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Huntington
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US Political Thought
Notes on Samuel P. Huntington, Chapter III: The United States
inThe Crisis of Democracy, byMichel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, andJ oji Watnuki
This is a condensation and arrangement of Huntington's argument, not a commentary upon it.
1. The sixties as a decade of democratic renewal: The1960switnessedadramaticrenewal of thedemocraticspirit inAmerica. Thepredominant
trendsof that decadeinvolvedthechallengingof theauthorityof establishedpolitical, social, andeconomicinstitutions, increasedpopular participation
inandcontrol over thoseinstitutions, areactionagainst theconcentrationof power intheexecutivebranchof thefederal government andinfavor of the
reassertionof thepower of Congressandof stateandlocal government, renewedcommitment totheideaof equalityonthepart of intellectualsand
other elites, theemergenceof thepublicinterest lobbyinggroups, increasedconcernfor therightsof andprovisions of opportunitiesfor minoritiesand
womentoparticipateinthepolityandeconomy, andapervasivecriticismof thosewhopossessedor wereeventhoughttopossessexcessivepower or
wealth. . . . It wasadecadeof democraticsurgeandof thereassertionof democraticegalitarianism (59-60).1
Inadditiontoincreasedcampaignactivity, therewasamarkedupswinginother formsof citizenparticipation, intheformof marches, demonstrations,
protest movements, andcause organizations... (61). Thereweremarkedlyhigher levelsof self-consciousness onthepart of blacks, Indians,
Chicanos, whiteethnicgroups, students, andwomen, all seekingtheir appropriateshareof theactionandof therewards (61).
Previouslypassiveor unorganizedgroupsinthepopulationnowembarkedonconcertedeffortstoestablishtheir claimstoopportunities, positions,
rewards, andprivileges, whichtheyhadnot consideredthemselvesentitledtobefore (61-62). Hadnt they!? Look at the struggle of blacks, for
example--Du Bois called for full civic and political equality in 1900.
...thesixtiesalsosawareassertionof theprimacyof equalityasagoal insocial, economic, andpolitical life. Themeaningof equalityandthemeans of
achievingit becamecentral subjectsof debateinintellectual andpolicy-orientedcircles. What waswidelyhailedasthemajor philosophical treatiseof
thedecade(Rawls, A Theory of Justice) definedjusticelargelyintermsof equality (62).
Theessenceof thedemocraticsurgeof the1960swasageneral challengetoexistingsystemsof authority, publicandprivate. . . . Peoplenolonger felt
thesamecompulsiontoobeythosewhomtheyhadpreviouslyconsideredsuperior tothemselvesinage, rank, status, expertise, character, or talents.
Withinmost organizations, disciplineeasedanddifferencesinstatus becameblurred. . . . Moreprecisely, inAmericansociety, authorityhadbeen
commonlybasedon: organizational position, economicwealth, specializedexpertise, legal competence, or electoral representativeness. Authoritybased
onhierarchy, expertise, andwealthall, obviously, rancounter tothedemocraticandegalitariantemper of thetimes. . . (75).
Intheuniversity, studentswholackedexpertise, cametoparticipateinthedecision-makingprocessonmanyimportant issues. Governmental
organizational hierarchyweakened. Inpoliticsgenerally, theauthorityof wealthwaschallengedandsuccessful effortsmadetointroducereformsto
exposeandlimit itsinfluence (75).
Huntingtonnotesthedemandfor anendtothenear monopolizationof political leadershipbywhitemenintheseterms: thevalueof categorical
representativeness waselevatedtochallengetheprincipleof electoral representativeness (75-76).
System assimilation: Apparently, Huntingtonseesthecapacityof theAmericantorespondbyassimilat[ing] thosegroupsintothepolitical system
andincorporat[ing] membersof thosegroupsintothepolitical leadershipstructure (61) asbothasignof itsresilienceandaproblem, sinceit
facilitatedthepressingof demands ongovernment that ledtoexcessexpendituresandother difficulties.
