Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 64821-23 January 29, 1993
UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and UNIVERSITY OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
Tanopo & Serafica for petitioner.
Hermogenes S. Decano for private respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
In the instant petition for mandamus and certiorari, petitioner union seeks to enjoin the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to resolve, or direct the Labor Arbiter to hear and
decide, the merits of three of petitioner's unresolved complaints, and to annul and set aside the
resolution of the NLRC affirming the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter dismissing the
petitioner's complaints for violation of certain labor standards laws but requiring respondent
university to integrate the cost of living allowance into the basic pay of the covered employees and
reminding it to pay its employees at intervals not exceeding sixteen (16) days.
The uncontroverted facts show that on various dates, petitioner filed the following complaints against
the University of Pangasinan (University for brevity) before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in
Dagupan City:
1. October 14, 1980: for nonpayment of benefits under P.D. No. 1713 and
emergency cost of living allowance (ecola) to part-time teachers, and for prompt and
accurate computation of benefits under P.D. No. 451 and the payment of ecolas;
2. November 7, 1980: for nonpayment of all ecolas to instructors from October 18-31,
1980;
3. November 20, 1980: for nonpayment of ecolas under P.D. Nos. 525, 1123, 1614,
1634, 1678 and 1713 for November 1-15, 1980, and extra loads during typhoons
"Nitang" and "Osang" on July 21 and 25, 1980, respectively;
4. April 13, 1981: for violation of P.D. No. 1751 and nonpayment of extra loads on
February 12-13, 1980 (Anniversary celebration);
5. April 27, 1981: for nonpayment of all ecolas for April 1-15, 1981 to faculty
members who were also members of the union;
6. May 21, 1981: for violation of Wage Order No. 1 and delayed payment of salaries;
and
7. June 17, 1981: for nonpayment of salary differentials for summer under P.D. No.
451.
1

The Regional Director in San Fernando, La Union certified six (6) of these complaints to Labor
Arbiter Pedro Fernandez of the Dagupan City District Office of the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment for compulsory arbitration.
2
According to the petitioner, it was made to understand by
Fernandez that the seventh complaint should also be discussed in its position paper. Accordingly,
petitioner filed a position paper discussing the merits of all the seven complaints. On the other hand, the
University limited its discussion to only four: the complaints filed on April 13, 1981, April 27, 1981, May
21, 1981 and June 17, 1981. Petitioner was of the view that Executive Labor Arbiter Sotero L. Tumang
adopted the stand of the University on the four complaints and accordingly dismissed them in his decision
of January 25, 1982.
3

Observing that in its position paper, the petitioner included matters which were "beyond the scope of
the issues alleged in the complaints," said Labor Arbiter discussed the four complaints individually.
On the April 13, 1981 complaint, he ruled that because at the time P.D. No. 1123 took effect on May
1, 1977, the University had not increased its tuition fees, there was of "nothing to
integrate."
4
However, from June 16, 1979 when the University increased its tuition fees, it was obligated
to cause the integration of the across-the-board increase of P60.00 in emergency allowance into the
basic pay as mandated by P.D. Nos. 1123 and 1751.
On the alleged nonpayment of extra loads handled by the employees on February 12 and 13, 1981
when classes were suspended, Tumang stated that Consuelo Abad, the petitioner's president, had
no cause to complain because her salary was fully paid and that, since there were "no complainants
for the alleged nonpayment of extra loads for two days," the issue had become academic.
With respect to the April 27, 1981 complaint, Tumang said that since the salary paid to Consuelo
Abad and other faculty members for the April 1-15, 1981 period had been earned "as part of their
salary for the ten-month period," she was no longer entitled to an emergency cost of living
allowance. He added that "payment of emergency cost of living allowance is based on actual work
performed except when they (employees) are on leave with pay." Hence, because classes ended in
March 1981, the teachers who did not report for work could not be considered on leave with pay
and, therefore, they were not entitled to an emergency cost of living allowance.
As regards the May 21, 1981 complaint alleging violation of Wage Order No. 1, Tumang found that
the University had actually implemented the additional living allowance of P2.00 a day required
therein. On the alleged delay in the payment of salaries of the employees, he rationalized that delays
could not be avoided but he reminded the University to pay its employees on time.
