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A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda
Edward Newman
a
a
Department of Political Science and International Studies , University of
Birmingham , Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
Published online: 17 Nov 2011.
To cite this article: Edward Newman (2011) A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda, Third World Quarterly,
32:10, 1737-1756, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2011.610568
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A Human Security Peace-Building
Agenda
EDWARD NEWMAN
ABSTRACT International peace building in post-conict societies has helped to
bring armed conicts to an end and reduced the recurrence of war. According to
some scholars, peace building has therefore contributed to the apparent
downward trend of major intra-state conict in recent years. However, the
liberal institutionalist values which underpin international peace building
emphasising democracy, free market economics and the liberal statehave
raised a range of criticisms and challenges from scholars as well as local
stakeholders in the societies in which peace-building programmes are deployed.
In particular, the prevailing approaches to peace-building give insucient
attention to basic and everyday human needs, and promote externally conceived
models of state institutions which are not always appropriate. This article
explores the problems of contemporary peace building and argues that an
alternative vision which draws upon the concept of human security and gives
greater emphasis to welfare, livelihoods and local engagement can make peace
building more legitimate and sustainable.
International peace-building and reconstruction activities in post-conict and
conict-prone societies have a fairly positive record in terms of promoting
stability and peace. Indeed, the role these activities have played in ending and
containing intra-state violence is generally considered to have contributed to
declining numbers of armed conicts, because fewer armed conicts recur.
However, the record, eectiveness and legacy of peace building in conict-
prone societies suggest that these operations have been less successful in
promoting welfare goals, equitable human development and inclusive
democratic politics. From a narrow perspective of peace buildingwhich
is conned to limited objectives, in particular ending open conictthese are
secondary goals, to be addressed by national authorities in the long term. In
contrast, this article will argue that social welfare and human security issues
should not be regarded as secondary challenges or relegated to the long term.
It suggests that social welfare shortcomings can jeopardise overall peace-
building objectives, obstruct the consolidation of peace, and contribute to
doubts about the legitimacy of peace-building programmes. The article also
Edward Newman is in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of
Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK. Email: e.newman.1@bham.ac.uk.
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 10, 2011, pp 17371756
ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/11/10173720
2011 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.610568 1737
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considers whether alternative approaches to peace building, based upon
welfare and public service deliverya human security approach to peace
buildingmight promote a more sustainable and inclusive form of peace.
Thus, the key question in this article is: can a human security approach to
peace building address the limitations, problems and controversies raised by
the prevailing liberal institutionalist peace-bulding consensus? In exploring
this question, the article therefore alludes to a core concern regarding
prevailing approaches to international peace building: the limitations of the
liberal peace-building project and the need for greater emphasis upon welfare
economics, human development and local engagement. It suggests that the
state-building model of peace buildingas a response to the merging of
development and security in policy circleshas lost sight of these essential
human security issues.
International peace building
International peace building in conict-prone and post-conict societies is,
ostensibly at least, aimed at preventing the resumption or escalation of violent
conict and establishing a durable and self-sustaining peace. It has developed
rapidly in recent years in terms of the range of activities conducted, the
number of operations carried out, and the number and variety of international
actors involved in these missions. International peace-building and recon-
struction activities have been credited with signicant successes in promoting
stability and containing conicts. They have also increased not only in
numbers and in complexity but also in scope. Almost all post-cold war
peacekeeping and peace-building operations have been carried out inor
subsequent tosituations of civil conict, and have involved tasks related to
promoting security, development, humanitarian assistance and strengthening
governance and the rule of law. Such activities have included supporting
ceaseres and peace processes; demobilisation and disarmament of former
combatants and reintegrating them into society; stabilising the economy;
employment creation and economic development; repatriation (or resettle-
ment) of refugees and internally displaced persons; responding to food
insecurity; responding to acute health concerns; strengthening law and order;
promoting and facilitating democratic practices; strengthening institutions of
justice and legislation; resuming and strengthening public service delivery;
promoting human rights and reconciliation; addressing land reform claims;
and constitutional drafting or amendments.
The key examples are the UN operations in Cambodia, Angola, Burundi,
Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Co te dIvoire, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, East Timor, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition
to these major, high-prole UN operations, a much larger number of
cases exists in which national development agenciessuch as the
UK Department for International Development (DFID), the US
Agency for International Development, the Canadian International
Development Agency, the German Corporation for International
EDWARD NEWMAN
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Development Cooperation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agencysupport and
undertake a range of similar activities. It is not possible to treat all of these
peace-building and aid actors as a disaggregated whole, but there is a
prevailing international peace-building consensus that rests upon broadly
liberal principles. The programmes and activities that have owed from this
have generated a range of academic and policy debates and controversies. A
key element of these debates relates to the nature and impact of liberal peace
building: the top-down promotion of democracy, market-based economic
reforms and a range of other institutions associated with modern states as a
driving force for building peace.
1
The results of these peace-building activities appear to suggest that
increased international eorts are helping to reduce the absolute numbers of
civil wars, although the relationship is complex and not denitive. The
intervention of international peace-building actors can arguably be
signicant in ending civil wars sooner than they otherwise would have done,
and in preventing the reoccurrence of major civil war, a proposition that is
supported by the empirical work of some political scientists.
2
The 2010
Human Security Report suggested that there has been an extraordinary
decline in the numbers of high-intensity conictswith more intra-state
conicts ending and not recurringwhich can be partially explained by an
extraordinary upsurge of international initiatives directed at preventing wars,
stopping those that could not be prevented, and seeking to prevent those that
had stopped from starting again.
3
Other sources are far more cautious about
the decline in intra-state conict, suggesting that an apparent decline may
owe something to the manner in which conicts are codied and dened, how
the data are interpreted, and what historical timeframe is used for analysis.
4
Nevertheless, there is signicant agreement that intrastate conictsand
especially major civil warsare declining in absolute numbers, and that
international peace-making and peace-building interventions have played a
role in this downward trend.
However, the record of peace building in terms of promoting durable and
positive peacebased on sustainable economic growth, service delivery, self-
sustaining institutions, inclusive democratic practices, personal security and
the rule of lawhas been much less positive, and perhaps even poor. The
consequences, such as social unrest, political stagnation or volatility, weak
state institutions, and the threat of insecurity, can be seen in Bosnia, East
Timor, Kosovo, Co te dIvoire, Sierra Leone and elsewhere. The reasons for
such shortcomings, insofar as the role of the international peace-building and
development community is concerned, may be found in two areas. First, the
rationale behind the international peace-building agenda is increasingly
driven by the belief that stability in fragile states is an international security
imperative. Second, there are problems related to the liberal institutionalist
models that guide the formulation and implementation of peace building in
post-conict settings. The next section will explore these themes.
