1) Essential Requisites of Marriage

ERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs CA, G.R. NO. 150758,

February 18, 2004
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage,
on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal
liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does
not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain
Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas
a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he
was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.
2
When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter,
3
Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.
4
The Information,
5
which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for
the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.
7
He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.
8
He further testified that he
requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila
whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes,
but there was no record of said marriage.
9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
10
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack
of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment
of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL
AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND
EFFECT.
11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to
Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which
is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated.
13
Hence, petitioner argues that all
four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays
for his acquittal.
14

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract
between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986,
which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila
City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and
certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;
15
and (2)
a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12,
1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.
16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented
(1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated
October 7, 1995;
17
and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.
18
Both these
documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda
B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the
best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and
Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification
issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that
issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997
would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact
that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather,
the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have
no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the
absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence
as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary
evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence
than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of
the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be
submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present.
19
There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-
serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner
informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and
petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the
non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his
brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to
note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office
and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995
and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are
dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the
subsequent judicial declaration
20
of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such,
he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently
declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
21

This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or
incapacity.
22
Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or
a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind,
there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the
sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner
has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that
petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified
by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer)
23
and formal (authority of the solemnizing
officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).
24
Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or
female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37
25
and 38
26
may contract
marriage.
27

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity
of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were
over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B.
Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence
of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is
not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate.
28
There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy
step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced
petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico
Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.


D E C I S I O N


QUISUMBING, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision
1
dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which
affirmed the judgment
2
dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and
sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also
assailed in this petition is the resolution
3
of the appellate court, dated September
25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house
of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of
four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact
with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia
Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of
letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General
Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by
the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago
4
at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the
declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground
that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information
5
filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the
civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When
arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688,
herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal
Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused
Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that
his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v.
Court of Appeals,
8
the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony
is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can
be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,
9
which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status
of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting
the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,
10
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not
know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was
pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed
that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil
Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be
punished by Article 349
12
of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a
second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA
held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia
from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines,
pursuant to Article 15
13
of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to
public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17
14
of the Civil Code, a
declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision,
contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,
15
allows mistake upon a
difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a
basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.
16
However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate
courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio,
then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the
eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT
WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL.
817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY
CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner
committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith
upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he
contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The
crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal
Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are
allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does
not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good
faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General
relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
18
which held that bigamy can
be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that
under Article 40
19
of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must
before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said
Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied
on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil
Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal
intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present
in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
20
we laid down the elements of bigamy
thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the
pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further
directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.
21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was
a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio,
in accordance with Articles 3
22
and 4
23
of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that
there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as
void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married."
24
The records show that no
appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020,
hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two
were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that
a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan.
25
In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We
held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."
26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed
a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to
constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable
for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a
penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of
the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity
of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision,
dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as
well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of
BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar
a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of
marriage license?

The facts are not disputed:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition
[1]
with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under
Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the
Family Code, citing respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC
denied the petition in a decision
[2]
dated November 11, 1997upon the finding
that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of
the relief he is seeking.
[3]
The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was
likewise dismissed in a resolution
[4]
dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner
to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality,
petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition
[5]
for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage
with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without
a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion
to dismiss
[6]
dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.

In an order
[7]
dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents
motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of
Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
[8]


Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an
order
[9]
dated January 21, 2000.

Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:

A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION
FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF
(THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME
MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFES
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT
HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY
AND DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD
DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW.

B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION
FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON
RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF
ACTION AND FORUM SHOPPING.
[10]


Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the
same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause
of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in
the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well
as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is no
identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie
to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was
no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the
splitting of a cause of action.

On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000,
counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still
involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity
of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is,
the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that
petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts
that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in
this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-
95.

The petition lacks merit.

The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter
of the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite
prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding
where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code?

Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license
constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the
prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by
the principle of res judicata.

The contention is untenable.

Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule
that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.
[11]


This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
[12]


In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47
(b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect
of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific
thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of
the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with
respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or
their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.


The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.
[13]
Section
47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as bar by prior judgment or estoppel by
verdict, which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other
hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as conclusiveness of
judgment or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which
ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action.
[14]
Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment
obtains in the present case.

Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment
or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second
actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
[15]


Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What
is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
[16]


Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought
by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on
separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition
which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is
different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is
anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds
for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of another.
[17]
In both petitions,
petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is
predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various
aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this
controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage.

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage
is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the
alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however,
petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and
celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission.
The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could
have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties
are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or
defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been
adjudged in that case.
[18]


It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application
of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case.
[19]
As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of
Appeals:
[20]


x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a
different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same
transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are
not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the
theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings
in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second
action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and
limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for
recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his
pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit
cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in
his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist
and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon
them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same
wrong or injury.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable,
must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or
both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his
favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute
it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon
which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the
presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no
end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is
allowed. (Citations omitted.)


In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to
take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case
is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein.
The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will
be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is
barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.
[21]


Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their
marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects
therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the
decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City,
in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.











FORMAL REQUISITES

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO
SY, respondents.


D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
For review is the decision
[1]
dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition
[3]
for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City.
[4]
Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and
February 14, 1978,respectively.
[5]

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in
Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They
operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
[6]

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their
mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at
Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his
father.
[7]

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as
Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a
petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned
her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one
year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership.
[8]
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based
on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.
[9]
The trial court
also granted custody of the children to Filipina.
[10]

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she
went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband
but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando,
Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued
playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away
from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled
Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body.
Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the
floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered
from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the
blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a
certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando
maltreated her.
[11]

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision
[12]
dated April 26,
1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries,
and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1)
repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent
against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable
cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, in its decision
[13]
dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree
of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to
petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition
[14]
for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity.
She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and
Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of
her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological
incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological
incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her
without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3)
refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband
existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.
[15]

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision
[16]
dated
December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of
absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the
respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity
which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
trial court. In the decision
[17]
of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it
ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported
psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to
nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the
alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court
that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years
from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation
in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance
with law and the evidence on record.
[18]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
[19]
which the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996.
[20]

Hence, this appeal by certiorari
[21]
wherein petitioner now raises the following
issues: Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES'
MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE
LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY
NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY
STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE
ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE
HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR
MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE
SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO
WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT
A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF
APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.
[22]

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the
ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the
time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack
of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that,
according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and
justice,
[23]
in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural
rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect
and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not
to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their
existence would be defeated.
[24]
Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should
not be subject to cavil.
[25]
In our view, the case at bar requires that we address
the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which
petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in
order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict
between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not
disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to
existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of
the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she
points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she
submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract
which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A"
in the course of the trial.
[26]
The date of celebration of their marriage at Our
Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both
by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's
petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and private respondent's answer admitting it.
[27]
This fact was also affirmed by
petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct
examination,
[28]
as follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were
married on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both
their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes
" B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the
course of the trial.
[29]
These pieces of evidence on record plainly and
indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence
renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows
that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite,
yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
[30]

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that
indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that
there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973.
The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates
on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code
[31]
is clearly applicable in this case.
There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage
between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those
enumerated in Articles 72-79
[32]
of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under
Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only
photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter
Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during
the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their
authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual
celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view,
therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing
to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the
facts contained therein.
[33]

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need
no longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of
petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the
time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the
Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The
marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and
private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

2) Authority of Solemnizing officer


RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J .:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in
relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent
judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been
used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with
his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had
earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for
lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-
95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation
from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years.
[1]
With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,
he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the
case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.
[2]

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt
upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will
suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this
declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio
Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.
[3]
The affidavit was not issued by the
latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before
him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to
have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left
the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor
been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption
that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit
is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for
him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse."
(Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In
fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into
the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that
the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance
of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the
beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code,
thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in
cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications
for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma
del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision
states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only
in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del
Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one
party, Gemma del Rosario.
[4]

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the
preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
[5]

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage
in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of
the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's
failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like
the ones involved in instant case.
[6]
It is not too much to expect them to know
and apply the law intelligently.
[7]
Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status
of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan
and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to
the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of
the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and
the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts
said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in
applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Aranes vs Judge Occiano
Aranes vs. J udge Occiano
AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with
gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and
Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the
requisite of marriage license.

It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of
marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on
January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also
appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.

Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset
the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement
of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple
that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he
told the couple that their marriage is valid.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial
jurisdiction.

HELD:

The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to
the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage
of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future will be dealt with more severely.






