SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

APPELLATE DIVISION



STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES,
Plaintiff Respondent
vs.
BONNIE SHIPLEY,
Defendant Appellant

Case No. ACIAS 1400026
[Trial Court UDDS1204130]
Appeal from a Final Judgment in
San Bernardino Superior Court
Entered on March 20, 2014
Honorable Michael A. Sachs




APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

Clerks Transcript on Appeal and Reporters Transcript filed 7/31/14











Nancy D McCarron, CBN 164780
950 Roble Lane
Santa Barbara, CA 93103
nancyduffysb@yahoo.com
805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492
Attorney for Appellant
\

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.. 0
INTRODUCTION... 1
ARGUMENTS
I. Structural Defects Overcome Presumption of Correctness on Harmless Errors ............... 2
II. Shipley has Statutory Standing to Appeal under CCP 906. 3
A. Shipley Is Aggrieved by Structural Errors Which Were Not Harmless .................. 4
B. Shipley Neither Invited Nor Waived Any Error Below By Her Conduct .. 5
III. Judge Sachs Serial Violations Were Not Harmless and Were Prejudicial to Shipley 15
IV. The Appeal Can Not be Dismissed for Alleged Failure to Comply .. 17
A. Shipley Cited to Matters in the Record 66 times in 20 pages (3 per page)..... 17
B. Shipley Complied With All Rules of Court and Decorum.. 18
CONCLUSION ............................................. 19
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ....... 20
PROOF OF SERVICE .............. 20


0

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Apple, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 13 ............................... 4
Barham v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1999) 74 CA.4th 744, 751 ................................ 4
Bonfigli v. Strachan (2011) 192 CA.4th 1302, 1314 ................................................... 14
Caruso v. Snap-Tite, Inc. (1969) 275 CA. 2d 211, 214 ................................................. 4
Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4
th
. 1148, 1161 .......................................................... 15
Estate of Hughes (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 550, 554-555 .................................................. 4
Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 C.A.4
th
1160, 1167-68 ................................................... 19
Friends of Aviara v. City of Carlsbad (2012) 210 CA.4th 1103, 1108 ........................ 4
Harrington v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 185, 188 ............................................. 16
Horsemens Ben. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155 ..... 14
In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 54 .................................................. 16
Judith P. LA Supr Court (2002)102 CA.4
th
535, 555 ................................................ 2, 3
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 202, 212-213 ................................ 14
Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Foster (1929) 207 Cal. 167, 170 ......................................... 4
People v. Landon (1991) 234 CA.3d, 66, 77 ................................................................. 2
People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4
th
799, 851 .............................................................. 2
Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 85, 93 ................................................. 4
Ricketts v. McCormack (2009) 177 CA.4th 1324, 1335 footnote 12............................ 4
Robinson v. Superior Court (1984) 158 CA.3d 98, 107 ................................................ 5
Sampson v. Parking Services. 2000 Com., Inc. (2004) 117 CA.4th 212, 217 n.4 ........ 4
San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436 ...... 14
Scott v. McNeal (1894) 154 U.S. 34, 46 ...................................................................... 16
Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co, Inc. (2008) 162 CA.4th 1014, 1026 ................ 4
Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 CA.4th 1035, 1045 ......................................................... 4
Soldate v. Fidelity National Title (1998) 62 CA.4th 1069, 1073 ................................... 4
Sturgeon v. Leavitt (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 957, 959, fn. 1 ............................................. 4
Vant Rood v. County of Santa Clara (2003) 113 CA.4th 549, 560 ............................... 4
Vivid Video, Inc. v. Playboy Entertain. Group, Inc. (2007) 147 CA.4th 434, 440 ........ 3
STATUTES & RULES
CCP 663(b) ................................................................................................................ 10
CCP 906 ....................................................................................................................... 3
Civil 798.56(d) ..................................................................................... 3, 11, 12, 14, 15
CRC 3.130(d) ............................................................................................................... 13
CRC 3.1312 ................................................................................................ 6, 7, 8, 11, 16
San Bernardino Local Rule 530 ................................................................................... 17
San Bernardino Local Rule 591.3 .......................................................................... 13, 16
1

