UNDERSTANDING THE PAST TO MAKE THE FUTURE:

REFLECTIONS ON ALLENDES GOVERNMENT

MARTA HARNECKER
JUNE 5
TH
,2003
(HISTORICAL MATERIALISM: RESEARCH IN CRITICAL MARXIST THEORY,
VOL.11, NO.3, AUTUMN 2003)
1. Thirty years after the September 11
th
that Latin America will always remember, we need to ask
ourselves what lessons we can learn from the Chilean experience.
1

. !n September 1"#$ somethin% occurred which deeply moved the Left in %eneral, and the Latin
American Left in particular& the electoral victory of Salvador Allende in Chile. !t was the first time
in the history of the 'estern world that a (arxist candidate had %ained the )residency throu%h the
ballot box.
*. !n facin% this victory, the opposition forces had the followin% alternative& they could either
respect the simple ma+ority ,Allende had only *- per cent of the votes., as traditionally had been
done in Chile, or they could impede, by any means necessary, the (arxist candidate from assumin%
%overnment. The most conservative forces in Chile tried to put this last option into practice. They
initially tried to %et Con%ress to elect their own candidate ,and runner up with a second relative
ma+ority. /or%e Alessandri, into the )residency.

!n pursuin% this ob+ective they resorted to various
tactics& a run on banks, the expatriation of 0S dollars, a campai%n of fear, abandonment of
companies and so on.
1. 2or their part, the 32re4sta5
*
sector 6 the more conservative sector of the centrist Christian
7emocracy ,Democracia Cristiana, 7C. was also very tempted to follow this road. 8owever,
they understood with %reat lucidity that the collapse of this tradition would brin% the country to
chaos and civil war, and so the ma+ority of the party chose to respect the winner. To have voted for
Alessandri in Con%ress would have sent a messa%e to over a third of the Chilean population that the
democratic and electoral roads were closed to them and that they should think instead of violence
and the route of insurrection. 9ut this support for )opular 0nity ,0)
1
. was not for free: its price was
that the Allende %overnment accept the Statute of Constitutional ;uarantees, throu%h which the
%overnment promised not to touch the armed forces, the educational system and the media.
<. 'hile this a%reement was reached, a sector of the ultra6ri%ht dedicated its ener%ies to plottin%
a%ainst Allende5s victory, brin%in% to%ether diverse political sectors of the opposition , elements of
1. !n writin% this article ! have combined information about Allende=s experience from my book Making Possible the
Impossible: The Left in the Threshold of the 21th Century ,forthcomin% from >ed 9ooks. and a text prepared for a
book about the film The Battle of Chile by )atricio ;u?m@n ,1"#<. and subseAuently published partially as La lucha de
un pueblo sin armas: los tres aos de gobierno popular in the Chilean +ournal Enuentro !!I ,1""<. 1: 3, pp. 169-
175; 1: 4, pp. 131-140; 2: 5, pp. 160-177.
2. !n Chile a candidate can be elected without the absolute ma+ority of the votes, as lon% as he is ratified by )arliament.
Thou%h the tradition has always been to ratify the candidate with the relative ma+ority, would that tradition be re+ected
with the election of AllendeB
3. After the former Christian 7emocratic )resident Cduardo 2rei.
4. Coalition formed by the Socialist )arty, the Communist )arty, the Dadical )arty, the (A)0 and the Christian Left.
,These two last ones were part of the Christian 7emocracy..
249224447 1
the armed forces and of the out%oin% %overnment. Spurred on by the attempted murder of the pro6
constitutional commander of the Army, ;eneral DenE Schneider, the victorious 0)coalition focused
part of its national campai%n on %ainin% the support of the armed forces on the basis of its
constitutional character.
The "P #ffensi$e
#. 7espite this opposition, Allende assumed office with the support of the Christian 7emocratic
)arty on Fovember 1, 1"#$, thus inau%uratin% a new period in the history of the country. The
%overnment immediately moved onto the offensive.
G. !n order to carry out the structural transformations outlined in its electoral pro%ram, the new
%overnment drew on some important le%al instruments available to the State& the Law of Land
Deform approved durin% the 2rei %overnment, despite its limitations allowed the new %overnment to
advance Auickly in the expropriation of bi% latifundios.
". 0sin% a an existin% 7ecree ,passed in Au%ust 1"* under the short6lived Socialist Depublic. to
avoid probable mutilation of their pro%ramme by the parliamentary opposition
<
, the minority 0)
%overnment took the initial steps toward the socialisation of property& on 7ecember , the
expropriation of the first company, the 9ellavista textile factory, was announced. The Lanera
Austral factory followed on # /anuary as did 2!A)6TomE and 2abrilana on 11 (arch 1"#1.