Despite noble intentions, peace building by international actors has often
resulted in a heavy reliance on top-down approaches andaccording to
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some observersa lack of sensitivity towards local needs and desires. More
importantly, although the importance of local ownership has been
increasingly emphasised, there is still very limited knowledge or research
about local opinions, perceptions and experiences that shape or react to
externally led peace-building processes. The argument of this article is that
these shortcomings cannot, as is usually done, be dismissed as an acceptable
short-term limitation, peripheral to the overall objectives of peace building,
namely, to maintain stability. Human insecuritydeprivation, alienation,
exclusionis a direct threat to peace-building processes and objectives, since
these undermine the legitimacy of peace building and fuel the underlying
sources of conict. Indeed, the implication of a human security approach to
peace building is that the overall integrity of peace-building and reconstruc-
tion projects is ultimately related to the everyday experience of individuals
and communities, including their material well-being.
Peacebuilding as international security
A key problem which helps to explain why many of the objectives of sus-
tainable peace building appear to be elusive relates to the motivations which
drive these international interventions. There is widethough not uncon-
testedagreement that unstable and conict-prone societies pose a threat to
international security and stability. Many analysts, especially after 9/11, now
consider these situations as the primary security challenge of the
contemporary era. Theories of conict and instability also increasingly point
to the weakness of the state as a key factor in the onset of violent conict, and
a merging of the security and development agendas.
5
Among foreign policy
elites this is a paradigm shift in security thinking: challenges to security come
not from rival global powers, but from weak states.
6
According to
Fukuyama, weak and failing states have arguably become the single most
important problem for international order.
7
The 2008 UK National Security
Strategyand many other sources within or close to policy circlesreects
similar thinking, arguing that a key driver of global insecurity in the
contemporary world is poverty, inequality and poor governance.
8
It is debatable whether this view reects reality or is rather a political
construction.
9
Nevertheless, greater eorts and resources have been forth-
coming from powerful states to contain, resolve and to some extent prevent
civil war. One analyst has therefore suggested that addressing failing and
conict-prone states has become one of the critical all-consuming strategic
and moral imperatives of our terrorised time.
10
In recent years international peace-building activities in conict-prone and
post-conict countries have increased in number and in complexity in line
with this evolving security discourse. These activities have also become an
exercise in state building, based upon the assumption that eective
(preferably liberal) states form the greatest prospect for a stable international
order. Peace building is therefore a part of the security agenda insofar as the
pathologies of conict-prone and underdeveloped states have been con-
structed as international threats.
11
Viewing conict, weak statehood and
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underdevelopment as a threat to international security has brought much-
needed resources, aid and capacity building to conict-prone countries in the
form of international assistance. This has arguably contributed to a
reduction in the absolute numbers of civil wars and the consolidation of
peace in many countries.
However, peace building as security has also generated a number of
critical challenges. This approach translates into peace-building policies
which often ignore the underlying sources of conict because the emphasis is
upon stability and containment, rather than conict resolution. It also results
in conditional and coercive forms of peace-building assistancemost
obviously for example in Bosnia and East Timor but more subtly in many
other contexts. When international stability becomes the priority, rather than
addressing local conict or demands for justice, international peace building
tends to rely on top-down mediation among power brokers and on building
state institutions, rather than on bottom-up, community-driven peace
building or the resolution of the underlying sources of conict. Instead of
promoting a sense of social justice and reconciliation, this can perpetuate the
inuence of sectarian leaders because international peace-building actors
believe that the latter must be engaged with as the key to local controla
part of the facts on the ground. This excludes or obstructs the emergence of
alternativepotentially more conciliatory and cosmopolitanleaders and
civil society, and thus alternative visions of peace.
The peace-building agenda itself often becomes an externally (often donor)
driven exercise, because it is ultimately oriented towards the promotion of
stability, often without a genuine understanding of local political culture,
desires or needs. As a result, this approach can be insensitive towardsand
exclude from the peace-building agendalocal traditions and institutions.
Indeed, there are numerous reports of local opposition and civil society
initiatives being discouraged by international peace-building agents because
they apparently do not t the agenda.
12
There is also evidence of peace-
building actorsespecially major UN operationsfailing to recognise
traditional social and political institutions in the countries in which they are
working.
13
Peace building is often reduced to a technical exercise, the
implication being that peace-building assistance is essentially value-free and
that it does not represent important choices and interests. Yet the apolitical
model of peace building can miss the reality on the ground and fail to create
conditions conducive to durable stability. Moreover, in this context there is a
danger that state building may undermine traditional indigenous authority
structures.
14
This may be morally questionable and illegitimate, but also, if the
new centralised agendas fail to take root, instability and conict can ensue (as
in East Timor in 2006). This raises the question: is the liberal peace being
promoted in societies, such as Sierra Leone, East Timor and Co te dIvoire, in
which it may, for social or cultural reasons, be fundamentally inappropriate?
The mixed record of peace building is therefore hostage to its prevailing
rationale to promote strong states and contain conict as a matter of inter-
national security, rather than to resolve conicts or address its underlying
sources. This is not to disparage the value of stability and negative peace:
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the ending of violence and establishing stability is a great achievement, and
clearly the prerequisite to any further peace-building and reconstruction
objectives. As noted above, it is not inconceivable that international peace-
building interventions have contributed to a historical downward trend in the
recurrence of intra-state conict. Many policy analysts, in particular, would
argue that the promotion of stability in conict-prone societies is the realistic
extent of what international peace-building can achieve.
However, there is ample evidence that a negative peace can be a fragile
peace; research shows that conict is often recurrent in societies that have
experienced conict in the past, and this remains the case, despite the
apparent downtrend in armed conict.
15
The tendency for international
peace building to emphasise stability through brokering elite bargaining has
meant that the sources of conictand the overall atmosphere of
sectarianism in public lifehave been perpetuated, which in the worst cases
can make peace fragile. Although international peace building is often
described as liberal, this may be a misnomer. Is international peace building
truly liberal when (in terms of conict resolution) it tends to mediatefrom
the top downbetween local power brokers, who are often politically
extremist or exclusionary, and does notdespite the civil society empower-
ment programmes that are invariably a part of peace-building activities
suciently engage with grassroots community actors who are potentially
more inclusive and moderate? Thus, the essential mechanism of a liberal
social contract is generally absent in post-conict states, which instead are
held together by external actors. This also obstructs more progressive
bottom-up forms of peace building that cultivate cosmopolitan peaceful
forces and address underlying sources of conict. So-called liberal peace
building is indeed premised upon the idea of democracy, the free market and
state institutions, yet the emphasis upon stability and security seems more
akin to the promotion of a strong Hobbesian state than a Lockean liberal
contract, because this serves international stability, an important objective of
international peace-building activities.