2. The danger posed by democratic renewal -- a legitimation and governability crisis stemming from a loss of trust in government and in major
nongovernmental institutions:
theoretical formulation -- Madisonian doctrine: Inframingagovernment whichistobeadministeredbymenover men, observedJ amesMadison
inThe Federalist, no. 51, thegreat difficultyliesinthis: youmust firstenablethegovernment tocontrol thegoverned; andinthenext placeobligeit
tocontrol itself. Toassumethat thereisnoconflictbetweenthesetworequirementsissheer self-delusion. Toassumethat it isimpossibletoreacha
roughbalancebetweenthesetworequirementsisunrealisticpessimism. Themaintenanceof that balanceis, indeed, what constitutional democracyis
all about. . . . Viewsastowhatconstitutestheprecisedesirablebalancebetweenpower andliberty, authorityanddemocracy, government andsociety
obviouslydiffer (63).
loss of trust in authority: Inademocracy, theauthorityof governmental leadersandinstitutionspresumablydependsinpart otheextent towhichthe
publichas confidenceandtrustinthoseinstitutionsandleaders. Duringthe1960sthat confidenceandtrustdeclinedmarkedlyintheUnited
States (76). PerhapsheshouldreadtheAnti-Federalistsonhowtomaintaintrustingovernment--democraticaccountability, closetiesof elected
officialswiththerepresented, activecitizenship, etc.
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traceable to an ideologically committed, active citizenry: Thedemocraticsurgeinvolvedamorepoliticallyactivecitizenry, whichdeveloped
increasedideological consistencyonpublicissues, andwhichthenlost itsconfidenceinpublicinstitutionsandleaderswhengovernmental policies
failedtocorrespondtowhattheydesired (76). Heattributespart of theriseinideological consistencytoincreasedparticipation, andpart tothenature
of theissues: social, racial, andmilitary. Onmorestrictlyeconomicissues, ontheother hand, ideologywasamuchlesssignificant factor (77).
Furthermore, heblameslossof trustat least inpart onideological development: thosewhotook moreextremepositionsonpolicyissues. . . tendedto
becomemoredistrustful of government. Polarizationover issuesgenerateddistrust aboutgovernment, asthosewhohadstrongpositionsonissues
becamedissatisfiedwiththeambivalent, compromisingpoliciesof government (78). Thusstrategiesof compromisebackfired.
Thislossof trustwasreflectedinopinionsurveys. Inthe1950saboutthree-quartersof Americansbelievedthat government wasrunprimarilyfor the
benefitof thepeople. By1972, only38percent believedthis, while53percent thoughtit wasrunbyafewbiginterestslookingout for
themselves (78). Thislossof trustbegantoberecoveredfor Congress, theSupremeCourt, andthemilitaryby1973, butnot for theexecutivebranch.
Theleadershipof themajor nongovernmental institutionsinsocietywhohadenjoyedhighlevelsof publicconfidenceinthemid-1960-- suchaslarge
corporations, higher educational institutionsandmedicine--alsosufferedasomewhatsimilar patternof substantial declineandpartial recovery (80).
Onlytheleadershipof thepressandtelevisionnews enjoyedmoreconfidencein1973thanin1966.
substantial decline in the sense of political efficacy: whichherelatesback tolossof trustingovernment andthefailureof itscompromisepoliciesto
meetpeoplesdemands.
3. The political and economic consequences of the sixties: The vitality of democracy in the United States in the 1960s produced a substantial
increase in governmental activity and a substantial decrease in governmental authority (64). Thus, Thevitalityof democracyinthe1960sraised
questionsaboutthegovernabilityof democracyinthe1970s (64).
Economic problems engendered by the democratic surge: Theexpansionof governmental activityproducedbudgetarydeficitsandamajor expansion
of total governmental debtfrom$336billionin1960to$557billionin1971. Thesedeficitscontributedtoinflationarytendenciesintheeconomy. They
alsobroughttotheforeintheearly1970stheentirequestionof theincidenceof thetaxburdenandtheissuesof taxreform (103).
Healsoblamesgrowingpublicsector unionization: Unionizationproducedhigher wagesandmorevigorouscollectivebargainingtosecurehigher
wages (103). Inthetendencyof government tocapitulatetounionsheseesaninflationaryspiral: higher wageswithouthigher taxesleadtolarger
deficitsandmoreinflation, whichjustifiescallsfor still higher wages.
Completelyabsent fromthisdiscussionisanyconsiderationof howmuchthemilitarycostsof theVietnamWar figuredinthis, or for that matter, the
overall costsof theColdWar military-industrial complex.
