A Priori Justifcation and Knowledge

First published Sun Dec 9, 2007

Knowledge is generally thought to require justifed true belief, even if justifed
true belief is not sufcient for knowledge as Edmund Gettier famously argued
!"#$%& 'n Gettier cases the (erson, in some sense, is lucky to believe what is
true on the basis of his evidence& )or e*am(le, you see (oodles in a feld that
have been bred and cli((ed to look just like shee(, and on the basis of what
you see you form the belief that there are shee( in the feld& +uckily there are,
hiding out of sight behind some boulders- .ou have a justifed true belief that is
not knowledge& 'n lottery cases if you hold a losing ticket you have a justifed
true belief that it will lose, the justifcation resting on your knowledge that it is
very likely that any given ticket will lose, but many think you do not know that
your ticket will lose& /o having a justifed true belief is not sufcient for
knowledge, but it does seem necessary&
A priori knowledge is knowledge that rests on a priori justifcation& A
priori justifcation is a ty(e of e(istemic justifcation that is, in some sense,
inde(endent of e*(erience& 0here are a variety of views about whether a
priori justifcation can be defeated by other evidence, es(ecially by em(irical
evidence, and a variety of views about whether a priori justifcation, or
knowledge, must be only of necessary, or analytic, (ro(ositions, or at least of
ones believed to be necessary or analytic& 1ecessary (ro(ositions are ones that
cannot be false, ones that are true in all (ossible worlds, such as 2all brothers
are male&3 4ontingent (ro(ositions are ones that are not necessary& 5n analytic
(ro(osition is a (ro(osition e*(ressed by a sentence whose logical form
guarantees its truth& 'n some cases the logical form of a sentence is obvious, as
in 25ll murders are murders,3 which has the form 25ll A6s are A6s&3 'n other
cases the form is not so obvious, as in 27urder is wrong&3 8ut the logical form
may become a((arent once we re(lace relevant words and (hrases by their
synonyms, e&g&, by re(lacing 2murder3 by 2wrongful killing3 to get, 29rongful
killing is wrong&3 5ny (ro(osition that is true in virtue of the logical form of the
sentence that e*(resses it is analytic, regardless of whether that form is
immediately a((arent or only a((arent when relevant words and (hrases are
re(laced by their synonyms& 5ny (ro(osition that is not analytic is synthetic&
7ore later on whether synthetic (ro(ositions can be necessary and whether
analytic ones can be contingent&
A priori justifcation seems to rest on rational intuitions, or insights, but there
are a variety of views about the nature of these intuitions or insights& 0here are
di:erent e*(lanations of how these intuitions (rovide justifcation, if they do,
with many thinking that the e*(lanation of how they justify what have been
called synthetic a priori (ro(ositions must di:er from the e*(lanation of how
they justify analytic (ro(ositions& 0here are also many objections to the idea
that rational intuitions (rovide any sort of justifcation& )inally, rationalists think
that there can be a priori knowledge of the world while em(iricists deny this&
!& 0he nature of a priori justifcation and knowledge
;& 9hat sorts of (ro(ositions can be a priori justifed and known<
=& E*(laining how a priori justifcation is (ossible
>& ?bjections to the justifcatory force of rational intuitions
@& Aationalism vs& em(iricism
#& 4oncluding AeBections
8ibliogra(hy
5cademic 0ools
?ther 'nternet Aesources
Aelated Entries
!& 0he nature of a priori justifcation and knowledge
9e seem to know some things a priori, or at least to be justifed in believing
them& /tandard e*am(les of (ro(ositions known a priori includeC a bachelor is
an unmarried maleD ; E = F @D if you know something, then what you believe is
trueD if A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, then Ais greater than CD no
object can be red and green all over at the same timeD the shortest distance
between two (oints is a straight lineD no object can be wholly in two di:erent
(laces at the same timeD it is wrong to torture infants to death just for the fun
of itD and it is unjust to (unish an innocent (erson&
)or the sake of argument, assume that we know that all of the following claims
are trueC some bachelors are unha((yD there are fve a((les in the bagD ' have
handsD my middle fnger is longer than my ring fnger, and it is longer than my
little fngerD the tomato '6m holding is red all overD the shortest route by car
from Getroit to 4hicago is along 'H">D ' was in 4alifornia in midH7arch, not
GetroitD torture (roduces unreliable testimonyD and (eo(le who are (unished
unjustly become resentful& 0he basis of the knowledge of these claims is
di:erent from the basis for knowing that bachelors are unmarried males, ; E =
F @, etc& 0he basis for knowing that bachelors are unmarried, etc&, is also
di:erent from the basis for knowing that ' now have a (ain in my left knee, that
' ate cereal for breakfast this morning, and that there was a massacre at
Iirginia 0ech on 5(ril !#, ;JJ$& 0he basis of a priori knowledge is not
(erce(tion, intros(ection, memory, or testimony cf& 4asullo ;JJ=, ;"H=JD
8onJour, !""K, $%& 'f there were such things as tele(athy and clairvoyance, they
also would not be the basis of a priori knowledge 4asullo ;JJ=, !>"D 8onJour
!""K, $HK%& A priori knowledge and justifcation seem to be based on reason
alone, or are based solely on understanding the (ro(osition being considered&
+ike (erce(tion, intros(ection, memory, and testimony, a priori justifcation is
fallible& ?ne might be justifed in believing something a priori, e&g&, that every
event has a cause, or even that unmarried adult males are bachelors, that is
actually false& 7any (hysicists think that some subatomic events occur at
random and so have no cause, and Gilbert Larman has cited studies by
9inograd and )lores that show that, 2/(eakers do not consider the Mo(e a
bachelor3 Larman !""", !>JD ;JJ!, ##; and n& K%& 4onsideration of
(hiloso(hical (arado*es can also make the (oint that a priorijustifcation is
fallible& 9e seem to be a priori justifed in believing that if you take one grain of
sand from a hea( of sand, you are still left with a hea(, and that if you only
have one, or no, grains of sand, you do not have a hea( of sand& 8ut we know
that one of these (ro(ositions must be false, for the frst leads to the denial of
the second& /o a priori justifcation must be fallible cf& 8ealer !""K, ;J;%&
8esides being fallible, it seems that a priori justifcation is defeasible, that is,
allHthingsHconsidered a priori justifcation can be defeated by further evidence&
)or instance, it seems (ossible for a (erson to be, all things considered, a priori
justifed in believing, say, that justifed true belief J08% is knowledge before,
but not after, becoming aware of GettierHty(e countere*am(les& 5nd if that is
(ossible, why couldn6t allHthingsHconsidered a priori justifcation be defeated by
em(irical, not just a priori, considerations< 'f you are, all things considered, a
priori justifed in believing that necessarily, all P6s are Q6s then why couldn6t
your obserin! a P that is not a Q defeat that justifcation< /ome would
contend that something like this has actually ha((ened, for they will say that
Kant was, all things considered, a priori justifed in believing that every event
has a cause but, because of develo(ments in subHatomic (hysics, we are not,
and that the Greeks were, all things considered, a priori justifed in acce(ting
Euclidean geometry but we are not because of develo(ments in cosmology&
9hy would anyone think that these a((earances are misleading< 'n (articular,
why would they think that no one can be, all things considered, a priori justifed
in believing something at one time and then have that justifcation defeated at
a later time by em(irical evidence< 9ell, the answer stems from the nature of
the a priori& Kant said that a priori knowledge is 2knowledge that is absolutely
inde(endent of all e*(erience3 Kant !$K$, >=%& 0hat understanding seems too
narrow because, if it were correct, all a priori knowledge would have to rest on
innate ideas, that is, ideas (eo(le are born with but do not acquire through
e*(erience& 5 more (lausible suggestion is that a priori knowledge and
