90 FESTSCHRIFT FOR HAMMALAVA SADDHATISSA

AjakarapI as it Ilows swollen aIter the rains. Associated with it are many
other interesting situations. On the advent oI the rains, the white cranes
who appear to dread the gathering dark rain clouds leave the vicinity oI
the river AjakaranI and Ily in search oI anew roost. The Ilight oI the birds
signals the impending change in the river, the enhancement oI its beauty
which brings joy to the heart oI Sappaka-MI3 nadi Afakararn rameti mam.
And such joy has always been looked upon both as a stimulus and an energetic
source oI inspiration to dispel lethargy. It inIuses in him a digniIied sense
simplicity, ruling out extravagance. With such an extremely placid spirit oI
contentment, one does not discover oneselI caught up in a whirl-pool oI
competitive accelarationi Sitting by the bank oI Ajakararu, Sappaka says
with deep conviction: ' Those rose-apple trees in Iruit, standing on both
banks oI the ri'ver, whose heart will they not cheer. They certainly adorn
the river batik. This certainly is no time to leave the mountain streams. In
the river AjakaranI is beauty, saIety and serenity (307-310),
Tr;y it, live it and see beauty in liIe as a Buddhist would see it.
NOTES ON THE BRAHMINICAL BACKGROUND TO BUDDHIST
ETHICS
RICHARD GOMBRICH
While his interests and accomplishments range Iar wider, a substantial
part oI the scholarly contribution oI the Ven. Dr. Saddhatissa as both
editor and expositor has been devoted to the interlocked topics oI Buddhist
ethics and the Buddhist layman. This concern seems singularly appropriate
in one whose liIe has been devoted both to scholarship and to making the
Buddha`s message available in the West, where the vast majority oI those
who hear it are unlikely ever to enter a monastery and may yet gain Irom it
insight and happiness. Perhaps it may thereIore also be appropriate iI I,
as an aspiring historian oI Indian religion, oIIer in Dr. Saddhatissa`s honour
a Iootnote to his book Buddhist Ethics}
My remarks relate to three recurrent themes in that book. The Iirst theme
is the complementarity oI morality and wisdom .(liberating insight) in
Buddhism. ' Morality and ' wisdom translate the Pali terms slla and
panha. Dr. Saddhatissa twice quotes, the Sopadanda Sutta: ' Morality is
washed all round with wisdom, and wisdom is washed all round with morality.
Wherever there is morality there is wisdom, and wherever there is wisdom
there is morality. . . . Morality and wisdom together reveal2 the height oI
the world. It is just as iI one should wash one hand with the other... .so
is morality washed. . . . with wisdom and wisdom with morality. `,3 Progress
in the one implies progress in the other, The Precepts (sila again) ' were
the essential preliminaries, as also the permanent accompaniments, to the
attaining to the Highest State .4
A second theme is that the merit or otherwise oI an act depends on
volition.5 This point is oI course Iundamental to any account oI Buddhist
ethics: Buddhism holds to an ethic oI intention. It is because morality
consists in good intentions, i.e. all moral acts are essentially mental acts,
that morality constitutes an integral part oI the training and progress towards
nirvana.
The third theme is that it is a mistake to exaggerate the religious diIIerence
between a layman and a monk in the Canon: the path to salvation is the
same Ior both and can be trodden by both.6
All oI these points are completely valid. Without Iurther ampliIying
them, I shall take them as read; they are the essential background to
what Iollows.
However, I see certain diIIiculties. As Dr. Saddhatissa says, ' The teachings
oI the Buddha are authoritatively grouped under the headings: sila, samadhi
and One would thereIore expect the topic oI a book on Buddhist
~2 FESTSCHRIFT FOR HAMMALAVA SADDHATISSA
ethics to be si la, and this is indeed the tenor oI Dr. Saddhatissa`s preIace.
But on closer scrutiny things are not quite so simple: sila seems at the same
time to be narrower than ' ethics or ' morality and yet to reIer also to
what we would not normally think oI as matters oI morality, but rather
oI decorum. It is my aim in this article to suggest that Buddhism as it has
actually been lived shows certain inconsistencies, which can perhaps be
understood by seeing it against the background oI Hinduism, with which
it must to some extent have interacted. What appear as inconsistencies in a
synchronic study (such as Buddhist Ethics) may just be diachronic develop-
ments (though our uncertainty about early Buddhist chronology will not
allow us to be sure). Or inconsistencies may be due to a shiIt in context,
e,g.I Irom theoretical discussion to practical liIe. This is not, however, a
lexicographical or philological study oI the term sUa I do not wish to attempt
an exhaustive study oI the use oI terms, or to quibble about translations.
| agree that ' morality is the most appropriate rendering oI sila in most
contexts. I merely wish, by drawing attention to some points oI history and
usage, to shade in certain nuances.
The most striking illustration oI the narrowness oI sila may be put thus.