A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and
APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J .:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and
Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process
Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are
respectively the Presiding Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
on October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following
offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the
monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the
court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the
custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities.
1

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective
Comments.
2
A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by
complainants.
3
The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C.
Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and
recommendation. The case was however transferred to First Assistant Executive
Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason
that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr.
4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this
administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each
particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without
the requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get
married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent
Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and
Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria
Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita
Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their
marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect
any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason
being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by
the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant
Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of
respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages
involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II,
the employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant
Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her
appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the
court had a marriage Register which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was
Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to
register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these
marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case. Complainant
Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept
by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to
follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their marriage licenses as
part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is
exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to
file the same with the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order
to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by
securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of
which was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to
in the administrative complaint were not illegally solemnized because the
marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and
place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by
him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license;
that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid
embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their
marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7)
marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most
those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear
that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial
Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which
were notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee
of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00
therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all
marriages celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive
control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one
who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported
marriages are merely based on the payments made as solemnization fees which
are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who
is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held
accountable for whatever alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because
she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the
notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00
charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the
Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund of the Supreme
Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were
manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of
the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages
celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of
marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that
month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month.
He claims that there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the
month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk
of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted
payment for notarial fees because he is the one in charge of the Notarial
Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in retaliation
for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent
judge contends that he is not the one supervising or preparing the monthly
report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court,
respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel
Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised
when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991.
They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she
gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an
air-conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to
transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she
decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by
the latter in his office was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position
of clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such
appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy.
He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after
Baroy had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that
naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of
honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et
al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change
her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was
never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the
bond has been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never
returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former
clerk of court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to
her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the
bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should
follow the proper procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for
failure of the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite
notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this
is the duty of the clerk of court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to
work in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal
Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was
in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never
recaptured; that in order to conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to
an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed
detention prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to
order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six (6)
months and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural
Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law
from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was
issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and,
instead, she deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro
(because respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand
payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for
P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash
the check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account
for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after
the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other
P400.00 was paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio
N. Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations
dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have
perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the
thorough and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in
said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and
perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply
substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical illations, we hereby
approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh.
B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh.
G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the
marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was
solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed
their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his
signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as
he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the
Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that
they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10)
days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their
marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living
together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites of
marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a
marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the
marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized
the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains
that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It
was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real
one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of
the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show
that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the
food for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were
already invited and the place of the parties where the reception
would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from
the poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The
fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract,
the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do
not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage.
His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya
and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had not
been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4,
K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot
possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage.
One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge
Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he was
solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he
did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be
highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be
used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya
and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he
did not solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B),
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but
he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh.
AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when
it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen
(18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost
six (6) years already before they got married as they stated in their
joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13)
years old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is
hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this
when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain
the qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve)
executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage
by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a
marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple
for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at
all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate
to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license
already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage
license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license was not required,
why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license
when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of
Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized
and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those
grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code
which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage
is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by
blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official
function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to
furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G),
Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint
affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage
(Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-
examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who
prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain
Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to
just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits
there which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their
two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs.
F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June
7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage license.
On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was
solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the
marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the
marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge
Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga
as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to
believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also
the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting
parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and
paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-
Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14).
Medina, however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit
has no probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have
been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter
his chamber in order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their
witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to
Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His
purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN,
p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are
supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare
that they take each other as husband and wife before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses
before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to
his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a marriage,
is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of
Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of
respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge
Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties and their
witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon
has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that
he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday.
On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows
that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E).
His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that
he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month
(Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs.
12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however,
did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not
charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is
not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having
falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme
Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the
notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants
insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September,
1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for
said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H
to H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one
hundred thirteen (113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon
for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the
monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six
(6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged
official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6)
documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with
respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based
on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees,
but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying
and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports
because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court
and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the
records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he
is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper
discharge of his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs.
Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581,
it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the
falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo
whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly
report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her
own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she
was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed)
to check the notarial register of the court to find out the number of
documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter
as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the
data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check
whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as
clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full
control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p.
11; 11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge
of falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those
documents notarized during the month of July and September,
1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that
she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a
bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued
temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have
been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents
notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113)
as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there
were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month,
though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56)
documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized
as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy
and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged was
P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the
Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she
really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for
each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for
considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees
were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later.
Similarly, the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by
Baroy considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances
where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage
license the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless
the contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over
to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was
not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of
the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated
January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the
personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she
assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh.
7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her
were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992
already. Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo
to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his possession.
Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in
spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings and issuing
memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W, FF, FF-1,
FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash
bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office
and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh.
Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the
alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond
was deposited informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993,
after this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28;
12-22-93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy
opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26,
1993 when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of
Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash
bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and
five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of
this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she
finally deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond
of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost
three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said
cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28,
1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in
Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent
Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and
X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00)
Pesos cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank
or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the
parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle
the case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months
later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said
cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash
bond deposits and other payments and collections she received.
She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she
issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that
receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims
that she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the
Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case
was already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in
cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner
was brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of
Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was
bought and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May
29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents
and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and
another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It
was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the
vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office
of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt
could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in
this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of
the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA
27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash
bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her
affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that
this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and
this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of
detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped
while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact,
the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge
Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular
charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the
municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and
0-3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken
by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused
was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge
Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a
former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
complainants should have presented records from the police of
Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in
Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without
basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the
accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the
warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The
records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return
of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing
that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused
who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested.
Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of
Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not
take custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case
archived was because he heard from the police that Alano escaped.
This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set the
case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former
should have been required to explain in writing why Alano was not
brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped from
jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on
when he could not be arrested when the case should have been
ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the reason that
he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which
gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have really escaped while
in his custody only that the complainants could not present records
or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing
fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying
filing fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank.
The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural
Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against
farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14
of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks
(from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money
cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of
the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent
Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he
was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated
January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she
would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,
comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of
Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening
the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have
them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was made on
February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here,
there is an undue delay again in complying with her obligation as
accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by
the complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license,
and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court,
particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it
has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same
or similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to
show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar
was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not
absolve him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one
responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal
requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code
of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in
the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58
SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report
of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same,
cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check
and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk
of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge
cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of
court personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the
monthly report of cases for the months of July and September,
1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for
having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said
two (2) months period; for having failed to account (for) the
solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized,
but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized
issuance of temporary receipts, some of which were issued
unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29,
1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which
she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it
with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or
after one year and five months in her possession and after this case
was already filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court
order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for
receiving a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from
Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered
temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and for not depositing it with
a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered
released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for collection cases filed
against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos,
but turning over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on
March 12, 1992, it is respectfully recommended that said
respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed
from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the
clerk of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city
or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised
Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.
127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact
the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and
their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and
order of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136,
Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum
Circular No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all
collections of funds of fiduciary character including rental
deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court
concerned upon receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial
Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no withdrawal of
any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the
court exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated
them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for
the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a
clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola
vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City;
A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of
court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt
thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated
December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash
bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct
and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty.
"Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and
serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the
service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond
suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.
5
Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity.
6
It
applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least
of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides
that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license
except in the cases provided for therein.
7
Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the
illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the
administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of
any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law."
9
This is of course, within the province of
the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed
on respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the
charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not
taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of
marriage and the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated
in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross
negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent
Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the
same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with.
Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in
any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office
of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Art 26
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX,
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn
seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in
Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to
Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married
in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence
in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case
No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating
that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render
an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June
11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and
is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However,
when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a
certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the
error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
1
Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste
of time to go ahead with the proceedings.
2
Weconsider the petition filed in this
case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and
that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is
the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction
over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his
address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations.
3
As explicitly stated in the
Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by
the court.
xxx xxx xxx
4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that
the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code,
5
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
6
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United
States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed
as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or
a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed
from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to
be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered
to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Cha
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C.
VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH
EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J .:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign
absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter
against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on
what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,
and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were
married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler
in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough,
and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the
spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He
claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982.
2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No.
83-15866.
3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of
said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of
that foreign jurisdiction.
4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner
"had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of
the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
5
However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986,
directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner.
6
The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case
No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge;
while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James
Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge
Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice
asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the
cases against her be dismissed.
8
A similar petition was filed by James Chua,
her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer
further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office
for review.
9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her
arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon.
10
As a consequence,
Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434.
On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension
of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of
the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of Justice.
11
A motion
to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction,
12
which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order
dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both
accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of
not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the
petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment.
13
Later, private respondent entered a plea of not
guilty.
14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The
petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to
try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does
not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under
his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint."
15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987
and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently,
on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the
aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a
resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner.
16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
17
the crime of adultery, as well
as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
18
While in point of strict
law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding
19
and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try
the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of
the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery
and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was
added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to
initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action
therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases
does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions
are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of
the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness
therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre,
the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a
public trial.
20
Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would
be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very
time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on
the specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced
only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated
differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether
it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and
existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which
are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall
have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion.
22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though
Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution
was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of
the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the
prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and
in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter.
We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-
a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse,
and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned
23
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,
24
after a divorce
was granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and
her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging
that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered
to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the
business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the
error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce
in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ...
25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family
nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery,
26
since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak
of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied
upon by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code,
substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which
punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the
Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be
made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null
and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to
that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it
never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for
adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to
stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action
for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial
declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would
necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this
case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited,
27
must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A
cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly
and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to
its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case
did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue
determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash
is SET ASIDE and another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concu
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed
and set aside the September 12, 1995
2
and January 31, 1996
3
Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and
its May 15, 1998 Resolution
4
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During
his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
5
before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which
issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.
6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
7
He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration
8
before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his
death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
9
on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal
10
of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
trial court issued an Order
11
denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5,
1994 her opposition
12
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree
of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2,
13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss.
15
They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256
16
of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage,
filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from
hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
17
denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic
18
because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by
Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition
19
against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration
20
from the
Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the
facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order
21
granting the motion
for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T.
Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,
22
the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested
23
that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their
position papers on June 14,
24
and June 20,
25
1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly
elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled
that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the
vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration
26
and for the disqualification
27
of Judge
Arcangel but said motions were denied.
28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished
from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged
his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
30
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
31
It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by
virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of
Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the
basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give
force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,
32
the Filipino divorcee,
"shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason,
the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as
"a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving
spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased. x x x
33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
34
which
were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted.
36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of
the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray
37
and Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,
38
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time.
Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving
wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,
39
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,
40
we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
41
(Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
"domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes
of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning.
42
However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.
43
Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale
44
dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented
billing statements
45
from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association
46
and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,
47
letter-envelopes
48
from 1988 to
1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the
deceaseds calling cards
49
stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed
in the Regional Trial Court
50
which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3.
51
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition
for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a
Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions
of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
52
involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was
not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse
had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.
Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by
a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or
a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the
nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should
not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to
a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
54
(Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
55
where the
Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it
was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other."
56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
57
the Court stated that where a Filipino
is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies.
58
Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the
said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long
been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage
and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of
upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law."
59
In Garcia v. Recio,
60
the Court likewise cited
the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.
61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,
62
the historical background and
legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and
38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As
so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, J r. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
63
(Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of
the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified
the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
64
Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15
65
and 17
66
of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
67
In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,
68
the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise,
we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of
the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the
intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be
sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply
the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
x x x x
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when
the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law
be dispensed with justice.
69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
70
the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of
a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
71

