SUBMITTED BY : Angeline Sibuea Djolly Pranata Tjakrapawira
SUBMITTED TO : Judith T. Gallena Sinaga, MBA, BSA 2
TABLE OF CONTENT
COVER ........................................................................................................ I TABLE OF CONTENT ............................................................................. 2 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 3 RELATED LITERATURE ......................................................................... 7 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 25 BIBLICAL REFERENCES ...................................................................... 26
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I. INTRODUCTION In this era, companies are mushrooming in Indonesia. The company went public and non go public began to grow rapidly along with the development of civilization. One of the responsibilities of each of these companies is to deliver annual financial statements audited by a public accounting firm. In Indonesia, there are only about 6,500 companies that have used the services of a public accountant. And that means only about 10% of the total existing company use the service of a public accountant. Companies that have total assets less than U.S. $ 50 billion is not obliged to use the services of public accountants. While the numbers public accountant firm continue to increase for any public accounting section is getting smaller. And it is not including the foreign public accountants which is start to practice in Indonesia. This is of course directly or not will impact to the fierce competition. Then in turn will have an impact on competition audit. Public accountant or an independent auditor in auditing their client, company has a strategic position as a third party in environment that is when the client of public accountants firm and task responsibility of the management (agent) to audit the financial statements of company management. In this case the wish that its management performance always looks good in the eyes of external parties, especially owners (principal). But on the other hand, the owners (principals) want to keep the auditor's report truthfully state that existed at the company been financed. From the discussion above shows the existence of an interest different between the management and the users of financial statements. Great confidence of users of audited financial statements and services provided by other public accountant is what ultimately require public accountant audit of the quality it produces. The questions 4
from the public about the quality of the resulting audit by accountant greater public after many scandals involving accountants public either domestically or abroad. The auditors must work professionally, given their responsibilities are so great in the results of the audit of the financial statements of a company that has their audit. Their role is so important that it demanded professionalism as an auditor. Carry out an audit of financial statements of a company must be in accordance with Auditing Standards, it is one of professionalism that should be done by all auditors. Besides determining the fee for the audit work carried out has also become one of the mirrors of professionalism. To support his professionalism as a public accountant auditor in performing audit tasks should be guided by the auditing standards established by the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IAI), the general standards, standards field work and reporting standards. Where is the common standard reflection of the personal qualities that should be possessed by an auditor who requires the auditor to have the expertise and technical training sufficient in performing audit procedures. While the field work standards and auditor reporting standards set in terms of data collection and activities Other implemented during the audit and require the auditor to prepare a report on the audited financial statements are overall. But in addition to standard auditing, CPAs also must adhere to a code of ethics profession which govern the behavior of public accountants to practice their profession in well with fellow members and the general public. code The ethics governing the professional responsibility, competence and prudence professional, confidentiality, professional behavior and technical standards for a auditors in their profession. An auditor also should have an independent attitude. The independence of public accounting is necessary because the public as an appraiser perform the audit of financial statements is not only for the benefit of clients who pay the fee but also to third parties or the 5
public who have an interest in the client's financial statements are audited or inspected such as shareholders, creditors, investors, prospective lenders , potential investors, and government agencies (especially the tax authorities). To maintain its independence, the auditor should accept an audit of the audit fee before starting work for the next period. The auditor is also not allowed to accept an engagement if the client has not paid off the previous auditor liability. Many factors can affect the size of the audit fee. And this causes the amount of audit fees is still a great debate in Indonesia. The size of the client, the location of public accounting firms and public accounting firm size are all factors that affect the size of the audit fee. In addition to these factors, many other things that should be considered by public accounting firms in setting the audit fee or a fee. These things include: duties and responsibilities under the law (statutory duties), the needs of the client, independence, skill levels (levels of expertise), experience and responsibilities, the amount of time required and effectively used by a public accountant. Stages of the audit work and reporting is also to be considered by the public accounting firm. In Indonesia there are only a few research on audit fees. Though the amount of audit fees set by a public accounting firm is an interesting thing to study. Not only in Indonesia, but this is happening in most of other developing countries. In contrast to countries that are already developed, public accounting firms have set the size of the audit fee is also published to the public. Whereas in developing countries besasrnya audit fee is relatively closed. This could be because the audit fee set by public accounting firms in Indonesia are still not published such as in Europe, America, Australia and other developed countries. The situation is different when compared to the countries mentioned above, which has been 6
published so that the audit fee research on audit fees is often performed and published in scientific journals or other publications (Al-Shammari et al., 2008). We need a further research about the audit fee in Indonesia. Since the issue is really interesting, public should know more and understand about that. In this papers we will try to study more deeply about the audit fee.