1$. After the unanimous approval by Con%ress of a Constitutional reform allowin% the
nationali?ation of copper and other basic natural resources, the bi% forei%n companies were also
expropriated without compensation.
11. Hn other fronts, the attempt at restructurin% the +udicial system in order to establish
nei%hbourhood tribunals produced the first %reat reaction of the Di%ht. The 0) decided to back
away from this initiative and it was put aside forever.
1. 7urin% the same period, however, the 0) %overnment5s economic strate%y was broadly
achieved. There was a considerable redistribution of income: %overnment economic policy yielded
risin% production whilst unemployment I which had previously reached alarmin% levels 6 fell
si%nificantly. !n the area of finance the %overnment advanced less& there, the resistance of bank
employees controlled by the 7C hindered the creation of a unified bank system.
1*. The %overnment also pushed forward an international political offensive restorin% relationships
with Cuba and be%innin% the relationships for the first time with China, Forth Jorea, Forth
Kietnam, Cast ;ermany and other communist states. The new %overnment %ained the respect and
sympathy of international opinion at a moment when the Curopean Left was lookin% for a
democratic road to socialism. !f the Cuban Devolution fortified the position of those who advocated
armed revolutionary stru%%le, the triumph of Allende vindicated those who defended the peaceful
path.
11. The experience was short6lived, however, as Allende lasted little more than three years.
2ollowin% his election, many people lost si%ht of the fact that it was the %overnment, but not power
itself, that had been won by Allende. The le%islative and +udicial powers were still under the
control of the opposition, as well as the fundamental pillar of the bour%eois State 6 the armed forces
6 which remained intact, and were protected by the so6called Statute of Constitutional ;uarantees.
5. 8u%o >emelman y )atricio LeLn, 3Cl comportamiento de la bur%ues4a chilena en el primer aMo del %obierno de la
0nidad )opular5, Revista de Sociologa% 1, Au%ust 1"#, p.1.
249224447 2
1<.The %overnment5s offensive found a fractionali?ed opposition, weakened politically by its
electoral defeat in September and its frustrated coup attempt in Hctober. They had two options& to
try to overthrow the 0) %overnment once a%ain or to %rind it down %radually so as to win the
presidential elections in 1"#-.
1-. 'hile the Di%ht debated different strate%ies, the popularity of the %overnment in this period
increased considerably as a result of its successful economic policies. The elections of April 1"#1
demonstrated this& in only five months, the 0) increased its share of the vote from *- to 1" per
cent. !n retrospect this was, without a doubt, the most favorable moment to have approved a
referendum authorisin% the creation of a Constituent Assembly mandated to elaborate a new
Constitution. !n order to advance alon% the le%al, peaceful road to socialism, it was essential for the
0) to chan%e the rules of the institutional %ame. !n the event, 0) chose not to take the risk.
1#. 7urin% these years, the country lived in a climate of revolution and profound transformation.
(any Chileans were full of hope and felt themselves to be masters of their own destiny. !t was a
dan%erous example not only to the powerful in Chile but to the rest of the world as well. 2or them,
this new paradi%m had to be defeated.
1G. The Di%ht, keepin% in mind the possibility of a military coup, made its strate%ic ob+ective to
thwart, by all possible means, the coalition of political and social forces that would %ive Allende a
parliamentary ma+ority and would allow him to transform society throu%h the le%islative process.
The principal political force amon% the opposition were the Christian 7emocrats, who had their
fundamental social support amon% the middle class, certain sectors of the workin% class, and the
urban poor. The murder of )Ere? >u+ovic
-
at the hands of former 0) militants in /une 1"#1,
however, would prove to be a %ift for the Di%ht, as it allowed the 32re4sta5 sector of the 7C to
recover the leadership of the party.
The Contraditions of &tate Po'er
1". Hn balance, we can say of this early period that, despite the considerable advances carried out
by the %overnment, the popular sectors appear as mere spectators and supporters of the
transformative process. The Committees of )opular 0nity, which had experienced an extraordinary
development durin% the pre6electoral period, mainly disappeared after the victory. The parties
devoted all their cadres to the new %overnment tasks, abandonin% to a si%nificant extent their work
in the popular movements.
$. Apart from the mobilisations to support the %overnment, the only important mobilisations
durin% this period were those carried out the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria ,(!D,
Devolutionary Left (ovement.