Weak foreign policy engendered by the democratic surge: Huntingtonargues that political leaders, unabletowinfavor throughtheir domestic
policies, look toforeignpolicyachievementstorebuildtheir popularity. But Thedynamicsof thissearchfor foreignpolicyachievementsby
democraticleaderslackingauthorityat homegivestodictatorships(whether communistpartystatesor oil sheikdoms), whicharefreefromsuch
compulsions, amajor advantageintheconduct of international relations (105).
Encouragement of economic nationalism as an indirect result of the democratic surge: Theexpansionof expendituresandthedecreaseinauthority
arealsolikelytoencourageeconomicnationalismindemocraticsocieties. Eachcountrywill haveaninterestinminimizingtheexport of somegoods in
order tokeeppricesdowninitsownsociety. At thesametime, other interestsarelikelytodemandprotectionagainst theimport of foreigngoods. . . .
Theresultingunilateralismcouldwell weakenstill further thealliancesamongtheTrilateral countriesandincreasetheir vulnerabilitytoeconomicand
militarypressuresfromtheSoviet bloc (105).
Restriction of military expenditures and action as a result of the democratic surge: agovernment whichlacks authorityandwhichiscommittedto
substantial domesticprogramswill havelittleability, short of acataclysmiccrisis, toimposeonitspeoplethesacrificeswhichmaybenecessaryto
deal withforeignpolicyproblemsanddefense (105).
Overall threat to global American hegemony: For aquarter-centurytheUnitedStateswasthehegemonicpower inasystemof worldorder. The
manifestationsof thedemocraticdistemper, however, havealreadystimulateduncertaintyamongalliesandcouldwell stimulateadventurismamong
enemies (106).
4. The causes of the sixties: Huntingtonargues that theincreaseinpolitical participationisnot aroot cause, nor arethespecificpolicyproblemsthat
confrontedtheUnitedStatesduringtheperiod(107). Theexpansionof political participationwasunderwaylongbeforetheseproblemscametoa
headinthemid-1960s, andthebeginningsof thedeclineintrustandof theincreaseinattitude[ideological] consistencygoback beforelarge-scale
Americaninvolvement inVietnam (107).
Was it the baby boom?: Henotesthat thegenerational bulge of youthinthe1960sbrought newvaluestothefore, chief amongthemalackof respect
for establishedauthority andfor dominant formsof ideological authority. Therewerebroader changesintheir attitudesandvalueswithrespectto
sexual morality, religionasasourceof moral guidance, andtraditional patriotismandallegiancetomycountryright or wrong (109).
Moreover, youthtendedtorejectthebehavioralist viewof democracy, withonly37percent agreeingwiththeopinionsurveystatement that Votingis
theonlywaythat peoplelikemecanhaveanysayabouthowthegovernment runs things (109).
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Was it due to the emergence of a post-industrial society?: Risinglevelsof affluenceandeducationleadtochangesinpolitical attitudesandpolitical
behavior. Thebetter-off, white-collar, suburbangroups aregrowinginnumbers andimportancerelativeto thepoorer, working-class, blue-collar
groups. . . (109). Most importantly, Themoreeducatedapersonis, themorelikelyheistoparticipateinpolitics, tohaveamoreconsistent andmore
ideological outlook onpolitical issues, andtoholdmoreenlightened or liberal or changeoriented viewsonsocial, cultural, anforeignpolicy
issues (110).
Unfortunatelyfor thisexplanation, ratesof participationranfar ahead of what changesineducational compositionwouldleadontoexpect. Thiswas
partlyduetothetremendousincreaseinblackpolitical participationduringtheseyears. . . . [, which] wastheproduct primarilynot of increased
individual statusbutrather of increasedgroupconsciousness. . . . A declineinthesaliencyof school integration, welfareprograms, lawenforcement,
andother issuesof special concerntoblackswill assomepointpresumablybeaccompaniedbyadeclineintheir groupconsciousness andhencetheir
political participation (110-111).
Nor caneducationexplainincreasedideological consistency, againfor empirical reasons: roughlyequal increasesoccurredinthefiftiesandsixties
amongthoseat thehighandlowendsof theeducational attainment spectrum. NieandAndersonsuggest that Thepolitical eventsof thelastdecade,
thecrisisatmospherewhichhas attendedthem, havecausedcitizenstoperceivepoliticsasincreasinglycentral totheir lives. Thustheexplanation
mustliewithchangingpolitical relationships.
It was creedal passion during a period of social change: Huntingtonendorsestheliberal consensusview: Americansocietyischaracterizedbya
broadconsensusondemocratic, liberal, egalitarianvalues. For muchof thetime, thecommitment tothesevaluesisneither passionatenor intense.