Theravada Buddhists are largely concerned with questions oI pufina
and papa, Pali terms which are oIten rendered in English as ' merit
and ' demerit , but might also be translated as ' good and ' evil ;8 yet
neither oI these terms appears in the index oI Buddhist Ethics. We must
u j thereIore ask ourselves to what extent sila and pfmna cover the same ground.
The Iirst answer which might suggest itselI, that sila is passive while puma
is active virtue, will turn out to be rather misleading
Perhaps the heart oI the whole problem area lies with the ethic oI intention
Even the Iour Nikayas, the kernel oI the Pali Canon, do not seem wholly
consistent in applying the ethic oI intention. There is a glimpse oI this in
Buddhist Ethics when we read: ' The extent oI moral guilt in killing depends
`on the physical and mental development oI the being that is killed and the
circumstances. . , . 3 Dr. Saddhatissa goes so Iar as to suggest that it may
be worse to kill a man than a child. Yet any such calculation compromises
the doctrine that evil lies solely in wicked intention.
It seems to me that a certain ambivalence about the doctrine oI intention
can be Iound in perhaps the most basic canonical passage on sila. Each oI
the Iirst thirteen suttas oI the Dlgha Nikaya contains a section called the
stla-vagga, a very long and speciIic list oI things Irom which the Buddha
abstains and his disciples should also abstain. The Iist is oIten ignored in
brieI expositions oI Buddhism, probably because it is tedious, obscure in
detailand perhaps a bit inconvenient, since it seems to be a kind oI moral
code by enumeration rather than general principle. However, it is also the
very exposition oI sila to which the Buddha is reIerring in his conversation
with Sonadanda when he puts it on a par with wisdom. It is also the exposi-
tion oI sila which occurs in the Samannaphala Sutta, the Iamous text which
RICHARD GOMBR1CH 93
lays out the path to arhatship (Buddhist Enlightenment) in the Iorm which
came to be summarized, as Dr. Saddhatissa shows, as sila-samadhi-paftm.
The list is divided into three parts, the Short, Middling and Long lists
(Culasilatri Mqffhimastlam, Mahastlam). (Hence morality so deIined is also
known as tividham silam.) The Short list contains the kind oI things one
might expect, like abstaining Irom violence and lying. The Middling list,
however, is a medley oI activities as diverse as talking about kings, running
errands and playing various games. The Long list is not relevant to my
argument, because it clearly states that the activities it lists are 'wrong
livelihood , i.e. bad as ways oI earning money, leaving open the question
oI whether they are bad in themselves (and some are obviously not).
II morality lies in intention, it should not be necessary Ior the Middling
list to proscribe activities which are in themselves morally neutral. The
reason Ior the list is however clear: the Buddha wished his monks to behave
with decorum and keep themselves distinct Irom the generality oI wandering
Iakirs.
' The other point to note about the entire list is that it is simply a list oI
abstentions. Indeed, at Its end10 it is summarized by the term sila-samvara,
and that is a common commentarial synonym Ior sila. Since the whole
passage concerns behaviour, I would translate the term sita-sam vara by some
such expression as ' restrained behaviour . Some aspects oI restrained
behaviour, such as selI-control in the Iace oI provocation, we would consider
moral; many others we would consider morally neutral matters oI decorum.
The sila-vagga is generally held to be among the texts most certJSin to be
early. So let us compare it with Theravada as systematized by Buddhaghosa
in the Visuddhimagga and the commentaries he edited.
In a recent article11 Damien Keown has shown how very little content
there is to the account oI sila in the Iirst chapter oI the Visuddhimagga.
A monk is to keep his sila unstained, untorn etc., a series oI metaphors
suggesting that sila i? envisaged as a land oI protective cloak in which the
monk is to remain wrapped, a cloak oI decorum. Buddhaghosa`s language
here suggests quite as much interest in conduct as in ethical intentions.
Moreover, his treatment oI sila is completed by the second chapter, which
treats oI the dhutanga, a set oI ascetic practices. In this case the sila could
be described as active rather than passive, albeit perhaps still moie negative
than positive, Ior the dhutanga too are in essence abstentions; but certainly
we are dealing with externals, with intentions very indirectly at best.
This point can be made even more strikingly iI we look at the commentary13
on the very text already quoted Irom the Sonadanda Sutta. The story told
to illustrate washing wisdom with morality is not what the modern Westerner
might expect, so I quote it in Iull.131 use the word ' morality to translate
sila in an attempt to show by its very incongruity how Iar Buddhist ideas oI
sila here diverge Irom the meaning normally ascribed to ' morality .
jHow does pne wash wisdom with morality? One whose morality as an
Yes but might this
not also be an aid
to concentration?
