G.R. No.

L-35645 May 22, 1985

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and
ROBERT GOHIER,petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and
ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.
May 1972; the US invited submission of bids for the following projects:
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline
revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay,
Philippines.
Private respondents submitted their bids. The company received from the United States
two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company complied with the requests.
June 1972; Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, sent
respondents a letter saying that the respondents did not receive the proposals because
of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at
the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
Respondents sued the US and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert
Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The order is to allow
the respondents to work on the project and in case of refusal, to pay for damages, and
the prohibit petitioner from contracting with third parties.
Petitioners question the jurisdiction of the court as the US have not given its consent to be sued.
The trial court ruled for respondents.
WON our courts have jurisdiction over the US and its agents
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States.
It has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts
(jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is
that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil.
"It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves
or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public
nature or character, as ruled by respondent judge.
G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983
JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner,
vs.
RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
The Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC) sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on October 26, 1986, 2-5 pm, from Luneta to the US Embassy. Once there, in an
open space of public property, a short program is to be held
After the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the
last day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and
the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a
representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be
delivered to the United States Ambassador. The local and foreign participants of such
conference would attend the march. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that
in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally."
October 20, 1986; still no action was taken as to the application of the permit. October 25, 1986;
respondent mayor filed an answer saying that on October 19, such permit was denied.
Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail.
The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which strongly
militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied
for." To be more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing]
the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." Respondent Mayor
suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities,
that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any
other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general
public may be ensured."
The trial court ruled for petitioner holding that there was no showing of any clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that would justify denial of the permit.
WON the denial of the permit is valid
Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters Of public concern.


An excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however,
that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free
speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining
access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon
rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous
scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to
reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be
sheltered by the Constitution."
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
In Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas," a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically
affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus
nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was
made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only
purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should
not be granted for the opposed march and rally starting from a public dark that is the
Luneta.
Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US
Embassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.
And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief
Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that 'a statute
requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special
license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the
rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed
by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of
licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession,
with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license.
The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted
in 1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the
instrument of ratification was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was
thereafter deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15.
As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the
Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps
to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent
any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. " The
Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the
land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or
damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there
would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be
the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Unless
the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is
understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights
of free speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that
question confronts this Court.
The participants to such assembly, composed primarily of those in attendance at the
International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of
All Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta. Proceeding through Roxas
Boulevard to the gates of the United States Embassy located at the same street. To
repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets,
there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the
permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes
discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The principle under
American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not
as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to The
relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the
freedom of speech which the Constitution protects."
By way of a summary the applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the
licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to
such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech
and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in
our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the
judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights



G.R. No. L-24294 May 3, 1974
DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and
EDGARDO GENER,respondents.
November 17, 1964; respondent Gener, filed an injunction against petitioner, commander fo the
US naval base in Olongapo.
Respondent was engaged in the logging business in Bataan and that the American naval base
authorities stopped is operations. Respondent judge granted Geners injunction.
Respondents contest jurisdiction of the court saying that the US has not given its consent.
December 12, 1964; respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the same ground.
It was therein pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of
the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official acts done
by him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in directing the
cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner
was entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the
security of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and
most important duty of the Commander of the Base.
December 14, 1964; respondent opposed and upheld the jurisdiction of respondent court saying:
"a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover
possession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government,
who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, said
officers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government."
January 12, 1965; petitioner went to the Forestry Director of Bataan offering evidence that
respondent was had no license to conduct logging business in the area. Notwithstanding,
respondent judge granted respondents writ of injunction.
WON the doctrine of immunity is applicable in this case
Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision.
14
In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for the
release of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking for
the Court, cited from Coleman v. Tennessee,
15
where it was explicitly declared: "It is well
settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the place."
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What was sought by private
respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with
the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the
powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This
point was made clear in these words: "Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the
Philippine Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue
a Timber License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement subjects the
exercise of rights under a timber license issued by the Philippine Government to the
exercise by the United States of its rights, power and authority of control within the bases;
and the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine and
United States Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the
boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security and
operation of the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. .. The doctrine of state
immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the
sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign
from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important
public function of any government - the defense of the state is equally as untenable as
requiring it to do an affirmative act."
There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court.
Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not
possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal
capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he
represents.
The infirmity of the actuation of respondent Judge becomes even more glaring when it is
considered that private respondent had ceased to have any right of entering within the
base area.
G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972
THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of
Rizal, MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and CAPTAIN PEDRO S.
NAVARRO of the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC), respondents.
Petitioner doctor was assigned by the WHO to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Director of
Health Services is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement
executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World Health
Organization.
When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the
Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordingly
allowed free entry from duties and taxes.
Respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of
respondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of Republic
Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code
3
directing the search
and seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.
March 6, 1972; Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific with
station in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the
same date respondent Judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from
search in respect of his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions" pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the search
warrant order "pending clarification of the matter from the ASAC."
May 8, 1972; the Office of the Solicitor General appeared and filed an extended comment
stating the official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government that
petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, he did not abuse his diplomatic
immunity, and that court proceedings in the receiving or host State are not the proper
remedy in the case of abuse of diplomatic immunity.
The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the quashal of
the search warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the
search warrant per his order of May 9, 1972 "for the same reasons already stated in (his)
aforesaid order of March 16, 1972" disregarding Foreign Secretary Romulo's plea of
diplomatic immunity on behalf of Dr. Verstuyft.
WON respondents judge denial to lift the search and seizure order is valid
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch
of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.
The unfortunate fact that respondent judge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents
COSAC officers "that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband
items" rather than on the categorical assurance of the Solicitor-General that petitioner
Verstuyft did not abuse his diplomatic immunity, which was based in turn on the official
positions taken by the highest executive officials with competence and authority to act on
the matter, namely, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, could not justify
respondent judge's denial of the quashal of the search warrant.
The Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations for consultations between the Host State and the United Nations agency
concerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged,
and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty
commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has the
force and effect of law.
Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance of the executive
branch of government that respondent judge had some ground to prefer respondents
COSAC officers' suspicion that there had been an abuse of diplomatic immunity, the
continuation of the search warrant proceedings before him was not the proper remedy.
Finally, the Court has noted with concern the apparent lack of coordination between the
various departments involved in the subject-matter of the case at bar, which made it
possible for a small unit, the COSAC, to which respondents officers belong, seemingly to
disregard and go against the authoritative determination and pronouncements of both the
Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, as confirmed by the Solicitor-General as the principal law officer of
the Government. Such executive determination properly implemented should have
normally constrained respondents officers themselves to obtain the quashal of the search
warrant secured by them rather than oppose such quashal up to this Court, to the
embarrassment of said department heads, if not of the Philippine Government itself vis a
vis the petitioners.