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text
72
of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.
73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception
of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their
joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6,
74
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration
may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2,
Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as
known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.
75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a
direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of
the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144
76
of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from
the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife
but are incapacitated to marry.
78
In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,
79
we held that
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
80
The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will
only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
x x x x
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be
had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponents defense. x x x
81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED.
Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA
GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch
149, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J .:
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion
allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the
regional trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad
by petitioner.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order
1
dated
September 30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga,
Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,
2
Branch 149, in Civil Case No.
96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order
3
dated March
31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially
set aside the trial courts order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the
purpose of resolving issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses
and the custody of their children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany,
married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11,
1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on
February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.
4
Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25,
1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition
5
for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On
February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,
6
but it was denied by the
trial court in its order
7
dated May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also
denied in an order
8
dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998,
the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First
Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has
ruled through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis
of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the
Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father.
The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.
9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20,
1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated
dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioners
motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the
properties between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
was filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done
anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang
Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by
the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of
divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999,
through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family
Code,
10
endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the
Philippine law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially
setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues
of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their
children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July
14, 1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by
respondent and considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227,
to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or
her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized
by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of the
termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and
52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property
relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children,
the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to these
matters which may be ventilated in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
11
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which
was denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.
12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition
the following:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the
instant case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
13

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial
Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision
obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.
14

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are
no conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and
in the Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been
awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.
15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in
issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her
order dated July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when
she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the
fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German
court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge
is completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3,
Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss
the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the
pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that
the ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a courts action on a motion is limited to dismissing the
action or claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its
order dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the
timely filing of respondents motion for reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.The trial
court may set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial,
upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court
finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or
final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such
judgment or final order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.If the grounds for a motion
under this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or
less than all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of
the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration
as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or
final order upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial
reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that
private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified.
Moreover, in Saado v. Court of Appeals,
16
we held that the court could modify
or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory
17
and
when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.
18
In our view, there are even more compelling
reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14,
1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from
the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,
19
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,
20
and Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,
21
we consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera,
22
where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16,
1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue
of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and
binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the
present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody,
care and support of the children, must still be determined by our
courts.
23
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules
of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with
respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis
for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner
to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German
court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondents
participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings
25
nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.
26
Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private
respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.
27
More importantly,
the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil
Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years,
the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the
issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private
respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct
in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care,
support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in
consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the
childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.
28

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent
exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the
issue concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent.
Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati,
subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any
conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts during their
marriage."
29
Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that
a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.
30
Given the
factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be
accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to
resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue
regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner
and private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming
cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not
at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149,
issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over
the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care,
support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial
court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 154380




- versus -

Present:

Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
QUI SUMBI NG, J .:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of
law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails
the Decision
[1]
dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution
[2]
dated July 4, 2002 denying
the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the
impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second
paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the
divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis
City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She,
Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE
[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.
[5]
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.
[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to
his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation
of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
. . .
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private
citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying
for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for
judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell
on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent
of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the
situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings
[9]
on the Family Code,
the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the
following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad.
These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-
marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity
of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-
marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law
only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of theCivil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[10]
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court
of Appeals.
[11]
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when
they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirit or intent.
[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2
of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of
the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for
legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.
[14]
Such foreign law must also be proved as our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved.
[15]
Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227),
should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION


GERBERT R. CORPUZ,
Petitioner,




- versus -





DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents. -- -
G.R. No. 186571

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,

*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.



Promulgated:

August 11, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------x

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J .:


Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision
[1]
of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
on certiorari
[2]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,
2000.
[3]
On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
[4]
Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition
for divorce onDecember 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later,
on January 8, 2006.
[5]


Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in
the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
[6]


Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with
the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file
a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,
[7]
the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of
the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
[8]
in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
[9]
Article 26 of
the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind
the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;
[10]
the provision was
enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
[11]


THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,
[12]
Gerbert filed the present petition.
[13]


Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to
the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched
the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is
a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would
be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General
and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,
[14]
both support Gerberts
position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and
intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void
[15]
and voidable
[16]
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising afterthe marriage.
[17]
Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
[18]


Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between
a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,
[19]
enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording,
as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
[20]
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
[21]
In both cases, the Court refused
to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign
courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse]
and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be
just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
[22]



As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
[23]
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry.
[24]
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
[25]
Article 17
of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
[26]


Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.


The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation,
we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.
[27]


The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws.

Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country.
[28]
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.
[29]
The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to
be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,
[30]
but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.
[31]
Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce
decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata
[32]
between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
[33]


In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition
of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.
[34]
We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.
[35]


A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act
No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

x x x x

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep
and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they
shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only
the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.


But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decreesregistration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it
can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when
it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982,
[36]
and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982
[37]
both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition
must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located;
[38]
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
[39]
and that the time and
place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
[40]
As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case,
we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed
as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding
[41]
by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Art 34
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL &
PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
1) D E C I S I O N
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J .:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family
Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of
the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.
[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his
death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which
enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.
[2]
Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the
verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the
allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
7, of the 1997 Rules.
[3]
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.
[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.
[5]
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code,
[6]
the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
[7]
in relation to Article
58.
[8]
The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in
the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
[9]
This interest
proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."
[10]
Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the
foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.
[11]
This is
why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union"
[12]
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but
a lifetime commitment."
[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76,
[14]
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.
[15]
To preserve peace in the family,
avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."
[16]
The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting
of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both
parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there
is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment
may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract
of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without
any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships
and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about
to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
[17]
The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,
[18]
subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil
law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery.
[19]
The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the
absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
[20]
cannot
be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court,
which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the
death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods
and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity
of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a
marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place
[21]
and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
[22]
That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged
spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,
[23]
and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53
and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing
voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived
before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there
was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be
noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
[24]
"A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order
of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that
the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."
[25]
"Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot
be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
[26]
But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration
of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage
[27]
and such absolute nullity can be based
only on a final judgment to that effect.
[28]
For the same reason, the law
makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage imprescriptible.
[29]
Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is
ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.



