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G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO
ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO,
AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
DOCTRINE: The extent of the authority and power of the
Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") limited on violations
involving civil and political rights
FACTS: A "Demolition Notice" signed by CarlosQuimpo in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents
(being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were
given a grace-period of three (3) days within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA.The group, led by their
President RoqueFermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-
samangSinumpaangSalaysay) with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion
Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-
1580.The CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA
pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before
the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before
the CHR.
A motion to dismiss questioned CHR's jurisdiction,
stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as
being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case
(were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to
engage in business."The CHR denied petitioners' motion to
dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.Hence, this
recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to
investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the
private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the
petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of
Quezon City
HELD:In its Orderdenying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the
CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the
Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial
body.This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this
Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights,the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no
way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court
explained:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant
by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial
agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.
In the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in adopting the
specific provisions on human rights and in creating an
independent commission to safeguard these rights, many voices
have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps
of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties,
who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in
the Philippines,"observes:
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But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973
enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became
unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21
September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule.
Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon
suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods,
sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by
the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to
petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since
group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other
mass media were subjected to censorship and short term
licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of
tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were
required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed
upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were
practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists.
xxxxxxxxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of
human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime,
everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos
regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they
had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights
to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not
to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
xxxxxxxxx
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the
1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission
on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by
any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights,"
31
has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not
connected with the organization or administration of the
government. They include the rights of property, marriage,
equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person
by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being
enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against
involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.
32

Political rights,
33
on the other hand, are said to refer to
the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and,
in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government.
34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human
rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such
areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair
and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and
hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the
religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to
have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it
has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take
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comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the
CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen
it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other
cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendation."
35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what
are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and
carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private
respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North
EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice
of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and
limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed
paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is
one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in
fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in
this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of
the private respondents can fall within the compartment of
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights"
intended by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED.
The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a
cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending its
investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights
violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in
situations involving a threatened violation of human rights,
which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well
as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as
posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it
involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private
respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the
majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has
unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII,
1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend
beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners.
Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause
of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional
agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is
transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures
but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given
a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may
(or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to
remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION ET. AL. VS. MAYOR OF MANILA
G.R. NO. L-24693
JULY 31, 1967
DOCTRINE
There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation
of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both
as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that
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matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell
its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness
is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process
requirement, official action, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression.
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS
The Municipal Board of City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760 approved on June 14, 1963 by then Vice Mayor
Herminio Astorga acting as Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition claiming that:
it is beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila to enact said ordinance regulating motels; that Section 1
of the ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose fees per annum for motels and that the provision in the
same section would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel , motel to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any
room or other quarter to any person or persons without his
filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at
all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name
and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation,
the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of
companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age
and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any,
coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of
the owner, manager, etc.; That the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old
from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses,
tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a
lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
etc. of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process
guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a
subsequent conviction would cause the automatic cancellation
of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
In the answer, respondent claims that the petition failed
to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance
bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to curb
immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power.

ISSUE
Whether or not Ordinance 4760 is violative of due
process clause
HELD
No. There is an absence of evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance. As was expressed by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people. The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation.
2
It admits of no doubt therefore
that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its
face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the
due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection
associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
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petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
4
extending
as it does "to all the great public needs."
5
It would be to destroy
the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed
itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health,
public morals, public safety and the genera welfare.
6
Negatively
put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
7
The challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals.

G.R. No. 196425 July 24, 2012
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL
AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY
DIVISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
1. In 2001, President Arroyo issued E.O. 12 creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with
the power to: a) investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others,
against presidential appointees in the government, its agencies,
and intrumentalities; and b) submit its report and
recommendations to the President.
2. In 2010, President Aquino issued E.O. 13, abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Rationale: to enable the Office of the President (OP) to
directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential
appointees in the Executive Department including heads of
GOCCs
3. Respondenft Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman
of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the four (4) incumbent
members of the LWUA Board of Trustees
4. Complaint arose from the purchase by the LWUA of
445,377 0shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
5. Petitioner then received an Order from Executive
Secretary Ochoa, Jr. requiring him to submit a written
explanation under oath. In compliance, he filed a Motion to
Dismiss manifesting that a case involving the same transaction
and charge of grave misconduct is already pending before the
Office of the Ombudsman.
6. Petitioner then resorted to the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition upon the following grounds among
others: violation of the guarantees of a) due process; b) equal
protection
Argument: arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's
investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-
level positions in the government
ISSUE: WON E.O. 13 violates petitioner's right to due process
and equal protection of the laws.
HELD: NO.
1. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
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It is embraced under the due process concept and simply
requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." The equal protection
clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial
distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exist for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only
upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority. In the case at bar, petitioner is a presidential
appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the
LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the President, who is well within his right to order an
investigation into matters that require his informed decision
2. Petitioner's right to due process was not violated when
the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative
complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity
to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain ones side. Hence, as long as petitioner was given the
opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with
because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity
to be heard. The records show that petitioner was issued an
Order requiring him to submit his written explanation under
oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against
him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice
defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process.

G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.
*

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM
CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CITY
OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,
respondent.
TINGA, J.:
DOCTRINES:
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Due Process; The purpose of
due process guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals.
Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in
the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style
enumeration of what may or what may not be done, but rather
an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored
under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other,
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their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by
them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
FACTS:
In December 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor
Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. The pertinent provisions of
the Ordinance are as follows:
Section 1. policy of the City Government to protect the
best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its
constituents.
Section 3. short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up
rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited
in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
Section 4. Short-time admission shall mean admittance
and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at
any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a
day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or
managers of said establishments but would mean the same or
would bear the same meaning.
Section 5. Penalty: fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.
Subsequently, Malate Tourist and Development
Corporation as the owner of Victoria Court in Malate, White
Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation, and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation as components of the Anito
Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels
and motels in Metro Manila, the petitioners in this case,
challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled, An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in
Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.
The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the
City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. Then
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to
desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. The RTC
rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void after
the pre-trial conference where the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to
submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a
purely legal question.
The RTC noted that the ordinance strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive
to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Lastly, the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought
to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay.
The case is elevated to CA. The City asserted that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power under LGC and its
powers under the Manila Charter. Petitioners argued that the
Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right
to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise
of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.
ISSUE:
WON the due process, equal protection, and liberty as
guaranteed by the Constitution were violated by the passage of
the Ordinance.


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RULING:
The Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No.
7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not
eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even
corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the
ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts
before this Court that the subject establishments have gained
notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in
Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill- seekers. Whether or not this
depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be
denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting
married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
protected will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of
Manila case: The concept of liberty compels respect for the
individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
respect; the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
by a compelling state interest. Also, We cannot discount other
legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting
the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are
known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the
power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers
who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate
purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any
person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private
spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a
motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and
vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis
wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is
not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate
product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives
for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of
individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in
effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the
petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with
immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
the oft-quoted American maxim that you cannot
legislate morality is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law,
since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately
interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail
if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right
and wrong.
Notes:
Unless the creeping interference of the government in
essentially private matters is moderated, it is likely to destroy
that prized and peculiar virtue of the free society:
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individualism. Every member of society, while paying proper
deference to the general welfare, must not be deprived of the
right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, to do his thing.
As long as he does not prejudice others, his freedom as an
individual must not be unduly curtailed. Let it always be
remembered that in the truly democratic state, protecting the
rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than,
protecting the rights of the public.

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE
MARCEL PANLILIO v. ROGELIO S. SOLUTA
G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
DOCTRINE: To constitute waiver of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, there must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it.
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Marcel Panlilio, Vice President for
Finance of petitioner Silahis International Hotel, Inc. (Silahis),
with his personal secretary, a Bulletin reporter, and a security
guard entered the union office located at the hotel basement.
The same is with the permission of union officer Henry Babay.
Babay was apprised about the suspected illegal activities. During
the search they discovered marijuana flowering tops in the
union office.
An Information indicting the union officers was then filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Republic
Act 6425, as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The
Dangerous Drugs Act). The RTC acquitted the accused on the
ground that the marijuana tops are inadmissible as evidence.
Soluta and his fellow union officers including the union
thereafter filed before the RTC a complaint against
Silahis, Panlilio and those who cooperated for malicious
prosecution and violation of their constitutional right
against illegal search. The RTC granted such petition. It
ruled that Silahis and Panlilio are jointly and severally
liable to pay for damages in favor of Soluta et al. Silahis
and Panlilio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On
appeal, the CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Silahis and Panlilio violated the
constitutional right of Soluta et al.
HELD: As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in
ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and
democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to
abuse, their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or
not, must be guarded against.
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold
not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable
for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under
this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a
violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
In the present case, as priorly stated, Silahis and Panlilio
had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of
illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and
Maniego conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the
morning of January 11, 1988, Silahis, Panlilio and their
companions barged into and searched the union office without a
search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and
notwithstanding the objection of Babay.
The course taken by Silahis and company stinks in
illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances
when a warrantless search is allowed by law. Silahis and
Panlilios violation of individual Soluta et al.s constitutional
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 10

right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for
the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
As for Silahis et al.s contention that property rights
justified the search of the union office, the same does not lie. For
Soluta et al., being the lawful occupants of the office, had the
right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.
Neither does Silahis et al.s claim that they were allowed
by union officer Babay to enter the union office lie. Babays
account of why Silahis and company went to the union office - to
consider Panlilios suggestion to settle the mauling incident is
more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and
even asked if they were armed with a search warrant.
While it is doctrinal that the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be
presumed. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an
actual intention to relinquish it to constitute a waiver thereof.
There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists;
(b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. In other
words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently made. The evidence shows otherwise, however.

6. RUBI vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
Gr. No. 14078 March 7, 1919
MALCOLM, J
DOCTRINE: Due process has been followed when there exists
a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according
to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class. Liberty itself is not unrestricted license to
act according to ones own will. The liberty of the citizen may
be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public
order and safety, for otherwise within the proper scope of
police power.
FACTS: For the following reasons (1) The failure of former
attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes., the Provincial Board
of Mindoro adopted Resolution No. 25 which provides that 800
hectares of public land in the Sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be
selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro and that Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on
this reservation. Further, pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the
Boco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and
Rubis place in Calapan are directed to take up their habitation
on the site of Tigbai, Naujan lake, not later than December 31,
1917. Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply will be
imprisoned. Rubi and those living in his Rancheria have not
fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and thus,
were held liable. Hence, they filed a petition for habeas corpus
and a petition assailing the validity of Section 2145 on the
ground that it illegally deprived their liberty without due process
of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of the due
process clause.
HELD: Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of
the legislative department of the Government; second, that this
law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 11

citizens of the state or to all of a class." What is due process of
law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter
and necessities of the situation."
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of
freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in
others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. However, even liberty itself is
not unrestricted license to act according to ones own will. The
liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the
public health, or of the public order and safety, for otherwise
within the proper scope of police power.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say
that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law,
there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it
applies alike to all of a class.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live
together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to
improve their living conditions. They are being made to
understand that they object of the government is to organize
them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They
are being aided to live and work. Their children are being
educated in a school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done from them in order that their
advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be
assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make
them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services
for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves.
There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from
emigrating to some other places under penalty of imprisonment.
Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this
people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have
permanent individual property. They move from one place to
another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire
space where they are roving about is the property of the nation,
the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from
one place to another on the public lands, why can not the
government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain
fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to
roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary
both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the
purposes and objectives of the government. For as people
accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to
the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty
is provinced for, you can not make them live together and the
noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically
will come to naught.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section
2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the
equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian
policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code of 1917 is constitutional.
NOTES:
On Due process
The Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, provides "That no
law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 12

deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and these
provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to
all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality."
Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the
Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme
Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning
of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life,
liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process
of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not
always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice
are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much
must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases.
On Civil Liberty
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever
guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of
the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it
is "Liberty regulated by law."
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his
faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by every
other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from
that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. That
authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal
and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the
savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty
exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint
on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that
man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p.
393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to
desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not do
desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Non-christian; The Manguianes
Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and
"non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature,
in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into
being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in
sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916;
sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of
1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine
Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and
different executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition
that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but,
in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually
living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have
considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive,
semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The
manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed
sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them
under any form of municipal government.




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DISSENTING OPINIONS
JOHNSON, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a
hearing. That fact is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any
act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty
without a hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian.
All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a hearing, at
least, before they are deprived of their liberty.
MOIR, J., dissenting:
The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged
with none. It does not appear they were ever consulted about
their reconcentration. It does not appear that they had any
hearing or were allowed to make any defense. It seems they were
gathered here and there whenever found by the authorities of
the law and forcibly placed upon the reservation, because they
are "non-Christian," and because the provincial governor
ordered it. Let it be clear there is no discrimination because
of religion. The term "non-Christian" means one who is not a
Christian Filipino, but it also means any of the so-called "wild"
or backward tribes of the Philippines. These non-Christian
tribes are Moros, Igorrotes, Bukidnons, Ifugaos, Manguianes
and various others, about one millions souls all together. Some
of them, like the Moros, Tinguianes and Ifugaos, have made
great progress in civilization. The have beautiful fields reclaimed
by hard labor they have herds of cattle and horses and some
few of them are well educated. Some of the non-Christians, like
the Aetas and the Negritos, are very low in the scale of
civilization, but they are one and all "non-Christians," as the
term is used and understood in law and in fact.




7. BAPTISTA vs. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 194709
July 31, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:
DOCTRINE: See highlighted/bold portions of the
Courts ruling on DUE PROCESS OF LAW and RIGHT
TO CONFRONT ACCUSERS
FACTS: Petitioners were former union members of Radio
Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU), a legitimate
labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of the rank and file employees of Radio Philippines Network
(RPN), a government-sequestered corporation involved in
commercial radio and television broadcasting affairs.
Respondents, on the other hand, were the unions elected
officers and members.
On suspicion of union mismanagement, petitioners,
together with some other union members, filed a complaint for
impeachment of their union president, Reynato Siozon, before
the executive board of RPN, which was eventually abandoned.
They later re-lodged the impeachment complaint, this time,
against all the union officers and members of RPNEU before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). They likewise
filed various petitions for audit covering the period from 2000
to 2004.
Two (2) written complaints were filed against petitioners
and several others for alleged violation of the unions
Constitution and By-Laws. Months later, a different group of
union members filed a third complaint against petitioners and
12 others, before the Chairman of RPNEUs Committee on
Grievance and Investigation (the Committee) citing as grounds
the "commission of an act which violates RPNEU Constitution
and By-Laws, specifically, Article IX, Section 2.2 for joining or
forming a union outside the sixty (60) days period and Article
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 14

IX, Section 2.5 for urging or advocating that a member start
an action in any court of justice or external investigative body
against the Union or its officer without first exhausting all
internal remedies open to him or available in accordance with
the CBL.
Petitioners received a memorandum notice from Jeric
Salinas, Chairman of the Committee, requesting them to answer
the complaint and attend a hearing. Petitioners and their group,
through an exchange of communications with the Committee,
denied the charges imputed against them and contested the
procedure adopted by the Committee in its investigation. The
Committee submitted their recommendation of expulsion of
petitioners from the union to RPNEUs Board of Directors. The
RPNEUs Board of Directors affirmed the recommendation of
expulsion of petitioners and the 12 others from union
membership in a Board Resolution No. 018-2005. Through a
Memorandum, petitioners were served an expulsion notice from
the union.
Petitioners with the 12 others wrote to RPNEUs
President and Board of Directors that their expulsion from the
union was an ultra vires act because the Committee failed to
observe the basic elements of due process because they were
not given the chance to physically confront and examine their
complainants.
RPNEUs officers informed their company of the
expulsion of petitioners and the 12 others from the union and
requested the management to serve them notices of termination
from employment in compliance with their CBAs union security
clause.
Petitioners and the 12 others were informed of the
termination of their employment effective March 20, 2006.
Petitioners filed three (3) separate complaints for ULP
against the respondents, which were later consolidated,
questioning legality of their expulsion from the union and their
subsequent termination from employment.
Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the petitioners and
adjudged the respondents guilty of ULP pursuant to Article 249
(a) and (b) of the Labor Code. LA also ordered the reinstatement
of petitioners as bonafide members of RPNEU.
On appeal, the NLRC vacated and set aside the LA decision and
dismissed the complaint for ULP for lack of merit.
Petitioners filed for MR but the same was denied by the CA.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Petitioners were denied substantive
and procedural due process of law when they were expelled from
the RPNEU?
2) Whether or not Petitioner were not given the
opportunity to personally face and confront their accusers,
which were violative of their right to examine the complainants
and the supposed charges against them?
HELD:
1) NO. Article 247 of the Labor Code provides: Unfair
labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and
employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate
interests of both labor and management, including their right to
bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-
management relations.
ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the
workers right to organize. As specified in Articles 248 and 249
of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts must necessarily relate to
the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a
CBA. Absent the said vital elements, the acts complained,
although seemingly unjust, would not constitute ULP.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 15

It appeared in this case that the charges against
petitioners were not mere internal squabbles, but violations that
demand proper investigation because, if proven, would
constitute grounds for their expulsion from the union.
Petitioners were found to have violated the provisions of the
unions Constitution and By-Laws when they filed petitions for
impeachment against their union officers and for audit before
the DOLE without first exhausting all internal remedies
available within their organization. This act is a ground for
expulsion from union membership. Thus, petitioners expulsion
from the union was not a deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict
their right to organize, but was triggered by the commission of
an act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of Article IX of the
unions Constitution and By-Laws.
Besides, any supposed procedural flaw in the proceedings
before the Committee was deemed cured when petitioners were
given the opportunity to be heard. Due process, as a
constitutional precept, is satisfied when a person was notified of
the charge against him and was given an opportunity to explain
or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. It cannot be denied that petitioners were
properly notified of the charges filed against them and were
equally afforded the opportunity to present their side.
2) NO. Mere absence of a one-on-one confrontation
between the petitioners and their complainants does not
automatically affect the validity of the proceedings before the
Committee. Not all cases necessitate a trial-type hearing. As in
this case, what is indispensable is that a party be given the right
to explain ones side, which was adequately afforded to the
petitioners.

