Submitted by: Robert V. Bulayungan Jr.

Date: 7/8/14

Barrera vs. Barrera, G.R. No. L-31589, July 31, 1970
FACTS: Respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico of the court of First Instance of cavite was
cited for contempt in accusing that the court had delegated its Clerk a power which is
applicable only to the Chief Justice. He explicitly expressed his refusal to apply Section
3, Rule 22 as interpreted by the Supreme Court, in the pending civil case Barrera v.
Barrera. Due to several postponements of the case, the counsel for the plaintiff
submitted a letter requesting that Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico be authorized to continue
hearing the case as the plaintiff has one more witness to present and intends to rest her
case. The letter was forwarded to the Department of Justice and was referred to the
respondent judge. The respondent judge commented and pointed out that since 14
months had already elapsed after the first day of trial in August 21, 1968, and that no
written authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme court was extended to the
branch, the only thing left to do is to dismiss the case based on the provisions of Rule
22 of the Rules of Courts.

ISSUE: Could violation of Section 3 Rule 22 on postponement and adjournments be
considered as grounds to dismiss the civil case Barrera v. Barrera?
HELD: No. The court has ruled in Barrueco v Abeto, that the ruling on postponements
and adjournments is simply directory and a violation of such rule will not inhibit judicial
proceedings; therefore the case should not be dismissed.
Moreover, the respondent judge was further reprimanded not for his thoughts or
opinions but in his allegation that the clerk of court was permitted to exercise an
authority which applicable only to the chief Justice. He further stood by his opinions that
he will not tolerate anybody else or a subordinate to act and act for itself. Moreover, he
was convinced that a doctrine of court that didnt meet his approval should not be
applied. This goes against another decision in 1958 saying that "Now if a Judge of a
lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application
of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against
his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the
case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply
the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a
principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary
inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said
a Judge, by delicate or acute qualms of conscience still believes that he cannot follow
our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he
could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art.
9, C. C.), and he has only one legal way to do that."