94
FESTSCHRIFI FOR HAMMALAVA SADDHATISSA
unenlightened person (puthuffanasila) is unbroken Ior sixty or eighty years,
oven on his deathbed burns out all his deIilements and attains arhatship by
washing his wisdom with morality, as a great elder oI sixty years ` standing
did in the monastery oI Katthaka-sala. They say that when the elder was
lying on his deathbed, groaning in great pain, King Vasabha14 came to see
him. Hearing the noise Irom the door, the king asked what it was. They
told him it was the elder groaning. He has been ordained sixty years and
cannot master pain, I shall not pay my respects to him, ` *said the king, and
turned away to pay his respects to the Bodhi tree. At this a young attendant
said to the monk, Your reverence, why do you put us to shame? The king,
who came with Iaith, changed his mind and went oII, having decided not to
pay you his respects. ' Why, sir? ' Because he heard you groaning.
' Then leave me alone, he said. He suppressed his pain, reached arhatship,
and gave the young monk a signal:' Go and bring the king to pay his respects
to me now . The young monk went and said, ' Now indeed you can pay
your respects to the elder. ` ` The king prostrated himselI Iull length15beIore
the elder and said, ' It is not your honour`s arhatship that I am worshipping
but the morality you preserved while you were at the unenlightened level.
That is how one washes wisdom with morality.,/
The very next sentence oI the commentary glosses slla as slla-samvara.
This vignette oI Buddhism in practice in ancient Ceylon could draw one
beyond the intended scope oI this article, Ior it suggests that ' iporality
and ' wisdom had become more than complementary, being almost
Iused in an exaltation oI selI-control. But I have noj wish to go so Iar. I only
wish to show that slla here reIers to conduct becoming to the role of a monk,
in a word, decorum.
BeIore seeing whether the history oI Hinduism can shed any light on
these matters, I must insert here a small point relating to the Iirst theme I
drew out Irom Buddhist Ethics, the question oI the relation oI slla to samadhi
to panha. There seems to be a Irequent misconception in the West that they
constitute a progress in the sense that one Iirst does one`s slla, then, having
got that straight, goes on to samadhi, and then in due course similarly on to
ppanfta. I agree with Dr. Saddhatissa (and with Sonadandato say nothing
oI the Buddha) that this is quite wrong. But I would like to suggest how
the misconception may easily arise. The analogy oI a journey, oI travelling
a path, is here misleading. For example, Buddhaghosa arranged his work
' The Path to Purity into three sections under the successive headings
Slla, Samadhi and Pahha, which suggest passing through stages. But on this
journey the places reached Iirst arc not leIt behind, but taken along with one.
1 would not dream oI suggesting that Buddhaghosa did not know this better
than I do; but maybe again the Hindu background may help to explain his
use oI a misleading analogy.
The early stages oI Indian religious evolution are too well known to need
systematic recapitulation, here, and I shall mention only wbat is relevant to
RICHARD GOMBRICH 95
my theme. The early Vedic texts prescribe religious activity, namely sacriIice,
Ior goods in both this liIe and the next, Ior progeny and prosperity on earth
and a place with the ancestors in heaven. Originally what we dub Ior con-
venience the theory oI karma,16 that acts always in the end to produce
appropriate consequences, arose as a promise oI the eIIicacy oI sacriIice.
Not until the Upanisads is it said that such acts may be what we would cali
moral or immoral,17in other words that moral or immoral acts are among
those which may entail Iuture automatic reward or punishment. The good
acts which will get one to heaven etc., are heterogeneous, in that they include
both what we would nowadays call ethical or moral acts and qualities, such
as generosity and kindness, and what we would consider ethically neutral
or irrelevant acts oI ritual. Indeed, the word Ior ' good is puriva, which
etymologically means ' puriIying . It never quite loses that meaning. The
metaphor which is used or implied by all Indian religions which accept the
soul, i.e. all but Buddhism, is that the soul is like a lamp which has to be
puriIied oI dross iI it is to shine Iorth in its natural radiance; then (to change
the metaphor) it can Iree itselI Irom the body at death and Iloat straight
up to heaven. The soul is to be cleaned and so Iitted Ior eternal bliss.
The incipient ethicizing oI karma which Iirst appears in the Brhadaranyaka
and Chandogya Upanisads is there but a minor aspect oI their re-interpreta-
tion oI Vedic religion; in Iact, they hardly discuss ethics at all. As is well
known, these texts reveal a religious biIurcation, one which has endured in
Hinduism. One can perIorm sacriIices etc., and go to heaven-at Iirst still
the early Vedic heaven oI the ancestral spirits. But that heaven is imperma-
nent: those in it will be reborn on earth in due course, when their credit
runs out. There is a superior alternative. One can understand the inner
meaning oI the sacriIice, and with that understanding withdraw Irom society
to the Iorest and perIorm sacriIices only symbolically, in meditative exercises
and ascetism. This will lead to something better than heaven: at death one`s
soul will go to Brahman. From that there is no relapse, no rebirth.