justifcation must be inde(endent of e*(erience be"ond that needed to ac#uire
the concepts re#uired to understand the proposition at issue&
+et6s switch the focus to a priori justifcation alone, since it is a com(onent of a
priori knowledge, and ask why anyone would think it indefeasible by
e*(erience, that is, why anyone would think that em(irical considerations could
not defeat some instances of allHthingsHconsidered a priorijustifcation& Mhili(
Kitcher thinks that if there is such a thing as allHthingsHconsidered a
priorijustifcation, then 2a (erson is entitled to ignore em(irical information
about the ty(e of world she inhabits3 !"K=, =JD see, also, ;>, KJHK$% and
Lilary Mutnam thinks that if there is that sort of justifcation, then there are
2truths which it is always rational to believe3 Mutnam !"K=, "J%& 8ut if a
(erson is entitled to ignore em(irical information, or it is always rational for her
to believe something no matter what the em(irical evidence is, (rovided she is,
all things considered, a priori justifed in believing that thing, then allHthingsH
considered a priori justifcation is indefeasible by e*(erience&
8ut why think that allHthingsHconsidered a priori justifcation im(lies either that
a (erson who has that sort of justifcation is entitled to ignore em(irical
information or that it is always rational for her to believe what she does no
matter what the em(irical evidence is< A priori justifcation must be
2inde(endent of e*(erience,3 which im(lies that it must be inde(endent of
em(irical evidence& 8ut there is an inter(retation of that sort of inde(endence
that does not im(ly that the (erson is entitled to ignore em(irical information
or that her justifcation will remain no matter what the em(irical evidence is&
/u((ose being justifed inde(endent of e*(erience sim(ly means that
e*(eriential sourcesdo not proide the justifcation, that the justifcation is
(rovided solely by some nonHe*(eriential source& 0hat does not im(ly that the
e*(eriential evidence could not defeat that nonHe*(eriential justifcation& 'n
other circumstances, it may& 5s +aurence 8onJour says, for a priori justifcation
2N it is enough if it is ca(able of warranting belief where e*(erience is silent3
8onJour !""K, !;!%& 0hat does not im(ly that the justifcation will remain
where e*(erience is not silent& 't allows that e*(erience might defeat that a
priori justifcation&
4onsider the following analogy& /u((ose (eo(le were born only with a sense of
touch and a sonar sense like bats (ossess& Each would allow them to detect the
(resence of objects in their vicinity& /omeone might truly say that an allHthingsH
considered justifed belief based on sonar evidence alone is a case of
justifcation inde(endent of touch because the sense of touch did not (rovide
any of the justifcation for that belief& ?f course, that does not im(ly that the
2sonar3 justifcation of such a belief is indefeasible by touch& ?n occasion, the
evidence (rovided by touch that some object is nearby might override the
sonar evidence that no object is nearby& /omething similar follows with res(ect
to a priori justifcation, that is, justifcation that must be inde(endent of
e*(erience& 't can be inde(endent of e*(erience without being inca(able of
being defeated by e*(erience because it is (ossible for the justifcation on
some occasion to rest solely on nonHe*(eriential evidence, even if on other
occasions that same sort of evidence can be defeated by e*(eriential evidence&
/ome will say that insofar as a priori justifcation can be defeated by
e*(erience it is not $holl"inde(endent of e*(erience& /till, we might say that it
is not deried %ro& e*(erience in the way that em(irical claims are& /o there
might be three categories of justifed (ro(ositionsC !% those whose justifcation
is $holl" inde(endent of e*(erience, ;% those whose justifcation does not rest
on, but can be defeated by, e*(erience, and =% those whose justifcation rests,
or de(ends on, e*(erience& 2A priori justifcation3 might be a((lied to
categories !% and ;%&
9hile a justifcation6s being inde(endent of, or not derived from, e*(erience
does not im(ly that it is infallible or indefeasible either e*(erientially, or nonH
e*(erientially, what is it for the justifcation to rest solely on a nonHe*(eriential
source< 4asullo says that there are negative and (ositive accounts of 2justifed
inde(endent of e*(erience3 based on how the source of such justifcation is
characteriOed 8onJour says the same at !""K, $%& /ometimes what is meant by
2e*(erience3 is given enumeratively by a listD beliefs based on e*(erience are
those that rest on any of the fve senses, intros(ection, memory, testimony
4asullo ;JJ=C =J, !>"%, and our kinesthetic sense of the (osition and
movements of our bodies cf& 8onJour lists all these sources at !""K, $%& /o
beliefs justifed inde(endent of e*(erience will be beliefs justifed by some
source not on the list&
4asullo ;JJ=, !>"% raises several (roblems for this negative account of what it
is for a belief to be justifed inde(endent of e*(erience& 't leaves une*(lained
why certain sources are e*cluded from the list and others (ut on it and,
similarly, whether to (ut (ossible new sources like clairvoyance and tele(athy
on the list or to leave them o:& 4asullo considers four di:erent ty(es of (ositive
accounts of e*(erience ;JJ=, !@JH@K% and criticiOes them all& 'n the end ;JJ=,
!@"%, he suggests that we take 2e*(erience3 to be a natural kind term like
2water,3 2aluminum,3 and 2horse3 and discover em(irically what its essence is&
0hen we will have a basis for distinguishing e*(eriential from nonHe*(eriential
F a priori% justifcation&
8ut if 2e*(erience3 is a natural kind term, then it is (ossible that its essence
has nothing to do with the qualia we normally associate with vision, touch,
smell, etc&, but, instead, has to do with certain (atterns of neural frings& 8ut
those visual, tactile, olfactory, etc&, sensations are what is e(istemically
relevantD they are the bases of our justifcations for certain intros(ective and
(erce(tual beliefs& 0hough e*ternalists about justifcation will disagree, from
the stand(oint of justifcation, it seems irrelevant what the di:erence between
e*(eriential and nonHe*(eriential sources of belief is if the nature of those
di:erent sources is not given in (henomenological terms& 7ore on reliabilism,
a ty(e of e*ternalism, below&% 8ut it is hard to see how the essence of
2e*(erience3 will be given in (henomenological terms if 2e*(erience3 is a
natural kind term&
'f the conclusions of the above discussion are correct, it is (ossible for a false
belief to be a priorijustifed, and a priori justifcation can be defeated by
em(irical evidence& A priori justifcation is justifcation that is inde(endent of
e*(erience but that does not im(ly that the (erson is justifed inde(endent
of all e*(erience, nor does it mean that she is justifed, all things
considered, no &atter $hat e'perience she has& 1egatively, it means that she
is justifed but not on the basis of (erce(tion, intros(ection, memory,
testimony, (ro(rioce(tion, and the li(e to handle tele(athy, clairvoyance, etc&,
should they e*ist%& 't is harder to say (ositively what it means, but on one
standard inter(retation nonHinferential a priori justifcation is justifcation
based solel" on understanding the (ro(osition at issue& 'nferential a
priori justifcation will involve nonHinferential a priori justifcation of the
(remises and 2seeing3 how the conclusion follows from, or is su((orted by,
those (remises& 0his 2seeing,3 in turn, might rest solely on a (erson6s
understanding what it is for one (ro(osition to im(ly, or follow from, another&
?f course, to be justifed in believing anything, say, that there are fve a((les in
the bag, you must understand the (ro(osition at issue& 8ut more than just
understanding the (ro(osition is needed to be justifed in believing that there
are fve a((les in the bag while no more is needed to be justifed in believing
that ; E = F @ and that all bachelors are unmarried&
;& 9hat sorts of (ro(ositions can be a priori justifed and known<
/ome have thought that only certain sorts of (ro(ositions can be a
priori justifed, in (articular, that only necessary ones can be so justifed& 8ut
insofar as a (erson can be a priori justifed in believing a false (ro(osition, a
priori justifcation need not be of necessary truths& 't need not be of truths at
all&
)urther, not all necessary truths are a priori justifable, that is, it is not true that
necessarily, if some (ro(osition is necessary, it can be justifed a priori& 't has
often been (ointed out that 29ater is L;?3 is a necessary truth, but it can only
be justifed em(irically, that is, a posteriori& 7any (hiloso(hers think a similar
remark a((lies to 20he morning star is the evening star,3 a statement of
identity that is a necessary truth that can only be known em(irically&
Even if a (erson can be a priori justifed in believing what is not a necessary
truth, (erha(s a (erson can be a priori justifed in believing, and know, only
what he beliees is necessarily true& 8ut that must be mistaken, too, for we can
imagine some young (erson, or mathematician, who lacks the conce(t of
necessity and who is still a priori justifed in believing, and knows, that ; E = F
@, bachelors are unmarried, etc& cf& 4asullo, ;JJ=, !@H!#D 8onJour !""K, !!>, n&
;=%& 5nd there are what 4asullo calls 2modal ske(tics3 who understand as well
as anyone what 2(ossibility3 and 2necessity3 mean but deny that any
(ro(ositions actually have those (ro(erties 4asullo ;JJ=,!#%& /urely they can
be a priori justifed in believing ; E = F @ even if not necessarily, ; E = F @&
5 fnal (ro(osal might be that a priori knowledge, though not justifcation,
requires that the (ro(osition known be necessarily true, even if the (erson
does not believe that it is necessarily true& 0he false (ro(ositions that we
imagined someone could be a priori justifed in believing are not
countere*am(les to this (ro(osal because, being false, they are not known,
and so not known a priori)
/aul Kri(ke argues that a (erson could have a priori knowledge of a contingent
(ro(osition& 'n (articular, he thinks a (erson could know a priori that S, the
standard meter stick in Maris, is one meter long at tJ if he f*ed the reference of
2one meter3 by the defnite descri(tion, 2the length of Sat tJ,3 even though that
(ro(osition is contingent in other (ossible worlds, at tJ S is longer or shorter
than a meter% Kri(ke, !"$;, ;$>H$@%& +et6s grant that a (erson can know a
priori that i% he has f*ed the reference in the described way, then S is one
meter long at tJ& /till, he cannot know, or even be justifed in believing, a
priori that he did f* the reference in that way& Le can only know by
intros(ection that he intended to f* the reference of 2one meter long3 by what
he did at tJ, and Smust have e*isted then for him to succeed in f*ing the
reference if he were only hallucinating S he might be trying to f* the reference
of 2one meter,3 but he could not succeed%& /o to know that he has f*ed the
reference of 2one meter,3 our subject must know certain things by
intros(ection and others namely, the e*istence of the S% by observation& /o he
can only know the consequent of the conditional we have granted that he
knows a priori by introducing a (remise that he only can knowa posteriori&
Lence, his knowledge of that consequent, which is that S is one meter long
at tJ, is alsoa posteriori, contrary to what Kri(ke claims& 't does not matter that,
2he knows automatically, without further investigation, that S is one meter
long3 Kri(ke, !"$;, ;$@%& 0hat is not sufcient for him to know a priori that is,
inde(endent of e*(erience% that S is one meter long 8onJour, !""K, !;H!=
o:ers a similar argument%&
9hile 2the standard meter stick in Maris is one meter long3 is not knowable a
priori, the conditional cited in the (revious (aragra(h is both knowable a
priori and contingent& 0he (ro(osition, 2'f Jones f*ed the reference of Pone
meterQ by Pthe length of S at tJQ, then S is one meter long at tJ,3 is not
necessary because there is a (ossible world where Jones f*es the reference
that way but the (articular stick that was named PSQ in our world is not, in the
other world, one meter long& 1evertheless, the contingent conditional can be
known a priori because the truth of both its antecedent and consequent are
assessed in the same world&
Gareth Evans discussed another sort of conditional sentence that also seems to
e*(ress contingent a priori truths& 4onsider the (ro(osition, 2'f actually p,
then p3 and the (articular instantiation of it, 2'f the (ost is actually red, then it
is red&3 9hat 2actually3 does here is to inde* the (ro(osition about the (ost6s
being red to some (articular world, call it *!& /o the relevant (ro(osition saysC
necessarily, if the (ost is red in *!, then it is red& 0o determine whether this
conditional is necessarily true, we have to consider whether it is true in every
(ossible world& 8ut surely it is not& 0here is some (ossible world,
say, *!JJ where 2the (ost is red in *!3 is true, but it is false that the (ost is red
because in*!JJ it is, say, green& /o the (ro(osition, 2'f the (ost is actually red, it
is red,3 is not necessary, but it is still true& )urther, it can be known a
priori because the truth of that contingent (ro(osition de(ends solely on how
things are in the actual world, and, of course, if the (ost is red in *! the actual
world%, it is red& 0he consequent of this conditional is true since its truth is
determined by how things are in the actual world, *!& ?nce we see this we can
know a priori that the (ro(osition is true, even though it is in fact contingent,
not necessary& )urther, we can know that the contingent (ro(osition is true
solely on the basis of understanding that (ro(osition cf& Evans !"$"C K=HK@ for
this entire (aragra(h%&
0o summariOe, a priori knowledge does not require that what is known be a
necessary truth, or even just be believed to be a necessary truth& )urther, a
(erson can be a priori justifed in believing, though, of course, not know, what
is false, and em(irical evidence can defeat a priori justifcation, and hence,
knowledge& 5s a start, what seems crucial to a priori justifcation is that it is
based solely on understanding the (ro(osition at issue&
Mutting aside contingent (ro(ositions that are knowable a priori, this has led
(eo(le to think that a priori knowledge can only be of analytic (ro(ositions,
that is, of (ro(ositions that can be reduced to logical truths by the substitution
of synonyms for a((ro(riate words or (hrases in the sentences that e*(ress
those (ro(ositions& 0here are other accounts of analyticity, but it will not be
necessary to consider them here&% /till ignoring the contingent a priori, for
similar reasons, (eo(le have been led to think that a priori justifcation can only
be of (ro(ositions that appear to be analytic, even if they turn out not to be& 8y
2a((ear to be analytic,3 ' mean they a((ear to be true in virtue of the
meanings of the terms involved, as is the case with 2bachelors are unmarried
males&3
Lowever, it seems that a (erson could be a priori justifed in believing a
(ro(osition like 2every event has a cause3 which, unlike 2every e:ect has a
cause,3 does not even a((ear to be analytic& 9hile 2e:ect3 might be defned
as 2the result of a cause,3 2event3 is not defned in terms of 2cause&3 5n event
is a change in some thing or state of a:airs& /o 2every e:ect has a cause3 can
be reduced to 2every result of a cause has a cause3 by the substitution of
synonyms, but no such reduction is (ossible for 2every event has a cause&3 't
seems that we can be a priori justifed in believing that no object can be red
and green all over at the same time, that no object can be wholly in two
di:erent (laces at the same time, that ha((iness is an intrinsic good, that it is
always wrong to torture an innocent child just for the fun of it, etc&, even
though these statements are not, and do not even a((ear to be, analytic& 0here
can be a priori justifcation of false (ro(ositions that do not even a((ear to be
analytic&
=& E*(laining how a priori justifcation is (ossible
/o how can we e*(lain a priori justifcation if not in terms of a((arent
analyticity or necessity< Merha(s there are two ways belief in a (ro(osition can
be justifed a priori& )irst, a (erson might have an intuition that a (ro(osition
like 2bachelors are unmarried3 is true based on understanding the conce(ts
involved and, second, she might have an intuition that, say, ha((iness is an
intrinsic good, or that no object can be in two wholly di:erent (laces at the
same time, based on her inability to think of countere*am(les to those claims&
'n each case, a rational intuition, or insight, would be the evidence on which
the justifcation rests, but the intuitions would be based on di:erent things&
9hat is a rational intuition or insight< +aurence 8onJour thinks it is an
immediate, nonHinferential gras(, a((rehension, or 2seeing3 that some
(ro(osition is necessarily true 8onJour !""K, !J#%& Le goes on to argue that a
(ro(osition6s appearin! to be necessarily true is the foundation of a
priorijustifcation, for he wants to allow that such justifcation is both fallible
and defeasible& /o for 8onJour, it is apparent rational insights that are the
evidence on which a priori justifcation rests, not rational insights themselves
!""K, !!;H!= and secs& >&@, >&#%& 7ore recently, and in res(onse to comments
by Maul 8oghossian ;JJ!%, 8onJour has said that these a((earances are not
(ro(ositional 8onJour ;JJ!, #$$H$KD 8onJour ;JJ@, !JJ%& /o in this res(ect
they are unlike beliefs and more like (erce(tual sensations&
Le contrasts his views with those of 5lvin Mlantinga and com(ares them to the
views of Manyot 8utchvarov 8onJour !""K, !JKH!J", notes !; and !=%&
Mlantinga also thinks that some sort of 2seeing3 is the basis of a
priori justifcation& 8ut he analyOes that 2seeing3 in terms of immediately
believing, and being convinced, that a (ro(osition is necessary, where that
conviction is accom(anied by an indescribable mental state that we all know
by considering (ro(ositions such as 2bachelors are unmarried3 Mlantinga !""=,
!J@HJ#%& 8utchvarov says that if you have a priori knowledge of some
(ro(osition, then you will fnd it unthinkable that the (ro(osition is false&
8onJour notes that if fnding the falsity of a (ro(osition unthinkable amounts to
its a((earing im(ossible that it be false, then 8utchvarov6s (osition is just like
his& 8ut there is another more (sychological reading of 2fnd its falsity
unthinkable3 that would im(ly that ' a priori know that ' now e*ist, because
' fnd the falsity of that (ro(osition unthinkable, even though ' know it is
contingent and so it does not a((ear necessary to me& ' might fnd the falsity of
20here is no golden s(here a mile in diameter3 unthinkable, and '
can6t i&a!ine a hybrid of a dog and an ele(hant, but on 8onJour6s
understanding, none of those things a((ear necessary because none a((ears
im(ossible cf& 8onJour ;JJ!, #"=%&
George 8ealer characteriOes a rational intuition as an intellectual seeming that
some (ro(osition is necessarily, or (ossibly, true 8ealer !""K, ;J$HJK%& Le
contrasts intuitions with 2judgments, guesses, and hunches3 !""K, ;!JH!!%,
common sense, belief, and even the inclination to believe !""K, ;JKHJ"%&
0here are (ro(ositions such as #>= R $;! F >#=,#J= that we may believe,
because we have done the calculations, that do not seem to be true, that is, of
which we have no intuition that they are true 9eatherson ;JJ=, =%& ?n the
other hand, in cases involving (arado*es that we have unraveled, one or more
of the (ro(ositions that constitute the (arado* can still seem true, even if we
do not believe it&
7onte Lall was the host for a game show called +et,s -a(e a Deal& 4ontestants
were given the chance to choose one of three doors knowing that a big (riOe
was hidden behind one of them but items of considerably less value behind the
other two& 5fter the contestant chose a door, 7onte Lall would sometimes o(en
one of the doors and show the contestant that the big (riOe was not behind it&
Le would then give the contestant the o((ortunity to switch doors and (ick the
uno(ened door that had not been his original choice, or stick with his original
choice& 't seems that the chance of (icking the winning door by switching is @JH
@J, but it can be shown that it is more twoHthirds%& Even after seeing the (roof,
or hearing reliable testimony that there is such a (roof, it can still seem that
the chances are @JH@J& 0hat seeming is intellectual, not (erce(tual, and so is a
rational intuition, though not a belief since we might believe, on the basis of
the (roof or reliable testimony, that the chances of winning the big (riOe are
greater if we switch from our original choice of doors& /omething similar might
be said about not having even the inclination to believe the chances are @JH@JC
it might seem true even if ' am not inclined to believe it&
Ernest /osa says something similar to 8ealer about the /orites (arado*
involving hea(s !""K, ;@KH@"%& 't seems obvious that if you remove one grain
of sand from a hea(, you still have a hea( left and that when there are no
grains of sand, or only just one left, you do not have a hea(& Le s(eculates that
if he were driven by argument to disbelieve one of the two claims that a((ear
obviously true, it would still appear true to him& 5t one (oint /osa thought that
intuitions are a certain ty(e of inclination to believe !""#, !@=H@>%, but he
later allowed that intuitions may not be dis(ositions, and so may not be
inclinations to believe !""K, ;@"%&
0he argument that intuitions (rovide evidence in sim(le cases, such as 2all
bachelors are unmarried3 or 2; E = F @,3 is that conce(t (ossession
guarantees reliability and that these sorts of intuition are based on conce(t
(ossession& .ou cannot have the conce(t of 2bachelor3 and not be dis(osed to
withhold a((lication of the term to (eo(le you take to be married or female&
.ou cannot have the conce(t of 2knowledge3 and not be dis(osed to withhold
a((lication of the term to guesses and what you take to be false beliefs& 'nsofar
as rational intuitions are based on conce(t (ossession, you cannot be
unreliable in a((lying the conce(t you (ossess to hy(othetical situations,
though this does not im(ly that you cannot make mistakes because, say,
(ragmatic or conte*tual im(lications mislead you or because it is hard to
distinguish one conce(t from another, as with jealousy and envy%& 0o (ossess a
conce(t, you must be reliable, though not infallible, in your judgments
involving a((lication of that conce(t to hy(othetical cases cf& Goldman ;JJ$,
!>H!#%& Meacocke ;JJJ, es(&, ;K>HK@% addresses the question of the
relationshi( between understanding and conce(t (ossession somewhat
di:erently and thinks that there are di:erent sorts of a priori justifcation whose
justifcatory force requires di:erent e*(lanations& 7ore on di:erent
e*(lanations below& 8ealer6s account of why rational intuitions justify is given in
terms of (ossessing a conce(t determinately cf&!""K%%&
?ne wonders whether reliability is either necessary or sufcient for justifcation
in general, and so ofa priori justifcation in (articular& 'n soHcalled demon worlds
a 4artesian evil demon makes you think all kinds of false things about an
e*ternal world by (roducing (erce(tions in you that are just like the ones we
now have& 5 similar thing ha((ens in .he -atri', a flm in which
su(ercom(uters (roduce (erce(tions like the ones we now have in (eo(le who
are hooked u( to the com(uters while Boating in a (od& 'n both cases, the
(eo(le are justifed in believing what they do about their surroundings des(ite
the fact that their beliefs are usually com(letely false and rest on an unreliable
source their (erce(tual e*(eriences that are caused by the demon or the
su(ercom(uters%& /o reliability is not necessary for justifcation in general& 't is
also not sufcient, for you may be hardHwired to believe things without
evidence that result from a reliable source that you have no reason to think is
reliable e&g&, clairvoyance without a track record 8onJour, !"K@, >!H>=% or a
thermometer secretly im(lanted in your brain that (roduces true beliefs in you
about the surrounding tem(erature +ehrer !""J, !#=H#>%%&
/o even if conce(t (ossession guarantees that judgments that stem from
rational intuitions will likely be true, that does not entail that rational intuitions
or insights (rovide justifcation& 0he reliability of a source of belief does not
guarantee that the resultant belief is justifed& /till, we could reBect on how
conce(t (ossession guarantees reliability of judgments involving the
a((lication of conce(ts to hy(othetical situations, and then know that these
sorts of judgment are reliable& 5nd known reliability does confer justifcation on
beliefs that we know were reliably (roduced by the (rocess or mechanism
known to be reliable& /o when it comes to what a((ear to be analytic
(ro(ositions, we might say that we are justifed in believing them because in
principle we could reBect on how conce(t (ossession makes us reliable in
a((lying the relevant terms& 5lternatively, we might say that even though we
are not in %act justifed in believing them we are in a position to be so justifed,
for we would be justifed if we just reBected on the im(lications of our conce(t
(ossession&
4once(t (ossession does not guarantee the reliability of judgments that stem
from rational intuition, for some nonHanalytic (ro(ositions might a((ear true
when they are not e&g&, every event has a cause% or fail to a((ear true when
they are e&g&, that it is wrong to torture an innocent (erson for the fun of it%&
5nd this might ha((en frequently des(ite the (erson6s (ossessing the conce(ts
involved in the nonHanalytic (ro(osition& Lowever, as we6ve seen, when it
comes to analytic (ro(ositions, (ossession of the conce(ts involved in them
guarantees the reliability of the relevant judgments& 1o one can (ossess the
conce(t of a bachelor and judge that an infant, a married man, or a female is a
bachelor, or judge that an average everyday thirtyHyearHold man who has never
been married is not a bachelor& Merha(s it is even true that no one who
(ossesses the conce(t of bachelor can fail to judge that all bachelors are
unmarried males& Aeliability with res(ect to analytic (ro(ositions is a
consequence of conce(t (ossession but not with res(ect to nonHanalytic ones&
/o how do intuitions that are not based on the a((arent analyticity of the
(ro(osition at issue (rovide justifcation for what have been called synthetic a
priori (ro(ositions< 0hey seem to be based on our inability to imagine
countere*am(les to those claims, say, to the claim that ha((iness is an
intrinsic good, or on our inability to imagine how we could have sufcient
evidence to reject the claim that every event has a cause& 9hy should these
inabilities justify us in believing the relevant (ro(osition even if intuitions that
are (roduced in this case are (henomenologically indistinguishable from those
(roduced when we consider (ro(ositions that at least a((ear to be analytic<
9hy shouldn6t we conclude, instead, that we have a limited imagination,
es(ecially given the fact that we know that in the (ast (ro(ositions have turned
out to be false that we were then unable to imagine false cf& Larman ;JJ=,
=J%<
'n the frst (lace, analytic (hiloso(hers are justifed in believing that they have
good imaginations, for they are often able to imagine how a claim can be false
that nonH(hiloso(hers cannot& /econd, an analytic (hiloso(her may not only be
unable herself to imagine how some claim can be false, she may also know
that no one in the (hiloso(hical literature, or community, has (resented an
e*am(le showing that the claim is false& 0he best e*(lanation of her failure,
and the failure of her colleagues in the disci(line, to fnd a countere*am(le
may be that the claim at issue is a necessary truth& /o on each of several
(articular cases, she is justifed in believing that the best e*(lanation of her
failure to fnd a countere*am(le to some claim is that it is a necessary truth& 5t
the same time, her failures are accom(anied by a rational intuition that the
(ro(osition she is considering is true, or (erha(s if she (ossesses the conce(t
of necessity, that it is necessarily true& 0hus she has inductive evidence over
these several cases that her rational intuitions are reliable when, even after
much reBection, she has been unable to fnd countere*am(les to some claim&
/o she will have reason to believe that her intuitions in those circumstances
(rovide evidence&
0he justifcation they (rovide is defeasible, for she may discover that others
whose imaginations are as good as hers have o((osing intuitions, or have
(lausible counter arguments that su((ort the denial of the claim that seems
intuitively obvious to her& 0hen, all things considered, she may not be justifed
in believing what she believes on the basis of an intuition that results from her
failure to imagine a countere*am(le& 8ut, of course, (erce(tion is like this, too&
' might seem to see a (erson on the quad wearing a blue coat while you
sincerely re(ort seeing nothing )eldman ;JJ#, ;;=%& ?r ' might know that ' am
in a house of distorting mirrors and have a visual image of myself as looking
very fat& 9hile ' am often justifed in believing what ' do on the basis of my
(erce(tual sensations, ' would not be in these s(ecial circumstances& 0his just
means that (erce(tion, and intuition based on failures to imagine
countere*am(les, are defeasible sources of justifcation&
Even if the account ' have given about why intuitions (rovide justifcation of
(ro(ositions that do not a((ear to be analytic is correct, doesn6t it make the
justifcation a posteriori instead of a priori< 't involves inference to the best
e*(lanation to e*(lain why a (erson6s failure, and the failure of others, to fnd
countere*am(les justifes her in believing that she is considering a necessary
truth, and induction to justify her belief that her intuitions that accom(any her
failures to fnd countere*am(les are reliable evidence that can be used to
detect necessary truths& 8ut knowledge of the relevant failures is intros(ective,
or based on observation, and the induction is across observed cases& /o the
evidence that intuitions of this sort are reliable is em(irical& /o how does this
show that intuitions that result from failures to fnd countere*am(les (rovide a
priori justifcation<
Aecall the e*am(le of the (erson with both a sonar sense and a sense of touch&
'f the sonar sense is corroborated by the sense of touch, is it an inde(endent
source of evidence< ?ne might say that once sonar sensations are 2certifed3
by touch it is (ossible for a belief to be justifed solely on the basis of sonar
evidence, not at all on the basis of touch, and so, in a sense, the justifcation is
inde(endent of touch& ?nce certifed, the sonar sense could even (rovide
evidence for (ro(ositions about objects (ermanently out of reach and so
evidence for (ro(ositions whose truth or falsity could not be determined by
touch& /imilarly, if the reliability of rational intuitions is 2certifed3 by
e*(erience, the intuitions could be considered an inde(endent source of
evidence because after the 2certifcation3 intuitions alone could (rovide
justifcation, and they might (rovide justifcation for (ro(ositions for which no
direct e*(eriential evidence is (ossible& ?f course, if this were the case, a
priorijustifcation would not be inde(endent of e*(erience in the way that
justifcation based on intros(ection is because intros(ection need not be
2certifed3 by e*(erience for it to (rovide justifcation& 8ut justifcation based on
rational intuitions would be inde(endent of e*(erience in a signifcant way&
8onJour argues that a priori justifcation that rests on rational intuitions, or
insights, does not re#uirewhat he calls a metajustifcation for those intuitions to
(rovide justifcation, that is, does not require reasons, or an argument, to show
that beliefs based on those intuitions are likely to be true& 'n this res(ect, it is
like intros(ection and unlike (erce(tion, (remonitions about the future, and
clairvoyance if it e*isted%& 8onJour seems to think that a (rinci(le such as the
following is trueC J% if S has a rational intuition, or insight, that necessarily p,
after i% considering p with a reasonable degree of care which includes a clear
and careful understanding of p% ii% having at least 2an a((ro*imate
understanding of the conce(t of logical or meta(hysical necessity3 8onJour
!""K, !;$ and !!>%, and iii% S is neither dogmatic nor biased
regarding p 8onJour !""K, sec& @&=, !==H=$%, then S6s belief that p is likely to
be true& Lere is the (roblem in justifying J%& J% itself must either be justifed
em(irically or a priori, if justifable at all& 'f justifed a priori, then it must be
justifed on the basis of rational intuitions, or insights& 8ut that sort of
justifcation would be circular and so no real justifcation at all& 8onJour argues
that if J% were justifed em(irically, and the justifcator" %orce o% rational
insi!hts re#uired that /01 be justifed, then the justifcation (rovided by rational
insight, whether for analytic or soHcalled synthetic a priori (ro(ositions, would
be em(irical, not really a priori& 'n that case J% would have been justifed, but a
priori justifcation would not have been vindicatedD it would have been reduced
to a ty(e of em(irical justifcation& 0he u(shot of all this is that i% the
justifcator" %orce o% rational insi!hts re#uires that a pre&ise li(e /01 be
justifed, then there is no way to vindicate a priori justifcation& 5ny argument
to do that would either be circular or (ull the rug out from under a
priori justifcation cf& 8onJour !""K, sec& @&@ on the metajustifcation of rational
insights, !>;H>$, and n& !! at !>#%&
'n light of the e*am(le where touch certifes the sonar sense, one wonders if an
em(irical justifcation of reliance on rational intuitions would turn justifcation
based on those intuitions into a ty(e of em(irical justifcation& Lowever,
8onJour6s res(onse is that the justifcatory force of rational insights does not
require the justifcation of some (remise like J%& 4onsiderations regarding
conce(t (ossession or the failure to fnd countere*am(les to some claim might
e*(lain why we are justifed in beliein! that rational insights have justifcatory
force& 8ut it can be true that they have such force even if we lack reason to
think so, that is, even if we lack a metajustifcation& Mut another way, rational
insights that satisfy the antecedent of J% or some (rinci(le like it% will (rovide
justifcation for a (erson even if that (erson is not justifed in acce(ting J%& /o
there is nothing wrong with a metajustifcation of rational insights to hel( us
understand, and to e*(lain, $h" they (rovide justifcation& 't just cannot be that
their justifcatory force rests, or de(ends, on such a metajustifcation& 5ll that is
required for S6s rational intuitions or insights to (rovide justifcation for Sis that
some (rinci(le like J% be trueD S need not be justifed in beliein! that
something like J% is true for his rational insights to (rovide evidence& 8onJour
thinks that (erce(tion, and clairvoyance if it e*isted, di:er in this regard
because in these cases a metajustifcation is required for observations to justify
beliefs that go beyond mere observation re(orts&
>& ?bjections to the justifcatory force of rational intuitions
0here are many objections to the view that rational intuitions (rovide evidence
and are the foundation of a priori justifcation& ?ne worry is that although in
(rinci(le intuitions might (rovide a priori justifcation, actual disagreement in
intuitions defeats any such justifcation& Em(irical researchers at least seem to
have found that undergraduate students from di:erent cultures have di:erent
intuitions in cases involving questions about whether justifed true belief is
knowledge, whether reliably (roduced belief is necessary or sufcient for
justifcation, and whether (eo(le in various circumstances act freely or do not
cf& 9einberg, 1ichols, and /tich, ;JJ!%&
5 worry about these e*(eriments is that the judgments the students make are
not based on intuitions when 2intuition3 is used in a sense relevant to
e(istemology and a priori justifcation cf& 8ealer !""K, ;!=%& Merha(s
2intuition3 is being used in a broader sense to mean 2whatever seems obvious
to a (erson on reBection, where that seeming obvious is not based on
inference3 or 2a s(ontaneous judgment about truth or falsity of a (ro(osition3
9einberg ;JJ=, n& =%& 't seems obvious to most that if you dro( a stone, it will
fall, that the earth is round, and that they are awake and not dreaming& 8ut
none of these claims are based on intuition in the relevant sense, for none are
based solely on understanding what the relevant (ro(ositions mean, nor on the
inability to conceive of how they might be false& 'nsofar as one holds with
8ealer and 8onJour% that to have a rational intuition something must seem
necessarily, or (ossibly true, none of these claims would qualify as a rational
intuition&
/till, assume that the students6 judgments in the cases they are (resented are
based on intuitions in the relevant sense& Merha(s even then they have no, or
little, justifcatory force because they do not understand the conce(ts involved
as well as (hiloso(hers who have thought long and hard about them& Merha(s
what seems true to them is a:ected by what is conte*tually im(lied, not by
what the relevant terms mean& Merha(s they have only a fuOOy gras( of the
conce(ts involved& 0he real concern arises when there are conBicting intuitions
among (hiloso(hers all of whom have thought long and hard about the
conce(ts involved& 'n that case, what a (erson should ultimately believe will
de(end on the arguments, and re(lies, that (hiloso(hers have in favor of their
own analysis of some conce(t, and against the analyses and intuitions of their
o((onents& 8ut even here the justifcation of (remises, and of conclusions
based on inferences from those (remises, will rest on intuitions about those
(remises, and of what follows from them&
5nother sort of criticism focuses on the use of intuitions in (hiloso(hy& 't says
that the terms (hiloso(hy is interested in, such as 2knowledge,3 2causality,3
2(ersonal identity,3 2morally res(onsible,3 2justice,3 and the like are all natural
kind terms and so are like 2water,3 2acid,3 2aluminum,3 etc& 0o fnd the essence
of water, acid, etc&, we must look for it through em(irical investigation& 5t most,
a((eal to our intuitions can hel( us understand our 2folk3 conce(ts, to
understand what we ordinarily mean by these terms, or as a starting (oint to
focus some scientifc inquiry& 8ut what we really need to discover em(irically is
the essential nature of the (henomena to which the terms refer& /o even if
rational intuitions can (rovide the ground for a priori justifcation of some
(ro(ositions, they cannot (rovide that ground for (ro(ositions of interest in
(hiloso(hy& Em(irical investigation is needed to answer the questions of
interest to (hiloso(hy cf& Kornblith !""K, ;JJ@, ;JJ#D Kitcher, !"K=, K;HK@
uses 25cids contain o*ygen3 in an argument that concludes we cannot have
any a priori knowledge& 8ut insofar as 2acid3 is a natural kind term, at most the
argument shows that we cannot have any a priori knowledge of (ro(ositions
e*(ressed by sentences containing natural kind terms&%
0he (roblem with this em(irical a((roach to (hiloso(hy is that the terms that
(hiloso(hy is interested in do not seem to be natural kind terms )eldman
!""", !$#HKJ%& 9hile we can imagine a liquid that is clear, odorless, colorless,
and (otable, but not water and vice versa%, we cannot imagine a nonH
accidentally justifed true belief that is not knowledge or vice versa%& /o while
there is room to discover em(irically what the essence of water is, since that
essence is not given by the relevant common, macrosco(ic (ro(erties of water,
there is no such room to discover em(irically the essence of knowledge since
that essence just is being a nonHaccidentally justifed true belief& Mut more
directly, the (ro(erties commonly associated with water hel( f* the reference
of 2water,3 but the (ro(erties relevant to knowledge are (art of the essence of
knowledge& /imilar remarks a((ly to other terms, and the associated conce(ts,
that traditionally have interested (hiloso(hers&
5nother a((roach that discounts the justifcatory force of intuitions, at least in
e(istemology, is (ragmatic& 't tells us to determine frst what goals we want
e(istemic (rinci(les to serve and then to discover em(irically which e(istemic
(rinci(les, if adhered to, will best serve those goals cf& 9einberg ;JJ#%& ?ne
(roblem with this a((roach is that intuitions must be relied u(on to rule out
certain goals as not being e(istemically relevant& Low else could we rule out,
say, the goal of making (eo(le ha((y through the beliefs they ado(t as
being episte&icall" relevant< 5nother (roblem is that we will have to
(resu((ose some e(istemic (rinci(les to determine whether we are justifed in
beliein! that acce(tance of certain frstHlevel e(istemic (rinci(les will further
the relevant goals& 8ut what will justify us in acce(ting those (resu((osed,
secondHlevel (rinci(les< ?n this (ragmatic a((roach, the answer must be that
it de(ends on whether we are justifed in believing that acce(ting these
(resu((osed secondHlevel (rinci(les furthers relevant e(istemic goals& 8ut then
we must (resu((ose thirdHlevel e(istemic (rinci(les to determine whether we
are justifed in acce(ting the secondHlevel (resu((osed (rinci(les& 't looks as
though we are going to have to be justifed in believing an infnite hierarchy of
(rinci(les to be justifed in acce(ting frstHlevel e(istemic (rinci(les, and,
(erha(s, even to be justifed in acce(ting what those frstHlevel (rinci(les
endorse&
0he fourth sort of objection to the justifcatory force of rational intuitions
a((eals to their fallibility& 'f we know that our intuitions are sometimes
mistaken, then how do we know that they are not mistaken on any given
occasion< 'f we do not have reason to think that they are not mistaken on a
given occasion, then we are not justifed on the basis of intuition in believing
what we do on that occasion& Given the known fallibility of intuitions, we are
never justifed in believing some (ro(osition on their basis alone& 9e always
must also have a justifed belief that they are not unreliable on the (articular
occasion&
0his argument can be generaliOed to a((ly to any (utative source of
justifcation that is known to be fallible& 9e know that (erce(tion is fallible so
that for us to be justifed in believing anything on its basis we must have a
justifed belief that it is not unreliable on the (articular occasion& 8ut if we are
justifed in believing that it is not unreliable on the basis of a source that is
known to be fallible, then we will have to have another justifed belief that that
source is not unreliable& 5nd this will go on to infnity if at every stage
justifcation derives from a source known to be fallible& /o justifcation, on this
view, must rest ultimately on some infallible source, or no source at all, or on
an infnity of considerations that (rovide justifcation& 1one of these
alternatives seems (lausible& /o the argument against the justifcatory force of
rational intuitions under consideration, when generaliOed in its a((lication,
leads to universal ske(ticism&
5 ffth sort of objection claims that a source of justifcation must be ca(able of
being calibrated to determine whether it is accurate 4ummins !""K, !!#H!K%&
9hat we see through telesco(es justifes us in believing that the moon has
mountains because we have looked through telesco(es at distant mountains on
earth and then traveled to see that the telesco(es (resented an accurate
(icture of the mountains& 8ut what can intuitions be checked against to
determine that they are accurate< ?ther intuitions< 8ut that is like checking a
crystal ball against itself&
?ne re(ly says that (ro(ositions like ; E = F @ that are a priori justifed can be
checked by observing with our senses that when two objects are added to
three more objects there are fve objects total& 0hat might lead some to think
that such agreement, and disagreement, between a priori justifcation and
(erce(tual justifcation would allow one to 2calibrate3 a priori justifcation& 4an
arithmetic (ro(ositions also be disconfrmed by e*(erience< Goes adding two
quarts of water to three quarts of carbon tetrachloride and getting less than
fve quarts of liquid disconfrm 2; E= F @3< 1o, because 2add3 in the
mathematical statement does not mean 2(hysically combine&3 5((lied to this
case, it means if you count the number of quarts of water, count the number of
quarts of carbon tetrachloride and add those two numbers together, you should
get the same number as you would if you just counted all the quarts of liquid,
namely, fve& Lowever, holding everything the same as in the frst count, if we
did carefully count and found the sum of the frst count ; E =% was often
di:erent from the total of the second count @%, we might think that these
results $ould disconfrm the mathematical claim that ; E = F @& 9hy not if
observations can disconfrm that every event has a cause or disconfrm
Euclidean geometry<
8onJour has argued that many errors involving a((arent rational insight can be
corrected internally by further reBection or by a((ealing to coherence 8onJour
!""K, !!#H!"%& ?thers have re(lied that neither (erce(tion, nor memory
Goldman ;JJ$, @% can be checked either, e*ce(t against themselves, but that
does not (revent these sources from (roviding justifcation in certain
circumstances& 'n re(ly to this sort of res(onse, (eo(le have said that at least
di:erent ty(es of (erce(tion can be checked against each other, say, vision
against touch 9eatherson ;JJ=, >%& ?f course, all the forms of (erce(tion
could be unreliable even if they, in a sense, corroborated each other& 0he critics
of intuition add that while we can distinguish circumstances where, say, vision
is unreliable say, where the lighting conditions, or the (erson6s eyesight, is
badD when we are in a desert where illusions often occurD when we are
hallucinating, etc&% from circumstances where it is not, nothing similar can be
done when it is a matter of intuitions& Lowever, the latter does not seem to be
true& ' can tell when ' do not have a very frm gras( of some conce(t say, of
(oignancy%, and sometimes ' know that someone has thought about some
conce(t as long and as hard as ' have, has intuitions o((osed to mine, and '
cannot e*(lain his intuitions away& 'n those circumstances, intuitions do not
(rovide a priori evidence, or at most, weak evidence& /omeone might res(ond
that we might know under what circumstances intuitions are unreliable, but we
do not know under what circumstances they are reliable& 8ut the same might
be said of (erce(tion& 0rue, sometimes we can check one sense modality
against another& 8ut su((ose we could check a ouija board against a crystal
ball, and they always agreed& 0hat would not give us reason to believe that
either is a reliable source of truth& /o how can agreement between, say, vision
and touch show that either is reliable<
5nother criticism of the view that intuitions are evidence is that they are only
evidence of what ' mean by some term, not of what the term means 7cKinsey
!"K$, es(& $ makes this (oint but does not o:er it as a criticism%& /ome (eo(le
have the intuition that you lie if you intend to deceive your fsherman father by
telling him that you caught a big, big fsh that you threw back, even if it was in
fact a really big one, (rovided you thou!ht it was not say, you thought it was
little because you were looking at your brother6s line that had a little fsh on it,
and thought that it was yours because your lines had become crossed, though
you did not realiOe it%& ?thers have the intuition that it is not a lie because you
did not say something false, only something you belieed to be false& /o some
(eo(le mean by 2a lie3 something you tell someone that you beliee is false,
with the intention of deceiving them& ?thers mean by 2a lie3 a %alsehood that
you tell someone with the intention of deceiving them& 0hese (eo(le s(eak two
di:erent idiolects, and their intuitions only su((ort hy(otheses about whateach
indiidual means by 2a lie3 +ycan ;JJ#, !#>H#@%& 9hat 2a lie3 means in English
cannot be determined without em(irical investigation into what most (eo(le
who s(eak English mean by 2a lie&3 /o &" intuitions are not evidence of what a
term means but only of what 2 mean by a term& 8ut then the objection is that
intuitions are only a reBection of what each (erson6s (ersonal (sychological
conce(ts are, which isn6t of much (hiloso(hical interest cf& Goldman ;JJ$, es(&
!>H!$%&
?ne res(onse to this criticism is to concede that all ' can get from consulting
my intuitions is what ' mean by the relevant term& 't then (ro(oses that we
engage in some social science research to determine if there is a shared
conce(t, which would be the case if there were substantial agreement across
the relevant conce(ts of many individuals Goldman ;JJ$ o:ers this res(onse
at !$%&
5 di:erent res(onse is that (hiloso(hy is not concerned with what a term
means in, say, English, with whether there is, in fact, agreement across many
individuals who s(eak English& Mhiloso(hers are interested in what a rational
person would come to mean by a term once she has considered her intuitions,
the intuitions of others, and the arguments to discount certain intuitions, to
acce(t others, and to acce(t some theory that best e*(lains the surviving
intuitions& 0he idea is that the theory about the meaning of, for e*am(le,
2knowledge3 that results is what everyone should mean by that term, which is
not necessarily what most (eo(le do mean by it, nor what any (articular
(erson means by it before doing (hiloso(hy& ?ne im(ortant use of intuitions in
