CASES UNDER ARTICLE 147

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error
committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner
avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared
void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both
parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten
during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez
sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the
trial court,
1
in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential
marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela
Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who
are in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same
code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages.
2
(Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the
Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the
hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to
remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides
that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant willown their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in
equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff
and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.
3
(Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property
regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by therules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application
since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the absolute community of property.
4

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on
30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code should be held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab
initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be
read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish
to stay.
5

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;
6
it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The
term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned
in Articles 37 and 38"
7
of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."
8
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has
clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides
that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-
ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her
share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or
waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent
party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation
9
or
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
10

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when
they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however,
are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in
bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner already heretofore expressed.
11

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must
be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential
matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the
Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,
12
of the
Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43,
13
relates only,
by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40
14
of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now
requiring forpurposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment
of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then
illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41
15
and 42,
16
of
the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has
also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain,
on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of
the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which
was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the
alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein
respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court,
amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response,
respondent filed an amended answer denying the allegation that she was
psychologically incapacitated.
1

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979,
null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5
million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from
the date of this decision plus attorneys fees ofP100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation
of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent
(50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12%
interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount ofP15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as
the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden
family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries
of properties.
SO ORDERED.
2

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case
was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase
the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura.
Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or that such
incident be set for oral argument.
3

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the
support pendente lite to P20,000.
4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
questioning the said Resolution.
5

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing
petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts
decision.
6
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From
the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution,
which increased the monthly support for the son.
7
Petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
8
and the Petition
for Certiorari
9
were ordered consolidated by this Court.
10

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6%
INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL
BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES
OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF ORP1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM
THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE
DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES;
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES
MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO
WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM,
BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS
PERSON.
11

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON
FOR HEARING.
12

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS
MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT
PRESENT PRICES.
13

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT,
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS
THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."
14

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.
15

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from
the testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but
likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of
Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-
appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her
that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he
married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in
fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to
relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a
father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of
trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and
their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that
the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the
parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those
arising from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of
marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided
case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-
performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such
award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and
exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in
the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of
what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court.
16

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of
the Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219
17
of the Civil Code
enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions
Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the
individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the
act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed
that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and
freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and
void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of
the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriagewhich, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. . . .
18

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner
after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a
product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as
grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of
acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the
possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering
into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this
case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as
a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the
petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent
was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of
exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
19

With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial
court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in
this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate
and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the
Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (par. 11)
20

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully
justified, the award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is
likewise fully justified.
21

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his
psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of
his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent
to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity,
which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to
comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral
and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and
the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of
the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the
marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity
of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property
(Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA,
pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was
ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment
therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and
the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160,
Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal
partnership properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both
of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from
the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of
each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an
inventory of what are the parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive
properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case
that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President
of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the
said bank in the amount ofP3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions
amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount ofP3,675,335.79 and actually
paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts
or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation
pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular case,
however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had
there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share
in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the
plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by
T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor
of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12,
1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was
actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past support.
In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the
plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of
liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here,
what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant
so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half
was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her
share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be
given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the
plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been
obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said
defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For
the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of
stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident
Group of Companies.
22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for
him to give one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank &
Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in
the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the
Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise
Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is
dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the
separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East
Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for
the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants service for the
bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-
appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the
outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the
time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half
thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the
ruling of the trial court.
23

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage,
the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family
Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule
applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of
equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,
24
this Court expounded
on the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses
and specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
capacityof a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her
share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the
period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her
share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or
waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent
party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or
declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must
be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common
property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern
the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the
latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the
co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article
43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent
from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by
final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims
to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage.
It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and
42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has
also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in
the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of
Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless,
even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code
on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family
Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the
spouses.
25

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found,
both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the
union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits
of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or
involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a
quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of
the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age
on May 27, 2005
26
and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these
would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its
Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for
Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted.
The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner
from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in
Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but
on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership
and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision
and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of
Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which
increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006
JOHN ABING, petitioner,
vs.
JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner John Abing (John, hereafter) seeks to set aside the Decision
1
dated
October 24, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675, reversing
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet, Branch 64, which affirmed an
earlier decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mankayan, Benguet in an
ejectment suit thereat commenced by the petitioner against the respondent.
In the main, the controversy is between a man and a woman who, during the
good old days, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Later, they parted
ways, and with it this litigation between them involving one of their common
properties.
The facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met and
fell in love with each other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. Together, the couple bought a 2-storey
residential house from one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot owned
by a certain Alejandro Dio on Aurora Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to
the purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-storey house was transferred in the
name of Juliet.
On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. She would
send money to John who deposited the same in their joint bank account.
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was
annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. This new structure and
the sari-sari store thereat are the properties involved in this case.
In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued to live with John. She managed
the sari-sari store while John worked as a mine employee of the Lepanto
Consolidated Mining, Inc.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence, they
decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed on October
7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was left
unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses thereto. Under their
unsigned agreement, John shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying him
the amount of P428,870.00 representing John's share in all their properties. On
the same date October 7, 1995 Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by
way of partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid
by Juliet in twelve monthly installment beginning November 1995.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. On account thereof, John
demanded of her to vacate the annex structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet
refused, prompting John to file an ejectment suit against her before the MTC of
Mankayan, Benguet.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent for the construction of the
annex structure with his own funds and thru money he borrowed from his
relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration for the structure was under
his name. On this premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the subject
structure, which thereby gave him the right to eject Juliet therefrom upon the
latter's failure to pay the agreed balance due him under the
aforementionedMemorandum of Agreement.
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original house was renovated thru their
common funds and that the subject structure annexed thereto was merely an
attachment or an extension of their original residential house, hence the same
pertained to the two of them in common.
In a decision
2
dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its finding that the money used
in the construction of the structure in question solely came from John, ruled that
the same exclusively pertained to the latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet's
eviction therefrom, including the sari-sari store thereat, and required her to
surrender possession thereof to John, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff (John) and against the
defendant (Juliet).
Defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the premises of the store in litigation
covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-001-00445 in the name of the Plaintiff and
turn over possession thereof to the latter.
Defendant is hereby further ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of P2,500.00 a
month from the time she withheld possession of the store in litigation in June
1996 until she vacates the same and turn over possession thereof to the Plaintiff.
Defendant is finally ordered, to pay the sum of P5,000.00 to the Plaintiff by way
of Attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
On Juliet's appeal to the RTC, the latter, in its decision of July 29, 1995, affirmed
that of the MTC. Undaunted, Juliet then went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 48675.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision of October 24,
2000,
3
reversed that of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner, Juliet Waeyan is entitled to
possess the property and maintain therein her business.
SO ORDERED.
Partly says the CA in its reversal disposition:
It is undisputed that the parties lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage from 1986 to 1995 and that they acquired certain properties
which must be divided between them upon the termination of their common law
relationship.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . their property relations cannot be governed by the provision of the Civil Code
on conjugal partnership... but by the rule on co-ownership.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the parties' share in respect of the properties they have accumulated during
their cohabitation shall be equal unless there is proof to the contrary.
To the CA, John's evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for the
construction of the annex structure. Hence, the same pertained to both, and
being a co-owner herself, Juliet cannot be evicted therefrom, adding that if ever,
John's cause of action should have been for a sum of money "because he claims
that Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension." According to the CA,
ejectment cannot lie against Juliet because Juliet's possession of the premises in
dispute was not by virtue of a contract, express or implied, nor did she obtain
such possession thru force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
Hence, John's present recourse, submitting that the CA erred in
1. not giving effect to the parties' Memorandum of Agreement which should have
been binding between them albeit unsigned by both;
2. in holding that the subject premises (annex structure housing the sari-sari
store) is owned by the two of them in common;
3. in ruling that the parties should settle their common properties in a separate
action for partition even as the community character of the subject premises has
not been proven.
We AFFIRM with modification.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether or not the
property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner,
John. Departing from the factual findings of the two courts before it, the CA
found that the premises in dispute is owned in common by Juliet and John, the
latter having failed to establish by the required quantum of proof that the money
spent for the construction thereof solely came from him. Being a co-owner of the
same structure, Juliet may not be ejected therefrom.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally
eschews from, yet, given the conflicting factual findings of the three courts
below, the Court shall go by the exception
4
to the general rule and proceed to
make its own assessment of the evidence.
First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties hereto lived together as
husband and wife from 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage. Neither is
it disputed that sometime in December 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked
thereat, sending money to John which the latter deposited in their joint account.
In fact, Juliet was still in Korea when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
Other than John's bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds and money he
borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex structure,
evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure, John even failed to
reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the names of the
alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of
money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed money in putting
up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg
to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00 from him. Even then, Macaraeg
stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John borrowed said
amount from him. With the petitioner's own admission that the subject structure
was constructed only in 1992, or two years after he borrowed P30,000.00 from
Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount he allegedly borrowed from
the latter went into the construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is noted
that while petitioner was able to present in evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he
failed to introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close relatives from whom he
claimed to have made similar borrowings. For sure, not a single relative came
forward to confirm petitioner's tale. In short, there is a paucity of evidence,
testimonial or documentary, to support petitioner's self-serving allegation that
the annex structure which housed the sari-sari store was put up thru his own
funds and/or money borrowed by him. Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax
declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and
again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of
claims of ownership.
5
Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more than
indicating possession in the concept of an owner.
6
Neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.
7