These two possible religious courses, diIIerent in both their actions and
their results, are succinctly described at Chandogya Up. V, 10, 1-7. Brhada-
rapyaka Up. VI, 2, 14-15 is extremely similar. Those texts make it perIectly
clear that the two courses are alternatives. The superior people (at whom,
no doubt, the texts are directed), who will not be reborn, live in the Iorest,
where they practise Iaith and austerities (I here Iollow the Chandogya
version). The others, who perIorm sacriIices and make giIts (primarily,
one supposes, to sacriIicial priests), live in the village. They are two diIIerent
classes oI people with two diIIerent liIe-styles. Their two ways oI liIe came
to be known as the ' path oI works and the ' path oI knowledge1` (karma-
marga and ffiana-marga). I Iind it convenient to use these terms, though
they were invented later. The same dichotomy was introduced by the Bhaga-
vad Gita (3,3) with the terms ' discipline oI works and ' oI knowledge
(karma- an dftiana-voga).
96 FESTSCHRIFT FOR HAMMALAVA SADDHAT1SSA
While these two groups oI people are diIIerentiated by their ultimate goals,
their Iates aIter death,18 in another respect they are not so diIIerent. The
village-dwelling sacriIice!' is interested in this liIe as well as the next: sacriIice
can bring beneIits long beIore death. The Upanisads make it amply cleai
that his ' renouncer cousin is not necessarily diIIerent in this respect.
In this liIe too his religious knowledge will bring him power, wealth,
whatever he wants. II there is a diIIerence, it is only that here too the esoteric
knowledge is simply more eIIicient than the exoteric practice.19
Again to use terms which became standard only later, religious activity
may be undertaken Ior either goal, enjoyment or liberation (bhukti or mukti).
Hinduism categorized everyone undertaking a religious act or discipline
as bubhuksu, ' wishing to enjoy , or mumuksu, ' wishing Ior release .
The distinction was not perhaps systematized beIore the sectarian literature
oI Tantra, but it reIers to a reality as old as the early Upanisads. The goals
oI the bubhuksu are pleasures in this world and the next, all necessarily
transient. The man who sacriIices can only be bubhuksu, because the best
sacriIice can do Ior one is to take one to heaven. On the other hand, the
fnana-mdrgin, who pursues salviIic knowledge, can be eithei bubhuksu or
mumuksu, he can use the power oI his realization Ior his pleasure or his
release.
We have seen that in the early Upanisads the paths oI works and oI
knowledge were alternatives, oI which the latter was superior. But the
mainstream oI brah mini cal Hinduism has never been at ease with any
doctrine that ritual liIe, i.e. karma, can be totally dispensed with even as a
preliminary stage. Patrick Olivelle has shown20 how originally the dsramas,
later interpreted as ' stages oI liIe , were liIe-styles; the liIe oI the house-
holder and that oI the ascetic renouncer were alternatives. The householder`s
station (gr hast ha dsrama) was associated with the pursuit oI works and the
ascetic`s {samnvdsa) with that oI knowledge/'gnosis. But the lawbook oI
Manu (2nd century A.C,?), immensely authoritative and inIluential, laid
down that the airamas were to be Iollowed successively (dsrama-samuccava);
eatery good Hindu was to marry and so pursue the path oI works Ior at
least a part oI his liIe: no renunciation without prior ritual activity. Similarly,
all Vedic literature beIore the Upanisads came to be called the karma-kanfa
(' section on works ) and the Upanisads the fnana-kdnda (' section on
knowledge ) and one was to study both in succession: purva-mimamsd,
literally ' investigation oI the Iormer , was the study oI the karma-kdnda,
uttara-mlmdmsd, ' investigation oI the latter , was the study oI the fnana-
kdnda. Mainstream (smarta) Hinduism has always considered it highly
desirable to do both. This view is known as fhana-karma-samuccava, and is
thus parallel to dsrama-samuccava in both expression and reality. It aIIords
an instance oI the prevalent Hindu tendency to hierarchize, to which Louis
Dumont has to brilliantly drawn attention.21 The system is conceived as a
whole, and though the goals arc ultimately accorded diIIerent value,' the
- t U C H A K U OUM SK1LU1
? ?
tower goal too must be pursued, at least to the extent that it does not impede
the higher one. The relation between the paths oI work and knowledge in
this ideology is very like that which Dumont shows to exist between the
Hindu goals oI man (purusartha).22
-uWe must not leave this topic without mentioning that not all Hindus
accepted the smarta view. The Bhagavad Gtta saw the disciplines oI works
and oI knowledge as received alternatives but urged a new solution: karma-
voga was the superior (3, 8 and 5, 2), provided that one *s perIormance was
disinterested. In this way the diIIerent disciplines could to some extent be
reconciled: the spirit oI the one was to imbue the perIormance oI the other,
and everyone was to be mumuksu. This was not so much an attempt to
ethiclze karma, as Buddhism had done, as to bypass the problem by leaving
all moral responsibility to God. Later, specialists In prva-mtmdmsd, the
MImamsakas, gave little regard to the fMna-mdrga and had no time Ior the
mumuksu. Their counterparts on the other extreme were some oI the specialists
in uttara-mlmdmsd, more generally known as Vedantins, who did not agree
that karma was a pre-requisite Ior plana. The most Iamous oI those holding
this view was Sankara. He remained close to his primary authorities, the
early Upanisads, when he claimed in his comment on the Iirst verse oI the
Brahma Sutras that the path oI works was not necessary: the only pre-
requisite Ior the path oI knowledge was disillusion with this transient world.
