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Facts: Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were the existing heirs of the late
Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without
an judicial authorization or even extra judicial agreement the administration of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These
properties included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a lot in Magallanes
Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.

Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be rendered in restoring and returning to them one half of the total value of
the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the aforementioned properties. However, respondent Matilde asserted that she
never refused to give the plaintiff her share of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar are
obliged to pay rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.

Issue: Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the said property

Held: No. The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property was a mere exercise of
their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-owners right of use is that he must use it in such a way so
as not to injure the interest of the other co-owners. In the case at bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of
the spouses Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same


Facts: Plaintiffs purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one of the duly authorized agents of the National Charity
Sweepstakes Office one ticket for the sum of two pesos (P2), said ticket was registered in the name of Jose Gatchalian and
Company.The ticket won one of the third-prizes in the amount of P50,000.

Jose Gatchalian was required to file the corresponding income tax return covering the prize won. Defendant-Collector made
anassessment against Jose Gatchalian and Co. requesting the payment of the sum of P1,499.94 to the deputy provincial treasurer of
Pulilan, Bulacan. Plaintiffs, however through counsel made a request for exemption. It was denied.

Plaintiffs failed to pay the amount due, hence a warrant of distraint and levy was issued. Plaintiffs paid under protest a part of the tax
and penalties to avoid the effects of the warrant. A request that the balance be paid by plaintiffs in installments was made. This was
granted on the condition that a bond be filed.

Plaintiffs failed in their installment payments. Hence a request for execution of the warrant of distraint and levy was
made. Plaintiffspaid under protest to avoid the execution.

A claim for refund was made by the plaintiffs, which was dismissed, hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether the plaintiffs formed a partnership hence liable for Income tax.

Held: Yes. According to the stipulation facts the plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because each of them put up
money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may win, as they did in fact in the
amount of P50,000. The partnership was not only formed, but upon the organization thereof and the winning of the prize, Jose
Gatchalian personally appeared in the office of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collection
the prize, the office issued the check for P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the said partner, in the same
capacity, collected the said check. All these circumstances repel the idea that the plaintiffs organized and formed a community of
property only.

DIAZ, M p:

1. Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the depository, and when he is, he is subject to the same obligations
imposed by law on all depository with respect to the preservation of the thing with the care, diligence and interest of a good father.

2. For the administration and better enjoyment of thing owned in common, according to article 398 of the Civil Code, it is mandatory
that there be an agreement of the majority of the participants (owners).