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II. RELATED LITERATURE 1. Hartadi, Bambang. (2009). Pengaruh Fee Audit, Rotasi KAP, dan Reputasi Auditor Terhadap Kualitas Audit di Bursa Efek I ndonesia. Ekuitas: Jurnal Ekonomi dan Keuangan ISSN 1411-0393. Ada satu fenomena dimana dari berbagai wacana, ternyata terbukti secara empiris bahwa kualitas audit ternyata lebih disebabkan oleh faktor fee audit, rotasi auditor, dan juga reputasi auditor. Sehebat apapun kemampuan teknikal auditor akan sangat tergantung dari variabel eksternal lainnya yang mendasari pengambilan ke- putusan auditor dalam pemberian opini. Apabila kita mengacu pada dua ketergantungan atas definisi kualitas auditor di atas, maka sebenarnya sangat sulit untuk mengaitkan langsung antara kewajiban rotasi dengan kualitas auditor, tetapi utama nya pada poin kualitas, memang dimung- kinkan bahwa kedekatan emosional yang terlalu lama akibat tenure yang panjang antara auditor dan klien dapat meng- akibatkan terganggunya kualitas tersebut tetapi apabila auditor tetap menjaga sikap profesionalnya, maka tidak akan pernah terganggu kualitasnya walaupun auditor tenure-nya lama tetapi pengaruh dari fee audit dan reputasi auditor banyak sekali yang membuktikan bahwa kedua variabel tersebut sangat mempengaruhi kualitas audit. Dari beberapa temuan riset sebelumnya, ketiga variabel ini ternyata memiliki pengaruh yang variatif. Ada beberapa diantaranya yang berpengaruh signifikan, tetapi banyak juga diantaranya yang tidak berpengaruh signifikan. Abdul et al. (2006) menemukan bukti bahwa fee memang secara signifikan mempengaruhi kualitas audit. Hoitash et al. (2007) menemukan bukti bahwa pada saat auditor bernegosiasi dengan manajemen mengenai besaran tarif fee yang harus dibayarkan oleh pihak manajemen terhadap hasil kerja laporan auditan, maka kemung 8
kinan besar akan terjadi konsesi resiprokal yang jelas akan mereduksi kualitas laporan auditan. Tindakan ini jelas menjurus kepada tindakan yang mengesampingkan profesi- onalisme, dimana konsesi resiprokal tersebut akan mereduksi kepentingan penjagaan atas kualitas auditor. Dhaliwal et al. (2008) menemukan bukti bahwa fee audit secara signifikan mempengaruhi kualitas audit (independensi auditor).
2. Suharli, Michell., Nurlaelah. Konsentrasi Auditor dan Penetapan Fee Audit: I nvestigasi pada BUMN. Jurnal Iskak (1999) mendefinisikan audit fee adalah honorarium yang dibebankan oleh akuntan publik kepada perusahaan auditee atas jasa audit yang dilakukan akuntan publik terhadap laporan keuangan. Iskak sendiri melakukan penelitian tentang audit fee yang dipengaruhi oleh ukuran perusahaan dan ukuran KAP dengan hasil yang signifikan. Penetapan biaya audit yang dilakukan oleh KAP berdasarkan perhitungan dari biaya pokok pemeriksaan yang terdiri dari biaya langsung dan tidak langsung. Biaya langsung terdiri dari biaya tenaga yaitu manager, superpiser, auditor junior dan auditor senior. Sedangkan biaya tidak langsung seperti biaya percetakan, biaya penyusutan computer, gedung dan asuransi. Setelah dilakukan perhitungan biaya pokok pemeriksaan maka akan dilakukan tawar menawar antar klien yang bersangkutan dengan kantor akuntan publik. Penetlitian Audit Fee di New Zealand Penelitian pada pasar audit New Zealand menyebutkan auditor didominasi oleh Big Five. Gilling (1985) meneliti masa transisi lingkungan audit New Zealand dari tahun 1986 - 1983. Gilling mencatat bahwa kenaikan yang signifikan pada konsentrasi market antara perusahaan audit terbesar di New Zealand (diukur berdasarkan jumlah klien yang dilayani), sementara jumlah perusahaan audit menurun dari 120 menjadi 29. Pengaruh ini dihubungkan 9
