NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME FORFILING

MOTION FORREHEARINGEXPTRES.
OR, IF FILED,DISPOSEDOF.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF Tr uF

ELEVENTHJUDICIALCIRCUITATA\E
FORMI,AMI-DADECOUNTY,FI,ORIDA
i_, 6
CARLOSMILLER
APPELLATEDIVISION
Appellant,
CASENO. 08-326AP
LowerTribunalCaseNo.M07I 0544
STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

filed: I a ll blol
opinion
An appealfrom a Final Judgmentby the CountyCourtof Miami-badeCounty,Florida.

CarlosMiller, pro se,Appellant.

KatherineFernandezRundle,StateAttorney,and IgnacioJ.Yazquez,Jr., AssistantState

Attomey,for Appellee.

BeforePLATZER, SCOLA andFREEMAN,JJ.

PERCURIAM.

Carlos Miller, Appellantand Defendantbelow, appealshis convictionand sentencefor

ResistingArrest and Obstru#$li of a Public Sheet. Finding error in both the conviction and

we reverse.
sentence,

Miller, a photojournalist,
wasarrestedfollowing anencounter
betweenhimselfandfive City

of Miami policeofficers.Theofficerswereinvestigatinganaccidenton a heavilytraveledroadway.

Miller wasatternptingto photographthemdoingso. TheofficersinstructedMiller to leavethe area

and an argumentensued.At one point, while being moved from the roadwaSMiller snappeda

PageI of5
 photographat closerange,with the flashengaged,
of theoffrcer. Miller wassubsequently
arrested

r
andchargedwith multiple criminalandcivil infractions.

At the trial, Miller testifiedin his own defense.Duringcross-examination,

theCourtallowed

the State,over objection,to questionMiller aboutthe contentsof a blog createdby him several

monthsafter the incident.In theblog, Miller questioned

policetacticsacrossthecountry. In some

postings,officerswerereferredto as"Gestapo"or "Nazis". Additionally,the Statewaspermittedto

questionMiller concemingan articlehe wrote over a yearafterhis arrestin which he expressed

negativeopinionsaboutthepoliceanddiscussed
policebrutalityin Los Angeles.

At closing,the Stateargued:

...(I)in someway or anotherwe're all studentsof history. Whenthe

Nazis andtheir Gestapoput someone'sheadto theground,it didn't
look like this. It did not. But that'sthewayMr. Miller ashe saidin
his own unvarnishedopinionfeelsaboutthe police. And that's the
story that he's writing about the police, and that's the story that
you're goingto hearaboutthepoliceon carlosmiller.com ....

The Statearguesthatthe questionswerepe(missibleasimpeachment

to showbias against

policeoffrcers. Courtshavelong allowedwitnessbiasto be exploredthroughcollateralevidence.

For example,in Tanziv. State,964So.2d 106,115 (Fla.2007),theStatewaspermittedto impeach

venue.'No areais moredesaving

thetestimonyof a witnessby raisingactscommittedin a separate

ability in a criminalcaseto arguethe'credibilityandbiasesof

of 'wide latitude'thanthedefen$4g*:s

the witnesseswho testifiedat trial.' lfilliams v. State,9l2 So. 2d 66,6E(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)

(quotingGoodrichv. State,854So.2d 663,665(Fla.3d DCA 2003). SeealsoCarlylev. State,945

So.2d 540 (Fla. }ilDCA2006) (a defendanthasthe absoluteright to fully cross-examine

adverse

witnessesto discreditthemby showingbias,prejudice,or interest);Gravesv. State,937So.2d 1286

(Fla.4th DCA 2006)(a criminaldefendanthasconsiderable

latitudein crossexaminationto elicit

testimonyshowingthebiasof a witness);Minusv. State,901So.2d344(Fla.4th DCA 2005)(for

Page2 of5
 r

' the purpose of discrediting a witness, the Sixth Amendment allows a defendant a wide range of

,/' cross-examinationas a matter of ri.ghtin regard to his motives, interest,or animus.)

I
f
However,eventhisright is not withoutlimits. See
Nelsonv. State,704So. 2d752(Fla.5th

DCA 1998)(biason partof prosecutionwitnessis valid point of inquiryin cross-examination,

but

prospectof biasdoesnotopendoorto everyquestionthatmightpossiblydevelopsubject;evidence

of bias may be inadmissibleif it unfairly prejudicesor misleadsthetrier of fact).

Moreover,we find a materialdistinctionbetweenattackinga witnessby collateralattackand

doing so to a defendant. Expett witrrcssescan be replacedand fact witnessesmay be discredited

without impugning the defendant. Further,juries cannotpunish witnessesthernselvesfor their

collateralwrongs,butmaybeledto do sowhenthecollateralwrongis committedby thedefendant.In

sum,introductionof a defendant's
collateralactprofoundlyincreases
therisk thatthecollateralactwill

.grosslyovershadow
whateverbiasit wasintendedto prove.

The standardofreview of a trial court'sevidentiaryrulingsis abuseof discretion..

Fitzpatrick

v. state. 900 so.Zd 495.514-15(F1a.2005\.

The hial court'sdiscretionis limited, however,by the

rulesof evidence,
Johnston.863So.2d,
at278.andby theprinciplesof staredecisis.Section90.402.

