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CHING T. CAMPOSAGRADO CASES NO. 1

SSPRO
WEDNESDAY- 5:30 8:30P


Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228

FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation(FCCC) and Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan
agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof,Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rota motor. Again,
Efraim and Edmund executed promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In
1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City.
Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and
(1) for Florence .Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to
the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities
was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Bank. Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez,
Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by
her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not
liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement. Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the
unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under
the said document. In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a
sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing
probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother
Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it mayprejudice the estate, the heirs
or third parties.

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ISSUE:W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate
estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending.
W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of the estate) was
void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court.
W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated

.HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to
be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of
the estate. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which
reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
Florence, my children. The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by
the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he
may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving
the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late
EfraimSantibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate
court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule isthe
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributes,
legatees, or heirs. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any
liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes
and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his
son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go
after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.


Trinidad v. CA 289 SCRA 189

Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and Lourdes, his siblings,
are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the following evidence. a. testimony of
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Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child b. testimony of Meren that she was present in
the marriage of Inocentes c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed) d. Family
pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios claims: a. testimony of
Briones that Inocentes was never married b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed
that Arturio was simply a neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is
shown holding the baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.

Issue: Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are sufficient.


Held:
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of marriage: fact of
marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the child, and other documents.
Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the
baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of
legitimacy.

Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis
G.R. No. 133743 (February 6, 2007)
Facts:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who was previously the governor of the
Province of Laguna. During the lifetime of Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit who predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin, an American
citizen, who later obtained a decree granting absolute divorce before the family court of Hawaii. The third
marriage was with the respondent, Felicidad Sagalongos, who he lived with for 18 years up to the time of his
death.
After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the dissolution of their conjugal assets and the
settlement of the estate. A petition for administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati City.
The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) venue
was improperly laid since the petition should be filed in Laguna where Felicisimo was the elected governor; (2)
Respondent does not have legal capacity to sue because her marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the
decree of absolute decree is not binding in the Philippines.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
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Issues:
1. Whether venue was properly laid.
2. Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
Held:
1. Venue was properly laid. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate should be filed in the RTC of the province in which he resides at the time of his
death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. CA, we laid down the rule that for determining venue, the residence of
the decedent is determining. Residence for settlement of estate purposes means his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence of place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence
or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It is possible that a person may
have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

2. The divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Corwin, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse.
However, the respondent was not able to provide sufficient documentation to prove the decree of divorce
obtained in Hawaii.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that
the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties acquired during their cohabitation.
The case is therefore remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.



OSCAR C. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, Branch 142, ZENITH INSURANCE
CORPORATION and RODRIGO C. REYES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 165744. August 11, 2008]
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were siblings together with two others, namely Pedro and Anastacia, in a
family business established as Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith), from which they owned shares of stocks.
The Pedro and Anastacia subsequently died. The former had his estate judicially partitioned among his heirs,
but the latter had not made the same in her shareholding in Zenith. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against petitioner (1) a derivative suit to obtain accounting of
funds and assets of Zenith, and (2) to determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and Anastacia that were
arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated [by Oscar, and were unaccounted for]. In his answer with
counterclaim, petitioner denied the illegality of the acquisition of shares of Anastacia and questioned the
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jurisdiction of SEC to entertain the complaint because it pertains to settlement of *Anastacias+ estate. The case
was transferred to. Petitioner filed Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and must be
dismissed. RTC denied the motion. The motion was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, but was again denied.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Rodrigo may be considered a stockholder of Zenith with respect to the shareholdings
originally belonging to Anastacia.
(2) Whether or not there is an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would characterize the
case as an intra-corporate dispute?
(3) Whether or not the complaint is a mere nuisance or harassment suit that should be dismissed under the
Interim Rules of Procedure of Intra-Corporate Controversies;
(4) Whether or not the complaint is a derivative suit within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a special
commercial court.