LOLITA D. ENRICO,
Petitioner,



- versus -



HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND
TRINIDAD CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173614

Present:

YNARES-
SANTIAGO, J.
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ,
CHICO-
NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.


Promulgated:

September 28,
2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:


The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure assails the Order,
[1]
dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting
reconsideration of its Order,
[2]
dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli
(Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D.
Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.
[3]
They begot
seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary
Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.
[4]
On 1 May
2004, Trinidad died.
[5]
On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before
the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.
[6]
Six months later, or on 10 February
2005, Eulogio passed away.
[7]


In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that
the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued
that Article 34
[8]
of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who
have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment
from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio
because they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by
said provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio
to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which
was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to
petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents
raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios
serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together
as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence,
they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their
union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli,
on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended
that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense,
she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,
[9]
granting the dismissal
of the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC,
[10]
dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as
basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the
Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in
Section 2, par. (a)
[11]
that a petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which
states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the
husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this
Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and
this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the
deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the
action to declare the marriage null and void.
[12]
(Emphasis
supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an
affirmative defense in the answer is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the
[respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio.
[13]



Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the
filing by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an
Order
[14]
dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the
RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order
ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,
[15]
which was on the authority for
holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void
marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only
where both parties to a void marriage are still living.
[16]
Where one or both
parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to declare
the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog,
328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court,
First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The
Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case
of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred
to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of
Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the
wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely
personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the
case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of
this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog
and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the]
basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a
person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced
particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the
lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right over
the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the
parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who
should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage
void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already
a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such
vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such
as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by
substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void
marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is
illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such
union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for
the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a
semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the
petition after the death of the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable
only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still
living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void
marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic)
marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b
the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil
procedure which shall be applicable.
[17]



Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for
reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.
[18]



Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground
that no new matter was raised therein.
[19]


Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme
Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this
Court, countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs
enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against
taking a direct recourse to this Court.
[20]
Instead, they should initially seek the
proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the
principle of hierarchy of courts.
[21]
However, it cannot be gainsaid that this
Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant
the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.
[22]
Moreover, notwithstanding the
dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to observe the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it
is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant
case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable,
whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot,
however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court
in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two
marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration.
[23]
What we have before us belongs to a different
milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners
marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis
supplied.)


The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for
doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.
[24]


Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003,
following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary
to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and
application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it
squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)


There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non
indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is
required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of
the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions
for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs
have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
[25]
(Emphasis supplied.)


Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a
quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory
or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6,
is ORDERED DISMISSEDwithout prejudice to challenging the validity of the
marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of
subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the
protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision
1
dated August 17,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its
subsequent Resolution
2
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J.
Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato
City
3
and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.
4
In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen.
Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and
in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda,
5
filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint
6
alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.
Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage
entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio
because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced"
has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done
so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that
the marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never
deemed, legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim
law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased
and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;
7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked
from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from
January 4, 1995,
8
and again, another 15 days
9
or until February 18, 1995, both
of which the court granted.
10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss
11
on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had
been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.
12
Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues
involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the
case for declaration of nullity.
13
Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995
a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA
14
which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the
case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage
even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to
participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their evidence.
When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such
purpose
15
were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March
22, 1996, suspended the proceedings
16
in view of the CAs temporary
restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the
case.
17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its
Decision dated September 30, 1996.
18
Estrellita then elevated the appellate
courts judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. 126603.
19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita
to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.
20
As Estrellita was indisposed on that
day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.
21
The day before this scheduled
hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.
22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib
moved to submit the case for decision,
23
reasoning that Estrellita had long been
delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed
her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.
24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon
City,
25
stating as one of the reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both
the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not
precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,
26
we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration
27
with
finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as
void ab initio.
28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never
severed, declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab
initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the
Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
29
The
court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the
second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the
subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent
marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared
his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the
second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino
spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous
marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the
Civil Code or Family Code.
30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,
31
Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the
Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC
should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to
dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his
marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim
Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the
validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,
32
the CA held
that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given
ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days,
a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that
Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher
courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the
proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas
marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that
the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which
does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial
celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was
only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to
file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the
senators subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,
33
the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked
the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the
public prosecutors report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule
9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court
34
and Article 48 of the Family Code
35
will
not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties
had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the
issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas
allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our
remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603
pertains to the issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue
of the validity of Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the
CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued,
depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to
dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that
Judge Macias v. Macias
36
laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to
dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and,
consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with
finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because
of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to
whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTCs
jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an
adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No.
126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.
37
She also questions
the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there
was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held
when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is
valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he
married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of
Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be
covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized
under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives
under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the
deceased.
38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file
suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs
reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be
heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the
proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is
collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the
vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of
collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing to
challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano,
reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a
void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they
are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even
though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was
rendered without waiting for the Supreme Courts final resolution of her
certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her
answer and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did
not even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas
marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to
answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning
the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all
suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon
City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due
process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in
the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias
40
to justify the suspension of the
period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following
reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to
wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of
filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the
period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved
by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to
suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April
19, 2001, issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner.
Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section
4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the
said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her
of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer
to the complaint: x x x
41
(Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that
the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to
dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial
court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts.
In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the
proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it
immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and
resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the
wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time
left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended
period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of
time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should
have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA
correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the
proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted
in the rendition of the judgment complained of."
42
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case."
43
In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again
require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we
never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the
principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita
remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when
it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our
decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be
allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other
party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and
rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to
present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the
decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it wait
for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves
strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of
marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules
of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
44
also requries the
participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to
determine whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. I nvestigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after
receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the
public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties
are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the
basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective
comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a
copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall
set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to
submit the required report,
45
which we find to have been sufficiently complied
with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation
dated March 30, 1995,
46
wherein he attested that there could be no collusion
between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the
spouse of any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming
that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public
prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,
47
the lack of
participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.
Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by
the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties.
Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties
is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.
49
The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was
the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time.
50
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No.
394
51
which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has
been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
52
the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article
13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of
PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites."
53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain
rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly
provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise
provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity
of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their
execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall
affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-
existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that
took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2)
which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in
accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under
Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to
be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of
mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal
status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In
view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void
ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only
the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in
application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground
is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,
55
Estrellita relies
on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that
under Section 2(a)
56
thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of
others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she
and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the
petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file
the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.
57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is
employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely,
this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous,
and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from
impugning the subsequent marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit
the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003.
58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas
marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the
proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior
to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no
marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
59
Since A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased
who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in
interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.
60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include
striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly
rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its
subsequent Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justic
1) Psychological Incapacity
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA
ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J .:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by
E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo
1
and the
Court of Appeal,
2
Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J.
Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth
to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred,
because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the
first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel
got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training
program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from
01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed,
Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that
it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of
their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit.
3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance
with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but
also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least
to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight
on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
2) xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose
B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but
Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in
sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is
that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise
of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is
more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would
make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use
of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage"
refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the
idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not
for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in
insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is
a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to
consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor
Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee
used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under
the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are
voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable
marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot
be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground
for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that
insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is
not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of
the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
3) xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage
by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean
Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
4) xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity
by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity,
there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a
ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He
emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
5) xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if
they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked
if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed
that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there
is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of
the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which
are completely different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still
a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable
marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated
but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect
has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue
can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he
has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of
children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a
lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist,
who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the
understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval
in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not
apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage.
5

6) xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate
among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in
some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is
only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy
stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine.
Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured.
Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is
incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough
to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply
with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.
Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at
the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that
after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but
later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the
remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.
6

7) xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although."
On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it
may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or
consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of
their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen
who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason
why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil
Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground
even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil
Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family
Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church
on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in
Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their
answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still
valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice
Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.
7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in
its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:
8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law,
9
which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at
least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,
10
giving an account on
how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm
was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because
of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon
297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the
term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to
draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of
incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b)
this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere
difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by
normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person
from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5,
1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at
the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy
11
cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave
or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such
possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken
and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully
examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines
might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code,
is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987
Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus
of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we
still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society
itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.