#
amon% the Mapuche natives in the territories of Caut4n and
Kaldivia, to recover lands expropriated from them in the past.
1. The popular %overnment5s publicly6announced decision not to use repression a%ainst workers
stimulated further similar actions. As the latter ne%atively affected small and medium peasants,
they broke with the a%rarian strate%y of the 0) which initially sou%ht to attack only the bi%
latifundistas. The ultra6ri%ht ma%nified these actions and took advanta%e of them in launchin% its
campai%n of dele%itimisation a%ainst the %overnment and mobilisin% important sectors of the rural
and urban middle classes a%ainst the %overnment by presentin% it as the enemy of private property.
6 2ormer (inister of the !nterior in 2rei5s Christian 7emocratic %overnment and hi%hly influential member of the
Christian 7emocratic party.
7.An extra6parliamentary politico6military or%ani?ation inspired by the Cuban Devolution, which was outside the )opular
0nity coalition.
249224447 3
. Hn the other hand, the first serious diver%ences arose inside the 0) when the first important
initiative involvin% popular participation 6 the creation of the Communal )easant Councils I was
activated in 7ecember 1"#$.
*. Hne %roup conceived these councils as rural or%ani?ations at a national level that would contain
a multiplicity of existin% rural or%ani?ations ,trades unions, cooperatives and asentados 6
or%ani?ations of peasants who had repossessed their land.. Hthers saw some problems in this way of
or%ani?in% the councils. They ar%ued that it excluded the or%anisations of small, independent
proprietors and other sectors in the country still not formally or%ani?ed, and %ave supremacy in
these councils to the 7C, as this party controlled two of the three peasant union federations and the
federation of asentados whilst the Left, especially the Communist )arty, controlled only one union
federation.
1. Net another %roup, a%reein% with the (!D, insisted in the formation of the Communal Councils
by the %rassroots, which would allow, in principle, the incorporation of the whole peasantry I
includin% the non6or%ani?ed sectors6 and to break the dominance of 7C in the rural or%ani?ations.
The problems of last this position were twofold& first, the difficulty in havin% a truly democratic
%rassroots election without political manipulation by the parties and, second 6and most seriously6
the division of the peasantry, as in reality the non60) sectors were excluded from the Communal
Councils.
<. After several months of discussion the leadership of the 0) reached an a%reement, but, despite
this, the character of each council came to depend on the orientation that each party %ave them, thus
resultin% in the further division amon% the proletarian peasantry. !n addition, the loss of support of
an important sector of small and medium landowners prevented the 0) from %ainin% the massive
support of the peasantry. Thus, despite the notable advances in a%rarian reform, the main ally of the
workin% class was not won over to the extent that had been anticipated.
-. This period of offense amon% revolutionary forces also lay bare the limits of the Chilean
bour%eois State and its le%ality. Cxcessive centralism prevented initiatives and decision6makin% at
the local level. 'ithout economic resources, local initiatives remained dreams. The ma+ority of the
cadres of the bureaucratic apparatus and other or%anisms of the State were not involved in the day6
today chan%es and the %overnment controlled only the hi%her echelons of the State.
#. 0nder the existin% Constitution, the Contralora ,the hi%hest +udicial entity of the State. had the
power to determine what was constitutional and what was not. !t re+ected the idea of creatin%
centers of power outside the State structure, thereby denyin% the possibility of le%ali?in% the
)easant Communal Councils. !t only approved a pro+ect which reduced their role to a mere advisory
role to the State5s a%ricultural or%anisms. The same happened later on with the le%ali?ation of the
Councils of Supply and )rices ,/untas de Abastecimientos y )recios
G
. created to fi%ht a%ainst the
black market and inflation.
G. )olitical 3Auotas5 proved to be an additional problem. Cach party within the 0) demanded a
certain number of positions in the public administration for its own members so that each ministry,
each or%anism of the State, was expected to reproduce the representation of all the parties in the 0).
This idea, which was intended to produce an inte%rated leadership within each or%anism, in reality
produced the opposite. As there was no unified leadership of the political process, each party made
its own policy. The inefficiency of the bour%eois State was accentuated by the absence of a common
approach in each ministry and within each administrative or%anism.
8. ;roups of people that or%ani?ed themselves to control prices.
249224447 4
". 2urthermore, in order to fulfill their Auotas, each party named candidates who often did not have
the reAuisite competence, and so opportunists of all stripes were able to rise within the ranks of the
State. As a result of parties +ockeyin% for positions, many experienced, efficient but independent
individuals were excluded from positions of influence.