RULINGS: (1) No. Rodrigo must, hurdle two obstacles before he can be considered a stockholder of Zenith with
respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia. First, he must prove that there are shareholdings
that will be left to him and his co-heirs, and this can be determined only in a settlement of the decedents
estate. No such proceeding has been commenced to date. Second, he must register the transfer of the shares
allotted to him to make it binding against the corporation. He cannot demand that this be done unless and until
he has established his specific allotment (and prima facie ownership) of the shares. Without the settlement of
Anastacias estate, there can be no definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs. Without the
partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, we cannot
consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship as
premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court. The subject
shares of stock (i.e., Anastacias shares) are concerned Rodrigo cannot be considered a stockholder of Zenith.
(2) No. Court cannot declare that an intra-corporate relationship exists that would serve as basis to bring this
case within the special commercial courts jurisdiction under Section 5(b) of PD 902-A, as amended because
Rodrigos complaint failed the relationship test above.
(3) Yes. The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and must specify the relief sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity. These rules find specific application to Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A
which speaks of corporate devices or schemes that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the
public and/or to the stockholders.
Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of
law that, without supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do not sufficiently
state an effective cause of action. Fraud and mistake are required to be averred with particularity in order to
enable the opposing party to controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting such fraud or mistake. Tested
against these standards, charges of fraud against Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual
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allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly committed by him, these
allegations are not particular enough to bring the controversy within the special commercial courts
jurisdiction; they are not statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law: how and why the
alleged appropriation of shares can be characterized as illegal and fraudulent were not explained nor
elaborated on. The case must be dismissed.
(4) No. The allegations of the present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit. First, as already discussed
above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to Anastacia; he only
stands as a transferee-heir whose rights to the share are inchoate and unrecorded. Second, in order that a
stockholder may show a right to sue on behalf of the corporation, he must allege with some particularity in his
complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporation by making a sufficient demand upon the
directors or other officers for appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue if relief is denied. Lastly, Court
found no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been done to the corporation due to Oscars acts. If
indeed he illegally and fraudulently transferred Anastacias shares in his own name, then the damage is not to
the corporation but to his co-heirs; the wrongful transfer did not affect the capital stock or the assets of Zenith.
In summary, whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC sitting as special commercial court has
no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigos complaint since what is involved is the determination and distribution of
successional rights to the shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigos proper remedy, under the circumstances,
is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move
that is not foreclosed by the dismissal of his present complaint.

Cuenco vs. CA
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts

FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons,
residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from
the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon
City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI
Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition
until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon
appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
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Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings .

HELD: The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly itsadmission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
wish. On Venue and Jurisdiction Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed
must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.

CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS G.R.No. 168970 January 15, 2010 Peralta, J.:

Facts: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January
3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural
Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed
and was sold to the bank as the sloe bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not
redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the
sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of
the Bank. On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246
square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge
of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the
same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein
respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered
Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of
respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. On June 27, 1995, respondents
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already
informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still
refused to surrender possession of the same to them. The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase
from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the
Bank. Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA. The CA ruled that
when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the redemption period and
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allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-
ownership was extinguished. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Issue: Whether
or not co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was
purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back
by the respondents from the Bank. Held: The court is not persuaded. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that
there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on
October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25,
1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the
Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive
ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject
property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never
inherited the subject lot from their father. Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings
intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the
subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property
divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same.
Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common.
It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a
specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the
other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates
petitioner's claims in the present case.

VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
- Troadio Manalo died intestate survived by wife and 11 children left several properties in Manila and
Tarlac. 8 children (respondents) petition for the judicial settlement of the estate in RTC Manila & appointment
of bro Romeo as administrator. Trial Court order declaring the whole world in default, except the
government. The order of general default set aside upon motion of petitioners (wife & remaining 3 children)
Trial Court ordered admitting the petition for judicial settlement of estate. Petitioners petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members of the same family; and no
certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
- CA denied the petition & MFR
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- Petitioners petition claiming for issuance of letters of admin, settlement & distribution of estate is an
ordinary civil action thus should be dismissed under Rule 16, Sec 1(j) of the ROC on the ground that a condition
precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with as there was failure to comply with the requirement
in Art 222 CC

ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an ordinary civil
action, thus
Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the petition NO
HELD:
Rule: In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment and the character of the
relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling. Scrutiny of the Petition for ILASD of Estate belies
herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. Petition contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate
Fact of death
Residence at the time of his said death
Enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
Tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
Reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention to seek judicial
Settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
Petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action & so petitioners, as
oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and
ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of the Civil
Code.
civil action/suit - action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right,
or the protection or redress of a wrong.
o Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions Use of term suit excerpt from the report of the Code
Commission to make it applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of
the same family.
Special proceedings remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status, right or particular fact.
Pet for ILASD of Estate = special proceedings


GARCIA FULE V. CA

FACTS:
- Amado Garcia died - left property in Calamba, Laguna. Virginia Garcia Fule (illeg sis) pet for letters of admin
& ex parte appointment as special administratix in CFI Laguna. Motion was granted. Preciosa Garcia (wife) and
in behalf of their child opposed for failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement & improper venue (avers no
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domicile/residence of deceased as required by Rule 79 Sec. 21) death certs presented by Fule show QC as
deceaseds last residence
> Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to succeed
from him2
- CFIdenied opposition
- CAreversed and annulled the appointment of Fule
- Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.

