The Franciscos have based their claim to ownership of the subject lots on the
alleged fact of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Their application represented to the land
registration court that the parcels of land subjects of the case were unregistered and not yet
brought within the coverage of the Torrens system of registration.
As the very nature of the action limits the subject matter to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, an ordinary registration proceeding cannot be availed of by the Franciscos in
order to establish claims over lands which had already been brought within the coverage of the
Torrens system. Chapter III (I) of PD 1529 does not provide that original registration
proceedings can be automatically and unilaterally converted into a proceeding for the issuance
of new TCT involving parcels of land already registered under the Torrens system. Certainly, it
is improper to make a legal short-cut by implementing the judgment of the land registration
court against the parcels of land in the names of the Rojases and Guidos under the guise that it
is contemplated in Guido.
A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in
the name of another in an earlier land registration case. Issuance of another decree covering the
same land is, therefore, null and void. What the land registration court should have done was to
dismiss the application for registration upon learning that the same property was already
covered by a valid TCT. We reiterate that, unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land
in a land registration or cadastral proceeding does not become final and incontrovertible until
after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration and that until
such time the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Until then the
court rendering the decree may, after hearing, set aside the decision or decree and adjudicate
the land to another person.
The "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Guido is a case where the Franciscos must present
specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claim that they are bona fide occupants of Lots 1-
4 of Psu-04-001463 while, at the same time, respondents are accorded due process of law by
availing of the opportunity to oppose and refute the representations made by the Franciscos.
Whatever the "appropriate proceeding" may be, the decisive factor is that the same should be a
proceeding in personam wherein personal service of summons and copy of the
complaint/petition is necessary.
Truly, one of the appropriate legal remedies that should have been availed of by the Franciscos
is an action for reconveyance. Contrary to petitioners declaration, proof of actual fraud is not
required as it may be filed even when no fraud intervened such as when there is mistake in
including the land for registration. In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
highly respected as incontrovertible; what is sought instead is the transfer of the property
wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name to its rightful owner or to the one with
a better right.
2) YES. Herein petitioner contends that the CA should have dismissed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed by respondents on January 3, 2001 for being filed beyond the 60-day
reglementary period in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules from the time they allegedly
discovered the existence of LRC Case No. 95-0004 in June 2000. He asserts that failure to perfect
an appeal within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality but mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature and that, for want of allegations of compelling reason for the court to
exercise its equity jurisdiction, procedural rules on timeliness of filing should have been strictly
adhered to.
Indeed, respondents committed a lapse in procedure, but not due to a petition that was
filed out of time before the CA. Respondents erred because they should have filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 thereof. Such petition does not require a person to be a party to the judgment sought to be
annulled. Nevertheless, considering that the petition before the CA essentially alleged lack of
jurisdiction and denial of due process two grounds upon which a petition for annulment of
judgment may be based (aside from extrinsic fraud) it is deemed wise to ignore the procedural
infirmity and resolve the substantial merits of the case, especially so since the action filed is not
yet barred by laches or estoppel.


SKUNAC CORPORATION v. ROBERTO and CAESAR SYLIANTENG
G.R. No. 205879 April 23, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

