The United States and World War II

George Brown Tindall, David Emory Shi, America: A Narrative History, Norton and
Company, 2007, pp. 101!10"# 1102! 110$# 1110!111$# 1120!112$
%orld %ar && 'egan on Septem'er 1, 1$, when Germany atta()ed *oland and
the +nited ,ingdom and -ran(e re.ponded 'y de(laring war again.t Germany. /owever,
the +nited State. made no .erio0. move toward a (ontinental (ommitment when the war
'ro)e o0t. By the late 1$0., 1meri(an poli(yma)er. re(ogni2ed that Na2i Germany wa.
a potential hegemon and that /itler wa. li)ely to attempt to (on30er E0rope. The
isolationist sentiment in foreign relations that had been so powerful in
the 1920s and 1930s disintegrated as the United States emerged from
the war with global responsibilities and interests.
Foreign policy ideas:
/aving .een the ri.e o4 /itler5. Germany and 6apan and the po..i'le danger. with
tho.e (o0ntrie. the +nited State., a4ter a long de'ate, de(ided to enter %orld %ar
&&.
D0ring %ar time the +S de(i.ion ma)er. .tarted .everal e44ort. 4or the .haping o4
a new world 'a.ed on 1meri(an val0e. and intere.t..
Foreign Policy Actions
&n the .pring o4 1"0 the German armie. la0n(hed their 4amo0. Blit2)rieg 7
lightning war. 8n 1pril , Na2i troop. o((0pied Denmar) and landed along the
Norwegian (oa.t. Denmar) 4ell in one day and Norway within 4ew wee).. 8ne month
later, /itler invaded ne0tral Belgi0m, Netherland., 90:em'o0rg and -ran(e. 1l.o
German troop. rea(hed the Engli.h Channel, (0tting o44 a Briti.h 4or(e .ent to help the
Belgian. and -ren(h armie.. &n the end, -ran(e .0rrendered on 60ne 1", 1"0 and it wa.
1
divided into a German and an &talian o((0pation 2one and an 0no((0pied r0mp .tate
0nder the ;i(hy regime. 1meri(an poli(yma)er. had e:pe(ted the Briti.h and -ren(h
armie. to .top a %ehrma(ht o44en.ive on the we.tern 4ront '0t, the German armie.
.ho()ed the world 'y winning a 30i() and de(i.ive vi(tory in. %ith thi. vi(tory, Germany
wa. well!po.itioned to threaten the +nited ,ingdom.
<ore important, however, /itler (o0ld 0.e mo.t o4 hi. army to invade the Soviet
+nion, 'e(a0.e he had no we.tern 4ront to worry a'o0t. &t wa. widely 'elieved in the
+nited ,ingdom and the +nited State. that the %ehrma(ht wa. li)ely to de4eat the =ed
1rmy and e.ta'li.h hegemony in E0rope. Thi. arg0ment wa. 'a.ed on the %%& memory
when pra(ti(ally Germany )no()ed =0..ia o0t 4rom the 4ront, '0t another arg0ment wa.
the 4a(t that Stalin p0rged it. =ed 1rmy 'etween 1$7 and 1"1 mar)edly red0(ing it.
4ighting power, and thi. .it0ation wa. highlighted in the =0..ian %ar again.t -inland
4rom the .0mmer o4 1"0. &n .hort, there wa. ample rea.on to thin) in the .0mmer o4
1"0 that Germany wa. on the thre.hold o4 dominating (ontinental E0rope.
The (ollap.e o4 -ran(e pre(ipitated a dramati( (hange in 1meri(an thin)ing a'o0t
a (ontinental (ommitment and there wa. a wa. wide.pread .0pport 4or providing
.0'.tantial aid to the +nited ,ingdom, whi(h now .tood alone again.t Germany, and 4or
preparing the 1meri(an military 4or a po..i'le war with Germany. 1l.o the p0'li(
opinion poll. .howed that 4or the 4ir.t time .in(e /itler (ame to power, a ma>ority o4
1meri(an. 'elieved it wa. more important to en.0re that the +nited ,ingdom de4eat
Germany than to avoid a E0ropean war. B0t more important, the +.S. Congre.. al.o
dra.ti(ally in(rea.ed de4en.e .pending in the .0mmer o4 1"0, ma)ing it po..i'le to .tart
'0ilding an e:peditionary 4or(e 4or E0rope. %ith the pa..age o4 the 9end 7 9ea.e 1(t
4rom <ar(h 1"1, the +nited State. .tar .ending amo0nt. o4 war material to Britain '0t
din not 4ormally go to war again.t Germany, 0ntil the German. de(lared war to the +S on
11 De(em'er 1"1. B0t however, 1meri(an troop. arrived on the E0ropean (ontinent in
Septem'er 1"$, when they landed in &taly.