ISSUES/HELD
a.) Venue v. Jurisdiction
JURISDICTION power/authority of court over subject matter
o Jurisdiction over all probate cases is w/ CFIs independently from the place of residence of the deceased
(Judiciary act 1948)
Not changed by procedure. There are cases though that if such power is not exercised conformably w/
procedure, court loses power to exercise it legally. However, this doesnt amount to loss of jurisdiction over
subject matter but only over the person or that judgment may be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it.
VENUE place where each case shall be brought
Because there are many CFIs, ROC fixed the venue (of settlement of estates, probate of will & issuance of
letters of admin) place of residence of deceased / province
Death Certificate deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna was
improper (death cert admissible to prove residence of deaceased at time of his death) Rule 73 Sec 13 - really a
matter of venue
Clause so far.
Caption Settlement of estate of Deceased Person. Venue and Processes. Contained in a law of procedure
merely a matter of method & convenience to parties
Rule 4 Sec 4 - Venue is subject to waiver
but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse
b.) What does the word resides in Rule 73 Sec 1 mean
Resides actual residence
Requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place In statutes fixing venue residence & domicile
synonymous even when statue uses domicile, it is stillconstrued as residence & not domicile in its technical
sense
- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed.
- Popular sense the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode
- No particular length of time required but must be more than temporary
legal residence or domicile requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.
DISPOSITION: Fules petition DENIED
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Reyes v. CA
281 SCRA 277 | Tan

FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land owned by petitioners and respondents father. Petitioner alleges
that a Deed of Exrajudicial Partition (Deed) was entered into between him and the respondents. Petitioner
managed to register 335 sq.m. of the land under his name; while 50 sq.m. of the land was registered under the
name of his sister, Paula (one of the respondents). After discovering the registration of the Deed, respondents
denied having knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed the same; nor did they ever waive their
rights, shares and interest in the subject parcel of land. According to respondents, subject Deed was
fraudulently prepared by petitioner and that their signatures thereon were forged. They also assert that one
Atty. Jose Villena, the Notary Public who notarized the said Deed was not even registered in the list of
accredited Notaries Public of Pasay City. Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale selling 240
square meters of the land to his children. After the property was partitioned, petitioner, his children and
private respondent Paula allegedly executed a Deed of Co-owners' Partition dividing the property among
themselves. This led the respondents to file a Complaint for "Annulment of Sale and Damages With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order" before the RTC, which ruled that private respondents' signatures on
the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement were indeed forged and simulated. The CA
affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Deed was forged.
2. Whether petitioner(s) had become absolute owners of the subject property by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.

RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals regarding
the existence of forgery. Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Petitioners' ludicrous claim that private respondents
imputed no deception on his part but only forgery of the subject Deed and the simulation of their signatures is
nothing short of being oxymoronic. For what is forgery and simulation of signatures if not arrant deception!
The allegation made by petitioner that the execution of a public document ratified before a notary public
cannot be impugned by the mere denial of the signatory is baseless. It should be noted that there was a finding
that the subject Deed was notarized by one Atty. Villena who at that time was not commissioned as a notary in
Pasay City.

2. NO. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession of the subject parcel of land since they could
not ave been possessors in good faith of the subject parcel of land considering the finding that at the very
inception they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which they claim to be the basis for
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their just title. Having forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of private respondents, petitioners, in fact,
are in bad faith. The forged Deed containing private respondents' simulated signatures is a nullity and cannot
serve as a just title. There can be no acquisitive prescription considering that the parcel of land in dispute is
titled property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both petitioner Florentino and
the private respondents.