Duringperiodsof rapidsocial change, however, thesedemocraticandegalitarianvaluesof theAmericancreedarereaffirmed. Theintensityof belief
duringsuchcreedal passionperiodsleadstothechallengingof establishedauthorityandtomajor effortstochangegovernmental structuretoaccord
morefullywiththosevalues (112). HecomparesthesixtiestotheJ acksonianandProgressiveeras.
5. Huntingtons theory of political cycles (which is implicitly a prescription for system restabilization): Thereis. . . somereasontothink that
theremaybeacyclical processof interactioninwhich:
(1) Increasedpolitical participationleadstoincreasedpolicypolarizationwithinsociety;
(2) Increasedpolicypolarizationleads toincreasingdistrust andasenseof decreasingpolitical efficacyamongindividuals;
(3) A senseof decreasingpolitical efficacyleadtodecreasedpolitical participation.
Discouragement andapathyare, for Huntington, desirable, sincetheyfacilitatesmoother systemmanagement. Note, though, aquasi-parallel with
Smithsserpentinepath -- egalitariansurges followedbyrestorationof ascriptivehierarchies-- exceptthat theserestorationsare, for Smith, setbacks
for liberalsandliberalism.
Huntingtonsuggestsonewayademocraticsurgemight bebrought toheal -- byshiftingtheissuefocustoeconomicissues(whichoccurredinthe
mid-1970s). First, henotesthat economicpositiontakingisnot asclearlyrelatedtoideological commitments. Inaddition, inflationand
unemployment arelikecrime: nooneisinfavor of them, andsignificant differencescanonlyappear if therearesignificantlydifferent alternative
programsfor dealingwiththem. Suchprograms, however, havebeenslowinmaterializing; hence, thesalienceof economicissuesmaygiveriseto
generalizedfeelingsof lackof confidenceinthepolitical systembutnot todissatisfactionrootedinthefailureof government tofollowaparticular set
of policies. Suchgeneralizedalienationcould, inturn, reinforcetendenciestowardspolitical passivity. . . (84-85).
Heelsewheremakes clear that thisisnot anextrinsicfactor. Thedemocraticsurgeproducedasurgeingovernment spending, whichprecipitated
economicproblems.
6. The need to restore balance: Huntington, basedonthetheoryabove, looksforwardtoadeclineindemocraticactivism. Al Smithonceremarked
that theonlycurefor theevilsof democracyismoredemocracy. Our analysissuggeststhat applyingthat cureat thepresent timecouldwell be
addingfuel totheflames. Instead, someof theproblemsof thegovernanceintheUnitedStatestodaystemfromanexcess of democracy -- anexcess
of democracy inmuchthesamesenseinwhichDavidDonaldusedthetermtorefer totheconsequencesof theJ acksonianrevolutionwhichhelpedto
precipitatetheCivil War. Neededinsteadisagreater degreeof moderationindemocracy (113).
Thismoderation comesintwoforms: reassertionof undemocraticauthorityandcultivationof political apathy. First, democracyisonlyonewayof
constitutingauthority, andit isnot necessarilyauniversallyapplicableone. Inmanysituationstheclaimsof expertise, seniority, experience, andspecial
talentsmayoverridetheclaimsof democracyasawayof constitutingauthority (113). Hegoesontosaythat democratizationinthesixtiesoftenonly
frustrate[d] thepurposesof thoseinstitutions[towhichit wasapplied]--amoredemocraticuniversityisnot likelytobeabetter university (114).
Second, theeffectiveoperationof ademocraticpolitical systemusuallyrequiressomemeasureof apathyandnoninvolvement onthepart of some
individualsandgroups. Inthepast, everydemocraticsocietyhas hadamarginal population, of greater or lesser size, whichhas not actively
participatedinpolitics. Initself, thismarginalityonthepart of somegroupsisinherentlyundemocratic, butit has alsobeenoneof thefactorswhich
has enableddemocracytofunctioneffectively. Now, withthemarginal groupsparticipatingmore, thedanger of overloadingthepolitical systemwith
demandswhichextenditsfunctionsandundermineitsauthoritystill remains. Lessmarginalityonthepart of somegroupsthus needstobereplacedby
moreself-restraint onthepart of all groups (114).
Therearepotentiallydesirablelimitstotheindefiniteextensionof political democracy (115).