*$. The lack of power and resources at the local level made de6centralised policy initiatives and
decision6makin% all but impossible, and so mass mobili?ations were limited to pressurin% the
central or%anisms of the State, thereby accentuatin% a historical tendency of the Chilean people to
expect all solutions to come from above.
*1. !n addition, the incorrect methods of leadership of the 0) militants, formed in centralised
or%ani?ations, reduced their ability to implement concrete tasks incorporatin% the people at local
and %rassroots level.
*. Another aspect that we must consider is that the political strate%y of the 0) in relation to the
popular sectors was centered fundamentally on the proletariat of the bi% industrial centers, minin%
and a%riculture. 7ue to their hi%h levels of or%anisation and previous social conAuests, these sectors
were in lar%e measure privile%ed with re%ard to the rest of the labour force workin% in small
industries, small a%ricultural farms, as well as in relation to the immense sector of small self6
employed workers, the truly mar%inal sectors of both town and country. This privile%in% of the
or%ani?ed, urban, industrial proletariat was evident in the %reat concern amon% the 0) for the
improvement of union or%ani?ation, without a similar concern for the or%anisation of the poor. Hn
the one hand, the 0) promoted production committees in the bi% industries, but on the other they
did not implement supervisory committees in the medium and small industries. The
redistributivepolicy based on wa%es did not reach the non6salaried sectors of the urban population.
!n this re%ard, it should be reco%nised that the 7C had a much more intelli%ent policy in this area,
worryin% in particular about the or%anisation of the 3mar%inalised sectors5.
**. Lastly, in spite of insistin% on the importance of incorporatin% the masses to the transformative
process, in its documents the 0) did not formulate concrete tasks aimed at encoura%in% %reater
numbers to become part of the process, thereby enlar%in% the %overnment5s support base. !nstead,
these tasks were carried out within the respective party structures.
The "ltra()ight Counteroffensi$e
*1. As we saw earlier, )Ere?Os >P+ovic5s murder ener%ised the effort of the ultra6conservatives
sectors tin unifyin% the opposition. Their strate%y revolved around six basic ob+ectives.
*<. 2irst, to divide the Dulin% 0) coalition. This was done by attemptin% to exploit supposed
divisions between 3(arxist5 parties and 37emocratic5 ones. 9y usin% an old anticommunist trick,
the ultra6ri%ht attempted to isolate (arxists from the rest of the 0) coalition by accusin% them of
tryin% to 3take over the whole %overnment5, and of 3unyieldin% sectarian loyalty to (oscow5.
*-. Second, maintainin% control over the mass media at all cost. At the time the opposition
controlled #$ per cent of the written press and 11< of the 1<$ radio stations existin% in the country,
includin% the most powerful.
*#. The third ob+ective involved the defense of private property. The Di%ht used every le%al
mechanism and pressure tactic within reach to prevent the transition to from private to social
property& the clearest example of this was the Constitutional Deform pro+ect presented by the 7C in
order to prevent the nationalisation of many businesses.
249224447 5
*G. 2ourth, the ultra6Di%ht sou%ht the creation of an anti6)opular 0nity consciousness within the
Armed forces. To do this, they exploited every opportunity to present the country as bein% 3in
chaos5, 3under anarchy5, or 3un%overnable5 and 3in a power vacuum5. And without a doubt, the
central %oal of this aspect of their campai%n was the denunciation of the existence of other armed
%roups outside the army.
"

*". 2ifth, the ultra6conservatives a%itated the middle class to act a%ainst the %overnment by
supportin% the supervisors who boycotted copper mine production: mobilisin% their professional
collea%ues: usin% the universities as tar%et %roups for their strate%ies.
1$. 9ut the last and fundamental %oal 6 that which would later allow them to achieve others 6 was to
provoke the economic failure of the Allende %overnment. Almost immediately after Allende5s
electoral victory they be%an to implement their counter6measures& capital fli%ht, the ille%al import of
0S dollars, the paralysis of certain industries, a free?e on raw material imports and industrial parts,
and so on. The dominant classes not only blocked the %overnment5s every attempt to modify the
unfair tax system throu%h their parliamentary ma+ority, but, at the same time, they denied the bud%et
resources to carry forward the new social a%enda& includin% milk distribution, health care plans,
housin%, and other public works. Thus, they blocked the 0)5s effort to improve workers5 standard
of livin% and, at the same time, spread fear amon% forei%n investors and domestic businesses,
leadin% to a sta%nation of productivity.