dengan kombinasi bisnis antara perusahaan New Zealand dan perusahaan merjer KAP. Studi Jonson (1995), memperbaharuhi studi Gilling (1985), tentang dampak perubahan pada pasar audit New Zealand sejak awal tahun 1980an. Penelitian biaya audit yang dilaporkan oleh perusahaan untuk menyediakan ukuran langsung kon sentrasi auditor pada pasar New Zealand. Konsentrasi auditor yang diukur dengan biaya audit dan membandingkan langsung rasio konsentrasi auditor di Inggris dan Amerika Serikat dengan metode yang sama. Dalam penelitian ini peneliti akan membandingkan audit fee yangditerima oleh KAPbig fourdengan jumlah audit fee yang diterima oleh KAP keseluruhan. Untuk itu dibuatkan rumusan untuk mengukur tingkat rasio konsentrasi auditor penelitian. Penelitian Audit Fee di Canada Andersen dan Zeghal (1994) melakukan pengujian atas audit fee di pasar Kanada dengan menggunakan cross time data KAP dan industri. Observasi atas jasa audit fee dilakukan dalam satu periode waktu yang dikaitkan dengan kode etik profesi tentang tender dan iklan pada saat itu, yang secara umum di Kanada sedang lesu. Hasil studi ini mendukung jasa audit yang terdiferensiasi dalam pasar audit di Kanada dan konsisten dengan De Angelo (1981). Walaupun ukuran luas kualitas audit tidak secara signifikan berbeda dengan penetapan harga atas jasa audit yang dideteksi, tetapi data tersebut menyajikan bukti perbedaan audit pricing antara kantor akuntanBig Eight atas pasar auditee yang berukuran kecil. Ukuran Kantor Akuntan Publik Kantor akuntan publik besar yang dapat berlaku universal adalah big six worldwide accounting firm. Kantor akuntan besar disebutkan memiliki akuntan yang berperilaku lebih etikal daripada akuntan di kantor akuntan kecil (Loeb, 1971). Dengan demikian kantor akuntan besar lebih memiliki reputasi baik dalam opini publik. DeAngelo (1981) 10
menyimpulkan bahwa kantor akuntan publik yang lebih besar dapat diartikan kualitas audit yang dihasilkan pun lebih baik dibandingkan kantor akuntan kecil. Dengan demikian pihak manajemen akan segera menyampaikan laporan akuntan yang telah diaudit kantor akuntan besar secara tepat waktu. 3. Audit Fee in Singapore The top five audit firms in Singapore have a 94.5% share of the market in 1986 compared with 96.3% inn 1983 in audit fee termss. The individual rankings of the top firms remain the same since 1983 although their relative market shares have altered. The highest audit fee paid by alisted company to its auditor and the auditors of its subsidiaries in 1986 was $1.3m and the lowest $9,000. The most common fee range is again $11,000 - $50,000, paid by 37.8% in number of listed companies which is however considerably less than 47.5% in 1983. Each year there were progressively increasing proportions of companies in the $50,000-$100,000 and $100,000-$500,000 ranges. The industry analysis provides statistics for various industrial sectors and lists individual company data under each sector. The analysis should enable a company to compares its audit fee with those paiid by other companies in the industry. Any comparison between companies should, of course, take account of economics of size, and the organisational and other complexities peculiar to each company. Users should also take into account staffing policies and thoroughness standards of different audit firms. Finally, the industry specialisations of the larger accounting firms are considered in the report. there is no significant change in their apparent specialisations.
