POLITICS IN JAPAN AND HINA(1931-1941)

The Manchurian upheaval of 1931 onward was impressive evidence that Japan and China
were at war. No matter by what nice terms, legal or political, these event were labelled, the fact
was that there has been resort to international hostilities on a large scale, that these hostilities had
produce no acceptable solution for either Japan or China, that the world machinery for collective
security had not preserved peace, and that the far east was becoming more rather than less
explosive. There was also impressive evidence that Japan and China were at war each within and
against itself, and it is to the nature of these respective internal conflicts that some attention must
now be given. After world war I a newly industrialized Japan and a newly national and
revolutionary China were achieving a new position in the community of nation and creating new
societies at home. Each nation was be set by political,economic,and social instability. In each,
men fought with ideas and institutions and guns for political power. In what direction was this
turbulence carrying the peoples of Japan and China? What kinds of societies lay just beyond the
political horizon? Were they to be authoritarian or responsible totalitarian or
democratic,capitalistic or socialistic, subservient or free?
A. Japan,1931 : THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE
When the Kwantung Army acted on its own authority in Manchuria in 1931 it had behind it
in japan a people prepared to follow any leadership that offered a positive solution for the
nations ills. Japan was deep in the world depression. Population had been increasing at nearly
one million annually,overtaxing the countrys food supply. The national economy was not
absorbing the more than 400,000 new worker annually who were seeking employment. The
farmer, already debt-ridden, face decreasing income. Capital was concentrated in a few great
families. Small business was near bankruptcy and without a voice in economic policy.
Hamaguchis theoretically sounds policy of retrenchment and return to the gold standard,1929,
cut deply into Japan exports of goods and doubled her exports of gold a dire condition for a
nation that live by foreign trade. The whole economic picture with its social implications was
fearfull. Added to these economic difficulties were frustrations in domestic politics and foreign
policy. The reader is already aware that, while party government was not without
accomplishment , the political record of the 1920s was marred by vacillation, inceptness, and
corruption. Japans restrain in foreign policy did not forestall anti-Japanesse demonstration in
china not criticism of her ambition by the west. Thus the stage was set beautifully for those who
had long been ready to say that responsible party government was a fraud and that japan must
return to the leadership of her true patriots.
By 1931 such critics were rapidly gaining importance. Their themes were not new. In the
meiji era ultranationalists had proclaimed their loyalty to the throne, their mystical believe in
japans destiny as leader off all asia, and their conviction that the japanesse possessed superlative
inborn qualities which set them apart from others. Proponents of these ideas form societies aimed
at promcting the faith. But the societis were not numerous until the 1920s, when some 600 or
more groups were spawned in response to the social and economic changes of the war years.
Most societies in the 1920s were short-lived and had little voice in national policy, their views
making little impression on those with political authority. The Manchurian incident, however,
which resulted partly from plots hatched by members of one of the ultranationalist societies, the
sakurakai (the society of the cherry) , tipped the balance toward the extremists. The success of
the Manchurian invasion gave weight demands for a stronger foreign policy. In 1932 the
activities of the ultranationalist became violent. Inouye-junnosuke,former finance minister and
manager of the minseito and Dan Takuma, managing director of the mitsui, were murdered on
February 9 and march 5 respectivly. On may 15, the primer minister, Inukai Tyuyoshi, was
assassinated by a small band off naval officers and farmers who believed japan cauld not be
purified until the old politicians and parties were destroyed significantly. All of the dead had
been out spoken foes of those who sought expansion of japanesse foreign interest throught force.
Ten days after Inukais assassination the seiyukai cabinet resign, thus destroying the las
vestige of party government. While the fall of the cabinet ended and era begun by Hara in 1918 ,
the even did not mean the immediate adoption of a new theory of structure of government or that
the extremists were in unchallenged control. What did happen was an attempt return to the
tradition, to government by elder statesmen who could balance opposing political elites, preserve
national unity, and prevent revolution of exsclussive army control. When Saionji, the only
survivol genro, recommended that the emperor call on admiral viscount Saito Makoto to form a
national government. He was appealing to japanesse political genius of the late Meiji period.
Saito an admiral, was acceptable to the army through not its chice. He was acceptable in a
society where status still prevailed because of his rank in membership in the aristocracy. The
bank rupt political parties could accept him because, though not a party man, he had shown them
no violent opposition. The court circle, the financiers, and indeed reasonable men of independent
judgement saw in Saito the hope of moderation. The saito cabinet included five party men, three
from the seiyukai, two from the minseito, two bureaucrats, three militarist, and tree members of
the house of peers. It survived until 1934. Thereafter until 1941 nine government trampled on the
heels of their predecessors. The high mortality in these administrations was symptomatic of the
turbulent instability of Japanese political society. Saitos immediate successor, admiral Okade
Keisuke, followed the saito pattern in cabinet personel. Thereafter cabinets became less
national and more representative of the growing power of the militarists and the fascists
even as early as june, 1932, the new American ambassador in japan, joseph clark grew, had
noted that one thing is certain and that is that the military are distinctly running the government
and that no step can be taken without their approval.
B. MILITARY FASCISM SEEKS CONTROL
The political history of japan after 1931 is a history of extreme nationalism nurtured in a
strong historical military tradition and directed by a politically-minded, authoritarian military
caste. The political maneuvering in this return to authoritarianism was complex and confused.
The resurgence of militarism itself was hardly a revolution because the democratic movement of
the 1920s was as much a victim of its own sterility as of attacks by its enemies. After 1936 the
army was unquestionably not wholly without competitor for political power. It owed its rapid
political resurgence to tradition, to error, and in part to the collaboration, voluntary and forced, of
civilian economic and political elites. Yet conflict at the top level of Japanese leadership was
never wholly resolved. As the decade advanced there was faltering opposition to the extremis of
militarism from concervative official of the court as well as from outsources; but by 1940 the old
political par.. had dissolved themselves almost with protest to make way for the imperial
rassistance association, a single, exclusive and official political party wich by 19 was controlled
by the army. Neverthel... the military fascist movement did not cre in concept or in reality a
fuhrer . even general premier tojo hidekai, the man who ried japan into total war in 1941, was
ne a hitler. Japans authoritarianism borrow from the west but did not imitate the w it
retained a Japanese pattern shaped the absence of individualism in Japanese mores. The Japanese
people followed military fascist because of tradition, cause of the psychologi crisis wich
constantly keep alive, and because the ar alone had a plan, as in Manchuria in 1931 and
was willing to act and to promise results.
Military fascism as a political philosophy or as an administrative structure was not new
idea in the japan of 1931. Its bas were deeply rooted in Japanese political social, and national
experience. Japanese nationalism in its formative years of the meiji period was fashioned not
primarily by middle class but rather by military ar agrarian leadership which, jealous of the
ri ing power of the commercial urban class revived the traditional symbols of Shinto the
emperor as ruler and high priest., an the union of peasant and soldier. These r glorified
symbol of an earlier military agrarian society were never replaced b Western middle
classmsymbols as Japanese move further into industrialization. As a results her modern
nationalism was less an expression of liberal and democratic principles than of traditional
authoritarian concepts. The intellectual so of japan in 1931 was deeply infected with the
potencial of chauvinism. All that was needed was the intrigue, the conspiracy, and the fanaticism
of the true patriot.
These elements were furnished by the..