1880: Certain jewelry were manufactured through the efforts of 6 pious ladies of Pagsanjan, Laguna,
o They were sisters Pia and Paula Lavadia, sisters Martina and Matea Lavadia, and sisters Elizabeth Lavadia and
Engracia Lavadia.
The ladies contributed their own jewelry in the making of the crown and also contributed money in the cost of making them.
o The jewelries consist of a golden crown encrusted with diamonds and a diamond choker, bright, also a belt embedded
with diamonds and diamonds, a gold necklace also completely embedded with glitter, gold bracelet encrusted with
diamonds and diamonds, iron silver gilt where the jewels are placed above, and other various pieces of gold silver or
gold for the decoration of the costumes of the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe
They sent said jewelries to adorn and decorate the Image of Our Lady of Guadalupe, patroness of the said township, retaining
for themselves, the ownership of the same
When they were finished, its owners agreed that these jewels would be left with the taxpayer Pia Lavadia. She had the jewelrys
custody until her death in 1882.
Then, her sister Paula Lavadia succeeded her in the custody of the same.
At Paula Lavadia 's death, her husband Peter Rosales, succeeded her in the care, preservation and custody of such jewelry
When he died, their daughter Paz Rosales, in turn succeeded him in the jewelrys custody, preservation and care.
At Paz Rosales' death, the crown and jewels passed to the custody of her husband Baldomero Cosme.
After Baldomero Cosme, said jewelry passed to Manuel Soriano.
He was succeeded in the custody, preservation and management of the jewelry by the defendant herein Rosario Cosme
Every year since 1980 to date, the jewels in question were used to decorate the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe in Pagsanjan,
and none of those who have been keeping or guarding these jewels had intended exclusive possession as owner.
Feb. 9, 1938: Rosario, in her capacity as administrator of the deceased intestate Baldomero Cosme, notified all persons
interested in such gems, that she would do a formal delivery of such jewelry to the Bishop of Lipa on February 12, 1938,
informing them that they might witness the act of delivery (without the consent of the other co-owners)
Feb. 12, 1938: Rosario and her husband did make formal delivery of the jewels, giving the document for that purpose.
At this time, the original owners (6 pious ladies) have died, with the exception the plaintiff widow Dona Engracia y Lavadia
Fernandez. The other plaintiffs are the heirs of Isabel, Matea and Martina Lavadia while the defendant Rosario Cosme de
Mendoza and her co-defendants are legitimate heirs and descendants of Paula Lavadia.
Plaintiffs not in accord with such delivery designated Engracia Lavadia, one of the original owners, as recamadora
plaintiff, to have in her care the crown and jewelry in question
June 21, 1938: The Bishop of Lipa, knowing the problem of possession, granted the administration giving custody of such crown
jewels (magulo tong fact na to, di ko matranslate)
Plaintiffs then filed a case to claim the possession and custody of all the said jewelry. All these jewels are locked now and
deposited in the Bank of the Philippine Islands, for it was there that Rosario Cosme had deposited the same.
Defendants Allegations:
o Rosario and his co-defendants do not intend to be sole owners of the said jewelry.
o On the intestacy of Baldomero Cosme, they have told the Court that they never claimed such dominion of jewelry or any
part thereof.
However, Rosario and her predecessors have complied faithfully in performing their duties as repositories and therefore the
court cannot withdraw the deposit of the jewelries
LOWER COURT: Against Rosario and co-defendants
o Plaintiffs are owners of said fourth-sixths of jewelry, and that the defendants are only owners of the remainder or only
two sixths
o The one who had a perfect right to determine who was to take charge of the jewels custody, were the plaintiffs and they
entrusted such care to Engracia Lavadia, one of the primitive owners.
o Rosario should deliver all of the jewels to the plaintiffs as she has been acting only as trustee and fiduciary
Defendants filed an appeal, believing the court erred:
o (1) in finding that the appellant Rosario Cosme de Mendoza, and her predecessors are in the possession of the said
jewels, but acted only as trustees, and fiduciaries ,
o (2) stating that appellees are owners of four sixths of jewelry, which for this reason, have the right to exercise
the designation of the person to whom to entrust their care,
o (3) by failing to declare that appellant Rosario Cosme de Mendoza, being co-owner and fiduciary of such jewelry
cannot be deprived of her administration and custody, except for reasons that she is incapacitated to do so, or
performs acts contrary to the will of their primitive owners, or dispose of the above jewels at will,
o (4) to stop claiming that Pia Lavadia and their descendants, down to Rosario Cosme de Mendoza, who had had the
custody and possession of the said jewels, have played their duties faithfully

1) Whether Ramona was a depositary and therefore obligated to return the jewelries to the owners even if she is a co-owner?
2) Whether the plaintiffs constitute the majority of the co-owners and therefore can elect who has custody of the property owned in
common? (YES)
3) Whether, assuming that Ramona is a depositary, the property cannot be withdrawn as she has complied faithfully in performing
their duties as repository? (NO, it can be withdrawn)