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4. Pratistha, Dwiyani., Ni Luh Sari Widhiyani. (2014). Pengaruh I ndependensi Auditor dan Besaran Fee Audit Terhadap Kualitas Proses Audit. E-Jurnal Akuntansi Universitas Udayana ISSN: 2302-8556 Penelitian Castellani (2008), menemukan bahwa independensi auditor berpengaruh pada kualitas audit. Penelitian ini sejalan dengan penelitian Saputra (2012), yang memperlihatkan bahwa independensi berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap kualitas audit. Hasil penelitian berbeda di ungkapkan oleh Hanny, dkk (2011) serta Rapina, dkk (2011) yang menunjukkan independensi auditor tidak berpengaruh pada kualitas proses audit. Fenomena lainnya yang juga mampu mempengaruhi kualitas audit yaitu kontrak kerjasama dalam hal penentuan besaran fee audit antara auditor dan klien. Hoitash et al.(2007), menemukan bukti bahwa ketika auditor melakukan negosiasi dengan pihak manajemen mengenai besaran tarif fee yang dibayarkan terkait hasil kerja laporan auditan, maka kemungkinan besar akan terjadi konsensi resiprokal yang jelas akan mereduksi kualitas laporan auditan. Elder (2011:80) menyatakan bahwa imbalan jasa audit atas kontrak kerja audit merefleksikan nilai wajar pekerjaan yang dilakukan dan secara khusus auditor harus menghindari ketergantungan ekonomi tanpa batas pada pendapatan dari setiap klien. Bervariasinya nilai moneter yang diterima auditor pada tiap pekerjaan audit yang dilakukannya berdasarkan hasil negosiasi, tidak menutup kemungkinan akan memberikan pengaruh pada kualitas proses audit. Jong-Hag,et a.l (2010) juga berpendapat hal yang sama, bahwa fee audit yang besar dapat membuat auditor menyetujui tekanan dari klien dan berdampak pada kualitas audit yang dihasilkan. Penelitian terkait hal tersebut dilakukan Wuchun (2004) yang menunjukkan bukti berbeda, bahwa fee audit berpengaruh positif terhadap kualitas audit, sedangkan Dhaliwan et al. (2008) membuktikan bahwa fee audit secara signifikan mempengaruhi kualitas audit. 12
Pengaruh Besaran Fee Audit terhadap Kualitas Proses Audit Besaran fee audit berpengaruh positif dan signifikan secara statistik terhadap kualitas proses audit. Kondisi ini menggambarkan semakin tinggi fee audit yang diberikan klien, semakin luas pula prosedur audit yang akan dilakukan auditor maka kualitas audit yang dihasilkan pun akan tinggi. Auditor dengan fee audit yang tinggi akan melakukan prosedur audit lebih luas dan mendalam terhadap perusahaan klien sehingga kemungkinan kejanggalan-kejanggalan yang ada pada laporan keuangan klien dapat terdeteksi. Pendeteksian kejanggalan mencerminkan kualitas proses audit tinggi, hal ini dikarenakan kualitas proses audit merupakan pelaksanaan audit dengan penerapan standar akuntansi dan standar audit yang benar oleh auditor. Wuchun (2004) menemukan bahwa fee audit berpengaruh positif terhadap kualitas audit. Hartadi (2009) dan Suryatini (2012) juga menemukan hal yang sama bahwa tingginya fee audit akan disertai pula pada tingginya kualitas proses audit. Hasil statistik penelitian ini pun mendukung penemuan sebelumnya.
5. Iyer, S Govind., Venkataraman M. Iyer, Birenda K. Mishra. (2003). Advances I n Accounting. Elsevier Ltd. Kidlington. Oxford, United Kingdom. Companines Act in the United Kingdom has required the disclosure of audit fees in the annual report for a long time. However, the requirement to disclose non-audit service fees paid to incumbent auditor hhas been a recent reform. The impetus for this amendment to the Companies Act 1989 was provided by growing allegations that large accounting firms were submitting loss leading bids for audit contracts in the hope of securing lucrative consulting work. In response to such allegations, the Companies Act 1989 (Disclosure of Remuneration 13
For Non-Audit Work) 1991 Regulations mandated that non-audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor should be disclosed in the annual report. The disclosure requirement is predicated on the belief that it would lead to the increased transparency of the economic bonding of the auditor and the client management. That is, shareholders, lenders, investors, and others would be able to judge for themselves whether the auditor is overly dependent on a particular client for substatial amount of income thereby impairing auditor indendence. Shareholders who become concerned about the relaionship could force the company to restrict purchase of consultancy services from the incumbent auditor ot insist that another auditing firm be selected. The increased transparency of the economic bonding of the auditor and the client management can also become another weapon in the armory of a shareholder in case of a shareholder lawsuit against the auditor for sub-standard audit. Deep pocket auditors become more vulnerable to shareholders lawsuit especially in situations where they have provided large amounts of non audit services (where shareholders can cite prima facie lack of independence). Alternatively, an auditor may also indicate his/her independence by curtailing the revenue generated from non-audit services. In the following sections, we document the effect of the disclosure requirement in the United Kingdom by tracking a sample of companies over a period of four years. Effect of disclosure on Audit Fee and Non-audit Service Fee We use 1991 as a bencmark for comparing the trend in the non-audit service fees for years 1992, 1993, and 1994. First, we document the trends in the mean audit fee, non-audit service fee, and total asset after adjusting for the effects of inflation. Changes in audit and non-audit service fee are positively related. This is also prima facie support for the argument that under a disclosure scenario, audit firms tend to manage nonaudit revenue. 14
6. (2008). Audits of Public Companies. New York: Nova Science Publisher, Inc.
