Manuel Japzon and Jaime Ty ran for mayor in May 2007. Japzon filed a petition for disqualification and cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy of Ty on the ground of misrepresentation. Japzon averred that Ty was a US citizen and has been a resident thereof for the past 25 years and that he falsely represented in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for one year before the date of the elections. He further averred that while Ty has reacquired his Philippine citizenship, he has not actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and that reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile in the said barangay. While the case was pending, Ty won the elections.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Ty complied with the 1 year residency requirement.
RULING:
Yes.
In Election Law, the term residence is to be understood as "domicile" which is the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.
Domicile of origin is acquired by every person at their birth, usually where the childs parents reside, and continues until abandoned by the acquisition of a new domicile that is the domicile of choice.
Acquiring Philippine citizenship does not abandon Tys domicile of origin in the U.S. but the fact that after acquiring Philippine citizenship he applied for a Philippine passport indicating his Philippine address, it became his domicile of choice.
Hence, the length of residence is counted from the time Ty made it his domicile of choice. It does not retroact to the time of birth but it is still within the 1 year period prescribed by the Local Government Code.
2. Dizon v. COMELEC, January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Roberto Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a petition to disqualify Marino Morales as a mayoralty candidate for the 2007 elections. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 and thus should not be allowed to run in the 2007 elections under the three-term limit.
On the other hand, Morales alleged that he did not win in the 1998 elections since the RTC declared his opponent as duly elected mayor in the said elections.
The COMELEC ruled in favour of Morales citing the former decision of the Supreme Court that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 notwithstanding the RTC Decision that the then proclamation of Morales was void. Hence, Morales was not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap. So Morales is qualified to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Morales violated the 3 term limit.
RULING:
No.
There are 2 conditions for disqualification namely; (1) that the candidate was elected for three consecutive terms for the same post, and (2) that he has fully served the three consecutive terms. Involuntary severance from the office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of the continuity of service no matter how short.
Notwithstanding the fact that the decision was rendered when the term was about to be finished, the length of litigation was in good faith and there was no proof of political manoeuvring in order to prolong his stay in office.
2-A. Simon Aldovino v. COMELEC, December 23, 2009
FACTS:
Wilfredo Asilo was elected as councillor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. During his third term in office in September 2008, a 90-day preventive suspension order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against Asilo in relation to a criminal case. Said order was eventually lifted and Asilo resumed office.
In 2007, Asilo ran for the same position. His qualification was challenged as he allegedly violated of the 3-term limit.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Asilo violated the 3-term limit.
RULING:
Yes.
Preventive suspension does not interrupt the term for the purpose of the 3-term limit. If it were considered an interruption, there would be a risk of fabricating false administrative charges to interrupt the term.
3. Edgar Y. Teves v. COMELEC, April 28, 2009
FACTS:
In 2007, the COMELEC disqualified Edgar Teves as a candidate for Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental on the ground that he was convicted in the Sandigandbayan for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which was allegedly a crime involving moral turpitude.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the violation of Teves constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.
RULING:
No.
Possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit license by the Local Government is prohibited. But illegality does not mean that the violation involves moral turpitude. Neither does it make it immoral. Moreover, Teves did not use his power to gain pecuniary financial interest in the cockpit.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It was held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other branches of the government to deal with.
4. Hermelina M. Abainza v. Ernesto Arellano and COMELEC, December 8, 2008
FACTS:
Ernesto C. Arellano and petitioner Hermilina N. Abainza were among the candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Jovellar, Albay, in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Abainza was one of the winners proclaimed on May 15, 2007. Arellano filed a petition for correction of the number of votes in certain precincts due to erroneous tally. the COMELEC 1st Division rendered a Resolution annulling the proclamation of petitioner as councilor of the Municipality of Jovellar, Albay, due to erroneous tally of votes.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the COMELEC has original jurisdiction over the petition for correction of manifest error.
RULING:
Yes.
The COMELEC is empowered by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. It exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials.