The liberal institutionalist approach to peace building
The second, related, source of the shortcomings associated with international
peace building is a consequence of the liberal institutionalist model which
informs such interventions, often disregarding local contexts, experiences and
institutional legacies. The liberal institutionalist approach to peace building
and development in fragile states is driven by the belief that the principal
problem with conict-prone and post-conict states is the absence of
eective state institutions. With this rationale (re)building viable institutions,
often based on generic models, becomes a priority, and almost an end in itself,
judging by the indicatorsrelating to the establishment of legal systems,
improvements in the performance of national police agencies, and the
holdings of electionsencouraged by the UN to measure progress.
16
It is
interesting that the UNs guidelines on Monitoring Peace Consolidation
suggest that Peace consolidation benchmarks should not reect broader
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aspirations for development, poverty reduction, and human rights if these are
not directly relevant; it is surely dicult to disentangle these broader
aspirations in the minds of citizens in post-conict settings.
17
The
institutionalist view assumes that state institutions and the right market
conditions are enough to generate the material objectives of peace building
and concentrates on institutional benchmarks and peace building metrics
relating to sequences and deliverables. According to this, certain institutions
are believed to be universally viablesecular citizenship, electoral democracy,
free market economics, a centralised state, civil and political human rights
so once these are achieved in a formal sense, political and economic
development will move forward and serve peace, all in a mutually supportive
process.
The hazards of promoting electoral democracy in transitional societies are
well known. While consolidated democracies tend to be peaceful, democratis-
ing, transitional societies are not necessarily peaceful. In fact, a signicant
amount of research suggests that transitional societiesthose moving
towards democracymay be more likely to experience civil conict,
especially in poor and divided societies. The Political Instability Task Force,
which conducted a large-scale analysis of conict from 1955 to 2003, came to
the conclusion that, in terms of statistical correlation, the risk of conict is
highest not among democracies or authoritarian states but in partial
democracies or transitional states, especially when factionalism is present
(typical in new democracies, where party systems are weak and political
participation is more likely to ow through networks rooted in traditional
identities or other parochial interests).
18
According to this research, by far
the worst situation in terms of risks of instability were for a political
landscape that combined deeply polarised or factionalised competition with
open contestation. The combination of a winner-take-all, parochial approach
to politics with opportunities to compete for control of central state authority
represents a powder keg for political crisis.
19
Therefore, the promotion of
democracy may not always support peace building because democratisation
can be destabilising in conict-prone and divided societies, since it may
exacerbate political conict and sectarian divisions.
20
Especially in conjunc-
tion with vulnerability factorssuch as ethnic heterogeneity, social inequal-
ity, weak state capacity, low levels of human rightsthe liberalisation of the
political system acts as a catalyst to armed conict. In particular,
democratisation in such situations encourages politicians to campaign on
sectarian grounds, including ethnicity, tribal aliation and religion. In
volatile or post-conict societies elections can exacerbate societal dierences,
and when a victorious political group is dominated by members of an
exclusive identity group, this can create insecurities among communities on
the outside of this group. There is also the argument that liberalising or
democratising societies which contain other vulnerability factors may
experience conict as the government opens to the door to (competing)
demands which cannot be met and unfullled expectations. The momentum
of public mobilisation created by the partial democratisation, and the
frustration encountered as a result of unfullled demands, may be
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transformed into violent opposition. Many other studies have also found that
states which are in the process of democratising are vulnerable to armed
conict.
21
There is ample experience to support this view: Angola 1992,
Burundi in the rst half of the 1990s, Bosnia in the 1990s, and Co te dIvoire
in 2010, among others. The central role of early elections as a part of peace-
building doctrine is therefore questionable.
The promotion of free market reforms in conict-aected societies also
rests on the liberal peace assumption. In addition, it is a part of the strategy
of economic growth and development which are essential for the consolida-
tion of peace. However, the emphasis upon market reforms has also been
challenged. There are claims that this approach can result in inequality,
unemployment and social problems, resulting in perceived injustice and
social grievances. It can hamper the development of public services at a time
when they are most needed. It may even contribute to the underlying sources
of conict, while perpetuating problems, such as the reliance of people upon
the informal economy. Of course, progress in public service delivery and
welfare requires economic growth, and this can only come from a free market
and a climate conducive to investment. However, ill-timed or premature
economic liberalisationincluding privatisation and public spending cuts
in volatile societies can result in growing inequalities and alienation, which
threaten broader peace-building goals. This, in turn, obstructs progress
towards a solid investment environment.
Externally led state building based on institutionalist models may under-
mine traditional indigenous authority structures, raising questions of
legitimacy in addition to eciency. Self-sustaining public institutions often
fail to take root; a phenomenon that has been observed in Sierra Leone.
22
When economic growth is largely unregulated and concentrated among the
elite, large sections of the population depend upon the informal economic
sector to surviveand in turn fail to pay taxes, and shun public institutions.
Where institutions are not organic and thus not durable in the absence of
external support, local ownership is jeopardised. In these circumstances,
combined with poverty and an apparent lack of opportunities, citizens
continue to support sectarian political forces which prolong the polarisation of
society, and in the worst cases threaten violence and insecurity. The eorts
and resourcesof donor agencies do not fully achieve their goals, aid is wasted
and society is prone to the danger of falling again into cycles of conict.
The liberal peace-building agenda encourages, as a long-term goal, con-
strained public expenditure, deregulation and privatisation. There is thus an
internal paradox: peace building implies the strengthening (or (re)construc-
tion) of the state, yet the liberal economic and social policies that are
promoted threaten to undermine the state, along with public service delivery.
Privatisation in Iraq during the conict period after 2003 is illustrative of
this.
23
Clearly some donor organisations, most notably DFID, do have an
emphasis upon social welfare and public service delivery and do undertake
important work which improves the lives of citizens and contributes to human
development.
24
There is also growing recognition of the importance of public
service delivery for peace building and state building.
