DIGEST: KMU Labor Center v. Garcia GR 115381 Dec.

23, 1994

October 26, 2013
FACTS:

Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Secretary Oscar M.
Orbos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman, Remedios A.S.
Fernando that will allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates
within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one (1) year to be implemented on August 6, 1990. The Memo read
as is the liberalization of regulations in the transport sector and to move away
gradually from regulatory policies and make progress towards greater reliance
to market forces: Chairman Fernando informed Sec. Orbos that the Memo is
not legally feasible and recommended for further studies because (1) under
Public Service Act rates should be approved by public service operators; there
should be publication and notice especially to affected sectors; and a public
hearing be held; (2) it was untimely due to an earthquake happened on July
16; (3) it will trigger upward adjustment in bus fares especially in trips bound
for Northern Luzon; and (4) DOTC should consider reforms that will be uplifting
after the earthquake. On December 5, 1990 the Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate
increase. On December 14, 1990 LTFRB released a fare schedule based on a
straight computation. On March 30, 1992 DOTC Sec. Pete Nicomedes Prado
issued Department Order No 92-587 defining the framework on the regulation
of transport services. Then on October 8, 1992 DOTC Sec. Jose B. Garcia
issued a memorandum to LTFRB for the swift action on the adoption of the
rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. 92-587 that laid
down the deregulation and other liberalization policies for the transport sector.
LTFRB issued on February 17, 1993

On March 16, 1994. Kilusang Mayo Uno anchors its claim on two (2) grounds.
First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to
set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus
twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the
existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a
presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport
service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative of
the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court and petitions before the LTFRB.

LTFRB dismissed because of lack of merit.

The Court, on June 20, 1994, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining,
prohibiting and preventing respondents from implementing the bus fare rate
increase as well as the questioned orders and memorandum circulars. This
meant that provincial bus fares were rolled back to the levels duly authorized
by the LTFRB prior to March 16, 1994. A moratorium was likewise enforced on
the issuance of franchises for the operation of buses, jeepneys, and taxicabs.

DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the
petitioner does not have the standing to maintain the instant suit. They further
claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRBs authority to set a fare range scheme
and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of
public convenience.



ISSUE:

Are the petitioners have the right to petition of this case?

Whether or not the fare adjustment is constitutional?

HELD:

(1) YES. KMU has a locus standi (or ability of a party to demonstrate to the
court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to
support that partys participation in the case) which is inherent in the Section 1
of Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.



NO. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED and the challenged administrative issuances and orders, namely:
DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular
No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB
are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect
provisions therein (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the
authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and
(b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant
for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that
there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT
insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of
the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders
declared invalid.
Araneta v Dinglasan
G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949
Tuason, J.:

Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of
CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of
emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules
and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the
duration of its effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The
petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the
provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero
seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota
Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes.
Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the
exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes
was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and
president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to
restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of
this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in
connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio
Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount
or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

YES.
The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became
inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular session on
May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not
the first special session after it.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot
rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and
226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the
Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating
funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null
and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the
Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the
language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the
emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the
war.
Rodriguez v Gella (G.R. No. L-6266 Feb. 2, 1953)
Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546
issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600
for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts,
earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have
Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds
pursuant to said EOs. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671.
Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727
intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to
the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note
also that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in
the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in
pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke
any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for
which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the
president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed
to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing
bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to
contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its power by a simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No.
671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of
the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept
the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the
relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that
the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.
Defensor-Santiago vs COMELEC (270 SCRA 106)
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend
the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative
The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication
of the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local
election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for
prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the
constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet
been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of
initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local
legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in
Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for
initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of
peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as
pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on
amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments
to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2
of Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of
the registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-
executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing
legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
Congressional action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional
action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in
the cold niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though constitutionally
guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten
justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their
various opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated,
that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a peoples initiative.

