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Critical Essay on "The Unreality of Time"

By Nathaniel J. Kan

In "The Unreality of Time," J. M. E. McTaggart attempts to prove that time

cannot exist; at least, no temporal relations exist. That it is illogical to say that one event

is simultaneous to, earlier than or later than another event, or that one event is in the

present, past or future. McTaggart offers no alternative theory of time; he only claims

time's unreality. In this paper I will attempt to show that there are significant logical holes

in his proof.

McTaggart begins by positing that there are two ways to view the ordering of

time. First, the series of times ordered running through the past up until the present,

through the present, and then continuing on through the future. This he terms the A-

series. The second series, which he calls the B-series, is the series that orders events by

"earlier than" and "later than," beginning (presumably) with the earliest time, and running

through all times until the last time.

McTaggart goes on to state that there cannot be time without change. I believe by

this he means that if all the particles in the universe were to maintain the same positions,

there would be no time, as this seems to be the only way his proposition could be true

(we will return to this). Therefore, the B-series alone cannot constitute time, because

nothing in the B-series can ever change; any event will always stand in the same (B-

series) temporal relations to every other event, and the only way for events to change is

for them to change in temporal relations. Only one class of characteristics of events can

change: the temporal relations with regards to the present. These are the basic
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assumptions on which he grounds his thesis.

I maintain that time is possible without change. The type of change that

McTaggart initially discusses is that of changing locations of particles. However if all

particles were to maintain the same positions, we would still have time. Imagine a world

where by a quantum fluke all particles on one side of the universe were to maintain their

positions for one Planck's time, and then continue their normal course of motion. We

would not consider time to have "frozen" for this one instant in half the universe,

especially because normal motion continued for the other half of the universe. Now

imagine a world where by another fluke all particles in the universe maintain their

positions for one Planck's time, and then continue their motion. By the same logic would

we half to believe that time continued as normal for that one Planck's time, it would

simply be inconceivable to us that it did so, because there would be no way to tell.

Furthermore, McTaggart is mistaken when he claims that an A-series alone can

constitute time. While it seems true that time would be inconceivable without any change

at all, here we (and he as well) are talking about change in the spatial distributions of

matter and energy, not in temporal relationships. Imagine a universe where nothing

besides temporal relations change (Classically all particles stay in the same position;

Quantum mechanically all particles continue to maintain the same waveforms which

never collapse). The only thing that would change in this world is which moment is the

present, and thus, every moment's relationship to the present. But time would also be

inconceivable in this world, and for the same reason McTaggart says time's existence

requires change. In this world also there would be no way of ever knowing that time was

progressing. Thus an A-series alone could not constitute time, at least not by McTaggart's
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definition. By claiming first that time depends on the existence of change (in spatial

relationships of matter) and then saying that the only the A-series offers the possibility of

change (in temporal relationships of moments), McTaggart is using a trick of words to

"prove" his point; he is discussing two different types of change.

In this way McTaggart claims that an A-series is necessary for time. Past, present

and future are relations to something outside the time series, for if they were relations

within the time series they would necessarily be fixed, because the relation between two

moments never changes. But past, present and future are mutually exclusive relationships

to stand in. This seems explainable because it can be said that a moment "is present, will

be past, and has been future" (McTaggart 32). But then if some moment T is present,

there is no past time in which T will be past, but T is past in some future moment T'. But

at some still later moment T", T' will be a past moment. And thus T is a past moment at

a past moment. The same can be worked out for T' and T" and so on, ad infinitum.

Therefore, there is a contradiction.

What if T having the present relation and T' having the past relation happen not at

the same time, but in succession? Thus T is a present moment in the present, T' is a past

moment in the future, and therefore we need the past/present/future relations to relate the

moments in the succession. Although T is a present moment now, it will be a past

moment at a past moment in the future, when it is no longer a present moment.

McTaggart claims this leads to another infinite series, which does not allow the first

moment T to escape from contradiction. Thus, because there can be no A-series, time is

unreal, and his argument concludes.

Presuming I understand McTaggart's argument correctly, this does seem to lead to

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the requirement of an infinite series, but not one that is vicious. McTaggart writes:

The attribution of the characteristics past, present, and future to the terms

of any series leads to a contradiction, unless it is specified that they have

them successively. This means … that they have them in relation to terms

specified as past, present, and future. These [relations] again, to avoid a

like contradiction, must in turn be specified as past, present, and future.

And, since this continues infinitely, the first set of terms never escapes

contradiction at all. (McTaggart 33)

Thus moments stand in temporal relations to the 'now' entity that is outside the A-series

(McTaggart labels this X), and these temporal relations stand in temporal relations, and

these temporal relations stand in temporal relations, and so on. However, let us examine

the situation from before, with T and T'. T is in the 'present' relation with X, which

means we would say "T is happening now." What relation does this 'present' relation

have with X? 'Present', as if we ask the question, "When will it be true that it holds?" the

answer would be "Presently." And thus the series would continue.

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Likewise consider T'. In the B-series, T' is later than T. While T' stands in the

past relation to X, it does so in the future. And when does the relationship of "T' will be a

past moment in the future" hold? In the present and in the past, but not in the far future.

And because of the need to discriminate thus the need for another relation continues.

A parallel can be draw here to Bradley's Regress, but in this case instead of an

external relations between objects, we have temporal relations between moments in time.

Why does the presence of infinite layers of temporal relations necessarily mean those

temporal relations do not exist? While arguing against Bradley's theory we can claim that

the existence of an external relation is a "brute" fact and that there is no need of an

explanation for why it holds1. This does not seem to apply here, because the temporal

relations are necessary to define the succession of relations on the level above. One

argument that might apply, however, is that there does not seem to be any good reason

for why there shouldn't be infinite levels of temporal relations. While it might be said that

infinite levels of temporal relations are inconclusive, I would claim that infinite levels of

temporal relations do absolve the primary level (that level regarding moments) of
1
Van Inwagen, Peter. Metaphysics. Westview Press: 2002. Pg 36.
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contradiction, as each level has an explanation of it's succession: the level beneath it.

One final important thing that McTaggart fails to point out is that his argument is

dependent on the truth of logical determinism, which he does not make a case for and

which does not seem to be clearly resolved yet (if it ever will be). Because he assumes

that the only type of change possible is that of temporal relations in the A-series, then

under his system the fact that an event will occur is always a fact, even before it's

occurrence. In order to decide if McTaggart's argument is true, the reader would have to

first decide that determinism is true.

In conclusion, I do not propose that time is either real or unreal. However, the

initial assumption that there cannot be time without change in temporal relationships is

false; McTaggart is first claiming that there must be spatial relation change for time and

then claiming that spatial relation change is not change, only temporal relation change is.

Even if we accept these questionable basic assumptions, the conclusion that the infinite

series of temporal relations leads to a contradiction is lacking evidence. For these reasons

I am disinclined to believe McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time.