25
Nevertheless, from a
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broader perspective, despite the good intentions and good work undertaken,
prevailing peace-building approaches ultimately reect the contradictions and
pathologies inherent in the structural conditions that characterise the
relationship between the developed and developing world. The criticisms
and concerns about the eectiveness and legitimacy of overseas development
aid in general are therefore relevant to understanding the limitations of liberal
peace building; while it is mostly well intentioned, it is ultimately constrained
by broader structural problems which limit its eectiveness and the ability of
countries to move out of poverty and instability.
26
Furthermore, there is ample evidence that marketisation is unhelpful in
volatile conict-prone societies which have been characterised by inequality
and social grievances. Contrary to a liberal economic approach, the evidence
suggests that the emphasisat least in the short termshould be upon
poverty alleviation and employment generation, on the basis of local
provision. While some agenciesnotably DFIDapparently take this
seriously, broader international peace building remains embedded in the
prevailing development assistance mind-set that has been widely challenged.
Problems and challenges
While aiming to contain instability and build generic state institutions
based upon external models, liberal institutionalist peace building often
neglects the welfare needs of local populations and fails to engage with
indigenous traditional institutions. This approach also fails to grasp the
underlying and everyday factors that may be the root causes and drivers of
conict in the rst place: social, economic and political exclusion and
grievances. As Lide n et al observe, Human security appears to have been all
but abandoned.
27
Simultaneously, if the state-building eorts embodied in
the peace-building agenda fail to take root in local societies, not only can
instability and conict ensue, but dependency on international sponsorship
can take root.
The result of liberal institutionalist peace-building programmes has often
been the alienation of signicant sections of the population in such societies,
who not only fail to embrace the core objectives of peace building, but engage
in reactionary practices such as shunning the institutions of the state or
turning to extremist forms of politics, which endanger peace and the peace-
building agenda. These and other problems are demonstrated in the cases of
Kosovo, East Timor, Co te dIvoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Afghanistan,
among many others.
28
In such situations huge investments by international
actors may have led to a welcome cessation of conicta negative peace
but danger signs are present: the peace dividend is not equitably spread,
disillusionment and social exclusion are widespread, reconciliation ob-
structed, and volatility persists. This is not to argue that such societies would
be better o without international peace-building assistance, but rather that
such intervention could be more eective.
Bosnia is illustrative: from a liberal institutionalist perspective peace
building there is largely successful: the country is stable, it is experiencing
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economic growth and it is increasingly integrated into many international
institutions. In addition, it no longer threatens regional stability. Yet the
reality is that the country is ethnically polarised and sectarian, democratic
politics mirrors the nationalist agendas of militant parties, and social and
economic gaps are sources of intense dissatisfaction and alienation. In 2004 a
thorough investigation by the World Bank found substantial poverty in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, accompanied by precarious livelihoods, widespread
health risks, violation of human rights, discrimination and corruption,
limited geographical mobility, and limited access to formal safety nets.
29
There is evidence that the situation remains precarious. There is little
consensus among the dierent communities regarding the causes of the civil
war in Bosniaand thus no reconciliationand it is questionable whether
self-sustaining national institutions would be durable in the absence of
external support. The informal economy, including the remnants of the war
economy, is a very signicant fact of life for many citizens.
30
As late as May
2009 US vice president Joe Biden told Bosnian politicians that they face
poverty and bloodshed unless they put a stop to nationalist rhetoric and
ethnic tensions.
31
All this should be a source of major concern to the donor
community after so many years of involvement.
32
East Timor is also illustrative. Almost a decade after independence and
huge amounts of peace-building assistance, the country remains poor and
volatile.
33
An Economist Intelligence Unit report suggested that Life has
only become more wretched for the countrys inhabitants since indepen-
dence.
34
Again, this is not to suggest that life would have been better
without the peace-building mission, but rather that certain decisions and
priorities have been questionable, and that a greater emphasis upon human
security would have been more likely to support the consolidation of peace.
At the time of East Timors crisis in 2006 around 40 per cent of the
population were said to be below the poverty line and only half of rural
households had drinking-water on tap, infant mortality was at a very poor
level, and rural communities were particularly suering.
35
Surely this
deprivation was relevant to understanding the crisis of the peace-building
project. There is evidence that the poverty and inequality that characterised
the country and contributed to the outbreak of violence in 2006 in many
ways remains.
36
Given the small population size of East Timor at one
million, its small geographic sizewhich suggests that development
assistance could presumably have lifted people out of the most desperate
circumstancesand the overall costs of international involvement, this
certainly raises questions about the peace-building priorities.
Liberal institutionalist approaches aimed at containing instability and
building generic state institutions based upon external models have arguably
neglected the welfare needs of local populations at the street level, and have
failed to engage with indigenous traditional institutions. Indeed, these
approaches are not grounded in the everyday politics, experiences and needs
of individuals and communities.
37
In some cases, such as Bosnia, despite huge
investment for years after the end of open conict, at best a negative peace
sponsored by international enforcement exists and a signicant proportion of
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the citizens remains alienated from national politics and from other
communities.
In addressing the challenges to liberal peace building, the literature on the
subject has generated two dierent responses. Firstly, some scholars would
argue that the liberal peace-building model is essentially solid, and problems
that have arisen are the result of poor co-ordination, a failure to adapt peace-
building and state-building activities to the local context, and poor
sequencing of peace-building programmes.
38
This approach acknowledges
that there are tensions and dilemmas within the peace-building agenda which
might not be completely reconciled, but argues that the right institutional
environment can allow progress in peace building and state building. A
number of analysts argue that institutions which can manage the competitive
environment of democracy and free market economics are necessary as a
precondition for democracy.
39
However, this responsewhich might be
described as a problem-solving approachis premised upon the idea of top-
down institutions as the primary goal of peace building, assuming that
development, growth and stability will follow, and assuming that essentially
liberal states can be promoted in dierent contexts.
The second response is provided by more critical analysts who are
sceptical of the role of markets and formal institutions of democracy in post-
conict situations, and of the role of externally derived models of the state
which are at the heart of peace building. This perspective therefore raises
more fundamental challenges to the promotion of liberalism in developing
and conict-aected societies.
40
Some critical scholars come close to
denouncing the entire international peace-building agenda as a hegemonic
exercise undertaken at the behest of powerful states, aimed at controlling or
exploiting developing countries.
41
The problem-solving approach which prescribes institutions before
liberalisation fails to expose the fundamental shortcomings of the liberal
institutionalist approach and therefore neglects the needs of war-torn
societies. The critical response, while intellectually stimulating, often fails
to oer a way forward, beyond problematising and deconstructing liberal
peace building. The second generation of critical scholarship on peace
buildingif the rst generation was mainly focused upon problematising and
deconstructing the legitimacy of peace buildinghas begun to seek a way
forward.