FACTS: The subject of controversy are two (2) parcels of land identified as Lot 1, with an area of
1,250 square meters and Lot 2, with an area of 990 square meters, both found in Block 2 of the
Pujalte Subdivision which are portions of a parcel of land previously registered in the name of
Luis A. Pujalte and covered by TCTNo. (-78865) (-2668) -93165 ("Mother Title") of the Register of
Deeds for the City of Manila.
Respondents Roberto and Caesar Sylianteng claim ownership over the subject lots based on a
Deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by their mother, Emerenciana Sylianteng on June
27, 1983. They further allege that Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late Luis Pujalte
through a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958 as reflected in Entry No. P.E. 4023, annotated on the
covering TCT, by virtue of which she was issued TCT No. 42369. Then, when she sold the lots to
appellants, TCT No. 39488, covering the same, was issued in their names.
Petitioners Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. Enriquez, on the other hand, claim that a certain
Romeo Pujalte who was declared by the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 as the sole heir of Luis
Pujalte, caused the reconstitution of the Mother Title resulting to its cancellation and the
issuance of TCT No. 5760-R in his favor. Romeo Pujalte then allegedly sold the lots to Skunac
and Enriquez in 1992. Thus, from TCT No. 5760-R, TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was issued in the
name of Skunac, while TCT No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was issued in the name of Enriquez.
Respondents contend that they have a better right to the lots in question because the
transactions conveying the same to them preceded those claimed by petitioners as source of the
latter's titles. They further assert that petitioners could not be considered as innocent purchasers
in good faith and for value because they had prior notice of the previous transactions as stated
in the memorandum of encumbrances annotated on the titles covering the subject lots.
Petitioners, for their part, maintain that respondents acquired the lots under questionable
circumstances it appearing that there was no copy of the Deed of Sale, between Emerenciana
and Luis Pujalte, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds.
ISSUES: 1) Is the provision of the Civil Code on Double Sale of registered land (Art. 1544)
applicable in the present case?
2) Is the best evidence rule applicable in the present case?
3) Is notarization an evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed?
4) May Romeo, as sole heir of Luis, validly sell the subject land and subsequently issue a TCT in
favor of petitioners?
RULING: 1) NO. Reliance by the trial and appellate courts on Article 1544 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. The requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply are:
(a) The two (or more sales) transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each represent conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter
must each have bought from the very same seller.

Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were
initiated not by just one but two vendors. In the present case, the subject lots were sold to
petitioners and respondents by two different vendors Emerenciana and Romeo Pujalte. Hence,
Article 1544 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

2) NO. Petitioners assail the authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale between Luis
and Emerenciana contending that respondents' presentation of the "duplicate/carbon" original
of the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958 is in violation of the best evidence rule under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. However, the best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present
case. It only applies when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the
issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply
and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need to account for the original.

In the instant case, what is being questioned
is the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its
contents.
3) YES. Evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed is the fact that it was
notarized. The notarization of a private document converts it into a public document. Moreover,
a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution, is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. This presumption is affirmed if it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.
To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
In the present case, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to prove that the
notarization of the subject deed was irregular as to strip it of its public character. On the
contrary, a certified copy of page 26 of the notarial register of the notary public who notarized
the subject deed of sale, which was issued by the Records Management and Archives Office of
Manila, shows that the sale of the subject lots by Luis to Emerenciana was indeed regularly
notarized.
4) NO. Evidence shows that Romeo never became the owner of the subject properties for two
reasons. First, the disputed lots were already sold by Luis during his lifetime. Thus, these
parcels of land no longer formed part of his estate when he died. As a consequence, Romeo's
sale of the disputed lots to petitioners was not affirmed by the estate court, because the subject
parcels of land were not among those included in the said estate at the time that Romeo was
appointed as the administrator thereof. As shown in its October 11, 1993 Order, the RTC of
Pasig, acting as an estate court, denied Romeo's motion for approval of the sale of the subject
lots, because these properties were already sold to respondents per report submitted by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan.
Second, even granting that the subject lots formed part of the estate of Luis, it was subsequently
proven in a separate case that Romeo is not his heir. In a criminal case for use of falsified
documents filed against Romeo, it was proven that his claim of heirship is spurious. In the said
criminal case, his birth certificate and the marriage certificate of his supposed parents, which he
presented before the estate court, to prove his claim that he is the sole heir of Luis, were found
by the criminal court to be falsified.
Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo never acquired any right whatsoever over the subject
lots, even if he was able to subsequently obtain a title in his name. It is a well-settled principle
that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what
one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller
can transfer legally. Since Romeo has no right to the subject lots, petitioners, who simply
stepped into the shoes of Romeo, in turn, acquired no rights to the same.

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