1) The contract which existed between the first owners of the jewels at issue and the first person who had their custody, was a
contract of deposit.
According to this contract as defined in Articles 1758 and following the Civil Code, Pia Lavadia first, and afterwards Paula
Lavadia and then her descendants, one being Rosario, received and possessed, one after the other, the said jewels, only for
purposes of custody or such that they must not use them for their own benefit.
If it was under a deposit agreement, it is clear that to those who received the jewelry has an obligation to return them to their
owners as soon as claimed by the latter.
Article 1766 of the Civil Code: "The, depositary is obliged to keep the thing and restore it, when so requested, to the
depositor, or his successors, or the person who has been designated in the contract. Their responsibility for the care and the loss
of the thing, is governed by the provisions of title I of this book. "
The restitution must be made with all the fruits and accessions of the thing deposited, if any, without it being given to the
depositary who may not withhold, as Sanchez says Roman, (IV Sanchez Roman, 885), even under the pretext of obtaining
compensation for other credits or compensated for expenses incurred for preservation.
ROSARIO AND OTHERS: Contract is not that of a deposit because the jewels cannot be considered as belonging to other
persons with respect to Rosario as she is also a co-owner as descendant of one of its early owners.
SC: The first owners of the jewelry concerned who came to entrust the custody of the same to some of them, expressly
reserved them to their property. Even among co-owners of a thing, one of them may be the depository, and thus it is
subject to the same obligations imposed by law on all depository with respect to the conservation of the thing with the
care, diligence and interest of a good father. "Joint owner. The fact that the depositary is a joint owner of the res does not
alter the degree of diligence required of him." (C. J. 18, 570).

2) Appellees are owners of said fourth-sixths of jewelry, and appellants only own the remaining portion (2/6). Therefore, Engracia
Lavadia must have the custody and administration of these jewels as she was entrusted by the appellees, constituting the majority of
the primitive owners
As there is no evidence of the contribution of the six primitive owners in the making or acquisition of the jewels often
mentioned in the same proportion, the conclusion, as reasonable as it is - and this is supported by a presumption of law (Art.
393, Civil Code) - is that the cost is the same and as such the portions corresponding to the participants of the
community shall be presumed of an equal share.
For the administration and better enjoyment of thing owned in common, according to article 398 of the Civil Code, it is
mandatory that there be an agreement of the majority of the participants.

3) The deposit agreement is such that allows the depositor to withdraw from the depository, the thing deposited, any time he
wanted, especially, when the latter, as in the case of Rosario Cosme Mendoza, has executed an act against the order received in
trying to entrust to another's custody and administration the thing deposited, on their own without the consent of depositors or their

DISPOSITIVE: Lower Court Affirmed.

Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period does not terminate the co-ownership and does not
vest in him sole ownership.

Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he mortgaged the land to Rural Bank
of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan. Francisco died in without paying the debt. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and
children Amparo, Carlos, Severo, Grace, Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.

The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina, Norma, Lina, Carlos and
Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of Amparo. Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses

Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a complaint for recovery and legal redemption with
damages against spouses Mariano.

RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia, et. al.

Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole owner of said property
and terminates the existing state of co-ownership?

No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the
period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole
ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-
ownership. Redemption is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day
period has not even begun to run.

AGUILAR v. CA- Co-ownership

Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter
the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his
remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they
agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilios family was in Cebu. After their
fathers death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the
issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to
accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial
proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte
without the respondent and held that the property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in
addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. Respondents appealed this and the decision was
reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court.
Hence this appeal.

A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2)
in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial?
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?

A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is clear that the appearance of parties at the
pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the
discretion of the court to grant the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found
that the reason for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when
they denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of
them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of
the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-
owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art.
498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of
them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.

SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded
1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of
the other half of the property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.



Cleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land (Lot 2319) to his 11 children. The children never formally divided the property
amongst themselves except through hantal-hantal whereby each just occupied a certain portion and developed each.
On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were interested in the land so they started buying the portion of land that each of the heirs
occupied. On 11 Apr 1973, one of the children, Fortunato, entered into a contract of sale with Lumayno. In exchange of his lot,
Lumayno agreed to pay P5,000.00. She paid in advance P30.00. Fortunato was given a receipt prepared by Lumaynos son in law
(Andres Flores). Flores also acted as witness. Lumayno also executed sales transactions with Fortunatos siblings separately.