In relation thereto, it is empowered to promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Under such rules the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing may be filed directly with the Commission, even after a proclamation of the winning candidates. While it deals with pre-proclamation controversies, it has also been held applicable to cases when a proclamation had already been made, where the validity of the candidates proclamation was precisely in question.
5. Indira R. Fernandez v. COMELEC, June 30, 2008
FACTS: In the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections Mark Anthony Rodriguez emerged as the winning candidate for SK chairman of Barangay Pandan del Sur, Pandan, Catanduanes. His opponent filed an election protest at the MTC of Pandan-Caramoran which ruled in favour of the opponent. Rodqiguez appealed the case to the COMELEC which reversed the decision of the MTC. Fernandez filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
Hence, Fernandez filed a petition to the Supreme Court alleging that the COMELEC has no appellate jurisdiction over contests involving SK officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC has appellate jurisdiction over contests involving SK officials decided by the MTC.
RULING:
Yes.
The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Construed in relation to the provision in R.A. No. 7160 that includes in the enumeration of barangay officials the SK chairman, the constitutional provision indeed sanctions the appellate review by the COMELEC of election protests involving the position of SK chairman, as in the instant case. Hence, there is nothing improper in the COMELECs assumption of jurisdiction over respondents appeal.
6. Jose L. Atienza, Jr. v. COMELEC, February 16, 2010
FACTS:
On March 2, 2006 Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections
COMELEC issued a resolution annulling the March 2, 2006 elections and ordering the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before Drilons term expired where Manuel A. Roxas II was installed as the new LP president.
On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza et. al., filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general.
Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution and that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers.
On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party disputes.
RULING:
Yes.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes only if it is necessary to the discharge of its Constitutional function.
Sec. 2 Art. IX-C of the Constitution provides that the powers and functions of the COMELEC include ascertainment of identity of political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts.
The COMELEC may resolve intra-party leadership disputes in a proper case brought before it as an incident of its power to register political parties.
7. Jamelea Salic Maruhom v. COMELEC, July 27, 2009
FACTS:
Maruhom and Abinal are both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanaodel Sur, for the the May 2007 elections. Abinal filed a Petition for Disqualification and to Cancel the Certifiate of Candidacy of Maruhom alleging that she was a double registrant since she supposedly registered first in Marawi and only after 3 days, she registered in Marantao, without canceling her Marawi registration.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the controversy.
RULING:
Yes.
The Constitution extends to the COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Under Sec. 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is aground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. It is within the competence of COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC.
If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC.
8. Jeremias V. Esteves v. Rene V. Sarmiento, November 11, 2008
FACTS:
Jeremias Esteves and Reynaldo Teh Bitong were both candidates for Mayor of Casiguarn, Aurora in the 2007 Elections. Bitong was declared the winner of such election.
Esteves filed an election protest in the RTC. Bitong filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by said court. Then he filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and issuance of a temporary restraining order with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining order directing the RTC to desist from proceedings until further orders from the COMELEC and thereafter rendered a decision nullifying the order of the RTC prompting Esteves to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can acquire jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
No.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. A litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The premature invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
9. Eddie T. Panlilio v. COMELEC and Lilia G. Pineda, July 15, 2009
FACTS:
Panlilio and Pineda were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the province of Pampanga during the 2007 elections. Thereafter, Panlilio was declared as the duly elected governor of Pampanga.
Pineda filed an election protest and the COMELEC issued an order giving due course to private respondents election protest and directed among others, the revision of ballots pertaining to the protested precincts of the Province of Pampanga. Panlilio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
He then filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration at the COMELEC En Banc; and (2) to stay the COMELECs order directing the collection of ballot boxes. Thereafter, he filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the retrieval and collection of ballot boxes. Such motions were also denied by the COMELEC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc properly denied the motion for reconsideration assailing the interlocutory order of the second division.
RULING:
No.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the Division, which shall be resolved by the Division which issued the order. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution also mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.
Since the COMELECs Division issued the interlocutory order, the same COMELEC Division should resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. The remedy is not a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc or Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
10. BANAT Party List v. COMELEC, August 7, 2009
FACTS:
BANAT filed a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 and enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the statute.