INTRODUCTION
The gravamen of Stubblefields derisory responding brief is that Shipley was
not aggrieved by the debauched order; she either invited or waived errors; and if
yall dont buy that bundle, then piecemeal procedural errors were harmless.
Stubblefields arguments are in the right pew---but the wrong church by a mile!
Because no appellate court has justified ten serial violations by a judicial officer
Stubblefield peppered arguments with ad hominem attacks on Shipleys counsel.
He urges this court to review opposing counsels character rather than the issues.
Stubblefield prays the court will put to bed this over-litigated case. We agree!
Former Appellate Panels Writ of Mandate is the blanket designed to do just that.
Stubblefield misrepresents that Shipley failed to cite to the record on key points.
Shipley cites 42 times to Clerks Transcript [CT], 18 times to Reporters Transcript
[RT], a total 62 citations in 20 pages, which is an average of 3 references per page.
Struggling to find a scintilla of evidence to support baseless ad hominem attacks
Stubblefield compares errors below to harmless ones in criminal trials, family law
battles, and a plaintiff labeled vexatious litigant after losing 15 in pro per appeals.
Bonnie Shipley never sued anyone. Shipley is prevailing defendant entitled to
final judgment as ordered last year in former Appellate Panels Writ of Mandate.
Unwilling to accept defeat Stubblefield continues to wage ad hominem attacks.
Stubblefield argues Shipleys facts are convoluted, urging the court to adopt his
paraphrased rendition of facts---just as he did below when he wrote a debauched
final judgment---paraphrasing former Panels findings and conclusions in its order.
Shipleys facts are only 3 pages---succinctly reciting relevant procedural history.
He argues footnotes on a few pages were 12-point instead of 13 point. Even if
true, this occurred without counsels knowledge as she set it 13 in starting the brief.
Because he cannot justify Judge Sachs serial violations in star court proceedings,
Stubblefield grasps at any straw to deflect this courts attention from the real issue;
structural defects [not harmless errors] rendered the judgment void ab initio.
2

I. Structural Defects Overcome Presumption of Correctness on Harmless Errors
Stubblefield cites People v. Landon (1991) 234 CA.3d, 66, 77 arguing courts must
presume validity. Landon found an erroneous jury instruction error was harmless.
This dwarfs in comparison to structural errors as explained by Supreme Court in 1996:
A structural defect is the type of error "affecting the framework within
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process
itself," one that " 'transcends the criminal process' " and "defies analysis by
'harmless-error' standards." (Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p.
309-311) Examples of structural defects include total deprivation
of the right to counsel at trial (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335; ...
trial before a judge who is not impartial (Tumey v.Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510)
...Trial errors, by contrast, are errors that "occurred during the presentation of
the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the
context of other evidence presented" in order to determine whether the error
was harmless. People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4
th
799, 851

Citing Marshall the court in Judith P. v. LA Supr Court (2002)102 CA.4
th
535 held:
.a per se reversible error standard should be applied, because the failure to
provide this kind of notice is in the nature of a structural, rather than a
trial, constitutional error. (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309-311;
People v.Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 851-852. Examples of such structural
errors that result in automatic reversal (the per se reversible error standard)
include total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, a biased judge,
failure to give Mother the minimum mandated 10 days' notice was a
structural error, and that the per se reversible error standard applies.
The lack of reasonable notice was not only a violation of the statute, but also
a violation of constitutionally required due process.Judith P, supra @ 558

Stubblefield does not even deny Judge Sachs serial violations of Procedural Codes,
Statutes of Limitations, CA Rules of Court, San Bernardino Local Rules, and his ultra
vires revision of Civil 798.56[d] by mere judicial proclamation. Rather, Stubblefield
euphemizes 10 serial violations as procedural oversights [Respondents Brief, p. 6]
1


1
All future references to Respondents Brief will be abbreviated as RB page is p.
3

The court in Judith P, supra @ 557 held the failure to give Mother the minimum
mandated 10 days' notice was a structural error, and that the per se reversible error
standard applies. The lack of reasonable notice was not only a violation of the
statute, but also a violation of constitutionally required due process.
Notwithstanding 10 serial violations, the most egregious violation occurred when
Stubblefield delivered final judgment to chambers without first serving it on Shipley.
Judge Sachs signed and entered a final judgment on the courts docket immediately,
without waiting 10 days for Shipley to objectas required under Local Rule 591.3.
It was a structural error. The per se reversible error standard is applied in this case.
Judge Sachs conspired with Stubblefield to set this trap; first by entering the bizarre
internal order on March 17, 2014 (after his last hearing on entry of final judgment)
to retain Shipleys file in chambers---rather than return it to a public access filing room;
second, by then signing a final judgment the minute Stubblefield delivered it to him;
third, by ordering his deputy to refuse to file Shipleys objections to preclude them from
becoming part of her court file. Judge Sachs is not even subtle in apparent corruption.
II. Shipley has Statutory Standing to Appeal under CCP 906
Stubblefield argues as prevailing party Shipley has no standing to appeal. The right
to appeal is entirely statutory.
2
CCP 906 conveys a right to appeal part of any order:
respondent, or party in whose favor the judgment was given, may, without
appealing from such judgment, request the reviewing court to and it may
review any of the foregoing matters for the purpose of determining whether
or not the appellant was prejudiced by the error or errors upon which he relies
for reversal or modification of the judgment from which the appeal is taken
Appellate jurisdiction is the power of a reviewing court to correct errors below.
3

Standing is liberally construed; doubts are resolved in favor of the right to appeal.
4