In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is instructive. It reads:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary, any property
acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed
to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And
under this regime, they owned their properties in common "in equal shares."
Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by
the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
True it is that under Article 487
8
of the Civil Code, a co-owner may bring an action
for ejectment against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of a common property. It bears stressing, however, that in
this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive
ownership of the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession
thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject
structure and the sari-sari store thereat by virtue of her being a co-owner
thereof. As such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as
John.
We, however, disagree with the ruling of the CA that the subject Memorandum of
Agreement, being unsigned by Juliet and John, has no binding effect between
them.
It is a matter of record that pursuant to said Agreement, Juliet did pay John the
amount of P232,397.66, as initial payment for John's share in their common
properties, with the balance of P196,472.34 payable in twelve monthly
installments beginning November 1995. It is also a matter of record that the
Agreement was signed by the witnesses thereto. Hence, the irrelevant
circumstances that the Agreement was left unsigned by Juliet and John cannot
adversely affect its binding force or effect between them, as evidently, Juliet's
initial payment of P232,397.66 to John was in fulfillment of what the parties had
agreed upon thereunder. However, and as correctly held by the CA, Juliet's failure
to pay John the balance of the latter's share in their common properties could at
best give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of
the said agreement and not for ejectment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed CA Decision is AFFIRMED,
except that portion thereof denying effect to the parties' Memorandum of
Agreement for being unsigned by both.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner,
vs.
NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January
19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen
Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon
located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-
101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 156283
1
of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was issued in the name of
Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31,
1995, a Decision,
2
declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same
decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-
spouses conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going
their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros,
obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.
(Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one
involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florencia
submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy of the
marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that
Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in favor of
Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but
did not incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan
obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated
foreclosure proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of
the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the
publication of the notice of sale on three issues of Remate.
3
At the auction sale on
January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000,
before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage
of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually raffled
to Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still
conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,
4
alleged that the
disputed lot, being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metrobank
also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was
subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001, judgment
finding for Nicholson. The fallo reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real estate
mortgage on the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds
for the City of Makati as well as all proceedings thereon null and void.
The Court further orders defendants [Metrobank and Florencia] jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff [Nicholson]:
1. PhP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. PhP75,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
3. The costs.
SO ORDERED.
5

Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said
lot to be conjugal, the same having been acquired during the existence of the
marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the
Family Code, providing that "all property acquired during the marriage, whether
the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name
of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is
proved." To the trial court, Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive
conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the RTC concluded that the
disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without
Nicholsons consent.
The RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be
fatally defective. For let alone the fact that Nicholson denied executing the same
and that the signature of the notarizing officer was a forgery, the waiver
document was allegedly executed on April 9, 1995 or a little over three months
before the issuance of the RTC decision declaring the nullity of marriage between
Nicholson and Florencia.
The trial court also declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith on account of
negligence, stating the observation that certain data appeared in the supporting
contract documents, which, if properly scrutinized, would have put the bank on
guard against approving the mortgage. Among the data referred to was the date
of execution of the deed of waiver.
The RTC dismissed Metrobanks counterclaim and cross-claim against the ex-
spouses.
Metrobanks motion for reconsideration was denied. Undeterred, Metrobank
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74874.
The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTCs Decision
On January 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision affirmatory of that of the RTC,
except for the award therein of moral damages and attorneys fees which the CA
ordered deleted. The dispositive portion of the CAs Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the award of moral damages and attorneys
fees which is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
6

Like the RTC earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to overthrow the
presumption established in Art. 116 of the Family Code. And also decreed as
going against Metrobank was Florencias failure to comply with the prescriptions
of the succeeding Art. 124 of the Code on the disposition of conjugal partnership
property. Art. 124 states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper
remedy x x x.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
As to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees, the CA, in
gist, held that Metrobank did not enter into the mortgage contract out of ill-will
or for some fraudulent purpose, moral obliquity, or like dishonest considerations
as to justify damages.
Metrobank moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA.
Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising
the following issues for consideration:
a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of
marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso
facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent
purchaser for value.
7

Our Ruling
A modification of the CAs Decision is in order.
The Disputed Property is Conjugal
It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing that
"[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife,"
applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of governing
application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. CitingManongsong v.
Estimo,
8
Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal ownership under
Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the
presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to
prove that not only was the property acquired during the marriage but that
conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden Nicholson allegedly failed
to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property,
Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals
9
and Jocson v. Court of
Appeals,
10
among other cases, where this Court held that a property registered in
the name of a certain person with a description of being married is no proof that
the property was acquired during the spouses marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation
11
and Wong v. IAC,
12
contends that Metrobank failed to overcome the
legal presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He asserts that
Metrobanks arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one
postulate needs to be shown for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership
to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses, as
inapplicable, Francisco and Jocson, noting that they are relevant only when there
is no indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property alleged to be
conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had
virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three
instances. The first was when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Case
No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as "spouses" in the
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Then came the published
notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again designated as co-
mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter
13
to vacate the disputed lot,
Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as "spouses," albeit the finality of
the decree of nullity of marriage between them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art.
116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was
acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that,
before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a showing
that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to
Metrobanks submission, the Court did not, inManongsong,
14
add the matter of
the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for the presumption of
conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a
necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal
presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed
in Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This
article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership.The presumption applies even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear.
15
(Emphasis supplied.)
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory. Metrobank
would thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the
registration of the property in the name of "Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson
Pascual" operates to describe only the marital status of the title holder, but not
as proof that the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the
acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The correct lesson
of Francisco andJocson is that proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is
a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by
the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that
the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
16

The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding
Metrobank having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to
question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the
former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or
her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve
into the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised only for the first time in
this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was designated below does not really
change, one way or another, the classification of the lot in question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does
not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership
Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CAs holding, Art. 129 of the
Family Code is inapplicable. Art. 129 in part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
x x x x
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided
in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed
by Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property
regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during
the marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without
more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is
shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the
properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This
conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on
liquidation of the conjugal partnerships assets and liabilities which is generally
prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to
185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the
relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal
properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation
following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of
the deceased.
17

