INTRODUCTION

Security defined as the state of being protected. Besides that, it can also defined as the area in a
place (such as an airport) where people are checked to make sure they are not carrying weapons
or other illegal materials.
The location that our group chose for this project is Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Airport. The airport
is located 15 km from the city. In 2009, the airport handled 226,912 passengers on 3,110 flights
(annually). For passenger facilities the airport has outdoor car park, a taxi stand, several small
shops, an arrival hall and a departure hall.

Aerodrome Emergency Planning
The Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) encompasses contingency plans to achieve the coordinated
actions to be taken by all agencies involved in response to emergencies at an airport. Moreover,
the AEP provide a clear chain of command and control established from the executive level to the
field operators. The AEP can be known as a living document and the requires actions and roles of
the various key personnel and organizations may be reviewed from time to time. Some of the
emergency planning that are stated in AEP are:
Crash gate
A Crash Gate located at respective runway ends provides access to and from the airfield
to the crash / accident site.

Designated Isolated Aircraft Parking Area
A designated area to route (if airborne) of isolated an aircraft subject to specific bomb
warning or hijack incident.

The hierarchy of Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Airport
General Manager, AVI
Mustafa Kamal Hj. Alang Othman
He started his career in 1980 and held Chief of Security positions at all international
airports including KLIA whilst working with Department of Civil Aviation (DCA).
He has extensive experiences in airport operations ranging from aviation security,
terminal operations, airport operations centre to airport fire & rescue service. He is a
subject-matter expert in aviation security and is frequently invited to be a speaker at
various security seminars, locally and abroad.


General Manager, Airport Fire & Rescue Services
Abd Malik MohdYunus
He was a Graduate Diploma in Airport Management from the National University of
Singapore under the Malaysia Airports-Airport Management Development Programme
(AMDP).
A Graduate Diploma in Airport Management from the National University of Singapore
under the Malaysia Airports-Airport Management Development Programme (AMDP).


















Airport emergency committee (AEC)



























Major incident management plan


MASB Airport manager
Chairman
(EN.Suhaimi Bin Abd Rahman)
Base Commander / SATCO
Head Of Operation
(Abdul Halim HJ.AwangMahmooh)
Polis Di Raja Malaysia (PDRM)
Chief Of Aviation Security (AVSEC)
(Insp.PBZamri Bin Ab.Latif)
Hospital TengkuAmpuanAfzan
(Member)
JabatanBombadanPenyelamat
Malaysia (JMPM)
(Member)
Kastam Di Raja Malaysia
(KDRM)
JabatanImigresen
JabatanPertahananAwam
Malaysia (JPAM)
PersatuanBulanSabitMerah
Malaysia (PBSM)
Syarikat Penerbangan / Aircraft
Operatior

























Airport Evaluation Committee


AFRS OIC
POLICE/AVESEC OUTER
CORDON COMAND
VIP VISTORS
MEDIA LIASON
RENDEZVOUS POINT
SRC FRC
OCPD / Chief Of Police IPD/IPK
(Chairman)

























Aviation Security (AVSEC)

MASB Airport manager
(Member)
Base Commander / SATCO
(Member)
Chief Of AVSEC / AVSEC Shift
Leader On Duty (Secretary)
Senior Representative Of Airlines
Concern
(Member)
As national gateways, large numbers of people pass through airports every day. The high
concentration of people located in a small area along with the potential of smuggling illicit goods
and materials are highly attractive to terrorists and those with ill intent, resulting in substantial
security risks at airports.

Airport security refers to the techniques and methods used in protecting passengers, staff and
aircraft which use the airports from accidental/malicious harm, crime and other threats.
Large numbers of people pass through airports every day. This presents potential targets for
terrorism and other forms of crime because of the number of people located in a particular
location. Similarly, the high concentration of people on large airliners, the potential high death
rate with attacks on aircraft, and the ability to use a hijacked airplane as a lethal weapon may
provide an alluring target for terrorism, whether or not they succeed due their high profile nature
following the various attacks and attempts around the globe in recent years.
Airport security attempts to prevent any threats or potentially dangerous situations from arising or
entering the country. If airport security does succeed in this, then the chances of any dangerous
situations, illegal items or threats entering into both aircraft, country and airport are greatly
reduced. As such, airport security serves several purposes: To protect the airport and country
from any threatening events, to reassure the traveling public that they are safe and to protect the
country and their people.