With Continued Audit Market Concentration, Large Public Companies Se Limited Choice, But No Apparent Significant Effect on Fees. Despite some reduction since 2002, the overall public ccompany audit market has remained highly concentrated. For large public companies, the market remains highly concentrated, with four largest accounting firms auditing the financial statements of almost all large public companies. However, the audit market for smaller public companies has become much less concentrated since 2002. Larger public companies indicated that the industry expertise and technical capability that they sought in an auditor generally meant that their choices were limited to the largest accounting firms in this highly concentrated market. Those we spoke to and surveyed had mixed views on the extent to which the current level of concentration adversely affected choice, audit prices, and audit quality, but most participants did not see the current level of concentration as significantly affecting participants did not see the current level of concentration as significantly affecting these aspects of competition. Although audit fees have increased and public companies opinions of the adequacy of competition ii the audit market varied, companies factors appear to exxplain the recent fee increaases. While the current level of concentration does not appear to be having significant adverse effect, the loss of another of the larger firms would further increase concentration and limit company choices and may affect price competition. Regulators overseeing the functioning of the audit market could take several actions in response to another large audit firms leaving the market. Market participants and others cited various factors that had contributed to recent fee increases. The most significant factors that staff from the largest firms cited in interviews were the increasing complexity of accounting and financial reporting standards and the additional reuirements of new auditing standards that had increased the 15
amount of work involved in audits and the need for technical expertise. For example, one of the largest firms noted that the number of experts on staff at the firm more than doubled between 2003 and 2007. Many market participants noted similar factors as impacting fees. The largest firms alsi cited the increased sosts of attracting and retaining talented stadd and specialists. Similarly midsize and smaller firms reported on our survey that the top four factors increasing ther cost since 2003 were compelxity of accounting principles and auditing standards, additional requirements of new standards, the time and effort necessary to prepare for PCAOB inspections, and the costs incurred to hire and train staff. In particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which increaed the amount of audit work performed at public companies, was frequently cited as one of the major factors in the recent fee increases. This legilation introduced a number of new requirements for audits of public companies, and many market participants told us that the new requirements accounted for much of the fee increases since 2002. representatives from some audit firms we spoke to said that section 404 of the act had, where implemented, substatially increased their worload and costs for implementing new methodologies and staff training. In addition, 84 percent of companies reporting that their audit fess had increased since 2003 indicated on our survey that the audit of internal control over financila reporting as one of the reasons for the increase. To datem only larger public companies-which SEC calls accelerated filers-have had to comply with the new requirements for assssing these internal controls. Smaller public companies-those considered non accelerated filers-are scheduled to fully comply with the new audit requirments in annual filing after December 15, 2008, potentially resulting in further increases in these companies audit fees. Independence requirements may also have changed the way some firm price audits, resulting in rising fees. 7. Sercu, P., M. Willekens. (2005). Corporate Governance at the Crossroads. Oxford: Intersentia. 16
Audit Pricing Based on the empirical evidence of high supplier concentration in the audit market, early audit fee research was mainly inspired by concerns about price competition in the audit market. In his seminal paper, Simunic (1980) proposed a model of audit pricing to test for competition in thw US audit industry. He assumed that tprice competition prevails in the small auditee market segment because of the lower supplier concetration in this segment, but that the large auditee market may not be competitive because of big N (then big 8) concetration. By comparing pricing in the tow market segment, Simunic draws conclusions about competition in the audit market. From the results of his study the hyhpothesis that the audit market is competitive could not be rejected, as no dignificant premia were found for bi N (then big 8) firms in the large client segment of the market. Many subsequent studies adopted a similar approach to study audit pricing. Unlike Simunic, most studies report a significant big N audit fee premium and exlain this finding by product differentiation by the big N and not as a result of big N market power. The different findings as to big N premia are explained by size differences in the client samples under investigation. Later audit fee studies were mainly concerned with specific determinants of audit ffees, such as the effect of auditor switching, auditor concetration and auditor industry specialization. Fee studies have also been done outside the U.S. for example, Francis (1984), Francis and Stokes (1986), Craswell et al. (1995) report evidence on the Australian market; Chan et al. (1993), Pong and Whittingtion (1994), Taffler and Ramalinggam (1982) on the UK market; Firth (1985) on the New Zealen market; Anderson and Zeghal (1994) on the Canadian market; and Chung and Lindsay (1988); Dominica Suk-yee Lee (1996), Gul (1999) and DeFond et al.(2000) on the Hong Kong market; Willekens and Achmadi (2003) for Belgian audit market. Overall, we can conclude that: 17
1. A fairly robust audit fee model seems to explain 50%-70% of audit fee variations across the world, including auditee size, client complexity and riskiness as explanatory variables, and 2. Significant price premia for big N firms are observed worldwide. Note that almost all prior audit fee studies used samples of public clients.