Orquiola v. Tandang Sora Development Corporation
Facts:
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689
covered by TCTs in Tandang Sora QC. Adjacent to the said lot
was a land registered to Herminigilda, who subdivided his lot
into smaller lots and sold them. One of the buyers of such
smaller lots was Spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola.
Sometime in 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint against
Herminigilda for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. The trial
court ruled in favor of Ledesma and directed through a writ of
execution to remove the house they constructed on the said
land.
Spouses Orquiola filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition alleging that the writ of execution cannot be enforced
against them as they were buyers in good faith and were not
impleaded on the said case. They contended that such
demolition would amount to deprivation of property without
due process of law.
Issue:
Whether the writ of execution may be enforced against
Spouses Orquiola
Held:
No. Spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola are entitled
fully to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system.
The private respondents should have imp leaded them in the
case. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by
the decision in the case. No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are
not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. Spouses
Orquiola have a valid cause to resist the demolition of their
house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to deprivation
of property without due process of law.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 16


CRISPINO PANGILINAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JOCELYN N. BALATBAT substituted by her heirs,
namely, VICENTE BALATBAT, ANA LUCIA N.
BALATBAT, JOSE VICENTE N. BALATBAT, ANTONIO
BENIGNO N. BALATBAT, JOCELYN BEUNA B. DE
GUZMAN, GERVACIO AFREDO N. BALATBAT, PIO
ROMULO N. BALATBAT and JUNIOPERO PEDRO N.
BALATBAT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 170787
September 12, 2012
Peralta, J.:
Doctrine: "essence of due process is a hearing before
conviction and before an impartial and disinterested tribunal,"
but due process as a constitutional precept does not always, and
in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense.
Facts: Respondent spouses Jocelyn N. Balatbat and Vicente A.
Balatbat were found by the PARAD (Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of San Fernando, Pampanga) to have landholdings
totaling 25.2548 hectares, which consisted of 9.8683 hectares of
riceland and 15.3864 hectares of sugarland. The 9.8683 hectares
of riceland was covered by land reform.Part if their lands were
utilized by respondents in a subdivision/condominium project
particularly called Carolina Village II, located at San Juan, Sta.
Ana, Pampanga, while Title No. 181462, representing Lot 21-B,
was subdivided among the children of respondents.
The exact area of riceland respondents applied for
retention is 8.3749 hectares, which is covered by TCT No.
181466-R, TCT No. 181465-R, TCT No. 181463-R, and TCT No.
181461-R.6
Although 8.6402 hectares was subjected to the Operation
Land Transfer Program under P.D. No. 27,7as amended by
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474, this case involves only
2.9941 hectares or 29,941 square meters thereof, covered under
TCT No. 181466-R,8 and identified as Lot 21-F of the
subdivision plan Psd-03-005059, being a portion of Lot 21 Sta.
Ana Cadastre, situated in the Barrio of San Juan, Municipality of
Sta. Ana, Province of Pampanga. The said Lot 21-F, with an area
of 29,941 square meters, was transferred to petitioner as
evidenced by TCT No. 25866,9 which was registered in the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga on May 30,
1997, pursuant to Emancipation Patent No. 00728063 issued by
the DAR on April 18, 1997.10 Hence, respondents sought to
cancel the said emancipation patent on the ground that they
applied to retain the land covered by it.
Respondents first filed an Application for Retention11of
their landholdings under P.D. No. 27 on December 24, 1975.
However, it was not acted upon. After investigation and
verification of the landholdings of respondents, Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer Victorino Guevarra, in a letter14 dated
March 21, 1997, recommended to the DAR Provincial Office, San
Fernando, Pampanga that respondents' re-application for
retention be denied.
On May 30, 1997, the Register of Deeds for the Province
of Pampanga issued TCT No. 25866 to petitioner, pursuant to
Emancipation Patent No. 0072806315 covering Lot 21-F of the
subdivision plan Psd-03-005059, situated in the Barrio of San
Juan, Municipality of Sta. Ana, Province of Pampanga, with an
area of 29,941 square meters, which is a portion of the land
sought to be retained by respondents. This prompted
respondents to file on February 4, 1998 with the DAR Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, San Fernando,
Pampanga a Complaint16 for annulment of emancipation
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 17

patent, ejectment and damages against petitioner Crispino
Pangilinan, Municipal Land Officer Victorino D. Guevarra, and
the DAR Secretary, represented by the Regional Director,
Region III.
In their Complaint, respondents alleged that although
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Victorino Guevarra knew
that the land cultivated by petitioner is one of those included in
their application for retention, Guevarra, acting in bad faith and
without notice to them and in disregard of their rights and in
collusion with petitioner, recommended for the coverage of their
land under Operation Land Transfer. Thereafter, Emancipation
Patent No. 00728063 and TCT No. 25866 were unlawfully
issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga
on May 30, 1997.
In this case, the PARAD declared that respondents
"retained" the sugarland with an area of 15.2864 hectares, and
4.8836 hectares thereof was divided into a subdivision lot, while
the remaining balance was subdivided among respondents and
their children. Hence, the PARAD held that the area of seven
hectares that can be retained under P.D. No. 27 can no longer be
awarded to respondents, since they already owned an aggregate
area of more than seven hectares used for residential and other
urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to
support themselves and their family.
Moreover, the PARAD stated that petitioner has absolute
ownership of the landholding as he has fully paid the
amortizations to the LBP.
Respondents appealed the decision of the PARAD before
the DARAB. DARAB affirmed in toto. Petitioner filed a petition
for review of the decision of the DARAB before the Court of
Appeals, alleging that the DARAB gravely erred in finding that
(1) once an emancipation patent is issued to a qualified
beneficiary, the latter acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the landholding that is no longer open to doubt or
controversy; and (2) respondents are no longer entitled to
retention, applying LOI No. 474.
On May 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision24 in favor of respondents.
Petitioner contends that he was deprived of the right to be heard
and denied due process of law because he was not personally
furnished a copy of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85017.
Issue: whether there is deprivation of the right to be heard and
denied due process.
Held: There is no question that the "essence of due process is a
hearing before conviction and before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal," but due process as a constitutional
precept does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-
type proceeding. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.32
In this case, petitioner was not denied due process as he
was able to file a comment before the Court of Appeals through
his counsel of record, DAR Legal Officer Dizon. Moreover,
records show that petitioner, with the assistance of two lawyers,
Atty. Paul S. Maglalang and Atty. Jord Achaes R. David, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 30, 2005, which motion was denied for lack
of merit by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
December 2, 2005.



4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 18

Javier vs. Commission on Elections
Nos. L-68379-81.
September 22, 1986
CRUZ, J
Judges; Fair play and delicadeza, where a Commissioner was
once a law partner of one of the parties to an election case
demands that he inhibit himself therefrom.
Facts
The petitioner and the private respondent were
candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May
1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular
support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of
the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On the eve of the
elections the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and
killed, allegedly by the latters men. The incident naturally
heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of
fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters
against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting
the candidate of the ruling party.It was in this atmosphere that
the voting was held, and the post- election developments were to
run true to form. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of
the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the
petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the
impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent
herein.
The Second Division promulgated the decision now
subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F.
Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique.
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano
and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan.
Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a
former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion
had refused.
Issue
WON Commissioner Jaime Opinion should have
inhibited from the case.
Held
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of
this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent
Commission on Elections is due process of law.Asked to inhibit
himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the
private respondent, Commissioner Opinion obstinately insisted
on participating in the case, denying he was biased.This Court
has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we haveheld that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may
color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just
decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due
process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a
sense of delicadeza. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer,
should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known
rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the
Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned
decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding
null and void.




4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 19

TITLE: Galman et al v. Sandiganbayan
GR & DATE: No. L- 72670 September 12, 1986
DOCTRINE: Double Jeopardy - In the case at bar, the
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction
when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process; in
effect the first jeopardy was never terminated and the remand
of the case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy
and does not expose the accused to a second one.
PONENTE: Chief Justice Teehankee
(Background of the case: Circumstances related to the
Assassination of Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr.)
FACTS: Then President Marcos created a Fact Finding Board to
investigate the assassination of former Sen. Benigno S. Aquino
Jr. on August 21, 1983. The Board which held 125 hearing days (
8 hearings in Tokyo ans 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California)
and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20, 377
pages of transcripts until the submission of their minority and
majority reposts to the President. The minority report was
referred to Tanodbayan "or final resolution through the legal
system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan. The majority report
was submitted the following day.
Both the minority and majority reports rejected the
military version as propounded by the chief investigator Gen.
Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin. The
reports agree that "only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen.
Aquino could have shot him"; that Galman was not the assassin
and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and
the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs,
deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured
story regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Ninoy." The
only difference between the 2 reports is that the majority report
found 26 private respondents headed by then AFP Chief General
Fabian Ver involved in the military conspiracy while the
minority report limit the plotters to 6 persons who were on the
service stairs while Sen. Aquino was descending.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all
his recorded public acts and statements from the beginning
disdained and rejected his own Boards above findings and
insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoys
assassin. It was against this setting that petitioners Saturnina
and Reynaldo Galman (mother and son of late Rolando
Galman), together with the other petitioners (former and
incumbent SC Justices, lawyers, members of the academe), filed
this action alleging that Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan
committed serious irregularities resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.
Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the
accused, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of
any civil liability. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
that was denied for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion to
admit their second motion for reconsideration based on the
starling and unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan
Manuel Herrera as reported in the Manila Times entitled
Aquino Trial a Sham, that the then President had ordered the
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo
Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to
whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents
accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. Thereupon the
second MR was admitted and the respondents commented that
the trial was conducted in a regular manner and that they did
not succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence the
rendered decision. On the other hand Deputy Tanodbayan
Herrera affirmed the allegations of the second MR and revealed
that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors
were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman case.
All the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy,
and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 20

because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayans judgment of
acquittal of all respondents-accused.
The Court resolved to appoint a 3-member commission
composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez,
chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate Court Justices
Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear
and receive evidence and submit their findings to the Court.
Thereafter a 64-page extensive report was submitted with the
recommendation that all 26 respondents should be charged as
principals for double murder of Aquino and Galman. The Court
approved and adopted the said report and findings and held that
the same were duly supported by facts of public record and
knowledge and that the then President (code-named Olympus)
had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace a scripted
and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a retrial puts the respondents-accused
in double jeopardy?
HELD: The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
mock trialthe non-trial of the centuryand that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts'
judgment of dismissal or acquit all where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied of
due process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due
process is thereby violated." The cardinal precept is that where
there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the States
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue."
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused." In the case at bar, the lower court was not competent
as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of
the prosecution to due process; in effect the first jeopardy was
never terminated and the remand of the case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy and does not expose the
accused to a second one.
Lastly, respondents-accuseds contention that the
Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal which cannot be appealed
or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully
disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is
fully applicable here, as follows: That is the general rule and
presupposes a valid judgment. However, said acquittal was a
void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction, thus
no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect,
no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.

PEOPLE VS Robert CASTILLO
GR NO. 120282; APRIL 20 1998
PANGANIBAN J.
DOCTRINE: The impartiality of a judge cannot be assailed on
the mere ground that he asked such questions during the trial. It
is a judge's prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to
ferret out the truth.
FACTS: Appellant was charged with murder in connection with
the fatal stabbing of Antonio Dometita in Cola pubhouse Q.C..
He pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense of denial and
alibi claiming that he was then asleep in his house at the time of
the incident. Prosecution witness Velasco testified that he was
sitting outside the pub house when appellant suddenly arrived
and stabbed the victim on the left side of the chest causing his
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 21

death. Another prosecution witness, Mercado, testified that
although she did not see the actual stabbing, she saw appellant
wrapping a bladed weapon in his shirt. However, defense
witness Marcelino, a tricycle driver, testified that he was about
25 meters away from the crime scene when he saw a 2 persons
ganging up on a person who was later identified as the victim,
and that appellant was not one of them. The trial court gave full
credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses
and rendered judgment of conviction with penality of RP.
Hence, this recourse. Appellant is questioning the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses and the partiality of the trial judge in
favor of the prosecution as shown by his participation in the
examination of witnesses. One of the errors raised by appellant
was That the trial court in many instances showed its prejudice
against the accused and in several instances asked questions
that [were] well within the duty of the prosecution to explore
and ask. Specific allegations are: that the trial judge took over
from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner,
interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give
answers favorable to the prosecution, and asked questions
which pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad
moral character, which could not be objected to by defense,
counsel, because they have been ventilated by the judge himself.
ISSUE: Whether the judge was showed partiality by asking
questions during the trial.
HELD: NO. The trial court judge is not an idle arbiter during a
trial. The impartiality of a judge cannot be assailed on the mere
ground that he asked such questions during the trial. The
allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge's
prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out
the truth. On the whole, the Court finds that the questions
propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature.
Questions which merely clear up dubious points and bring out
additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative. The
propriety of a judge's queries is determined not necessarily by
their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test
of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In
this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if
all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated,
appellant would still be convicted. There is no showing of any
interest, personal or otherwise, of the judge over the prosecution
of the case. He is therefore, presumed to have acted regularly
and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the 'cold neutrality
of an impartial judge' implicit in the guarantee of due process.

