The Floundering Expatriate

Case Study











Aaron Glassman





Introduction
The Floundering Expatriate case study is an all-to-familiar example of problems
associated with the global marketplace and when businesses and their leaders transcend
physical and cultural boundaries yet fail to adapt to cultural specifics (Javidan, Dorfman, De
Luque, & House, 2006). This analysis will begin with an introduction, a set the stage, of the
Floundering Expatriate case study. Once key players have been identified and the
organizational environment discussed, an analysis will be presented. This analysis will contain
discussion on culture and communication issues along with globalization. This paper will
conclude with recommendations for future research.
The Floundering Expatriate case takes place in 1995 and surrounds the events of a
globalization effort by Argos International, a holdings company based in the United States. The
CEO of this holdings company, Bill Louin, recognized a rising corporate star in Detroit and felt
this new executive, Bert Donaldson, would be the perfect person to help facilitate
communication between recently acquired divisions in Europe. Bert Donaldsons resume was
impressive. He was a professor of American Studies in Cairo, Egypt for 5 years and while in the
United States, Bert made major improvements to the organizational structure by implementing
cross-functional teams, achieved considerable cost reductions, and much more. In addition,
Bert was charismatic, a hard worker, and very sharp, a proven leader within the U.S.
organization. Louin recognized the need for just such a can-do company man in Zurich. (Adler
et al., 1995)


At the same time, Frank Waterhouse, the CEO of Argos Diesel Europe was awaiting
Donaldsons arrival in Europe in hopes that together, they could both climb the corporate
ladder and grow to corporate hero status (pp. 24). As the case study will later show, this did
not happen. In fact, just the opposite occurred. With Bert Donaldsons arrival, the corporate
environment became tense and dysfunctional, and there was obvious friction between Bert,
the expatriate, and the local, European divisional leadership. Bert recognized the problem, but
didnt have an immediate solution. (Adler et al., 1995)
The case-study mentions several European staff members that attempted to inform
Waterhouse about Donaldsons cross-cultural unawareness. Ursula Lindt is Waterhouses
executive assistant and she attempts to inform Waterhouse of the large number of complaints
shes received regarding Donaldsons inability to adapt or recognize the need to adapt to local
culture. Lindts attempts to inform Waterhouse were met with a frown (pp. 25) so Lindt
changed the subject. Although direct attempts to converse with Waterhouse failed,
Waterhouse did finally recognize Donaldsons failure to culturally adapt. Waterhouse sent a
letter back to CEO Bill Louin in the United States questioning Donaldsons ability to successfully
adapt and manage, but Louin simply replied with Thats rubbish Frank (pp. 28). (Adler et al.,
1995)
Another key player is Bettina Schweri. Schweri is Ursula Lindts childhood friend, and is
responsible for organizing Donaldsons programs. Schweri speaks five different languages and
is extremely familiar with local culture. But, her knowledge is not tapped by Donaldson. Even
worse, Donaldson insulted her by calling her a secretary (pp. 28). Throughout the entire


case-study, as was the case with Schweri, Donaldson failed to recognize the need for cultural
adaptation, training, and awareness and the importance of utilizing local resources to assist
with cultural issues. (Adler et al., 1995)
Now that the key players have been identified, lets take a look and some of the
circumstantial interactions that occurred throughout this case-study. At this point, all
discussion will be based solely on the text without analysis. Bill Louin, the CEO of Argos
International, assigned Donaldson to Waterhouse without any formal cross-cultural training on
the assumption that his Cairo experience was international. In addition, when Waterhouse
questioned Donaldsons capabilities, Louins reply was not that of concern but of persistence
without much analysis. (Adler et al., 1995)
Waterhouse appears to be a competent executive with a busy schedule. Waterhouse
doesnt understand why Donaldson is not doing well and keeps referencing Donaldsons
success in the United States as evidence he too is a competent leader. There seems to be
internal conflict because although Waterhouse recognizes Donaldsons U.S. successes, he
continuously points out his European mistakes. Waterhouse wonders why Donaldson didnt
arrive early for the Argos Management Meeting to schmooze (pp. 28). After Donaldsons
failed keynote address, Waterhouse mumbles I dont have time to walk Donaldson through
remedial cultural adjustment. (pp. 28). This statement implies there was an initial cultural
adjustment process but the text doesnt discuss this. Waterhouse continuously laments
throughout the case-study that firing Donaldson would destroy his career, how successful
Donaldson was in the United States, but how he doesnt know how to help him succeed in the