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April
30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be
that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when
the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the
right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the
disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of
Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the
remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having
consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly
waived his share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a
quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson three
months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal partnership of
gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of the
notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all,
albeit it may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for
value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the
successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other
undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot
in question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights
"shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership."
18
This disposition is in line with the
well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized
as far as it is legally possible to do soquando res non valet ut ago, valeat
quantum valere potest.
19

In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of
Metrobank, there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank
was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the
mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or
mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners of the title is
inapplicable.
20
Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks to exercise greater
care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The
ascertainment of the status or condition of the property offered as security and
the validity of the mortgagors title must be standard and indispensable part of
the banks operation.
21
A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be
accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,
22
as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the due
diligence requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral
obliquity or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of
fraud that would justify damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA
dated January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC,
Branch 65 in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, isAFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the REM over the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City is hereby declared valid only insofar as the pro
indiviso share of Florencia thereon is concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by
TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings
thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion of the
disputed property owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other
undivided 1/2 portion belonging to Florencia.
The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are DENIED for
lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review
1
assailing the 18 October 2006
Decision
2
and the 12 March 2007 Order
3
of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood
friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided
to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together
again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las
Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give
love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that
depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not
faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time
of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America.
Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition
within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was
granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also
learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V.
Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no
indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on
the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative
years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground
that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential
marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to
establish respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even
without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed
acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that
respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her
under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another
man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor
General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of
the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment
shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and
modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil
Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.
5

Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution
of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues
that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
6
(the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of
the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
7
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,
8
such as petitioner and respondent in the
case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall
be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death
of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received
under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies
only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we
ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring a previous marriage void.
11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment.
12
In both instances under Articles 40
and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property
13
or conjugal partnership of gains
14
unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-
ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
36
15
of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the
rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
16
The rules on co-ownership apply
and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,
"[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses
in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147
of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
SOLAS, JR vs AGUILA

G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013
EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE ABUDA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the Decision
1
dated 9 March
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 and the
Resolution
2
dated 3 August 2012 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
Decision and Resolution dismissed the Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and
affirmed with modification the Decision
3
dated 24 November 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-Manila).
The Facts
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June
1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never had common children, both of them
had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline
Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U.
Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas
(Crispin) when she married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952.
This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorros
marriage to Esteban.
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes
death in 1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a
portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila
(Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline
on her fathers behalf sometime in 1970.
4
The Vitas property was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980, issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."
5

Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small
business establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila
(Delpan property).
6

On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to
Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).
7
According to Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to
sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying
the amortizations on the two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street. The
amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php
200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were considered part
of the purchase price of the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her
father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas
properties and she shouldered his medical expenses.
8

Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31
July 1999.
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto,
discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for
Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the
sale of the properties was fraudulent because Estebans signature on the deeds
of sale was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of
Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null
and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over
the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
9

The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void
from the beginning.
10
Article 83 of the Civil Code, which was the governing law at
the time Esteban and Socorro were married, provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the first spouse of such person shall be illegal and void from its performance
unless:
1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void.
During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorros daughter-in-law
Conchita Ventura (Conchita). In her first affidavit, Conchita claimed that Crispin,
who was a seaman, had been missing and unheard from for 35 years. However,
Conchita recanted her earlier testimony and executed an Affidavit of Retraction.
11

The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity does not affect
the status of the union. It applied our ruling in Nial v. Badayog:
12

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. x x x
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns
the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which [the] fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife,
and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.
13

According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are not conjugal,
and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges,
shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to
the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proved.
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro and Esteban in
the properties. It found that:
with respect to the property located at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas,
Tondo, Manila covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos Road, Magsaysay
Village, Tondo, Manila, [Evangeline] declared that part of it was first acquired by
her father Esteban Abletes sometime in 1968 when he purchased the right of
Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970, she x x x bought the right to one-half of the
remaining property occupied by Ampiano Caballegan. However, during the survey
of the National Housing Authority, she allowed the whole lot to be registered in
her fathers name. As proof thereof, she presented Exhibits "8" to "11" x x x.
These documents prove that that she has been an occupant of the said property
in Vitas, Tondo even before her father and Socorro Torres got married in June,
1980.
14

Anent the parcels of land and improvements thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street,
Tondo, Manila, x x x Evangeline professed that in 1978, before her father met
Socorro Torres and before the construction of the BLISS Project thereat, her
father [already had] a bodega of canvas (lona) and a sewing machine to sew the
canvas being sold at 903 Del Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she was also
operating Vangies Canvas Store at 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, which was
evidenced by Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued in her favor on
09 November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS project was constructed in 1980, the
property became known as Units D-9 and D-10. At first, her father [paid] for the
amortizations for these two (2) parcels of land but when he got sick with colon
cancer in 1993, he asked respondents to continue paying for the amortizations x x
x. [Evangeline] paid a total of P195,259.52 for Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces
of receipts x x x and the aggregate amount of P188,596.09 for Unit D-10, as
evidenced by 36 receipts x x x.
15

The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the
acquisition of the properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and
her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan properties.
16

Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its Decision
17
dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the decision of the RTC-
Manila. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED and the challenged Decision of the
court a quo STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
18

The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila should have applied Article 148 of
the Family Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of the
Family Code states that in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court of Appeals,
19
and held that the
foregoing provision applies "even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the
property occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code."
20
The CA found that
Edilberto failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of the Vitas
and Delpan properties. Edilberto was unable to provide any documentation
evidencing Socorros alleged contribution.
21

On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
22
which was denied
by the CA in its Resolution dated 3 August 2012.
23

Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition.
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership over the properties acquired
during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v.
Descallar
24
in his petition:
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to
the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
25

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the
assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be
considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation
of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows
that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several months
after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."
26

We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban
alone.1wphi1 The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of
his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.
27
The
evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas
property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued
after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system
merely confirms, and does not vest title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page
9 of his petition wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates
of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one
the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles
of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does
not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and
that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and
did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations.
28
Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that
the Delpan property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and
Socorro.
29
Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan
property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her
father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be
reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor
s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who has
accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the
name of Esteban.
During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the
amortizations for the Delpan property.1wphi1 On the other hand, Edilberto
failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s alleged monetary contributions.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:
settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the
affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound to prove the
allegations in the complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.
30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.





















CASES UNDER ARTICLE 148

G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner,
vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and
Herminia P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of two
parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private
respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private
respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman
Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949,
he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was
born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964
and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales
with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found
evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii.
1
When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private
respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second
marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner.
2
Two months
earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale,
jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan with an area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September
23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said
property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as
a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter.
3
The
parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels
of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
4

Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on
December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage
upon Carlina's complaint.
5
Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz,
herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents
sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan,
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with
petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT
No. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already
given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the
same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming
aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their conjugal estate to
Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989
dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove
that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and
Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the
parties, particularly of Kristopher Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot
located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot
290-B including the old house standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural
land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080
square meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda
Agapay;
4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father,
Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel
Palang, provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this
decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims
to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal
properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated
October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to
be settled in another separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
6

On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of
Appeals rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 with the following dispositive
portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in hereby REVERSED
and another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question
to herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of
title in the name of plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs.
7

Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of
two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, the first
in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda
Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred
in not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus
entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate. Third, respondent court erred, according
to petitioner, "in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that
Kristopher A. Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be considered as party-
defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No.
24199.
8

After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provisions of
law and jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition and affirms the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject
of this action. Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of conveyance over the
same parcels of land. There is no dispute that the transfer of ownership from the
original owners of the riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the
spouses Cespedes, respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are notcapacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was
patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still
subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de factoseparation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to
Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family
and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
9

