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54!&
7
54
0
an 547
"(
of the Civil
Code. Cndeed& the decision e2plicitl$ decreed that the re,and of the records of the case was for the
court of ori*in IFtGo deter,ine the ri*hts of the defendants-appellees under the aforesaid articleFsG of
the New Civil Code& and to render >ud*,ent thereon in accordance with the evidence and this
decision.I
A final and e2ecutor$ >ud*,ent ,a$ no lon*er -e ,odified in an$ respect& even if the ,odification is
,eant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will -e ,ade -$ the court that
rendered it or -$ the hi*hest court in the land.
""
The onl$ e2ceptions to this rule are the correction of
A"B clerical errors@ A'B the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no pre>udice to an$ part$& and
A%B void >ud*,ents.
"'
<ell-settled is the rule that there can -e no e2ecution until and unless the >ud*,ent has -eco,e
final and e2ecutor$& i.e. the period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal havin* -een taken& or&
havin* -een taken& the appeal has -een resolved and the records of the case have -een returned to
the court of ori*in& in which event& e2ecution shall issue as a ,atter of ri*ht.
"%
Cn short& once a
>ud*,ent -eco,es final& the winnin* part$ is entitled to a writ of e2ecution and the issuance thereof
-eco,es a court1s ,inisterial dut$.
"4
CIVIL LAW
5urther,ore& as a ,atter of settled le*al principle& a writ of e2ecution ,ust adhere to ever$ essential
particulars of the >ud*,ent sou*ht to -e e2ecuted.
"5
An order of e2ecution ,a$ not var$ or *o
-e$ond the terns of the >ud*,ent it seeks to enforce.
"!
A writ of e2ecution ,ust confor, to the
>ud*,ent and if it is different fro,& *oes -e$ond or varies the tenor of the >ud*,ent which *ives it
life& it is a nullit$.
"
)therwise stated& when the order of e2ecution and the correspondin* writ issued
pursuant thereto is not in har,on$ with and e2ceeds the >ud*,ent which *ives it life& the$ have pro
tanto no validit$
"7
? to ,aintain otherwise would -e to i*nore the constitutional provision a*ainst
deprivin* a person of his propert$ without due process of law.
"0
As aptl$ pointed out -$ the appellate court& fro, the inception of Civil Case No. 00-'(-"'& it was
alread$ of >udicial notice that the i,prove,ents introduced -$ petitioners on the liti*ated propert$ are
residential houses not fa,il$ ho,es. /elatedl$ interposin* such an e2traneous issue at such a late
sta*e of the proceedin* is tanta,ount to interferin* with and var$in* the ter,s of the final and
e2ecutor$ >ud*,ent and a violation of respondents1 ri*ht to due process -ecause ?
As a *eneral rule& points of law& theories and issues not -rou*ht to the attention of the trial court
cannot -e raised for the first ti,e on appeal. 5or a contrar$ rule would -e unfair to the adverse part$
who would have no opportunit$ to present further evidence ,aterial to the new theor$& which it could
have done had it -een aware of if at the ti,e of the hearin* -efore the trial court.
'(
l awphil .net
The refusal& therefore& of the trial court to enforce the e2ecution on the *round that the
i,prove,ents introduced on the liti*ated propert$ are fa,il$ ho,es *oes -e$ond the pale of what it
had -een e2pressl$ tasked to do& i.e. its ,inisterial dut$ of e2ecutin* the >ud*,ent in accordance
with its essential particulars. The fore*oin* factual& le*al and >urisprudential scenario reduces the
raisin* of the issue of whether or not the i,prove,ents introduced -$ petitioners are fa,il$ ho,es
into a ,ere afterthou*ht.
=ven s;uarel$ addressin* the issue of whether or not the i,prove,ents introduced -$ petitioners on
the su->ect land are fa,il$ ho,es will not e2tricate the, fro, their predica,ent.
As defined& IFTGhe fa,il$ ho,e is a sacred s$,-ol of fa,il$ love and is the repositor$ of cherished
,e,ories that last durin* one1s lifeti,e.
'"
Ct is the dwellin* house where the hus-and and wife& or an
un,arried head of a fa,il$ reside& includin* the land on which it is situated.
''
Ct is constituted >ointl$
-$ the hus-and and the wife or -$ an un,arried head of a fa,il$.I
'%
Article "5% of the 5a,il$ Code
provides that ?
The fa,il$ ho,e is dee,ed constituted fro, the ti,e it is occupied as a fa,il$ residence. 5ro, the
ti,e of its constitution and so lon* as an$ of its -eneficiaries actuall$ resides therein& the fa,il$
ho,e continues to -e such and is e2e,pt fro, e2ecution& forced sale or attach,ent e2cept as
hereinafter provided and to the e2tent of the value allowed -$ law.
The actual value of the fa,il$ ho,e shall not e2ceed& at the ti,e of its constitution& the a,ount of
:%((&(((.(( in ur-an areas and :'((&(((.(( in rural areas.
'4
Jnder the afore-;uoted provision& a
fa,il$ ho,e is dee,ed constituted on a house and a lot fro, the ti,e it is occupied as a fa,il$
residence. There is no need to constitute the sa,e >udiciall$ or e2tra->udiciall$.