In recent study, Menon and Williams (2001) report eveidence on long-term trends in audit fees in the US audit market. They find that fees increased in the 1980s but stayed flat in the 1990s. In particular, a significant increase in fees is noted in 1988, which the authors atrribute to an expansion of audit effort as a response to the issuance of the expectations gap standards. The evidence also indicates a short-term but not a long-term effect of the big 8 mergers in 1989 on audit pricing. Some changes in the audit fee model over the sample period (1980-1997) are also documented. Note that Hay, Knechel and Wong (2005) provide a meta-analysis of audit fee determinants across 88 audit fee studies. The audit fee is determined by a wide range of variables. On the one hand, client-firm characteristics have a seroius impact on the time invested and the risk faced by the auditor. On the other hand, also audit-firm characteristics have an impact on the audit fees. The audit pricing literature suggests that dor clients with certain litigations risk, or extra extra effort to produce a more defensible audit. Five client characteristic are considered to have a possible impact on the audit price: firm size, the ownership type, organitazational compelxity, the financial situatuation, and board characteristics. Certain auditor-firm characteristics may have an influence on the audit fee. The two characteristics that are generally 18
considered are economies of scale and product differentiation or specialisation. Tow studies have been done on audit pricing in Beelgium. Willekens and Achmadi (2003) provide evidence on audit pricing in the private client sement of he audit market in 1989 and 1997. They investigate whether (1) audit pricing is competitive in the private client segment of the audit market, and (2) the increase in market concentration between 1989 and 1997 resulted in more or less price competition. They report that audit fees are significantly associated with the incumbent auditors market share both 1989 and 1997. This resul is similar to prior studies on pricing in the public client segment of the market. It is not clear whether this finding implies that there is a lack of competition in the market or whether the price premium is due ti product differentition. Knechel and Willekens (2004) invetigate audit pricing in the ublic client segment of the Belgian audit market and find that internal control, risk management and governance significantly affect audit demand and pricing. In particular, audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, disclose a relatively high level of financial risk management and has a larger precentage of independent board members. Audit fees are lower when a company disclose a relatively high lelvel of compliance risk management. That latter result indicates that controls are only complementary as long as voluntary, as mandated controls act as substitues for non- mandated controls.
8. Boynton, William C., Raymond N. Johnson. (2006). Modern Auditing: Assurance Services anf the I ntegrity of Financial Reporting. USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Rule 503 Commisions and Refferal Fees 19
A. Prohibitted commisions. A member in public practice shall not for a commision recommend or refer to a client any product or service, or for a commision recommend or refer any product or service to be supplied by a client, or receive a commision, when the member or the members firm also perfoms for that client. (a) An audit or review of financial statement, or (b) A compilation of financial statement when the member expects, or reasonably might expect, that a third party will use the financial statement and (c) An examination of prospective financial information. This prohibition applies during the period in which the member is engaged to perform any of the services listed above and the period covered by any historical financial statements involved in such listed services. B. Disclosure of permitted commissions. A member in public practice who is not prohibited by this rule from performing services for or receiving a commission and who is paid or expects to be paid a commission shall disclose that the fact to any person or entity to whom the member recommends or refers a product or service to which the commission relates.
C. Referral fees. Any member who accepts referral fee for recommendingor reffering any service of a CPA to any person or entity or who pays a referral fee to obtain a client shall disclose such acceptance or payment to the client.
This rule was also modified significantly in1990 to comply with a FTC order. The former rule contained a general prohibition against members accepting any commission, even when disclosed to, and approved by, the client. The FTC deemed the former rule to be in restraint of trade. 20
When the FTC order leading to the amendment of rule 503 was imposed in 1990, CPAs in 50 of the 54 jurisdictions nonetheless remained subject to state statutes or state board of accountancy regulations that barred them from accepting contingent fees and commissions. Now, most of these jurisdictions have eliminated or reduced limits on these arrangements for nonattest services. However, students should be aware that some states may bar contingent fee and commissions either through state board regulations or through state statutes. Some states may permit contingent fees but not commissions, or they mey permit CPAs to accept, nut not pay, commissions and referral fees.