Florida Statutes(2005)providesthat all relevantevidenceis admissibleexceptasprovidedbylaw.

However,relevantevidenceis inadmissibleif its probativevalueis substantiallyoutweighedby the

dangerofunfair prejudice.Thecourtmustconducta balancingtestin orderto applythis discretion.

Despitebareattemptsto link Miller's commentsto testimonialbias,theStateplacedCarlos

Miller's abstractedcommentson trial. Miller's comments,admittedfor the limited purposeof

impeachment, evidenceofhis guilt. "[S]uchauseofimpeachment

ultimatelybecame testimonyhas

beenheld to be reversibleerror."Merrill v. State,228So.2d 305,307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)(citing

Adamsv. State,l5 So.905,908(Fla.I 894);Whorelyv. State,33So.849(Fla.1903);Hernandezv.

state,22 So.2d 781,786(Fla. I 945)).

Page3 of5
 the purposeof discreditinga witness,the SixthAmendmentallowsa defendanta wide rangeof

cross-examination
asa matterof ri'ghtin regardto his motives,interest,or animus.)

However,eventhisrightis not withoutlimits. SeeNelsonv. State,704So.2d752(Fla.5th

DCA 1998)(biason partof prosecution

witnessis validpointof inquiryin cross-examination,
but

prospectof biasdoesnotopendoorto everyquestionthatrnightpossiblydevelopsubject;evidence

of biasmay be inadmissibleif it unfairly prejudicesor misleadsthetrier of fact).

Moreover,we find a materialdistinctionbetweenattackinga witnessby collateralattackand

doing so to a defendant.Expertwitnessescanbe replacedand fact witnessesmay be discredited

without impugning the defendant. Further,juries cannotpunish witnessesthernselvesfor their

collateralwrongs,butmaybeledto do sowhenthecollateralwrongis committedby thedefendant.In

sum,introductionof a defendant's
collateralactprofoundlyincreases
theriskthatthecollateralactwill

grosslyovershadow
whateverbiasit wasintendedto prove.

The standardofreview of a hial court'sevidentiaryrulingsis abuseof discretion..Fitzpatrick

v. state. 900 so.Zd 495.514-15$1a.2005).The trial court'sdiscretionis limited, however,by the

rulesof evidence,Johnston.863So.Zdat278.andby theprinciplesof staredecisis.Section90.402.

Florida Statutes(2005)providesthat all relevantevidenceis admissibleexceptasprovidedby law.

However,relevantevidenceis inadmissibleif its probativevalueis substantiallyoutweighedby the

dangerofunfair prejudice.Thecourtmustconducta balancingtestin orderto applyfhis discretion.

Despitebareatternptsto link Miller's commentsto testimonialbias,theStateplacedCarlos

Miller's abstractedcommentson trial. Miller's comments,admittedfor the limited purposeof

impeachment, evidenceofhis guilt. "[S]ucha useof impeachment

ultimatelybecame testimonyhas

beenheld to be reversibleerror."Merrill v. State,228So.2d 305,307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)(citing

Adamsv. State,l5 So.905,908(Fla.1894);Whorelyv. State,33So.849(Fla.1903);Hernandezv.

state,22 So.2d 781,786(Fla. I 945)).

Page3 of5
 The jury having found you guilty, I'm adjudicatingyou guilty. I'm
imposing a $250 fine, there's Court costsandsurcharges.I'm placing
you on one (year) reporting probation, a special condition anger
course,a specialcondition 100 hours of community service at arate
/
of ten hours minimum per month and all conditionsto be completed
with ten months of todav.

The courtimposedan additionalfine andadditionalcourtcostson the civil infraction.

It is constitutionallyimpermissiblefor a trial court to imposea sentencebasedupon a

defendant'sassertion before,during,andafteriial. Ritterv. State,885So.2d413(Fla.

of innocence

200$; Holtonv. State,573So.2d 284,292(Fla.I 990).TheStatecontends

this did not occur,stating

". . . the courtreviewedthetotaltrial evidenceandenteredits sentence

with a merepassingrernarkon

remorsein the contextof a commenton the Appellant'smisbehaviorand demeanor." On the

assumptionthatwe havereviewedthesametranscript,werejecttheState'sinterpretationoftherecord.

SeeU.S.Fire Ins.Co.v.Beltmnnn
NorthAm. Co.,1nc..703F. Supp.681,685,n.15(N.D.I11.,
1988).

TheStatelooksto Meltonv.State,949So.2d994,1015(FIa.2006)andShellitov.
State,70l

So.2d 837,842(Fla.1997),to supportthepropositionthata passingor de minimr,s to a

reference

guiltyparty'slackofremorsewillnotconstituteerror.
We agreewithMeltonandShellito,butfind

theyhaveno applicationhere.As evidencedby thesentencing

colloquy,thetrial court'sconcern,in

largepart,wasfor the 'real' heroesat Arlington,for Miller's supporterc,

andfor Miller's 'shocking'

lack of remorse. The trial court's commentswerenot so muchpassingreferences,

but, instead,

groundsfor sentencing.

REVERSEDwith directionsthat Defendantbe tried and,if necessary, beforea

sentenced

differentjudge. (PLATZER.,SCOLA andFREEMAN,JJ.,CONCUR)

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