The Heirs of JOLLY R. BUGARIN, namely MA. AILEEN
H. BUGARIN, MA. LINDA B. ABIOG and MA. ANNETTE
B. SUMULONG, vs Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 174431 August 6, 2012
Mendoza, J:
Doctrine: The essence of due process is the right to be heard.
This Court continues to emphasize that due process is satisfied
when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their respective sides of the controversy or
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Thus,
when the party seeking due process was in fact given several
opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his own
fault or choice he squanders these chances, then his cry for due
process must fail.
FACTS: The late Bugarin was the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) when the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos was still the president of the country from 1965-1986.
After the latters downfall in 1986, the new administration,
through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), filed a petition for forfeiture of properties under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 against him with the
Sandiganbayan. The Court held that Bugarins properties, which
were visibly out of proportion to his lawful income from 1968 to
1980, should be forfeited in favor of the government. Bugarin
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 22

moved for a reconsideration and while his motion was pending,
he passed away in September 2002. With this development, his
heirs, the petitioners herein, moved to have the case dismissed.
The Court denied both Bugarins Motion for Reconsideration
and petitioners Motion to Dismiss. With the case back at the
Sandiganbayan, hearing was set for January 12, 2005 to
determine which properties of the late Bugarin would be
forfeited in favor of the government. However, The scheduled
hearings were reset several times as requested by the
petitioners. Thereafter, petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of this order arguing that the Sandiganbayan
could not determine the properties to be forfeited on its own,
and further prayed that the parties be allowed to present
evidence to determine what properties of Bugarin would be
subject to forfeiture. Finally, on April 3, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan issued its assailed Resolution ordering the
forfeiture of certain properties of Bugarin. Petitioners accuse
the Sandiganbayan of allegedly reducing their rights to a simple
mathematical equation of subtracting the late Bugarins
amassed wealth against his lawful income for the same period
and using the difference as basis for choosing the properties to
be forfeited for the sole reason that their total acquisition cost
was closest to said difference. They, thus, want that another
round of trial or hearing be conducted for further reception of
evidence to determine which among the properties enumerated
in the Republic case24 are ill-gotten wealth.
ISSUE: Whether Bugarin's heirs was deprived of their right to
due process
HELD: NO. The Bugarin was accorded due process. He was
given his day in court to prove that his acquired properties were
lawfully attained. A review of the full text of the said case will
reveal that the summary of properties acquired by Bugarin
during his tenure as NBI Director was based on his very own
exhibits. From this enumeration, the Court set aside those
properties that had been liquidated or those that had been
obtained in 1981 onwards. Even those properties whose
acquisition dates could no longer be determined were also
excluded, all to the benefit of Bugarin. What remained was a
trimmed down listing of properties, from which the
Sandiganbayan may choose in executing the order of forfeiture
of the Court.
Moreover, in arriving at the amount representing his lawful
income or disposable income during his incumbency as NBI
Director, the Court subtracted from Bugarins income as stated
in Exhibit -38, the personal expenses of his family, which
according to the Court was quite conservative, again redounding
to the benefit of Bugarin.
The essence of due process is the right to be heard.32
Based on the foregoing,Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not
denied that right. Petitioners cannot now claim a different right
over the reduced list of properties in order to prevent forfeiture,
or at the least, justify another round of proceedings.
This Court continues to emphasize that due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.
Thus, when the party seeking due process was in fact given
several opportunities to be heard and air his side, but it is by his
own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then his cry for
due process must fail.
When the case was remanded to the Sandiganbayan for
execution, petitioners were likewise accorded due process.
Records of this case reveal that every motion by petitioners for
resetting of hearing dates was granted, and every motion filed,
either for reconsideration or leave of court, was heard.
In the case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v.
COMELEC,43 this Court elucidated on this all too important
right to due process,
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC
that PGBI's right to due process was not violated for PGBI was
given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 23

reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of
due process, we have consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.
The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute
lack of notice and hearing x xx.
In the case at bar, the requirements of due process were
satisfied and the very essence of due process, that is, to be given
the opportunity to be heard was afforded among herein
petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

14) BILL OF RIGHTS
G.R. No. 182280, July 29, 2013
TERESA C. AGUILAR, CESAR D. RAAGAS, VILLAMOR
VILLEGAS, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE
CITY OF MAKATI, v. MICHAEL J. OPALLICK
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE: A person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling
rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a
party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law.
FACTS: On 3/20/95, Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI
executed a CONTRACT TO SELL with Reynaldo Poblete and
Tomas Villanueva (Poblete and Villanueva over Unit 3301 of the
Makati Prime Citadel Condominium in Makati City (the unit)
covered by CCT No. 25156. Poblete and Villanueva then
executed a deed of assignment over the unit to Respondent O
Pallick, after he paid the purchase price in full. Respondent
however failed to register and annotate the deed of sale in the
CCT when he took possession of the Unit.
Meanwhile, in a case between PPGI and herein petitioner
Aguilar filed in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board,
Petitioner was able to obtain a final and executory Decision

in
her favor, and as a result, Sheriff Raagas of RTC of Makati,
caused several properties of PPGI to be levied, including the
disputed unit. The sale at public auction was scheduled to be
held on 3/30/00. Raagas issued a Sheriffs Notice of Sale dated
2/17/00, posted it, and sent a copy thereof to PPGI, which was
also published.

But before the scheduled auction sale, or on
March 21, 2000, OPallick filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim.

YET Raagas still conducted the public auction sale on
March 30, 2000, where Aguilar was declared the highest bidder
for the subject unit. A certificate of sale was issued in her favor.
Because PPGI failed to redeem the property, a final Deed of Sale

was issued in favor of Aguilar on 4/20/01. CCT No. 25156 was
cancelled, and CCT No. 74777 was issued in her name.

She then
moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession,

which was
granted by HLURB in a 12/21/01.
On 5/6/01, OPallick instituted Civil Case No. 01-572 with
the RTC Makati

for quieting of title and to set aside the levy
on execution of the subject unit, to annul the certificate of sale
issued in favor of Aguilar, and to recover the unit.
Later OPallick likewise filed an Amended Complaint,

impleading Respondent Villegas and the Office of the Makati
Register of Deeds, and alleging further that at the time of the
levy, Aguilar knew that PPGI no longer owned the unit, as she
had been informed of such fact by PPGI during the proceedings
in the HLURB case; that Aguilar obtained her title through
unlawful means; that his eviction from the premises was illegal;
that he suffered actual damages; he suffered unrealized monthly
rental income from the eviction of his tenant; that he be
awarded also exemplary damages; and that OPallick also prayed
for the cancellation of Aguilars CCT No. 74777.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 24

During the proceedings, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdictionover the subject matter, and a
Motion for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses.
RTC dismissed the Civil Case No. 01-572 holding that it had no
jurisdiction to annul the levy and sale on execution ordered by
the HLURB, an agency under the Office of the President, which
is a co-equal body, that the the case for quieting of title or
reconveyance constitutes such prohibited interference. MR
denied.
CA favored respondent, since he was not a party to the HLURB
case, he could not be bound by its disposition, incidents, and
actions taken therein; thus, he had the right to file a separate
action to protect and vindicate his claim. ThusCA remanded the
case to the RTC. MR denied. Hence this petitioner for review on
Certioari
ISSUE: W/N Respondent O Pallick was bound by the levy,
auction sale, and award conducted by the sheriff of RTC of
Makati in favor of Petitioner Aguilar over the disputed Unit
hence a separate action to question Petitioners title was barred.
HELD: NO. The Civil case in G.R. 157801s pronouncement can
in no way constitute a final determination of OPallicks claim. It
did not foreclose the possibility of separate action questioning
Aguilars title, which may be instituted, either by PPGI or
anyone claiming a right in the disputed unit.
It must be stressed that the Register of Deeds had already
cancelled CCT No. 25156 and issued CCT No. 74777 in the name
of the respondent. Thus, the argument of [PPGI] that the title or
ownership had been wrongfully vested with the respondent is a
collateral attack on the latters title which is more appropriate in
a direct proceeding.
In OPallicks Amended Complaint, he avered that Aguilar
obtained her title through unlawful means. Thus he prayed for
the nullification of Aguilars CCT No. 74777. Clearly, therefore,
although captioned as one for Quieting of Title, OPallicks suit is
actually a suit for annulment of title. The principle that a person
cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law
And since respondent was not impleaded in the HLURB
case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein.
Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given the
opportunity to present his case therein. But, more than the fact
that OPallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he had the
right to vindicate his claim in a separate action, as in this case.
As a prior purchaser of the very same unit, he had the right to be
heard on his claim.
NOTE: NEVER FORGET TO ANNONATE OR REGISTER
IMPORTANT MATTERS IN THE TITLE SO TO AVOID
INCONVENINCE!

CARAS VS.CA
[G.R. No. 129900. October 2, 2001]
DOCTRINE: Due Process/BP 22. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the
basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor
be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the
opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: That on or about the 5
th
day of January 1992 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Chu Yang
T. Atienza to apply on account or for value PCI Bank,
Commonwealth Ave. Branch Check No. 017744 dated March 18,
1992 payable to the order of CASH in the amount of P14,125.00
Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 25

presentment which check when presented for payment was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused
failed to pay said Chu Yang T. Atienza the amount of said check
or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five
(5) banking days after receiving said notice.
One of the averments of petitioner is that she was not
properly notified of the dishonor of her checks. She maintains
that the prosecution failed to show that she received the notices
of dishonor purportedly sent to her. She points out that no
return card nor acknowledgment receipt for the first demand
letter was presented in evidence. While there was a return card
attached to the second demand letter, this was not marked nor
offered in evidence, and hence must be ignored
ISSUE:Was petitioner denied procedural process because she
was not properly notified of the dishonor of her checks?
HELD: YES.The absence of proof that petitioner received any
notice informing her of the fact that her checks were dishonored
and giving her five banking days within which to make
arrangements for payment of the said checks prevents the
application of the disputable presumption that she had
knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she
issued the checks. Absent such presumption, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said checks,
otherwise, she cannot be held liable under the law.
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives
an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic
postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be
actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity
to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the
dishonor of her checks and was given the opportunity to make
arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, we
cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg.
22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was
given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her
acquittal.

RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner, v.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013
DOCTRINE: Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides for a right to a speedy disposition of a case This
constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either
judicial or quasi-judicial.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of
Negros Occidental (Province) for three (3) full terms which
ended on June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Nacionales served
as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales
subordinate, and Malvas as Provincial Health Officer. The Office
of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint
from Peoples Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to
investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural
equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00
which allegedly happened around a month before Coscolluela
stepped down from office. Acting on the letter-complaint, the
Case Building Team of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted
its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation
Report which upgraded the complaint into a criminal case
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 26

against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners filed their
respective counter-affidavits.
The assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Caares
prepared a Resolution on March 27, 2003, finding probable
cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and recommended the filing of the
corresponding information. On even date, the Information was
prepared and signed by Caares and submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro for
recommendation. Miro recommended the approval of the
Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of
Acting Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only
on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the Information was
filed before the SB.
Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27,
2003 Resolution and Information only when they received a
copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB. Coscolluela
filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated
as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after
almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted.
Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluelas
motion.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion
to Quash explaining that although the Information was
originally dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go through
careful review and revision before its final approval. It also
pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections
regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the
interim.
The Sandiganbayan in a Resolution denied petitioners
Motion to Quash for lack of merit. It held that the preliminary
investigation against petitioners was actually resolved by
Caares on March 27, 2003, one (1) year and four (4) months
from the date the complaint was filed. As these issuances had to
undergo careful review and revision through the various levels
of the said office, the period of delay i.e., from March 27, 2003
to May 21, 2009, or roughly over six (6) years cannot be
deemed as inordinate and as such, petitioners constitutional
right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration.
The SB, however, denied the foregoing motions in its Resolution
for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in finding that petitioners right to speedy disposition
of cases was not violated.
HELD: Yes.
A persons right to the speedy disposition of his case is
guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution (Constitution) which provides:

SEC. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.
In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice. It must be noted, however, that the
right to speedy disposition of cases should be understood to be a
relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient.
Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only
when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 27

Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the
following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length
of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused
by the delay.
Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court
holds that petitioners right to a speedy disposition of their
criminal case had been violated.
FIRST, it is observed that the preliminary investigation
proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete. In
this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SBs
position that the conduct of preliminary investigation was
terminated as early as March 27, 2003, or the time when
Caares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the
Information. This is belied by Section 4, Rule II of the
Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise
known as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman." No information may be filed and no complaint
may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of
the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all
other cases. Therefore, in the case at bar, the preliminary
investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not
terminated upon Caares preparation of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time
Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In this
regard, the proceedings were terminated only on May 21, 2009,
or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.
SECOND, the above-discussed delay in the
Ombudsmans resolution of the case largely remains unjustified.
Verily, the Office of the Ombudsman was created under the
mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the protector of the
people and as such, required to act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of
the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service.
Thus, barring any extraordinary complication, such as the
degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or any
event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work
activity any of which have not been adequately proven by the
prosecution in the case at bar there appears to be no justifiable
basis as to why the Office of the Ombudsman could not have
earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings
against the petitioners.
THIRD, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be
faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy
disposition of cases.
Records show that they could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were unaware that the
investigation against them was still on-going. They were only
informed of the March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information
against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when
they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on
June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably
assumed that the proceedings against them have already been
terminated. This serves as a plausible reason as to why
petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether.
FOURTH, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice
caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings
against them.
Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that
bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the
government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules
do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence
or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that
such right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of
fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v. United
States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 28

despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused
suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from
the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no
more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary
processes of justice.
Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the
Office of the Ombudsmans resolution of the case as well as the
concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is
undeniable that petitioners constitutional right to due process
and speedy disposition of cases had been violated. As the
institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the
Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of
accountability in order to ensure that cases before it are resolved
with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are
responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.
Corollarily, for the SBs patent and utter disregard of the
existing laws and jurisprudence surrounding the matter, the
Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the quashal of the Information. Perforce, the assailed
resolutions must be set aside and the criminal case against
petitioners be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED.

ZALDIVAR VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR 80578
FACTS:
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged
before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who
was investigating the case.

Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of
the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a
Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to
temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations
against Zaldivar.
Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and
he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even
had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he
scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts
issuance of the TRO is a manifestation that the rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez.
The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his
side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers
were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech;
that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point
out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also
said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the
Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on
Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
HELD: Yes.
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs
on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 29

[G.R. No. 136726. September 24, 2003]
PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., petitioner, vs.
REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, MODESTO ABARCA, JR.
and MARILOU M. CLEOFAS, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
DOCTRINE: Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity
to be heard.
The Facts
Petitioner PanfiloV. Villaruel, Jr. is the former Assistant
Secretary of the Air Transportation Office (ATO), Department
of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). Respondents
Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and
Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative
Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil
Aviation Training Center (CATC).Petitioner issued a
memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the
respondents, detailing them to the Office of DOTC
Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995. Petitioner
issued a memorandum on 19 July 1995 addressed to Abarca
placing him under preventive suspension for 90 days without
pay pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary
Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to their
mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed.
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and
refused to reinstate respondents to their mother unit.On 24
January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and
Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.
The trial court granted respondents prayer for a preliminary
mandatory injunction.For petitioners continued failure to
comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents
moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved
to declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer within
the period prescribed in the trial courts order of 26 January
1996.
On 11 July 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision in
favor of the petitioners and against the respondent declaring
mandamus permanent and thereby ordering respondent Panfilo
V. Villaruel, Jr., to pay moral, exemplary, and temperate
damages, and attorneys fees.Aggrieved, petitioner, represented
by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the
OSG failed to file the memorandum. The Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to
file the required memorandum. The OSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the same. The
Resolution became final and executory.
Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for
Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy of the
motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition.Acting
on the motion for execution, the trial court issued a Writ of
Execution on 22 September 1997.
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to
Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the
trial courts decision never became final and executory as the
trial court deprived him of his right to due process.
On 23 February 1998, the trial court issued an Order
quashing the Writ of Execution because the Sheriff failed to
follow Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The trial court,
however, issued an Alias Writ of Execution. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court denied the same.
Dissatisfied with the trial courts orders, petitioner filed a
special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the execution of the trial courts decision of 11 July
1996. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for
certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision dated 30
September 1998. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 30

appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution of 3 December
1998.Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied of his right to due
process when the appellate court dismissed his appeal for failure
of the OSG to file the memorandum.
HELD: No Denial of Petitioners Right to Due Process.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard
and this opportunity was not denied petitioner. Throughout the
proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals,
petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed
to do so. Clearly, petitioners former counsel, the OSG, was
negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial
and appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of the
OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence
and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final
and executory.
Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the
OSGs errors. Petitioner should have taken the initiative of
making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court
about the status of his case. Litigants represented by counsel
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and
await the outcome of their case. To agree with petitioners stance
would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or
decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on
the part of his counsel. The Court will not countenance such ill-
founded argument which contradicts long-settled doctrines of
trial and procedure.