G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground
(in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the
validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although
this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled
exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals
2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
3
Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina
to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
8) The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church
4
in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina
was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime
in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that
in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king
to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from
what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he
and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at
the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano
Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the
petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony
and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora
Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr.
Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital
and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as
Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
9) The I ssue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of
Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the
phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts
of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish
in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied
5
heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage
between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the
Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable
of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
10) The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals
6
this Court, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,
7
Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us
that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to
us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
8

COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on
your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part
of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the
Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,
9
Vicar J udicial (Presiding J udge) of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
10
a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36
of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family,
11
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code
12
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes thepermanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis,
13
nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature.
14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is
to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose
of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.









Petitioner,


- versus -



LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE
and MANOLITO SAN JOSE,
Respondents.


G.R. No. 168328

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.


Promulgated:

February 28, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N


CARPIO MORALES, J .:

Respondents Laila Tanyag-San Jose (Laila) and Manolito San Jose
(Manolito) were married on June 12, 1988. Laila was 19 years and 4 months
old, while Manolito was 20 years and 10 months old.
[1]


The couple begot two children: Joana Marie who was born on January 3,
1989,
[2]
and Norman who was born on March 14, 1997.
[3]

For nine years, the couple stayed with Manolitos parents. Manolito was
jobless and was hooked to gambling and drugs. As for Laila, she sold fish at the
wet market of Taguig.
[4]


On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her parents
house.
[5]


On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,
[6]
under Article 36
[7]
of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig where
it was docketed as JDRC Case No. 4862.

Testifying for Laila, Dr. Nedy Tayag, a clinical psychologist at
the National Center for Mental Health, declared that from the psychological test
and clinical interview she conducted on Laila, she found Manolito, whom she
did not personally examine, to be psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties of a husband.

Dr. Tayags May 28, 1999 Report on the Psychological Condition of
LAILA T. SAN JOSE
[8]
was submitted in evidence. The pertinent portions of the
Report read:



BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

x x x x

. . . [Lailas] association with [Manolito] started with the
game of basketball. As a youngster, petitioner often spent her
free time seeking fun in the outdoors. She was then beginning to
cast her interests on basketball games and eventually became
one of the avid spectators when a minor league was staged at
their place. Respondent happened to be one of the cagers who,
with his hardcourt skills, greatly impressed petitioner. The latter
then became a fan of respondent. Eventually acquiring the upper
hand, respondent introduced himself personally to his admirers
and their initial encounter with petitioner proved to be a
milestone for both of their fates. Courtship followed and after a
short period, they were already steadies.

Savoring the momentum, petitioner and respondent
decided to formally seal their union. They entered marriage
on June 12, 1989 under religious ceremonies held in Taguig.
After the occasion, the newlyweds then went on to lead a life of
their own making. However, contrary to what was expected,
their marriage turned out to be rocky right from the very start.

Claimed, respondent refused to get himself a job. Instead,
he spent most of his available time with his friends drinking
intoxicating substances and gambling activities. Petitioner was
left without much choice but to flex her muscles and venture on
several areas which could be a source of income. She tried to
endure the situation with the hope that respondent would change
for the better in no time. Their first child, Joana Marie, was born
of January 3, 1989. Petitioner was apparently happy with the
birth of their first born, thinking that her presence would make a
difference in the family, particularly on the part of respondent.

Years had passed but no improvement was seen on
respondents behavior. He turned out to be worse instead and it
was only later that petitioner discovered that he was into drugs.
Said, he prefers to be with his friends rather than his own
family. He seemed oblivious to the efforts rendered by petitioner
just to make ends meet. She was the breadwinner of the family
and whenever an argument occurred between her and
respondent, she often received the brunt of her husbands
irrationality. On one of such incidents, she decided to separate
from respondent. The latter however pursued her and pleaded
for another chance. He promised that he would change his
behavior if only petitioner would give him a son. Seeing his
sincerity and unwilling to give up the marriage, petitioner
agreed to the compromise.

They reconciled and she did gave birth to a son, Norman,
on March of 1997. Respondent was happy but his show of good
nature was superficial. Briefly after the birth of their second
child, respondent resumed his old ways and made them even
worse.

Still, petitioner remained hopeful that something will turn
out right in their union. However, with respondents continuing
irresponsibility, she realized that all her efforts proved nonsense
to him. OnAugust 20, 1998, respondent went out of their
dwelling for his usual late night stints but he never came back
the following morning. They never lived together since.

Respondent is MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 31 years old
with last known address at 14-D Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig, Metro
Manila. He is unemployed and stayed in school only to finish
his secondary education. He was described to be a happy-go-
lucky individual spending most of his time hanging out with
friends. Considered to be a bad influence, he was into gambling,
drinking sprees and prohibited drugs as well.

x x x x

REMARKS:

Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with
clinical interviews and description of their marital plight, it is
the opinion of the undersigned that the disintegration of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was caused
primarily by the latters psychological incapacity to perform
the essential roles and obligations of a married man and a
father.

His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant
irresponsibility, lack of concern for the welfare of others, self-
centered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and
his involvement in activities defying social and moral ethics;
suits under the classification of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder.

Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply
[immersed] within the system. It continues to influence the
individual until the later stage of life.
[9]
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)


Branch 70 of the RTC of Pasig, by Decision of July 17, 2001,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
[10]
and Leouel Santos v.
CA, et al.
[11]
denied Lailaspetition in this wise:


In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina (268 SCRA 198), the
Supreme Court, reiterated its ruling [in] the earlier case of
[Leouel] Santos vs. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20), to the
effect that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical incapacity x x x) and that there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality disorder clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage and that such incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

Viewed in the light of the above guidelines, the present
petition must necessarily be denied.

Petitioners portrayal of respondent as jobless and
irresponsible is not enough. As the Supreme Court said in the
Molina case (supra), (I)t is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable
of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

Petitioners case is not in any way enhanced by the
psychological evaluation and assessment done by psychologist
Nedy Tayag as per her Psychological Report (Exhs. C to C-
1). Although the body of the report mentions that the
respondent is affected with Anti-Social Personality Disorder,
the same cannot sway this Court from its above
disposition. There is no showing that [Dr.]
Tayag was able to interview the respondent or any of his
relatives in order to arrive at the above conclusion.
Obviously, the data upon which the finding or conclusion
was based is inadequate.
[12]
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Lailas motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision was, by
Order of November 13, 2001,
[13]
denied. Laila thus appealed to the Court of
Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. CV No. 73286, faulting the trial court in
holding that she failed to comply with the guidelines enumerated in Molina.

By Decision dated February 15, 2005,
[14]
the appellate court, finding
Manolito psychologically incapacitated after considering the totality of the
evidence, reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage
between him and Laila void ab initio. Thus the appellate court held:


. . . We perused the records of the present case and
unearthed that the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case including the testimony of the petitioner, were
enough to sustain a finding that Manolito San Jose is
psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of the
Family Code. We believe that his (respondents) defects were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. If being jobless (since the commencement of the
marriage up to the filing of the present petition) and worse,
a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or
physically ill what then can We describe such acts? Are
these normal manners of a married man? We are not at all
swayed that a union affirmed in church rites and subsequently
having children, are proofs that either of the spouses is mature
and responsible enough to assume marital responsibilities.

Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency
is so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed
relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but to declare the marriage between
the herein petitioner and the respondent herein dissolved. While
the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity
([A]rticle 68 of the Family Code), however, what is there to
preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as an inviolable social
institution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose must be allowed to
rise from the ashes and begin a new lifefreed from a marriage
which, to Us, was hopeless from the beginning and where the
bonding could not have been possible.

x x x x

While We may not have strictly adhered to the ruling in
the Molina case in arriving at Our present conclusion We have
reason to deviate from the same. In view of the peculiar
circumstances attendant in this case, We were constrained to
take exception from the Molina case. Note that the (c)
ommittee did not give any example of psychological incapacity
for the fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to apply the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decision of Church tribunals which although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. (page 37, Handbook of
the Family Code of the Philippines, Sempio-Diy, 1991
reprinted). Hence, whether or not psychological incapacity
exists is for Us to establish, as there is no hard and fast rule in
the determination of what maybe considered indicia of
psychological incapacity. To Our mind there are sufficient
grounds for Us to conclude that indeed psychological incapacity
exists so as to warrant declaration of the marriage void ab
initio.
[15]
(Italics and underscoring in the original; emphasis
supplied)


Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
[16]
of the appellate courts decision which was denied, by
Resolution dated June 2, 2005,
[17]
hence, its present Petition for
Review,
[18]
positing that:

I

IT WAS NOT PROVEN THAT MANOLITOS ALLEGED
DEFECTS ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLE 36
OF THE FAMILY CODE AND THAT THE SAME HAS
JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, IS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE[, AND]

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT ADHERING TO THE RULING OF THE
MOLINA CASE AND THE DOCTRINE OF STARE
DECISIS.
[19]



Petitioner contends that Laila failed to prove that Manolito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations as she merely
relied on the report of Dr. Tayag; and granted that the psychological
examination of Manolito is not a requirement for a declaration of his
psychological incapacity, the totality of the evidence presented does not show
Manolitos psychological incapacity.

Petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in believing that
the defects of Manolito already existed at the inception of the marriage or are
incurable; and in any event, belief cannot substitute for proof which the law
and jurisprudence require.

Petitioner finally contends that a deviation from the Molina ruling is not
proper in the present case.

Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage.

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been
succinctly expounded in the recent case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v.
Brix Ferraris (Ferraris),
[20]
thus:

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to
a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or
isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason
that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained[.] (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)


As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. Tayag shows, her conclusion about
Manolitos psychological incapacity was based on the information supplied by
Laila which she found to be factual. That Laila supplied the basis of her
conclusion, Dr. Tayag confirmed at the witness stand:

Q [Atty. Revilla, Jr.]: What was your conclusion, what w[ere]
your findings with respect to the respondent?

A [Dr. Tayag]: Base[d] on the narration made by [Laila],
which I found the narration to be factual, regarding
her marital relationship with the petitioner (should have
been respondent), I came up with a conclusion that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. The one
which I found in him is his anti-social personality
disorder because of the following overt manipulations:
the presence of drug, the absence of remourse [sic], the
constant incapacity in terms of maintaining the marital
relationship, the lack of concern to his family, his self-
centeredness, lack of remourse, in addition to the
womanizing, respondent which clearly connotes the
defiant of moral and personality disorder, he is
tantamount to a person under the level, under our
diagnostic criteria labeled as anti-social personality
disorder, sir.

Q: So you would like to impress this Court that your
findings with respect to this case were only base[d] on
the information given to you by [Laila], is that
correct?

A: Yes, wherein I found the narration made by [Laila] to
be factual, sir.
[21]
(Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, the doctors conclusion is hearsay. It is unscientific and
unreliable, so this Court declared in Choa v. Choa
[22]
where the assessment of
the therein party sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated was based
merely on the information communicated to the doctor by the therein
respondent-spouse:

. . . [T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was
based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological
examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so.
In fact, his Professional Opinion began with the statement [I]f
what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, . . .

x x x x

Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of
the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to
him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one
side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as
unscientific and unreliable.
[23]
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Parenthetically, Dr. Tayags Psychological Report does not even show
that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was already present
at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither does it explain
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause.
It merely states that [s]uch disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply
[immersed] within the system [and] continues to influence the individual until
the later stage of life.

There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.
[24]
If it
can be proven by independent means that one is psychologically incapacitated,
there is no reason why the same should not be credited.

In the present case, the only proof which bears on the claim that Manolito
is psychologically incapacitated is the following testimony of Laila, in answer
to the clarificatory questions propounded by the trial court:

Q [Court]: Now, so aside from what you said that your
husband is a drug user and that he is jobless and was not able to
support your family, what other reasons do you have for saying
that your husband is psychologically incapacitated from
performing his marital obligations?

A [Laila]: He cannot give us a brighter future because he
is jobless, your honor.

Q: Apart from these two reasons which is for alleged use
or possession of drugs and his inability to get a job and support
his family you have no other basis to show for the declaration of
nullity of your marriage?

A: Yes, your honor.
[25]
(Underscoring supplied)

Manolitos alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his
being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his family and
his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Manolitos state or condition or attitude has not been shown,
however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition.

In Molina, where the therein respondent preferred to spend more time
with his friends than with his family, this Court found the same to be more of a
difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations.

In Ferraris,
[26]
this Court held:

We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the
leaving-the- house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent
tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. (Underscoring supplied)


Also in Ferraris, this Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like sexual
infidelity or perversion and abandonment, does not by itself constitute ground
for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity.
[27]
Neither is
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility.
[28]
Or failure or refusal to meet
duties and responsibilities of a married man if it is not shown to be due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
[29]


While Molina then is not set in stone,
[30]
the facts and circumstances
attendant to this case do not warrant a deviation from it.


WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 15, 2005
Decision and June 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV
No. 73286 areREVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The July 17, 2001 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in JDRC Case No. 4862
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.






ERNARDINO S. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141917
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus - AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated:
NORMA MERCADO ZAMORA,
Respondents. February 7, 2007
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J .:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated August 5, 1999and January 24, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525, entitled
Bernardino S. Zamora v. Norma Mercado Zamora, which affirmed the
dismissal of a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.

The facts
[1]
are:

Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4,
1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage, they lived together at No. 50-
A Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any child. In 1972,
private respondent left for the United States to work as a nurse. She returned to
the Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made
periodic visits to Cebu City until 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.

Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of private respondent, as
provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position, he
alleged that his wife was horrified by the mere thought of having children as
evidenced by the fact that she had not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he
also alleged that private respondent abandoned him by living in the United
States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout their
marriage they lived together for not more than three years.

On the other hand, private respondent denied that she refused to have a
child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by
profession and that she would from time to time borrow her husbands niece
and nephews to care for them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of
their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. He allegedly had
two affairs with different women, and he begot at least three children with
them.

On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision thus:
. . .

Plaintiff consented to defendants trip to the United
States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there
because she wanted to help her husband build a big house at
the Beverly Hills, CebuCity. Defendants testimony was
corroborated by Paulina Martinez, a former househelp of
the Zamoras.She always wanted to live in the Philippines before
her husband committed infidelity.

One reason why defendant seldom saw her husband while
she was in the Philippines was because of the infidelity committed
by her husband. No less than plaintiff himself admitted that he has
a child with a certain [x x x]. The court is also convinced that he
has two children with a certain [y y y]. The infidelity on the part of
the plaintiff was one of the contributing factors which led to the
estranged relationship between him and defendant.

[N]othing in the evidence of plaintiff show[s] that the
defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she
failed to comply with her essential marital obligations. There is no
evidence of psychological incapacity on the part of defendant so
that she could not carry out the ordinary duties required in married
life. Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect
on the part of defendant.

. . .

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the complaint.

Without special pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.
[2]


Petitioner appealed to the CA which rendered a Decision on August 5,
1999 affirming the ruling of the trial court. The pertinent portions of the CA
decision read:



Without delving further into both parties allegations, we
must deny this appeal.

In the case of Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals,[
[3]
] the
High Court ruled that, psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[
[4]
] it
was held that mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.

This appeal does not fall in the category of psychological
incapacity as defined in the aforementioned cases. The mere
refusal of the appellee to bear a child is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, since even if such allegation is true, it is
not shown or proven that this is due to psychological illness.


As correctly stated by the appellee in her brief, the
appellant even failed to present any psychologist or other medical
expert to prove the psychological incapacity of defendant-appellee.
This WE feel is a fatal omission on the part of the appellant,
considering the doctrine laid down in the Santos and Molina cases
(supra).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Cebu City is hereby
AFFIRMED. Appeal DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
[5]



Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the CA in its Resolution dated January 24, 2000.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:


1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of
weight and substance affecting the result of the present case;

2) Whether or not Article 68 of the Family Code is applicable
to this case;

3) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or
psychiatrists is still desirable, if evidence in this case already
shows the psychological incapacity of private respondent;

4) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or
psychiatrists is still desirable, considering that the private
respondent is a resident of the United States and living far
away from the Philippinesfor more than twenty (20) years:

5) Whether or not private respondents refusal to live
with petitioner under one roof for more than twenty (20)
years, her refusal to bear children with petitioner, and her
living a solitary life in the United States for almost three (3)
decades are enough indications of psychological incapacity
to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36
of the Family Code.
[6]



Briefly, the issue is whether there can be a declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues as follows:
First, there is nothing in Santos v. CA,
[7]
upon which private respondent
relies, that requires as a conditio sine qua non the presentation of expert opinion
of psychologists and psychiatrists in every petition filed under Article 36 of the
Family Code. This Court merely said in that case that [t]he well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. However, no
expert opinion is helpful or even desirable to determine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years;
whether she has a child; and whether she has made her residence abroad
permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship; and

Second, Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. Among the essential marital obligations embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the same Code is to procreate children through sexual cooperation
which is the basic end of marriage. To live together under one roof for
togetherness spells the unity in marriage. The marriage had been existing for
twenty four years when private respondent filed a legal separation case against
petitioner. Throughout this period, private respondent deliberately and
obstinately refused to comply with the essential marital obligation to live and
cohabit with her husband.

