Journal of Experimental Psvchology: General

1988, Vol. 117, No. 2, 171-'l81

Copyright 1988 hy the Am :an Psychological Association, Inc.
OD96-3445/88/$00.75
Is There a Special Flashbulb-Memory Mechanism?
Michael McCloskey, Cynthia G. Wible, and Neal J. Cohen
Johns Hopkins University
Many people report vivid recollections of the circumstances in which they learned of major
events, such as the assassination of President Kennedy, or the assassination attempt on President
Reagan. Brown and Kulik (1977) argued that this phenomenon, which they labeled flashbulb
memory, implies the existence of a special memory mechanism that creates a detailed, permanent
record of the individual's experience when triggered by an event exceeding criterial levels of
surprise and consequentiality. In this article we evaluate the special-mechanism hypothesis,
arguing on empirical and logical grounds that the flashbulb-memory phenomenon does not
motivate the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory mechanism. We suggest instead that
flashbulb memories should be viewed as products of "ordinary" memory mechanisms, and hence
as phenomena that may offer insights into the nature of these mechanisms.
Where were you when you learned of the assassination of
John F. Kennedy, the shooting of Ronald Reagan, or the
explosion of the space shuttle Challenged How did you hear
about the event? What were you doing at the time? What
were your first thoughts upon hearing the news? Many people
report that they can remember vividly the circumstances in
which they learned of certain major public or personal events,
a feat of memory that has intrigued researchers since at least
the turn of the century (e.g., Brewer, 1986; Brown & Kulik,
1977; Colegrove, 1899; Linton, 1975; Neisser, 1982, 1986a,
1986b; Pillemer, 1984; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Thompson &
Cowan, 1986; Winograd & Killinger, 1983; Yarmey & Bull,
1978).
Brown and Kulik (1977) suggested that this phenomenon,
which they labeled flashbulb memory, implies the existence
of a special memory mechanism. They argued that the special
mechanism, when triggered by an event exceeding criterial
levels of surprise and "consequentiality," creates a permanent
record of the contents of awareness for the period immediately
surrounding the shocking experience. The special-mechanism
hypothesis has been the subject of considerable discussion in
recent years, with some authors endorsing the hypothesis and
others noting potential problems. Pillemer (1984), for exam-
ple, argued in favor of the hypothesis on the basis of data
concerning subjects' recollections of the circumstances in
which they learned about the assassination attempt on Presi-
dent Reagan. In contrast, Neisser (1982) raised doubts about
the accuracy of flashbulb memories, and also pointed out
problems with several other aspects of the Brown and Kulik
hypothesis. Furthermore, Rubin and Kozin (1984) questioned
whether the characteristics of flashbulb memories clearly set
these memories apart from other autobiographical memories.
Although a number of important issues have been raised,
it remains unclear whether the flashbulb-memory phenome-
We thank Roberta Goodman-Schulman, Kathi Hirsh, Brenda
Rapp, Scott Sokol, and Molly Treadway for their helpful comments.
We also thank the Cognitive Lunch group for an illuminating discus-
sion.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Michael McCloskey, Cognitive Science Center, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity, Baltimore, Maryland 21218.
non warrants the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory
mechanism. One reason is that no detailed, coherent formu-
lation of a special-mechanism hypothesis has been set forth.
The hypothesis as stated by Brown and Kulik (1977) and
discussed in subsequent articles is underdeveloped in several
crucial respects, and there is also considerable variation be-
tween and even within articles in what is claimed about the
mechanism and the memories it produces. A related problem
is that discussions of the special-mechanism hypothesis have
often failed to engage the critical issue of what would consti-
tute a sufficient basis for positing a special flashbulb-memory
mechanism.
As a consequence of these problems, the implications of
the evidence and arguments presented in studies of flashbulb
memory have not always been clear. For example, Neisser
(1982) reported two examples of inaccurate flashbulb mem-
ories in support of his argument that these memories are not
necessarily veridical. Thompson and Cowan (1986), however,
presented evidence that for one of Neisser's examples the
inaccuracy is relatively minor, and concluded that this ex-
ample does not challenge the "basic accuracy of flashbulb
memories" (p. 200). Neisser (1986b), in a reply to Thompson
and Cowan, disagreed with their conclusions. Unfortunately,
the exchange fails to clarify what implications any particular
degree of inaccuracy has for the special-mechanism hypothe-
sis. Do a few examples of minor inaccuracy call the hypothesis
into serious question? Or does the hypothesis remain unchal-
lenged if the accounts are usually "basically accurate"?
In this article we attempt to evaluate the special-mechanism
hypothesis systematically and, more generally, to assess the
implications of the flashbulb-memory phenomenon for the-
ories of memory. On the basis of data and arguments, we
conclude that the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory
mechanism is unwarranted. Instead, we suggest, flashbulb
memories' should be viewed as products of "ordinary" auto-
biographical memory mechanisms, and hence as phenomena
that may offer insights into the nature of these mechanisms.
1
We will use the term flashbulb memory in a theoretically neutral
sense, to refer to individuals' recollections of the circumstances in
which they learned about surprising and consequential events. It
should be understood that our use of this term does not imply
anything about the memory processes underlying the recollections.
171
172 M. McCLOSKEY, C. WIBLE, AND N. COHEN
The Special-Mechanism Hypothesis
Underlying the hypothesis of a special flashbulb-memory
mechanism is the following implicit argument: Flashbulb
memories have special characteristics, that is, characteristics
different from those the memories would have if they were
produced by "ordinary" memory mechanisms. These special
characteristics imply that the memories are products of a
special memory mechanism.
Thus, in evaluating the special-mechanism hypothesis, we
must consider the following questions: What claims does the
hypothesis make about the characteristics of flashbulb mem-
ories? To what extent are these claims warranted by the
available evidence? And, if these claims are accepted, do they
clearly distinguish flashbulb memories from "ordinary" mem-
ories and therefore warrant the postulation of a special flash-
bulb-memory mechanism?
Characteristics of Flashbulb Memories
Statements of the special-mechanism hypothesis are not
entirely clear with regard to the characteristics of flashbulb
memories, at times pressing strong claims while at other times
qualifying these claims. As a starting point for discussion, we
will consider one particular interpretation of the Brown and
Kulik (1977) hypothesis, an interpretation that makes strong
claims about the characteristics of flashbulb memories. On
this rendering the special flashbulb-memory mechanism,
when triggered by criterial levels of surprise and consequen-
tiality, creates in memory a detailed and permanent record of
the individual's experience immediately before, during, and
immediately after learning of the shocking event. (Brown and
Kulik, 1977, p. 87, stated that the mechanism records all
"brain events above some level of organization," apparently
meaning something like the contents of awareness, including
such information as where the individual was, what he or she
was doing, etc.) The representations created by the special
mechanism are complete, accurate, vivid, and immune to
forgetting (i.e., the stored information, in its original veridical
form, remains permanently accessible).