Under the current rule, a CPA may accept a disclosed commissions. For example, a CPA may accept a disclosed commissions from a computer manufacturer based on equipment purchased by a client on the CPAs recommendation, except when the CPA performs any of the services described in the rule for the same client. Payments by a CPA to obtain a client are now permitted provided disclosure is made to the client.
9. Boynton, William C., et.al. (2003). Modern Auditing jilid 1 (edisi 7). Terjemahan Paul A. Rajoe, dkk. Jakarta: Erlangga.
Imbalan Yang Belum Dibayar. Imbalan yang belum dibayar untuk jasa profesional yang telah diberian akan dianggap sebagai pinjaman yang diberikan anggota kepada klien. Oleh karena itu, independensi kantor akuntan publik dapat dianggap melemah apabila CPA telah menerbitkan laporan audit untuk tahun berjalan bagi klien, namun CPA belulm 21
menerima imbalan, baik telah ditagihkan atau belum ditagihkan selama lebih dari satu tahun. Ketetapan ini tidak berlaku bagi imbalan yang belum dibayar akibat pailitya klien.
10. Lindrianasari. (2010). Pergantian CEO Dunia Suatu Bukti Pentingnya I nformasi Akuntansi dalam Isu Pergantian CEO. Yogyakarta: Kanisius. Financial Restatement Pada studi Feldman, Read and Abdolmohammad FRA (2009), mereka menguji post-restatement, audit fess dan executive turnover pada sampel perusahaan yang melakukan restated laporan keuangan mereka tahun 2003. FRA menginvestigasi dan menemukan bukti bahwa audit fees yang lebih tinggu terdapat pada perusahaan yang melakukan restatement dibandingkan dengan perusahaan lain yang tidak melakukan restatement yang menjadi sammpel kontrol pada penelitian. Tujuan paper FRA ini adalah untuk menginvestigasi apakah audit fee yang lebih tinggi pada perusahaan mengikuti kesalahan pelaporan keuangan dan untuk menentukan apakah bagian dari tindakan pengulangan tersebut dapat meningkatkan audit fee. Mengikuti penelitian sebelumnya, FRA menggunakan restatement sebagai kesalahan pelaporan keuangan (financial reporting failure). FRA mengajukan preposisi bahwa mengikuti pelaporan keuangan yang salah-catat (misstatement), seorang auditor sepertinya menilai bahwa perusahaan memiliki risiko audit yang lebih tinggi relatif terhadap perushaan yang tidak memiliki permasalahan audit. Karena terdapat hubungan positif antara risiko dengan audit fee yang telah mapan di dalam literatur, FRA menghipotesiskan dan menemukan bahwa 22
perusahaan dengan restatement memperlihatkan audit fee yang lebih tinggi dibandingkan dengan sampel kontrol perusahaan yang non-restatement. Financial restatement yang dilakukan perusahaan mengindikasikan bahwa sebenernya ada kesalahan yang terjadi di dalam laporan keuangan. Kesalahan tersebut akan meningkatkan risiko audit dan akhirnya akan menambah audit fee, jika restatement dilakukan sebatas kesalahan yang tidak material. Jika restatement dilakukan untuk menutupi kesalahan fatal yang dilakukan oleh pihak manajemen, risiko audit akan semakin tinggi dan akhirnya akan mendorong audit fee yang tinggi pula. Kondisi inilah yang dapat merugikan legitimasi perusahaan, dan beberapa perusahaan akhirnya akan mengganti eksekutifnya yang terkait dengan tindakan financial restatement tersebut. Penjelasan ini yang meyakinkan beberapa peneliti untuk menjelaskan bahwa hubungan financial restatement dengan pergantian adalah positif. 11. Hartoyo, Dwi. (2011). Panduan Audit I nvestigatif Korupsi di Bidang Kehutanan. Bogor: Center for International Forestry Research. Penyusunan rencana biaya audit Berdasarkan program kerja pemeriksaan maka auditor juga dapat memperkirakan biaya yang diperlukan untuk mendukung pelaksaan audit. Biaya audit harus mencakup seluruh biaya yang diperlukan untuk mengumpulkan bukti dalam pelaksanaan audit serta melaporkan dan menyampaikan hasil audit kepada pihak-pihak yang ditentukan. Jika auditor telah menyusun dan menetapkan perencanaan audit maka audit investigatif dapat mulai dilaksanakan.