2
Vivid Video, Inc. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2007) 147 CA. 4th 434, 440
3
Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 85, 93
4
Vant Rood v. County of Santa Clara (2003) 113 CA.4th 549, 560
4

A. Shipley Is Aggrieved by Structural Errors Which Were Not Harmless
Any aggrieved party may appeal, and a party is considered aggrieved when its
rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment.
5
A party who has not
obtained all of the relief requested is aggrieved and has a statutory right to appeal.
6

Stubblefield does not dispute Shipley was injured by a judgment reciting former Panel
held Stubblefield could evict a homeowner or resident under Civil Code 798.56(d).
This is exactly the opposite of what former Panel held; i.e. he could not evict Shipley
directly as they were not in privity of contract and his remedy was to proceed against
the homeowner for her or co-residents failure to comply with a reasonable rule:
CT 184
7


CT 185


5
Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 CA.4th 1035, 1045; Serrano v. Stefan Merli
Plastering Co, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1026-1027.
6
Friends of Aviara v. City of Carlsbad (2012) 210 CA.4th 1103, 1108; Apple, Inc. v.
Franchise Tax Board (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1, 13; Ricketts v. McCormack (2009)
177 CA.4th 1324, 1335 footnote 12; Sampson v. Parking Services. 2000 Com., Inc.
(2004) 117 CA.4th 212, 217 n.4 (party awarded significantly less than requested was
aggrieved party for purposes of appeal); Barham v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1999)
74 CA.4th 744, 751 (party that prevails generally may appeal from the unfavorable
part of judgment); Soldate v. Fidelity National Title (1998) 62 CA.4th 1069, 1073;
Sturgeon v. Leavitt (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 957, 959, fn. 1; Caruso v. Snap-Tite, Inc.
(1969) 275 CA. 2d 211, 214; (issues material to judgment deemed appealable);
Estate of Hughes (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 550, 554-555 (unfavorable provisions) ;
Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Foster (1929) 207 Cal. 167, 170;

7
CT refers to Clerks Transcript - filed in this Appellate Division on 7/31/2014
5

Because Stubblefield knows Shipley has a statutory right to appeal any part of the
judgment against her interest, he cites an appellate court case holding that a prevailing
party has no right to appeal even if there is a claimed error; i.e. Robinson
8
However,
Robinson is distinguished because it did not involve a structural defect or error---
but rather a party seeking trial de novo after losing an arbitration over harmless error.
There is a strong public policy in California against appealing an arbitration award
absent fraud in the arbitration proceedings. This case is distinguished from Shipley.
B. Shipley Neither Invited Nor Waived Any Error Below By Her Conduct
Stubblefield misrepresents what happened below to swell the absurd argument that
Shipley invited errors and/or waived those errors by her conduct. Stubblefield argues
general principles about invited or waived errors soley in the context of a partys
conduct in trial below (erroneous jury instructions, erroneous exclusion of evidence)
or waiving error by failing to take the proper steps at trial to avoid or correct the
error [RB, p. 8] The cited cases are distinguishable because they do not involve
structural defects in the manner in which the court conducted its own proceedings,
as opposed to harmless errors during trial proceedings.
Stubblefield argues there is no doubt that a lot of effort was put into drafting the
final Order/Judgment. [RB, page 9]. McCarron put a lot of effort into objecting to
star court proceedings Judge Sachs conducted during those hearings. Stubblefield
admits that Judge Sachs ordered Stubblefield to prepare the judgment. [RB, p.9]
THAT IS THE POINT! ONLY A BIASED JUDGE ORDERS THE LOSING
PARTY TO PREPARE THE PREVAILING PARTYS FINAL JUDGMENT!
This violated CRC 3.1312 which calls for prevailing party to prepare the judgment.
What happened below is exactly why our Judicial Council enacted CRC 3.1312; i.e.
to ensure a loser does not tweak final judgment to transmute himself into a winner.

8
Robinson v. Superior Court (1984) 158 CA.3d 98, 107
6

Stubblefield misrepresents what happened at the final hearing on 3/17/2014 by
urging this panel to look at a clerks Minute Order---rather than an Official Transcript.
The summarized Minute Order recites only that Judge Sachs gave attorneys a copy of
his notes scribed onto his working copy of the proposed judgment Stubblefield filed.
Stubblefield artfully argues the Trial Court informed counsel that he had revised
the proposed order/judgment and that he gave a copy of those notes to counsel.
Stubblefields attorney tried to create a pretext or imply that Judge Sachs gave his
notes to McCarron during the hearing, implying she saw them and failed to object.
THIS WAS A DISHONEST, UNETHICAL BREACH OF ATTORNEY ETHICS.
As an officer of the court each attorney is expected to be honest and forthright in
the manner in which he presents arguments so as not to mislead an appellate panel.
A review of the 3/17/14 Reporters Transcript [RT 63:7] shows Judge Sachs did
not give the bailiff his notes until after he concluded the 3/17/14 judgment hearing:
7| Mr. WILLIAMSON: It is my understanding the court had
8| concluded this hearing.
9| THE COURT: It is concluded.
10| Thank you very much.
11| THE BAILIFF: Your Honor, did you want me to make
12| copies?
13| THE COURT: The record should reflect that I have
14| handed to Mari, my courtroom attendant, my worked up order
15| that she is going to make copies for everybody.
16| Thank you everybody.
17| Ms. McCARRON: Thank you
18| THE COURT: You are welcome.
19| (foregoing proceedings are concluded.) RT 63:7-19 [emphasis added]

