threats to non-member states. The recent crisis in Ukraine has raised the question of the responsibility for NATO to intervene in security threats beyond the alliances borders, particularly in instances that affect the stability of the regional neighborhood. The author also highlights the need for further burden sharing with interna- tional partners. Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief Deterrence Beyond NATO Borders by Sinan lgen German Marshall Fund of the United States-Paris 71 Boulevard Raspail 75006 Paris T: +33 1 47 23 47 18 E: infoparis@gmfus.org October 2014 Te Ukraine-Russia crisis has rekin- dled the debate on the role of NATO as a security provider in Europe. Many observers criticized the Alliance for not doing more to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine, yet the question remains if it was NATOs role to do so. Te short answer is no: it was not incumbent upon NATO to deter Russia from its territorial ambitions against a non-NATO state. Nonethe- less, NATO has a role to play in the long term stability of the European continent, and the Ukraine crisis has helped better identify this role and frame the question of deterrence beyond the borders of the Alliance. First, the Ukraine crisis has helped to frmly reset the priorities of the Alliance. NATO has a commitment to defend its members, and only its members. Article 5 does not apply to countries that are beyond the borders of the Alliance. For NATO members, however, and especially in Eastern Europe, there has been an identi- fed need to strengthen the reassur- ance provided by NATO. What the Ukraine crisis therefore unravelled is a debate on the credibility of Article 5 in a context that harkens back to the conditions of the Cold War. As the diferent policy papers and latest NATO Strategic Concept highlighted, the focus for the Alliance shifed to areas such as crisis management and cooperative security. Te issues of collective and territorial defense and Article 5 commitments have become less preeminent in an Alliance emphasizing asymmetric threats and partnerships. With an increasingly ambitious and assertive Russia almost a self-styled adversary of the West the terms of the debate have now changed. Te crisis has also demonstrated the continued commitment of the United States to the security of the European continent, but also more importantly to the credibility of Article 5, and has helped eradicate some of the uneasi- ness the pivot to Asia introduced in the debate. Tis does not neces- sarily change the strategic outlook for Washington, whose main strategic challenges continue to be in Asia, but who has nonetheless demonstrated that their shifing long-term priorities did not have to come at the expense of the credibility of the Alliance. Tus, NATO was able to launch actions such as the deployment of addi- tional aircraf for Baltic air policing designed frstly to reassure those Allies who started to view Moscows ambitions with increasing concern. Tis latest crisis has also confrmed the need for a transatlantic response Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief 2 to the burning challenge of ensuring the stability and security of a geography beyond NATOs borders. In other words, NATO could not be, and was not, the sole institu- tional vehicle for coordinating such a response. Te trans- atlantic framework provided a more suitable structure for addressing this policy challenge. A clear division of labor emerged in the transatlantic context with the United States and the EU taking the lead role in the political containment and gradual economic isolation through sanctions and measures that aimed to ostracize Russia from the G8, while NATO was tasked with the reassurance of its members. Whether the transatlantic reaction will be sufcient to deter Russia from the continuing destabilization of Ukraine remains to be seen. It can be contended that the transatlantic community has so far been able to dissuade Putin and his followers from engaging in further military adventurism. A key factor in this respect has been the maintenance of political cohesion, both across the Atlantic and within Europe. Equally important in this game of deterrence is the looming threat of a strengthened regime of sanctions, which can be scaled up to include measures against specifc companies or sectors. Tis threat has been instrumental in a worsening outlook for the Russian economy with a drop in growth forecasts, an acceleration of capital fight, and overall higher borrowing costs. But going beyond the deterrence debate, the crisis with Russia heralds the beginning of a new era in the conti- nental order that is set to be characterized by rising East-West tensions. Tese tensions will not be as under- pinned by ideological diferences as was the case in the past, but rather by the ambitions of a Russian leadership which intends to re-establish a regional order based on a contested vision of its zone of infuence. Te strategic shif undertaken by Vladimir Putins Russia is a watershed moment for the European order. Te Kremlins decision to position Russia as an adversary of the West by violating the rules of the international system, including the changing of state borders by force, heralds a more confrontational era for U.S.-Russian and Europe-Russian relationships. By doing so, Russia has chosen to undermine some of the most basic tenets of peaceful order in Europe. Tis should not, however, be seen as a return to the Cold War dynamics. Russias revisionism should be better under- stood as being rooted in the resentment of Moscows loss of power in the post-Soviet period, the internal political dynamics in the country, and the growing rejections of the cultural values of liberal Europe. Tis more confict-riddled context has ramifcations for global and regional security governance institutions, and therefore on the ability of the transatlantic partner- ship to contribute to the establishment of a stable and secure neighborhood. For instance, it should be expected that under these conditions, the United Nations Security Council will be less functional in managing future crisis scenarios, especially in cases where Russias interests are divergent; we may not see the UNSC adopt resolutions such as Resolution 1973 that condoned the international intervention to Libya. Syria was a real test case as Moscows (and Beijings) opposition has made it impossible to get a UNSC mandate for an international intervention. As a result, the Syrian crisis has spiraled into a civil war and created the conditions for more long term and possibly permanent security spillovers, such as the rise of radical Islamist groups. Te transatlantic community has not come to terms with the full implications of this perceived dysfunction. Tere is, therefore, a need to fully explore the consequences of such a development. It can, for instance, mean that the transatlantic partnership will need to muster the political willingness to operate and intervene in regional conficts that have the potential to severely afect the stability of our neighborhood, even in the absence of a UN mandate. Te coalition of the willing approach will need to be relied upon more frequently. At the same time, the burden of crisis management will be shifed to regional organizations, and inter-regional gover- nance institutions setup by like-minded states will be faced with a heavier burden in terms of managing security chal- lenges. One clear implication is the need for improvement The crisis with Russia heralds the beginning of a new era in the continental order that is set to be characterized by rising East-West tensions. Transatlantic Security Task Force Series Policy Brief 3 in NATO-EU relations in a world where these organiza- tions are likely to have a greater role. EU and NATO should be able to have a more sustained discussion about security threats. Tis is necessary not only to calibrate responses but also pre-empt some of the difculties that can emerge due to diferent threat perceptions. Te more challenging the strategic environment becomes, the less room there will be to maintain and defend these non-cooperative solutions that are inimical to our sense of overall security. Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the views of the author alone. About the Author Sinan lgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on the implications of Turkish foreign policy for Europe and the United States, nuclear policy, and the secu- rity and economic aspects of the transatlantic relations. About GMF Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. Contact Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Schefer Director, Paris Ofce German Marshall Fund of the United States Tel: +33 1 47 23 47 18 Email: adehoopschefer@gmfus.org