As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties


G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO,
petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION,

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in
several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor
was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-
93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was
joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge
succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited
but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be
amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No.
3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER,
INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005

Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia,
that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be
prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the
common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b)
all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable
starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys,
mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC
Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that,
inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue
taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of
police power, i.e. lawful subject and lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised
its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving
traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting
the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police
power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the
means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its
professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What
should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and
then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority
and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the
laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its reasonableness, not its
effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a
law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be
justified whenever they happen to be effective.
De La Cruz vs Paras (G.R. No. L-42571, July 25, 1983)
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would
close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the
TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO
REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid
exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed
citing that they were deprived of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit
the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which
is further in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated
and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers
and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws
or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be
attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to
be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by
an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should
and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO,
Petitioners vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY OF CEBU,
Respondents
G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. But then, in late
1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu.
Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance. The court a quo
ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the
final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take
possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters.
Thus petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision and issued a writ of
execution and order of demolition. However, when the demolition order was
about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to
the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the
City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition.
Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.Petitioners filed with the RTC an
action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the
expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an
endeavor contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the
Constitution.
Ruling:
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in
the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances. Local
government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise
it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160,
Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate.
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was
enacted by the SPof Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless
and low-income residents of the City. However, while we recognize that
housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local
government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. There are two legal
provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise
by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In
fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must
comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
White Light Corp. vs City of Manila (576 SCRA 456)
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses,
pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light
Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the
Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of
their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance
strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution.
The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police
power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed
infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which
serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The
said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels
and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some
are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the
infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected
only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may
be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce
(OIC)vs Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. Sutton
G.R. No.162070
Facts
: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,respectively, which declared DAR
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being
violative of the Constitution.
which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26,
1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the
government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took
effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and
swine.
Secretary of DAR, the Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-
raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included
livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, respondents
filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from
the coverage of the CARL.
Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to
cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
drawal
of their VOS andrequested the return of the supporting papers they submitted
in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such request.
provided that only portionsof private agricultural lands used for the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15,1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to beexcluded, the A.O.
fixed the following retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of
1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall
likewise be excludedfrom the operations of the CARL.
him to consider as finaland irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under
the Luz Farms doctrine, their entirelandholding is exempted from the CARL.
Order partiallygranting the application of respondents for exemption from the
coverage of CARL. Applying theretention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9,
petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes,
and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure.Petitioner ordered the
rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under
Compulsory Acquisition.
landholding should beexempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.
Said motion was denied. Respondentsfiled a notice of appeal with the Office of
the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9,
s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock indetermining
the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case
which declared cattle-raising landsexcluded from the coverage of agrarian
reform. The OP affirmed the impugned order. On appealto CA, the CA ruled in
favor of respondents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as void.
Issue:
prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock
raising is constitutional?

Held:
pugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulatelivestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximumretention limit for their ownership. However,
the deliberations of the 1987 ConstitutionalCommission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,swine and poultry-
raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine
andpoultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry
is different from crop or treefarming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural,
activity. A great portion of the investment in thisenterprise is in the form of
industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures andfacilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors,
exhausts andgenerators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other
supplies, anti-pollution equipmentlike bio-gas and digester plants augmented
by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevatedwater tanks, pumphouses,
sprayers, and other technological appurtenance.
ich have been
exempted by theConstitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has
exceeded its power in issuing theassailed A.O.
reenactment of a statute byCongress without substantial change is an implied
legislative approval and adoption of theprevious law. On the other hand, by
making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at
bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No.
7881which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law
changed the definitionof the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial
farming" by dropping from its coverage landsthat are devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significantmodification, Congress
clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the
1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage
of agrarianreform.
dministrative bodies must be in harmony with the
provisions of theConstitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution.
To be valid, they must conform toand be consistent with the Constitution. In
case of conflict between an administrative order andthe provisions of the
Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR
wasproperly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of
agrarian reform beyondthe scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority
Cruz, 1991
FACTS:
Gonong, the SC ruled that (1) theconfiscation of the license plates of motor
vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that couldbe
imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605; and, that (2) even
the confiscation of driver'slicenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to beimposed by the
Commission.
authorities of driver's licenses andremoval of license plates for alleged traffic
violations. These sanctions were not among those that may beimposed under
PD 1605.
tan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
authorizing itself "to detach thelicense plate/tow and impound attended/
unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked orobstructing the flow
of traffic in Metro Manila."
O The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on
the ground that it was adoptedpursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO
392. There was no conflict between the decision andthe ordinance because
the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.
O The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was
null and void because it representedan invalid exercise of a delegated
legislative power. It violated PD 1605 which does not permit, and soimpliedly
prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses
for trafficviolations in Metropolitan Manila.
ISSUE & HELD:
WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)
RATIO:
legislative power. The question the SC must resolve is the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
O A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulatetrade; 5) must
not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