This Court rules as follows:

It is true, as petitioner noted, that the case of Santos v. CA
[8]
did not
specifically mention that the presentation of expert opinion is a vital and
mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage grounded on psychological incapacity referred to under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Even in the subsequent case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals
[9]
(also known as the Molina case
[10]
), wherein the Court laid down the
guidelines
[11]
in the interpretation and application of the aforementioned article,
examination of the person by a physician in order for the former to be declared
psychologically incapacitated was likewise not considered a
requirement.
[12]
What is important, however, as stated in Marcos v.
Marcos,
[13]
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, states:

(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing
that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity
at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
[14]



The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence
presented, considered in totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of
the psychological incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, failed
to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to
bear a child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear
out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent that petitioner
cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former
exhibited a similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions reached by the trial court and the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated August 5, 1999 and January 24, 2000,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53525 are AFFIRMED.

No costs.


SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision
1
and Resolution
2
of
the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court
of Appeals had reversed the judgment
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie
Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we
reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married before a minister of the Gospel
4
at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding
5
at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong
Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
6
Out of their union, a child was
born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,
7
petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents
incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up
to the present.
8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things,
9
to
wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,
10
and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.
13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same
vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village
Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect
14
but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.
15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold
and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.
16
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of
their quarrels.
17
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.
18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer.
19
She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up
his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her
unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good
in November 1991.
21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents
persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect.
22
They further asserted that
respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.
23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there
was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.
24
She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.
25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from
head to foot.
26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer
of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson
for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal
Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was
not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office
after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her
honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political
clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.
29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking
for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts.
30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.
31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to
their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay
and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is
not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.
32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,
33
together with
the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was
not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies,
and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence
of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.
34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only
one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake
the results of such test.
35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that
respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
36
The trial court
thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.
37
During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was
impaired by a lack of due discretion.
38
Subsequently, the decision of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.
39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While
conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals
40
governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated
the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively
establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.
41
It is a
settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor
or lack thereof.
42
The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of
Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.
43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts
as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards
were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals
44
(also known as the Molina case
45
), and indeed the Court of Appeals
cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.
46
Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
47
In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one
case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
48
wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the
Supreme Court is concerned.
49
Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the
petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a
decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
50
The concept
of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our
body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground
for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons
"who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."
51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,
52
in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among
others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,
53
but a marriage where "either party was of unsound
mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under
the Marriage Law of 1929.
54
Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable
insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.
55
Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the
Civil Code as a voidable marriage.
56
The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the
marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.
57
Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45
(2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.
58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent,
just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential
requisites of a contract.
59
The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a
specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of
the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse
may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.
60
Dr. Tolentino likewise
stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage."
61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically
incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage,
which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code
x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage
only."
62
At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were
psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."
63
These
concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of
Appeals,
64
wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage."
65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them,
was further affirmed in the Molina
66
case. Therein, the Court, through then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereto."
67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized
that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume."
68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."
69
At the same time, it has
been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code
committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application,
by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."
70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as
intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics.
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current
trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under
the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework
that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of
this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then
in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation
of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,
73
and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by
the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.
74
It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has
expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
75
Still, it must be emphasized that
the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation
of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law,
its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation
occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on
lower courts.
76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection
to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains
the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-
political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification
that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation
the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes
the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it
may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections
1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who,
for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on
evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.
77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General
issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.
78
This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
79
Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings
before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on
this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary
trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of
these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied
about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology
who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to
psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of
evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus,
even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the
parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories,
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.
81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to
medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,
82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can
say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards.
There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again
in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of
the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another.
The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also
something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent
in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of the marriage?
x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page
six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which
means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is
having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we
also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is
abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes
that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.
83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of
petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."
84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the
case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well
as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos
85
that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
86
We deem
the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their
medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common
conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their
own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since
the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there
is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court
explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state
of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of
make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to
petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and
amounts to psychological incapacity.
87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural
childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports
the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record,
was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as
false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly,
they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction,
or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were
emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic
nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of
respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried
her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to
perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly
banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly
disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her
commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to,
and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her
marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is
difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.
88
Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion
89
dated 30
March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.
90
Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,
91
and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
92
In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
93
was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting
another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the
marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other
words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-
concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction
pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to
prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.
94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by
the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper
import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold
sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the
veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such
conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial
trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.
95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories,
and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion
that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents
psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it
would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized
respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity
on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36
or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995,
began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee,
96
then the opinion of canonical scholars,
97
before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.
98
Santos did
refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"
99
and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that
psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
100
However, in formulating the doctrinal rule
on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.
101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court
came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents
psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in
an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity
at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial
courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite
arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,
102
the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts
of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.
103
Yet
we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment
from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was
curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit
such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those
presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and
their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at
the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of
Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to
reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced
that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been
established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the
fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability
as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the
marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and
not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10
August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL
and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.





EDWARD KENNETH NGO
TE,
Petitioner,


- versus -


ROWENA ONG
GUTIERREZ YU-TE,
Respondent,

REPUBLIC OF
G.R. No. 161793

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:
THEPHILIPPINES,
Oppositor.


February 13, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x





D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J .:



Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological
incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of
discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much
ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily
imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed,
totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and
devoid of any definition.

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision
[1]
of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails
the January 19, 2004 Resolution
[2]
denying the motion for the reconsideration of
the challenged decision.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent
Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas
close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided
to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore
student and respondent, a freshman.
[3]


Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one
another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In
March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and
sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing
the boat ticket.
[4]


However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension
house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not
find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena
proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family
was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she
would commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles
place.
[5]


On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get
married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20.
[6]
The two then continued to
stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not
allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena.
[7]
At one point, Edward was able to call
home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their
parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who,
however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on
their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home.
[8]


After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and
stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family
whenever they telephoned to ask for him.
[9]


In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his
persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
[10]


After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological
incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.
[11]


As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000,
ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate
whether there was collusion between the parties.
[12]
In the meantime, on July
27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and
deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings.
[13]


On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating
that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it
recommended trial on the merits.
[14]


The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties
psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and
conclusions:

BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino
male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He
finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994
and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my
office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for
Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of
psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon
Street, Quezon City.

Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in
business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the
business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable,
and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the
family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and
simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting
people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of
Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay
long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full
servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate
himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only
loves to read the Bible and hear its message.

Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite
having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not
finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual
moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.

In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to
petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate
relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to
respondent that he is having problems with his family. Respondent
surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she
actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on],
respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live
together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they
are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would
somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of
March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and
she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner
reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The
parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent,
but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to
rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not
find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go
back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties
arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all
out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home
for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their
home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner
by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent
confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent
acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent
would call by phone every now and then and became angry as
petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent
of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his
family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be
able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent
brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in
life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that
very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage
Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for
any Marriage License.

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their
house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the
parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner
to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her
uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened
that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made
petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities
should look for him at his parents[] and relatives[]
houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape
and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and
they forgave him and supported him by giving him military
escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a
marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,]
petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to
live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they are
still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she
would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their
own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner
that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit
from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent
demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled
his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to
live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner
decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He
told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not
have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing
that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent
stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they
should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said
to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up
was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting
boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
M M P I

TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:

Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be
emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to
their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different
notions on marriage.

Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is
said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to
marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants
in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable
and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling
with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle
that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a
relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her
dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and
timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and
spend a solemn time alone.

ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to
be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be
somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and
glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that
her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he
is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she
used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow
weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for
wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.

REMARKS:

Before going to marriage, one should really get to know
himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows.
Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a
serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case
presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear
that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as
they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert
to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral
disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and
aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly
uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she
is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since
childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties
display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big
mistake for them to take.
[15]



The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision
[16]
declaring the
marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
[17]
The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.
[18]


On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003
Decision
[19]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts
ruling.
[20]
It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent,
and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the
psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
[21]
needed for
the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
[22]
The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the
required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for
its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition.
[23]
The CA
later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the likewise assailed
January 19, 2004 Resolution.
[24]


Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for
review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
[25]


In his memorandum,
[26]
petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out
that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP
because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished
copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.
[27]


For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,
[28]
that the annulment
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital
obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was
not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG
concludes that the requirements in Molina
[29]
were not satisfied.
[30]


The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article
36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.
[31]

I.