European environment nor does he have the time to facilitate the acclimation process. In
addition, Waterhouse knows that Louin and Argos International focus on U.S. ideals and would
not understand why Donaldson was not successful under Waterhouse, something that would
make them both look bad. (Adler et al., 1995)
Donaldson, a main character in this case-study has an impressive resume. But, from the
moment he stepped on European soil, he did no alter one single trait in an attempt to culturally
adapt to his new environment. Throughout the case-study, Donaldson seems to recognize his
inability to bring a multi-cultural environment together, but cannot seem to identify any
specific problems to resolve. Reports from Ursula Lindt show that Donaldson is contributing to
low morale, and that managers from other divisions have voiced concerns over Donaldsons
inability to manage a cross-cultural environment. Although not a key player in this case-study,
a human resources officer also made observations similar to Lindts. In Donaldsons own
words, he has tried everything and has reached a point of frustration and flippantly states,
.theyre just doing to have to join the rest of us in the postindustrial age, learn to do things
the Argos way. I worked wonders in Detroit. (pp. 30). (Adler et al., 1995) Unfortunately for
Donaldson, the Argos way is American and this concluding statement in the case study is the
most revealing of his interpersonal struggle.





Analysis
This analysis will begin with a general discussion on culture and cultural awareness and
then focus on several interactions within the case study that could have been handled
differently potentially altering the outcome. The analysis will conclude with several
recommendations for further study. Throughout the analysis, there will be a focus on culture
and cultural awareness as it applies to globalization.
Its clear to this reader that CEO Bill Louin entered the global marketplace with a
domestic mindset and a misunderstanding of what it means to be international. This is
proven throughout the case-study by the selection of a manager (Donaldson) with extensive
successes in the United States and only superficial international experience. In this readers
opinion, Donaldson was doomed from the beginning. As soon as Donaldson arrived, he acted
American and couldnt understand why his international colleagues responded so poorly to his
actions. Donaldson said No matter what I do..someone is always pissed off. (pp. 30). This
general disconnect seems to be from a lack of cultural understanding that caused Donaldson to
be puzzled, irritated, and anxious every time he encountered unfamiliar and seemingly
irrational behaviors (Schein & NetLibrary, 2004).
Further, the case study does not mention any specific cultural training offered to
Donaldson. Waterhouse appears to have a thorough cultural understanding, but doesnt have
the time to share his knowledge with Donaldson. One reason Donaldson may not have been
respected is because people in different countries have different criteria for assessing their
leaders (Javidan et al., 2006). What made Donaldson a successful leader in the United States is


no guarantee that he will be successful in other cultures. Even worse, what made Donaldson
successful in the United States may even be offensive to some other cultures (Javidan et al.,
2006). One strategic point could have been the formation of a cross-cultural task force. This
task force would involve managers from each culture so cross-cultural issues could be discussed
and cross-cultural friction minimized (Yukl, 2006). But, this approach required individual
culture to be valued, something the following examples discount.
Although numerous cultural missteps occurred, a few interactions will be discussed here
as examples. The first is when Ursula Lindt mentioned to Waterhouse that Donaldson must be
having problems at home because he is working so late. Although a common sign of dedication
in American organizational culture, in Switzerland, working late is a self-sacrificial behavior and
considered atypical thus the concern over Donaldsons home life. Another cultural incident
arose when Donaldson referred to his program organizer Battina Schrewi as a secretary. In a
high power-distance country, power is valued (unequal distribution of), and calling a program
organizer a secretary is an insult to Lindts earned power and status. In addition, when Lindt
attempted to discuss other managers dissatisfaction with Waterhouse, Waterhouse frowned
and she dropped the subject. This behavior is expected in low assertiveness cultures, such as
Switzerland, but had this occurred in the United States, a high assertiveness culture, Lindt more
than likely would have continued stating But sir, you need to hear this and continued
discussing Donaldsons faults. (Javidan et al., 2006)
It is clear that Donaldson did not have the respect of other managers necessary to
achieve any form of cohesion or management of this new international venture. Donaldson