confiscation of driver's licenses for trafficviolations committed in Metropolitan
Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the Metropolitan
ManilaCommission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to impose such
sanctions.

delegation of legislative power from thenational legislature (except only that the
power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes isconferred by
the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinatelegislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all timesthe will of their
principal. Here, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevailagainst the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

but, worse, impose sanctions thedecree does not allow and in fact actually
prohibits.
and indeed there is a statutory
prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan
Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by
thechallenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
NOTE:
SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only
to the Metropolitan Manila area. It isan exception to the general authority
conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to
punishviolations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction
therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna 228 SCRA 329, Dec. 10,
1993Facts:
P.D. No. 851 provides for the Thirteen-Month Pay Law. Under Sec. 1 of said
law, allemployers are required to pay all their employees receiving basic
salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month, regardless of the nature of the
employment, and such should be paid onDecember 24 of every year. The
Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. 851 containedprovisions defining
13-month pay and basic salary and the employers exempted fromgiving it
and to whom it is made applicable. Supplementary Rules and
RegulationsImplementing P.D. 851 were subsequently issued by Minister Ople
which inter alia set items of compensation not included in the computation of
13-month pay. (overtime pay, earnings andother remunerations which are not
part of basic salary shall not be included in thecomputation of 13-month pay).
Pres. Corazon Aquino promulgated on August 13, 1985 M.O.No. 28,
containing a single provision that modifies P.D. 851 by removing the salary
ceiling of P1,000.00 a month. More than a year later, Revised Guidelines on
the Implementation of the13-month pay law was promulgated by the then
Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon, among otherthings, defined particularly what
remunerative items were and were not included in theconcept of 13-month
pay, and specifically dealt with employees who are paid a fixed orguaranteed
wage plus commission or commissions were included in the computation of
13thmonth pay)A routine inspection was conducted in the premises of
petitioner. Finding thatpetitioner had not been including the commissions
earned by its medical representatives inthe computation of their 1-month pay,
a Notice of Inspection Result was served on petitionerto effect restitution or
correction of the underpayment of 13-month pay for the years, 1986 to1988 of
Medical representatives. Petitioner wrote the Labor Department contesting the
Noticeof Inspection Results, and expressing the view that the commission paid
to its medicalrepresentatives are not to be included in the computation of the
13-moth pay since the lawand its implementing rules speak of REGULAR or
BASIC salary and therefore exclude allremunerations which are not part of the
REGULAR salary. Regional Dir. Luna Piezas issued anorder for the payment
of underpaid 13-month pay for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988. Amotion for
reconsideration was filed and the then Acting labor Secretary Dionisio de la
Sernaaffirmed the order with modification that the sales commission earned of
medicalrepresentatives before August 13, 1989 (effectivity date of MO 28 and
its implementingguidelines) shall be excluded in the computation of the 13-
month pay.Similar routine inspection was conducted in the premises of Phil.
Fuji Xerox where itwas found there was underpayment of 13th month pay
since commissions were not included.In their almost identically-worded
petitioner, petitioners, through common counsel, attributegrave abuse of
discretion to respondent labor officialsHon. Dionisio dela Serna and
Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano.
ISSUE:
Whether or not commissions are included in the computation of 13-month pay
HELD:
NO. Contrary to respondents contention, M.O No. 28 did not repeal,
supersede orabrogate P.D. 851. As may be gleaned from the language of MO
No. 28, it merely modifiedSection 1 of the decree by removing the P 1,000.00
salary ceiling. The concept of 13th Monthpay as envisioned, defined and
implemented under P.D. 851 remained unaltered, and whileentitlement to said
benefit was no longer limited to employees receiving a monthly basicsalary of
not more than P 1,000.00 said benefit was, and still is, to be computed on the
basicsalary of the employee-recipient as provided under P.D. 851. Thus, the
interpretation given tothe term basic salary was defined in PD 851 applies
equally to basic salary under M.O. No.28. The term basic salary is to be
understood in its common, generally accepted meaning,i.e., as a rate of pay
for a standard work period exclusive of such additional payments asbonuses
and overtime. In remunerative schemes consists of a fixed or guaranteed wage
pluscommission, the fixed or guaranteed wage is patently the basic salary for
this is what theemployee receives for a standard work period. Commissions
are given for extra effortsexerted in consummating sales of other related
transactions. They are, as such, additionalpay, which the SC has made clear
do not from part of the basic salary.
UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME INSURANCE AND
GUARANTY CORPORATION,
petitioners,vs.
BF HOMES, INC.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
Facts: United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole
representative of all homeowners of BF Homes while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI)
isthe owner- developer of the subdivision.Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was