The bailiff departed to another room to make copies while Ms. McCarron and Mr.
Williamson waited for the copies in the courtroom audience seats. Mr. Williamson sat
on the left side directly in front of the courtroom entry/exit door while McCarron sat
on the right side directly in front of the bailiffs table on the right side of the room.
Judge Sachs bailiff returned a few minutes later with original notes and two copies.
7

The bailiff gave a copy of Judge Sachs notes to Mr. Williamson by the exit door.
He departed immediately. The bailiff then walked up to her desk and gave a copy to
McCarron, who was unable to do anything about the notes as Mr. Williamson had
already darted out the exit door before she had an opportunity to read the Judge notes.
Secondly, Judge Sachs had summoned the parties on the next case on calendar and
was listening to attorney arguments on their motion, with a court reporter recording it.
Attorney McCarron had no choice but to depart, wait for Mr. Williamson to serve her
the proposed order (which he had always done) - before submitting his order to court,
and then serve written objections back to Mr. Williamson within the 5-day window as
described in CRC 3.1312. McCarron believed he would repeat his regular practice.
Rule 3.1312. Preparation and submission of proposed order
(a) Prevailing party to prepare Unless the parties waive notice or the court
orders otherwise, the party prevailing on any motion must, within five days of the
ruling, serve by any means authorized by law and reasonably calculated to ensure
delivery to the other party or parties no later than the close of the next business day a
proposed order for approval as conforming to the court's order. Within five days after
service, the other party or parties must notify the prevailing party as to whether or not
the proposed order is so approved. The opposing party or parties must state any reasons
for disapproval. Failure to notify the prevailing party within the time required shall be
deemed an approval. The extensions of time based on a method of service provided
under any statute or rule do not apply to this rule. (Subd (a) amended effective January
1, 2011; previously amended effective July 1, 2000, and January 1, 2007.)

(b) Submission of proposed order to court The prevailing party must, upon
expiration of the five-day period provided for approval, promptly transmit the proposed
order to the court together with a summary of any responses of the other parties or a
statement that no responses were received.(Subd (b) amended effective January 1,
2007; previously amended effective July 1, 2000.)
On this single occasion Mr. Williamson deviated from his regular past practice of
complying with CRC 3.1312 by serving Ms. McCarron with his proposed order, and
waiting five days for her objections which he knew would be forthcoming. CT 172
A review of CT 172 shows the transmittal letter Mr. Williamson always served in the
past each time he proposed a judgment to submit to the court for signature:
8

CT 172 served 3/3/14
Mr. Williamsons letter recited the last day to file objections before submission.
Because Mr. Williamson had always complied with CRC 3.1312 McCarron relied
on his past practice in always serving the judgment on her before submitting to court.
Williamson, presuming McCarron would wait for him to serve a proposed order,
deviated from his regular practice by hiring an attorney service to deliver the proposed
order directly to chambers on 3/20/14 without first serving it on McCarron for review.
This was only three days after the 3/17/14 hearing on a proposed judgment. CT 223.
A careful review of CT 223 shows how this contrivance was designed by Judge Sachs
and Mr. Williamson to intentionally prevent Shipley from filing any written objections
before Judge Sachs entered final judgment on the docket. CT 223 shows that Judge
Sachs accepted delivery of the judgment on 3/20/14 --- without a proof of service.
CT 223 also shows he signed and entered the order on the same day3/20/2014!
9

CT 223 Recd/Entered 3/20/14
Attorney McCarron did not see the proposed judgment until she looked at her email
the next morning on Friday 3/21/14--- at which time she immediately typed up written
objections, transmitted them to Bonnie Shipley by email, who printed them in Highland
and drove over to file the objections. As explained in AOB on page 16, Judge Sachs
made a bizarre journal entry on 3/17/14 (right after his last hearing on judgment) reciting
files retained in department. (rather than returning to public access file room). CT 71
CT 71 files retained in department

As explained in AOB, page 17 the clerk in the public filing room would not accept objections
on 3/21/14 due to the bizarre order about retaining her file in chambers. The clerk told Shipley
to go upstairs to Judge Sachs court to file objections. Judge Sachs clerk refused to accept them
stating that her objections were late because he entered judgment the day before---on 3/20/14.
10