PEOPLE VS BARAOIL
G.R. NO. 194608
JULY 9, 2012
DOCTRINE
The law presumes that an accused in a criminal
prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proven. This basic
constitutional principle is fleshed out by the procedural rules
which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an
accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is
largely left to the trial courts to determine. However, an appeal
throws the whole case open for review such that the Court may
look into the records if only to ensure no fact of weight or
substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied
by the trial court.
REYES, J.
FACTS
Accused is a neighbor of the victims family. On August 8,
2004, at about 2:00 p.m., accused invited the victim (a minor, 5
yrs old) to take a ride with him on his bicycle and took her into a
rice mill in Brgy. San Maximo, Natividad, Pangasinan. In the
comfort room inside the rice mill, accused sat on a toilet and
unzipped his pants. He lifted the victim, seated her on his lap
and inserted his penis into her vagina. He also inserted his right
forefinger in her vagina. Thereafter, accused went to buy
slippers for himself and biscuit for the victim. After half an hour
or at about 2:30 p.m., accused took the victim back to the
comfort room of the same rice mill and undressed her and
sucked her vagina.
Accused was charged with 2 counts of Rape. Accused
claims alibi as a defense stating that he was at a fishpond at the
time of the incident. He also claims that the accusation of the
victims family was only a means of revenge because they got
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 31

mad at him after he disconnected their jumper connection from
the power source.
RTC convicted accused for the 2 counts of rape. CA
modified the decision for the second charge and convicted the
accused of Acts of Lasciviousness. Both courts gave credence to
the testimony of the victim which was credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and normal
course of things.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accuseds guilt has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt
HELD
Yes. The totality of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution proved the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Findings of the trial court relative to the credibility of the
rape victim are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal,
more so, if affirmed by the appellate court. This rule may be
brushed aside in exceptional circumstances, such as when
courts evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial
court overlooked or misapplied certain facts of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case. The
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to
the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to
observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a
vantage point denied appellate courts and when his findings
have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court.
The victim testified in a spontaneous and straightforward
manner and never wavered in identifying appellant as her rapist
despite grueling cross examination.
The Court affirmed the CA decision: Statutory Rape for
the 1
st
charge and Acts of Lasciviousness for the 2
nd
charge.

G.R. No. 192108
SY VS ANDOKS LITSON CORPORATION
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Cely Sy (Sy) is the registered owner of a 316
square-meter lot (located in Sta. Cruz, Manila). Respondent
Andoks Litson Corporation (Andoks) is engaged in the
business of selling grilled chicken and pork with outlets all
over the Philippines.
2. The parties entered into a 5-year lease contract covering the
parcel of land owned by Sy. Monthly rental was fixed at
P60,000.00, exclusive of taxes, for the first 2 years and
P66,000.00 for the third, fourth and fifth year with 10%
escalation every year beginning on the fourth year.
3. Per contract, the lessee shall, upon signing the contract, pay
four (4) months of advance deposit amounting to
P240,000.00 and a security deposit equivalent to four (4)
months of rental in the amount of P240,000.00.
Accordingly, Andoks issued a check to Sy for P480,000.00.
4. Andoks allegations:
a. It was discovered that Sy has an unpaid MERALCO bill
amounting to P400,000.00. Andoks presented a system-
generated statement from MERALCO.
b. Construction for the improvement it intended for the
leased premises could not proceed because another
tenant, Mediapool, Inc. incurred delay in the
construction of a billboard structure also within the
leased premises.
5. Demand letters were sent to the spouses but all were
ignored. Andoks suffered damages in the total amount of
P627,000.00 which comprises the advance rental and
deposit, cost of money, mobilization cost for the construction
of improvement over leased premises, and unrealized
income.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 32

6. The complaint for rescission was filed, three years after
continued inaction on the request to have the billboard
construction expedited. Petitioner and counsel failed to
appear during the pre-trial.
7. Sys answer: she has faithfully complied with all the terms
and conditions of the lease contract and denied incurring an
outstanding electricity bill.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners right to due process was violated.
HELD: NO
Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requires the parties and
their counsel to appear at pre-trial while Section 5 of the same
rule states that such failure result to the dismissal of the action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered
by the court.
What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and
their counsels from appearing at the pre-trial under Section 4,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is subject to the sound discretion of
a judge. Such discretion was shown by the trial court, which was
correct in putting into effect the consequence of petitioners
non-appearance at the pre-trial. While Sy filed an Urgent
Motion to Reset Pre-trial, she cannot assume that her motion
would be automatically granted. As found by the Court of
Appeals, the denial of petitioners motion for postponement is
dictated by the motion itself:
A perusal of the Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-Trial
Conference discloses that other than the allegation that counsel
will attend a hearing in another branch of the same court in
Manila, yet, it failed to substantiate its claim. It did not state the
case number nor attach the Calendar of Hearing or such other
pertinent proof to appraise the court that indeed counsel was
predisposed.
We cannot allow petitioners to argue that their right to
due process has been infringed.
In The Philippine American Life & General Insurance
Company v. Enario, we reiterated that the essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through
verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can
present its side or defend its interest in due course, there is no
denial of procedural due process.

G.R. No. 189028. July 16, 2013.
*

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO
ALMARIO, et al. vs. The Executive Secretary.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
DOCTRINES:
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; No real and
substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner
Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the
laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing
respondents in an exceptional position. The undue
classification was not germane to the purpose of the law.
Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established
guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into
effect.
Equal Protection of the Law; There was a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution when the former President
gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno; The conferment of the Order of
National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with
grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.



4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 33

FACTS:
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1001, it created the category of Award
and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos
who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the
same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first
National Artist.
Proclamation No. 1144

was issued, amending
Proclamation No. 1001 by creating a National Artists Awards
Committee that would administer the conferment of the
category of National Artist upon deserving Filipino artists. The
Committee, composed of members of the Board of Trustees of
the CCP. They were tasked to draft the rules to guide its
deliberations in the choice of National Artists.
National Artist Award was again reiterated in
Presidential Decree No. 208 issued on June 7, 1973. On April 3,
1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law
Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts,
was signed into law. It established the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate
over the development, promotion and preservation of the
Filipino national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural
heritage. Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under
Republic Act No. 7356 is to extend recognition of artistic
achievement through awards, grants and services to artists and
cultural groups which contribute significantly to the Filipinos
cultural legacy. The NCCA is vested with the power to advise
the President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts,
including the creation of a special decoration or award, for
persons who have significantly contributed to the development
and promotion of Philippine culture and arts. As both the CCP
Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to
promote, develop and protect the Philippine national culture
and the arts, and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino
artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer
the National Artists Award. Thereafter, they reviewed the
guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration of
the National Artists Award. The CCP and NCCA adopted the
revised guidelines in September 2007 (Administration of the
Award, Criteria for Selection, Nomination Procedure, Screening
and Selection Process, Presentation of Awards)
In 1996, the NCCA and the CCP created a National Artist
Award Secretariat. They added another layer to the selection
process to involve and allow the participation of more members
of the arts and culture sector of the Philippines in the selection
of who may be proclaimed a National Artist.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s.
2003. The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of
National Artists and raised to the level of a Cultural Order,
fourth in precedence among the orders and decorations that
comprise the Honors of the Philippines. Executive Order No.
236, s. 2003, recognizes the vital role of the NCCA and the CCP
in identifying Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to
arts and letters and states that the National Artist recognition is
conferred upon the recommendation of the Cultural Center of
the Philippines and the National Commission for Culture and
the Arts.
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, was subsequently issued
on June 8, 2005. It amended the wording of Executive Order No.
236, s. 2003, on the Order of National Artists and clarified that
the NCCA and the CCP shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists.
On January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA Board
of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to
discuss, among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of
National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award
Secretariat. The nomination period was set for September 2007
to December 31, 2007, which was later extended to February 28,
2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held from January
to March 2008.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 34

The panel convened and started at 87 nominees which
was eventually reduced in to shortlists several times until it had
finally submitted a final list to PGMA. Subsequently, a letter was
referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and
individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Maosa
and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly
processed these nominations and invited resource persons to
validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees. A
recommendation was again submitted to PGMA and acting on
this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel
Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009.
Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829
were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz
and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently
announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita on July 29, 2009.
ISSUE:
WON due process and equal protection were violated.
RULING:
The petition is hereby GRANTED in PART.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming
respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Maosa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National
Artists are declared INVALID andSET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno fails to pass rational
scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would
justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the
law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established
guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into
effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the
Order of National Artists he is entitled to be given an equal
opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there
was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this
case.
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution when the former President gave preferential
treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno. The former Presidents constitutional duty to
faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines and
policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the
nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the
conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the
rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an
arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of
National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with
grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.







4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 35

FELICIDAD M. ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N.
MABANGLO, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN; HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO
DESIERTO; and HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO,
JR., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, respondents.
G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999
DOCTRINE: Due Process in relation to speedy disposition of
cases
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN

FACTs: Petitioner Felicidad M. Roque was a Schools Division
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato, until her
compulsory retirement on May 17, 1991 (pp. 2-3, Petition).
Petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo was likewise a
Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS, assigned in
Tagum, Davao Province, until his compulsory retirement on
May 8, 1997 (ibid.)
On January 14, 1991, Laura S. Soriano and Carmencita
Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, by virtue of COA Regional Office
Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991, conducted
an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECS
Regional Office No. XI to its division offices (Annexes M and N,
Petition).
As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez
found some major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019), violations of
COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and
Section 88 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 (ibid.).
Consequently, affidavits of complaint were filed before
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against several
persons, including petitioner Mabanglo on May 7, 1991, and
against petitioner Roque on May 16, 1991 (ibid.).
In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for a
preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner
Mabanglo was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that
involving petitioner Roque was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0203
(Annex O, Petition).
Thereafter, petitioners filed their respective counter-
affidavits (p. 4, Petition).
On March 18, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0201, which involved
petitioner Mabanglo, was resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding that all the respondents [were]
probably guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019). The same
was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on
September 19, 1997.
An Information dated March 18, 1997, for Violation of
Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, was filed before
the Sandiganbayan, Manila, against several respondents, among
them, petitioner Prudencio N. Mabanglo. The same was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 24229.
On April 30, 1997, OMB-MIN-91-0203, which involved
petitioner Roque, was resolved by the Office of the
Ombudsman-MIndanao, recommending the filing [of cases] and
prosecution of all the respondents for violation of Section 3 (e)
and (g) of Republic Act 3019. The same was approved by
respondent Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997.
Two Informations similarly dated April 30, 1997, for
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and
for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic 3019, as amended,
were filed before the Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations
charged several respondents, among whom was petitioner
Roque. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case No. 24105
and Criminal Case No. 24106, respectively.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 36

On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant
petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that [a]fter
the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary
investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and the subsequent
submission of their counter-affidavits, until the present[,] or
more than six (6) years, no resolution has been issued by the
Public Respondent [and no] case [has] been filed with the
appropriate court against the herein Petitioner (par. 3, p. 4,
Petition).
On November 24, 1997, this Honorable Court issued a
temporary restraining order directing respondents to cease and
desist from further proceeding with the cases filed against
petitioners.
[2]

On August 21, 1998, petitioners asked the Court to cite
respondents in contempt, contending that a criminal
information was filed in violation of the Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO). In compliance with this Courts Resolution dated
October 21, 1998,
[3]
the respondents filed their Comment to the
Petition for Contempt.
[4]

ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay
in resolving [the] complaints against petitioners (respondents
therein) which violated their constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases

HELD: Yes, there was. The Supreme Court held that clearly, the
delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsmans duty, as
mandated by the Constitution
[12]
and Republic Act No.
6770,
[13]
to act promptly on complaints before him. More
important, it violated the petitioners rights to due process and
to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against them. Although
respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by
Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy
Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took
almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints.
[14]
Thus,
in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, this Court dismissed a
Complaint that had been pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman for more than six years, ruling as follows:
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than
six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints against petitioner to be violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy
disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the
dismissal of said criminal cases...
[15]

Similarly, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,
[16]
this Court
dismissed the Complaints, which the then tanodbayan was able
to resolve only after the lapse of three years since the cases had
been submitted for disposition, viz.:
We find the long delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case
to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due
process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law
governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by
the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of
the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
speedy disposition of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that delay may be due
to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official. In the first place, such a statement suggests
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 37

a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically
rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the
petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement
of assets and liabilities required by Republc Act 3019, which
certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such painstaking and grueling scrutiny as would
justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to
alleged bribery and alleged giving [of] unwarranted benefits to a
relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual
issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three
years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We are not persuaded by respondents argument that the
Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic when the
Complaints were resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao and the Informations were filed. The same
contention was rejected in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, wherein
the Court declared that the long and unexplained delay in the
resolution of the criminal complaints against petitioners was not
corrected by the eventual filing of the Informations. The Court
ruled:
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the
preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even
the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not
warrant dismissal of the information. True --- [for] the absence
of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now,
man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
x x x the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the
petitioner to due process and the speedy disposition of cases
against him. Accordingly, the informations x x x should be
dismissed x x x.
[17]

Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a ruling
directing the dismissal of Ombudsman Case Nos. OMB-MIN-91-
0201 and OMB-MIN-91-0203, this Court, in the interest of the
speedy disposition of cases, resolves to dismiss the above cases
directly. This ruling is in line with Angchangco, in which the
Court dismissed the complaints outright, although petitioner
therein sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so.

23. ANG TIBAY vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.,
Gr no. 46496 February 27, 1940
LAUREL, J.:
DOCTRINE: Although the CIR can act without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidencebut may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable, this does NOT
mean that CIR can entirely ignore or disregard
the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative character.
FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a
leather company which supplies to the Philippine Army. Due to
the alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of
members of National Labor Union, Inc. NLU alleges that such
claim was unsupported by the Bureau of Customs records and
the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme
adopted to discharge all the members of the NLU from work.
Hence, they say that Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
practice for discriminating against NLU and unjustly favoring
National Workers Brotherhood.
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As regards the exhibits attached to this case, NLU says
that these are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the CIR. In addition,
the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
herein. Hence, they pray for a new trial to be able to present the
newly obtained evidence before the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been due process of law.
HELD: The Court ruled that there should be a new trial for
NLU. All administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process. The
first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party
be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. Not only must
there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but
the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of
Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall
be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove
NOTES:
Court of Industrial Relations
Special court whose functions are stated in CA No. 103
More of an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system
Function is more active, affirmative, dynamic
Exercises judicial / quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees
Has jurisdiction over the entire PH re: matters
concerning employer-employee, landlord-tenant/farm-
laborer relations
Can take cognizance of industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout provided that
The number of employees involved exceeds 30
Such dispute is submitted to the Court by the Labor Sec.
or by any / both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by Labor Sec. as proper to be dealt with by the
court
Investigates and studies all pertinent facts related to the
industry concerned when directed by the PH President
There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers


4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 39

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, JR. vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-52245
January 22, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
DOCTRINES: Equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is
not violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to
the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the
same class.
FACTS: Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of
Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said
position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter
and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified
voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. They assail Batas
Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution. It provides that:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of
section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are
hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective
officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official
who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term
of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired.

Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, on the other hand,
assails the validity of Sec 7 of BP 51 (Terms of Office = 6 years);
Sec 4 of BP 52 (any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State shall not be qualified to be a candidate for
any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any
partisan political activity); Sec 1 of BP 52; and BP 53
(accreditation of some political parties by respondent
COMELEC).
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Court can exercise its function of judicial
review in this case?
2) Whether or not Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to equal
protection?
HELD:
1) NO. In the present case, there is a misjoinder of
parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to
that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan. Petitioner Dumlao does
not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their
complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They
respectively contest completely different statutory provisions.
Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity
as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is
more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners
plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it
would have required only a modicum more of effort tor
petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and
Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the
interest of orderly procedure.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 40

Furthermore, there are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial
review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case: (2) an
interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that
the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide
the case. In the present case, only the third requisite was
present. Nevertheless, the Court was not entirely
without discretion in the matter. The Courts
adherence to the strict procedural standard was
relaxed.

2) NO. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of
BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by
the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision
have already been filed with the COMELEC.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger
ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In the case of retirees, retirement from government service may
or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local
officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is
not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official,
who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running
for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work,
but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will
neither result from the application of the challenged provision.
Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither
does it permit of such denial. Persons similarly situated are
similarly treated.

Equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose
of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger
blood in local governments. The classification in question being
pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even
it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies."
First paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52
was declared VALID.




4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 41

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
BARREDO, J., concurring: As regards the matter of equal
protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I
is more expensive than the equal protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring: Paragraph 2, section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain
presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4885
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: Wish to add that a judgment
of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa
Big. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring: It was a cause for concern, for
me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in
the recent past had shown less than full awareness of the
doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application
whenever the exercise of this awesome and delicate
responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or
presidential decree is invoked.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I dissent from the majority's
dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory
and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52. To
specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired
elective local official from running for the same elective office
(of governor, in this case) previously held by him and from
which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable.
Persons similarly situated are not similarly treated, e.g. a retired
vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for
governor (because the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to
run for the same elective office from which he retired) but
petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any
other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is
barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid
distinction? Is this not an arbitrary discrimination against
petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was
concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of petition
to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya? Is
there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal
constitutional guarantee that equal protection and security shall
be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not
Identical circumstances?