In this, as in so much else, Sankara seems to have been proIoundly inIluenced
by Buddhism. He Iurther agreed with Buddhism, as we shall see, and
diIIered on the other hand Irom the Upanisads, by identiIying the Iollower
oI the path oI knowledge as necessarily mumuksu.
None oI the great Hindu religious texts have much to say about ethics.
They do not discuss such problems as whether the morality oI an action lies
in its intention or its eIIect, beyond the general recommendation to equanimity
and disinterestedness. Ethics remained mainly the province oI the law books
(Dharma Sastras) like Manu, which were Iull oI detailed injunctions but
had little to say about general principles. Hindu ethics have two salient
Ieatures. Firstly, they are particularistic: your dutits depend upon your
station in liIe. Apart Irom a Iew injunctions oI the kind Iound almost all
over the world (Brush your hair and teeth and tell the truth `)23Hindu ethics
are mostly a matter oI successIul role perIormance. Secondly karma,
which one could call ' signiIicant action the acts Ior which one would
be bound to reap consequencesremained predominantly ritual The
ethicization oI karma begun in the early Upanisads was never taken much
Iurther. Though what we would consider morally good or wicked acts Iit
into the category oI karma, the term does not primarilv reIer to them. It
was oI course against this position that the Buddha was taking a stand,
particularly when he equated karma with intention.
Unlike the authors oI the Upanisads (and oI almost all other Sanskrit
religious texts), the Buddha was no brahmin. Indeed, he was probably bom
Shankara
inuenced
by
Buddhism
98 FESTSCHRIFT FOR HAMMALAVA SADDHATISSA
and .brought up in a society (the Sak~a) which had no brahmins. Coming
on brahminical categories as a matureadult, he could manipulate and play
with them. But no man. is wholly independent oI the society-in which he
operates. To some extent the Buddha had to phrase his message in terms
adapted to the social and intellectual categories oI those around himand
it is notable how many oI his interlocutors in the Canon are brahmins.
What applies to the Buddha applies with even greater Iorce to his successors,
the early Buddhists; many oI them had received a brahminical education.
Indeed Buddhaghosa is said to have been a brahmin pundit beIore his
conversion to Buddhism.
The Buddha preached that Iully to understand the Iirst noble truth, the
noble truth'oI suIIering, would lead anyone to become what a Hindu would
see.as a fhdna-mdrginfmitmuksu (We mentioned above that Sankara, more
than a thousand years later, said the same. And Sankara Iounded the Iirst
Hindu monastic orders). The Buddha declared ritual valueless; the kind
oI karma he recognized was purely ethical. On the other hand, even this
ethical karma was powerless by itselI to achieve the goal- oI liberation;
that depended on gnosis, paniid, the Buddhist equivalent oI Hindu fndna.
For the Buddhists as Ior the Hindus, to attain the salviIic gnosis one-hat! to
practise the discipline oI meditation24the discipline which in Hinduism
grew out cI archaic austerities (tapas) into meditative voga (in the sense in
which Patanjali used that term, which is also the sense widely known in
the. West). . -
Thus the Buddhist sequence oI slia samadhi and pannd was very like the
Hindu sequence oI karma, voga and fndna. I teIer oI course to the Iormal
structure, not to the content. This structural similarity helps to explain
an ...oddity in. the Buddhist view oI karma to which I drew attention in an,-
earlier article.25 Everything that matters m Buddhist soteriology-r-rji/a
samadhi, pannd, right up to liberationgoes on in the mind,. Theoretically
it is all (good) karma, all oI a piece. As I put it then, ' Buddhist philosophy
declares that good karma good intentions puriIication oI the.mind
spiritual, progress, i.e, progress towards nirvana. 26 And yet, meditation;
is not reIerred to in early Buddhist texts as karma. For this I then put Iorward.
a sociological explanation, which 1 still think correct as Iar as it goes. But
| wish to complement it here with a historical explanation. The Iormulation oI
Buddhism was too strongly inIluenced by the brahminical . dichotomy
between a path oI works and a path oI knowledge, which Ior them was a
distinction between action and thought, Ior it to be possible to call the pursuit
oI gnosis, a mental activity, karma. The term karma.had physical overtones
too .strong to be ignored, I shall soon be making an analogous point about
pahna, a
One oI the most remarkable aspects oI the Buddha`iroIound,originality,
was. his abandonment oI Hindu hierarchic structures and modes oI thought.