When McCarron reviewed the online court docket no journal entry appeared on the docket
reciting that judgment was entered on 3/20/14. As of 3/25/14 no journal entry appeared on the
online docket indicating a judgment entered on 3/20/14. Despite 3 round trips to the courthouse
Shipley was never able to obtain a copy of the final judgment despite being the prevailing party!
Shipley and McCarron never saw a copy of the final judgment until 4/4/14 when McCarron
eventually received a copy Mr. Williamson served by mail on 4/1/2014 to her law office.
This was intentionally done to run the clock out on a 10-day window to file a writ petition.
(10 days from entry of judgment). Shipley was forced to file a regular appeal to avoid the
debauched judgment from ripening into an un-appealable final judgment. [see AOB, p.16-17]
The only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the above-described bizarre series of
events is that Judge Sachs acted as a de facto advocate for Stubblefield every step of the way by
conducting star court proceedings in Department S-32. Judge Sachs motivation is irrelevant.
The facts show that Judge Sachs, at worst, conspired with attorney Williamson by telephone,
or, at best, conducted proceedings in a bizarre manner to transmute Stubblefield into a winner.
It is not a series of 10 coincidences that Judge Sachs deviated from regular court procedures by:
1.) vacating a 5-month old summary judgment order after jurisdiction expired CCP 663(b)
(then re-writing it including paraphrased findings not recited in the hearings transcript)
2.) ordering the loser to compose prevailing partys judgment violating CRC 3.1312 (3 times)
(including paraphrasing former Panels findings to change the import of those findings)
and revising a statute by mere judicial proclamation in violation of Separation of Powers to
carve out a new remedy to directly evict non-homeowner residents without contract privity
3.) after giving Williamson his notes [adding or resident to Civil 798.56(d)] on 3/17/14
ordering a bizarre journal entry maintaining Shipleys case file in his chambers to exercise
exclusive control over what documents she tried to file would be accepted for filing--so he
could reject objections he knew she would try to file---as soon as she saw his judgment
4.) on 3/20/14 signing and entering final judgment the minute it was delivered to chambers---
without a proof of service or transmittal letter showing it had been served on Shipley, and
then rejecting Shipleys attempt to file objections the next day on 3/21/14 when she saw it.
5.) making emphasis marks on CT 221 on the sentence he wants the panel to look at which
does not state that his notes were given to counsel after he concluded the hearing:
11

CT 221 w/emphasis drawn on the MO
This differs from the official minute order appearing on Register of Actions at CT 69:
CT 69-no emphasis marks appear on official MO
This is compelling evidence of a joint effort to mislead a panel on what occurred on 3/17/14
12

Although Judge Sachs announced he had revised his working copy of the final judgment
Stubblefield submitted, he never announced that he inter delineated the words or resident into
the language of Civil Code 798.56(d) typed up verbatim on Stubblefields proposed judgment.
If Judge Sachs announced this at the hearing McCarron would have vehemently objected to it.
The court said plaintiff may proceed against the homeowner under 798.56(d) but never said
the words or resident would be inter delineated into the typed up Civil 798.56(d) language.
Stubblefield seized the opportunity to type up a final judgment with the words or resident
inserted thereon. He delivered a final judgment to chambers, without first serving McCarron.
Judge Sachs had already pre-arranged to sign and enter the final judgment the minute it hit his
desk in chambers, which is exactly what he did. All of these acts were conspired and executed
in a manner clearly designed to preclude Shipley from filing objections before it was entered,
and to thwart her ability to file objections even after the judgment was entered that same day!
6.) violating San Bernardino Local Rule 591.3 which requires all judges to hold a judgment
for 10 days before entering it to afford opposing parties an opportunity to object to entry.
7.) ordering his deputy and clerk to reject Shipleys objections on 3/21/14 as late when
they were not late, and even if late, he was required to accept them under CRC 3.130(d)
8.) ensuring that Shipleys objections were never part of the record on appeal so that
Stubblefield could argue Shipley waived any right to appeal by not filing objections
which is exactly what they did. RB page 8-11 in keeping with the joint effort to deceive.
The above described evidence demonstrates a serial pattern of a joint effort to deceive this
panel about what actually occurred---to argue that Shipley invited or waived errors by failing
to object during the hearing and/or before final judgment was entered on the courts docket.
McCarron objected in advance to a serial pattern of fraud she suspected would occur. RT 60:25
13