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged
in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store
10
but failed to persuade
us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting
is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only
around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic
to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase
price of subject property,
11
there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel
and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added
assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of
the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their
adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively
that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any
case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation,
the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would
still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price
of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-
ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate
their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court
erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise agreement "in
effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property
between spouses and the termination of the conjugal partnership."
12
Separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation
in the marriage settlements.
13
The judgment which resulted from the parties'
compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and
should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The
testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified
that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that
Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee.
14

The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family
Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses
now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage,
15
for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred
guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
16

The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an
illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of respondent
court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements
regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are
the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated
in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose
and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery of ownership and possession."
17

As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be
considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following the trial court's
decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party
defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court's jurisdiction through
his mother/guardian ad litem.
18
The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not
having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His
mother, Erlinda cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in
the case at bar. Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file
another action to prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits.
19
Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding
paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of
Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights has been pointed out.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and a woman who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally,
may be deemed co-owners of a property acquired during the cohabitation only
upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere
cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a co-ownership.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the November 19, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals
1
(CA), which reversed
the October 7, 1997 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
2
The dispositive part
of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the questioned orders of the
court a quo dated October 7, 1997 and November 11, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The judgment of the court a quodated June 5, 1997 is
hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
3

The assailed Order of the RTC disposed as follows:
Wherefore, the decision of this Court rendered on June 5, 1997 affirming in
toto the appealed judgment of the [MTC] is hereby reconsidered and a new one is
entered reversing said decision of the [MTC] and dismissing the complaint in the
above-entitled case.
4

Petitioner also assails the February 14, 1999 CA Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts as follows:
[Herein respondents] were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 6756, an action for
ejectment filed before Branch 82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against
[herein Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their
complaint dated July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute
owners of an apartment building located at ARTE SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila; that through tolerance they had allowed the
defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last
seven (7) years, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed
upon that after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a
month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as
rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants; that they
have demanded several times [that] the defendants . . . vacate the premises, as
they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building; and that
they have also demanded payment of P84,000.00 from Toto and Gina Tumlos
representing rentals for seven (7) years and payment of P143,600.00 from
Guillerma Tumlos as unpaid rentals for seven (7) years, but the said demands
went unheeded. They then prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the
property in question and to pay the stated unpaid rentals, as well as to jointly pay
P30,000.00 in attorneys fees.
[Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the
complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of
action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced
by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property
in question together with [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the
dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the MTC
required the parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual
issues defined in their pleadings within ten (10) days from receipt of such order,
pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. [Petitioner]
Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position paper on November 29, 1996,
while the [respondents] filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching
thereto their marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the
Contract to Sell over the disputed property. The MTC thereafter promulgated its
judgment on January 22, 1997[.]
x x x x x x x x x
Upon appeal to the [RTC], [petitioner and the two other] defendants alleged in
their memorandum on appeal that [Respondent] Mario Fernandez and
[Petitioner] Guillerma had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the
property in question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived
together in the said apartment building with their two (2) children for around ten
(10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals
from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that [Respondent
Mario] deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. It was also during the
early part of 1996 when [Respondent Mario] accused her of being unfaithful and
demonstrated his baseless [jealousy].
In the same memorandum, [petitioner and the two other] defendants further
averred that it was only recently that Toto Tumlos was temporarily
accommodated in one of the rooms of the subject premises while Gina Tumlos
acted as a nanny for the children. In short, their presence there [was] only
transient and they [were] not tenants of the Fernandez spouses.
On June 5, 1997, the [RTC] rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of
the MTC.
The [petitioner and the two other defendants] seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration on July 3, 1997, alleging that the decision of affirmance by the
RTC was constitutionally flawed for failing to point out distinctly and clearly the
findings of facts and law on which it was based vis--vis the statements of issues
they have raised in their memorandum on appeal. They also averred that the
Contract to Sell presented by the plaintiffs which named the buyer as "Mario P.
Fernandez, of legal age, married to Lourdes P. Fernandez," should not be given
credence as it was falsified to appear that way. According to them, the Contract
to Sell originally named "Guillerma Fernandez" as the spouse of [Respondent
Mario]. As found by the [RTC] in its judgment, a new Contract to Sell was issued
by the sellers naming the [respondents] as the buyers after the latter presented
their marriage contract and requested a change in the name of the vendee-wife.
Such facts necessitate the conclusion that Guillerma was really a co-owner
thereof, and that the [respondents] manipulated the evidence in order to deprive
her of her rights to enjoy and use the property as recognized by law.
x x x x x x x x x
The [RTC], in determining the question of ownership in order to resolve the issue
of possession, ruled therein that the Contract to Sell submitted by the Fernandez
spouses appeared not to be authentic, as there was an alteration in the name of
the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Hence, the contract presented by the
[respondents] cannot be given any weight. The court further ruled that Guillerma
and [Respondent Mario] acquired the property during their cohabitation as
husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage. From such findings,
the court concluded that [Petitioner] Guillerma Tumlos was a co-owner of the
subject property and could not be ejected therefrom.
The [respondents] then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
reversal, but the same was denied by the [RTC].
5

As earlier stated, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this Petition filed by Guillerma
Tumlos only.
6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rejected petitioner's claim that she and Respondent Mario Fernandez
were co-owners of the disputed property. The CA ruled:
From the inception of the instant case, the only defense presented by private
respondent Guillerma is her right as a co-owner of the subject property[.]
x x x x x x x x x
This claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma, as
correctly held by the trial court. No other evidence was presented to validate
such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. As previously stated, it
was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitioner-
husband without the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two (2) children.
Attached to her memorandum on appeal are the birth certificates of the said
children. Such contentions and documents should not have been considered by
the . . . (RTC), as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper before
the trial court (MTC).
x x x x x x x x x
However, even if the said allegations and documents could be considered, the
claim of co-ownership must still fail. As [herein Respondent] Mario Fernandez is
validly married to [Respondent] Lourdes Fernandez (as per Marriage Contract
dated April 27, 1968, p. 45, Original Record), Guillerma and Mario are not
capacitated to marry each other. Thus, the property relations governing their
supposed cohabitation is that found in Article 148 of Executive Order No. 209, as
amended, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines[.]
x x x x x x x x x
It is clear that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to
Article 147 of the Family Code which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or
industry (Agapay v. Palang, 276 SCRA 340). The care given by one party [to] the
home, children, and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the
other, is not included in Article 148 (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, 1988 ed., p. 209). Hence, if actual contribution
of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares (Agapay, supra at p. 348, citing Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines Volume I by Arturo M. Tolentino, 1990 ed., p.
500).
In the instant case, no proof of actual contribution by Guillerma Tumlos in the
purchase of the subject property was presented. Her only evidence was her being
named in the Contract to Sell as the wife of [Respondent] Mario Fernandez. Since
she failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
subject apartment building, We find no basis to justify her co-ownership with
[Respondent Mario]. The said property is thus presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership property of Mario and Lourdes Fernandez, it being acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no other proof to the
contrary (please see Article 116 of the Family Code).
The court a quo (RTC) also found that [Respondent Mario] has two (2) children
with Guillerma who are in her custody, and that to eject them from the
apartment building would be to run counter with the obligation of the former to
give support to his minor illegitimate children, which indispensably includes
dwelling. As previously discussed, such finding has no leg to stand on, it being
based on evidence presented for the first time on appeal.
x x x x x x x x x
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC
failed to consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article 203 of
the Family Code expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs
it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand. . . .1wphi1.nt
In contrast to the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the RTC instead
presumed that Guillerma and her children needed support from [Respondent
Mario]. Worse, it relied on evidence not properly presented before the trial court
(MTC).
With regard to the other [defendants], Gina and Toto Tumlos, a close perusal of
the records shows that they did not file any responsive pleading. Hence,
judgment may be rendered against them as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein, as provided for
in Section 6 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. There was no basis for
the public respondent to dismiss the complaint against them.
7
(emphasis in the
original)
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for the
consideration of the Court:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in not outrightly
dismissing the petition for review filed by respondents.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that petitioner is not the co-owner of the
property in litis.
III. Corollary thereto, the Court of Appeals erred in applying Art. 148 of the Family
Code in the case at bar.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the substantive right of support vis-
-vis the remedy of ejectment resorted to by respondents.
8