Process and equipment
Some incidents have been the result of travelers being permitted to carry either weapons
or items that could be used as weapons on board aircraft so that they could hijack the plane.
Travelers are screened by metal detectors. Explosive detection machines used include X-ray
machines and explosives trace-detection portal machines (a.k.a. "puffer machines"). In the United
States the TSA is working on new scanning machines that are still effective searching for objects
that aren't allowed in the airplanes but that don't depict the passengers in a state of undress that
some find embarrassing. Explosive detection machines can also be used for both carry on and
checked baggage. These detect volatile compounds given off from explosives using gas
chromatography.
A recent development is the controversial use of backscatter X-rays to detect hidden weapons and
explosives on passengers. These devices, which use Compton scattering, require that the
passenger stand close to a flat panel and produce a high resolution image. A technology released
in Israel in early 2008 allows passengers to pass through metal detectors without removing their
shoes, a process required as walk-though gate detectors are not reliable in detecting metal in
shoes or on the lower body extremities. Alternately, the passengers step fully shoed onto a device
which scans in under 1.2 seconds for objects as small as a razor blade. In some countries,
specially trained individuals may engage passengers in a conversation to detect threats rather than
solely relying on equipment to find threats.
A single backscatter scan exposes the target to between 0.05 to 0.1 micro Sievert of radiation. In
comparison, the exposure from a standard chest x-ray is almost 100 times higher.
Generally people are screened through airport security into areas where the exit gates to the
aircraft are located. These areas are often called "secure", "sterile" and airside. Passengers are
discharged from airliners into the sterile area so that they usually will not have to be re-screened
if disembarking from a domestic flight; however they are still subject to search at any time.
Airport food outlets have started using plastic glasses and utensils as opposed to glasses made out
of glass and utensils made out of metal to reduce the usefulness of such items as weapons.


Insp.PBZamri Bin Ab.Latif
Chief Of Aviation Security (AVSEC) on duty


Briefing about the operation from head of operation sultan Ahmad Shah Airport
Sir Abdul Halim HJ.Awang Mahmooh


Briefing Emergency Planning And Security Of Kuantan Airport from chairman (EN.Suhaimi
Bin Abd Rahman) and Insp.PBZamri Bin Ab.Latif Chief Of Aviation Security (AVSEC)
















Briefing about the operation from head of operation sultan Ahmad Shah Airport
Sir Abdul Halim HJ.AwangMahmooh































DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION (DCA)


The DCA is established as an agency under the Ministry of Transport (MOT) Malaysia to provide safe,
efficient orderly flow of air transportation, and to regulate aviation activities in Malaysia. The rapid
expansion of Malaysia's aviation and air transport industries is largely due to the pragmatic approach
taken by DCA in ensuring compliance to standards and recommended practices of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO)

- DCA control the tower in Tentera Udara Diraja Malaysia((TUDM) area
-

























Airport Terminal Design - Fire Safety Issues

Airport fire safety design poses unique challenges for the fire protection engineer. There are few other
building types whose dominant focus is a full operations cycle involving large numbers of public occupants
as well as a complex support system to enable the building function (retail, baggage handling, security, and
so on). To enable this interaction, architecture becomes key in creating tall, open front-of-house spaces
and enabling high-frequency operations back-of-houseall in a specific departures and arrivals cycle
running in parallel. This remains true regardless of the geographic location. This article presents a fire
safety design approach, using the fire protection engineering process outlined in BS 7974,
1
to highlight the
key items that can create a practical airport terminal fire safety design.
Over the years, the fire protection engineer has played a role in airport designseen as an enabler of the
operational and design features. Success relies on integration with the other design team members and
stakeholders. With operational requirements and signature architecture forming a fundamental basis of
the project, close communication with the airport operator, their fire safety management team, as well as
the architect, from the very conceptual stages, have proven to be fundamental to the successful design and
implementation of an airport terminal fire safety design.
The fire protection engineer has a substantial role from concept stages, right through to design,
quantifying the agreed principles and being part of the specification stage and onwards to construction
and design compliance on-site. For airports (like many other complex buildings and one could suggest, in
fact, any building), a robust strategy for commissioning the fire and life safety systems and inspecting the
key elements for completeness, as well as participating in the training and handover of a functioning fire
strategy, is increasingly a required part of the fire protection engineer's role.
A recent project at Dublin Airport (Terminal 2) in Ireland illustrates pertinent fire safety issues relating to
the design and, ultimately, the successful delivery of an airport terminal.
Terminal 2 is located to the east of the existing Terminal 1. The building consists of a seven-story main
terminal building of approximately 70,000 m
2
and a three story Pier E building of approximately 20,000
m
2
in area. The state-of-the-art terminal is capable of handling up to 15 million passengers per year. At its
peak, Terminal 2 was the largest construction project in the state and employed up to 2,600 workers on-
site. Importantly, the terminal was built in a live airport environment creating substantial logistics re-
alignment on the site to enable continuity of operations.
The initial fire strategy concept began in 2006, culminating in completion of the final as-built fire strategy
revisions in 2012.
Irish legislation, until recent amendments were introduced, required that site works could not commence
without prior approval of fire safety design in the form of an approved Fire Safety Certificate from the
fire authority. Revised certificates were subsequently required in order to reflect the as-built form. A
change control method was adopted so that the fire protection engineer could review changes as they arose
and subsequently address them with the fire authority. Such changes included architectural design
development and modifications arising from on-site construability issues.