failed to consider that although he may have authority, if nobody responds to his position, he
truly lacks power and cannot lead change without the consent of those who will be lead
(Shafritz & Ott, 2005). In this case-study, Donaldson is more of a facilitator vs. a pure change
agent, so some aspects of the change literature are relevant here. Although this reader
recognizes the distinction between facilitator and change agent, the case study eludes to this
internal confusion within Donaldson. A key mistake that Donaldson made was to discount the
importance of participation (Pietersen, 2002). Had Donaldson capitalized on the knowledge of
Lindt or Scherwi, many of the problems highlighted in the case study may not have occurred.
But, the grander problem may have been Louins mission expressed through Donaldson,
which is unclear in the case study. The case study discusses the Argos way and that the
corporate culture is American, and further discusses how the corporate culture is not
disconnected from the geographic (United States) culture. In addition, there seems be no
unified vision to help transcend the cultural barriers (Yukl, 2006) in an attempt to isolate
geographic culture from corporate culture. In this readers opinion, Donaldson was destined to
fail.
How could an American effectively waltz into existing organizations acquired though
buy-outs and mergers and say Well folks, ignore your cultural upbringing, ignore your
geographic culture, ignore your previous corporate culture, and lets begin anew as Argos
America in Europe!? This is in essence what happened and the results were as predicted by
most of the change and culture literature. The real question is how could this incident have
been prevented?


Let us for a moment create a comprehensive error chain to help decipher what went
wrong. First, Louin choose the wrong person for the job. Instead of consulting with
Waterhouse or expatriate consulting firms, Louin choose a leader that was as American as
Apple Pie. It can be assumed that Louin knew this, but rationalized his decision based on
superficial, international experience. Another possible explanation is in-group favoritism,
where added value is placed on an internal candidate vs. a more qualified external candidate
(Bazerman, 2006). Either way, Donaldson was the wrong person for the job without additional,
cross-cultural training.
Once Donaldson arrived, his incompetence was obvious. Waterhouse recognized his
incompetence, but due to his own busy schedule and his own motivation of appearing capable
to Louis at Argos Headquarters, Waterhouse did not effectively address the situation. It wasnt
until the negative feedback became overwhelming that Waterhouse intervened and sent a
letter to Louin. This letter was indirect and led to a passive response from Louin. How could
Waterhouse and Donaldson stay the course in the face of overwhelming evidence that failure
was near? It is clear that Waterhouse was unable to manage the ambivalence associated with
Donaldsons U.S. vs. international performance and how to take decisive action (Simon, 2006).
In addition, it was clear that Donaldson took a one-size-fits-all approach and was unable to
enter a learning mode to command resources for his own cultural benefit and future success
(Schein & NetLibrary, 2004). Had any one link in this chain if errors been broken, the case study
would cease to exist.



Further Study
Although its unknown how many expatriates run into specific cross-cultural leadership issues
since the scope and nature of problems runs the gamut, it would be interesting to research the
acclimation times of expatriates to new cultures. Understanding acclimation times may serve
to curb instant success expectations placed on expatriates. For example, if its understood
that it takes an average of 8 months to fully acclimate to the local culture, language, economic
environment, business practices, etc., then managers can have more realistic expectations on
acclimation times and expected performance levels.
Research Question: How long, in months, would it take for an expatriate manager to leave one
geographic culture* category and acclimate** to another with no previous exposure?
*Geographic culture as defined by GLOBE categories (Anglo, Latin America, etc.)
**Acclimate would be given a definition based on levels of comfort in different scenarios.
In this readers opinion, a standardized cross-cultural curriculum should be designed and
administrated by an international accrediting body. This curriculum would be constructed using
subject matter experts from each culture and involve practice exercises, scenario-based
training, and a test instrument of some sort. After the construction of such a training program,
it would be interesting to propose this research question:
Research Question: How long, in months, would it take for an expatriate manager to leave one
geographic culture* category and acclimate** to another having only completed a certified
training curriculum with no previous exposure?


*Geographic culture as defined by GLOBE categories (Anglo, Latin America, etc.)
**Acclimate would be given a definition based on levels of comfort in different scenarios.
The answers to these questions would lead to one final research question on the benefit (if any)
of standardizing cross-cultural training for expatriate managers.

References

Adler, G., Ready, D. A., Schneider, S., Johansson, B., Trompenaars, F., & Borboa, R. (1995). The
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Bazerman, M. H. (2006). Judgment in managerial decision making (6th ed.). Hoboken, NJ: J.
Wiley. Retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy053/2005275472.html
Javidan, , Dorfman, P., De Luque, M., & House, R. (2006). In the eye of the beholder: Cross
cultural lessons in leadership from project GLOBE. Academy of Management Perspectives,
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Pietersen, W. (2002). The mark twain dilemma: The theory and practice of change leadership.
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Schein, E. H., & NetLibrary, I. (2004). Organizational culture and leadership (3rd ed.). San
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Simon, A. (2006). Leadership and managing ambivalence. Consulting Psychology Journal:
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