In resolving this case, we shall answer two questions: (a) Is the petitioner a co-
owner of the property? (b) Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit? We
shall also discuss these preliminary matters: (a) whether the CA was biased in
favor of respondents and (b) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the
ejectment suit.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
Petitioner submits that the CA exhibited partiality in favor of herein respondents.
This bias, she argues, is manifest in the following:
1. The CA considered the respondents Petition for Review
9
despite their failure
to attach several pleadings as well as the explanation for the proof of service,
despite the clear mandate of Section 11
10
of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of
Court and despite the ruling in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort.
11

2. It allowed respondents to submit the pleadings that were not attached.
3. It considered respondents' Reply dated May 20, 1998, which had allegedly
been filed out of time.
4. It declared that the case was submitted for decision without first determining
whether to give due course to the Petition, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.
12

The CA, for its part, succinctly dismissed these arguments in this wise:
It is too late in the day now to question the alleged procedural error after we
have rendered the decision. More importantly, when the private respondent filed
their comment to the petition on April 26, 1998, they failed to question such
alleged procedural error. Neither have they questioned all the resolutions issued
by the Court after their filing of such comment. They should, therefore, be now
considered in estoppel to question the same.
13

We agree with the appellate court. Petitioner never raised these matters before
the CA. She cannot be allowed now to challenge its Decision on grounds of
alleged technicalities being belatedly raised as an afterthought. In this light, she
cannot invoke Solar
14
because she never raised this issue before the CA.
More important, we find it quite sanctimonious indeed on petitioners part to
rely, on the one hand, on these procedural technicalities to overcome the
appealed Decision and, on the other hand, assert that the RTC may consider the
new evidence she presented for the first time on appeal. Such posturing only
betrays the futility of petitioner's assertion, if not its absence of merit.
One other preliminary matter. Petitioner implies that the court of origin, the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), did not have jurisdiction over the "nature of the
case," alleging that the real question involved is one of ownership. Since the issue
of possession cannot be settled without passing upon that of ownership, she
maintains that the MTC should have dismissed the case.
This contention is erroneous. The issue of ownership may be passed upon by the
MTC to settle the issue of possession.
15
Such disposition, however, is not final
insofar as the issue of ownership is concerned,
16
which may be the subject of
another proceeding brought specifically to settle that question.
Having resolved these preliminary matters, we now move on to petitioners
substantive contentions.
First Issue:
Petitioner as Co-owner
Petitioners central theory and main defense against respondents' action for
ejectment is her claim of co-ownership over the property with Respondent Mario
Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell
indicating that she was his spouse. The MTC found this document insufficient to
support her claim. The RTC, however, after considering her allegation that she
had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence presented
before it,
17
ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the
RTC could no longer be considered because they had not been submitted before
the MTC. Hence, the appellate court concluded that "[t]he claim of co-ownership
was not satisfactorily proven . . ."
18

We agree with the petitioner that the RTC did not err in considering the evidence
presented before it. Nonetheless, we reject her claim that she was a co-owner of
the disputed property.
Evidence Presented on
Appeal Before the RTC
In ruling that the RTC erred in considering on appeal the evidence presented by
petitioner, the CA relied on the doctrine that issues not raised during trial could
not be considered for the first time during appeal.
19

We disagree. In the first place, there were no new matters or issues belatedly
raised during the appeal before the RTC. The defense invoked by petitioner at the
very start was that she was a co-owner. To support her claim, she presented a
Contract to Sell dated November 14, 1986, which stated that Mario Fernandez
was legally married to her. The allegation that she was cohabiting with him was a
mere elaboration of her initial theory.
In the second place, procedural rules are generally premised on considerations of
fair play. Respondents never objected when the assailed evidence was presented
before the RTC. Thus, they cannot claim unfair surprise or prejudice.
Petitioner Not a Co-Owner Under
Article 144 of the Civil Code
Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and the RTC, we cannot
accept petitioner's submission that she is a co-owner of the disputed property
pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code.
20
As correctly held by the CA, the
applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family
Code which provides:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
21
only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a
woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other,
22
or to one in which the
marriage of the parties is void
23
from the beginning.
24
It does not apply to a
cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife.
25

Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those submitted by
petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario Fernandez was
incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes
Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by petitioner, she cohabited
with Mario in a state of concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is
inapplicable.
As stated above, the relationship between petitioner and Respondent Mario
Fernandez is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-
Diy points out
26
that "[t]he Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code by expressly regulating in its Article 148 the property relations of
couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, petitioners argument that the Family Code is inapplicable because the
cohabitation and the acquisition of the property occurred before its effectivity
deserves scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself states that it can
be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights.
27
In this
case, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the property in question.
Moreover, to resolve similar issues, we have applied Article 148 of the Family
Code retroactively.
28

No Evidence of Actual Joint
Contribution
Another consideration militates against petitioners claim that she is a co-owner
of the property. In Agapay,
29
the Court ruled:
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that the actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to
Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family
and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares. (emphasis ours)
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual
contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of
co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during the cohabitation is
unsubstantiated. In any event, this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for
nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the administration of the
property amounts to a contribution in its acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in
question belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents. Hence, the MTC
and the CA were correct in ordering the ejectment of petitioner from the
premises.
Second Issue:
Support versus Ejectment
Petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to repudiate
her claim regarding the filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil and Michael
Fernandez, his silence on the matter amounts to an admission. Arguing that
Mario is liable for support, she advances the theory that the childrens right to
support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents
to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby
respondents seek to exercise their possessory right over their property. It is
summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of the
property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they have a better right to
possess it than does the petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on
their tolerance.1wphi1.nt
Moreover, Respondent Mario Fernandez' alleged failure to repudiate petitioner's
claim of filiation is not relevant to the present case.1wphi1 Indeed, it would be
highly improper for us to rule on such issue. Besides, it was not properly taken up
below.
30
In any event, Article 298
31
of the Civil Code requires that there should
be an extrajudicial demand.
32
None was made here. The CA was correct when it
said:
Even assuming arguendo that the said evidence was validly presented, the RTC
failed to consider that the need for support cannot be presumed. Article [298] of
the [New Civil Code] expressly provides that the obligation to give support shall
be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
need it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial
and extrajudicial demand.
33

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000
EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the amended decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
dated May 7, 1998 in CA G.R. CV No. 48443 granting respondent's motion for
reconsideration of its decision dated November 7, 1996, and of the resolution
dated December 21, 1998 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint
2
for
"Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages"
against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner and
respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective
spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their
respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the
Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and
chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and
treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real
and personal properties which were registered solely in respondent's name. In
1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner
demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent
refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name.
In her Amended Answer,
3
respondent admitted that she engaged in the customs
brokerage business with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight Customs
Brokerage Corporation was organized with other individuals and duly registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She denied that she and
petitioner lived as husband and wife because the fact was that they were still
legally married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the exclusive owner
of all real personal properties involved in petitioner's action for partition on the
ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and registered
solely in her name.
On November 25, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
4
in
accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Court.
5
She contended that summary
judgment was proper, because the issues raised in the pleadings were sham and
not genuine, to wit:
A.
The main issue is Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or payment of co-
ownership share, accounting and damages, considering that plaintiff and
defendant are admittedly both married to their respective spouses under still
valid and subsisting marriages, even assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they
lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other words,
can the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties, under the law,
considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of
marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife
(?)
B.
As a collateral issue, can the plaintiff be considered as an unregistered co-owner
of the real properties under the Transfer Certificates of Title duly registered solely
in the name of defendant Ma. Elvira Castillo? This issue is also true as far as the
motor vehicles in question are concerned which are also registered in the name
of defendant.
6