One could certainly formulate weaker interpretations of
Brown and Kulik's (1977) position (e.g., flashbulb memories
are impressively, although not perfectly, complete, accurate,
vivid, and resistant to forgetting). However, we consider the
strong claims first because these claims, if supportable, would
make the most convincing case for the position that flashbulb
memories are so remarkable that a special memory mecha-
nism must be posited to account for them. If the strong claims
prove untenable, we can then consider whether weaker claims
motivate the postulation of a special flashbulb-memory mech-
anism.
2
We begin our evaluation of the strong claims about char-
acteristics of flashbulb memories by reporting a study aimed
at evaluating these claims.
Flashbulb Memories for the Explosion
of the Space Shuttle
With one exception (Pillemer, 1984), studies of flashbulb
memories (Brown & Kulik, 1977;Colegrove, 1899; Winograd
& Killinger, 1983; Yarmey & Bull, 1978) have probed sub-
jects' memories for the circumstances in which they learned
of an event only once, long after the event. Yet, as Neisser
(1982) has pointed out, this procedure does not permit the
accuracy of the subjects' reports to be assessed. Moreover, it
is difficult to determine whether the amount of remembered
information remains constant over time, as it should if flash-
bulb memories are immune to forgetting, or whether subjects'
memories instead become less detailed and complete as time
passes.
Potentially more informative is a procedure in which sub-
jects are questioned twice, once shortly after a surprising,
consequential event, and again some time later, as in Pille-
mer's (1984) study concerning the Reagan assassination at-
tempt. The two sets of responses may then be compared with
regard to amount and consistency of information reported on
the two occasions. The explosion of the space shuttle Chal-
lenger on January 28, 1986, tragically provided the opportu-
nity to carry out a study of this sort. The flight of Challenger
was highly publicized because the crew included the teacher
Christa McAuliffe. Furthermore, the explosion was com-
pletely unexpected and had important consequences for the
space program and, more generally, for public confidence in
government, science, and technology. Thus, with regard to
surprise and consequentiality, the presumed triggering con-
ditions for the special flashbulb-memory mechanism, the
shuttle explosion appears comparable to the events used in
previous studies of flashbulb memory (e.g., the Reagan assas-
sination attempt, assassinations of other political leaders).
Indeed, the disaster was widely described in the media as one
of those events for which people remember where they were
and what they were doing when they learned of it. In the
present study we probed subjects' memory for circumstances
of learning about the shuttle explosion a few days after the
explosion, and again 9 months later.
Method
Questionnaire. The questionnaire presented to subjects included
four questions about the circumstances under which the respondent
learned of the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger:
1. Where were you when you first learned of the explosion?
2
It might be suggested that the strong claims we have formulated
about characteristics of flashbulb memories are stronger than Brown
and Kulik (1977) intended. For example, whereas the strong claims
characterize flashbulb memories as complete records of the individ-
ual's experience around the time of learning about a surprising,
consequential event, Brown and Kulik (1977, pp. 74-75, 85) stated
that flashbulb memories vary in "elaboration," suggesting that under
some circumstances these memories could be less than complete.
However, Brown and Kulik also repeatedly assert (e.g., see Brown &
Kulik, 1977, pp. 76, 95-96) that the flashbulb-memory mechanism
records all recent brain events. Thus, potential conflicts between the
strong claims we have formulated and statements made by Brown
and Kulik reflect ambiguities in their claims. In any event, regardless
of what Brown and Kulik intended, it is important to consider strong
claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories because, as stated
earlier, these claims would provide the firmest basis for asserting that
flashbulb memories are very different from ordinary memories.
FLASHBULB MEMORY 173
2. What were you doing when you first learned of the explosion?
3. Did you see the event at the time it was actually happening, or
did you learn about it later? If later, how did you learn about it?
4. What were your first thoughts upon hearing the news?
We will refer to these items collectively as the circumstances ques-
tions, and individually as the location, activity, source, and reaction
questions, respectively. For each question subjects were asked to rate
their confidence in the correctness of their answers on a scale from 1
(low confidence) to 7 (high confidence).
The four circumstances questions were intended to probe cate-
gories of information that should be included in memories generated
by a mechanism that records the contents of awareness for the period
immediately surrounding the learning about a surprising, consequen-
tial event. Previous studies have focused on six "canonical categories"
of information: place, ongoing event, information, own affect, affect
in others, and aftermath (see, e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Pillemer,
1984). Our location, activity, and source questions closely correspond
to the first three of these categories, respectively, and our reaction
question corresponds roughly to the own affect category. We did not
probe affect in others or aftermath, because information in these
categories may not always be available to be recorded, at least within
the span of time over which a special flashbulb-memory mechanism
would operate. For example, a person who heard a radio announce-
ment about the shuttle explosion while alone might have no experi-
ence of affect in others to remember.
The questionnaire also included a single question about the re-
spondent's memory for his or her whereabouts at the time of the
assassination attempt on President Reagan.
These five critical questions (the four shuttle circumstances ques-
tions and the single question about the Reagan assassination attempt)
occurred in identical form on both the initial and 9-month question-
naires. Instructions on both questionnaires stressed that answers
should be as specific as possible.
Both questionnaires also included several additional questions,
most of which concerned the sources from which the respondent
obtained information about the shuttle disaster subsequent to initially
learning about it, and the details of the shuttle flight itself. The results
for these questions are not relevant for our purposes and therefore
will not be discussed.
Design and procedure. On January 31, 1986, three days after the
explosion, questionnaires were distributed to 50 faculty, postdoctoral
fellows, graduate students, undergraduate students, and support staff
associated with the Psychology Department of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. Forty-five of these "immediate" questionnaires (90%) were
returned within 1 week of the shuttle disaster.
On October 21, 1986, approximately 9 months after the explosion,
follow-up questionnaires were distributed to the 29 subjects who (a)
had returned the immediate questionnaire within 1 week of the
explosion and (b) were still available at the time of the follow-up.
Twenty-seven subjects (93%) completed the 9-month questionnaire.
These subjects will be referred to as the repeated testing group.
To assess effects of completing the immediate questionnaire on
responses given at 9 months, the 9-month questionnaire was also
distributed to 35 individuals who had not received the immediate
questionnaire. Thirty-one (89%) completed the questionnaire. These
subjects will be referred to as the 9-month-only group.
Results
Answers to the location, activity, source, and reaction ques-
tions were first scored simply as substantive or "don't remem-
ber" responses. A response was scored as substantive if it
provided an answer to the question, even if the response was
not highly specific. For example, "at work" as well as "Lever-
ing Hall next to the news stand" was scored as a substantive
answer to the location question. This scoring criterion appears
to be consistent with those used in previous studies (e.g.,
Brown & Kulik, 1977; Pillemer, 1984) to assess whether a
subject provided information in a canonical category. Because
some subjects reported information relevant to one of the
circumstances questions in an answer to another of these
questions, the scoring for each question took account of any
relevant information the subject provided in answers to other
questions.