placed under receivership by SEC for 10 years under Atty. Orendain for 10
years.Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI.
Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into anagreement with
the two major homeowners' associations, the BF Paraaque Homeowners
Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BFHomeowners
Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative
homeowners' association and the setting up of an integratedsecurity program
that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision.
Subsequently, this tripartite agreement wasreduced into a memorandum of
agreement, and was amended.Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner
UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty
Corporation (HIGC), andrecognized as the sole representative of all the
homeowners' association inside the subdivision.Respondent BFHI, through its
receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of
the subdivision's clubhouse and astrip of open space respectively.The first
receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of
respondent BFHI's board of directors was appointed. Based on BFHI's title to
the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the
different homeowners' association in thesubdivision informing them that as a
basic requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be
responsible for the security of thesubdivision in order to centralize it and abate
the continuing proliferation of squatters. On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI
filed with the HIGC apetition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against
respondent BFHI alleging that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their
securityagreement with the previous receiver.The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO
which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking over the clubhouse, securing all
entry and exit points, impeding orpreventing the execution and sale of
properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or agreement
or petitioner with the BFHI.Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's
petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibitionfor the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. The HIGC
issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for
preliminary injunction, until such time that respondentBFHI's application for
prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day
(20) effectivity of the temporary restrainingorder had lapsed, the HIGC ordered
the parties to maintain the
status quo. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's
petition for prohibition. Motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was
denied.Hence this petition.Issues: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and
authority to hear the case as provided for in sec1(b) rule II of HIGCs rules of
procedure.Ruling:HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Originally,
administrative supervision was vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to
PD902-A, this function was delegated to the HIGC. As statedin PD92-A, HIGC
was given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
homeowners disputes arising out of the following intra-corporate relations: 1.
Between and among members of the association; 2.Between any and/or all of
them and the association of which theyare member; and 3.In so far as it
concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and
the state.
When HIGCadopted its revised rules of procedure in the hearing of
homeowners disputes, it added the phrase Between the association and the
state/general public or other entity.
The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated
the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to undulyexpand the
provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A.The inclusion of the phrase
GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot
legally do . The rule-making power of a publicadministrative body is a
delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority
given it by Congress or the Constitution orto enlarge its power beyond the
scope intended. The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings tocarry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace mattersnot covered by the statute." If a
discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.Moreover, where the legislature has
delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out anexpress legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which
conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of
the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to
legislate. "Astatutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Lupangco vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to
Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with
the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to
restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitutional.
Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the
examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or
the like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a
commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the
licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal
its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or
any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like
or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing
the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future
examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on
each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not
act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be
valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the
end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which
they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on
the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent
PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained
from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition
to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their
faculties in attaining success in their endeavors