The June 17, 1981 complaint was also resolved in favor of the University. Stating that P.D. No. 451
which mandates salary increases is dependent on enrollment and allowable deductions, Tumang
ruled that, again, Consuelo Abad had no cause to complain as she had been paid out of the
allowable 12.74% for distribution which was a "substantial compliance with P.D. No. 451."
5
The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the above-entitled cases
are dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent however, is required to integrate the
allowance of P60.00 under P.D. 1123 into the basic pay of the covered employees if
the same has not as yet been complied with. Respondent is also reminded to pay the
employees at intervals not exceeding sixteen (16) days pursuant to Article 102 of the
Labor Code.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner appealed the said decision to the NLRC. In its resolution of June 20, 1993, the NLRC
affirmed the decision of Executive Labor Article Tumang. Hence, the instant petition
for mandamus and certiorari with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that this
petition be given due course and that judgment issue:
1. Declaring petitioner as possessed with capacity to represent its members in the
complaints it filed thru its president, Miss Consuelo Abad, against private respondent,
and the complaints are pertaining to the members who are entitled under the law to
the claims sought herein, not to Miss Abad alone;
2. Annulling and setting aside the appealed resolution insofar as the issues of
nonpayment of Ecola for April 1-15, 1981 and nonpayment of salary differentials for
summer of 1981 under P.D. No. 451 are concerned;
3. Ordering private respondent to pay covered members of petitioner their Ecola for
April 1-15, 1981 and their salary differentials for summer of 1981 pursuant to the
mandate of P.D. 451;
4. Enjoining public respondent to resolve on the merits the issues of nonpayment of
extra loads of February 12-13, 1980 and violation of Wage Order No. 1 which were
properly brought on appeal to said office;
5. Enjoining public respondent to resolve on the merits the issues or grievances
alleged in the complaints filed on October 14, November 7 and November 20, all in
1980, which were not resolved by the labor arbiter but nonetheless appealed to
public respondents, or
6. Enjoining public respondent to order or direct the labor arbiter to resolve on the
merits the said issues or grievances alleged in the complaints mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph;
7. Attorney's fee in such amount as this Honorable Tribunal may deem just and
reasonable in the premises;
8. Ordering private respondent to pay costs of suit, including this appeal.
Petitioner further prays for safeguards and/or measures to insure the correct
computation of the amount of claims herein sought due to each covered member of
petitioner, and for such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.
6

We shall first deal with the propriety of the special civil action of mandamus. In this regard, petitioner
contends that the NLRC should have, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, resolved the issues
raised in the three (3) complaints filed on October 14, November 7 and November 20, 1980 or, in the
alternative, ordered the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide the aforementioned three (3) complaints, it
having the power of supervision over Labor Arbiters.
Sec. 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Petition for Mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
As succinctly provided in this section, anyone who wishes to avail of the remedy of mandamus must
state in a verified petition "the facts with certainty." On account of this requirement, mandamus is
never issued in doubtful cases and showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner is
required.
7
Indeed, while the labor arbiter is duty bound to resolve all complaints referred to him for
arbitration and, therefore, he may be compelled bymandamus to decide them (although not in any
particular way or in favor of anyone),
8
we find that the peculiar circumstances in this case do not merit the
issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Petitioner admits that only six of the complaints were certified to Labor Arbiter Fernandez for
compulsory arbitration. It failed, however, to allege why this was the case or whether it had exerted
any effort to include the remaining complaint in the certification. What it stresses is the alleged
assurance of Labor Arbiter Fernandez that the seventh complaint may be discussed in its position
paper. It turned out, however, that, according to the unrebutted allegation of the Solicitor General,
Labor Arbiter Fernandez inhibited himself from handling the cases referred to him as he was
teaching at the University. Hence, Labor Arbiter Fernandez forwarded the complaints to the
Assistant Director for Arbitration in Regional Office No. 1 in San Fernando, La Union for appropriate
action. He should have forwarded all of the complaints to the said Assistant Director, but it appears
that Fernandez turned over only four of them. In turn, the Assistant Director referred only complaints
Nos. 5, 6 and 7, which had been docketed as RBI-C-24-81, LS-42-81 and LS-43-81, to Executive
Labor Arbiter Sotero L. Tumang for compulsory arbitration. However, while only these three docket
numbers appear on the caption of the decision, the same actually resolved four complaints, as
earlier mentioned.
9

From these facts, one may infer that there must have been a mishandling of the complaints and/or
the records of the cases. However, the petitioner failed to substantiate by evidence such negligence
on the part of the public respondents as to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
10
Its officials
even neglected the simple act of verifying from the MOLE office in Dagupan City whether the records of
all the cases filed had been forwarded to the proper official who should resolve them.
11
Infact, nowhere in
its pleadings
12
is there an allegation to that effect.
On the contrary, the petitioner took Fernandez' words seriously and allowed the proceedings to
reach its inevitable conclusion. When it received a copy of the decision, the petitioner should have
taken note of Executive Labor Arbiter Tumang's observation therein that it had discussed matters
"beyond the scope of the issues alleged in the complaints." In its memorandum of appeal, it should
have prayed for the inclusion of the three complaints inasmuch as in labor cases, an appeal may be
treated as a motion for reconsideration or
vice-versa.
13
The fact that three complaints had been omitted did not escape the attention of the NLRC
which stated in its resolution that "since those cases were not consolidated it is now too late to
consolidate them" with the four decided cases.
14
We agree with the NLRC that the said complaints should
proceed separately as long as their resolution would not conflict with the resolved
cases.
15
It should be added that under Art. 217(b) of the Labor Code, the NLRC has "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Labor Arbiters." Needless to say, the NLRC could not have
acted on matters outside of the cases appealed to it.
Petitioner's contention that the cases filed by Consuelo Abad as its president should affect, not only
herself, but all the other union members similarly situated as she was, is well taken. The
uncontroverted allegation of the petitioner is that it is the holder of Registration Certificate No. 9865-
C, having been registered with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment on February 16, 1978. As
such, petitioner possessed the legal personality to sue and be sued under its registered
name.
16
Corollarily, its president, Consuelo Abad, correctly filed the complaints even if some of them
involved rights and interest purely or exclusively appertaining to individual employees, it appearing that
she signed the complaints "for and in behalf of the University of Pangasinan Faculty Union."
17

The University's contention that petitioner had no legal personality to institute and prosecute money
claims must, therefore, fail. To quote then Associate Justice Teehankee in Heirs of Teodelo M. Cruz
v. CIR,
18
"[w]hat should be borne in mind is that the interest of the individual worker can be better
protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its moral and legal obligations to represent the rank
and file faithfully and secure for them the best wages and working terms and conditions. . . . Although this
was stated within the context of collective bargaining, it applies equally well to cases, such as the present
wherein the union, through its president, presented its individual members' grievances through proper
proceedings. While the complaints might not
have disclosed the identities of the individual employees claiming monetary benefits,
19
such technical
defect should not be taken against the claimants, especially because the University appears to have
failed to demand a bill of particulars during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
On the merits of the petition, the NLRC did not abuse its discretion in resolving the appeal from the
decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Tumang except for the disallowance of the emergency cost of
living allowance to members of the petitioner. The Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1713 which took
effect on August 18, 1980 provide:
Sec. 6. Allowances of full-time and part-time employees. Employees shall be paid
in full the monthly allowance on the basis of the scales provided in Section 3 hereof,
regardless of the number of their regular working days if they incur no absences
during the month. If they incur absences without pay, the amounts corresponding to
the absences may be deducted from the monthly allowance provided that in
determining the equivalent daily allowance of such deduction, the applicable monthly
allowance shall be divided by thirty (30) days.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied).
This Section, which is a virtual reproduction of Section 12 of the old Rules Implementing P.D. No.
1123, has been interpreted by this Court as requiring that the full amount of the cost of living
allowance mandated by law should be given monthly to each employee if the latter has worked
continuously for each month, regardless of the number of the regular working days.
20
But
more apropos is the ruling of this Court in University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University of
Pangasinan and NLRC,
21
a case involving the same parties as in the instant petition and dealing with a
complaint filed by the petitioner on December 18, 1981 seeking, among others, the payment of
emergency cost of living allowances for November 7 to December 5, 1981, a semestral break. The Court
held therein:
. . . The "No work, no pay" principle does not apply in the instant case. The
petitioner's members received their regular salaries during this period. It is clear from
the . . . law that it contemplates a "no work" situation where the employees voluntarily
absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, certainly do not, ad
voluntatem absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather, they are constrained
to take mandatory leave from work. For this, they cannot be faulted nor can they be
begrudged that which is due them under the law. To a certain extent, the private
respondent can specify dates when no classes would be held. Surely, it was not the
intention of the framers of the law to allow employers to withhold employee benefits
by the simple expedient of unilaterally imposing "no work" days and consequently
avoiding compliance with the mandate of the law for those days.
As interpreted and emphasized in the same case, the law granting emergency cost of living
allowances was designed to augment the income of the employees to enable them to cope with the
rising cost of living and inflation. Clearly, it was enacted in pursuance of the State's duty to protect
labor and to alleviate the plight of the workers. To uphold private respondent's interpretation of the
law would be running counter to the intent of the law and the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the NLRC is
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that private respondent University of Pangasinan shall
pay its regular and fulltime teachers and employees emergency cost of living allowance for the
period April 1-15, 1981. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55674 July 25, 1983
LA SUERTE CIGAR AND CIGARETTE FACTORY, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, THE LA SUERTE CIGAR AND
CIGARETTE FACTORY PROVINCIAL (Luzon) AND METRO MANILA SALES FORCE
ASSOCIATION-NATU, and THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Marcelino Lontok, Jr. for respondent NATU.

GUERRERO, J .:
In the determination of the basic issue raised in the case at bar involving the status of some 14
members of private respondent local union whether they are employees of petitioner company in
which case they should be included in the 30% jurisdictional requirement necessary to support the
petition for certification election, or independent contractors and hence, excluded therefrom, Our
rulings in Mafinco Trading Corp. vs. Ople, 70 SCRA 139, where We reiterated the "control test"
earlier laid down in Investment Planning Corp. vs. Social Security System, 21 SCRA 924, and
in Social Security System vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Shriro (Phils.) Inc., 37 SCRA 579 are
authoritative and controlling.
In the Mafinco case, the Court, through Justice Aquino, said:
In a petition for certiorari, the issue of whether respondents are employees or
independent contractors should be resolved mainly in the light of their peddling
contracts. Pro hac vice the issue of whether Repomanta and Moralde were
employees of Mafinco or were independent contractors should be resolved mainly in
the light of their peddling contracts. A different approach would lead this Court astray
into the field of factual controversy where its legal pronouncements would not rest on
solid grounds.
A contract whereby one engages to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied
by the manufacturer but providing that other party (peddler) shall have the right to
employ his own workers, shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against
losses, shall be responsible for damages caused to third persons, shall obtain the
necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of the
soft drinks is not a contract of employment.-We hold that under their peddling
contracts Repomanta and Moralde were not employees of Mafinco but were
independent contractors as found by the NLRC and its factfinder and by the
committee appointed by the Secretary of Labor to look into the status of Cosmos and
Mafinco peddlers. They were distributors of Cosmos soft drinks with their own capital
and employees. Ordinarily, an employee or a mere peddler does not execute a
formal contract of employment. He is simply hired and he works under the direction
and control of the employer. Repomanta and Moralde voluntarily executed with
Mafinco formal peddling contracts which indicate the manner in - which they would
se Cosmos soft drinks. That circumstance signifies that they were acting as
independent businessmen. They were free to sign or not to sign that contract. If they
did not want to sell Cosmos products under the conditions defined in that contract,
they were free to reject it. But having signed it, they were bound by its stipulations
and the consequences thereof under existing labor laws. One such stipulation is the
right of the parties to terminate the contract upon 5 days' prior notice. Whether the
termination in this case was an unwarranted dismissal of an employee, as contended
by Repomanta and Moralde, is a point that cannot be resolved without submission of
evidence. Using the contract itself as the sole criterion, the termination should
perforce be characterized as simply the exercise of a right freely stipulated upon by
the parties.
Tests for determining the existence of employer-employee relationship.-In
determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elements
are generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to
control the employees' conduct-although the latter is the most important element.
Factors to determine existence of independent contract relationship. An
independent contractor is one who exercises independent employment and contracts
to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to
control of his employer except as to the result of the work. 'Among the factors to be
considered are whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business;
whether the work is part of the employer's general business; the nature and extent of
the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to
assign the performance of the work to another; the power to terminate the
relationship; the existence of a contract for the performance of a specified piece of
work; the control and supervision of the work; the employer's powers and duties with
respect to the hiring, firing, and payment of the contractor's servants; the control of
the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, material and labor,
and the mode, manner, and terms of payment.'
In the Shriro case, We held that the common law rule of determining the existence of employer-
employee relationship, principally the "control test", applies in its jurisdiction. Where the element of
control is absent; where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure
and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and in turn is compensated according to
the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, relationship of employer and employee does not
exist.
And supplementing the above jurisprudence is Our ruling in Social Security System vs. The Hon.
Court of Appeals, Manila Jockey Club, Inc., Phil. Racing Club, 30 SCRA 210 wherein the Supreme
Court, speaking through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Fernando, held:
The question of when there is employer-employee relationship for purposes of the
Social Security Act has been settled in this jurisdiction in the case of Investment
Planning Corp. vs. Social Security System, 21 SCRA 924 which applied the so-called
control test, that is, whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control
the employee not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the
means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. In other words, where
the element of control is absent; whether a person who works for another does so
more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of
work, and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the
amount thereof, we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee
exists. This decision rejected the economic facts of the relation test.
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the resolution of the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations dated January 15, 1980 ordering that a certification election be conducted among
the sales personnel of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory, as well as his resolution dated
November 18, 1980 denying the motion for reconsideration and directing that a certification election
be conducted immediately. The said resolutions reversed and set aside the order of dismissal dated
August 29, 1979 of the Med-Arbiter.
The antecedent facts show that on April 7, 1979, the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory
Provincial (Luzon) and Metro Manila Sales Force Association (herein referred to as the local union)
applied for and was granted chapter status by the National Association of Trade Unions (hereinafter
referred to as NATU).
On April 16, 1979, some thirty-one (31) local union members signed a joint letter withdrawing their
membership from NATU.
Nonetheless, on April 18, 1979, the local union and NATU filed a petition for direct certification or
certification election which alleged among others, that forty-eight of the sixty sales personnel of the
Company were members of the local union; that the petition is supported by no less than 75% of the
sales force; that there is no existing recognized labor union in the Company representing the said
sales personnel; that there is likewise no existing collecting bargaining agreement; and that there
had been no certification election in the last twelve months preceding the filing of the petition.
The Company then filed a motion to dismiss the petition on June 13, 1979 on the ground that it is not
supported by at least 30% of the members of the proposed bargaining unit because (a) of the
alleged forty-eight (48) members of the local union, thirty-one (31) had withdrawn prior to the filing of
the petition; and (b) fourteen (14) of the alleged members of the union were not employees of the
Company but were independent contractors.
NATU and the local union opposed the Company's motion to dismiss alleging that the fourteen
dealers are actually employees of the Company because they are subject to its control and
supervision.
On August 29, 1979, the Med-Arbiter issued an order dismissing the petition for lack of merit as the
fourteen dealers who joined the union should not be counted in determining the 30% consent
requirement because they are not employees but independent contractors and the withdrawal of the
31 salesmen from the union prior to the filing of the petition for certification election was
uncontroverted by the parties.
Thereafter, on September 24, 1979, the local union on its own signed only by the local union
President, filed a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal from the order of dismissal on the
following grounds: (a) the findings of facts of the med-arbiter as it appears on the order are contrary
to facts and (b) in finding that no employer-employee relationship exists between the alleged dealers
and respondent firm, the med-arbiter decided in a manner not in accord with the factual
circumstances attendant to the relationship.
Acting on the motion for reconsideration/appeal, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, in the
Resolution dated January 15, 1980, reversed and set aside the order of dismissal, holding that the
withdrawal of the 31 signatories to the petition two days prior to the filing of the instant petition did
not establish the fact that the same was executed freely and voluntarily and that the records are
replete with company documents showing that the alleged dealers are in fact employees of the
company.
The Company then filed a motion to set aside the resolution dated January 15, 1980 of the Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations, contending that the appeal was never perfected or is
jurisdictionally defective, copy of the motion for reconsideration/appeal not having been served upon
the Company, and that the Resolution was based solely on the distorted and self-serving allegations
of the union.
The local union opposed the Company's motion for reconsideration and submitted a memorandum
on April 22, 1980 in amplification of its opposition.
At this juncture, the legal counsel of NATU filed a manifestation on May 15, 1980 stating that the act
of the local union of engaging another lawyer to handle the case amounts to disaffiliation, for which
reason said legal counsel was withdrawing from the case. The local union counter manifested that
the local union had not been officially notified of its expulsion from the NATU; that there was no valid
ground for its expulsion; that the National Executive Council of NATU had not approved such
expulsion; and that it had no objection to the withdrawal of Atty. Marcelino Lontok, Jr. as its counsel.
Then came a motion of NATU through its President and legal counsel withdrawing as petitioner and
contending that since the local union was no longer affiliated with it, it was no longer interested in the
case. Twelve members of the National Executive Council then came in and manifested that they
constitute a majority of the Executive Board of NATU and affirmed that the local union was still an
affiliate of NATU.
There followed a counter-manifestation of Atty. Marcelino Lontok, Jr. on August 27, 1980 stating that
six signatories to the aforesaid manifestation had no authority to make the said foregoing statement
as they had resigned from the Executive Board en masse; that the acts of the President may not be
reversed by the Executive Council; and that the twelve signatories did not constitute a majority of the
sixty (60) members of the Executive Council.
The local union made its reply to the counter-manifestation stating that the power to expel an affiliate
exclusively belonged to the National Executive Council of NATU, under Section 2, Article V of the
NATU Constitution and By-Laws; that such power could only be wielded after due investigation and
hearing; that disaffiliation is effected only by voluntary act of the local union, which is not the case
here, because it is the President and legal counsel who are trying to expel the union.
Simultaneously with said reply, the local union filed an opposition to Atty. Lontok's motion to dismiss-
withdraw petition, stating that Atty. Lontok had no more personality to file the same inasmuch as he
had previously withdrawn as counsel in his manifestation dated May 7, 1980, and the local union has
accepted the same in its counter-manifestation dated May 16, 1980; that expulsion requires two-
thirds vote of the members of the National Executive Council, as well as investigation and hearing;
that engaging another lawyer is not a ground for expulsion of an affiliate; and that the local union
was compelled to hire another lawyer because up to the last day of the reglementary period, Atty.
Lontok still had not filed an appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter.
On November 18, 1980, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations promulgated a resolution
denying the Company's motion for reconsideration and directing that the certification election be
conducted immediately. Hence, this petition.
In the apparently simple task of determining whether the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the direct
certification election, three difficult issues must be resolved, namely:
I. Whether or not the 14 dealers are employees or independent contractors.
II. Whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members from the NATU affected the petition for
certification election insofar as the thirty per cent requirement is concerned.
III. Whether or not the withdrawal of the petition for certification election by the NATU, through its
President and legal counsel, was valid and effective.
A basic factor underlying the exercise of rights under the Labor Code is status of employment. The
question of whether employer-employee relationship exists is a primordial consideration before
extending labor benefits under the workmen's compensation, social security, medicare, termination
pay and labor relations law. It is important in the determination of who shall be included in a
proposed bargaining unit because it is the sine qua non, the fundamental and essential condition
that a bargaining unit be composed of employees. Failure to establish this juridical relationship
between the union members and the employer affects the legality of the union itself. It means the
ineligibility of the union members to present a petition for certification election as well as to vote
therein. Corollarily, when a petition for certification election is supported by 48 signatories in a
bargaining unit composed of 60 salesmen, but 14 of the 48 lacks employee status, the petition is
vitiated thereby. Herein lies the importance of resolving the status of the dealers in this case.
It is the contention of the company that the dealers in the sale of its tobacco products are
independent contractors. On the other hand, the Union contends that such dealers are actually
employees entitled to the coverage and benefits of labor relations laws.
According to the petitioner, to effectively market its products, the Company maintains a network of
dealers all over the country. These arrangements are covered by a dealership agreement signed
between the Company and a dealer in a particular area or territory. And attached to the petition is a
representative copy of the said dealership agreement which We quote below:
DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT, executed at Pasay City, Philippines, this 8 day of
March 1977, entered into by JOSE TEN SIU KEE, JR., of legal age, married and a
resident of 178-E San Ramon Street, Iloilo City, hereinafter referred to as DEALER,
and TELENGTAN BROTHERS & SONS, INC., doing business under the style of "LA
SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY", hereinafter referred to as FACTORY,
bears witness that:
WHEREAS, JOSE TAN SIU KEE, JR. of 178-E San Ramon Street, Iloilo City, had
applied to be a DEALER of the FACTORY for the territories of ILOILO and/or such
other territories that the FACTORY may designate from time to time; and
WHEREAS, the FACTORY had accepted the application of JOSE TAN SIU KEE,
JR., and therefore, appointed him as one of its dealers in ILOILO and/or such other
territories that the FACTORY may designate from time to time, who is willing and
able to do so as such for the main purpose of extensively selling the products of the
FACTORY in the said territories, under the following express terms and conditions, to
wit:
1. That the DEALER shall handle for sale and distribution of cigarette products of the
factory covering the territories of ILOILO and/or such other territories that the
FACTORY may designate from time to time, in accordance with existing laws and
regulations of the government, without however, incurring any expenses in doing so,
without the previous written consent of the FACTORY being first had and obtained;
2. That for the purpose of selling the cigarettes or products of the FACTORY, the
DEALER shall send his orders to the FACTORY plant in Paraaque, Metro Manila,
either in cash or on credit; Provided, however, that in cases of credit order the
DEALER can only get or order the supply of cigarettes up to the amount of not more
than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) only at any given time during the
existence of this Contract, unless allowed by the FACTORY to get more;
3. That the FACTORY shall supply the DEALER with a truck or panel delivery and all
expenses shall be borne by the FACTORY; driver shall be borne by the DEALER;
4. That the DEALER shall not receive any commission from the FACTORY but the
latter shall give the DEALER a discount for all sales either on consignment or in
cash, and said discount shall be decided by the FACTORY from time to time;
5. That the FACTORY shall not be liable for any violation of any law, which the
DEALER may commit, and that the DEALER alone shall be responsible for any
violation;
6. The geographical area (hereinafter referred to as "Territory") covered by this
Agreement in which the DEALER shall undertake the responsibilities provided herein
is ILOILO. It is, however, agreed and understood that the FACTORY may from time
to time, upon written notice thereof THE DEALER, change or subdivide the Territory
as the business exigencies, and the policy of the FACTORY with respect thereto will
dictate.
7. The DEALER agrees that during the term of this Agreement:
(a) He will diligently, loyally and faithfully serve the FACTORY as its
DEALER and diligently canvass for buyers of the FACTORY's
Products in the Territory;
(b) He shall not sell or distribute goods of a similar nature or such as
would compete and interfere with the sale of the Products of the
FACTORY in the Territory, either on his account or on behalf of any
other person whatsoever;
(c) Furnish to the FACTORY every three (3) months a list of the
buyers/customers in the Territory, specifying the names and address
of such customers as well as their individual daily supply/stock
requirements;
(d) He will faithfully and religiously abide by the FACTORY policy,
rules and regulations, particularly with respect to the pricing of all
Products to be sold and distributed by him;
(e) He will keep account of all his dealings hereunder and promptly
liquidate his account with the FACTORY with respect to the Products
sold by him in the Territory;
(f) He will not engage in any activity which will in any manner
prejudice either the business or name of the FACTORY, such as, but
not limited to, "black- marketing" operations;
(g) He will not withdraw cigarettes if the maximum volume allotted to
him by the FACTORY has been exceeded;
(8) That the DEALER shall sell the Products of the FACTORY at a price to be agreed
upon between both parties;
(9) That the DEALER shall hereby bind and obligate himself to furnish the
FACTORY, within a week from the date of this Contract with Surety or Cash Bond in
the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P 50,000.00). The surety
bond should be issued by one or several bonding companies acceptable to and
approved by the FACTORY to guarantee and secure complete and faithful
performance of the DEALER and his obligations herein enumerated, particularly the
payment of his financial obligations with the FACTORY. The bond may be increased
as required by the FACTORY;
10. In the event that the DEALER should become incapacitated to discharge his
undertakings and responsibilities under this Agreement, for any reason whatsoever,
the FACTORY may designated, for the duration of such incapacity, a substitute to
handle the sale and distribution of the Products in the Territory;
11. The FACTORY reserves its right to determine, from time to time, the amount of
credit granted or to be granted to the DEALER with respect to the Products to be
sold and distributed in the Territory;
12. This Agreement may be cancelled and/or terminated by the FACTORY should
the DEALER violate its undertaking under this Agreement especially with respect to
Paragraph 7(f) hereof. It is understood, however, that the failure of the FACTORY to
enforce at any time or for any period of time, any right, power or remedy accruing to
the FACTORY upon default by the DEALER of his undertakings under this
Agreement shall not impair any such right, power or remedy or to be construed to be
a waver or an acquiescence in such default; nor shall the action of the FACTORY in
respect of any default, or any acquiescence by it in any default, affect or impair any
right, power or remedy of the FACTORY in respect of any other default.