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12. Mulyadi (2002) Auditing Buku Dua, Edisi Ke Enam, Salemba Empat, Jakarta. Menurut Mulyadi (2002:33), umumnya hirarki auditor dalam perikatan audit dalam kantor akuntan publik dibagi menjadi berikut ini : 1. Partner (rekan) 2. Manajer 3. Auditor Senior 4. Auditor Yunior. Adapun uraiannya sebagai berikut : Partner (rekan) Partner menduduki jabatan tertinggi dalam perikatan audit; bertanggung jawab atas hubungan dalam klien; bertanggung jawab secara menyeluruh mengenai auditing. Partner menandatangani laporan audit dan management letter, dan bertanggung jawab terhadap penagihan fee audit dari klien. 13. Supriyono, R.A. 1988. Pemeriksaan Akuntansi (Auditing) : Faktor-faktor yang Mempengaruhi Independensi Penampilan Akuntan Publik. Penerbit Salemba Empat, Jakarta. Menurut Supriyono (1988:60) audit fee yang kecil kemungkinan dapat mengakibatkan suatu kantor akuntan lebih independen karena: (1) Kantor akuntan tidak merasa tergantung pada klien tertentu sehingga lebih berani menentang kehendak klien yang tidak sesuai dengan prinsip akuntansi yang diterima umum atau norma pemeriksaan akuntan. 24
(2) Hilangnya klien yang audit fee-nya kecil tidak mengakibatkan turunnya pendapatan kantor akuntan dalam jumlah yang relatif besar. Wati dan Subroto, Faktor-faktor yang Mempengaruhi Independensi Penampilan Akuntan Publik akan tetapi, audit fe e yang kecil kemungkinan dapat pula mendorong akuntan publik kurang independen dalam memberikan opini atas laporan keuangan klien karena waktu dan biaya audit yang terbatas.
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CONCLUSION Audit fee adalah honorarium yang dibebankan oleh akuntan publik kepada perusahaan auditee atas jasa audit yang dilakukan akuntan publik terhadap laporan keuangan. Penetapan biaya audit yang dilakukan oleh KAP berdasarkan perhitungan dari biaya pokok pemeriksaan yang terdiri dari biaya langsung dan tidak langsung. Biaya langsung terdiri dari biaya tenaga yaitu manager, superpiser, auditor junior dan auditor senior. Sedangkan biaya tidak langsung seperti biaya percetakan, biaya penyusutan computer, gedung dan asuransi. Setelah dilakukan perhitungan biaya pokok pemeriksaan maka akan dilakukan tawar menawar antar klien yang bersangkutan dengan kantor akuntan publik. Besaran fee audit berpengaruh positif dan signifikan secara statistik terhadap kualitas proses audit. Kondisi ini menggambarkan semakin tinggi fee audit yang diberikan klien, semakin luas pula prosedur audit yang akan dilakukan auditor maka kualitas audit yang dihasilkan pun akan tinggi. Auditor dengan fee audit yang tinggi akan melakukan prosedur audit lebih luas dan mendalam terhadap perusahaan klien sehingga kemungkinan kejanggalan-kejanggalan yang ada pada laporan keuangan klien dapat terdeteksi. Pendeteksian kejanggalan mencerminkan kualitas proses audit tinggi, hal ini dikarenakan kualitas proses audit merupakan pelaksanaan audit dengan penerapan standar akuntansi dan standar audit yang benar oleh auditor. Jika dibandingkan dengan beberapa negara lain, pembahasan mengenai audit fee di Indonesia masih sedikit. Dan KAP di Indonesia masih terbatas dibandingkan dengan negara- negara maju dan belum banyak penelitian yang membahas mengenai audit fee. Di negara lain sudah banyak penelitian mengenai audit fee dan lebih transparan.
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BIBLICAL REFERENCES
IBRANI 13:5 Janganlah kamu menjadi hamba uang dan cukupkanlah dirimu dengan apa yang ada padamu. Karena Allah telah berfirman: "Aku sekali-kali tidak akan membiarkan engkau dan Aku sekali-kali tidak akan meninggalkan engkau."
HEBREO 13:5 Mangilag kayo sa pagibig sa salapi; mangagkasiya kayo sa inyong tinatangkilik: sapagka't siya rin ang nagsabi, Sa anomang paraan ay hindi kita papagkukulangin, sa anomang paraan ni hindi kita pababayaan.
HEBREW 13:5 Let your conduct be without covetousness; be content with such things as you have. For He Himself has said, I will never leave you nor forsake you.