VILLACORTE v. MARIANO (89 Phil 160)

Facts:
Leon Calimon married thrice. With his first wife Adriana Carpio he had three children Canuta, Tranquilina,
Maria and Enriqueta. He then married Venacia Inducil who has a child by previous marriage, Tiburcio Villacorta.
Venancia and Leon did not have any children. Leon thenafter married Macaria Mariano, they did not have any
children as well.
Petitioners here are the widow and daughter of Tiburcio seeking to recover 38 parcels of land from Canuta and
her sisters and Macaria Mariano. Mariano in her answer claimed that the lots were owned exclusively by Leon
Calimon but later on filed another answer asserting that all the realities has been acquired during her coverture
with Leon and she also filed a cross claim against Canuta and her sisters demanding the recognition of her
rights as surviving spouse. She claimed that through deceit, the sisters made her sign three documents
assigning to her a riceland, a fishpond and 2,400 and renouncing her interest and rights in the estate of Leon as
well as her participation in the conjugal partnership with him. The sisters then after partitioned the properties,
this was also thumb marked by their stepmother Macaria.
he Court then concluded that the three documents were valid and binding and that as a consequence the
Calimon sisters are entitled to continue possessing the land and properties assigned to them.
Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in finding that the properties belong to the sisters without previously requiring
an inventory and liquidation of the conjugal properties of the deceased Leon and Macaria.
Held: NO
Ratio:
It was unnecessary to prepare the inventory and make the liquidation because the parties interested the
widow and the children, already reached a compromise. Macaria cannot get away from her commitment and
claim that she did not know the contents of the documents she signed. The said documents are valid and
binding, and it was shown that only when there was delay in the delivery of one of the properties assigned to
her did she question the validity of the documents.

Montaer, et, al. vs. Shariah District Court

Facts: Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception
Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners herein are their three children. Liling Disangcopan and
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her daughter, Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the
ShariaDistrict Court. They claim to be the first family of Alejandro.
Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss becasue Discangcopan failed to pay the correct
amount of docket fees. Petitioners point to Disangcopans petition which contains an allegation estimating the
decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was
insufficient.

Issue: Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for Complaint for the judicial partition of properties.

Held: Yes, only because the petitioner children failed to present the clerk of courts assessment.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket
fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency
assessment lies with the same clerk of court. In such a case, the lower court concerned will
not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient
assessment of the docket fees. As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged
by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case
cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment. However, the party concerned will be
required to pay the deficiency.

In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees.
Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether Disangcopan
correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.


Sheker vs Estate of Alice Sheker

Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left a holographic
will which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for
all creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a
contingent money claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent
for selling some properties for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.
Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others that the money claim filed by
Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.
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HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan
Shekers money claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers will. Under
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.
A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to be recognized and taken
into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to
initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which
the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.


ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE vs. CA

FACTS:
The estate of Amadeo Matute Olave (AMO) is the owner of a parcel of land in Davao (OCT 0-27). Southwest
Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a collection case with the CFI of Davao against Carlos V.
Matute and Matias S. Matute, co-administrators of the estate of AMO. Carlos and
Matias denied their lack of knowledge and questioned the legality of the claim of SAMCO. The CFI of Manila
directed the administrators to secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction
involving the seventeen (17) titles of the estate, of which OCT No. 0-27 is one. The parties
(CFI Davao) submitted to the CA an Amicable Settlement whereby OCT No. 0-27 was conveyed and ceded to
SAMCO as payment of its claim. The said Amicable Settlement was not submitted to and approved by the then
CFI of Manila. In 1967, the CA approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a
court decision.

Issue: WON the amicable settlement needs to be approved by the probate court

HELD: YES, the amicable settlement needs to be approved by the probate court. The claim of private
respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in
theadministration proceedings in the CFI of Manila for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo
Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed
"barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court). The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents
of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or
administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator
and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for
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its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death
of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any
preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased. Section
1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The law is clear that
where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.

Puno vs Puno Enterprises

FACTS: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises,
Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a
complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased
with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and
privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow
petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962,
and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.

ISSUE: W/N SHARES OF STOCKS ARE AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERRED TO HEIRS AFTER THE DEATH OF THE
DECEDENT.

HELD:
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks
must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in
the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation.
[16]
During such
interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly
appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.
[17]
Until a settlement and division of the
estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor.
[18]
Consequently,
during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as
stockholder.

Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos
L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be entitled to receive dividends from
respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were
transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated
in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

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Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights
over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who
claims to be an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the
recovery of property.
[19]
The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance to
direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his
representatives.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED