I.

Memorize Verbatim, Definition

Verba Legis - plain-meaning rule
when the statute is plain and unambiguous, it warrants an ordinary meaning
Basis: Index amini sermo est (speech is the index of the intention)
Presumptions:
a. words correctly express intention
b. the statute says what it means and means what is says there - SIR

Stare Decisis -- Stand by decisions - when the SC has laid down a principle applicable to
certain set of facts, it shall adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where
the facts are substantially the same
Reason: For certainty and stability in the legal system.
Rule: Article 8 of the Civil code - judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the philippines. - SIR

Ratio Legis - Spirit rather than the letter of statute determines construction - SIR

Index Animi Sermo Est - speech is the index of the mind or speech is the index of
intention
The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute.

Ejusdem Generis - of the same kind or specie
The general rule is that where a general word of phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things
or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
(Agpalo, 308-9)
Requisites: (Um, easier to memorize it this way, I guess. Ignore if otherwise.)
1. a statute contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by
a general word or phrase;
2. the particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. the enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not
merely by examples; and
4. there is no indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases
a broader meaning
(Agpalo, 313-4)

Expresio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius - expression of the one is exclusion of the other
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. (Agpalo, 318)

Noscitur A Sociis - associated words
Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.
(Agpalo, 302)

Casus Omissus [Pro Omisso Habendus Est] - an omitted case
A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. (Agpalo, 336)

Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus - Where the law does not
distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and
phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance. (Agpalo, 289-290)

Strictissimi Juris - Follow the law strictly.

Dura Lex Sed Lex - The law may be harsh, but it is still the law.
A statute, being the will of the legislature, should be applied in exactly the way the
legislature has expressed itself clearly in the law. (Agpalo, 208)

Reddendo Singula Singulis - Referring to each; or referring each phrase or expression to
its appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be
taken distributively. (Agpalo, 339)

II. Memorize the statutes that are -CHECK PDF NI SIR

A. Strictly construed
1. Penal in nature
2. Authorizing expropriation
3. Granting privileges
4. Ground for removal of officials
5. Naturalization
6. Imposing taxes
7. Granting tax exemptions
8. Authorizing suits against government (SIR)

B. Liberally construed
1. Social legislation
2. Election laws
3. Veteran and Pension laws
4. Amnesty proclamation
5. Adoption laws
6. Rules of court (SIR)

C. Mandatory
1. Conferring power
2. Granting benefits
3. Prescribing time to take action or appeal
4. Prescribing qualifications for office
5. Prescribing jurisdictional requirements
6. Concerning public auction (SIR)

D. Directory
1. Prescribing manner of judicial action
2. Requiring rendition of decision within prescribed period (SIR)

E. Prospective
1. Penal laws
2. Substantive in nature
3. Affecting vested rights
4. Affecting obligations of contract
5. Repealing and Amendatory acts (SIR)

F. Retrospective
1. Penal laws (when favorable to the accused)
2. Procedural laws
3. Curative statutes
4. Police power legislations
5. Statutes relating to appeals (SIR)

III. Cases

1. Agencia Exquisite v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Under the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, it behoves that the Court to
apply its previous ruling in Lhuillier to the case under consideration.Once a case has
been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as
in the present case, should be decided in the same manner.
o lending investors are not pawnshops for the purpose of imposing the 5%
percentage tax. -SIR

2. Celestial Nickel v. Microasia
In the interpretation of ambiguous provisions, history of enactment of laws
may be used as an extrinsic aids. Based on the grant of implied power to terminate
mining contracts under previous laws or issuances ( PD463, EO221, EO279) the
Philippine Mining Act should be construed as continuation of legislative intent to
authorize the DENR secretary to cancel mineral agreements on account of violations
of the terms and conditions thereof.

3. Garcia v. SSS
a. the liability imposed under SSS law does not preclude liability for unremitted amount.
Relevant section 28(f) is Sec 22(a) of the same law, which provides that every employer is
required to deduct and remit such contributions
b. (kulang) - SIR

4. Pagcor v. Phil E-gaming
In its ordinary sense, game is a sport, pastime, or contest while
amusement is the pleasurable occupation of senses, diversion or enjoyment. On
the other hand, game of chance is a game in which chance rather than skill
determines outcome, while gambling is defined as making a bet or play for value
against an uncertain event in the hope of gaining something of value. In fine, RA
7903 did not grant to Zambo ecozone the power to operate and/or license games of
chance/gambling. -SIR

5. David vs. Arroyo
PP1017 is unconstitutional -to prevent or suppress lawless violence. however,
provisions giving the president power to issue decrees are unconstitutional.
PGMAs ordinance power is limited to issues -eo, ao, proclamation, mo, mc, so. She
cannot issued decrees similar to issued by marcos (presidential decrees) PD only
during martial law. Ordinance power is limited to the 6types of pres. issuances.
GO no. 5 is constitutional since it provides standard by which afp and pnp should
implement PP1017. - SIR

6. Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Held: Ordinance contravene PD 1869, which authorized casino gambling, as they
prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate casino.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress. PD1869 has not been modified by the Local Government code, which
empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of
gambling prohibited by law. - SIR

7. Republic v. Lacap
The plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without interpretation.
The wordings of RA 4566 are clear. It does not declare explicitly or impliedly, as
void, contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired.
Nonetheless, such contractor is liable to the payment of the fine prescribed.
o COA has no reason to withhold payment, which constitute just enrichment. -
SIR

8. Canet v. Decena
FACTS: Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Decena was the mayor
therein. In 1998, Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to operate a cockpit in
Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance 001 entitled An Ordinance
Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the
Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the
Provisions Thereof. This ordinance was submitted to Decena for her approval but she
denied it because the said ordinance does not contain rules and regulations as well as a
separability clause. The council then decided to shelf the ordinance indefinitely.
Meanwhile, Canet applied for a mayors permit for the operation of his cockpit. Decena
denied Canets application on the ground that under the LGC of 1991 (Section 447 (a) (3)
(v)), the authority to give licenses for the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is
vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as
there was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same. Canet
then sued Decena on the ground that he should be given a permit based on the 1998
resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances
which generally provide for the issuance of a mayors permit for the operation of
businesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit sans a municipal
ordinance which would empower her to do so.

HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayors permit would not only be a violation of
the explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also
be an undue encroachment on Decenas administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998
resolution allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an ordinance
allowing the operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution). The tax ordinances Canet
mentioned contain general provisions for the issuance of business permits but do not
contain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be paid in the operation of
cockpits and other gamefowl activities.

9. Davao Oriental Electric Coop v. Prov Davao Oriental
FIRB Resolution is crystal clear in stating that tax exemption privileges are restored
effective July 1, 1987. The language of the law is plain and unambiguous. When the
language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must me take to mean
exactly what is says.
o President Cory Aquino encouraged electric cooperatives through FIRB
REsolution which granted a tax exemption.
o Davao Electric construed the tax exemption as retroactive, to include its real
property taxes since 1984. -SIR

10. Perfecto v. Meer
Collection of income tax from salaries of judicial officers is diminution of their salaries
in violation of the constitutional provision.
Reason behind the exemption is to preserve the independence of the judiciary,
which is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing
their salaries. - SIR

11. Endencia v. David
Interpretation of the Constitution and the statutes is the exclusive jurisdiction of
judiciary
In enacting laws, legislative may not provide therein that it be interpreted in such a
way that it may not violate Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the
courts in their tasks of interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation
provided in said statute runs counter to previous interpretation already given in a
case by the supreme court. -SIR

12. Free Farmers vs. CA
The literal import, if given effect, will defeat the purpose of Act which is to grant
laborers share in sugar produce legislative meaning is to give laborers share for as
long as sugar is produced and planters receive increased participation
Thus, legislative intent is to make Act operative irrespective of whether there exists a
milling agreement between central and sugar planters. (kulang) - SIR

13. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-
51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm
Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share.
RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet
to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino
First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSIS
refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale
to RB.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:
1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law
because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national
patrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be
proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is
in light of the Filipino First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary
meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also
refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only
our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness
to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to
individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term
qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can
make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and
efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to
Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen
over the former.


14. Marcelo v. Cruz

Defendant Fernando Cruz sold his property with an area of 13,856 square meters to
defendant Servando Flores pursuant to a deed of sale (Kasulatan ng Bilihan) dated
November 3, 1968 (Exh. C) which sale, includes the encroached portion (7,540 square
meters of plaintiffs property) Defendant Fernando Cruz heretofore purchased the said
property from Engracia dela Cruz and Vicente Marta and Florentino all surnamed
Sarmiento, pursuant to a Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at Bilihang
Patulayan dated November 19, 1960 (Exh. D) covering an area of 6,000 square
meters. The Tax Declaration No. 4482 (Exh. E) covering the property in the name of Jorge
Sarmiento and Engracia Cruz covered an area of 6,800[3] square meters. As soon as the
said property was sold to Fernando Cruz, the adjoining property described and classified as
parang with an area of 7,856 square meters was declared by said Fernando Cruz in his
name which circumstance, increased his landholding to 13,856 square meters (Exh.
F). The said property was subsequently sold by defendant Fernando Cruz to defendant
Servando Flores.

Held: We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the scope and effect of
the provisions of this article of the Code in its application to ordinary prescription. It is
evident that by a titulo verdadero y valido in this connection we are not to understand a
titulo que por si solo tiene fuerza de transferir el dominio sin necesidad de la prescricion (a
title which of itself is sufficient to transfer the ownership without the necessity of the lapse of
the prescription period); and we accept the opinion of a learned Spanish law writer who
holds that the titulo verdadero y valido as used in this article of the code prescribes a titulo
colorado and not merely putativo; a titulo colorado being one which a person has when
he buys a thing, in good faith, from one whom he believes to be the owner, and a titulo
putativo being one which is supposed to have preceded the acquisition of a thing, although
in fact it did not, as might happen when one is in possession of a thing in the belief that it
had been bequeathed to him. (Viso Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda, p. 541)[20]
The records of the case amply supports the holding of the appellate court that the
requirements for ordinary prescription hereinabove described have indeed been duly met; it
explained:
In the instant case, appellant Servando Flores took possession of the controverted portion
in good faith and with just title. This is so because the said portion of 7,540 square meters
was an integral part of that bigger tract of land which he bought from Fernando Cruz under
public document (Exh. I) As explicitly mentioned in the document of sale (Exh. I) executed
in 1968, the disputed portion referred to as parang was included in the sale to appellant
Flores. Parenthetically, at the time of the sale, the whole area consisting of the riceland and
pasture land was already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Fernando Cruz (Exh.
F) and further surveyed in his favor (Exhs. 3&4). Hence, appellant Flores possession of the
entire parcel which includes the portion sought to be recovered by appellees was not only in
the concept of an owner but also public, peaceful and uninterrupted. While it is true that the
possession of the entire area by his predecessor-in-interest (Fernando Cruz) may not have
been peaceful as it was indeed characterized with violence which resulted in the death of
Jose Marcelo, this cannot be said of appellant Flores possession of the property, in respect
of which no evidence to the contrary appears on record.[21]
This Court finds no cogent reasons to reverse the above findings of the appellate court and
thus gives its affirmance to the assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner for review on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.


15. Chua v. CSC
FACTS: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of
the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the
program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one
half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to
the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is coterminous
with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations
under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a
special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act
No. 6683.

HELD: YES. Petition was granted.
RATIO: Petitioner was established to be a coterminous employee, a non-career civil
servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason
why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not.
It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be
argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is
the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioners application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement
within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of
substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government not
only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15)
years in four (4) successive governmental projects.


16. Batungbakal v. NDC
FACTS: On February 14, 1939, Batungbakal was appointed as a cash and property
examiner by the Auditor General in National Development Company. On August 24, 1945,
Batungbakal was reassigned as a property examiner in the same company. However, on
December 31, 1946, he was suspended from the office by the Investigation Committee. And
on April 17, 1947, Batungbakal has received a notice for dismissal. It was stated in the said
notice that according to the findings of the Investigation Committee, Batungbakal has been
found to have committed gross negligence in the performance of his duty to the detriment of
the company.
In 1948, Honorable e La Costa, the chairman of Investigation Committee passed to
the office of the President through the Department of Secretary the results of their
investigation. It was found out that Batungbakal has not committed gross negligence in the
performance of his duty, therefore, it was requested that Batungbakal shall be given remedy
through reinstatement to his office, as well as to pay back his salaries from the dismissal up
to the reinstatement.
However, it is obviously not feasible since the former position of Batungbakal was
already occupied by the present incumbent, and to dismiss the present is to remove him
without cause.
On the basis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparently dissatisfied if not
disgusted with the treatment accorded him, filed this case in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against the NDC and Manuel Agregado as Auditor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not Batungbakal has the rights to reinstatement and to back salaries.

HELD: Having proven that the plaintiff had been suspended and dismissed without cause,
contrary to the express provision of the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plain
ministerial duty of the Auditor General, a duty whose performance may be controlled and
enjoined by mandamus. There is no room for discretion. The Auditor General is not being
directed to perform an act which he may or may not execute according to his discretion. He
is being asked and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong done. And the payment
of the back salary is merely incidental to and follows reinstatement, this, aside from the
parallel and analogy which may be found in section 260, paragraph 1, Revised
Administrative Code which provides for the payment of back salary upon reinstatement.
According to Article 12, section 4 of the Constitution, No officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.
Batungbakal would receive a remedy of reinstatement to the office since his right was
violated on the part of NDC. And the present incumbent being made to leave the post to
give way to the plaintiffs superior right might be considered as a cause of dismissal.

17. Salvacion v. Central Bank
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape
and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several
dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to
escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,
exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the
China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
be made applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: NO.The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release
to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;
and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law
for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and
inequality such as the case before us.

18. Quimpo v. Mendoza
FACTS: Quimpo, an owner of a building in CDO, was assessed P20k for 1969, P400
annual realty tax payable in 4 equal installments. Quimpo was able to pay the first 3
monthly installments but was not able to pay the last installment.
On August the following year, he wanted to pay P124.00 (P100 tax due + P24
penalty) to Mendoza, the City Treasurer of CDO, but Mendoza required him to pay P196
(P100 + P96 penalty based on City Charter of CDO). Quimpo consigned P124 with Clerk of
Court then instituted mandamus with damages against Mendoza in CFI
CFI: dismissed based on Padilla v. City of Pasay and City Treasurer
1. Pay P96 penalty = 2% of original tax which is P400
2. no authority to entertain suit for failure of Quimpo to comply with provisions of Charter of
CDO on payment of tax
ISSUE WON the basis for computing the tax penalty should be the tax payable for the said
year or only the installment unpaid
HELD Only base deficiency on unpaid installment
Ratio. We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the interpretation of tax
statutes that such statutes are construed most strongly against the government and in favor
of the taxpayer. Moreover, simple logic, fairness and reason cannot countenance an
exaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done in compliance with the law. Since petitioner is
allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal installments due and payable on four
specified dates and having paid the first three (3) installments faithfully and religiously, it is
manifest injustice, sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing so
when he fails to pay the fourth and last installment.
Reasoning. Padilla v. City of Pasay not applicable to the case as the said case was decided
before RA 5447 took effect in January 1, 1969.
Where a statute which requires that the annual realty tax on lands or buildings be
paid on or before the specified date, subject to penalty of a percentage of the whole amount
of tax in case of delayed payment, is amended by authorizing payment of the tax in four
equal installments to become due on or before specified dates. The penalty provision of the
earlier statute is modified by implication that the penalty for late payment of an installment
under the later law will be collected and computed only on the installment that became due
and unpaid, and not on the whole amount of annual tax as provided in the old statute.
Legislative intent to change the basis is clear when the later law allowed payment in four
installments.

19. Ochate v. Deling
FACTS Ochate is the incumbent municipal Mayor of Clarin, Misamis Occidentak, while P
and Deling are the incumbent Provincial Governor of the Province and Vice-Mayor of the
said municipality, respectively.
In an administrative complaint, Ochate was charged before the Provincial Board of: (1)
organizing, participating, and tolerating illegal cockfights and other forms of gambling; (2)
committing grave public scandals and acts unbecoming of a public official; (3) misconduct in
office (in slapping his wife and daughter inside the municipal building in front of many
people); (4) neglect of duty; and (5) oppression. On the same date that the priginal
administrative charges was filed, the Governor suspended Ochate from office, directing the
latter to turn over the same to Deling, the Vice-Mayor.
Ochate questions the legality of the administrative charges and of the order of suspension.
Hence, this action.
Under Sec.2188, Revised Administrative Code, the authority of the Provincial Governor to
receive and investigate complaints against municipal officials rests on 2 grounds:
(1.) neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of office, and
(2.) conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Pending action by the Provincial Board, the Provincial Government may suspend the officer
concerned if in his opinion the charge is one affecting the official integrity of the officer
charged.
ISSUE Are the administrative charges above-stated grounds for the valid suspension of
Ochate

HELD No. Acts charged affect only his character as a private individual. Ochate's acts
cannot be safely said or considered to be related to the performance of his official duties
and he does not have to be a Mayor to commit the offenses charged. Misconduct in Office
is misconduct such as affects the performance of his duties as an officer and not such as
only affects his character as a private individual.In the instant case, the records fail to
indicate that Ochate was motivated by any official considerations when he committed the
acts complained of. It appears that the acts complained of were done for more personal
reason.The charges do not constitute misconduct or maladministration of office. As such,
the order of suspension was not founded on legal grounds.
20. Ebarle v. Sucaldito
FACTS: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidate
for re-election in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed
complaints with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
Law) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner
filed petitions for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned to
the Supreme Court and alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply
with the provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure how complainants charging the
government officials and employees with the commission of irregularities should be guided.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not
to criminal complaints

HELD: Petition dismissed. The title of the EO 264 is of Commission of Irregularities. It
speaks of commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended to
make it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific terms like
accused, convicted, and the like.

21. Salvacion v. Central Bank (eto yung kinwento mo bm)
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape
and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several
dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to
escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,
exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act
No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release
to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment
and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;
and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law
for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and
inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits
from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However,
the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain
his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a
transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a
foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

NOTES:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg
Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to
rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.
On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg
Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered
from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-
1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.)
Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.)
Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear)
used in seducing the complainant.

22. Nera v. Garcia

Facts:

Nera served as clerk in the Maternity and Childrens Hospital, a government institution
under the supervision of the Bureau of Hospitals and the Department of Health. He also
served as manager and cashier of the Maternity Employers Cooperative Association, Inc.
Having hold of the positions, the fund of the associatin is supposedly under his control. On
May 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with
malversation for allegedly misappropriating a certain amount of money which belongs to the
association. After a few months, a certain Simplicio Balcos, filed an administrative complaint
case against Nera. Nera was suspended as clerk of the said hospital, as approved by
respondent Garcia, Secretary of Health. The petitioner asked PCAC to intervene on his
behalf. PCAC recommended respondents to lift the suspension of the petitioner.
Respondents did not grant the lifting of suspension. The petitioner asked for reconsideration
but was still denied. The CFI ruled in favour of the petitioner. As a result, respondents filed
an appeal to the decision of the CFI. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition,
certiorari, and mandamus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the administrative
case until the termination of the criminal case and annul the suspension and to compel
respondents to lift the suspension.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally suspended thus, he must be reinstated in office
and pay back his salary

Held:

There are two relevant laws outlined by the Supreme Court in this case. First is the Sec.
694 of the Administrative Code, entitled Removal or Suspension which states that
suspension is applicable if the charge against such subordinate or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty.
According to the Supreme Court, because of the use of the comma, dishonesty and
oppression need not be committed in performance of duty.

On the other hand, the other law involved is the Sec. 34 of Civil Service Act which is entitled
Preventive Suspension which states that it is applicable if the charge against such officer,
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or to believe that the
performance of duty, or if there are strong reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of
charges which would warrant his removal from the service. According to the Supreme
Court, with the use of comma, the charges of dishonesty and oppression or grave
misconduct need not be committed in the performance of duty it is only applicable if
neglect is committed in performance of duty.

StatCon maxim: The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last
antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents.

23. PLDT v. Province of Laguna
Facts: PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise under Act No. 3436, as amended, to
render local and international telecommunications services. The terms and conditions of its
franchise were later consolidated under Republic Act No. 7082, Section 12 of which
embodies the so-called in-lieu-of-all taxes clause, whereunder PLDT shall pay a franchise
tax equivalent to 3% of all its gross receipts, which franchise tax shall be in lieu of all
taxes.
Thereafter, the Local Government Code took effect. Section 137 of the Code, in
relation to Section 151 thereof, grants provinces and other local government units the power
to impose local franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise. Invoking its authority, the
Province of Laguna, through its local legislative assembly, enacted a provincial ordinance
imposing a franchise tax upon all businesses enjoying a franchise, which includes PLDT. In
compliance with the ordinance, PLDT paid the Province of Laguna its local franchise tax
liability for the year 1998 in the amount of P1,081,212.10.
Prior thereto, Congress enacted the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
Philippines. Then, the Department of Finance, thru its Bureau of Local Government Finance
(BLGF), issued a ruling to the effect that PLDT, among other telecommunication
companies, became exempt from local franchise tax. Accordingly, PLDT shall be exempt
from the payment of franchise and business taxes imposable by LGUs under Sections 137
and 143, respectively of the Local Government Code, upon the effectivity of RA 7925.
However, PLDT shall be liable to pay the franchise and business taxes on its gross receipts
during the period that PLDT was not enjoying the most favored clause provision of RA
7025.
PLDT then refused to pay the Province of Laguna its local franchise tax liability for
the following year and it even filed with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer a written claim
for refund of the amount it paid as local franchise tax for the previous year.

Issue: Does Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7925 operate to exempt PLDT from payment of
franchise tax?

Held: No. In approving Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a
blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict
construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in
favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing
powers, we hold that section 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended
petitioners franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise
taxes.
The tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear language that leaves no doubt
of the intention of the legislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it is granted, the
exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing authority.
Mutatis mutandis also applies to this case: When exemption is claimed, it must be shown
indubitably to exist. At the outset, every presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt is
fatal to the claim. It is only when the terms of the concession are too explicit to admit fairly
of any other construction that the proposition can be supported.

24. Republic v. CA

FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and
gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility
on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his
friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and
his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986,
Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later.
The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of
two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-
trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied
the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological
incapacity

HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights,
and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her
personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for
the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

25. Asian Transmission v. CA
FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through Undersecretary
Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an Explanatory Bulletin, wherein it clarified, that employees
are entitled to 200% of their basic wage, which, apart from being Good Friday, and,
therefore, a legal holiday, is also Araw ng Kagitingan, which is also a legal holiday, even if
unworked. Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation
opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of their basic pay. Respondent Bisig ng
Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. In accordance with Step 6 of the
grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement existing between petitioner
and BATLU, the controversy was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The Office of the
Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered employees
"200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for the unworked.
In deciding in favor of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU), the
Voluntary Arbitrator held that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay for every
regular holiday, the computation of which is determined by a legal formula which is not
changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling on one day; and that that the law, as
amended, enumerates 12 regular holidays for every year, and should not be interpreted as
authorizing a reduction to nine the number of paid regular holidays "just because April 9
(Araw ng Kagitingan) in certain years, is also Holy Friday or Maundy Thursday." The Court
of Appeals upheld the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, holding that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and BATLU, the law governing the relations
between them, clearly recognizes their intent to consider Araw ng Kagitingan and Maundy
Thursday, on whatever date they may fall in any calendar year, as paid legal holidays
during the effectivity of the CBA and that "there is no condition, qualification or exception for
any variance from the clear intent that all holidays shall be compensated. The Court of
Appeals further held that "in the absence of an explicit provision in law which provides for
[a] reduction of holiday pay if two holidays happen to fall on the same day, any doubt in the
interpretation and implementation of the Labor Code provisions on holiday pay must be
resolved in favor of labor."
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays
which fall on the same day
RULING: Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative
that the State shall afford protection to labor. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent
diminution of the monthly income of the workers on account of work interruptions. In other
words, although the worker is forced to take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is,
his holiday pay. It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in the national
celebrations held during the days identified as with great historical and cultural significance.
As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, afford a worker the enjoyment
of 12 paid regular holidays. The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee
is paid on a monthly or daily basis. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of 12 paid
regular holidays, the fact that two holidays fall on the same date should not operate to
reduce to 11 the 12 holiday pay benefits a worker is entitled to receive.
It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when the language of
the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the
case at bar, there is nothing in the law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to 12
days of holiday pay shall be reduced to 11 when two holidays fall on the same day. In any
event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provide that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor. For the working mans welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration. Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to
Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify an
employer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked
regular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employer
practice or policy. From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties,
petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law.

26. Ortiz v. Comelec
GR No. 78957, June 28, 1988
Facts: The petitioner was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner by then President
Marcos for a term expiring on May 17, 1992. Following the installation of the Aquino
government, the petitioner submitted a "courtesy resignation" which was accepted by
President Aquino. The petitioner requested for payment of retirement benefits by invoking
RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595 and re-enacted by RA 6118, which was denied by the
respondent on the ground that he is "not entitled to retirement benefits under RA 1568, as
amended" without specifying the reason therefore

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits as provided by RA
1568 and re-enacted by RA 6118.

Decision: YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in character which should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to benefit thereby.
This is, as it should be, because the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government
employees may be enhanced.

27. Gonzales v. Gonzales (divorce case to dura lex sed lex-roby)

28. Parayno v. Jovellanos
(under Expresso unius in Agpalo)
The court held that since the ordinance made a distinction between gasoline service
station and gasoline filling station, the maxim ejusdem generis does not apply and what is
applicable is the maxim expression unius exclusion exclusion alterius. we hold that the
zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between gasoline
service station and gasoline filling station
Pertinent provisions: Sec 21. Filling station. A retail station servicing automobiles and
other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only. Sec 42. Service station. A building and its
premises where gasoline oil, greases, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied
and dispensed at retail and where, inaddition, the following services may be rendered and
sales and no other. Hence, because of the distinct and definite meaningsalluded to the two
terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service station
under Sec 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Sec21. Indeed, activities
undertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace tose in a gas filling
station.

29. Mutuc v. Comelec
FACTS: Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His
candidacy was given due course by the COMELEC but he was prohibited from playing his
campaign jingle on his mobile units because this is an apparent violation of COMELECs
band to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin. It was COMELECs contention that the jingle proposed to be
used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material (falling under and the likes category), under the above COMELEC
statute subject to confiscation.

HELD: By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be of
the same class as those specifically referred to. It did contend, however, that one of its
provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda
gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words
and the like. For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an
order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the
well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration
being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. It
is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of
the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate
responsible for its distribution.













4.Memorize

Implications
Rule:
a. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed - Agpalo
1. doctrine of necessary implication
2. illegality of Act is implied from prohibition

b. DITO DIN - c
1. remedy implied from a right
2. grant of jurisdiction
3. grant of power includes incidental power

c. and also all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms
1. what is implied should not be against the law
2. what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
3. there should be no penalty for compliance with the law
Doctrine of Necessary Implication
presumption - every statute enjoys presumption of validity
reasons
legislative - has decided law to be constitutional
executive - is convinced of the validity of the law
Note: recognition of tedious process of enacting a law
power to declare - Art VIII, sec. 4 (2) - SC en banc

Rules on Constitutional Construction
1. Constitution is construed in its entirety
2. Provisions of the Constitution are self-executing
3. Strict interpretation of prohibitory provisions
4. Liberal construction of One-Subject-One-Title Rule
5. Special provision prevails of general one
6. Suprema Lex
7. Interpret language used in ordinary sense

Requisites of Judicial Inquiry
1. There must be an actual case or controversy.
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party
3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case

Effects of unconstitutional statute under the Orthodox and Modern theories

ORTHODOX
total nullity
stricken from the statute books
confers no rights, imposes no duties, affords no protection, creates no office

MODERN
deemed inexistent
not stricken from the statute books
does not annul/repeal statute and the court simply ignores it
existence of statute prior to its unconstitutionality is an operative act and has
consequences which could not justly be ignored (DAP case)

Intrinsic aids
those found in printed page of statute itself

Kind Definition Value
Title Expresses subject matter Great weight
Sub-title Subordinate title Great weight
Preamble States objective of enactment Low degree
Context Words or phrases used Great weight
Punctuation Comma, semi-colon, period Low degree
Headnotes Prefixed to sections/chapters Low degree

Extrinsic aids
those extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page

Kind Value Reason
Legislative History (antecedents of
the statute)
Great weight Best means to ascertain
legislative intent
Executive Construction (by
administrative bodies)
Great respect Expertise and experience
Contemporary Circumstances
(conditions during enactment)
Strongest in law Made by three branches of
govt
Policy of law (what the law
encourages)
Great weight It embodies legislative intent
Judicial Construction (stare decisis) Great weight Part of Legal System (Art. 4,
New Civil Code)
Legislative Interpretation
(prescribes rules of construction)
Respectful
consideration
But cannot prevail over courts
prerogative to decide
Dictionaries (List of words with their
meanings)
Great weight Use of definition is presumed
Foreign Decisions (Construction by
foreign courts)
Great weight Adoption of foreign decisions
is presumed

Similarities and distinction between interpretation and construction

Interpretation Construction

purpose ascertain legislative intent same

applicability when ambiguity exists same

manner discover true meaning draw conclusions

reference limited to written text transcends text of
statute

type of aid intrinsic extrinsic

Instances when ambiguity exists (ambiguity exists when the language of the statute):
a. Admits two or more meanings
b. Capable of being understood in more than 1 meaning
c. Refers to two or more things at the same time
d. Susceptible to more than 1 interpretation
e. Literal interpretation will result to absurd consequences
f. Statute is in conflict with the Constitution
g. Statute defeats the policy of the legislature