CASE # 25
G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995
THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING
AGENCIES, INC., et al., vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR AND
THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.
DOCTRINES:(1) While the making of laws is a non-delegable
power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the
latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that
may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.
(2) It is an established principle of constitutional
law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And
for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 42

(3) The constitutional prohibition against
impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be
read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with
respect to property or some object of value and which confer
rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no
application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the State and
involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise
by the State of its police power by enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals;
comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though
contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be
placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and
control them.

FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies,
Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning
agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies
which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their
respective foreign shipowner-principals, seek to annul
Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the
ground, among others, that:(1) The POEA does not have the
power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death
and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in
ocean-going vessels; only Congress can; (2) Even granting that
the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the
standards for its exercise.(3) That the resolution and the
memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate
the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of
contracts clauses of the Constitution.
Governing Board Resolution No. 01, issued on 14 January
1994,

read as follows:
GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01 SERIES OF 1994.
xxxxxxxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the POEA Governing Board, in a meeting
duly convened, hereby resolves to amend and increase the
compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II,
Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which shall
henceforth read as follows:
I. Section C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
1. In case of death of the seaman during the term of his Contract,
the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency
equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional
amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of twenty-one
(21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate
prevailing during the time of payment.
Where the death is caused by warlike activity while sailing
within a declared warzone or war risk area, the compensation
payable shall be doubled. The employer shall undertake
appropriate warzone insurance coverage for this purpose.
xxxxxxxxx
III. The maximum rate provided under Appendix I-A shall
likewise be adjusted to US$50,000 regardless of rank and
position of the seafarer.
IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits
herein provided shall apply to any Filipino seafarer on board
any vessel, provided, that the cause of action occurs after this
Resolation takes effect.


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ISSUES: (1) Whether or not POEA can promulgate rules by
virtue of a delegation of legislative power.
(2) Whether or not the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract
clauses of the Constitution.
(3) Whether or not the assailed resolution and
memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of
Rights.
HELD:
(FIRST ISSUE) YES.
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of
the POEA-based on impermissible delegation of legislative
power had been, as correctly contented by the public
respondents, brushed aside by the Supreme Court inEastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.

The authority to issue the said
regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797, reading as follows:
. . . The governing Board of the
Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided,
shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the
National Seamen Board, which, as earlier
observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping
contract substantially the same as the format
adopted by the POEA.
Another challenge is more serious as it is true that
legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the
legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered
by the legislature to the delegate.
The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable
to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially
important in the case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when delegation is permitted. The occasions are
rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by
the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of
legislative power, however, such occasions have become more
and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The
growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar
and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative
bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found
it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general
provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."With this power, administrative
bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute
by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 44

promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations,
such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force
and effect of law.
It is, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that,
while the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable,
if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.

This is the
principle of subordinate legislation.
(SECOND ISSUE)NO.
There isno merit to the claim that the assailed resolution
and memorandum circular violate the equal protection and
contract clauses of the Constitution. To support its contention of
inequality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign
shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in
favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are
not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated
by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the
classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class. There can be no
dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-
based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things,
work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb,
and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

(THIRD ISSUE) NO.
There is no merit in the claim that the resolution and
memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of
Rights.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing
contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with
literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to
property or some object of value and which confer rights that
maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to
statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.
It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police
power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the
community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for
such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of
the State to regulate and control them.
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all
contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject
to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or
as experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the
Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police
power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but
are impresses with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly
provides:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and
labor are not merely contractual. They are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts
lust yield to the common good. Therefore, such
contracts are subject to the special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 45

closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of
labor and similar subjects.

The challenged resolution and memorandum circular
being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted
under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down
on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold
otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and
to subordinate the police power to the contract clause.

G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRINE: Equal Protection of Laws: Election to the position
of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-
pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on
two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts
1
is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases.
ISSUE: Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
HELD: In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down
to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws."
6
This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.
7
The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the
people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the
duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House
of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few
of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 46

has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can
also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The
importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise.
The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling
under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty
to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer
must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest
wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in
favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
8

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
9

We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
10

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against
the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office
gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police
power of the State.




Separate Opinions
GONZAGA-REYES,J., concurring opinion;
I agree with theponencia that to allow accused-appellant
to attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified
broadening of the privilege from the arrest bestowed by the
Constitution upon members of Congress. Neither the legislative
history of this provision nor the general principles of official
immunity support an expanded interpretation of such privilege.
It should also be mentioned that, under the factual
circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege from
arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and academic. The
constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal
process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired
over the accused by means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no
longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact,
he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial
court.
Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election
constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an
expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by
even the police power of the State is hollow. In Aguinaldo v.
Comelec,
11
Aguinaldo v. Santos
12
and in Salalima v. Guingona
13

we laid down the doctrine that a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove therefor. This doctrine of
forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which
the re-elected official may have committed during his previous
term.
14
The administrative liability of a public officer is separate
and distinct from his penal liability.


4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 47

Stonehill v. Diokno
Doctrine: Search and Seizure General Warrants
Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine
Facts:
Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged
to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant
was issued against their persons and their corporation. The
warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into
(2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books
and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed
of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado
doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized
are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal
cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC
emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation
for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of
action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of
the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right
against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant
was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed
a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 48

violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the
aforementioned applications without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise
abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective
search warrant is emphasized.




G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO BELOCURA y PEREZ, Accused-Appellant.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Appellant Reynaldo Belocura is a police officer. One day
while driving his newly-assembled jeep, he was caught
committing a traffic violation of illegal use of government plate.
The apprehending officer was one PO2 Santos. Thereafter, a
visual search of his jeep was made. There was found a plastic
bag colored red and white named Shin Ton Yon. The plastic
bag contained 1.7kg of marijuana. Consequently, he was charged
with illegal possession of 1,789.823 grams of marijuana in
violation of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The lower court
convicted him which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
During the trial in the lower court, the alleged police officer PO2
Santos who actually caught Belocura was not presented as
witness during trial. As for Belocuras part, one of his main
argument in the present petition is that the prohibited drugs
seized from him was illegally made, thus should be inadmissible
as evidence, having been the fruit of the poisonous tree.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid search made on Belocuras
vehicle.
RULING:
Yes.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating
Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation
and Traffic Code).
21
In flagrante delicto means in the very act of
committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto
necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 49

an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct
evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption."
22
Even by his
own admission, he was actually committing a crime in the
presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such
manner by which Belocura was apprehended fell under the first
category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest
was valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby
became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person
and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might
be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from
him and the area within his reach or under his control, like the
jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the
incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from
being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon.
Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not
by itself be the basis of his acquittal.
23


***However, Belocura was still acquitted for the reason
that the Corpus Delicti of the crime was not established. First,
PO2 Santos was not presented as witness during the trial in the
lower court. Second, there was no accounting of the seized
drugs from Belocuras possession. It only means that there was
no proper compliance of the chain-of-custody requirement
enshrined in the Dangerous Drugs Act. Thus, acquittal of
Belocura is called for.






MARYNETTE GAMBOAvs.P/SSUPT. MARLOU C.
CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his
capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial
Office, Ilocos Norte
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
SERENO, J.:
Doctrine: The right to privacy is considered a fundamental
right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. When
the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these
cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding
state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
Facts:
In 2009, PresidentArroyo issued A.O. 275, "Creating an
Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country."
7
The body, which was later on
referred to as the Zearosa Commission, was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon
the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.
Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its
evening news program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a
PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as
someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified
information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 50

to the Zearosa Commission. As a result, she claimed that her
malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also
made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified
with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance
operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents, praying
for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports
from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification
of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to
refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e)
restraining respondents from making baseless reports.
RTC Br. 13, ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list
of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report,
constituted a violation of her right to privacy. By her inclusion in
the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed
that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboas activities. It
cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis
therefor.
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless
dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to
prove through substantial evidence that the subject information
originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this
database to the Zearosa Commission without the benefit of
prior verification. The trial court also ruled that even before
respondents assumed their official positions, information on her
may have already been acquired. Gamboa then filed the instant
Appeal by Certiorari.
Issue:WON Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ
of habeas data.

Held:
NO.The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and
to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. In order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other.
The right to informational privacy, as a specific
component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding
legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of
whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an
extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a
delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life
of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of
private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the
duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment
of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national
police commission.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear
that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim,
which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate
objective of dismantling them permanently.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently
establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a
PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP
to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 51

violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or
security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share
intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created
for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance
from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander,
the fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and
without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot
be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy
since that act is an inherent and crucial component of
intelligence-gathering and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa
herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which
was used to update information on individuals associated with
PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the
field.
66
Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the
Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it was
leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even
warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed
to establish that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs
available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state
interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion
on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant
to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of
habeas data must be denied.

EN BANC G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and
WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL,
City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS
ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento,
Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.
DOCTRINE: (1) Probable cause" required to justify the
issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and
circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them
and act in pursuant thereof. Mere generalization will not suffice
and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon
which a warrant may issue. (2) Search Warrants must not be a
general warrant. There must be specific, definite guidelines,
containing particular descriptions on what items are to be seized
or taken. It cannot be too general, and all embracing. (3) As an
incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was
made can also be search without a search warrant. The extent
and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own
facts and circumstances. What must be considered is the
balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals.
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 52

FACTS: Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused still at large
charged with the crime of Rebellion in People vs Jose Ma. Sison.
At 11:30 AM of August 6, 1984 she was the arrested by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon
Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City with Cynthia D.
Nolasco. at 12:00 Noon CSG searched the premises at 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City. Respondents alleged that the search
was conducted "late on the same day". Earlier at around 9:00
A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a
Search Warrant (AKA Search Warrant case) from Hon. Ernani
Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City. The CSG determined the property to be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round
the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." A Search warrant was
issued by Judge Pao after deposing Saldajeno and S/A Dionicio
Lapus who claimed personal knowledge that subversive
document can be found in said place. Search was made in the
presence of two tanods and the owner of the building. Willie
Tolentino was arrested being the care-taker of the premises. The
searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, a
portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in
all. NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO on August
10th, were charged for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33
(Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) before Branch 42
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (AKA
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio
P. Santos, presided. Judge Pano decided to admit the 431
documents seized subject to disposition of tribunal trying the
case. Petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress the Subversive
Documents claiming that the proceedings for the Search
Warrant were unlawful and thus the documents were illegally
seized and inadmissible as evidence. Judge Santos denied
Motion claiming that it is tribunal of Judge Pano who should
decide on the validity of the Search Warrant. Thus a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the
Search Warrant and the denial of their Motion to Suppress.
PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is
void because it is a general warrant, and that probable cause has
not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant's witness.
ISSUE (1) WON Search Warrant No. 80-84 which was issued
was valid.
(2) WON Search without warrant was lawful.
HELD: (1) No. First, probable cause was not
established properly. The questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The "probable
cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a
cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. Of
the 8 questions asked, three pertain to Identity; two are leading
not searching questions; three refer to the description of the
personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search
Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The
examination conducted was general in nature and merely
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. Second, the
warrant issued falls under the category of a general
warrant. It does not specify what the subversive books and
instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to
the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to
be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion
regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also
were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the
nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 53

similar description were considered null and void for being too
general. The language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of
whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is
constitutionally objectionable. This infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of
things to be seized.
(2) Yes. The SC ruled that notwithstanding the
irregular issuance of the Search Warrant some
searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section
12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides: Section 12.
Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense. The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is
confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person
who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an
incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was
made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter
case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be
decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been
stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some
confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of
the place or premises which may be searched. "What must be
considered is the balancing of the individual's right to privacy
and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals."
In sum. The SC held the arrest to be valid. The Search
warrant issued was null and void. The Search was
justified being incidental to the arrest considering the
balance of individual rights to privacy and public
interest.
Consti Provision: Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution,
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Breakdown of Votes. Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr.,
De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur. Makasiar, C.J.,
concurs in the result.Aquino, J.; took no part. Concepcion Jr.,
J., reserves his vote.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting: Claims Search
warrant has correctly been declared null and void being a
general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional
mandate. The majority pronouncement that as an incident to
arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City
could have been searched, even without a warrant, for evidence
of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional proscription
and settled law and jurisprudence. The arresting CSG Group
themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and
obtained the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule
126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is
lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time
of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a
place other than the place of arrest.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting: Concur in
the annulment of Search Warrant No. 80-84 Claims Panos
action can only be described as deplorable. I cannot agree with
Justice Cuevas, statement that not all the things seized can be
ordered returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive
materials seized by the government agents." What are
subversive materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 54

a conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the
determination? Certainly not the military for it is not competent.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting I agree with the
pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search
warrant No. 80-84 Being in the nature of a general warrant, it
violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be particularly
described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution) I, dissent to
dictum justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court. The same must be limited to and
circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As
to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect
to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from
him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense." As to time
and place search must have been conducted at about the time of
the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where
the suspect was arrested, it cannot extend to other places. Being
without SW search is illegal and items are inadmissible as
evidence.

GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
PERALTA, J.:
DOCTRINE: . In determining whether or not the right to the
speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid
down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
FACTS: On Oct 13, 2004 Maj Gen Carlos P. Garcia was issued a
restriction to quarters by Col. Henry A. Galarpe, by command of
Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes. He was not allowed to leave his
quarters. He was then charged before the Court martial of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman for failure to
disclose all his existing assets for his SALN (Statement of Assets
Liabilities and Net Worth) during the year 2003 violating his
oath to uphold the constitution. He was also charged with
Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline when
he made false statements in the same SALN. He was found
guilty and sentenced dishonorably discharged from service. On
Nov 18 2004 he retired from service. After trial, at the Special
General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings
or the After-Trial Report
5
of the same court was read to the
petitioner discharging him from service and forfeit all pay and
allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard
labor at such place the reviewing authority may direct for a
period of two (2) years. After six (6) years and two (2) months of
preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner was
released from the Camp Crame Detention Center. On September
9, 2011The Office of the President, or the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the Confirming
Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence
imposed by the Court Martial against petitioner. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari
and petition for habeas corpus, alternatively. However, this
Court, in its Resolution

dated October 10, 2011, denied the
petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration
13
dated November 15, 2011, but was denied by
this Court on December 12, 2011.
Petitioner contends that he should no longer serve such
sentence as he already served the same during his preventive
confinement. He invokes equal protection clause as Art 29 of the
RPC, applicable to those convicted by civil courts for criminal
cases, should also be made available to him as Court martials
are no different from civil courts. He also invokes his right to
speedy disposition of cases.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the equal protection
clause?
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WON there was a violation of his right to the speedy
disposition of his case?
HELD: Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made
applicable in the present case. In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, this Court ruled that a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court"
akin to any other courts. In the same case, this Court clarified as
to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 17

of
the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to
appear as counsel in any criminal case in which an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office. This Court held: We are of the opinion
and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any
court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial
case is a criminal case within the meaning of the above quoted
provisions of our Constitution. That court-martial cases are
criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of
the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and
misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the Articles of War are
offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. Considering
that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October
2004, the entire period of his confinement since 18 October
2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year
sentence of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.
The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the
Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through the state's duly-constituted authorities.
39
In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.
40
It, however, does not
require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the
same class.

"Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
42
In the present case, petitioner belongs to the
class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is
entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no
substantial distinction between those who are convicted of
offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and
the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning,
petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. It must be
remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the
petitioner violated are penal in nature.
As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy
disposition of his case was violated, this Court finds the same to
be without merit.
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a
speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of cases.

However, it
needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. In determining
whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has
been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines:
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(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay
during the trial. What is being questioned by petitioner is the
delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically,
the case has already been decided by the General Court Martial
and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing authorities
without any delay. The only thing missing then was the
confirmation of sentence by the President. The records do not
show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of
the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence
was finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any
positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of
Appeals,
47
where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of
delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully
complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or
disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason for the
failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution.
Petitioner merely sat and waited.