Such cardinal Ieatures oI Buddhism as the religious equality, oI all men.can
No
Brahmins
in the
Sakya
Republic?
Panna
equivelant
to Hindu
jnana
RICHARD GOMBRICH 99
be seen Irom this rather Iormal point oI view. I think we may also say, in
the context oI this article, that his view that morality and wisdom were
complementary can also be. seen in this light. It may be signiIicant that the
view is Iirst put into the mouth oI a brahmin interlocuter whom the Buddha
has just Iorced to retreat Irom several brahminical tenets. Be that as it may,
the Buddhist view is in stark contrast to the Hindu view that the disciplines
oI work and oI gnosis are. hierarchically related alternatives., The Buddha
is denying both that they are hierarchically related and that they are alter-
natives.
Though the substance oI the Buddha`s message on, this important point
was preserved, the standardized Iormulation took on a somewhat Hinduized
appearance. I suggest that this explains such matters as the potentially
misleading arrangement of the Visuddbimagga. I direct this point primarily
to Western readers; Buddhists have probably never been misled.
Thus Iar 1have suggested Hindu inIluence only in matters oI Iormulation.
I think however that there is some such inIluence on the substance oI sila
as. well. Here the inIluence to which I am reIerring should perhaps be said to
come Irom the social context oI early. Buddhism rather than Irom brahminical
ideologywere it not that I am dubious about making any such distinction.
I hays shown above how the scripturally Iundamental account oI sila is a
discursive list largely devoted to observable conduct-very similar in
character, we may now add, to the contents oI Hindu law books. We can
now go on to say that that tripartite list is a kind oI proto-vinava, an
embryonic Iormulation oI how a Buddhist monk should live,
It has oIten been remarked that the Buddhist Rule, the Vinaya Piaka,
concerns itselI with a monk`s actions, not his thoughts. Sometimes a dis-.
tinction is drawn between this standpoint and that oI the Sutta Pitaka,
which is said to be more strictly doctrinal and thus concerned with the mind.
Our glance at the tripartite sila shows, however, that this distinction cannot
stand. Moreover, the Vinaya Pitaka too Iails to support it. For in Buddhism
iri;contradistinction to both Hinduism and Jainismthere is no absolute
oIIence: a monk can only.be disciplined Ior something he did consciously
{sancicca).
This synthesis between intention and action, between the mind and the
body, in Buddhist ethics was doubtless Iirst worked out in monastic jurispru-
dence. It came however to be applied in all ethical contexts; the
commentaries apply it to- the Iive precepts, the very bedrock oI Buddhist
morality, ' There are Iive conditions which constitute the immorJ act oI
killing; (i) the Iact and presence oI a. living being, (ii) the knowledge that
the-being is,a living being, (iii) the intent or resolution to kill,, (tv) the act
oI killing by appropriate means, (v) the resulting death.``27
We can ignore the Iirst, second and IiIth clauses as scholastic elaborations
oI what can be logically deduced Irom the other two. What is crucial is the
addition, oI the Iourth clause, the. act oI killing, to the third, the intention
xuu II cM S C t iK i M K JK HAMMALAVA SADDtiA 115SA
to kill, Ior the whole to become ' the immoral act oI killing . This just
cannot be reconciled with the doctrine that intention, cetana, is karma.
In my book Precept and Practice28 I made a distinction between cognitive
and aIIective religion, the religion oI the head and oI the heart. In the chapter
on ' The Ethic oI Intention I argued that the doctrinal tenet that ethically
it is only the intention that counts does not feel right, and that this unease
had led to some compromise among Sinhalese Buddhists. 1 would apply
the same reasoning to the development in classical Buddhism to which I
have just drawn attention. But I also wish to stress the inIluence oI the
Indian context. Not only the Vinaya view oI ethics but also the commentarial
one just quoted were Iormulated with the Sangha in mind: the commentary
on the Sonadanda Sutta says that when Sonadanda spoke oI the com-
plementarity oI sila and panna he had only the Iive precepts (applicable to
all laymen) in mind, whereas the Buddha (and this is oI course in the text)
was reIerring to the tripartite list.29
In this view, heavily slanted towards the Sangha, sila is the monk`s success-
Iul role perIormance. It makes it clear to society that he is being a good and
proper monk. The anecdote about the monk groaning on his deathbed
and there are many more such in the commentariesshows that this did
not apply only within what we call India, just as brahminical thought Iormed
societies beyond India`s boundaries.
I must not be misunderstood to mean that any Buddhist ever thought oI
this sila, this role perIormance, as a purely external matter. Certainly not.
But there was an overwhelming demand Ior empirical evidence oI a monk`s
internal state; and in practice this demand seems to have been accepted,
perhaps even unquestionmgly, by the monks themselves.30
u; ;1 thus see sila in ancient Buddhism as something rather like character
in'the classical West, A character is built up by moral habit. It is primarily
an internal state. But that state is instantly recognizable by a pattern oI
behaviour. The Buddhist monk, like the smeirta brahmin, like so many
other Iigures in Hindu society, would have Iitted, by convention, into the
Iramework oI one oI Theophrastos ` sketches, a genre which depicts not
individuals but types.