Nine-month responses. Table 1 presents, for the repeated
testing subjects on the immediate and 9-month question-
naires, and for the 9-month-only subjects on the 9-month
questionnaire, the proportion of subjects who offered substan-
tive responses to each of the circumstances questions. From
the 9-month results, it is clear that the explosion of Challenger
is an event for which the flashbulb-memory phenomenon
occurs: 9 months after the shuttle explosion most subjects
could provide reports concerning where they were, what they
were doing, how they heard, and how they reacted when they
learned of the disaster.
All subjects in both groups gave substantive answers to at
least two of the four questions; 22 of the 27 repeated-testing
subjects (81%) and 26 of the 31 9-month-only subjects (84%)
gave substantive responses to all four questions. Subjects were
also highly confident about their responses. Across the four
circumstances questions, mean confidence for substantive
answers was 6.13 (on a scale with 7 as the highest confidence
level) for the repeated-testing group, and 6.16 for the 9-month-
only group.
Brown and Kulik (1977) scored a subject as having a
flashbulb memory for an event if the subject (a) answered
"yes" to the question, "Do you recall the circumstances in
which you first heard that [event]?", and (b) provided infor-
mation in at least one of the six canonical information cate-
gories in reporting these circumstances. Assuming that any
subject who gave a substantive response to one or more of
our circumstances questions would have given a "yes" answer
to a question of the form "Do you recall the circumstances in
which you first heard that the space shuttle Challenger had
exploded?", then by the Brown and Kulik criteria all of our
repeated-testing and 9-month-only subjects have flashbulb
memories for the space shuttle explosion.
Table 1
Proportion of Repeated Testing and ^-Month-Only Subjects
Providing Substantive Responses to the Circumstances
Questions on the Immediate and 9-Month Questionnaires
Repeated testing
Question
Location
Activity
Source
Reaction
Immediate
questionnaire
1.00
1.00
1.00
.96
9-month
questionnaire
.96
.89
1.00
.89
9-month
only
9-month
questionnaire
.94
.87
1.00
.97
M .99 .94 .94
174 M. McCLOSKEY, C. WIBLE, AND N. COHEN
Comparison of the 9-month results for the repeated-testing
group and the 9-month-only group suggests that completing
the immediate questionnaire had little if any effect on the 9-
month responses of the repeated-testing group. The mean
number of questions answered substantively was 3.74 (out
of 4) for the repeated-testing group and 3.77 for the 9-month-
only group, t < \. Furthermore, confidence did not differ
across groups (see earlier results on confidence levels).
Comparison of immediate and 9-month responses. The 9-
month results paint a seemingly impressive picture of subjects'
ability to remember the circumstances in which they learned
of the shuttle explosion. However, comparison of the 9-month
responses with those given shortly after the explosion reveals
that the amount of stored information subjects could access
decreased over the retention interval, and further that the
immediate and 9-month responses were not always consistent.
For each of the 107 circumstances questions answered
substantively on the immediate questionnaire (27 subjects
times 4 circumstances questions, minus a single reaction
question answered "don't remember"), two independent
judges compared the immediate response with the corre-
sponding 9-month response.
A 9-month response was scored as the same as the corre-
sponding immediate response if it provided basically the same
information (although not necessarily in the same wording).
A relatively lax criterion was applied, so that, for example,
the responses "reading" and "studying" to the activity ques-
tion were scored as the same.
A 9-month response was scored as more specific than the
immediate response if it was not inconsistent with the im-
mediate response, but answered the question at a finer level
of detail, or included particular pieces of information not
reported on the immediate questionnaire. For example, the
9-month response "eating lunch (actually, drinking coffee)
with S S , S D , and M M " to the
activity question was scored as more specific than the imme-
diate response "eating lunch with some friends."
Similarly, a 9-month response was scored as more general
than the corresponding immediate response if it was not
inconsistent with the immediate response, but was less spe-
cific, or omitted particular details. For example, the 9-month
response "word of mouth" was scored as more general than
the immediate response "heard C talking about it."
A 9-month response was scored as inconsistent if it contra-
dicted the corresponding immediate response in some (al-
though not necessarily all) respects. For example, the 9-month
response "at my desk" to the location question was scored as
inconsistent with the immediate response "walking out of the
door toward B 's office."
Finally, a 9-month response was scored as don't remember
if the question was answered substantively on the immediate
questionnaire but given a "don't remember" response on the
9-month questionnaire.
The two judges agreed on 86% of the initial classification
decisions. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
For some ambiguous responses, the subject was consulted for
clarification. For example, one subject indicated that the 9-
month response "examining some data for an experiment"
did not refer to the same activity as the immediate response
Table 2
Comparison of Immediate and 9-Month Responses for
Repeated-Testing Subjects
Relationship of 9-month response to immediate
response
Question
Location
Activity
Source
Reaction
Total
Same
21
15
16
13
65
More
specific
1
1
3
2
7
More
general
2
4
7
7
20
Inconsistent
2
4
1
2
9
Don't
remember
1
3
0
2
6
"designing an experiment." Table 2 presents for each of the
four circumstances questions the number of responses falling
into each of the scoring categories.
Although there is considerable consistency over the 9-
month retention interval, there is also substantial evidence of
forgetting and inaccuracy. First, the data for "don't remem-
ber" responses clearly reveal forgetting over the retention
interval. On the immediate questionnaire, 26 of the 27 re-
peated-testing subjects provided a substantive answer to all
four circumstances questions, and the remaining subject gave
a substantive response to three of the four questions. On the
9-month questionnaire, however, 4 of the 27 subjects (15.4%)
gave "don't remember" responses to a total of 6 questions
they had answered substantively on the immediate question-
naire.
Further evidence of forgetting may be found by comparing
the frequency of more specific and more general responses. If
the accessible information remains constant over time, there
should be no systematic difference between the immediate
and 9-month questionnaires in specificity of responses. That
is, although corresponding immediate and 9-month responses
may occasionally vary in specificity due to variation in sub-
jects' decisions about how much of the accessible information
to report, we would expect the number of responses that
became more specific at 9 months to be approximately the
same as the number that became more general. On the other
hand, if the amount of accessible information decreased over
the interval between questionnaires, we might expect a sys-
tematic shift toward more general responses on the 9-month
questionnaire. This is just what we found. Whereas only 7
responses became more specific, 20 became more general
(p < .01 by binomial test).
Finally, subjects' confidence ratings provide additional
suggestive, although by no means definitive, evidence of for-
getting: Confidence in substantive answers declined over the
retention interval, with a mean across the four circumstances
questions of 6.84 on the immediate questionnaire, and 6.13
on the 9-month questionnaire, /(26) = 2.84, p < .01.
The comparison of immediate and 9-month responses also
revealed a number of inconsistencies. On the 9-month ques-
tionnaire, 7 of the 27 repeated-testing subjects (25.9%) gave
a total of 9 responses (8.4% of the 107 total responses) that
were inconsistent with the corresponding immediate re-
sponses. For example, one subject reported on the immediate
questionnaire that she learned of the explosion when "my
FLASHBULB MEMORY 175
husband telephoned me to ask if I saw it," but stated on the
9-month questionnaire that "I did not see the actual launch
but a little while after the explosion the TV news made a
statement concerning the shuttle." (See the discussion of
scoring for two other examples of inconsistency.)