PEOPLE vs COURT of APPEALS, 4
TH
DIVISION
GR No. 198589, 7/25/12
Reyes, J.:
DOCTRINE: Mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled
principal that acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. A re-examination of
the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to
repose of an accused, which the rule against double jeopardy
protects.
FACTS: Respondent Juliet Ando was convicted of 3 counts of
Falsification of Public Documents by MeTC Br. 26 for making it
appear that Tee Ong, private complainant Tees father, signed,
executed and sworn a Deed of Sale, an Affidavit, and a Transfer
of Rights of the business name, To Suy Hardware, in favour of
respondent Ando.
The petition alleged that Tee Ong was already dead at the
time the allegedly falsified documents were executed and
notarized. Furthermore, it was alleged that respondent Ando
was in possession of the falsified documents which gave rise to
the presumption that she was responsible for the falsifications
thereof.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision.
However, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
acquitted respondent Ando for failure of the prosecution to
prove that the subject documents were falsified without
presenting any expert witness to prove the falsities. Moreover,
the CA found that the lower courts have overlooked the fact that
Tee Ong might have executed the documents before he died.
Private complainant Tee alleged grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the CA, alleging that there was proof beyond
reasonable doubt, as found by the lower courts, that the
inconsistencies of respondent Andos statements and her
possession of the falsified documents led to the conclusion that
Ando forged Tee Ongs thumbmark and signature.
ISSUE: W/N the petition should be dismissed in view of the
principle of double jeopardy
HELD: Yes. In People vs Hon Tria-Tirona, the Supreme Court
reiterated that mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled
principal that acquittal is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. A re-examination of
the evidence without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to
repose of an accused, which the rule against double jeopardy
protects.
In the case at bar, the petition does not allege a mistrial
and the sole challenge posed by petitioners against the validity
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of the CAs disposition was its misappreciation of the evidence,
which was an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction or a
manifestation of grave abuse of discretion.
An acquittal, to be considered tainted with abuse of grave
discretion, must show that the prosecutions right to due process
was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
In this case, the petition is bereft of any allegation or
evidence that the prosecutions right to due process was violated
or the proceedings before the CA were a mockery such that
Andos acquittal was a foregone conclusion.
Thus, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the
interpretation of the applicable laws or the appreciation of
evidence that the CA may have committed in acquitting
respondent Ando, absent any showing that the CA acted with
caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due process, the
CAs findings can no longer be reversed, disturbed and set aside
without violating the rule against double jeopardy.

[G.R. No. 143384. February 4, 2005]
DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING, petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY,
INC., respondent.
TINGA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Under this second requirement (procedural due process),
two notices must be sent to the employee who is the subject of
an investigation for acts which may warrant his eventual
dismissal from employment. The notices required before an
employee may be validly dismissed are: (a) a written notice
served on the employee specifying the grounds for termination
and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain
his/her side; (b) a hearing or conference wherein the employee,
with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is given opportunity
to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut evidence
presented against him/her; and (c) written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify termination. The twin requirements of
notice and hearing constitute elements of due process in cases of
employees dismissal; the requirement of notice is intended to
inform the employee concerned of the employers intent to
dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the
other hand the requirement of hearing affords the employee an
opportunity to answer his employers charges against him and
accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is
effected.
Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee
that an investigation will be conducted on the charges
particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his
dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a plain statement
of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must
categorically state the effect on his employment if the charges
are proven to be true.
Where the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case,
the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer
to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later,
which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Maquiling was employed by respondent
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTS). He was then
dismissed from service as Deputy Executive Director after
serving PTS for twenty-three (23) years. Dr. Maquiling filed a
complaint against PTS for reinstatement or, in the alternative,
for payment of full backwages and separation pay in accordance
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with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as well as moral damages
and exemplary damages.
The records disclose that Dr. Maquiling received a memo
dated 2 April 1991 from the PTS OIC-Executive Director Andres
B. Soriano (Soriano) directing him to submit within five (5) days
from notice a written explanation on the following matters:
1. The delayed GSIS remittances;
2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing
in our financial statement for 1990;
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in
connection with the Dale Carnegie and Silva
Mind Control Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses
appearing in our financial statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract
with Ultra.
The PTS Executive Committee approved Sorianos findings
and recommendations calling for his dismissal effective
immediately, without any retirement benefits.
Despite Sorianos instruction for him not to report for work,
Dr. Maquiling continued to report for work at the PTS daily. In
the meantime, he elevated his case to the PTS Board of Directors
which sought to point out the illegality of his dismissal from
office and prayed for a resolution upholding his position.
Dr. Maquiling, protested the non-payment of his salary but
PTS informed Dr. Maquiling that there are no wages
forthcoming inasmuch as the latters service had been
terminated for cause since 7 June 1991.
In an effort to exhaust the remedies within PTS, Dr.
Maquiling wrote the President of PTS a letter dated 5 August
1991 saying, among others: my counsels agree with me that if
your Board does not act on my 28 June 1991 Memorandum
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter, such omission
will mean a confirmation of Sorianos notice of my alleged
termination from the service a dismissal which is referable to
the proper outside forum.
Receiving no response from the PTS, Dr. Maquiling stopped
reporting for work at the PTS in the last week of September
1991. Then, on 10 October 1991, Dr. Maquiling filed his
complaint with the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC and the Labor Arbiter both found the dismissal
from service of Dr. Maquiling illegal. However, theCourt of
Appeals reversed the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter
by ordering the dismissal of the complaint and declaring that his
dismissal from employment as legal and valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Maquiling was afforded due process.
HELD:
NO. Dr. Maquiling was dismissed from employment for
just cause consisting of loss of trust and confidence. The records
reveal that he was Deputy Executive Director of PTS, a
responsible position, at the time of his dismissal.
PTS imputes the delayed GSIS remittances to Dr.
Maquilings failure to follow his duties as prescribed by law. The
records disclose that Dr. Maquiling was aware of the problem
but he failed to give priority thereto. This non-remittance was
partially brought about by a Guideline on the Releasing of
Checks he issued, which placed the GSIS account as a last
priority. The security of workers compensation was undermined
by his act which patently transgressed the constitutional
injunction that workers should be afforded full protection in
their employment. Subsumed in said mandate is the protection
of the right to workmens compensation to which a lowly worker
may be entitled. To rule otherwise would frustrate the policy
that the State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 59

employees compensation program whereby employees and
their dependents, in the event of work-connected disability or
death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit, and
medical or related benefits.
Recent decisions of this Court distinguish the treatment of
managerial from that of rank-and-file personnel insofar as the
application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is
concerned. Thus, with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of
trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof
of involvement in the alleged events in question and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will
not suffice. But as regards a managerial employee, mere
existence of a basis for believing that such employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his
dismissal.
After careful perusal of the factual backdrop of the case, we
rule that Dr. Maquiling was indeed validly dismissed for just
cause. However, PTS was remiss in its duty to observe
procedural due process in effecting the dismissal of Dr.
Maquiling.
Under this second requirement, two notices must be sent to
the employee who is the subject of an investigation for acts
which may warrant his eventual dismissal from employment.
The notices required before an employee may be validly
dismissed are: (a) a written notice served on the employee
specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee
reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side; (b) a hearing or
conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel
if so desired, is given opportunity to respond to the charge,
present his evidence or rebut evidence presented against
him/her; and (c) written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify
termination. The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute elements of due process in cases of employees
dismissal; the requirement of notice is intended to inform the
employee concerned of the employers intent to dismiss and the
reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand the
requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to
answer his employers charges against him and accordingly to
defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.
Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee
that an investigation will be conducted on the charges
particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his
dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a plain statement
of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must
categorically state the effect on his employment if the charges
are proven to be true.
This notice will afford the employee an opportunity to avail
all defenses and exhaust all remedies to refute the allegations
hurled against him for what is at stake is his very life and limb
his employment. Otherwise, the employee may just disregard
the notice as a warning without any disastrous consequence to
be anticipated. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short
of the requirement of due process. Ones work is everything,
thus, it is not too exacting to impose this strict requirement on
the part of the employer before the dismissal process be validly
effected. This is in consonance with the rule that all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations,
shall be resolved in favor of labor.
It is worthy to note that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals all agree in concluding that procedural due
process in the instant case was not observed.
The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the
dismissal is for just cause but statutory due process was not
observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural
infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal.
However, the employer should be held liable for non-
compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
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Where the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case,
the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the
employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his
statutory rights. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer
to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later,
which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction
should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should
depend on the facts of each case, taking into special
consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the
employer.

G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
MALCOLM, J.:
Doctrine: The guaranties of a free speech and a free press
include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration
of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is
wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a
judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any
public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty
it is to inquire into and punish them.
Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, then prepared and signed a petition to
the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for
his removal. The complainants charged that the justice of the
peace solicited bribe money in consideration of favorable
decisions. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the
judge of first instance of the district. The judge of first instance,
after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that
the justice of the peace be removed from office. After filing a
motion for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the
suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace
of the same. Criminal action was then begun against the
petitioners, now become the defendants, charging that portions
of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were
libelous. The information stated that: That on or about the
month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame
Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province,
wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false,
scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the
justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which
writing appear among other things the following:
That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan
Serrano, of this town of Macabebe, on account of the
conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct highly
improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a
public functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently
immoral and dangerous to the community, and
consequently unworthy of the office.
That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a
clear and positive manner by facts so certain, so serious,
and so denigrating which appear in the affidavits
attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious, but
which the undersigned refrain from citing herein for the
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sake of brevity and in order not to bother too much the
attention of your Honor and due to lack of sufficient
proof to substantiate them.
That should the higher authorities allow the said justice
of the peace of this town to continue in his office, the
protection of the rights and interests of its inhabitants
will be illusory and utopic; rights and interest solemnly
guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in
this town will not be administered in accordance with
law.
That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office
and of his bad conducts as such justice of the peace,
previous to this time, some respectable citizens of this
town of Macabebe were compelled to present an
administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan
Serrano before the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in
which case there were made against him various charges
which were true and certain and of different characters.
That after the said administrative case was over, the said
justice of the peace, far from charging his bad and
despicable conduct, which has roused the indignation of
this town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts
abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits herewith
attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to
show his mistaken valor and heroism.'
All of this has been written and published by the accused
with deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor,
and reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman
Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public
hatred contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law.
The trial court found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and
sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court for review of the evidence.

Issue: Whether Bustos, et al. are entitled to constitutional
protection by virtue of their right to free speech and free press

Held: YES
Defendants are acquitted. Express malice was not proved by the
prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners.
Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the
petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the
proper functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of
punishing them for an honest endeavour to improve the public
service, they should rather be commended for their good
citizenship.
History of freedom of speech in the Philippines. Freedom of
speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the
Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was
consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de
Cien Anos" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.)
describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos
insist upon, said: "The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be
reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines
free and by instituting Filipino delegates." The Malolos
Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill
of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and
assembly and petition.
Liberty to comment on the conduct of public men in free speech.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the
abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 62

be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must
expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising
superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive,
to the Legislature, to the Judiciary -- to any or all the agencies of
Government -- public opinion should be the constant source of
liberty and democracy. (See the cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4
L.R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3 F. & F., 372; The
Queen vs. Sir R. Garden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right
to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or
badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If
the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled.
Right to assemble and petition. The right to assemble and
petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means
a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of
course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Privileged communication. Public policy, the welfare of society,
and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable
result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. "The doctrine of privileged communications rests
upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may
in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and
malignant slanderer.'" (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce,
Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privileged communication; qualified. Privilege is classified as
either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned.
As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie
privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. In the usual case
malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies
on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant
the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to
proof of malice. But a privileged communication should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of
malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the
protection which the law throws over privileged
communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
SERENO, J.:
Doctrine: 1. While an accused may have failed to object to the
illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest. 2. When a person was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely
for this reason, arrested.
Facts: PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the
Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic
enforcer, testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00
oclock in the morning, he saw the Luz, who was coming from
the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal
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ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmets; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the accused is
almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1
Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was
alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of
the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it;
that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two
(2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife;
that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to
open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed
a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container
on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the
two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that
he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his
person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure,
because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding
that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not
even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city
ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims
that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
Issues: 1. Whether or not there was a lawful arrest. 2. Whether
or not there was a lawful search and seizure.
Held: 1. There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was
flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers
license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been "under
arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to
arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody.
Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely
as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-
station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in
front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no
intention to take petitioner into custody.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012,
which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued
if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by
a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner
was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic
violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the
reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of
arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
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rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
they might make could be used against them.
14
It may also be
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had
been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested"
when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he
waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for
him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers
allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their
custody.
2. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the
instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented
warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk"
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.

None of
the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a
lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While
he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the
earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. The subject items seized during the illegal
arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of
the accused.

36. DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, complainant, vs. HON.
JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO, respondent.
[A.M. No. 1120-MJ. May 5, 1976.]
ANTONIO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The right of the municipal mayor to examine
judicial records was sustained, subject to reasonable rules and
conditions.
FACTS: Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of Taal,
Batangas, was charged with abuse of authority in refusing to
allow employees of the Municipal Mayor of Taal to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in
connection with their contemplated report on the peace and
order conditions of the said municipality. In his answer,
respondent judge claimed that there has never been an intention
to refuse access to official court records; that although court
records are among public documents open to inspection not
only by the parties directly involved but also by other persons
who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same is
always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where
and how they may be inspected. The judge merely imposed
restrictions on the matter of examination, inspection, or copying
of his court records for fear that the right might be abused and
the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be at play.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted arbitrarily.
HELD: NO. The respondent allowed the complainant to open
and view the docket books of respondent under certain
conditions and under his command and supervision. It has not
been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the
respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records is
predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the
public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
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significance, hence, the people's right of free access to public
records is predicated on their right to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people
are entitled to information on matters of public concern and
thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as
documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject
to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role
of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no
realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is needed
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of
the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of
such information depends on protection for both its acquisition
and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the
flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to
certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon
a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders
ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
Justice Briones, in his concurring opinion in the case of Sabido
vs. Ozaeta, said that the public's right of access to public records
is not merely predicated on statutory right but on the
constitutional right of the press to have access to information as
the essence of press freedom. The Sabido case further states:
It is not his [official having custody of a public document] duty
to permit the office to be thronged needlessly with persons
examining its books of papers, but it is his duty to regulate,
govern, and control his office in such a manner as to permit the
statutory advantages to be enjoyed-by other persons not
employed by him as largely and extensibly as that consistently
can be done. What the law expects and requires from him is the
exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment, by which all
persons resorting to the office, under legal authority, and
conducting themselves in an orderly manner, shall be secured
their lawful rights and privileges, and that a corporation formed
in the manner in which the relator has been, shall be permitted
to obtain all the information either by searches, abstracts, or
copies, that the law has entitled it to obtain.
Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of
the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity,
we do not believe it is the duty under the law of these
officials having custody of such documents to concern
themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of
the person seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records
contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not
made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records,
it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof
which is called upon to devise a remedy. As to the moral or
material injury which the publication might inflict on other
parties, that is the publisher's responsibility and lookout. The
publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.
NOTE: In order to compel a public office or the official having
the custody of the public document to allow a citizen to examine
such document, petition for mandamus may be filed.








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SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION VS. CA
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
CORTES, J.
DOCTRINE:
Employees of the Social Security System (SSS) do not have the
right to strike. By reason of the nature of the public employer
and the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private
industry as not applying to public employees and civil service
employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast
to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the
public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as
are present in private labor relations could not exist in the
relations between government and those whom they employ.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June
9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal
strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the
strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and
that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and
that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to
act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of
the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent
employees and their entitlement to the same salaries,
allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the
SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and
after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the
employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and
unfair labor practices.
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary
restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction. On July 22, 1987, in a four-page
order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and
converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting
of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal. Hence, the
instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. In
dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals
held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined
by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS'
complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin the Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking
and order the striking employees to return to work.
HELD:
YES. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so,
or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from
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striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6
and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be
stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at
issue].
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
.2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the
civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and
that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum
prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the
employees of the SSS was illegal.
As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government-
Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the
instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of
employment in the government, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned
and controlled corporations with original charters are governed
by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of
securing changes thereof."