On the first point, respondent contended that even if she and petitioner actually
cohabited, petitioner could not validly claim a part of the subject real and
personal properties because Art. 144 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
rules on co-ownership shall govern the properties acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage
which is void ab initio, applies only if the parties are not in any way incapacitated
to contract marriage.
7
In the parties' case, their union suffered the legal
impediment of a prior subsisting marriage. Thus, the question of fact being raised
by petitioner, i.e., whether they lived together as husband and wife, was
irrelevant as no co-ownership could exist between them.
As to the second issue, respondent maintained that petitioner cannot be
considered an unregistered co-owner of the subject properties on the ground
that, since titles to the land are solely in her name, to grant petitioner's prayer
would be to allow a collateral attack on the validity of such titles.
Petitioner opposed respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
8
He contended
that the case presented genuine factual issues and that Art. 144 of the Civil Code
had been repealed by the Family Code which now allows, under Art. 148, a
limited co-ownership even though a man and a woman living together are not
capacitated to marry each other. Petitioner also asserted that an implied trust
was constituted when he and respondent agreed to register the properties solely
in the latter's name although the same were acquired out of the profits made
from their brokerage business. Petitioner invoked the following provisions of the
Civil Code:
Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common
consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a
trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest
of each.
Art. 1453. When the property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his
declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another grantor, there is an
implied trust in favor of the person whose benefit is contemplated.
On January 30, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision
9
granting respondent's
motion for summary judgment. It ruled that an examination of the pleadings
shows that the issues involved were purely legal. The trial court also sustained
respondent's contention that petitioner's action for partition amounted to a
collateral attack on the validity of the certificates of title covering the subject
properties. It held that even if the parties really had cohabited, the action for
partition could not be allowed because an action for partition among co-owners
ceases to be so and becomes one for title if the defendant, as in the present case,
alleges exclusive ownership of the properties in question. For these reasons, the
trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 93-656.
On appeals, the Court of Appeals on November 7, 1996, ordered the case
remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. It cited the decision
in Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court
10
to the effect that an action for
partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. If the
defendant asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition should
not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is
unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the
action, not because the wrong remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists
for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. Resolving the issue whether
petitioner's action for partition was a collateral attack on the validity of the
certificates of title, the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner sought to
compel respondent to execute documents necessary to effect transfer of what he
claimed was his share, petitioner was not actually attacking the validity of the
titles but in fact, recognized their validity. Finally, the appellate court upheld
petitioner's position that Art. 144 of the Civil Code had been repealed by Art. 148
of the Family Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of Court of Appeals. On
May 7, 1998, nearly two years after its first decision, the Court of Appeals granted
respondent's motion and reconsidered its prior decision. In its decision now
challenged in the present petition, it held
Prefatorily, and to better clarify the controversy on whether this suit is a
collateral attack on the titles in issue, it must be underscored that plaintiff-
appellant alleged in his complaint that all the nine (9) titles are registered in the
name of defendant-appellee, Ma. Elvira T. Castillo, except one which appears in
the name of Eloisa Castillo (see par. 9, Complaint). However, a verification of the
annexes of such initiatory pleading shows some discrepancies, to wit:
1. TCT No. 149046 (Annex A) = Elvira T. Castillo, single
2. TCT No. 168208 (Annex B) = do
3. TCT No. 37046 (Annex C) = do
4. TCT No. 37047 (Annex D) = do
5. TCT No. 37048 (Annex E) = do
6. TCT No. 30368 (Annex F) = Steelhaus Realty & Dev. Corp.
7. TCT No. 30369 (Annex G) = do
8. TCT No. 30371 (Annex F) = do
9. TCT No. (92323) 67881 (Annex I) = Eloisa Castillo
In this action, plaintiff-appellant seeks to be declared as 1/2 co-owner of the real
properties covered by the above listed titles and eventually for their partition
[par. (a), Prayer; p. 4 Records]. Notably, in order to achieve such prayer for a joint
co-ownership declaration, it is unavoidable that the individual titles involved be
altered, changed, cancelled or modified to include therein the name of the
appellee as a registered 1/2 co-owner. Yet, no cause of action or even a prayer is
contained filed. Manifestly, absent any cause or prayer for the alteration,
cancellation, modification or changing of the titles involved, the desired
declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition will utterly be an indirect or
collateral attack on the subject titled in this suit.
It is here that We fell into error, such that, if not rectified will surely lead to a
procedural lapse and a possible injustice. Well settled is the rules that a certificate
of title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
In this jurisdiction, the remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another name is, after one year from the
date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting it as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an action for
reconveyance or, if the property had passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages. Verily, plaintiff-appellant should have first
pursued such remedy or any other relief directly attacking the subject titles before
instituting the present partition suit. Apropos, the case at bench appears to have
been prematurely filed.
Lastly, to grant the partition prayed for by the appellant will in effect rule and
decide against the properties registered in the names of Steelhouse Realty and
Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, who are not parties in the case. To
allow this to happen will surely result to injustice and denial of due process of
law. . . .
11

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution dated December 21, 1998. Hence this petition.
Petitioner contends that: (1) the Court of Appeals, in its first decision of
November 7, 1996, was correct in applying the Roque ruling and in rejecting
respondent's claim that she was the sole owner of the subject properties and that
the partition suit was a collateral attack on the titles; (2) the Court of Appeals
correctly rules in its first decision that Art. 148 of the Family Code governs the co-
ownership between the parties, hence, the complaint for partition is proper; (3)
with respect to the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty,
respondent admitted ownership thereof and, at the very least, these properties
could simply be excluded and the partition limited to the remaining real and
personal properties; and (4) the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that under
the Civil Code, there is an implied trust in his favor.
12

The issue in this case is really whether summary judgment, in accordance with
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, is proper. We rule in the negative.
First. Rule 35, 3 of the Rules of Court provides that summary judgment is proper
only when, based on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after
summary hearing, it is shown that except as to the amount of damages, there is
no veritable issue regarding any material fact in the action and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
1
Conversely, where the pleadings tender
a genuine issue, i.e., an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious,
contrived, set-up in bad faith, or patently unsubstantial, summary judgment is
not proper.
14

In the present case, we are convinced that genuine issues exist. Petitioner
anchors his claim of co-ownership on two factual grounds: first, that said
properties were acquired by him and respondent during their union from 1979 to
1992 from profits derived from their brokerage business; and second, that said
properties were registered solely in respondent's name only because they agreed
to that arrangement, thereby giving rise to an implied trust in accordance with
Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code. These allegations are denied by
respondent. She denies that she and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife. She also claims that the properties in question were acquired solely by her
with her own money and resources. With such conflicting positions, the only way
to ascertain the truth is obviously through the presentation of evidence by the
parties.
The trial court ruled that it is immaterial whether the parties actually lived
together as husband and wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made
to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, it
was impossible for a co-ownership to exist between them.
We disagree.
Art. 144 of the Civil Code provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This provision of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
provided they are not incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each
other,
15
or in which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous.
Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship.
However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited co-ownership in
cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It states:
In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article,
16
only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were
not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have
been living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The
Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man
and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be
equal. There is thus co-ownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to
marry each other.
In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein.
Consequently, whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the
properties involved in the case are part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine
and material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been
acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the
property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was
really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded.
Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that:
Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff assisted
by defendant, their customs brokerage business grew and out of the profits
therefrom, the parties acquired real and personal properties which were, upon
agreement of the parties, listed and registered in defendant's name with plaintiff
as the unregistered co-owner of all said properties.
17