BANAT argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal since under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President, and the COMELEC en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Thus in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not sections 37 and 38 impair the powers of the PET and SET.
RULING:
No.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.
On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.
11. Jovito Palparan, Jr. v. HRET, February 11, 2010
FACTS:
Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. was the first nominee of Bantay party-list group which received the sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives in the 2007 elections.
Members of the other party-list groups filed with the HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, Palaparan alleging that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of Representative because he did not belong to a marginalized and underrepresented sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.
Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee and that HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list that was elected to assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups.
RULING:
Yes.
Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, there are two kinds of membership in the House of Representatives namely; members who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations Thus, it is the party-list representatives who are elected into office. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives and district representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
11-A. ABC Party List v. COMELEC
FACTS:
A petition for cancellation of registration was filed against ABC party-list on the ground that it was the front of religious organization Ang Dating Daan. The petition was dismissed and ABC won a seat in the House of Representatives.
The COMELEC en banc reviewed the case and set a hearing stating that Mauricio was not given the opportunity to present evidence. ABC averred that COMELEC has no more jurisdiction since ABC was already proclaimed winner and COMELEC committing grave abuse of discretion upon their holding of hearing/recognizing the petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether COMELEC still has jurisdiction over ABC when it was already proclaimed a winner of the elections.
RULING:
Yes.
The Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List.
In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.
12. Rodante Marcoleta v. COMELEC, April 24, 2009
FACTS:
The party-list group Alagad first won a seat in the House of Representatives in 1998. Diogenes S. Osabel sat as the partys representative in Congress. In 2004 Alagad won one seat and Rodante D. Marcoleta sat as Alagads representative.
Due to infighting within Alagads ranks, Osabel and Marcoleta parted ways, each one claiming to represent the partys constituency. In the 2007 National and Local Elections, Osabel and Marcoleta each filed a separate list of nominees for Alagad at the COMELEC. Alagad won again. The Marcoleta and Osabel blocs contested the right to represent the party in the 14th Congress. Osabel, purportedly the bona fide president of Alagad, sought the cancellation of the certificates of nomination of the Marcoleta group. The COMELEC division resolved it in favour of Osabel.
The controversy was then elevated by the Marcoleta group to the Comelec En Banc which when voting, failed to reach the required number of votes and set a rehearing.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC may call for a rehearing.
RULING:
Yes.
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that a majority vote of all the members of the COMELEC, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.
Alagads reasoning that a rehearing is unnecessary since it garnered a majority vote of the quorum does not thus impress.
The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the First Division, cannot do away with a rehearing since its Rules clearly provide for such a proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments.
Neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a majority in the En Banc Resolution of November 6, 2007. The Resolution served no more than a record of votes, lacking in legal effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the First Division Resolution. Accordingly, the Comelec did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing.
13. Ricardo P. Presbeterio v. COMELEC, June 30, 2008
FACTS:
On May 10, 2007, the MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental rendered the municipal election officer of Valladolid to include the names of 946 individuals in the list of qualified voters of the said municipality for the May 14, 2007 elections. The acting provincial election supervisor directed the Election Officer not to comply with the MCTC order. As a consequence, 946 voters were disallowed to vote.
These 946 then moved before the MCTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent the Municipal Board of Canvassers from canvassing the election returns and from proclaiming the winning candidates. MCTC granted the motion and issued the restraining order. Nonetheless, the Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing and subsequently proclaimed all the winning candidates.
Dissatisfied with the turn of events, petitioners filed before the COMELEC a petition for the declaration of failure of election and the holding of a special election which was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a failure of election can be validly declared in this case.
RULING:
No.
Failure of election may be declared only in the three instances namely: (1)that the election has not been held; (2)the election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law; and (3)the preparation and the transmission of the election returns have given rise to the consequent failure to elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner.
Furthermore, the reason for such failure of election should be force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. Finally, before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be established, namely: (1) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes cast would affect the result of the election.