42
Nevertheless, the critical approach is to some extent trapped
within its own ontological conundrum: it assumes that values are subjectively
constructed and intervention is not value-free (and indeed is hegemonic) so it
is dicult to propose a way forward for international peace building because
it will always be a form of intervention by powerful actors in weaker
societies.
Some scholars have begun to apply human security ideas to peace-building
challenges as a response to the apparent problems and limitations of
international peace building.
43
These arguments promote the idea of a
self-sustaining positive peace through human security, linked to ideas of
social justice and emancipation. However, the manner in which human
security might be applied to contemporary peace-building challenges, both
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theoretical and practical, remains underexplored. But we need not rely only
upon the evolving critical peace-building discourse to nd intellectual
support for a human security approach to peace building: Galtungs idea
of positive peace, Burtons human needs, and Azars work on protracted
social conict provide the rich antecedents for such an approach to
understanding and responding to violence.
44
Human security: an alternative approach to peacebuilding?
International peace building has demonstrated a range of problems and
controversies. In particular, the eectiveness and appropriateness of
promoting liberal democracy and market economics in volatile conict-
prone societies are contested. The perceived absence of local ownership, and
insucient consultation with local stakeholders, have led some observers to
question the legitimacy of peace-building operations. The apparent emphasis
in international peace building on top-down mediation among power brokers
and building state institutionsin contrast to more bottom-up, community-
driven peace buildinghas raised concerns about the sustainability of peace
building projects. The attention to reconstruction and stability and the
neglect of the underlying sources of conict suggest, to some, that the nature
of the peace that is being built is not entirely inclusive. The seeming paradox
of combining reconstruction with coercionmost obviously in Afghanistan
and Iraq, but also more subtly in Bosnia and elsewhereand the manner in
which other components of the peace-building agenda also appear to be in
tension with each other suggest that there are deep and unresolved internal
contradictions in the peace-building project.
In particular, the concept of liberal peace building and the manner in
which it is promoted in fragile and divided societies are problematic. The
tenets of liberal peace buildingliberal democracy, liberal human rights,
market values, the integration of societies into globalisation and the
centralised secular stateare not necessarily universal (or universally
applicable) values. Moreover, the liberal peace and its neoliberal economic
dimensions, which have displaced older liberal ideas about welfare, are not
necessarily appropriate for conicted or divided societies. Indeed, democracy
and the market are arguably adversarial or even conictual forcestaken for
granted in stable Western democracies but not necessarily suitable for
volatile societies that do not enjoy stable institutions. Peace-building
activities are thus not neutral in their normative orientation or impact, and
this raises important questions regarding policy options.
There is real concern that post-conict peace-building programmes may
therefore sow the seeds of their own failure by exacerbating the social
tensions that resulted in violent conict in the rst place, or by failing to
create the domestic foundations for democratising and marketising reforms.
As a result, dierent components of the liberal reform agenda may be in
tension with each other in ways that cast doubt on the viability of the larger
liberal peace-building project. A human security approach to peace building
can oer some solutions.
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Human security suggests that public policy must be directed above all at
enhancing the personal security, welfare and dignity of individuals and
communities. The human security concept is in itself theoretically con-
troversial.
45
All approaches to human security agree that the referent of
security policy and analysis should be the individual, but they disagree about
which threats the individual should be protected from, and what means
should be employed to achieve this protection. The theoretical human
security debate is thus embroiled in disagreements about the scope of the
concept. Nevertheless, despite these theoretical controversies, the funda-
mental claim of human security is compelling and applicable in many
dierent policy areas: the irreducible referent object of security should be
individuals, rather than constructions such as territorial integrity, national
security, or state sovereignty. This is not to presume that human security is
necessarily in conict with state security; the state remains the central
provider of security in ideal circumstances. Human security does, however,
suggest that international security traditionally denedas territorial
integritydoes not necessarily correlate with human security, and that an
over-emphasis upon state security can be to the detriment of human welfare
needs. So traditional conceptions of state security are a necessary but not
sucient condition of human welfare. The citizens of states that are secure
according to the traditional concept of security can be personally perilously
insecure to a degree that demands a reappraisal of the concept of security.
The concept of human security can be critically applied to a range of policy
areas in order to deconstruct existing structures and institutions of power,
gender and distribution. This raises questions about existing policy assumptions
and priorities, and the interests they serve. Acritical approach to human security
leads us to question and, if necessary, challenge existing constructions such as
state sovereignty, high politics, national interest and the market. Critical
approaches question or challenge prevailing structures of power and power
relations, and also prevailing discourses or ways of thinking. Human security
encourages us to interrogate and problematise the values and institutions which
currently exist as they relate to human welfare, and more thoroughly question
the interests that are served by these institutions. For example, poverty
alleviation and employment generation eorts by international nancial
institutions may help to lift communities out of poverty, but this must be seen
within the broader liberal market context which (according to some analysts)
arguably disempowers communities and results in social deprivation.
The human security concept clearly also has implications for the activities
that are undertaken in international peace-building programmes, and the
nature of engagement between international and local actors. In general
terms, a human security approach to peace building would strive to enhance
the physical and material security of individuals and communities, through
poverty alleviation, employment creation, and public service delivery, in the
belief that this will ultimately serve the cause of peace and stability. The
human security approach would suggest that the individual and commu-
nities, rather than aggregate indicators of growth or performance, should be
the primary beneciaries. The human security approach to peace building
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rests upon the belief that post-conict societies are more likely to embrace
peace, and perhaps reconciliation, and eschew sectarian politics if they are
materially secure and if citizens believe that they have a stake in society and
have real prospects. From a human security perspective the prevailing liberal
institutionalist peace-building consensus does not give adequate attention to
human welfare as a priority, or else has undue condence in the market and
liberal democracy to deliver human security goals. In this sense the human
security and the liberal approaches to peace building basically agree upon the
end point, but dier on how to get there. The liberal approach to peace
building is mainly oriented around aggregate indicators of development,
which can obscure very serious problems, while the human security
perspective suggests that the experience of individuals is critically important.
A human security approach to peace building also places emphasis on
addressing the underlying sources of conict, rather than merely containing
conict through a negative peace.
If operationalised, these ideas could potentially strengthen the legitimacy
of peace-building activities, make them more sensitive to local needs and
conditions, and therefore strengthen local buy-in and support while restoring
dignity to post-crisis societies. A number of implications arise from the
human security concept.