2
&n North Ea.t 1.ia, on the other hand the 'alan(e o4 power ha. (hanged d0e to the
4all o4 -ran(e and the German inva.ion o4 +SS= in 60ne 1"1. Germany5. 30i() and
de(i.ive vi(tory over -ran(e and the Netherland. in the late .pring o4 1"0 greatly
red0(ed, i4 not eliminated, -ren(h in4l0en(e on 6apane.e 'ehavior in 1.ia, leaving their
empire. v0lnera'le to 6apane.e aggre..ion. 1l.o Great Britain wa. 0na'le to (ontri'0te in
the (ontaining o4 6apan in 1.ia d0e to the 4a(t that it had to 4ight again.t Germany and
4a.(i.t &taly in the <editerranean area. <oreover, in the per.pe(tive o4 a Soviet (ollap.e
6apan wo0ld have 'een well po.itioned to e.ta'li.h hegemony in the Northea.t 1.ia, d0e
to the 4a(t that it wo0ld have remained the only great .0perpower le4t in the region.
1meri(an poli(yma)er. were e.pe(ially worried that 6apan wo0ld move northward and
atta() the Soviet +nion 4rom the rear, helping Germany 4ini.h o44 the Soviet +nion.
Germany wo0ld then 'e the hegemon in E0rope, while in Northea.t 1.ia, only China
wo0ld .tand in the way o4 6apane.e hegemony. 14ter the *earl /ar'or atta() the +S main
o'>e(tive wa. to de4eat 6apan 'e4ore it a(hieved regional hegemony.
D0e to thi. .trategi( (al(0l0. the +S de(i.ion ma)er. pre4erred an allian(e with
the Soviet +nion 7 a m0(h wea)er .tate and a .maller threat ! de.pite it. politi(al and
e(onomi(al regime. Ea(h o4 the vi(tor. wa. .pea)ing in term. o4 their own nation5.
hi.tori(al e:perien(e.. Ch0r(hill pledged 4or the re(on.tr0(tion o4 the traditional 'alan(e
o4 power in E0rope# thi. meant re'0ilding +,, -ran(e and even de4eated Germany .o
that, along with the +S the.e (o0ntrie. (o0ld (o0nter'alan(e the Soviet (olo..0. to the
ea.t. Stalin5. approa(h re4le(ted 'oth hi. (omm0ni.t ideology and traditional =0..ian
4oreign poli(y, meaning that he wi.hed to e:pand Soviet in4l0en(e into (entral E0rope
and to t0rn the o((0pied (o0ntrie. into '044er 2one. in order to prote(t =0..ia again.t any
40t0re %e.tern aggre..ion. To a (ertain e:tent =oo.evelt thin)ing wa. .imilar to %il.on5.
politi(al view. /e al.o 'elieved in a po.t war ordered 'a.ed on harmony, and in hi. view,
the three vi(tor., +S1, Great Britain, +SS= and along with Nationali.t China wo0ld a(t
a. a 'oard o4 dire(tor. in the world, en4or(ing pea(e again.t any potential aggre..or. -or
=oo.evelt the p0rpo.e o4 war wa. not to remove /itler a. the o'.ta(le to a (ooperative
international ordered 'a.ed on harmony and not on e30ili'ri0m.
$
*lanning 4or the po.t!%orld %ar && world 'egan 'e4ore the +nited State. even
entered the (on4li(t. 8n 10g0.t , 1"1, *re.ident -ran)lin D. =oo.evelt and *rime
<ini.ter %in.ton Ch0r(hill 4ir.t met a'oard the (r0i.er +SS 10g0.ta. The 1tlanti(
Charter (alled 4or the .el4 determination o4 people 4reedom o4 the .ea., glo'al e(onomi(
(ooperation, and di.armament o4 aggre..or nation., red0(ed trade 'arrier., and 4reedom
4rom want and 4ear. &n addition, the +nited State and Britain .tated that they .o0ght no
territorial gain. 4rom the (on4li(t and (alled 4or the de4eat o4 Germany. 1nno0n(ed on
10g0.t 1", it wa. .oon adopted 'y the other 1llied nation. a. well a. the Soviet +nion.
Both =oo.evelt?. -o0r -reedom., and the 1tlanti( Charter were governed 'y the .ame
prin(iple. a. tho.e 4o0nd in the *ream'le to the +.S. Con.tit0tion. =oo.evelt wa. a
li4elong 4ree!trader and anti!imperiali.t. Ending E0ropean (oloniali.m wa. one o4 hi.
o'>e(tive..