'5
There can -e no ;uestion that a fa,il$ ho,e is *enerall$ e2e,pt fro, e2ecution&
'!
provided it was
dul$ constituted as such. Ct is likewise a *iven that the fa,il$ ho,e ,ust -e constituted on propert$
owned -$ the persons constitutin* it. Cndeed as pointed out in Kelle$& 9r. v. :lanters :roducts&
Cnc.
'
IFTGhe fa,il$ ho,e ,ust -e part of the properties of the a-solute co,,unit$ or the con>u*al
partnership& or of the e2clusive properties of either spouse with the latter1s consent& or on the
propert$ of the un,arried head of the fa,il$.I
'7
Cn other words4
CIVIL LAW
The fa,il$ ho,e ,ust -e esta-lished on the properties of AaB the a-solute co,,unit$& or A-B the
con>u*al partnership& or AcB the e2clusive propert$ of either spouse with the consent of the other. Ct
cannot -e esta-lished on propert$ held in co-ownership with third persons. 8owever& it can -e
esta-lished partl$ on co,,unit$ propert$& or con>u*al propert$ and partl$ on the e2clusive propert$
of either spouse with the consent of the latter.1avvphi1
Cf constituted -$ an un,arried head of a fa,il$& where there is no co,,unal or con>u*al propert$
e2istin*& it can -e constituted onl$ on his or her own propert$.
'0
A=,phasis and italics suppliedB
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. 5or all their ar*u,ents to the contrar$& the
stark and i,,uta-le fact is that the propert$ on which their alle*ed fa,il$ ho,e stands is owned -$
respondents and the ;uestion of ownership had -een lon* laid to rest with the finalit$ of the
appellate court1s >ud*,ent in CA-G.R. CV No. 55'(. Thus& petitioners1 continued sta$ on the
su->ect land is onl$ -$ ,ere tolerance of respondents.
All told& it is too late in the da$ for petitioners to raise this issue. <ithout dou-t& the instant case
where the fa,il$ ho,e issue has -een vi*orousl$ pursued -$ petitioners is -ut a clear-cut plo$
,eant to forestall the enforce,ent of an otherwise final and e2ecutor$ decision. The e2ecution of a
final >ud*,ent is a ,atter of ri*ht on the part of the prevailin* part$ whose i,ple,entation is
,andator$ and ,inisterial on the court or tri-unal issuin* the >ud*,ent.
%(
The ,ost i,portant phase of an$ proceedin* is the e2ecution of >ud*,ent.
%"
)nce a >ud*,ent
-eco,es final& the prevailin* part$ should not& throu*h so,e clever ,aneuvers devised -$ an
unsportin* loser& -e deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
%'
An un>ustified dela$ in the enforce,ent of a
>ud*,ent sets at nau*ht the role of courts in disposin* of >usticia-le controversies with
finalit$.
%%
5urther,ore& a >ud*,ent if not e2ecuted would >ust -e an e,pt$ victor$ for the prevailin*
part$ -ecause e2ecution is the fruit and end of the suit and ver$ aptl$ called the life of the law.
%4
The issue is ,oreover factual and& to repeat that trite refrain& the .upre,e Court is not a trier of
facts. Ct is not the function of the Court to review& e2a,ine and evaluate or wei*h the pro-ative value
of the evidence presented. A ;uestion of fact would arise in such event. Luestions of fact cannot -e
raised in an appeal via certiorari -efore the .upre,e Court and are not proper for its
consideration.
%5
The rationale -ehind this doctrine is that a review of the findin*s of fact of the
appellate tri-unal is not a function this Court nor,all$ undertakes. The Court will not wei*h the
evidence all over a*ain unless there is a showin* that the findin*s of the lower court are totall$
devoid of support or are clearl$ erroneous so as to constitute serious a-use of discretion.
%!
Althou*h
there are reco*ni3ed e2ceptions
%
to this rule& none e2ists in this case to >ustif$ a departure therefro,.
<8=R=5)R=& the petition is D=NC=D. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated #a$ %"& '(( in
CA-G.R. CV No. !55 declarin* respondents entitled to the writ of e2ecution and orderin*
petitioners to vacate the su->ect propert$& as well as the Resolution dated .epte,-er '"& '((
den$in* the ,otion for reconsideration& are A55CR#=D. Costs a*ainst petitioners.
.) )RD=R=D.
-oncepcion #s -a
Facts:
Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa Almonte were married on December 29, 1989.
They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to
Jose Gerardo.
CIVIL LAW
On December 19, 1991, Gerardo fled a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never
annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage was a
sham and that she have never lived with Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and
subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo to be
an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted
visitation rights. Also, it allowed the child to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for the reverse of the courts decisions. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her frst
marriage considering the fact that the second marriage was void from the beginning. Therefore, the
child Jose Gerardo under the law is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
Gerardo Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the decision.
Issue:
Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Gerardo.
Held:
The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and fliation of a child cannot be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family Code which
states, A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. It is fully
supported by Art. 167 of the Family Code which states, The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy.
It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent ofspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became
her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child. The minor
cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even
much less, the supposed father. In fne, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate
or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. It should be
what the law says and not what a parent says it is. Additionally, public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and fliation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those
who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
CIVIL LAW
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. Also, there
being no such parent-child relationship between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no legally
demandable right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae afords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially signifcant where, as in this
case, the issue concerns their fliation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage. The child, by
reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth. In case of assault on his rights by those who
take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-
minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.