It is admitted by the petitioners that elections were held in the subject locality. Also, the private respondents and four of the petitioners won in the elections and were proclaimed as the duly elected municipal officials. There is nothing in the records from which the Court can make even a slim deduction that there has been a failure to elect in Valladolid, Negros Occidental. Absent any proof that the voting did not take place, the alleged disenfranchisement of the 946 individuals and 2,000 more supporters of the petitioners cannot even be considered as a basis for the declaration of a failure of election.
14. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, April 8, 2010
FACTS:
The COMELEC denied the registration of Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans- gendered individuals (LGBTs) on the ground of morality quoting the Bible and the Koran as basis.
Ang Ladlad filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. That the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have seeped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad is qualified to run under the party-list system.
RULING:
Yes.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
14-A. BANAT v. COMELEC, July 15, 2009, April 21, 2009
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list election which was held in May 2007.
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid and also questioned if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not he 20% allocation for party-list representatives is mandatory or merely a ceiling. 2) Whether or not the 3-seat limit is Constitutional. 3) Whether or not the 2% threshold is Constitutional.
RULING:
1) The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
2) Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
3) There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
15. Mike A. Fermin v. COMELEC, December 18, 2008
FACTS:
Mike A. Fermin was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. Subsequently, he applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to Barangay Indatuan claiming that he had been a resident of said barangay for 1 year and 6 months. Meanwhile, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter, Fermins application for transfer of registration was approved by the COMELEC.
Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 2007 Elections. Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen filed a petition for disqualification for not meeting the residency requirement. Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen won the elections. Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with the RTC of Cotabato City.
COMELEC, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. Fermin argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters registration record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the effective date of its creation.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in declaring that Fermin failed to meet the residency requirement.
RULING:
Yes.
The mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation.
A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favor is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced on the other side.
16. Antonio B. Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC, February 23, 2009
FACTS:
On January 9, 2004, Datu Israel Sinsuat filed a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Gunsi for the May 2004 elections alleging, that Gunsi was not a registered voter in the Municipality of South Upi, Maguindanao, that Gunsis name was inserted illegally in the List of Applicants and Voters and the unsigned application for registration has no legal effect.
Gunsi asseverated that his failure to sign his application for registration did not affect the validity of his registration since he possesses the qualifications of a voter set forth in the omnibus election code as amended by RA 8189.
Provincial Election Supervisor issued a resolution recommending Gunsis disqualification to run for Municipal Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao on the ground that he is not a registered voter of the municipality pointing out that the signature in the application for registration is indispensable for its validity as it is an authentication and affirmation of the data appearing therein. The COMELEC affirmed the decision and Gunsis motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the failure to affix signature is material in voters registration.
RULING:
Yes.
Sec.10 of RA 8189 provides that a qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
Moreover, the application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
17. Romulo F. Pecson v. COMELEC, December 24, 2008
FACTS:
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007 elections where Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest with the RTC which rendered a decision in his favor.
Cunanan filed a notice of appeal while Pecson filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials[2] (Rules) allows this remedy.
The RTC granted Pecsons motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to the Rules, the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the remedy of execution pending appeal was valid.
RULING:
Yes.
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion, order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period to appeal, subject to the following rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party. Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must state the good or special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:
(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
(b) If the court grants execution pending appeal, an aggrieved party shall have twenty working days from notice of the special order within which to secure a restraining order or status quo order from the Supreme Court of the Commission on Elections. The corresponding writ of execution shall issue after twenty days, if no restraining order or status quo order is issued. During such period, the writ of execution pending appeal shall be stayed.
18. Joselito Mendoza v. COMELEC, March 25, 2010
FACTS:
Joselito Mendoza won as Governor of the province of Bulacan in the 2007 elections. His opponent Roberto Pandanganan. filed an election protest anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner. The COMELEC annulled Mendozas proclamation as governor and proclaimed Pagdanganan instead. The COMELEC en banc affirmed such decision.
Mendoza questioned the COMELEC decision asserting that it exercised judicial power.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not COMELEC has judicial power.
RULING:
No.
Under the Constitution, the judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and the lower courts.
The COMELECs function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment. Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is quasi- judicial.
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