On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art.
1452 of the Civil Code which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to
purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of
one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
others in proportion to the interest of each." We do not think this is correct. The
legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the
Family Code under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their
actual joint contributions of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-
ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for
the other.
18
The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are
no longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership which
is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.
Second. The trial court likewise dismissed petitioner's action on the ground that
the same amounted to a collateral attack on the certificates of title involved. As
already noted, at first, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner's action does not
challenge the validity of respondent's titles. However, on reconsideration, it
reversed itself and affirmed the trial court. It noted that petitioner's complaint
failed to include a prayer for the alteration, cancellation, modification, or
changing of the titles involved. Absent such prayer, the appellate court ruled that
a declaration of co-ownership and eventual partition would involve an indirect or
collateral attack on the titles. We disagree.
A torrens title, as a rule, is conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D.
No. 1529,
19
48 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack and can not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct
proceeding. When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the
action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment
pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of
an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its
enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made
as an incident thereof.
20

In his complaint for partition, consistent with our ruling in Roque regarding the
nature of an action for partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration that he is a
co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares. He does not attack respondent's titles. Petitioner alleges no fraud,
mistake, or any other irregularity that would justify a review of the registration
decree in respondent's favor. His theory is that although the subject properties
were registered solely in respondent's name, but since by agreement between
them as well as under the Family Code, he is co-owner of these properties and as
such is entitled to the conveyance of his shares. On the premise that he is a co-
owner, he can validly seek the partition of the properties in co-ownership and the
conveyance to him of his share.
Thus, in Guevara v. Guevara,
21
in which a parcel of land bequeathed in a last will
and testament was registered in the name of only one of the heirs, with the
understanding that he would deliver to the others their shares after the debts of
the original owner had been paid, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the
registration of the land in the name of only one of the heirs, the other heirs can
claim their shares in "such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to
partition the estate of the testator."
22

Third. The Court of Appeals also reversed its first decision on the ground that to
order partition will, in effect, rule and decide against Steelhouse Realty
Development Corporation and Eloisa Castillo, both strangers to the present case,
as to the properties registered in their names. This reasoning, however, ignores
the fact that the majority of the properties involved in the present case are
registered in respondent's name, over which petitioner claims rights as a co-
owner. Besides, other than the real properties, petitioner also seeks partition of a
substantial amount of personal properties consisting of motor vehicles and
several pieces of jewelry. By dismissing petitioner's complaint for partition on
grounds of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly denied
petitioner his right to prove ownership over the claimed real and personal
properties. The dismissal of petitioner's complaint is unjustified since both ends
may be amply served by simply excluding from the action for partition the
properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo.
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998,
is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59,
Makati City for further proceedings on the merits.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death
benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married. 1wphi1.nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in
toto the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992,
with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back
in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,
3
while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection
of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that
petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-
six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits
which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM,
[and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,
prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented:
1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number;
5
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality
on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or
transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever
legal purpose it may serve.
6

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death
benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in
the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN
THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF
THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE
OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.
8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void.
9
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case.
10
In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon
the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage,
12
and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions,
13
renders the marriage void ab initio.
14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
15
the Court
held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a
marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death
benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there
must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage
of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage
of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime.
16
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,
17
-
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it
could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent
has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said
death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent,
not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a
marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
x x x
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned
by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal
shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned
the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
19
Conformably, even if the
disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government
employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the
present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith.
Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case
of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
20
where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and
the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void
the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the
first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the
new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive
him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as
such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here
in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its
nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize
the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by
her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.
21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the
rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the
parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
22
however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the
Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a
marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage.
That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage,
he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void,
before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is
patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the
validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a
marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity
is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights
flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the
issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to
determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
23
the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 94, BOAC,
MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
1

Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,
2
but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in
July 1987.
3
After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and
wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father.
4
Their cohabitation was
not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing
vessel "Saguid Brothers."
5
Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but
decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her
relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however,
did not ebb away the conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple
decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.
6

On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the
Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of
$1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00
in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an
entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances,
pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She
prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that
the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of
their house, be reimbursed to her.
Private respondent testified that she deposited part of her earnings in her savings
account with First Allied Development Bank.
7
Her Pass Book shows that as of May
23, 1995, she had a balance of P21,046.08.
8
She further stated that she had a
total of P35,465.00
9
share in the joint account deposit which she and the
petitioner maintained with the same bank.
10
Gina declared that said deposits
were spent for the purchase of construction materials, appliances and other
personal properties.
11

In his answer
12
to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the
construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of
their fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish
dealer rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house.
Besides, selling fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with
the small quantity of fish allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner further
contended that Gina did not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but
only for a 6-month duration each year. When their house was repaired and
improved sometime in 1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the
expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on the daily needs and
business of her parents. From his income in the fishing business, he claimed to
have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of which was placed in a joint
account deposit with private respondent. This savings, according to petitioner
was spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to
file a pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.
13

On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
14
of the May 21,
1997 order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was
allowed to present evidence ex parte.
15
Petitioner filed another motion for
reconsideration but the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision
16
was rendered in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff Gina S. Rey against defendant Jacinto Saguid:
a) Ordering the partition of the house identified as plaintiffs Exhibit C and D and
directing the defendant to return and/or reimburse to the plaintiff the amount of
seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter actually contributed to its
construction and completion;
b) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the personal properties listed
on Exhibit M;
c) Ordering the defendant, and/or anyone in possession of the aforesaid personal
properties, to return and/or deliver the same to the plaintiff; and
d) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
17

On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; however, the
award of P50,000.00 as moral damages was deleted for lack of basis.
18
The
appellate court ruled that the propriety of the order which declared the
petitioner as in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rules now require the
filing of a pre-trial brief and the defendants non-compliance therewith entitles
the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration which were denied; hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE
PRESENT CASE AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN MOOT AND
ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS
REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR
EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RELYING ON THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE
EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE.
19

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial court erred in allowing
private respondent to present evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial
courts decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the
defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parteand the court
shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
20
The remedy of the defendant is to
file a motion for reconsideration
21
showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.
22
The motion need not
really stress the fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense
because his answer which contains his defenses is already on record.
23

In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is
justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not,
however, sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be
represented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was
able to file a motion for extension to file answer,
24
the required answer stating
therein the special and affirmative defenses,
25
and several other motions.
26
If it
were true that petitioner did not understand the import of the April 23, 1997
order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court
or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief. Instead, he waited until
May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order
before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief. Pre-
trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may
result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
27

In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a
persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the
Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be
represented by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to
a denial of due process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process clause
such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed
ignored or violated.
28

However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot
and academic the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present
evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the
rules may indeed be applied retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at
bar. Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the
filing of a pre-trial brief was required under Circular No. 1-89 which became
effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-
trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear at the pre-trial,"
that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered as in default.
29

Coming now to the substantive issue, it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto
were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married
to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property
regime therefore is governed by Article 148
30
of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime,
"only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ..."
31
Proof of actual contribution is
required.
32

In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
33
Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing
property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence,
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
34

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang,
35
and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
36
which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-
ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
37
we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponents defense.
38
This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant
case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some
measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the
complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that
the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
39
Indeed, the party alleging a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
40