25| Ms. McCARRON: Why cant I file it, your Honor? He
26| is going to paraphrase again.
1| THE COURT: It is his motion, it is his work I am
2| working off of and I am assuming counsel will do what I have
3| asked him to do. In fact, I am happy to give him my notes,
4| you can make a copy and both of you can share it. RT 60:25
There was no pending motion. Stubblefields attorney had never filed any motion.
Judge Sachs refused to allow prevailing partys attorney to prepare her final judgment.
The only reasonable inference is that Judge Sachs wanted Stubblefield to prepare the
final judgment with language transmuting him into a winner, by way of carving out
a new remedy to evict residents, such as Shipley, directly without privity of contract.
Finally, the doctrine of invited error does not apply if a party objects but then
acquiesces in a judicial determination to the contrary.
9
This is because every litigant
has a duty to submit to the courts rulings. After a litigant has done so, he or she may
demonstrate the error on appeal.
10
McCarron objected to the courts authorizing
Stubblefield to compose her final judgment because she knew he would paraphrase
it to transmute himself from a loser to a winner. RT 60:25 (see directly above)
McCarron tried everything to urge Judge Sachs not to assign Stubblefield to
compose her final judgment but to no avail. Stubblefield did exactly as predicted and
Judge Sachs did everything in his power to ensure Stubblefield would gain an illegal
benefit from inserting or resident into Civil 798.56(d). Within a few weeks
Stubblefield circulated a letter to all residents, reciting how they could be evicted
directly under Civil 798.56(d). (see Motion to Augment, Exh. B)

9
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 202, 212-213;
Bonfigli v. Strachan (2011) 192 CA.4th 1302, 1314.
10
San Mateo Union HS Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 CA.4th 418, 436
Horsemens Benev. & Prot. Assn. v. Valley Racing Assn. (1992) 4 CA.4th 153, 155
14







The above shows Stubblefield circulated his new weapon to all residents not homeowners.
This is because he fully intends to use Civil Code 798.56(d) to evict non-homeowner residents
directly despite that he is only in privity of contract with homeowners---not non-homeowners.
Stubblefield intends to use Judge Sachs gratuitous gift as a device to steal more mobile homes
from poor, elderly residents, to stuff his portfolio of rental units inside a park he advertises as
a homeowners park. Shipley was prejudiced by Judge Sachs gratuitous gift to Stubblefield in
that he can now proceed to evict her under Civil Code 798.56(d) despite that he is not in privity
of contract with her, as explained in former Panels Writ of Mandate.

15

III. Judge Sachs Serial Violations Were Not Harmless and Were Prejudicial to Shipley
Stubblefield argues a general theory that errors must be prejudicial to trigger reversal,
citing our Supreme Courts recent holding in Diaz v. Carcamo
11
which recited as follows:
[t]o establish prejudice, a party must show a reasonable probability that in the absence of
error, a result more favorable to [it] would have been reached. Stubblefield argues,
Shipley did not, and cannot meet that burden here [RB 12] without showing how Shipley
failed to meet the burden. Stubblefields naked premise, devoid of proof, is worthless fodder.
First, Diaz concerns an employers vicarious liability for a collision injuring a plaintiff,
where appellant failed to show a reasonable probability that a more favorable result would
have been reached absent erroneous admission of evidence at trial. Diaz is distinguished
because it involved harmless trial errors, as opposed to structural defects and errors,
which are per se reversible, as explained above in this REPLY at page 2-3.
Prejudice need not be proved where structural defects and errors are per se reversible.
Even if Shipley had to show a reasonable probability that in the absence of error, a more
favorable result would have been reached she clearly met that standard of proof herein.
If Judge Sachs allowed prevailing party Shipley to submit a proposed judgment, as called for
in CRC 3.1312, the judgment shown at CT 209-210 [composed by Shipley] would have
recited former Panels conclusions verbatim. If Judge Sachs had not vacated Judge Alvarezs
summary judgment order Stubblefield could not have misconstrued his findings as well.
If Judge Sachs had complied with Local Rule 591.3 by holding the judgment for 10 days
to wait for objections, and had not rejected the objections Shipley tried to file the next day,
he may have crossed out the words such as defendant in the preliminary recitals, and the
words or resident in Civil 798.56(d) before entering judgment. A more favorable result
necessarily would have been reached---but for Judge Sachs serial violations of Procedural
Codes, Statutes of Limitations, CA Rules of Court and Local Rules. Stubblefield argues
there is no prejudice to Shipley because she prevailed. Shipley is prejudiced as the order
authorizes Stubblefield to evict her directly under Civil 798.56(d) despite a lack of privity
and contravening former panels conclusion that such eviction without privity is illegal.

