OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE CITY VS. MARIO D.

EBIO AND HIS

CHILDREN/HEIRS
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

FACTS:
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of located
Paraaque City and covered by Tax Declaration in the name of respondent Mario D.
Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original
occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose
Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on,
Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after
executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. Pedro was able to obtain a
tax declaration over the said property in his name. Since then, respondents have been
religiously paying real property taxes for the said property.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida.
Upon Pedros advice, the couple established their home on the said lot. In April 1964
and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque
municipal office for the construction of their house within the said
compound.
[7]
On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of Rights
[8]
ceding
his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax
declarations under Pedros name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario
Ebios name.
[9]

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed
Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from theCity Government of
Paraaque for the construction of an access road alongCut-cut Creek located in the said
barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez
Compound traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. Respondents immediately
opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials
from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees
planted on the said lot. On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days, or be
physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim
over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request
remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque
City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.

HELD:
No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the
case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the
Civil Code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along
the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The
only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription.
No matter how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land
which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its
banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.















MARIO C. RONQUILLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-43346 March 20, 1991

FACTS:
Del Rosario owns a registered land adjacent to Estero Calubcub which is already
dried up due to the dumping of garbage by the surrounding neighborhood and not by
any natural causes. Defendant now occupies said dried up land until Del Rosario,
claiming ownership over the same, required him to vacate on the basis of Article 370 of
the Civil Code which provides that riparian owner owns the dried up river bed
abandoned by natural changes.
ISSUE:
Whether the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub being claimed by herein
petitioner was caused by a natural change in the course of the waters and Article 370
applies.
HELD:
Under Art. 370 of the Civil Code, The beds of rivers, which are abandoned
because of a natural change in the course of the waters, belong to the owners of the
riparian lands throughout the respective length of each. If the abandoned bed divided
tenements belonging to different owners the new dividing line shall be equidistant from
one and the other.
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article
370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on
alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that
adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.
24
Considering our earlier finding
that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active
intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and,
hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming
part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership.
Lastly, the fact that petitioner and herein private respondents filed their sales
applications with the Bureau of Lands covering the subject dried-up portion of Estero
Calubcub cannot but be deemed as outright admissions by them that the same is public
land. They are now estopped from claiming otherwise.






HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS VS. COURT OF
APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118436. March 21, 1997

FACTS:
Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for Registration of two parcels of
unregistered land located in Tagaytay. In support of its application for registration they
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Melliza as
vendor who bought the property from Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half
months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990. Notices of the initial hearing were sent by
the Land Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna while Trinidad de
Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified because she was not named as an adjoining owner,
occupant or adverse claimant. Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the
Record Newsweekly. After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court
proceeded to hear the land registration case. On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the
subject parcels of land had previously been applied for registration at the CFI of Cavite
by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has been made. February 13,
1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration.
Consequently RTC issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991,
after it ordered the application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon dismissed. It
was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land
that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. De Roxas learned of its sale and the registration of
the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence, she filed a petition for review before
the RTC to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud, alleging that her signature was forged in both
the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in
the application for registration submitted to the LRA, such that the latter could not send
her a Notice of Initial Hearing RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual
fraud and dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April 15, 1992. CA
affirmed the findings of RTC, ruling that Roxas failed to and demonstrate that there
was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite
for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Hence this
petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels of land in
Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review a decree of
registration.
HELD:
The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual
fraud in obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by Roxas.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds
from an intentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or
concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though
the act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud or
injury upon other persons. Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is
regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated therein, and is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that
there is not a fair submission of the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but
collateral to the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has
been accepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of
registration reopened and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case
(Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes an intentional omission
of fact required by law.
Intentional Omission of Name
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the RTC only the
following names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil,Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court
found that the some words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five
letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. However, Maguesun
Corporation, annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review the
application of theRoxas where in instead of PROVINCIAL ROAD, the name ROXAS
appeared. The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional.
It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking
that "Roxas" was placed in the original application as an adjoining owner,
encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the same application which formed the basis for
the LRA in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names and addresses of
all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the
extent of the search made to find them. Maguesun Corporation failed to comply with
this requirement.
Possession in OCENO
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the property
uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. Maguesun Corporation also that
the subject land was unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker
resided in the subject property. Maguesun Corporation is likewise charged with the
knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of
Sale over the property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de
Roxas owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected
the property prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors or
occupants could have been made facilely. Maguesun Corporation intentional
concealment and representation of Roxas interest in the subject lots as possessor,
occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopening and review of
the decree of registration.
Concealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas
Mention of the late President's name as well as that of Trinidad was made
principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for Maguesun Corporations tax declarations
and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the
law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosure of petitioner's
adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at the appropriate time,
i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons concerned will
not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore, miss the opportunity
to present their opposition or claims.
Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation
remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a
component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as
possible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of the
registration proceedings may be notified thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is
not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general
circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
Forgery and Discrepancies
A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible
conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is
no proof of respondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution
and preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves that
Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits the
protection of the law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in several documents
executed by Trinidad. The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have
none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures characteristic of
the penmanship of elderly persons.
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as
well as the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at
Clark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have been
ignored. If Trinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why she should
state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.











































Submitted by: HERNANDEZ, Annabel F.
Submitted to: Atty. Palabrica