We have seen that the Buddha laid down Ior monks rules oI behaviour
not just moral principles. But he was evidently most concerned that no monk
should become bubhuksu, turning his spiritual attainments to proIit. He
Iorbade monks to perIorm miracles. And he Iorbade boasting oI one`s
spiritual attainments, even iI they were true; iI they were not, he took so
grave a view oI the matter that this was one oI the Iour oIIences involving
expulsion Irom the Sangha. This austerity can only have increased the pressure
to show oII one`s character, Ior one had nothing else one was allowed to show.
1 The Buddha -envisaged that the layman, like the jIcjndu householder
(grhastha) would normally be bubhuksu. He even envisaged a compromise
with the Hindu style oI kanna-marga, Ior though he consicIere-d traditional
K i L . l * l A l \ j U k j v j i t i j j j `
rites and customs to have no ethical or soteriological value, he advised his
lay Iollowers to make oIIerings to ancestral spirits and gods (pubbapeta-
bali and deva-bali)51 and to give material support to brahmins and ascetics
who would tell him how to get to heaven.32 He even preserved the Hindu,
expression Ior good works as ' puriIying `~puHikt. In these externals the
Buddhist layman is leIt looking just like a Hindu karma-margin bubhuksu.
It is the very continuity oI this tradition, Irom pre-Buddhist times to the
present day, that explains why Dr. Saddhatissa`s book does not speciIically
deal with puma; the term is so pan-Indian, not speciIically Buddhist, and
suggests the bubhuksu.
On the other hand, as the book makes abundantly clear, the Buddha gave
a new content to the term. It is here that the Buddhist ethic oI intention
really comes into its own. Though my book shows compromises with the
rigorous ethic oI intention, it also shows the other side oI the coin: it is
amazing how strongly that mentalistic views oI ethics survives in .Buddhist
society. Were it not so, we could not Iind the custom oI sharing merit by
rejoicing at the good works oI others. Though it has acquired some Iormal
elements, punfia is still largely ethical in the Iull senseand much broader
than sila. The norms oI classical Hindusim have leIt a residue, even in wholly
Buddhist societies: an implication that punria, even when perIormed by a
monk, is Ior the bubhuksu rather than the mumuksu. But Buddhist societies
in Iact thrive on punria. I thus reach the conclusion, consonant with Dr.
Saddhatlssa`s view oI the religious role oI the Buddhist laity but perhaps
going even Iurther, that the lay side oI Buddhist ethics, subsumed under
the word puMa, has remained at least as true to pure canonical doctrine
'as the monastic side, subsumed under the word sila.
Sankara wrote,33 ' For him who desires liberation {mumuksu) even right
conduct {dharma) is deIilement, because it generates bonds. No Buddhist
could agree with that. But the Hindu tendency to hierarchize values and to
place gnosis above (though oIten subsuming) morality did .cast its shadow
on institutionalized Budahism, as the bloodless account oI sila in the Visuddhi-
in'agga bears witness. Were it not so, Mahayana criticism oI other Buddhists
as selIish would make no aense. The morality oI the Boclhisattva is ever
active; compassion and wisdom go hand in hand, in Iact one in each hand
oI the Tan trie Buddhist34just as in the Sonadanda Sutta.
FESTSCHRIFT FOR HAMM ALA VA SADDHATISSA '302
NOTES
1. London 1970. HereinaIter B.E.
, 2. This is rather a Iree translation. A closer one would be *are said to be. `1
3. B. E. pp. 123-4, translating D X124. The words are Iirst ascribed to the brahmin
Sonadapda, but the Buddha repeats them, as Iar as the simile, with approval,
4. B.Ep~ 113.
5. B.E. p.26.
6. See especially B.E. pp. 119-120,
7. B. E, p. 64. The commentator point soutand the context makes it clearthat in the
passage Irom the Sonadapda Sutta quoted above, which i shall be discussing, samddhi,
' concentration , is subsumed under pawim
8. From now on I shall use punha as a shorthand term Ior pttnna-kamma, ' meritorious
act , Iollowing the usage oI Buddhists, I must mention this because modern Hindus
have come to use pupva and papa to reIer almost exclusively to the results oI the
acts rather than the acts themselves,
9. B. E. p. 88.
10. D I 69.
11. ' Morality in the Jisuddhimagga, Journal of (he International Association o f Buddhist
Studies 6, I, 1983. i am greatly indebted to Keown`s article, which was written in
1980, since it began the train oI thought which has led to this one.
12. DA I 291.
13. The episode is summarized in W. Rahula Historv of Buddhism in Cevlon (Colombo
1956), p. 223.