11
Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4
th
. 1148, 1161
16

The due process clauses of the United States and California Constitutions require
that a party be given reasonable notice of a judicial proceeding.
12
Yet, neither Judge
Sachs nor Williamson gave notice to Shipley or McCarron that he intended to submit
a new final judgment without first serving it on Shipley and giving her an opportunity
to object to its form before it was delivered to chambers for signature, as required
under CA Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and San Bernardino Local Rule 591.3.
Stubblefield tries to justify Judge Sachs violation of Local Rule 530 (presiding
judge re-assigns) by saying Judge Alvarez clerk reassigned a new judge, citing how a
presiding judge can delegate her authority to another judge. Even if true, how does it
compute to a low-level courtroom clerk assuming the power to re-assign judges?
This argument is preposterous on its face. Stubblefield argues no prejudice when
Judge Sachs vacated Judge Alvarezs order. This opened the door for Stubblefield to
paraphrase Judge Alvarezs findings, adding the word such as defendant to his
findings---implying he found Shipley was an unlawful occupant. He never found that.
Stubblefield argues such as defendant did not prejudice Shipley because Judge
Sachs said those words were irrelevant. Why include them in an order if irrelevant?
Why didnt he order the words stricken if they were irrelevant? It makes no sense!
Stubblefield argues adding the word or resident was irrelevant as the actual order
written by last years Panel was attached as Exhibit A. The answer is transparent.
Stubblefield intends to copy only Judge Sachs 3-page order and show it to residents
to intimidate them into submission. Either comply with his whims or be evicted.
Stubblefield will never attach Exhibit A or B to the order when used as a weapon.
If the words were irrelevant why did Judge Sachs have three hearings on the final
judgment to make sure those words were included in it? The answer is transparent!

12
Scott v. McNeal (1894) 154 U.S. 34, 46; Harrington v. Superior Court (1924)
194 Cal. 185, 188; In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 54

17

IV. The Appeal Can Not be Dismissed for Alleged Failure to Comply
Stubblefields ad hominem attack on Shipleys counsel is clearly unwarranted,
not Shipleys Cut & Paste of a few key excerpts in the Court or Reporter Transcripts.
A. Shipley Cited to Matters in the Record 66 times in 20 pages (3 per page)
Stubblefield misrepresents that Shipley failed to cite to the record on key points.
Shipley cites 42 times to Clerks Transcript [CT], 18 times to Reporters Transcript
[RT], a total 62 citations in 20 pages, which is an average of 3 references per page.
Struggling to find a scintilla of evidence to support baseless ad hominem attacks
Stubblefield compares errors below to harmless ones in criminal trials, family law
battles, and a plaintiff labeled as vexatious litigant after losing 18 in pro per appeals.
Shipley never sued anyone. Shipley is prevailing defendant entitled to entry of final
judgment as ordered by former Panels Writ of Mandate issued over a year ago.
Unwilling to accept defeat Stubblefield continues to wage ad hominem attacks.
Because Stubblefield has no valid arguments on the merits he wastes the panels
time splitting hairs over purported di minimus failures to comply with 13 point font
because footnotes on a few pages were purportedly 12 points instead of 13 points.
Dismissal is a remedy used for only the most egregious failures to comply with rules.
The remedy here, if the court felt the brief did not comply was to ask counsel to re-
submit it. The court apparently did not care if a few footnotes were inadvertently
printed at 12 instead of 13 point. The brief substantially complied with the rules.
Counsel set the typeface at 13. Perhaps Word 2010 has internal code which assigns
footnotes at 12 points instead of 13 despite the document being set to 13 points.
Stubblefield whines about cut and paste used in AOB. This is because he
realizes these demonstrate key points facially, without the reader having to search
through a 292 page Transcript to get the point. Stubblefield argues it is improper
yet failed to cite any court rule prohibiting the pasting of identified excerpts from the
record. Each cut & paste showed the corresponding page in the CT or RT records.
18