Case 38 G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FILEMON
REMIGIO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. VITUG, J.:
Doctrine: Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the state. The reason being that public welfare is
superior to private rights. Hence lands covered by P.D. No. 27
may not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the
promulgation of said decree.
Facts: Remigio obtained from PNB a loan secured by a real
estate mortgage covering five (5) parcels of land in Isabela.
Upon default in payment, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed on the
mortgage, and PNB acquired the encumbered assets. Remigio
redeemed the property in instalments. Subsequently,
Presidential Decree No. 27 was enacted mandating an agrarian
reform. Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer
Program" was launched; among the areas it covered were the
parcels of land of Remigiothat PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed.A Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between
PNB and Remigio. Remigio instituted an action for "Annulment
of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of Money and
Damages" against PNB.While the case was yet pending, PNB
additionally received from the Land Bank of the Philippines
cash and Land Bank Bonds in payment of the
foreclosedparcels that became the subject of
agrarianreform covering the subject property that were
previously mortgage to PNB by Remegio.Court of Appeals,
rendered a decision, ordering PNB to release the properties
andRemigio to transfer the rights to the tenants-beneficiaries in
favor of the Land Bank of the Philippines; declaring the deed of
promise to sell executed by the plaintiff and the defendant bank
rescinded.
Issue: Whether PD No. 27 may impair the obligation of the
mortgage contract.
Held: Yes, lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of
the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said
decree, it had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly
executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. There is no
question, however, that the land reform program of the
government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by
the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the
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exercise of the police power of the state. The Constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the state. One limitation
on the contract clause arises from the police power, the reason
being that public welfare is superior to private rights. The
situation here, is like that in eminent domain proceedings,
where the state expropriates private property for public use, and
the only condition to be complied with is the payment of just
compensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings do
not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely
appropriate or take for public use. As the Land Bank is obliged
to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee
is not left without any compensation. Police power subordinates
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AYSON,
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
Narvasa, J.
DOCTRINE:
A person suspected of having committed a crime and
subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the
following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing
evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the
public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after
having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him
by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to incriminate him for
some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
FACTS:
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It
having allegedly come to light that he was involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted, in accordance
with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the CBA signed
by it with the PALEA to which Ramos pertained.

On the day before the investigation, Ramos gave to his superiors
a handwritten notes stating that he was willing to settle
irregularities charged against him in the amount of
approximately P76,000.00. During investigation, the findings of
the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he
misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented
from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however
this did not ensue.

About two (2) months later, an information was filed against
Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa. On arraignment
on this charge, Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued. At the close of the people's case, the private
prosecutors offered the hand written admission given by Ramos,
to which defendants argued that the confession was taken
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without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent
Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not
reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judge was correct in making inadmissible
as evidence the admission and statement of accused
HELD:
NO. At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, to which respondent Judge has given a
construction that is disputed by the People.
(Note: The 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the
rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination,
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself,"
is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation,
which have been made more explicit, are now contained in
Section 12 of the same Article III.)
A person suspected of having committed a crime and
subsequently charged with its commission in court, has the
following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing
evidence, to wit
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the
public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after
having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the
police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence,
threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
rejected; and

2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him
by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to incriminate him for
some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe
Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as
the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket
sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation
did not therefore come into play, and were of no relevance to the
inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily
answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, and agreed that the proceedings
should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked
during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against
him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his
superiors, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged
irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.
They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called
"Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
* * *
Additional Discussion of Right v. Self Incrimination
and Rights in Custodial Investigation:
Right Against Self-Incrimination
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The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section
20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every
person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself".

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.
It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to
a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to
answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the
answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some
crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific
question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give
a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it,
appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to
him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense,
that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution does not impose on the judge, or other officer
presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-
incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know,
in accordance with the well known axiom that every one is
presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no
one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge
nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the
character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or
automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by
or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into
play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or
impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a
second right, or better said, group of rights. These rights apply
to persons "under investigation for the commission of an
offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police
authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from
that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-
incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to
any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.

This provision granting explicit rights to persons under
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It
is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Miranda v. Arizona, a decision described as an "earthquake
in the world of law enforcement."
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural
safeguards laid down for a person in police custody, "in-custody
interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an
adversary proceeding against the suspect:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those
rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
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and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings
and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in
some crime is within the scope of the constitutional protection.
If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under
investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is
not protected.

People v. Bravo -- It is not considered part of any custodial
inquest because it is conducted before that stage is reached
(PEOPLE vs. BRAVO 1999).

Christopher Gamboa v Hon. Alfredo Cruz
G.R. No. L-56291
Padilla, J.
Note: Rene V. Sarmiento appeared for petitioner
Doctrine:
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, such as when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused.The moment there is a move or even
an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information which may appear
innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
Facts:
The case herein is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, to annul and set aside the
order issued by herein respondent.
Patrolman Arturo Palencia arrested petitioner, without
warrant, for vagrancy on July 19, 1979. He was booked and
thereafter detained with several others. The following day, he
was called for a lineup with five other detainees. It was there
where complainant Erlinda Bernal pointed to petitioner, saying
that one is a companion. Petitioner was asked to stay and was
even told to sit down in front of complainant while the police
investigator was interrogating the latter.
An Information for Robbery was thereafter filed against
petitioner.
The records likewise show that it was after the
prosecution has formally offered its evidence that petitioner
filed a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. Such motion
was based on the fact that the conduct of the line-up, without
notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process.

Respondent court denied the said motion, hence this
petition.
Issue:
Was petitioners right to counsel violated when he was
deprived of counsel during the lineup?
Held:
The Court upheld the ruling of the lower court.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions
from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person
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being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
In this case, however, petitioner was not yet in a stage of
investigation. Agreeing with the Solicitor General, the Court
reiterated that the police line-up is not a part of the custodial
inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was
held that when the process had not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does
not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the
services of his lawyer.

The Court also took note that there was likewise no
deprivation of due process as to petitioner. It stated that
certiorari and prohibition are not proper remedies against an
order denying a Motion to Acquit. It is considered an
interlocutory order and hence may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law through an appeal from the judgment
after trial.
Dissent:
Chief Justice Yap:
The investigatory part of the proceedings started when
the accused was singled out and "ordered to sit down in front of
the complainant" while the latter gave her statement which led
to the filing of the information.
The majority overlooked the fact that the incident
objected to took place after the police line-up, when the accused
was made to confront the complainant, and the latter made her
statement which became the basis of the information filed
against the accused. The right to counsel must be afforded to the
accused the moment he is under custodial investigation, and not
only when a confession is being exacted from him.
Justice Sarmiento:
It is noteworthy that the accused was already in custody
at the time. And although he was detained for some other cause
vagrancy, it left him little or no choice other than to face his
accuser. It cannot be then gainsaid that as far as he was
concerned, the situation had reached what American
jurisprudence refers to as the "critical stage" of the inquiry, in
which the confrontation becomes an accusation rather than a
routine procedure preliminary to a formal prosecution. He was
in custody not for the "usual questioning" but for an existing
charge, although the investigation was in connection with
another offense. While I am not prepared to hold that a police
line-up per se amounts to a critical stage of the investigation, for
in most cases, it merely forms part of the evidence gathering
process, the fact that the accused herein stood charged for an
offense and has been detained therefor should make this case
different.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y
ORBISTA
G.R. No. 199877 AUGUST 13, 2012
REYES, J.
DOCTRINE: The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at
the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being
made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a
part of custodial investigation.
FACTS:
On May 31, 2001 at around 9:00 a.m., Sumulong, an
accounting staff, withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 to defray
the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian Allied Services,
Inc. He placed the money in a black bag, rode the pick-up, and
immediately left the bank. At around 10:30 a.m., while they
were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig
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City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the
pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, Akin na ang pera,
iyong bag, nasaan? Bautista, who was seated at the back,
shouted, Wag mong ibigay! Sumulong then threw the bag in
Bautistas direction and the latter alighted from the pick-up and
ran. Lara ran after Bautista while firing his gun. Sumulong left
to report the incident to their employers. When he returned, he
was informed by a bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag
was taken away from him.
On June 7, 2001, while Sumulong was on his way to
Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking along the
street. He alerted the police and thereafter, Lara was arrested.
At the police station, Lara was placed in a police line-up where
he was positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob, and Atie.
On arraignment, Laran pleaded not guilty. He interposed
alibi as his defense. He said that he was a plumber and that he
was at his house working on a sewer trench on the date and at
the time of the crime. The Regional Trial Court found Lara guilty
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Lara pointed out
several errors that supposedly attended his conviction, among
which are: 1.) He was arrested without warrant under
circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest; and 2.)
He was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a
line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in
violation of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
CA affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the identification made by the prosecution
witnesses in the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara
stood therein without the assistance of counsel.


HELD:
NO. Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided
with counsel when he was placed in a police line-up did not
invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he
stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did
not render Sumulongs identification of Lara inadmissible. The
right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment
custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a
police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial
investigation.
Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements.
During a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the
witnesses or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives
a statement in the course of the line-up.
EXTRA:
On Laras right against the warrantless or illegal arrest,
the court held that it may no longer invalidate the proceedings
because he failed to file a motion to quash the information on
that ground before entering his plea. He raised this error for the
first time on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such failure
constituted a waiver on his part.





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CASE # 43
G.R. No. 197550, September 25, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DE LOS REYES, Accused-
Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
DOCTRINE:The Constitution demands that an accused in a
criminal case be presumed innocent until otherwise proven
beyond reasonable doubt.Likewise, Section 2, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify
a conviction; anything less than that entitles the accused to an
acquittal.
FACTS:
This is an appeal of the Decision of the Court of
Appealswhich affirmed the Regional Trial Decision wherein
accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
(Prosecutions Version)
Several police officers received reports from the barangay
office and other concerned citizens regarding drug-dealing
activities in the locality of Porac, Pampanga. They immediately
conducted a casing and surveillance operation to verify the
reports. About four operations were carried out, on a weekly
basis, which confirmed that accused-appellant Enriquez was
indeed dealing drugs among the truck drivers and helpers
within the vicinity. After confirming the reports, a test-buy was
conducted. During the test-buy, SPO2 the asset of the operation
was able to buy P200.00 worth of shabu, which he confirmed to
be so by burning it, contrary to standard police procedure.After
the test-buy, a teamwas organized to conduct a buy-bust
operation. On June 3, 2003, a buy bust operation was
conductedwherein Enriquez was arrested and which resulted to
the discovery of a plastic game card containing one big and 45
small plastic sachets of white crystalline substance. The plastic
sachets confiscated from Enriquez tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
(Defenses Version)
Enriquez testified that in truth, he was alone, eating in an
eatery in Manibaug, Porac, Pampanga, when three (3) men, all
in civilian clothes, alighted from an owner-type jeep and
approached him. One of the men, SPO2 David, then poked a gun
at him. The former asked Enriquez if he knew a certain truck
driver who is suspected of selling shabu. When he denied
knowledge thereof, he was immediately handcuffed and was
brought to the police station for further investigation. He was
detained and was told that he is being suspected of selling
shabu.
Nora Pangilinan, a 37-year old helper of the sari-sari
store, corroborated Enriquezs testimony.She saw how the
apprehending team rudely approached and arrested Enriquez.

The RTC convicted Enriquez. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTCs decision.
Enriquez claims that the prosecution was not able to
prove with moral certainty the identity of the corpus delicti for
failure of the police officers to comply with Section 21(a) of
Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and disposition of
confiscated or seized dangerous drugs.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Enriquezs
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: NO.
The Supreme Court finds that the prosecution was not
able to establish with moral certainty that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items confiscated from Enriquez were
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preserved such that they could be used as basis for Enriquezs
conviction.
The Constitution demands that an accused in a criminal
case be presumed innocent until otherwise proven beyond
reasonable doubt.Likewise, Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify a
conviction; anything less than that entitles the accused to an
acquittal.
Enriquez was charged and convicted for the sale and
possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu, in violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
When prosecuting the sale of a dangerous drug, the
following elements must be proven: (1) the identities of the
buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In cases of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the essential requisites that
must be established are: (1) the accused was in possession of the
dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
dangerous drug.
30

As the dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus
delicti of both offenses, its identity and integrity must definitely
be shown to have been preserved. "This means that on top of the
elements of possession or illegal sale, the fact that the substance
[possessed or illegally sold], in the first instance, the very
substance adduced in court must likewise be established with
the same exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining
a conviction." Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for
each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from
the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was
presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. The chain of
custody requirement "ensures that unnecessary doubts
respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not
altogether removed."
In the case at bar, not only was there no justifiable
ground offered for the non-compliance with the chain of custody
requirement, there was an apparent failure to properly preserve
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure
the identity of the corpus delicti from the time of seizure to the
time of presentation in court. In other words, the prosecutions
evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown
that the sachets of shabu presented in court were the very same
items seized from Enriquez.
The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with
the seizure from Enriquez of the dangerous drugs and its
subsequent marking. Under the law, such marking should have
been done immediately after confiscation and in the presence of
the accused or his representative. While it is true that the items
presented in court bore the initials of SPO2 David, who was also
the poseur-buyer and primary apprehending officer, nowhere in
the documentary and testimonial evidence of the prosecution
can it be found when these items were actually marked and if
they were marked in the presence of Enriquez or at least his
representative.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of
the seized dangerous drugs or other related items immediately
after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding
handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover,
the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at
the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting"
or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of
taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of
custody that the law requires.
The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of
the illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer. Both SPO2David and SPO2 Divina testified that after the
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buy-bust operation, they brought Enriquez and the seized items
to the police station. However, they both failed to identify the
person to whom they turned over the seized items. Records
show that the request for laboratory examination was prepared
by Chief of Police Erese, and yet there is no evidence to show
that he was the person who received the seized items from the
apprehending officers. There is therefore a crucial missing link,
i.e., what happened to the seized items after they left the hands
of SPO2 David and SPO2 Divina and before they came to the
hands of Chief of Police Erese.
As for the third and the last links, although records show
that Chief of Police Erese signed the request for laboratory
examination, he was not presented in court to testify as such.
The testimony of Chief of Police Erese is indispensable because
he could have provided the critical link between the testimony of
SPO2 David, and the tenor of the testimony of P/Insp. Dizon,
which the parties have stipulated on. The unaccounted for
whereabouts of the seized items from the time they were
brought to the police station to the time they were submitted to
P/Insp. Dizon for examination constitutes a clear break in the
chain of custody. Moreover, no one testified as to how the
confiscated items were handled and cared for after the
laboratory examination.
Overall, the prosecution failed to observe the requirement
that the testimonies of all persons who handled the specimen
are important to establish the chain of custody. Of all the
individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical
possession of the shabu allegedly seized from Enriquez, only
SPO2 David testified for the specific purpose of identifying the
evidence.However, his testimony miserably failed to
demonstrate an unbroken chain as it ended with his
identification of the money and seized items he marked and
documents he signed. In effect, the custodial link ended with
SPO2 David when he testified that he brought the seized items,
together with Enriquez, to the police station.
Under the above premises, it is clear that there was a
break in the chain of custody of the seized substances. The
failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of
custody is fatal to its case as we can no longer consider or even
safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.

G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, et al. vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER et al.
YAP, J.:
DOCTRINE: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other
violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.
FACTS: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and
seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in
view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in
Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying
with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without
proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
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plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence
and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed
threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to
punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights
were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to
terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the
respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done
in the performance of official duties or function
ISSUE: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action
for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such
violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or
their superiors as well.
HELD: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state
immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the
performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No.
2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on
January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch
pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the
rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low,
civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility.Only judges are excluded from liability under the
said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5
Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which
constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as
actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties
enumerated therein, among others
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with
abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights
and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were
violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of,
among others, searches made without search warrants or based
on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants;
seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and
personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by
the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without
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warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of
'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and
subjected to physical and psychological torture and other
inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of
extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a
detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have
participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the
Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect,
is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our
law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on
what appears on the face of the complaint.
6
To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered.
7
For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
8

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all persons, be
they public officers or employees, or members of the military or
police force or private individuals who directly or indirectly
obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair the
constitutional rights and civil liberties of another person, stand
liable and may be sued in court for damages as provided in Art.
32 of the Civil Code.