Subjects were often quite confident about their inconsistent
9-month responses; these responses clearly were not offered
as guesses. Three of the 9 inconsistent responses were given
with confidence ratings of 7, and the mean over the 9 re-
sponses was 5.22. Confidence in incorrect recollections was
also apparent when we interviewed subjects to determine
whether apparently inconsistent responses were in fact incon-
sistent. For example, the subject who reported his ongoing
activity as "designing an experiment" on the immediate ques-
tionnaire but as "examining some data for an experiment"
on the 9-month questionnaire was asked 16 months after the
shuttle explosion what he was doing when he learned of the
explosion. No information about his previous responses was
given. The subject replied that he remembered vividly sitting
at his desk looking at the data from an experiment. Shown
his initial response, he was surprised, and confirmed that his
current memory was inconsistent with his original report.
Although the 9-month responses scored as inconsistent were
clearly discrepant with the corresponding immediate re-
sponses, none were grossly incongruent.
3
Thus, the inconsist-
encies do not imply that flashbulb memories are often com-
plete confabulations, but instead suggest that these memories
are subject to the same sorts of reconstructive errors that seem
to occur frequently for "ordinary" memories. That is, for
flashbulb memories, as for other memories, inaccuracies may
be introduced when information that cannot be retrieved
from memory is filled in through inference or guesswork.
Further, the reconstructed information may be stored in
memory and recalled (perhaps with high confidence) on sub-
sequent occasions.
In using subjects' immediate responses as the standard for
assessing the accuracy of the 9-month responses, we are
assuming that the immediate responses are accurate. Of
course, this may not always be the case, given that the
"immediate" questionnaires were completed between 3 and
7 days after the explosion. However, the risk we take in
assuming that the immediate reports are accurate is one of
underestimating the amount of inaccuracy at nine months: If
immediate reports are sometimes inaccurate, then some 9-
month reports that are the same as the corresponding imme-
diate reports may be inaccurate.
More generally, our results should probably be viewed as
placing a lower bound on the amount of forgetting and
inaccuracy that occurred over the 9-month period following
the shuttle explosion. In addition to the possibility that some
of the immediate reports are inaccurate, it is possible that
some of the responses that became more specific on the 9-
month questionnaire did so through the importation of in-
accurate information. Furthermore, when subjects give con-
sistent but rather general responses on both occasions, these
responses may conceal forgetting and inaccuracy. For exam-
ple, if a subject reports on both questionnaires that he was
walking to class with some friends when he learned of the
shuttle explosion, we have no way of knowing whether he had
the same particular friends in mind both times, or whether
he even remembers who the friends were.
These points were brought home to us with some force
when we described our study at an informal seminar attended
by several of the individuals who had served as subjects. A
discussion ensued about the particular flashbulb memories of
some of the seminar participants, in the course of which it
became apparent that the memories of our subjects, as well
as those of other individuals who did not participate in the
experiment, were often rather vague, and frequently incon-
sistent with one another. (In the following account names
have been changed to protect the forgetful.) Susan, one of the
repeated-testing subjects, reported on the immediate question-
naire that she was eating lunch with some friends in the
university cafeteria when she learned of the explosion. On the
9-month questionnaire, she stated that she was eating lunch
in the cafeteria with John, Beth, and Jennifer. Thus, her 9-
month response was scored as more specific than her imme-
diate response. However, Tim, who was not a subject in the
experiment, stated at the seminar that he was eating with
John when he learned of the explosion, but did not remember
Susan, Beth, or Jennifer being there. Beth, contacted by
telephone, stated that she was elsewhere at lunch that day.
John, questioned after the seminar, reported that he was
eating lunch with Susan and a few other people when he
learned of the explosion, but did not remember Tim being
there. Furthermore, John initially did not think that Jennifer
was present at the lunch, although he later conceded that she
may have been. (John, a repeated-testing subject, did not list
his luncheon companions on either questionnaire, and his
immediate and 9-month activity responses were scored as the
same). Jennifer, who was not a subject in the experiment,
reported that she did eat lunch with John that day, but did
not remember Susan being there and instead believed that
Phil and Roger were present. Phil, a repeated-testing subject,
stated that he ate lunch in his office that day, and learned of
the explosion from the radio. Roger, who was not a subject
in the study, also reported that he does not remember eating
lunch in the cafeteria on the day of the shuttle explosion, and
stated that he learned of the explosion in the psychology
building when someone told him. Roger further indicated
that he believed David was the person who gave him the
news, but Linda states that she is the one who informed
Roger. Asked whether it could have been Linda who told
him, Roger conceded the possibility but stated that he did not
3
Similarly, Neisser's inaccurate memory for learning of the attack
on Pearl Harbor is apparently not grossly inaccurate: Neisser recalls
that he was listening to a baseball game on the radio, when in fact he
was probably listening to a football game (see Neisser, 1982, 1986b;
Thompson & Cowan, 1986). Linton (1975) describes another example
of an inaccurate flashbulb memory, in which an acquaintance re-
ported lhat Linton was the source of his information about the
assassination of President Kennedy, when according to documentary
evidence (and Linton's own memories), Linton was elsewhere at the
time. However, no information is available about the circumstances
in which Linton's acquaintance actually learned of the Kennedy
assassination, and thus we have no way of knowing to what extent
the memory was inaccurate.
176 M. McCLOSKEY, C. W1BLE, AND N. COHEN
specifically remember her telling him. Clearly, these accounts
are not entirely complete and consistent.
The final point to be made about the data from the shuttle
circumstances questions is that the forgetting and inaccuracy
apparent in these data were not limited to responses about
which the subject was uncertain on the immediate question-
naire. If we restrict the analysis to the 89 responses for which
the subject gave a confidence rating of 7 on the immediate
questionnaire, the pattern of results is almost identical to that
for the full set of responses: 55 (61.8%) same responses, 6
(6.7%) more specific responses, 17 (19.1%) more general
responses, 8 (9.0%) inconsistent responses, and 3 (3.4%) don't
remember responses.
The Reagan assassination attempt. In addition to asking
about the circumstances in which subjects learned of the space
shuttle explosion, we also asked a single question about sub-
jects' memories for their whereabouts at the time of the
Reagan assassination attempt. The assassination attempt oc-
curred on March 30, 1981, roughly 5 years prior to the present
study. For the repeated-testing group, 13 of the 27 subjects
(48.2%) gave a substantive response on the immediate ques-
tionnaire; 15 (55.6%) responded substantively on the 9-month
questionnaire. (Interestingly, 2 subjects gave a don't remem-
ber response on the initial questionnaire and a substantive
response 9 months later.) For the 9-month-only group, 17 of
the 31 subjects (54.8%) gave a substantive response. Finally,
for the 18 subjects who completed the immediate question-
naire but not the 9-month questionnaire, 9 (50%) gave a
substantive response.