11. This plan had the full support of multinational corporations and the Fixon administration, which
besie%ed the Allende %overnment by reducin% credits, preventin% the rene%otiation of forei%n debt,
and by placin% an embar%o on %oods from nationalised companies, whilst spreadin% the ima%e
abroad that Chile was a bankrupt country, thereby stran%lin% it economically. The %overnment, not
wantin% to compromise the ne%otiatin% capacity of the workers, had no other alternative but to
increase the amount of money in circulation, knowin% that this would result in steep inflation. At
the same time, the 0S %overnment embar%o prevented them from importin% enou%h food to keep up
with the purchasin% power of the population. 2ood shorta%es steadily worsened. !n addition to
these factors, the opposition5s efforts caused the economic situation to deteriorate further throu%h
speculation, hordin% and the %rowth of the black market. !n tandem with this, the opposition6
controlled media unleashed a systematic campai%n to show that the country lacked basic necessities
and placed this at the center of their attacks.
1. Thus, as the Allende %overnment moved forward , a truly counter6revolutionary situation was
fermentin% internally. The first symptoms were already evident when 2idel Castro visited Chile in
Fovember 1"#1. (ore and more social sectors of the ri%ht and their allies participated in
demonstrations, protests, transport strikes, copper strikes, demonstrations a%ainst the military. As
the oppositional forces continued to execute their strate%y, the forces of the 0) coalition could not
a%ree on how to react to this counteroffensive.
1*. !n response to this spiralin% deterioration of the political and socio6economic climate, Allende
decided to address the situation by callin% for a popular referendum. The presidential address was
scheduled for 11 am on the 11
th
of September, 1"#*. ;unfire would silence the heroic Chilean
leader at that time instead.
The Military Coup
11. The military coup was made possible by the success of a ri%ht6win% counteroffensive. 'hile
the ri%ht6win% forces %rew in stren%th, and contradictions amon% the forces of the Left sharpened,
9 . This made any attempt to arm the people to defend the popular %overnment much harder.
249224447 6
an important part of the middle class6 which had initially supported Allende6 distanced themselves
from his pro+ect, creatin% a fertile political and social terrain for the military coup.
1<. ! a%ree with /or%e Arrate, the Chilean socialist leader, that Allende5s pro+ect was far too
heterodox for the orthodox character of the Left at the time
1$
, whose ideas did not correspond to the
new challen%es that the country faced. 'hen Allende spoke about the democratic transition to
socialism, sectors of the Left painted on the walls& 3Lon% live the dictatorship of the proletariatQ5
'hen Allende spoke about winnin% over sectors of the bour%eoisie for his pro+ect, a si%nificant
portion of the Left identified the entire bour%eoisie as the enemy, basin% everythin% on dependency
theory, which sustained that national capitalist development was no lon%er possible. 'hen the
socialist )resident fou%ht for unity, the most powerful parties the socialists and communists
made their differences public. 'hile Allende sou%ht to consolidate economic achievements throu%h
the strate%ic nationalisation of certain industries, aware of the limits of his own power: other sectors
of the Left wanted to extend the nationali?ation even to small businesses, demandin% that Allende
assume a more radical stance, as if all power were in his hands.
1-. Hn the other hand, the leadership of )opular 0nity Coalition and )resident Allende himself
understood Auite well that the Chilean process could not succeed without the support of the armed
forces. Accordin%ly they made a bi% effort to win them over to the popular cause. 8owever, they
trusted excessively in the constitutionalist loyalties of the Chilean armed forces and failed to work
sufficiently for the creation of their own loyal force.
1#. Net there is somethin% else that was only understood later on, namely that this type of 3peaceful5
transition from capitalism to socialism 6 usin% the resources and the possibilities of power within a
system of democratic representation needs another conception of socialism. !t was necessary to
rethink what kind of socialism we wanted to build, a socialism better adapted to the Chilean reality.
This was what Allende seemed to understand intuitively when he used the folk metaphor of
3socialism with red wine and Chilean empanadas5, indicatin% the need for a socialist society that
was democratic and rooted in popular national traditions.
11
10. Arrate, /or%e, La fuer*a demor+tia de la idea soialista, Santia%o de Chile, Cdiciones 7el Hrnitorrinco, p. 1#<.
11. Tom@s (ouli@n, La nidad !opular " el #uturo$ Enuentro !!I, 1& *, Santia%o de Chile, 1""<, p.<.
249224447 7