G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013
ANITA MANGILA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE HERIBERTO M. PANGILINAN, ASST. CITY
PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY SOLINAP, and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (DIRECTOR
REYNALDO WYCOCO), Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS
On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging
petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa
in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the
others to the private complainants as overseas contract workers
in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing
fees, membership fees and on-line application the private
complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
1

On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M.
Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a
preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining
Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge
Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her
cohorts without bail.
2
On the next day, the entire records of the
cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the
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City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings
and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.
3

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and
detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
4

ISSUE Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the
proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
RULING With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by
virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ
of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her
from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint,
being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be
inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum
enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v. Director of
Prisons:
13

The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have
the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court
of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful
authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party who
has appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not
extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by
which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face.
It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after
examining Palayon, one of the complainants against Mangila
and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered
Palayons evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against
her and her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably
presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the
Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following
the preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for
habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she
could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting
that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure
would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional
rights.
15

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the
issuance of the warrant of arrest by hinting that the
investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of
determining the existence of probable cause for its issuance due
to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice, for that consideration was presumed.
And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,
16
Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the
investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the
release of the detainee if no probable cause should beultimately
found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no
need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure
her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the
supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to
the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile
given the most direct access to the entire records of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinans
transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate
action.
17
We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas
corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available
remedy.
18


[G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000]
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JOSELITO V. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. FLOR MARIE
STA. ROMANA-CRUZ, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Doctrine: When the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion
perpetua, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge before
the bail can be granted. Without such hearing, the order
granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
FACTS:
After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of
Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst.
City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City
recommended and thereafter filed, the information for parricide
against Joselito Narciso.
Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the
prosecutors resolution [before] the Department of Justice
(DOJ) which was however denied. Joselito Narciso moved for
reconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ.
Failing before DOJ, the accused on February 6, 1992, filed in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179 an "Omnibus Motion for
Reinvestigation and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest". The Motion
was granted and the case was set for reinvestigation by another
prosecutor.
Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was
assigned for reinvestigation, found no reason to disturb the
findings of the previous prosecutor and recommended the
remand of the case to the court for arraignment and trial.
On August 3, 1992, accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex
Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post
Bail. The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said
motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused to post
bail at P150,000.00.
On August 14, 1992, the private prosecutor representing private
complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accuseds
deceased wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing
Accused To Post Bail.
Accused objected to the aforesaid urgent motion by filing a
Motion to Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of the Private
Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing
Accused to Post Bail".
Arraignment was conducted on September 14, 1992 and the
case was set for hearing on November 9, 16, 23, December 2, 9,
1992, January 6, 13, 20, 27, 1993, February 3, 7, 10 and 24 1993.
On October 15, 1992, private complainant through counsel filed
her opposition to the motion to expunge [filed by] accused.
On November 3, 1992 private complainant moved for the
postponement of the trials set on November 9, 16 and 23 and
the subsequent hearings thereon pending the resolution of their
Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail.
"Not obtaining any resolution on her Motion To Lift Order
Allowing Accused to Post Bail, private complainant filed this
petition [before the CA]."
As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private
respondents Petition for Certiorari. Hence, this recourse to us
via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the grant of bail is valid

HELD: No
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 81

corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, also provides: "No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution."
Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is
punishable with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA
that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was
not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his
Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding that the
prosecution evidence against him was not strong.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis
for such finding, since no hearing had been conducted
on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise. The
appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed
between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order
granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient
for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree
with the CA.
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to
determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the Court
held:
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused
is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.
x x x x x x x x x
"Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged
with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. A summary hearing means such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the
purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try
the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The
course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination. If a party is denied the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of
procedural due process." (Emphasis supplied.)
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to
conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which the
accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of
bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to presume that the
prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity
with the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the
prosecutor the duty of exercising judicial discretion to
determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial
discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition
for provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to
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exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the
prosecutor."
Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to conduct
a hearing despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. We quote
below the pertinent portion of the Decision therein:
"The importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a few
cases wherein the Court ruled that even if the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to
the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct
a hearing or ask searching questions from which it may infer the
strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the
accused."
In Gimeno v. Arcueno Sr., the Court also held:
"The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving
capital offenses when the matter is left to the sound discretion of
the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether
or not a hearing should be held but in the appreciation and
evaluation of the prosecutions evidence of guilt against the
accused. x x x A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge
can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the
evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong."
And in Concerned Citizens v. Elma, the Court ruled:
"It is true that the weight of the evidence adduced is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion
may only be exercised after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining
whether or not he should be granted liberty."
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several cases that emphasized
the mandatory character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a
capital case. It enunciated the following duties of the trial judge
in such petition:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for
bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7
and 8, supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v.
Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra).
Otherwise, petition should be denied."
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should
now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in
cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to
conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the
proper cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any
member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness
thereof."
Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of
which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of
the accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the
application for bail.
Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced
with grave abuse of discretion and the Court of Appeals was
correct in reversing him.

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GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN
ANTONIO MUOZ,
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
DOCTRINE: While our extradition law does not provide for
the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to
due process under the Constitution. The accused must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is not a flight risk
and should be granted bail.
FACTS: Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as
agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven
(7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by
the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October
25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him.
On November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the extradition of private respondent. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case, filed a petition for
bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued
an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
from further hearing the case. It was then raffled off to Branch 8
presided by respondent judge Olalia.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated
December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail.
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail. In his comment on the
petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a
prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Issue: Whether or not Munoz has the right to bail.
Held: Yes. In Government of United States of America v. Hon.
Guillermo G. Purganan, this Court held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition
proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings.
However, The modern trend in public international law
is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. The Philippines,
along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right
to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to
human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order. If
bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,
considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 84

invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained
is not in issue.
While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest
of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting
state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of
the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall
not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a
prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step
in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December
20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In
other words, he had been detained for over two (2)
years without having been convicted of any crime. By
any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was
this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail
to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him
or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under
the Constitution. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a
flight risk and should be granted bail.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court
to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

*proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases
proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases
standard of substantial evidence in administrative cases
clear and convincing evidence- standard lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance
of evidence










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#48 BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, petitioner, vs.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID,
DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA,
DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III
ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.]
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE: The right to privacy has been accorded
recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected
by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. The
constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and
seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the
government does not disappear merely because the government
has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as
employer. But some government offices may be so open to
fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable. Given the great variety of work environments in the
public sector, the question of whether an employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-
by-case basis
FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer assigned
to a government employee who was charged administratively
and eventually dismissed from the service. The employee's
personal files stored in the computer were used by the
government employer as evidence of misconduct.
Petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo is a former Supervising
Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also
the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison
Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya
Na" program of the CSC.
A certain Alan San Pascual sent an unsigned letter-complaint,
marked as confidential, to respondent Civil Service Commission
(CSC0 Chairperson Karina Constantino-David. The letter stated
that a certain CSC employee, the Chief of "Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC, is a lawyer of an
accused government employee having a pending case in the
CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four
personnel with background in information technology (IT), and
issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and
specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions." The backing-
up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and
Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several
employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who
closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director
Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who
were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the
ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders
of the CSC Chair.
The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and
secured for the purpose of preserving all the files stored therein.
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the
hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to
Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined
by the CSC's Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that
most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from
the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or
letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and
other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David
issued the Show-Cause Order 8 dated January 11, 2007,
requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to
submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days
from notice. Chairperson David observed that this gives rise to
the inference that petitioner, the one who prepared, the draft
pleading and letters, was knowingly, deliberately and willfully
aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the
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interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in
the government service.
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person
referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no
attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he
"lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC
officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they
unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer,
and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which
violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he
had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he
was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he
informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some
associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,
duplicating and printing as these would violate his
constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-
incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. In view of the
illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer
without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being
"fruits of a poisonous tree."
On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 070382 11
finding prima facie case against the petitioner and charging him
with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees).
On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,
finding petitioner Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo guilty of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is
meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public
office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil
service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service
examinations.
On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted
on petitioner's computer, the CSC noted the dearth of
jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where
the government as employer invades the private files of an
employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official
use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct
committed by said employee and without the latter's consent or
participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the
United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of
O'Connor v. Ortega as authority for the view that government
agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law
enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the
governmental workplace without meeting the "probable cause"
or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling
cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark
L. Simons which declared that the federal agency's computer use
policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein
recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the
respondent's legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in
which the computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of
the employee's office was upheld as valid because a government
employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to
an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search
is reasonable in its inception and scope.
With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the
CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional
office in view of the CSC computer use policy which
unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any
privacy right to a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that
there was no such administrative policy, the CSC was of the view
that the search of petitioner's computer successfully passed the
test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 87

as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed
that it pursued the search in its capacity as government
employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving work-related misconduct, which exempts
it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With
the matter of admissibility of the evidence having been resolved,
the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately
supports the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of
R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions
justified petitioner's dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties.
By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that in
view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as
government property, employee-users thereof have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send, or receive on the computer system.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioners
office computer and the copying of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent, is a transgression on his constitutional
right to privacy.
HELD: NO. For searches conducted pursuant to an
investigation of work-related employee misconduct, even when
employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest
substantially different from "the normal need for law
enforcement." Public employers have an interest in ensuring
that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner,
and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the
inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-
related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases,
public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility,
and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to
both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In
contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public
employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public
employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that
the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient
manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement
for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable
burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the
employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause
rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible
and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and
ultimately to the public interest. To ensure the efficient and
proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers
must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-
related, non-investigatory reasons.
The "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the probable-cause requirement
impracticable," for legitimate, work-related non-investigatory
intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct.
A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the
efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and
proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary
intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold,
therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well
as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the
inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable.
OConnor Case: Twofold Inquiry of a Searchs
Reasonableness
As pronounced in O'Connor [U.S.] case, determining the
reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: (1) first,
one must consider whether the action was justified at its
inception, and (2) second, one must determine whether the
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 88

search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.
Ordinarily, a search of an employee's office by a supervisor
will be "justified at its inception" when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct,
or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-
related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. The search will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
Simons Case: Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
In Simons [U.S.] case, to establish a violation of his rights under
the Fourth Amendment (to the U.S. Constitution, which pertains
to the constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure), the employee must first prove
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place
searched or the item seized. And, in order to prove a legitimate
expectation of privacy, the employee must show that his
subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared
to accept as objectively reasonable.
Application of OConnor and Simons Tests to the Case
at Bar
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O'Connor
and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the following
questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the
hard drive on petitioner's computer reasonable in its inception
and scope?


Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to
consider include "(1) the employee's relationship to the item
seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the
employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee
took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors
are relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the
reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions
together. Thus, where the employee used a password on his
computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the
same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any
search of that space and items located therein must comply with
the Fourth Amendment.
CASE AT BAR: Petitioner has No Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy
Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued
computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not
allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he
used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary,
he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-
ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends,
associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to
use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown
people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging
his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming
clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in
charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program,
Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of
service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he
stays in the office as a paying customer." Under this scenario, it
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can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of
privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation
or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that
petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his
computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy
regulating the use of office computers. Office Memorandum No.
10, a computer use policy implemented in the CSC, provides that
there is no expectation of privacy in anything that the employees
create, store, send, or receive on the computer system, by reason
of users express waiver of any right to privacy.
The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means.
This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure
that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate
business purposes.
CASE AT BAR: The Search Authorized by the CSC
Chair (Copying of Contents of the Hard Drive) on
Petitioners Computer is Reasonable in its Inception
and Scope
The search of petitioner's computer files was conducted in
connection with investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where
the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division
is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in
the CSC.
A search by a government employer of an employee's office is
justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct. Under the facts obtaining,
the search conducted on petitioner's computer was justified at
its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSC's
discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it
were with the guidelines established by O'Connor:
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such
administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo's computer has successfully
passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the
workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American
authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the
search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a
work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted
from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a
complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief
in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending
cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The
nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously
disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending
cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions.
It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional
integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in
the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an
impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is
settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only
be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the
general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.
Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible
adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the
complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted
involving the computer resources in the concerned regional
office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the
search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 90

an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the
computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of
computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of
a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly,
to impose the need to comply with the probable cause
requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the work-
related investigation.
Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission
effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent
manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office,
who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the
process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself
was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.
All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless
search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way,
vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of
the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer
aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by
going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search
are deemed admissible.
CARPIO, J., pointed out in his concurring opinion. The
constitutional infirmity of the exemption is worsened by the
arbitrariness of its rank-based classification. The three CSC
commissioners, unlike the rest of the lower ranked CSC
employees, are excluded from the operation of the CSC's data
transparency regulation solely because they are the CSC's
highest ranking officers. This classification fails even the most
lenient equal protection analysis. It bears no reasonable
connection with the CSC regulation's avowed purposes of "[1]
protecting confidential, proprietary information of the CSC from
theft or unauthorized disclosure to third parties; [2] optimizing
the use of the CSC's computer resources as what they are
officially intended for; and [3] reducing and possibly eliminating
potential legal liability to employees and third parties." The
assumption upon which the classification rests that the CSC
commissioners, unlike the rest of the CSC's thousands of
employees, are incapable of violating these objectives is
plainly unfounded.
The only way by which the CSC commissioners, or for that
matter, any of its employees, can constitutionally take
themselves out of the ambit of the CSC's no-privacy regulation is
if they (1) invoke the doctrine of confidentiality of information,
and (2) prove that the information sought to be exempted
indeed falls under any of the classes of confidential information
adverted to above (or those comparable to them). Sensitivity of
content, not rank, justifies enjoyment of this very narrow
constitutional privilege.
BERSAMIN, J., dissenting. In view of the petitioner's
expectation of privacy, albeit diminished, I differ from the
Majority's holding that he should be barred from claiming any
violation of his right to privacy and right against unreasonable
searches and seizures with respect to all the files, official or
private, stored in his computer. Although I concede that
respondent David had legal authority and good reasons to issue
her order to back up the petitioner's files as an exercise of her
power of supervision, I am not in full accord with the Majority's
holding for the confiscation of all the files stored in the
computer. The need to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to the State's regulation may not be
filled by means that unnecessarily and broadly sweep and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
I hold, instead, that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable
expectation of privacy in respect of the communications created,
stored, sent, or received after office hours through the office
computer, as to which he must be protected. For that reason,
respondent David's order to back up files should only cover the
files corresponding to communications created, stored, sent, or
4E [2014-2015] | Bill of Rights 91

received during office hours. There will be no difficulty in
identifying and segregating the files created, stored, sent, or
received during and after office hours with the constant
advancement and improvement of technology and the presumed
expertise of the Commission's information systems analysts.
Nonetheless, my concurrence with the Majority remains as
regards the petitioner's administrative liability and the seizure
of the remainder of the files. I am reiterating, for emphasis, that
the diminution of his expectation of privacy in the workplace
derived from the nature and purpose of a government office,
actual office practice and procedures observed therein, and
legitimate regulation. Thus, I vote to uphold the legality of OM
No. 10. I hasten to add, to be very clear, that the validity of the
seizure of the files should be limited to the need for determining
whether or not the petitioner unjustly utilized official resources
of the Commission for personal purposes, and should not extend
to the reading of the files' contents, which would be violative of
his right to privacy.
I adhere to the principle that every man is believed to be free.
Freedom gears a man to move about unhampered and to speak
out from conviction. That is why the right to privacy has earned
its worthy place in the Bill of Rights. However, although the
right to privacy is referred to as a right to be enjoyed by the
people, the State cannot just sit back and stand aside when, in
the exercise of his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts
the scales to the detriment of the national interest.
In upholding the validity of OM No. 10, I also suppose that it is
not the intention of the Majority to render the Bill of Rights
inferior to an administrative rule. Rather, adoption of the
balancing of interests test, a concept analogous to the form of
scrutiny employed by courts of the United States, has turned out
to be applicable especially in the face of the conflict between the
individual interest of the petitioner (who asserts his right to
privacy) and the Commission's legitimate concern as an arm of
the Government tasked to perform official functions. The
balancing of interest test has been explained by Professor
Kauper, viz.:
"The theory of balance of interests represents a wholly
pragmatic approach to the problem of First Amendment
freedom, indeed, to the whole problem of constitutional
interpretation. It rests on the theory that is the Court's function
in the case before it when it finds public interests served by
legislation on the one hand and First Amendment freedoms
affected by it on the other, to balance the one against the other
and to arrive at a judgment where the greater weight shall be
placed. If on balance it appears that the public interest served by
restrictive legislation is of such a character that it outweighs the
abridgment of freedom, then the Court will find the legislation
valid. In short, the balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis
that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those
stated in the First Amendment, and that they may be abridged
to some extent to serve appropriate and important interest."