These percentages are considerably lower than those ob-
tained by Pillemer (1984) for subjects questioned 1 and 7
months after the Reagan assassination attempt. Pillemer (per-
sonal communication) found that 96% of the subjects (80
of 83) tested 1 month after the assassination attempt and 85%
of the subjects (70 of 82) tested at 7 months could report
where they were when they learned of the incident.
Note that whereas Pillemer's (1984) subjects were faculty
at Wellesley College, our subjects were faculty, students, staff,
and others associated with the Johns Hopkins Psychology
Department. Perhaps, then, differences between the subjects
in the two studies are responsible for the lower incidence of
flashbulb memories in our study than in Pillemer's. However,
examination of our data provides no support for this inter-
pretation. Eight of our subjects were university faculty at the
time of Pillemer's study in 1981, and hence may reasonably
be considered comparable to Pillemer's subjects. Only three
of these subjects37.5%could report their whereabouts at
the time of the Reagan assassination attempt.
Of course, caution must be exercised in comparing absolute
performance levels across studies. However, the difference
between studies in the incidence of flashbulb memories is
sufficiently large to suggest that between the time of Pillemer's
(1984) study a few months after the assassination attempt on
Reagan, and the time of our study approximately 5 years
later, considerable forgetting of the circumstances of learning
about the assassination attempt occurred. (Note also that
Pillemer's data show a decline over the interval between the
1- and 7-month questionnaire in the percentage of subjects
who could report their location at the time of the assassination
attempt.) Thus, the assassination attempt data argue against
the claim that flashbulb memories are immune to forgetting.
4
Our results for the assassination attempt question also
provide further evidence that flashbulb memories may be
inaccurate. Of the 13 repeated-testing subjects who gave a
substantive response to the question on both the immediate
and 9-month questionnaires, 2 (15.4%) gave inconsistent
responses. For example, on the immediate questionnaire one
subject responded as follows:
I was in the Department of Hearing and Speech Sciences,
University o Specifically I was either in my office or
giving a speech therapy session when told. However, I can
really only picture myself in the videotape room watching the
assassination attempt on one of the video TV's. (That actually
seems like where I was when I first learned about it, but I
know that in reality I was only watching it at that time because
I had already heard about it and wanted to hear/see what
happened.)
On the 9-month questionnaire, the subject gave a somewhat
different answer:
I was rewinding a speech therapy tape in the TV room at the
Univ. of I believe it was in the morning (9:30-10:30)
and I was watching TV and saw the news flash right away after
it happened.
The television report, which the subject initially said she saw
after being told of the assassination attempt, is now remem-
bered as the original source of the news. Interestingly, at the
time of the initial account the watching of the television
report was apparently the most vivid part of the subject's
memory and seemed "like where I was when I first learned
about it." Note also that the second report corresponds more
closely than the first to the stereotype of a flashbulb memory:
The later account is more detailed and less tentative.
The subject was questioned again in June 1987, 8 months
after completing the 9-month questionnaire. At this time she
provided an account very similar to her 9-month report.
When she was then informed of her previous accounts, she
stated that she thought her initial reportthat someone else
told her of the assassination attemptwas incorrect, because
she was the one who told everyone else. She also provided
additional details, stating that she was in the TV room pre-
4
In October, 1982, Rubin and Kozin (1984) asked college students
whether they had flashbulb memory for several events, including the
Reagan assassination attempt. Fifty percent reported a flashbulb
memory for the assassination attempt. However, in Rubin and Ko-
zin's study the subject was first given a definition of a flashbulb
memory (e.g., "A flashbulb memory occurs when your brain 'takes a
picture' of an event. You have particularly vivid memories of these
events long after they occur. You tend to remember your surround-
ings in exceptional detail"; Rubin & Kozin, 1984, p. 85), and was
then asked for each of the events whether his or her memory for the
event was a flashbulb memory. Thus, the Rubin and Kozin procedure
defines a much higher criterion than our procedure, or that of Pillemer
(1984). Presumably, to report a flashbulb memory for the Reagan
assassination attempt, a subject in Rubin and Kozin's study not only
had to remember the circumstances in which he or she learned of the
event, but had to remember these circumstances vividly and in
exceptional detail. Consequently, Rubin and Kozin's results cannot
be compared directly with either our results or Pillemer's.
FLASHBULB MEMORY 177
paring to videotape an upcoming session with a client. Fur-
ther, she said, she clearly remembered the client, a 12-year-
old boy with a fluency disorder whom she always saw on
Wednesdays. However, reference to a calendar indicated that
Reagan was shot on a Monday. Furthermore, a check of
speech therapy records revealed that whereas the assassination
attempt occurred in the spring of 1981, the client our subject
clearly remembers working with on the day of the incident
was someone she first met the following fall.
Discussion
In probing subjects' memories for the circumstances of
learning about the space shuttle explosion and the Reagan
assassination attempt, our principal aim was to assess the
strong claims that flashbulb memories are complete, accurate,
vivid, and immune to forgetting. In the following sections we
discuss these claims in light of our results and the results of
previous studies.
Accuracy and immunity to forgetting. Our data clearly
indicate that flashbulb memories are neither uniformly ac-
curate nor immune to forgetting. The results suggest that like
other memories, memories for the circumstances of learning
about a surprising, consequential event are subject to recon-
structive errors, and to a decline over time in the amount of
information that can be retrieved from memory.
In contrast, most previous studies of flashbulb memory
(e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1977; Colegrove, 1899; Pillemer, 1984;
Yarmey & Bull, 1978) have emphasized the longevity of the
memories, and have assumed that they are accurate. However,
the procedures used in these studies were simply not adequate
to detect forgetting and inaccuracy. With the exception of
Pillemer's (1984) study, previous flashbulb memory studies
have probed subjects' memories only once, long after the
event or events of interest. These studies have found that high
proportions of subjects can report at least some information
about the circumstances in which they learned of surprising,
consequential events. This finding, which constitutes the ma-
jor empirical basis for claims about the characteristics of
flashbulb memories, was also obtained in the present study:
Nine months after the space shuttle explosion, all of our
subjects could report some information about the circum-
stances in which they learned of the event. However, the
ability of subjects to report at least some information about
the circumstances of learning about an event does not dem-
onstrate that their memories for these circumstances are im-
mune to forgetting; whatever information subjects report on
a questionnaire may be far less than they could have reported
at an earlier time. This is especially true when, as we found
(see also Pillemer, 1984, p. 71), subjects' reports are often
vague and general. Furthermore, as Neisser (1982) has argued,
and our findings amply illustrate, the ability of subjects to
provide accounts of the circumstances in which they learned
of surprising, consequential events does not ensure that these
accounts are accurate.
Pillemer questioned subjects twice about the assassination
attempt on Reagan, 1 month and 7 months after the event.