(hiloso(hy serves a normative (ur(ose to determine what should be meant by
a term%, and that investigation need not involve em(irical inquiry because it
does not de(end on what most (eo(le do mean by the term&
0he fnal objection is that rational intuitions have some, but very little,
e(istemic weight& 5 few hy(othetical e*am(les can be enough for a (erson to
reject his initial intuition& )or instance, most (eo(le initially have the intuition
that it would be wrong to (ush a heavy man in front of a runaway trolley to
sto( it even if that is the only way to save fve innocent (eo(le tra((ed on the
tracks from being run over and killed by the trolley& 8ut they often change their
minds if several cases involving runaway trolleys are (resented that lead u( to
the one involving the heavy man& 'f you ask them whether it would be all right
to turn a runaway trolley down a s(ur where two innocent workmen will be
killed as a way of (reventing the trolley from running over fve innocent (eo(le
on the track it is on, most will say it is (ermissible to turn down the s(ur& 'f you
then ask them if it would be (ermissible to run an em(ty trolley into a runaway
trolley with two innocent (eo(le on it, in order to knock that trolley o: the
tracks so it will not run over the fve, most will answer it is even if the two will
be killed by the im(act& 1e*t, if you again assume that none are on the
runaway trolley headed for the fve, but two are on the trolley that you can run
into the em(ty runaway trolley to knock it o: the tracks, most will say that it is
(ermissible to run the one trolley into the other even if the two will be killed&
Laving considered all these variations on the trolley case, many will now say
that it is (ermissible to run a heavy man say, on rollerskates-% into the trolley
headed for the fve to knock it o: the tracks& 5fter all, if it is morally (ermissible
to run a trolley with two on it into the runaway trolley to knock it o: the tracks
so that fve won6t be killed, even though the two will be killed, why isn6t it
morally (ermissible to (ush a heavy man not on a trolley into the same sort of
runaway trolley to sto( it from running over the fve< /o (eo(le can be brought
by considering a series of hy(othetical cases to reject a frm intuition they
(reviously held see Snger, !""#, KKH"! for a similar multiHo(tion trolley case%&
't is much harder to get (eo(le to give u( what they believe they have
(erceived, and rarely will merely h"pothetical cases do the trick&
5ccording to the view that intuitions don6t have much evidentiary force, while
Gettier e*am(les (rovide so&e reason to reject the view that justifed true
belief J08% is knowledge, (erha(s, all things considered, we should acce(t the
J08 account because it is sim(ler and systematiOes many of our intuitions
about knowledge 9eatherson ;JJ=, es(& !H;D #H!!%& ?thers are not willing to
acce(t the J08 account of knowledge just because of its sim(licity and sco(e,
but they are willing to reject certain intuitions in favor of a nonHJ08 theory that
is itself sim(le and general cf&, 9illiam +ycan, ;JJ#, !@K and !#;H#= where he
holds that a (erson who sees a barn on a street containing many very realistic
barn facades knows it6s a barn, assuming that the (erson does not know that
there are many barn facades nearby, because +ycan6s sim(le and systematic
theory im(lies that the (erson knows&% 'f intuitions can be given u( because
some sim(le and systematic theory im(lies they are mistaken, then intuitions
do not have the same justifcatory force as (erce(tions& 'f a scientifc theory
(lus au*iliary hy(otheses really im(ly that bumblebees cannot By, but we see
them Bying, we should reject that theory, or at least one of those hy(otheses&
8ut on the theory of a priori disconfrmation under consideration, we need not
give u( the J08 theory of knowledge just because of Gettier e*am(les&
't is obviously a hard question about what should weigh more heavily, intuitions
or theoretical considerations, when a (erson must determine what, all things
considered, she should acce(t& 0o settle the issue, some argument is needed
for treating intuitions either like, or di:erent from, (erce(tions when it comes
to their ability, or inability, to disconfrm theories&
@& Aationalism vs& em(iricism
Aationalists have ty(ically thought that we can be a priori justifed, and even
know, things about the world, and em(iricists have denied this& 1ow if the
world includes abstract entities like numbers and (ro(ositions, then some
rationalists, and even some em(iricists, will hold that we can know a
priorithings about the e*istence and nature of these entities though the
em(iricists might have a di:erent view about what it is to be an abstract
entity%& Lowever, rationalists like 8onJour !""K% will insist that we can also
know a priori things about the natural world& )or instance, we can know a
priorithat no object can be red and green all over at the same time and in the
same res(ects, that no object can be wholly in two distinct (laces at the same
time, and (erha(s% that backward causation is im(ossible& 0hey will claim that
this is knowledge of the nature o% realit" and will be true of any object, or
event, that e*ists&
?ne might grant this claim and at the same time (oint out that it does not give
us knowledge of the e*istence of things, events, and states of a:airs but only
knowledge of what they must be like i% they e*ist& 9e only know that there are
objects and events in s(ace and time by e*(eriencing them, even if we can
know a priori certain things about the distribution of colors on their surfaces,
how many (laces they can be in at any given time, and whether a later event
can cause an earlier one&
#& 4oncluding AeBections
't seems that ultimately a priori justifcation must rest on the justifcation that
rational intuition, or insight, (rovides& 'n deductive arguments they (rovide the
justifcation for the belief that the conclusion follows from the (remises, and
sometimes for the (remises themselves& 'n inductive arguments, or arguments
involving inference to the best e*(lanation, rational intuitions must ultimately
(rovide justifcation for those am(liative (rinci(les themselves& 9hen it comes
to the (hiloso(hical analysis of conce(ts, intuitions (rovide the data of which
the (ro:ered analysis, if justifed, is the best e*(lanation& /ome maintain that
to be justifed in acce(ting the (ro:ered analysis it, too, should be intuitively
obvious, even if not immediately& 0hough em(iricists will disagree, others will
embrace 8onJour6s claim that (hiloso(hy must be a priori 2if it has any
intellectual standing at all3 8onJour, !""K, !J#%&
Em(irical a((roaches to (hiloso(hy seem unable to do away with a((eal to
intuitions as the grounds for believing some conclusion follows from the
(remises, to su((ort am(liative inferences that go beyond observations to
more general claims, or to discover the essence of conce(ts that nonHnatural
kind terms e*(ress& Mragmatic a((roaches to (hiloso(hy seem to require
reliance on intuitions to determine relevant e(istemic goals and to sto( a
threatening regress& 'n the (ast it was widely held that a priori knowledge could
only be of necessary or analytic truths, and that all necessary truths were
ca(able of being known a priori& /imilar things were thought of a
priori justifcation& 'n light of develo(ments in the last half of the ;J
th
century,
all of these claims about the relation between a priori knowledge and
justifcation on the one hand, and necessity and analyticity on the other, seem
false& )urther, a priori justifcation is fallible, and both it and a priori knowledge
are defeasible, both by a priori and em(irical evidence& Kant seems right in
arguing that not only analytic (ro(ositions can be justifed, and known, a priori,
though many reject his account of how synthetic a prioriknowledge is (ossible
as obscure and unconvincing& Merha(s (hiloso(hers were mistaken in thinking
that if there is an e*(lanation of how a priori justifcation, and knowledge, are
(ossible it must be of just one ty(e& 7aybe at least two di:erent accounts must
be given, one in terms of conce(t (ossessionD the other, in terms of the
inability to fnd countere*am(les&
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/ource, and 0heir E(istemic /tatus,3 :ra@er Philosophische Studien, $>C
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