The human security approach recognises the root causes of conicts in
terms of social and political exclusion, horizontal inequalities or structural
violence, in addition to power politics and spoiler activities. This recognition
therefore requires root cause analysis, preventive action, early warning
indicators and strategic planning, taking the exercise of peace building
beyond a quick impact project with short-term goals.
The human security approach does not rely on preconceived benchmarks
relating to state institutions, democracy or the market as the end goals, but
rather as means for protecting and providing for citizens. This is a marked
departure from the liberal institutionalist approach, which takes externally
driven visions of security, the market and the state as benchmarks. From a
human security perspective a weak state is one which cannot exercise its
primary function of social protection and therefore fails in its duty to protect,
care for and empower its citizens.
46
A failed state therefore is one that
cannot provide for the needs of its citizens, rather than one which cannot
maintain institutions of liberal governance and markets or one that threatens
international security. The legitimacy of state institutions is thus a function of
the states willingness and ability to distribute justice, meet human needs, and
undertake public service delivery. Institutions are fundamentally important,
but they are not ends in themselves, but rather the means to an end: to
enhance the welfare and livelihoods of individuals and communities.
Finally, while the human security concept places individuals and
communities as the referent of policy and analysis, it also seeks to endow
individuals with the agency required to bring about positive change in their
lives. International assistance may be necessary in post-conict and conict-
prone societies, and this always raises sensitive questions related to the
balance between international and local control of the peace-building
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agenda. In these circumstances, local ownership will be compromised, since
the relationship between local and international actors is rarely, if ever,
equal. Nevertheless, a human security approach, while acknowledging this
reality, strives as far as possible to facilitate the empowerment of
communities, and to facilitate conditions that allow responsibility to be
brought directly to local actors.
The human security approach therefore provides a number of critical
answers for addressing the performance and legitimacy problems of peace
building. The more populations and their perceptions of the common good
are included, the more dicult it is to simply impose particular ideals, values
or models deemed universally applicable but proven problematic in local
contexts. However, this does not mean a mere adherence to the principles of
participation or local ownership to improve the success of reforms or to
prevent inertia or a hostile local response. Perceptions count because those
who are directly suering in crisis situations have a moral right to freedom
from their suering. This approach to peace building builds upon and is
sensitive towithout romanticisingindigenous institutions.
A critical assessment of peace building, from the human security point of
view, also brings a number of problem-solving, practical approaches: when
individuals and communities, instead of institutions, are put at the centre of
analysis, there are implications for the assessment, planning, implementation
and evaluation of peace-building initiatives. All these require in-depth
knowledge of the situation and context-specic solutions, instead of
adherence to external models.
Providing for security and stability may remain as a priority. However, the
human security approach also recognises that meeting welfare goals, such as
immediate basic needs and public service delivery, job security, employment
and poverty alleviation, as well as addressing grievances, is absolutely
essential. A failure to do so, and the alienation and exclusion that results
from this, threatens both the legitimacy and eectiveness of peace-building
eorts. The question of sequencing and prioritisation, therefore, is not
whether security comes rst but how security is provided and what the
expanded notion of security really means in everyday lives.
Similarly, it also suggests that peace-building must go beyond material
factors, such as economic growth, and address social relations, and in
particular restore or build trust within a broader context of inclusive
development and social integration. Peace building is fundamentally about
social and interpersonal relations.
47
Because conicts erode trust, the need to
support reconciliation and coexistence cannot be ignored. A human security
approach to peace building implies a process of trustbuilding: trust and
condence in peaceful community relations, and in the national project.
Conclusion
The legitimacy of liberal peace building has come under growing criticism,
although there are major dierences of opinion in terms of whether this is a
result of the fundamental values and assumptions that underpin it or
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problems related to its application in dierent contexts. Some analysts focus
on improving sequencing or increasing local ownership, participation and
consultation, whereas others focus on more fundamental questions about the
suitability of liberal political and economic values. A human security
approach goes beyond this debate by suggesting that the articulation of local
ideas, norms, culture, needs and perceptions in peace buildingin contrast to
institutional, state-centric frameworkscan contribute to improved peace
building in theory and practice. It suggests that the politics of peace building
should ultimately spring organically from the agency of the people involved.
A failure to achieve this results in citizens remaining disillusioned, margin-
alised, susceptible to manipulation by extremist political elites and spoilers,
and unlikely to support eorts at reconciliation.
Is a human security approach to peace building realistic? Clearly, it is
ambitious, and it rests upon a (perhaps overly) optimistic assumption of
donor motivations and local good will. However, current gaps in peace-
building activities make them unsustainable and exclusive, neither wholly
eective nor legitimate. A human security approach to peace building which
increases local support, encourages the payment of tax, discourages political
extremism, and promotes reconciliation is not only viable but essential. In
very dierent contexts Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Co te dIvoire, Iraq, East Timor, among many othersthere is ample
evidence that in volatile societies signicant numbers of the population,
either individually or collectively, will seek to disrupt the peace-building
project if they feel excluded or alienated, and if their immediate human needs
are not met. It is essential to acknowledge this simple fact in order to
understand why well resourced operations around the world encounter
diculties, or even founder. A human security approach to peace building
therefore speaks to the underlying nature of conict in the 21st century.
In many respects this involves adjustments in policyrather than a
fundamentally new paradigmto prioritise certain public goods, and it is
this which sets the human security approach slightly apart from the more
critical approaches. Above all, in policy terms, it is not a woolly or idealistic
idea. Given the costs of protracted international involvement in post-conict
societies, an approach that improves project deliverables and helps to avoid
an interminable international involvement is politically essential. Indeed, the
record of major international peace-building missions has threatened to
undermine the legitimacy of the whole liberal project. A more nuanced,
hybrid approach that breaks down the distinction between international and
local actors, involves fewer external resources, and facilitates more open local
politics may be the only way forward for international peace building.
Finally, a humansecurity approachtopeace building is not only anemphasis
upon poverty alleviation and welfare, even though these are the key policy
priorities. It also makes a contribution to the critical peace-building debate.
This approach therefore questions whether peace building really is liberal,
whether it should be liberal and whether liberal peace building can be a
coherent concept or policy programme in diverse contexts. Underlying this is
the concern that liberal peace building might have adverse (though perhaps
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unintended) consequences for politics and for everyday life, or worse that it is a
mechanism of hegemony. This approach questions the assumption, all too
often found in the international liberal peace-building agenda, that a universal
vision of conicted or post-conict situations is possible. It questions the
assumption that these conicted societies are uniform virgin territories onto
which liberal ideas can be promoted (or even imposed), despite local
dierences. It seeks to understand so-called post-conict or conict-prone
societies not as unique or special circumstances, but as a manifestation of
perennial challenges relating to the everyday needs and rights of individuals
and communities.