He reported a high incidence of flashbulb memories, and
emphasized that subjects' reports were quite consistent over
the 6-month interval between questionnaires. However, Pil-
lemcr's results are actually quite consistent with our findings,
and support our conclusion that flashbulb memories are
subject to forgetting and inaccuracy. With regard to forgetting,
the percentage of subjects who responded "yes" when asked
if they recalled the circumstances in which they learned of the
assassination attempt declined over the 6-month interval be-
tween Pillemer's 1- and 7-month questionnaires. Further-
more, even among the subjects who responded "yes" on both
questionnaires, the mean number of canonical informational
categories and the mean number of words provided in free
reports of recollections decreased over the interval between
questionnaires, as did the mean number of substantive re-
sponses to specific questions concerning the canonical cate-
gories. With regard to inaccuracy, comparison of 1-month
and 7-month responses to the six specific questions about
canonical information categories revealed inconsistency for
an average of 1.12 of the 6 responses per subject (19%).
Completeness. The strong claims about characteristics of
flashbulb memories hold that the flashbulb-memory mecha-
nism creates a detailed record of all material to which the
individual was attending immediately before, during, and
immediately after learning of the event in question. This
claim is entirely without empirical support, in part because
the criteria that researchers have used to classify a memory as
a flashbulb memory are orders of magnitude weaker than the
claim would appear to require. Typically, a subject is classified
as having a flashbulb memory for an event if the subject
answers "yes" to a question of the form, "Do you recall the
circumstances in which you first heard of [event]?", and
provides any information in at least one of the six canonical
informational categories defined by Brown and Kulik (1977;
i.e., place, ongoing event, informant, own affect, affect in
others, aftermath). Even if we ignore problems associated with
potential inaccuracy in subjects' reports, these criteria ob-
viously fail to ensure that a memory classified as a flashbulb
memory is a detailed record of the individual's conscious
experience around the time of learning about the event in
question. The subject is not required to report information in
all of the categories (which in any event were not selected on
the basis of an analysis of the sorts of information the posited
mechanism should record), or to provide detailed information
in any category. Thus, for example, a subject whose report of
the circumstances in which she learned of the Kennedy assas-
sination consisted solely of the statement "I was at work" (or
perhaps even "I was in Baltimore"; see Winograd & Killinger,
1983) would be scored as having a flashbulb memory.
The weakness of the classification criteria might be of little
consequence if subjects typically provided accounts that were
far more detailed and complete than required to meet the
criteria. However, this does not appear to be the case. In the
Brown and Kulik (1977) study, for example, subjects gave
free reports of their recollections about 10 different events.
The mean number of informational categories per report
ranged from 1.6 to 5.6 across the 10 events; for most events
the mean was less than 3. Thus, subjects did not uniformly
or even typically provide information in all six categories.
Even when subjects provide information in a category, the
information may be very vague and general. For example,
178 M. McCLOSKEY, C. WIBLE, AND N. COHEN
Pillemer (1984) noted that his subjects' substantive responses
to questions about canonical information categories were
often "short and unspecific" (Pillemer, 1984, p. 71). As dis-
cussed earlier this was also true in the present study. Thus,
the available data provide no basis for the claim that memories
for the circumstances of learning about surprising, consequen-
tial events preserve the contents of awareness for a period
extending from shortly before to shortly after learning of the
event.
Of course, vague, incomplete responses to questionnaire
items do not necessarily imply vague, incomplete memories;
subjects may not report all of the details they recall when
writing answers to questionnaire items. However, this point
in no way alters the fact that the completeness claim is entirely
without empirical support. Furthermore, several observations
suggest that incompleteness is a characteristic not merely of
subjects' questionnaire reports but also of the information
they can recall. First, the "don't remember" responses given
by some of our subjects to specific questionnaire items (e.g.,
What were you doing when you first learned of the explosion?;
see Table 2) cannot readily be explained in terms of mere
failure to report remembered details. Furthermore, in the
interviews we conducted to follow up ambiguous question-
naire responses and to pursue apparent inconsistencies in the
seminar discussion of flashbulb memories for the shuttle
explosion, we encountered numerous instances in which in-
dividuals failed to remember, or were uncertain about, various
aspects of the circumstances of learning about the explosion
of the space shuttle. Finally, it is clear to us that our own
flashbulb memories for the shuttle explosion, although gen-
erally quite detailed, have significant gaps. For example, Mi-
chael McCloskey remembers learning of the explosion when
two colleagues came into his office around lunchtime, but
cannot recall what he was doing when they walked in, or even
which of them told him the news. Neal Cohen recalls that he
learned of the explosion when someone listening to the radio
shouted out the news, but does not remember whether he saw
the person who shouted, or only heard the voice. Further,
although Cohen remembers speaking to some other people
immediately after learning of the explosion, he cannot re-
member who they were. Many of our other flashbulb mem-
ories, especially those for less recent events, are considerably
more fragmentary. Similarly, Brown and Kulik (1977, p. 75)
describe lacunae in their flashbulb memories for the assassi-
nation of President Kennedy.
It might be suggested that gaps in individuals' recollections
reflect forgetting, and not incompleteness in the originally
created memories. However, from the perspective of the
strong claims about the characteristics of flashbulb memories
this would constitute a step from the frying pan into the fire:
In the attempt to save the completeness claim, the claim of
immunity to forgetting is sacrificed. Alternatively, it might be
argued that details missing from flashbulb memories are
details that simply were not among the contents of awareness
at the time of learning about the event in question, and so
were never recorded by the special flashbulb memory mech-
anism. However, this argument is thoroughly unpersuasive;
for example, it is hard to argue that McCloskey was unaware
of which of his two colleagues told him of the shuttle explo-
sion, or that Cohen was unaware of the identities of the people
to whom he spoke just after learning of the explosion. Thus,
the claim that flashbulb memories preserve a complete rep-
resentation of the contents of awareness around the time of
learning about a surprising, consequential event is not only
unsupported, but in fact difficult to maintain in the face of
the available evidence.
Vividness. Most discussions of flashbulb memory repeat-
edly emphasize that these memories are exceptionally vivid
(e.g., Brown & Kulik, 1978; Pillemer, 1984; Winograd &
Killinger, 1983; Yarmey & Bull, 1978). For example, Brown
and Kulik (1977) suggested that flashbulb memories for Pres-
ident Kennedy's assassination almost always have "a primary,
'live' quality that is almost perceptual" (p. 74). Hence, vivid-
ness has been treated as another attribute that distinguishes
flashbulb memories from memories produced by ordinary
mechanisms. However, once again the available data fail to
motivate this claim; the criteria used by researchers to classify
memories as flashbulb memories have typically not included
any requirement that the memories be vivid. Furthermore,
Rubin and Kozin (1984) have found that memories involving
surprising, consequential events are not often among those
reported by subjects who are asked to describe their most
vivid memories.