In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make the the delivery to her of the registrable deed of sale over Fortunatos portion of the
Lot No. 2319. Fortunato assailed the validity of the contract of sale. He also invoked his right to redeem (as a co-owner) the portions
of land sold by his siblings to Lumayno. Fortunato died during the pendency of the case

ISSUE: WON, Partition already took place.


. Francisco v Boiser
GR 137677; May 31, 2000; 2
Div; J.Mendoza; by Erwin Roxas

1. Francisco and 3 sisters own 4 lands on which stands Ten Commandments Building
2. They sold 1/5 of the undivided share to their mother, making the mother a co-owner.
3. Aug 8, 1986: Mother, without knowledge of her daughters, sold her 1/5 share to Boiser, another sister of Francisco.
4. Aug 5, 1992: Francisco received summons for a complaint filed by Boiser demanding her share in the rentals collected by Francisco
from the building tenants.
5. Francisco however counterclaimed by exercising her right of redemption as co-owner.
6. However, Boiser was declared non-suited, so the case and the counterclaim were dismissed.
7. In a new case, Francisco filed for the redemption contending the 30-day redemption period had not yet begun since the vendor, the
mother, never informed her and the other co-owners of the sale.
8. Boiser contended that Francisco knew of the sale as early as May 30, 1992 when Boiser sent her a letter demanding the rentals with
the Deed of Sale attached.
9. RTC and CA dismissed Franciscos complaint for legal redemption saying Art1623 does not prescribe any form of notifying co-owners of
the sale to enable the co-owners to exercise the right of redemption. The letter sent by Boiser to Francisico with a copy of the deed of
sale was a substantial compliance to the required written notice, thus the 30-day period already expired before Francisco exercised her
right of redemption.

Was there sufficient compliance with the required written notice? NO. Notice should come from vendor. However, SC in view of justice
considered the receipt of summons by Francisco (when Boiser filed demand for rentals) as actual knowledge of the sale, so that Francisco can be
allowed to exercise her right of redemption without waiting for the notice to be sent by the vendor (mother).

Art 1623 NCC: The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case maybe. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

(Flip flop cases)
In Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons [4 SCRA 526 (1962)], the Court ruled that Art. 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly prescribes that the
(30) days for making the pre-emption or redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor.
Etcuban v. Court of Appeals [148 SCRA 507 (1987)]: Despite the apparent meaning of Art. 1623, it was held it was "of no moment" that the
notice of sale was given not by the vendor but by the vendees. "So long as the [co-owner] is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars
thereof, the 30 days for redemption stair running, and the redemptioner has no cause to complain.
In Salatandol v. Retes [162 SCRA 568 (1988)]... the Court expressly affirmed the ruling in Butte that the notice required by Art. 1623 must be
given by the vendor. In Salatandol, the notice given to the redemptioner by the Register of Deeds of the province where the subject land was
situated was held to be insuffucient.

Reversion to the ruling in Butte is proper. Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the
vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is, therefore, no room for construction. Indeed, the principal difference
between Art. 1524 of the former Civil Code and Art. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify who must give the notice, whereas
the present one expressly says the notice must be given by the vendor. Effect must be given to this change in statutory language.

it makes sense to require that the notice required in Art. 1623 be given by the vendor and by nobody else the vendor of an undivided
interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners who under the law must be notified of the sale. It is likewise the notification from
the seller, not from anyone else, which can remove all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection, and its validity, for in a contract of sale, the
seller is in the best position to confirm whether consent to the essential obligation of selling the property and transferring ownership thereof to
the vendee has been given.