We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.

Article 36 of the Family Code
[32]
provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.


As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee
that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the
Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate
opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
[33]


However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision
Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil
Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add
some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and
Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman
Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the
inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.

During its early meetings, the Family Law
Committee had thought of including a chapter on
absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code
(Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a
no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number
of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an
action for dissolution of marriage and the effects
thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous
years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b)
whenever a married person would have obtained a
decree of absolute divorce in another country.
Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce
but called by another name. Later, even the Civil
Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.

Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code
Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of
the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as

a special contract of permanent
partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for
the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law.

With the above definition, and considering the
Christian traditional concept of marriage of the
Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable,
indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong
opposition that any provision on absolute divorce
would encounter from the Catholic Church and the
Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought
that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the
nagging problem of church annulments of marriages
on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages
as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed
by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in
the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was
the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in
the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil
Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient
use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated
to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.

as well as the following implementing provisions:

Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a
marriage may be invoked or pleaded only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring
the marriage void, without prejudice to
the provision of Article 34.

Art. 33. The action or defense for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe.

x x x x x x x x x

It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country
today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds
proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well
as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy
of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground
of lack of due discretion for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.
[34]



In her separate opinion in Molina,
[35]
she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason
or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took
finally produced the following revised provision even before the
session was over:

(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.

Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above
has dropped any reference to wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage
and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained that these phrases
refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is
not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation. There being a defect in consent, it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not
refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

My own position as a member of the Committee then was
that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser
degree.

As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
psychological or mental impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz
opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another.

One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for
the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex.

The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase and is incurable but Prof.
Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa
agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that
one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes
manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the
remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz.:

1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of
marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under
special cases and special situations, hence, its special treatment
in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.

Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a
ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close
to being psychological in nature.

Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at
the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until
annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.

On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly
the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds
of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices
of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.

Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: 3. (those) who,
because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage provided the model for what
is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law
recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the
marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place,
for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a
properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a
Court selection and a formal hearing.

Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by
Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties
to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married
couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage
bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract
a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-
in relationships.

It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee
decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same as a
ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent
from the beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This
Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological
incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required persons
to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent;
Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the
major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force
and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called
lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give
valid consent at the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is
invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.

Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the
1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality
and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to
the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for
annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several
cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was
nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight,
the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that
manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
[36]



Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that
the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from
the Canon Law.
[37]
The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in
its application.
[38]


Yet, as held in Santos,
[39]
the phrase psychological incapacity is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68
[40]
of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law
has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
[41]
This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with
that in Canon Law, thus:

3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp
conceptual distinction must be made between the second and third
paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of
discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential
obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a
house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable
according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the
object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a
different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the
house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is
the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological
process of giving consent because it has been established a priori
that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know
well the object of their consent [the house and its
particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological
act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano
Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals
not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of
consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he
assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.

Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in
1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising
from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.

The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual
anomalies always and in every case imply a grave
psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of
intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies
that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain
physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect
the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so
that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The
evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are
certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person
towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect
to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the
activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However,
these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the
higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted
continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is
and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can
assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he
may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues
from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the
incapacity to posit consent itself.

Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually
confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts
were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit
consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c.
Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly
deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of
reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is
under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under
these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this
irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely
the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is
always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to
think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would
be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in
a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more
correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically
ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he
cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire.

3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems
to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess,
proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the
inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill
the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that
nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and
they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have
no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However,
such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free
consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the
object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise
treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction
usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and
evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the
delivering of the goods.

3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of
Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is
possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that
the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that
is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same
person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The
decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed
that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person
in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in
understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the
weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.

Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it
was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or
psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the
personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will
and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to
distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment
dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the
subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to
the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of
fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad
impossibile tenetur.

x x x x

3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when
either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or
maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those
cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a
narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a
union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the
spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual
consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is
unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The
canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum
conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or
contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather
than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite
capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security
of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of
the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for
detained and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be
suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the
respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the
essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming
them because of his constitutional immorality.

Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person
as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only
at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to
constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent
consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a
person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in
the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to
assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking
at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in
facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz
collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential
obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person,
precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and
his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability
to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense
of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to
achieve ones ends.

Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the
children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume
any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in
which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic
features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage
include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.

Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear
under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating
of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because
of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or
because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively,
however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity
to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so
afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial
consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also
the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095
[incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to
account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very
few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full
sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity,
and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave
lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by
itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather,
the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of
marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so
much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent.

3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be
addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes
of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other
words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the
person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the
psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that
one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the
hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged
incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found
to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which
impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply
engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a
source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that
there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the
development of the habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic
constitution. It would seem then that the law insists that the source
of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree
of freedom.
[42]



Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case
basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,
[43]
ruled that the findings of the trial court are
final and binding on the appellate courts.
[44]


Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision
was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals,
[45]
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before
the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of
parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of
procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-
case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of
strict standards in Molina,
[46]
thus:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations,
the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due
to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our
people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from
each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[47]



Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts
membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and
another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose
their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own
facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.
[48]


Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,
[49]
the Court has
applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear
intention that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs
exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world.
[50]
The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little
the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all
sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.
[51]


The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency,
among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to
guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.
[52]
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological
incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is
actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.
[53]
Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void
from the very beginning.
[54]
To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.

The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not
pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none
of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal
spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a
personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in
their marriage.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante
O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
[55]
there is need to emphasize other perspectives
as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

II.

We now examine the instant case.

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months.
They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May,
and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern
falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
[56]


By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
[57]


Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important
in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid
consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in
this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for
annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There
was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of
marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The
result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
casesthat a person who could intellectually understand the concept
of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite
to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient
psychological incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all
kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right
of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in
its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult
personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the
obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that
the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of
the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is
not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements
necessary to the mature marital relationship:

The courts consider the following elements
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent
and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2)
openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

At stake is a type of constitutional impairment
precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia,
where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal
responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.

x x x x

The psychological grounds are the best
approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she
has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are,
experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to
be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume
or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to
using the ground of lack of due competence is that at
the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce
and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities
as promised at the time the marriage was entered
into.
[58]



Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
[59]
emphasizes the importance of
presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos
[60]
asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity.
[61]
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave,
severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
[62]
Parenthetically,
the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,
[63]
an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the
psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts
in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination
of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative
to present their own expert witnesses.

Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we
consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with
personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner,
and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note
that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as
follows

A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are
characteristic of a persons recent and long-term functioning.
Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to
isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive
and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or
anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by
adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become
less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.

The common factor among individuals who have personality
disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which
the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are
perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even
criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities
may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame
others for their problems. Other individuals with personality
disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be
lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal
difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.

Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health
viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality
disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic
theories and brain wave activity.

Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain
stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some
disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and
phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior
(dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from
fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity
and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the
anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to
shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate
relationships. However, later researchers have found little
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be
a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and
borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of
inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption
and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be
related to genetic factors.

Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline
personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-
hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with
measures of aggression and a past history of suicide
attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low
platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth
pursuit eye movement.

Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in
electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported
abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38
percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with
19 percent in a control group.

Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality
disorders are categorized into three major clusters:

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to
have odd or eccentric habits and traits.

Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often
appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.

Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and
passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have
these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality
disorder not otherwise specified, that can be used for other
specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not
qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.

Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.
[64]



Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner


A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem
and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are
easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring
about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early
adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to
make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions
(such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they
believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in
order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.
[65]



and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows


Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is
intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a
society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or
criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly,
child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication
that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others
and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals,
they also may befit some individuals who are prominent in
business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard
for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.

During the 19
th
century, this type of personality disorder
was referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral,
guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in
reasoning.

According to the classification system used in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.,
rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four
dramatic personality disorders, the others being borderline,
histrionic and narcissistic.
[66]



The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders
considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological
evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the
parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We
further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the
witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder,
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to
make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
[67]
As clearly shown in this case,
petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is
insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no
cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the
respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her
unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into
account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by
society.
[68]
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on
April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19,
2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30,
2001, REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.