To summarize, we have shown that contrary to the strong
claims of accuracy and immunity to forgetting, flashbulb
memories are subject to inaccuracy and forgetting. Moreover,
we have argued that claims of completeness and vividness
are, at best, entirely without empirical support. We conclude,
therefore, that the strong claims about characteristics of flash-
bulb memories cannot be offered as grounds for postulating
a special flashbulb-memory mechanism.
A potential counterargument. Our conclusions might be
called into question on grounds that we have failed to separate
the wheat from the chaff in our data. Specifically, it might be
argued that the special flashbulb-memory mechanism does
not "fire" for everyone at the time of learning about an event
such as the space shuttle explosion or even the assassination
of President Kennedy; for some individuals the criterial levels
of surprise and consequentiality may not be achieved. Thus,
the data on which our conclusions are based may constitute
a mixture of some memories created by the special flashbulb-
memory mechanism and some memories created by ordinary
memory mechanisms. If this were the case, it would not be
surprising that the data show some inaccuracies, gaps, and
decreases over time in the amount of information that could
be reported. These findings would simply reflect the fact that
some subjects with memories created by ordinary memory
mechanisms were mixed with subjects having complete, ac-
curate, vivid, and permanent memories created by the special
flashbulb-memory mechanism.
This "wheat versus chaff" argument does not stand up to
scrutiny. First, simply to dismiss as products of ordinary
memory mechanisms any memories that do not evidence the
characteristics posited on the strong construal of the special-
mechanism hypothesis serves only to render the claim that
flashbulb memories have these characteristics entirely circu-
lar. The argument merits serious consideration only if criteria
independent of claims about characteristics of flashbulb mem-
FLASHBULB MEMORY 179
ones can be specified for distinguishing true flashbulb mem-
ories (i.e., memories created by the presumed special mecha-
nism) from memories created by ordinary memory mecha-
nisms. It might of course be suggested that flashbulb and
ordinary memories could be distinguished by assessing for
each individual subject whether the subject experienced high
levels of surprise and consequentiality. However, it has not
been demonstrated that assessments of surprise and conse-
quentiality (or any other criteria) would in fact partition
memories into two distinct classes, one made up of true
flashbulb memories that are complete, accurate, and immune
to forgetting, and the other of ordinary memories that evi-
dence gaps, forgetting, and inaccuracy. In the absence of such
a demonstration the wheat versus chaff argument represents,
at best, a promissory note.
5
A second problem is that the argument offers no response
whatever to one of our two major points. We asserted not
only that our results provide evidence against some of the
strong claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories, but
also that even the data usually taken as support for these
claims fail to motivate them. Even if the present data (or, for
that matter, any other data showing inaccuracy and forgetting)
could be dismissed as reflecting memory representations cre-
ated by ordinary memory mechanisms, the strong claims
about characteristics of flashbulb memories would remain
unsupported: One will search the flashbulb-memory literature
in vain for data demonstrating completeness, accuracy, viv-
idness, and immunity to forgetting for a single memory in a
single individual.
Weaker Claims as a Basis for the Special-Mechanism
Hypothesis
Given that the strong claims about characteristics of flash-
bulb memories are untenable, we may ask whether postula-
tion of a special mechanism can be motivated on the basis of
weaker claims. Consider, then, the following formulation of
the special-mechanism hypothesis: People can often provide,
months or years after a surprising and consequential event,
reasonably detailed, accurate, and vivid reports of the circum-
stances in which they learned about the event. Although
imperfect, recall seems far better than would be expected if it
were based upon memories created by ordinary memory
mechanisms, and so points to the operation of a special
flashbulb-memory mechanism.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that these weaker
claims about the characteristics of flashbulb memories are
defensible. Given this assumption, the central question is
whether these characteristics clearly distinguish flashbulb
memories from memories produced by ordinary memory
mechanisms. To address this question we need to know what
the special-mechanism hypothesis claims about the character-
istics of memories produced by ordinary memory mecha-
nisms, and we need to know the basis for the claims.
Brown and Kulik (1977) and Pillemer (1984) seem to have
assumed that memories for the circumstances of learning
about surprising, consequential events would, if created by
ordinary memory mechanisms, be just like (i.e., just as poor
as) memories for the humdrum circumstances of everyday
life. Pillemer, for example, made the following statement:
What is remembered about personal circumstances (as op-
posed to the actual newsworthy event) often is inconsequential,
and is really nothing to recount to others (unless a psychologist
happens by). Why these mundane, private experiences are
remembered at all is what was in need of explanation in the
first place. (Pillemer, 1984, p. 77, italics added)
This conclusion appears to reflect a tendency to view the
circumstances of learning about a newsworthy event from
within a framework that focuses narrowly on the event itself.
Within this framework the circumstances of learning about
the event are seen as incidental (relative to the central infor-
mation about the event itself), and the significance of these
circumstances is evaluated by applying the criteria used to
assess the significance of the event itself. This perspective is
illustrated clearly in a statement by Pillemer (1984):
But what information do these recollections [of learning about
a surprising, consequential event] convey? They do not portray
social or political consequences, but rather the individual's
own behaviors and reactions at the time. One's location upon
first hearing, what one was doing, how one found out, one's
feelingswhy are mundane personal circumstances so vividly
remembered years later? (Pillemer, 1984, p. 65)
Viewed in this way, the circumstances of learning about a
newsworthy event do indeed seem inconsequential and non-
memorable.
If we view matters from a slightly different perspective,
however, it is no longer obvious that ordinary memory mech-
anisms would yield very poor memory for the circumstances
of learning about a surprising, consequential event. Learning
about such an event is itself an event: a personal experience.
For example, a memory of the circumstances of learning
about the space shuttle explosion is a memory for the expe-
rience of learning about the explosion. While the experience
5
There is some evidence to suggest that surprise and consequen-
tiality are correlated with amount of information remembered. For
example, Brown and Kulik (1977) found that the percentage of
subjects classified as having a flashbulb memory for an event, and
the number of canonical informational categories included in free
reports, were correlated with rated consequentiality. Furthermore,
Pillemer (1984) found that rated surprise (but not rated consequen-
tiality) was correlated with the number of canonical information
categories represented in subjects' free reports of the circumstances
of learning about the Reagan assassination attempt. However, these
findings obviously fall far short of establishing a discontinuity between
memories created under conditions in which both surprise and con-
sequentiality are high, and memories created under other conditions.
Furthermore, Ncisser (1982) and Winograd and Killinger (1983) have
pointed out that flashbulb-like memories occur for events that are
not surprising in the sense of being unexpected, such as the landing
on the moon in 1969, the resignation of Richard Nixon, or the death
of General Franco, and Pillemer (1984) noted that flashbulb memo-
ries for the assassination attempt on President Reagan occurred even
among subjects who rated the event as inconsequential. Finally,
Pillemer (1984) interpreted his results as suggesting a graded effect of
surprise or emotional reaction on the amount of information subjects
can remember, and not an all-or-none effect of the sort that might be
expected on the basis of the special-mechanism hypothesis.