=oo.evelt and Ch0r(hill met again in %a.hington DC on De(em'er 22, 1"1 at
the .o (alled 1r(adia Con4eren(e. The )ey de(i.ion 4rom thi. (on4eren(e wa. the
agreement on a @E0rope -ir.t@ .trategy 4or winning the war. Thi. Con4eren(e al.o
prod0(ed the De(laration o4 the +nited Nation. term whi(h later 'e(ame the o44i(ial
name o4 the allie.. 1nother important event wa. the Tehran (on4eren(e 4rom Novem'er
2A, 1"$, thi. 'eing the 4ir. meeting o4 the Big Three B+S1, Great Britain and +SS=C.
&nitial (onver.ation. .aw =oo.evelt and Ch0r(hill re(eive Soviet .0pport 4or their war
poli(ie. in e:(hange 4or 'a()ing the (omm0ni.t *arti.an. in D0go.lavia and allowing
Stalin to manip0late the Soviet!*oli.h 'order. Stalin al.o promi.ed to de(lare war on
6apan 4ollowing the de4eat o4 Germany.
%hile the Big Three leader. were dire(ting the war, other e44ort. were moving
4orward to '0ild the 4ramewor) 4or the po.twar world. &n 60ly 1"", repre.entative. o4 "E
1llied nation. gathered at the <o0nt %a.hington /otel in Bretton %ood., N/ to de.ign
the po.twar international monetary .y.tem. 844i(ially d0''ed the +nited Nation.
<onetary and -inan(ial Con4eren(e, the meeting prod0(ed the agreement. that 4ormed
the &nternational Ban) 4or =e(on.tr0(tion and Development, the General 1greement on
Tari44. and Trade, and the &nternational <onetary -0nd. &n addition, the meeting (reated
the Bretton %ood. .y.tem o4 e:(hange rate management whi(h wa. 0.ed 0ntil 171.
"
1. the war wa. winding down, the Big Three met again at the Bla() Sea re.ort o4
Dalta 4rom -e'r0ary "!11, 1"E. Ea(h arrived at the (on4eren(e with their own agenda,
with =oo.evelt .ee)ing Soviet aid again.t 6apan, Ch0r(hill demanding 4ree ele(tion. in
Ea.tern E0rope, and Stalin de.iring to (reate a Soviet .phere o4 in4l0en(e. 1l.o to 'e
di.(0..ed were plan. 4or the o((0pation o4 Germany. =oo.evelt wa. a'le to o'tain
Stalin?. promi.e to enter the war with 6apan within 0 day. o4 Germany?. de4eat in
e:(hange 4or <ongolian independen(e, the ,0rile &.land., and part o4 Sa)halin &.land.
8n the i..0e o4 *oland, Stalin demanded that the Soviet +nion re(eive territory 4rom their
neigh'or in order to (reate a de4en.ive '044er 2one. Dalta Con4eren(e i. al.o )nown 4or
the 4amo0. per(entage agreement 'etween Soviet premier 6o.eph Stalin and Briti.h prime
mini.ter %in.ton Ch0r(hill a'o0t how to divide .o0thea.tern E0rope into .phere. o4
in4l0en(e. The 4inal meeting o4 the Big Three too) pla(e at *ot.dam, Germany 'etween
60ly 17 and 10g0.t 2, 1"E.The prin(ipal goal. o4 the (on4eren(e were to 'egin de.igning
the po.twar world, negotiating treatie., and dealing with other i..0e. rai.ed 'y the de4eat
o4 Germany. The (on4eren(e largely rati4ied many o4 the de(i.ion. agreed to at Dalta and
.tated that the goal. o4 the o((0pation o4 Germany wo0ld 'e demilitari2ation,
dena2i4i(ation, demo(rati2ation, and de(arteli2ation.
The war5. end opened a new era 4or the +nited State. in the world arena. &t
a((elerated the growth o4 1meri(an power while deva.tating all other world power.,
leaving the +nited State. e(onomi(ally and militarily the .tronge.t nation on earth.
Documents
Extract from TE F!U" F"EED!#S
deli$ered %y Fran&lin Delano "oose$elt' on (anuary )' *+,*
In the future days which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded
upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression
everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship !od in his own way"" everywhere in
the world.
E
The third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its
inha#itants ""everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means a world"wide
reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation
will #e in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neigh#or
""anywhere in the wold. That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite #asis for
a kind of world attaina#le in our own time and generation. That kind of world is the very
antithesis of the so"called $new order$ of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with
the crash of a #om#.
To that new order we oppose the greater conception the moral order. A good society is
a#le to face schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear.
%ince the #eginning of our American history we have #een engaged in change, in a
perpetual, peaceful revolution, a revolution which goes on steadily, &uietly, ad'usting
itself to changing conditions without the concentration camp or the &uicklime in the
ditch. The world order which we seek is the cooperation of free countries, working
together in a friendly, civili(ed society.
F