Figure 1. QDR Process
THE FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING PROCESS
Airports, due to their design, necessitate the adoption of a fire protection engineered approach as opposed
to following the recommendations of prescriptive guidance. BS 7974 provides a basic framework for the
application of fire safety engineering and is similar in that regard to the processes set out in other
contemporary performance-based design guides such as that developed by SFPE.
2
This approach is
illustrated in Figure 1.
The guidance recommends four main steps in the process:
1. Qualitative design review (QDR)
2. Quantitative analysis of design
3. Assessment against criteria
4. Reporting and presentation of results
While all of these stages are important in developing a robust strategy, it is during the QDR stage where
the parameters that can create a successful fire safety design are created. If the key items are not known or
identified during the QDR, the remainder of the process will suffer. The remainder of this discussion will
use the challenges met during the design and construction of Terminal 2 as an example of items that
should be identified and addressed during the QDR stage.
THE QUALITATIVE DESIGN REVIEW (QDR)
BS 7974 identifies the main stages in the QDR process as the following:
a. Review of architectural design and occupant characteristics,
b. Establish fire safety objectives,
c. Identify fire hazards and possible consequences,
d. Establish trial fire safety designs,
e. Identify acceptance criteria and methods of analysis,
f. Establish fire scenarios for analysis.
Storage
Concept Design Construction
Team
Client (including
client bodies such
as security, retail,
customs, etc.)
Understand
operational goals &
agree on business
continuity objectives.
Communicate concept
fire strategy.
Communicate detailed fire
strategy and any operational
implications. Clearly outline
fire safety management
requirements. Hold
workshops with client bodies
as required.
Close collaboration during
Operational Readiness Activation
Transition (ORAT) phase to
understand client needs. Provide for
the safety of occupants within the
building prior to completion. Advise
on legislative health & safety
implications.
Architect Understand
architectural
aspirations &
communicate concept
Communicate detailed fire
strategy & hold design
workshops to develop
integrated solutions. Illustrate
Approving benchmark construction
details and assisting with site
inspections. Assistance with
problems encountered on-site.
fire strategy. fire strategy on drawings.
Agreement of construction
details.
Mechanical,
Electrical &
Plumbing (MEP)
Understand concept
MEP strategy &
communicate concept
life safety systems
strategy.
Communicate detailed fire
strategy & hold design
workshops to develop
integrated solutions.
Assist and witness systems
commissioning. Assist with site
inspections.
Dublin Fire
Brigade
Agree on main fire
strategy principles.
Hold meetings and workshops
as necessary to agree on
detailed strategy. Gain formal
strategy approval.
Additional approvals if required.
Insurer Understand main
insurance objectives.
Communication and
agreement of detailed
strategy.
Verify that insurance goals are
maintained.
Construction
Manager
Impart fire strategy principles and
importance of quality during
construction. Regular liaison to
prioritize areas of work depending
on client needs (e.g., ORAT).
Assisting with construction quality
assurance.
Main Contractor Agree on benchmark details. Close
liaison to agree on solutions to
problems encountered during
construction.
Table 1. QDR Team Members and Responsibilities




Figure 2. Cabin Concept

The cabin concept approach referenced above relates to a method commonly adopted in large - volume
buildings in which the fire load is located within cabin-like structures. A retail unit within a shopping
center or airport is a prime example.
The approach is based on the provision of a ceiling void that acts as a smoke reservoir, as shown in Figure
2. The provision of automatic sprinkler protection limits the fire size and volume of smoke produced.
Smoke extraction is designed to limit any spread out of the cabin. The cabin concept is a useful approach
in buildings in which, allowing smoke to flow up to the roof, would result in significant extraction rates.
Other benefits include limiting smoke spread (and, therefore, business disruption) to the fire unit and the
maintaining of an open-unit frontage.