180 M. McCLOSKEY, C. WIBLE, AND N. COHEN
of learning about a surprising, consequential event does not
have the same sort of public significance as the event itself, it
may nonetheless have personal significance for the individual.
For example, Neisser (1982) suggests that memories for the
circumstances of learning about newsworthy public events
perform the important function of tying one's personal "time
line" to the time line of public events: "They are the places
where we line up our own lives with the course of history
itself and say 'I was there.'" (Neisser, 1982, p. 48; see also
Brewer, 1986, and Rubin & Kozin, 1984.)
As well as being personally significant, experiences in which
one learns of a surprising, consequential event are likely to be
distinctive. For example, a meeting that is interrupted by the
announcement that the President of the United States has
been assassinated is, by virtue of the announcement alone, a
very unusual meeting. The significant departures from routine
that are likely to follow the announcement (e.g., the adjourn-
ment of the meeting, the seeking of additional information
from radio or television) may contribute further to the dis-
tinctiveness of the experience.
Other factors might also be mentioned in this context. For
example, experiences of learning about a surprising, conse-
quential event may be rehearsed covertly as one thinks about
the experience, or overtly as one recounts it to others (Neisser,
1982). Furthermore, experiences of learning about shocking
events are, at the least, interesting personal experiences: The
news itself, the shock we feel, the departures from routine
that ensue, and so forth, clearly render these experiences more
interesting than the mundane events of everyday life.
It is commonly accepted that the strength and durability of
memories produced by ordinary memory mechanisms are
influenced by factors such as the distinctiveness of the to-be-
remembered material, the interest and significance it holds
for the individual, and the extent to which it is rehearsed. If,
then, experiences in which one learns of a surprising, conse-
quential event are indeed more significant, distinctive, or
interesting than the commonplace experiences of everyday
life, or more often rehearsed, there is reason to expect that
ordinary mechanisms would yield considerably better mem-
ory for the former than for the latter. More generally, expe-
riences in which one learns about events may, as the events
themselves are increasingly surprising and consequential, be
increasingly significant, distinctive, and so forth, and therefore
increasingly memorable.
As soon as we recognize that ordinary memory mechanisms
would not necessarily yield very poor memory for the circum-
stances of learning about surprising, consequential events, we
can see that the weak version of the special-mechanism hy-
pothesis is in serious trouble. To the extent we accept that
ordinary memory mechanisms could support reasonably good
memory for experiences of learning about shocking events
(and note that reasonably good recall, and not perfect recall,
is what the weak claims assume), there is no need to postulate
a special flashbulb memory mechanism.
Of course, our analysis of what can be expected from
ordinary memory mechanisms is not beyond question. How-
ever, proponents of the special-mechanisms hypothesis clearly
carry the burden of demonstrating that ordinary memory
mechanisms could not support reasonably good memory for
the circumstances of learning about surprising, consequential
events. However, no such demonstration has been made.
A Conceptual Problem
In addition to inadequate empirical motivation, the special-
mechanism hypothesis suffers from a serious conceptual prob-
lem. Although studies of flashbulb memory have focused on
memory for the circumstances of learning about surprising,
consequential events, it has not been suggested that the flash-
bulb-memory mechanism evolved in response to a need to
record these circumstances. Rather, proponents of the special
mechanism hypothesis argue that the primary purpose of the
special mechanism is to record surprising, consequential
events in which the individual is directly involved (e.g., Brown
& Kulik, 1977, pp. 97-99; Pillemer, 1984, pp. 65-66). That
the mechanism also records the circumstances of learning
about surprising and consequential events is viewed as a
largely accidental consequence of the fact that high levels of
surprise and consequentiality may be associated not only with
direct involvement in important events, but also with the
learning about such events. For example, Brown and Kulik
(1977) stated that
What surely had to be printed neurologically and put in
permanent store was not the circumstances of an unexpected
and biologically significant event, but the event itself. To
survive and leave progeny, the individual human had to keep
his expectations of significant events up to date and close to
reality. A marked departure from the ordinary in a consequen-
tial domain would leave him unprepared to respond ade-
quately and endanger his survival. The "Now print!" mecha-
nism [i.e., the special flashbulb memory mechanism] must
have evolved because of the selection value of permanently
retaining biologically crucial, but unexpected events....
...Probably the same "Now print!" mechanism accounts both
for the enduring significant memories in which one has played
the role of protagonist and those in which one has only been
a member of an interested audience of millions. (Brown &
Kulik, 1977, pp. 97-99).
What is curious about this argument is the underlying
assumption that a special mechanism would be required for
individuals to remember very important events in which they
were directly involved. The need to remember such events is
certainly clear, but why would a special mechanism be re-
quired to do so? The implicit claim is that ordinary memory
mechanisms are so impoverished that they could not support
good memory for even the most important events in which
an individual is involved. This is an extraordinary claim,
much more radical and far less defensible than the claim that
ordinary mechanisms are not powerful enough to record the
circumstances surrounding our learning of surprising, conse-
quential events.
Concluding Remarks
In this article we have endeavored to assess the theoretical
implications of flashbulb memories. On the basis of empirical
observations and logical arguments, we have concluded that
claims about characteristics of flashbulb memories strong
FLASHBULB MEMORY 181
enough to motivate positing a special flashbulb-memory
mechanism are untenable, and that weaker, more defensible
claims do not provide sufficient grounds for asserting that
flashbulb memories are so special as to require postulation of
a special memory mechanism.
As an alternative to the special-mechanism hypothesis, we
have suggested that flashbulb memories may be viewed as
memories for significant and distinctive personal experiences,
and hence as memories explicable in terms of ordinary mem-
ory mechanisms. From this perspective, two final observations
may be offered. First, our viewpoint (see also Rubin & Kozin,
1984) suggests that the distinction between the flashbulb
memories and other sorts of autobiographical memories is an
artificial and arbitrary one. Memories for experiences of learn-
ing about surprising, consequential events are continuous in
their characteristics with other autobiographical memories,
and conform to the same principles. The experience of learn-
ing about an event may be more significant, distinctive, and
so forthand therefore more memorableas the event itself
is more surprising and consequential, but there is no qualita-
tive distinction to be drawn between memories for learning
about shocking, important events, and memories for learning
about expected, trivial events.
A related observation has to do with research on the flash-
bulb-memory phenomenon. By adopting as a starting point
the position that a special memory mechanism is required to
account for flashbulb memories, proponents of the special-
mechanism hypothesis have stressed the disconnection be-
tween these memories and more "ordinary" memories, thus
insulating the research from theory and data regarding normal
memory. In contrast, the present analysis has led us to em-
brace a view in which flashbulb memories fall squarely within
the domain of normal memory (see also Rubin & Kozin,
1984). Working within this framework, our conceptions of
flashbulb memories must be informed by data and theory
concerning normal memory; and conversely, the study of
flashbulb memories should help to illuminate our understand-
ing of normal memory.
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Received September 14, 1987
Revision received November 30, 1987
Accepted December 4, 1987