However, the human security and critical perspectives sometimes have an
uncomfortable relationship. Many critical scholars view peace building as a
manifestation of coercive liberal hegemony in international relations, aimed
among other things at reforming problematic states and containing the spill-
over eects of conict. A human security approach may acknowledge the
problematic relationship between peace building and international order, but
it suggests that improvements to peoples lives can and should be made at the
ground level within this context. It brings with it certain critical perspectives
meant to deepen understanding of the challenges of peace building and the
relationships between local and international actors. However, it does not
demand emancipation or social justiceambitious ideas which are at the
heart of many critical peace-building projectsas a condition of achieving
human progress in conict-prone societies at the everyday level. In this sense
a human security approach, while it problematises and exposes the aws of
prevailing peace-building approaches, can be applied within this same
context. After all, international peace building is international, and it involves
the transmission of ideas and resources into traumatised or conict-prone
societies. Tadjbakhsh calls for placing the social contract back within the
heart of post-conict states and allowing a new conception of peacebuilding
that is more locally authentic, resonant, and agential, to emerge.
48
Until such
an aspiration can be achieved, a greater emphasis upon human security
whether this is described as a problem-solving or a critical approachwill at
least make international involvement more legitimate and eective.
Acknowledgements
This article draws upon my ongoing involvement in a United Nations
University research project entitled Peacebuilding in Conict-aected
Societies: Comparative Experiences and Local Perspectives, which I co-
direct with Madoka Futamura. I would like to thank the participants of
project workshops held in Accra and Sarajevo for feedback on some of the
issues presented here. Some of the ideas in this article develop those
contained in Madoka Futamura, Edward Newman & Shahrbanou Tadj-
bakhsh, Towards a human security approach to peacebuilding, UNU
Research Brief, 2, 2010. In particular, I thank Shahrbanou for allowing me to
develop some of her ideas.
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Notes
1 E Newman, R Paris & OP Richmond, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, Tokyo: UNU Press,
2009.
2 VP Fortna, Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the durability of peace
agreements after civil war, International Studies Quarterly, 48(2), 2004, pp 269292; and MW Doyle &
N Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
3 Human Security Report Project (HSRP), Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and
the Shrinking Costs of War, Vancouver: HSRP, 2010, p 13 (forthcoming in print from Oxford University
Press). See also Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st
Century, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; and the Uppsala University Conict Data
Program, at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/. For a discussion on this, see E Newman, Conict
research and the decline of civil war, Civil Wars, 11(3), 2009, pp 255278.
4 MR Sarkees & FW Wayman, Resort to War 18162007, Correlates of War Series, Washington, DC:
CQ Press, 2010, pp 566569.
5 R Vayrynen, Complex humanitarian emergencies: concepts and issues, in EW Nafziger, F Stewart &
R Vayrynen (eds), War, Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies, Vol 1,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp 4384; and KJ Holsti, Political causes of humanitarian
emergencies, in Nafziger et al, War, Hunger, and Displacement, p 239. See also DM Snow, Uncivil
Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conicts, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996; H
Munkler, The New Wars, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004; and M Kaldor, New and Old Wars,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.
6 C Hagel, A Republican foreign policy, Foreign Aairs, 83(4), 2004, p 64.
7 F Fukuyama, State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2004, p 92.
8 UK National Security Strategy, Norwich: HMSO, 2008, p 14. See also UK Strategic Defence and Security
Review, Norwich: HMSO, 2010; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, In Larger Freedom, New York: UN, 2005; US
Department of Defence, National Defence Strategy 2008, Washington, DC, 2008; J Straw, Order out
of chaos: the challenge of failed states, in M Leonard (ed), Reordering the World: The Long-term
Implications of September 11, London: Foreign Policy Research Centre, 2002, pp 98104; OECD,
Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations: from fragility to resilience, Paris: OECD,
2008; and SD Krasner & C Pascual, Addressing state failure, Foreign Aairs, 84(4), 2005, pp 153163.
9 E Newman, Failed states and international order: constructing a post-Westphalian world,
Contemporary Security Policy, 30(3), 2009, pp 421443.
10 RI Rotberg, The failure and collapse of nation-states: breakdown, prevention and repair, in Rotberg
(ed), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004,
p 42.
11 Newman, Failed states and international order.
12 C Hughes, We just take what they oer: community empowerment in post-war Timor-Leste, in
Newman et al, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, pp 218242.
13 Ibid.
14 S Chesterman, Ownership in theory and in practice: transfer of authority in UN statebuilding
operations, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 1(1), 2007, pp 326; and N Lemay-He bert,
Statebuilding without nation-building? Legitimacy, state failure and the limits of the institutionalist
approach, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3(1), 2009, pp 2145.
15 TD Mason, The evolution of theory on civil war and revolution, in MI Midlarsky (ed), Handbook of
War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009,
pp 6399.
16 United Nations, Monitoring Peace Consolidation: United Nations Practitioners Guide to Benchmarking,
New York: United Nations, 2010.
17 Ibid, p 7.
18 JA Goldstone, RH Bates, TR Gurr, M Lustik, MG Marshall, J Ulfedlder & M Woodward, A global
forecasting model of political instability, paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 14 September 2005, p 19.
19 Ibid, p 20.
20 R Paris, At Wars End: Building Peace after Civil Conict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004, p ix.
21 For example, P Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, London: Bodley Head,
2009; and ED Manseld & J Snyder, Democratic transitions, institutional strength, and war,
International Organisation, 56(2), 2002, pp 297337.
22 I Taylor, Earth calling the liberals: locating the political culture of Sierra Leone as the terrain for
reform, in Newman et al, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, pp 159177; and CP Kurz,
EDWARD NEWMAN
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What you see is what you get: analytical lenses and the limitations of post-conict statebuilding in
Sierra Leone, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 4(2), 2010, pp 205236.
23 A Shlash & P Tom, Is liberal democracy possible in Iraq?, in S Tadjbakhsh (ed), Rethinking the
Liberal Peace: External Models and Local Alternatives, London: Routledge, 2011, pp 195205.
24 Department for International Development (DFID), Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID
Practice Paper, London: DFID, 2010; and DFID, Working eectively in conict-aected and fragile
situations, Brieng Paper, London: March 2010.
25 S Van de Walle & Z Scott, The role of public services in state- and nation-building: exploring lessons
from European history for fragile states, GSDRC Research Paper, Governance and Social
Development Resource Centre, Birmingham, 2009; and J Eldon & D Gunby, States in development:
state-building and service delivery, London: HLSP, 2009.
26 A group of African public opinion leaders and analysts has argued that UK development policy has
since its inception stunted growth and subsidised bad governance in Africa. See Andrew Mwenda,
What is the best way to help the worlds deserving poor? Africans do not want or need Britains
development aid, The Telegraph, 22 August 2010. See also C Boin, J Harris & A Marchesetti, Fake
aid: how foreign aid is being used to support the self-serving political activities of NGOs, London:
International Policy Network, 2010; and J Tooley, DFID critics speak out: White Paper policies would
perpetuate poverty, poor education and ill health, press release, International Policy Network,
London, 13 July 2010. See also the collection of papers in Poverty in Focus, Does Aid WorkFor the
MDGs? International Poverty Centre, Brazil, October 2007, in particular RC Riddell, Eective aid
requires new structures; S Browne, Target the MDGsnot aid amounts; D Goldsbrough & B
Elberger, The IMF and spending for the MDGs; and T McKinley, Use aid for investing in the MDGs
not for reserves and debts.
27 K Lide n, R Mac Ginty & OP Richmond, Introduction: beyond northern epistemologies of peace:
peacebuilding reconstructed?, International Peacekeeping, 16(5), 2009, pp 587598.
28 See, for example, Shlash & Tom, Is liberal democracy possible in Iraq?; S Tadjbakhsh, Liberal peace
and the dialogue of the deaf in Afghanistan, in Tadjbakhsh (ed), Rethinking the Liberal Peace,
pp 206220; MAMSalih, Acritique of the political economy of the liberal peace: elements of an African
experience, in Newman et al, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, pp 133158; I Taylor, Earth
calling the liberals; A Suhrke & K Borchgrevink, Afghanistan: justice sector reform, in Newman et al,
New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, pp 178200; V Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Peacebuilding in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: reections on the developmentdemocracy link, in Newman et al, New Perspectives on
Liberal Peacebuilding, pp 201217; and C Hughes, We just take what they oer.
29 World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region,
Bosnia and Herzegovina Poverty Assessment, Report No 25343-BIH, 2003.
30 G Krstic & P Sanfey, Mobility, Poverty and Well-being among the Informally Employed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Working Paper No 101,
London: EBRD, 2006; and B Divjak & M Pugh, The political economy of corruption in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, International Peacekeeping, 15(3), 2008, pp 373386.
31 Biden: Bosnias ethnic tension will bring poverty, bloodshed, Voice of America News, 19 May 2009,
at http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-19-voa67-68801542.html.
32 International Crisis Group (ICG), Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovinaa parallel crisis, Europe
Report No 209, 28 September 2010, Brussels: ICG.
33 R Margesson & B Vaughn, East Timor: political dynamics, development, and international
involvement, Congressional Research Service Report 7-5700, 17 June 2009; and The path out of
poverty: integrated rural development, Timor-Leste Human Development Report 2006, New York:
United Nations Development Programme, 2006.
34 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), East Timor economy: free but hungry, EIU ViewsWire, New York,
10 March 2006.
35 Ibid.
36 World Bank, A 2009 update of poverty incidence in Timor-Leste using the survey-to-survey
imputation method, Washington, DC, 17 September 2010
37 OP Richmond, A post-liberal peace: eirenism and the everyday, Review of International Studies, 35,
2009, pp 557580.
38 R Paris, At Wars End; T Gromes, A case study in institutionalisation before liberalisation: lessons
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 3(1), 2009, pp 93114; and R
Paris & TD Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace
Operations, London: Routledge, 2009.
39 R Paris, At Wars End; and ED Manseld & J Snyder, Prone to violence: the paradox of the
democratic peace, The National Interest, Winter 200506, pp 3945.
40 D Chandler, International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance, London: Routledge,
2010; Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building, London: Pluto Press, 2006; N Lemay-
A HUMAN SECURITY PEACE-BUILDING AGENDA
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He bert, Statebuilding without nation-building?; Richmond, A post-liberal peace; and M Pugh, N
Cooper & M Turner (eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of
Peacebuilding, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
41 M Dueld, Development, territories, and people: consolidating the external sovereign frontier,
Alternatives, 32(2), 2007, pp 225246; T Jacoby, Hegemony, modernisation and post-war
reconstruction, Global Society, 21(4), 2007, pp 521237; and Chandler, Empire in Denial.
42 Tadjbakhsh, Rethinking the Liberal Peace.
43 EC Morgan, Peacebuilding and human security: a constructivist perspective, International Journal of
Peace Studies, 10(1), 2005, pp 7086; E Begby & JP Burgess, Human security and liberal peace, Public
Reason, 1(1), 2009, pp 91104; OP Richmond, Human security and the liberal peace, Whitehead
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 7(1), 2006; and K Lide n, Peace, self-governance and
international engagement: from neo-colonial to post-colonial peacebuilding, in Tadjbakhsh,
Rethinking the Liberal Peace, pp 5773.
44 J Galtung, An editorial, Journal of Peace Research, 1(1), 1964; Galtung, Violence, peace and peace
research, Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 1969, pp 167191; E E Azar, The Management of Protracted
Social Conict: Theory and Cases, London: Dartmouth, 1990; E Azar & JW Burton, International
Conict Resolution, London: Longman Higher Education, 1986; JW Burton, Violence Explained: The
Sources of Conict, Violence and Crime and their Prevention, New York: St Martins Press, 1997;
Burton, Conict Resolution and Prevention, New York: St Martins Press, 1990; and J Galtung, Peace
by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conict, Development and Civilisation, London: Sage, 1996.
45 E Newman, Critical human security studies, Review of International Studies, 36(1), 2010, pp 7794.
46 S Tadjbakhsh & A Chenoy, Human Security: Concepts and Implications, London: Routledge, 2007.
47 See, for example, KV Brabant, Peacebuilding and statebuilding: an invitation for reection
Interpeaces experiences, Interpeace, Geneva, 2008.
48 S Tadjbakhsh, Introduction: liberal peace in dispute, in Tadjbakhsh, Rethinking the Liberal Peace,
p 7.
Notes on contributor
Edward Newman is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science
and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, and is editor-in-
chief of the journal Civil Wars (http://www.tandfonline.com/FCIV).
EDWARD NEWMAN
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