14. Ruled 67-111 A. C., according to the University oI Ceylon Historv of Cevlon vol. 1
part 2 (Colombo 1960). The same king tested a monk Ior holiness by making a
salad oI jujube Iruit in his presence; the monk salivated, Irom which the king deduced
that he was no arhat (Rahula, op. cit. p. 222),
15. The text says he Iell like a crocodile.
16. Sanskrit kartnan, Pali kamnva. I however assume the word to be naturalized in
English.
17. Locus classicus: BIhadaranyaka Upani`ad 4, 4, 5II.
18. A slightly diIIerent version, with the same purport, at BIhada. Up. 1, 5, 16: one can
win the pitrloka by kartnan, the devaioka by vidva BIhada. Up. 6, 2, 14 goes on
to speciIy that Irom the devaioka one passes to the hrahmaloka. The pitrloka is
evidently the earlier Vedic heaven.
T9. e.g; Brhada Up. 1, 4, 17 Iin.; 2, 1, 2-13.
20. 'The Notion oI Airama in the Dharmasutras , Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde
Sudasiens, XVIII, 1974, 27-35.
21. Especially in'Homo Hierarchies (Paris 1966, English translation Chicago 1970).
22. 'The Conception oI Kingship in Ancient India in Religion, Politics and Historv
in India (Paris and The Hague 1970), p. 78.
23. Hilaire Belloc A Mora' Alphabet, reprinted in Cautionarv Jerses (London 1940),
p. 300,
24. ' A Iew Buddhists dissented Irom this view, to the extent that they saw no need Ior
samatha, the type oI Buddhist meditation which is closely related to Hindu yoga.
25. 'Buddhist Karma and Social Control , Comparative Studies in Societv and Historv
Voi. 17, 2, April 1975, pp. 212-220,
26. Op, cit, p. 216,
27. B, E.p. 89.
28. OxIord 1971.
29. D A I 292. ...............
30. 1 am not suggesting that si la has this social aspect only Ior rponks. The Buddha
pointed out to some householders that there were Iive practical advantages to virtue
(slid). Two oI them are a good reputation and Ieeling at ease in society; a third,
getting rich, is no doubt causally connected to those two. D. II 86.
31. A III 45.
32. D i l l 191.
33. Comment on Bhagavad Gita 4, 21.
34. In his right hand the initiate holds a symbol oI the Buddha `omniscience ( wisdom),
in his leIt a symbol oI his perIect skill in the means to bruIe~eings to Enlightenment
( compassion).
(&"&(%!#%%)'$'
RATNA HANDURUKANDE
The advantages gained by revering the Three Jewels (triratna), viz.,the
Enlightened One (Buddha), the doctrine (Dharraa) and the community
oI monks (Sarpgha) are listed Irequently iri the class oI narrative literature
called the avddanarriala, which are mostly metrical adaptations oI older
works. The period oI composition oI the avadanamalas is said'to be about
the sixth century A.C. and later.1 While emphasizing the'value oI paying
homage to the Three Jewels, the avctdanamala texts set Iorth quite clearly
the ideal oI the Mahayaiia Buddhist' which is the attainment oI Buddhahood
Ior the emancipation oI all beings. ' /
I give below (I) a selection Irom an avadanamfila describing the advantages
gained by those who pay homage .to the Jhree Jewels, Iollowed by (II)
a synopsis in English oI its contents, in thisIspecial volume issued to honour
a 1samgharatna \ The text quoted` Iro/h is the Triratnabhajananusamsa-
vadana, a Sanskrit text written in tIiC Newari script, a microIilm copy oI
which is available in The Institute Ior Advanced Studies oI World Religions
at Stony Brook, New York.2 The king addressed to in the text is Asoka,
and the speaker, a celestial deity. A group oI merchants approach the king
and inIorm him that their ship was shattered, and the wealth destroyed,
by nagas living in the oceati. The king is distressed as he cannot counteract
the destructive activities/6I the nagas. Then a deity appears and advises him
to take recourse to the Buddha, detailing t he.advantages resulting Irom
paying homage to/the Buddha, Dharma and Saipgha, in the Iollowing
verses: /
/
/ 1
ye 'pujayanti sambuddhe satkrtya sraddhaya muda
,-Iesam ajnakarah sarve traidhatukadhipa api
/ tatha brahmadaya` capi praraksanti ubhamkarah3
Sakradayah surendras ca lokapala maharddhikah
Dh`rtarastradayas capi gandharvas taddhitamkaraIi u
/ praraksanti sada nityarp dadanti ca yathepsitam
tatha ca palayanty eva Vaisvanaradayo `gnayah
dahotpatarn na kurvanti grhadisu kadacana
tatha pretadhipah kalah kumbhandas ca mahabalah
Virudhakadayo naiva.vighnanty api kathamcana
Nairrtyadi mahavlra raksasas ca sadanugah
palayanti sada dustan hatva nityaip samantatah