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties
of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her
testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the
record are receipts
41
in her name for the purchase of construction materials on
November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00.
On the other hand, both parties claim that the money used to purchase the
disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account with First Allied
Development Bank. While there is no question that both parties contributed in
their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact
amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution,
their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties
were valued at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not
questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-
half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
The Court of Appeals thus erred in affirming the decision of the trial court which
granted the reliefs prayed for by private respondent. On the basis of the evidence
established, the extent of private respondents co-ownership over the disputed
house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in the
construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein
should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.
As regards the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Court of
Appeals correctly deleted the same for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64166 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Private respondent Gina
S. Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house
to the extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent of P55,687.50.
Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the amount of P67,100.50 to private
respondent, failing which the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy
private respondents claim.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169698 November 29, 2006
LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Decision
1
dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
69797, as reiterated in its Resolution
2
of September 16, 2005, reversing an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action
for Judicial Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by the herein
petitioner Lupo Atienza against respondent Yolanda de Castro.
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General
Manager of Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation,
hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two
corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became
intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived
together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two
children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their
relationship turned sour until they parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda
for the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements
located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint,
docketed in said court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject
property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband
and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was
acquired by Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title
thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his knowledge
and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time,
their affair was still thriving. It was only after their separation and his receipt of
information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in the disputed
property, when he demanded his share thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired
the same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00)
using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it thru her own savings and
earnings as a businesswoman.
In a decision
3
dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for
Lupo by declaring the contested property as owned in common by him and
Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City to
be owned in common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and the defendant YOLANDA U.
DE CASTRO share-and-share alike and ordering the partition of said property
between them. Upon the finality of this Decision, the parties are hereby directed
to submit for the confirmation of the Court a mutually agreed project of partition
of said property or, in case the physical partition of said property is not feasible
because of its nature, that either the same be assigned to one of the parties who
shall pay the value corresponding to the share of the other or that the property
to be sold and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between the parties after
deducting the expenses incident to said sale.
The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69797, therein arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that she
purchased the disputed property in her own name with her own money. She
maintained that the documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the
best evidence to prove who actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the
trial court, as well as Lupos assertions casting doubt as to her financial capacity
to acquire the disputed property.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision
4
of April 29,
2005, reversed and set aside that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated
property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE . The subject property is hereby declared to be exclusively owned
by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled
that under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the evidence
on record and attending circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole ownership is
meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo
failed to overcome the burden of proving his allegation that the subject property
was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its
Resolution of September 16, 2005,
5
Lupo is now with this Court via the present
recourse arguing that pursuant to Article 144
6
of the Civil Code, he was in no way
burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property
because with or without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-
owner thereof, adding that under Article 484
7
of Civil Code, as long as the
property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital union,
such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the
rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special provisions.
We DENY.
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each
other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at
the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime,
therefore, is governed by Article 148
8
of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ...
9
Proof of actual contribution is
required.
10

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless
live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
11

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or
way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
12
Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in
a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article
148 governs.
13

The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in
other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength
of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents
defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
warrant such relief.
14
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it
and a mere allegation is not evidence.
15

It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to
acquire the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of
his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for
petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property
contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24,
1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the
Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the
respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner. As
aptly pointed out by the CA:
Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this
burden. Perusing the records of the case, it is evident that the trial court
committed errors of judgment in its findings of fact and appreciation of evidence
with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of the disputed
property and ultimately the rightful owner thereof. Factual findings of the trial
court are indeed entitled to respect and shall not be disturbed, unless some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked or
misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the case.
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete
evidence be formally entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual
contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed
property, [Lupo] diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting
her as a shrewd and scheming woman without the capacity to purchase any
property. Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent thereof, over the
subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere attack on the financial
capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of
the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove
his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that
[Yolanda] had a limited access to the funds of the said corporations and had
repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts for their behalf do not
prove that the money she used in buying the disputed property, or any property
for that matter, came from said withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent financial
capacity of the parties.1wphi1 On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain
and the President and General Manager of two corporations and on the other is
[Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo] is financially well
heeled than [Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda]
had taken advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is in error. (Words in
brackets supplied.)
As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is
without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution
in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In
contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts,
which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his
burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply
stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not
evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under
co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may
only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to
the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioners
evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the
trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article
148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his
cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent
sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property
from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman
engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She
presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings
with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase
price of the subject property.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in
rendering the herein challenged decision and resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real
properties in the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole
name the properties were registered under the Torrens system?
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was
assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to
work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the
Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met respondent
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as
a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to
tutor him in English. In dire need of additional income to support her children,
respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a
squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented
house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house
and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts
to Sell dated November 18, 1985
1
and March 10, 1986
2
covering the properties,
Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 16, 1987
3
was likewise issued in their favor. However, when the
Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of
Deeds, registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and
could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs
name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as
buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were
issued in respondents name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-
MAN,
4
and per Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5,
1988.
5

However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new
boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City.
Jambrich supported respondents sons for only two months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was
engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a
hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat
from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for
about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the
Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment."
6
On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register
the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has already
been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery
of real property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner
alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986
and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties
which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid
for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and
absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute
ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991
which Jambrich executed in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and
exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price
of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited
to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial
capacity to buy the disputed property with money from a supposed copra
business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary
evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still
employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of
[the] properties under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and
earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only supported by
documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant
Antoniet*t+a Opalla. So that, Jambrichs financial capacity to acquire and purchase
the properties . . . is not disputed.
7

x x x
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met
Jambrich sometime in the latter part of 1984, she was only working as a waitress
at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month and was . . . renting
and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu City;
that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he offered
her a better life which she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable financial
situation of hers and her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child
Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied
to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was personally
interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her two children by
Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true because these are now
denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during this time she was already
earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra
business, it would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only
in such a miserable condition since it is the observation of this Court that she is
not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty as she
wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her
actuation when she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that
according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00 a
month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her
children.
8

This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire
the properties under litigation or could contribute any amount for their
acquisition which according to her is worth more than P700,000.00 when while
she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as
salary and tips of more or lessP2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily
needs of her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in
financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and
live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children
who were already abandoned by her husband.
9

x x x
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included
in [the contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally,
the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as
observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has
taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still
bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him
since he could still very well provide for everything she needs, he being earning
(sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of
these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship was still
going smoothly and harmoniously.
10
[Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of
strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which
are covered by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the
name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790,
24791 and 24792 in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue
new ones in the name of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided
insofar as they appear to convey rights and interests over the properties in
question to the defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount
of P25,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.
11

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10,
2002,
12
the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for
the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances involved in the
case cited by the lower court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court
which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are
absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title to the
subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et
al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of
Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159
SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547;
Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of the subject
property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant.
Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.
13

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENTS JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICHS PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT
THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE
COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).
14

First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between
respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to
1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an
Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00.
Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year where his monthly
salary was approximately P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985
with a monthly salary of not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of
land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her during the pre-trial
conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were
unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the business of her
mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra, and
had not filed any income tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were
lost to fire, and the last one left standing was already scrap. Further, the Child
Study Report
15
submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondents two sons by Jambrich
disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as
a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with
money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are (sic) foreigners and they
gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners
coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial
problem started then. She was even renting a small room in a squatters area in
Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of great financial distress that she
met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself and her
children.
16

The DSWD Home Study Report
17
further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta
Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the
girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English language. Antonietta accepted the
offer because she was in need of additional income to support [her] 2 young
children who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be
scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the
family particularly the children who were malnourished. After a few months
sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent place. He told
Antonietta that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was
miserable and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of
the children.
18

Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the
source of fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the
house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct
examination and during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children,
that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question, but that his name was
deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless,
his signature remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in
postdated checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account
with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments were also in the name of
Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for
ten months, where she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner,
bequeathed the subject properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of
the trial court are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court,
subject to a number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find no reason to
disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not
controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their
conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples
cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies
to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each
other, does not apply.
19
In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to
another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each
of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-
ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
20

Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of
respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and
lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of
the properties in the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
21
It is only a
means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at
large.
22
Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title
does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that
respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title
implies that the title is quiet,
23
and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible.
24
However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when
the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration.
25
This is the situation in the instant case.
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any
savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is
embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
26
which is basically a
reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution,
27
and Section 14,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
28
The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations
at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental
law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private
lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a
former natural-born citizen.
29

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a
Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,
30
the
Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases
31
that if land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or
transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for
World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these
properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the
cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as
owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and three parcels
of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise
ordered respondent to pay petitioner P25,000 as attorneys fees and P10,000 as
litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,
32
is this since the ban on aliens is
intended to preserve the nations land for future generations of Filipinos, that
aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to
Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified
person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected.
The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands
has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated
July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.