[However], it is unjust when the subject sale has already been established before both lower courts and now, before this Court, to further
delay petitioner's exercise of her right of legal redemption by requiring that notice be given by the vendor before petitioner can exercise her
right. For this reason, we rule that the receipt by [Francisco] of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 [the case filed by Boiser] on August 5, 1992
constitutes actual knowledge on the basis of which [Francisco] may now exercise her right of redemption within 30 days from finality of this

receipt by [Francisco] of summons in Civil Case No. 15510 on August 5, 1992 amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from which the 30-day
period of redemption commenced to run. [Francisco] had until September 4, 1992 within which to exercise her right of legal redemption, but on
August 12, 1992 she deposited the P10,000.00 redemption price. As [Franciscos] exercise of said right was timely, the same should be given

RTC and CA reversed. RTC ordered to effect Franciscos exercise of right her right of legal redemption.

plurality of subjects many owners
unity of material (indivision) of object of ownership
recognition of ideal shares
1. law
2. contracts
3. succession
4. fortuitous event/chance commixtion
5. occupancy 2 persons catch a wild animal
Distinguished from partnership
partnership created only by agreement; co-ownership
has many sources
purpose of partnership is to obtain profit; co-ownership
is collective enjoyment of a thing
in partnership there is juridical personality distinct from
individuals, none in co-ownership
partnership can be created for more than 10 years, not
in co-ownership
partners cannot transfer rights w/o consent of other co-
partners, not co-ownership
partnership extinguished when partner dies, not in co-
distribution of profits in partnerships may be stipulated,
this is not flexible in co-ownership but depends on ideal
Rights of co-owners
1. Right to benefits proportional to respective interest;
stipulation to contrary is void
2. Right to use thing co-owned
1. for purpose for which it is intended
2. without prejudice to interest of ownership
3. without preventing other co-owners from making
use thereof
3. Right to change purpose of co-ownership by agreement
4. Right to bring action in ejectment in behalf of other co-
5. Right to compel co-owners to contribute to necessary
expenses for preservation of thing and taxes
6. Right to exempt himself from obligation of paying
necessary expenses and taxes by renouncing his share
in the pro-indiviso interest; but cant be made if
prejudicial to co-ownership
7. Right to make repairs for preservation of things can be
made at will of one co-owner; receive reimbursement
therefrom; notice of necessity of such repairs must be
given to co-owners, if practicable
8. Right to full ownership of his part and fruits
9. Right to alienate, assign or mortgage own part; except
personal rights like right to use and habitation
10. Right to ask for partition anytime
11. Right of pre-emption
12. Right of redemption
13. Right to be adjudicated thing (subject to right of others
to be indemnified)
14. Right to share in proceeds of sale of thing if thing is
indivisible and they cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them
1. Share in charges proportional to respective interest;
stipulation to contrary is void
2. Pay necessary expenses and taxes may be exercised
by only one co-owner
3. Pay useful and luxurious expenses if determined by
4. Duty to obtain consent of all if thing is to be altered
even if beneficial; resort to court if non-consent is
manifestly prejudicial
5. Duty to obtain consent of majority with regards to
administration and better enjoyment of the thing;
controlling interest; court intervention if prejudicial
appointment of administrator
6. No prescription to run in favor co-owner as long as he
recognizes the co-ownership; requisites for acquisition
through prescription
1. he has repudiated through unequivocal acts
2. such act of repudiation is made known to other co-
3. evidence must be clear and convincing
1. Co-owners cannot ask for physical division if it would
render thing unserviceable; but can terminate co-
2. After partition, duty to render mutual accounting of
benefits and reimbursements for expenses
3. Every co-owner liable for defects of title and quality of
portion assigned to each of the co-owner
Rights of 3
1. creditors of assignees may take part in division and
object if being effected without their concurrence, but
cannot impugn unless there is fraud or made
notwithstanding their formal opposition
2. non-intervenors retain rights of mortgage and
servitude and other real rights and personal rights
belonging to them before partition was made.