B. Shipley Complied With All Rules of Court and Decorum
Stubblefield argues Shipley made unwarranted personal attacks on the court,
Stubblefield and his counsel. If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and walks
like a duck----its a duck! Shipley calls a spade a spade and calls it exactly like it is.
When a Judge runs a Star Chamber Court she identifies it as a Star Chamber Court.
Shipley cut and pasted Wikipedias definition of Star Court. [see AOB, footnote 1].
Stubblefield argues there is nothing improper in addressing counsel as maam
arguing it is a polite way to address a woman you dont know. Judge Sachs knew
McCarrons name because she announced it every time she appeared before him.
If Judge Sachs cannot remember a name he heard five minutes earlier he should be
tested for Altzheimers; if suffering from it he should resign. Even if he could not
remember a name five minutes later, he should address each attorney as counsel
not maam in a loud condescending voice intended to demean the standing attorney.
It is unacceptable for a Judge to demean female attorneys by calling them maam.
Judge Sachs called Stubblefields attorney either Mr. Williamson or counsel every
time he appeared. Demeaning conduct should not be encouraged in any courtroom.
Stubblefields argument that Judge Sachs used maam to stop attorney
McCarron from interrupting is preposterous. A careful reading of all Reporters
Transcripts shows that nearly every time Judge Sachs called McCarron maam
he was interrupting her---to prevent her from recording objections on the transcript.
Stubblefields past bribes to county officials are fair game as they are documented.
The news releases about his bribes are published on various online websites.
Shipley calls a spade a spade. If he does not want to be criticized then Stubblefield
should stop offering bribes to county and city officials. Stubblefield intimidates
every official in San Bernardino County because he has a reputation for bank-rolling
opposing candidates against officials who do not do exactly as he demands.
Stubblefield's comparing Shipley to plaintiff in Fink v. Shemtov l 3 is over the top.
The court labeled Fink a vexatious litigant after 15 failed lawsuits and losing appeals.
Shipley never sued anyone. Shipley is defendant. prevailing on final judgment as
ordered in a Writ of Mandate. Unwilling to accept defeat Stubblefield cotltinues to
wage ad hominem attacks on counsel because he is unable to justify serial violations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited above and in Appellant's Opening Brief, Shipley
respectfully asks Presiding Panel to grant the relief she prayed for in her opening
brief, to vacate the order Judge Sachs entered on 3120114, to reinstate Judge Alvarez'
order granting summary judgment on 1012 1113, to enter the final judgment Shipley
offered at CT 209. and to direct Judge Sachs to recuse himself from this case.
Dated: 10/14/14
I3
Fink v. Shemtov (2010) ,180 c.A.~'" 1160, 1167-68
X D a v i d M. Fink vs. Eddie S. YLSE286 Fed. Appx 498 (9th Cir. 2008). Mr. Fink appealed an order
of the district court, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.
"2) David M Fink vs. Eddie YLST, 198 Fed. Appx. 587 (9th Cir. 2006). Mr. Fink appealed from a
judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
"3) David Fink vs. Hollywood Marble, Inc. B190153. Mr. Fink appealed, and judgment was affirmed.
"4) DavidFink vs. Warren Garth Ki Mn, G038711. Mr. Fink's appeal was dismissed as untimely.
"5) David Fink vs. Moreno, Becerra & Guerrero, lnc.. B201957. Mr. Fink appealed from a post-
judgment order, and the appellate court affirmed.
"6) David Fink vs. Warren Garth Ki Mn. G039395. Mr. Fink's appeal was dismissed as untimely.
"7) David Fink vs. Jacobe Enterprises, 30-2008-0010571 1. Mr. Fink filed, and subsequently
dismissed, this action.
"8) David Fink vs. Global Natural Stones et. al., G039689. Mr. Fink's petition to the Court of Appeal
was summarily denied.
"9) David Fink vs. Robe.rt Gaynor et. a/., ~038703. Mr:'Fink's petition to the Court of Appeal was
summarily denied. _.
"10) David Fink vs. Jerome +$+Stark, G037274. Mr. Fink abandoned his appeal.
"1 1) David Fink vs. Sailor Kennedy. G035771. Mr. Fink's petition to the Court of Appeal was
summarily denied.
"12) David Fink vs. Calstar Properties, LLC, G035730. Mr. Fink's petit~on to the Court of Appeal was
summarily denied.
"13) David Fink vs Sailor Kennedy, G034765. Mr. Fink's petition to the Court of Appeal was
summarily denied.
"14) David FInk vs. Sailor Kennedy, G034656. Mr. Fink's petition to the Court of Appeal was
summarily denied; and
"15) DavId Fink vs. Jose Calderon et al., G030717. Mr. Fink's petition to the Court of Appeal was
summarily denied.
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
REPLY Brief contains 6, 600 words [excluding cover & tables], is size 13
roman typeface. The undersigqed relied on status bar WORD 2010 word count
October 14, 2014
PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDlNO
Stubblefield v. Shivley Court Case: UDDSI 204130 APPEAL Case: ACIAS1400026
The undersigned is counsel for Bonnie Shipley, who is appellant in this appeal.
(Appellate Division) and defendant in UDDS 1204130 in limited jurisdiction below.
950 Roble Lane, Santa Barbara, California. 93 103 nanc~duf f vs b@vahoo. c~ -
cell phone: 805-450-0450 fax and phone: 805-965-3492
On the date recited below the undersigned served this document as indicated below:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
[x] PERSONAL DELIVERY to Panel & Judge Sachs as Justice Center on 10/14/14
Presiding Panel, Appellatt Division Hon. Michael A Sachs S-28
San Bernardino Justice Center San Bemardino Justice Center
247 West Third Street 247 West Third Street
San Bernardino, CA 924 15-0063 San Bemardino. CA 9241 5-0063
tel 909-521-3574 fax 909-521-3563 909-708-8699 fax 909-708-8586
[x] US MAIL SERVICE to ~t ubbl e f i e l d~r o~e r t i e s on 10/14/14 addressed to:
Robert Williamson, Esq. for Stubblefield Properties
HartKing
4 Hutton Drive, Suite 900 / . .
Santa Ana, CA92707 tel 714-432-8700 " fax.714-546-7457
I am familiar wifh mail,c$llection in Santa Barbara. I deposited the envelopes in the
mail at San Bemardino, CA. I know on a party motion. service is presumed invalid
if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on service affidavit.
[x] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury and laws of California that the
above statements are true. Executed in San Bemardino CA on the date below.
October 14,2014