13. That either party may terminate this Contract without cause by giving to the other
party fifteen (15) days notice in writing but without prejudice to any right or claim
which as of that date may have accrued to either of the parties hereunder, however,
in the event of breach of this Contract, the FACTORY may terminate this Contract
without notice to the DEALER.
14. That it is hereby finally stipulated and agreed that in case of litigation arising out
of or in connection with this Contract, the Municipal Court of Paraaque or the Court
of First Instance cf Rizal, as the case may be, shall be the competent court wherein
to file such action or actions.
15. That this Contract shall supersede any Contract which the DEALER may have
with the FACTORY.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, these presents are signed at Pasay City, Philippines on this 8 day of
March 1977.
TELENGTAN BROTHERS & SONS, INC.
(La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory)
FACTORY
By:
(SGD.) LIM HAN ENG (SGD.) JOSE TAN SIU KEE, JR.
Assistant Manager Dealer
Sales Department TAN 5976-397-9
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(SGD.) ILLEGIBLE (SGD.) ILLEGIBLE"
(Acknowledgment omitted)
The records embody standard copies of the Dealership Supplementary Agreement which We also
quote hereunder:
DEALERSHIP SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Supplementary Agreement, made and entered into this 14th day of February,
1975 in Pasay City, Philippines, by and between:
TELENGTAN BROTHERS & SONS, INC., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and doing
business under the business name and style of "LA SUERTE CIGAR
& CIGARETTE FACTORY", with principal place of business at Km.
14 South Super Highway, Paranaque, Rizal, represented in this act
by its duly authorized Manager, Mr. ROBERT UY, hereinafter referred
to as COMPANY;
and
MR. PURISIMO EMBING of legal age, married, Filipino and with
postal address at 3047 Lawaan, UP II, Paranaque, Rizal hereinafter
referred to as DEALER,
WITNESSETH: That
For and in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements made herein, by
one to the other, the COMPANY and the DEALER, by these presents, enter into this
Supplementary Agreement whereby the COMPANY will avail of the services of the
DEALER to handle the sale and distribution of its cigarette products, consisting of
MARLBORO REGULAR, MARLBORO KING SIZE, MARLBORO 100'S; PHILIP
MORRIS REGULAR, PHILIP MORRIS FILTER KING, PHILIP MORRIS 100'S
MENTHOL, PHILIP MORRIS 100'S REGULAR; ALPINE 100'S; MR. SLIM 100'S
REGULAR, MR. SLIM 100'S MENTHOL, subject to the following terms and
conditions:
1. The COMPANY hereby constitutes and appoints the DEALER as its authorized
dealer for the sale and distribution of the COMPANY's products as enumerated
above, (hereinafter referred to as "Products") and the DEALER hereby accepts such
appointment, all upon the terms and conditions herein contained.
2. The geographical area (hereinafter referred to as "Territory") covered by this
Agreement in which the DEALER shall undertake the responsibilities provided herein
is GREATER MANILA AND SUBURBS. It is, however, agreed and understood that
the COMPANY may from time to time, upon written notice thereof to the DEALER,
change or subdivide the Territory as the business exigencies, and the policy of the
COMPANY with respect thereto will dictate.
3. The DEALER agrees that during the term of this Agreement:
(a) He will diligently, loyally and faithfully serve the COMPANY as its
DEALER and diligently canvass for buyers of the COMPANY's
Products in the Territory;
(b) He shall not sell or distribute goods of a similar nature or such as
would compete and interfere with the sale or the Products of the
COMPANY in the Territory, either on this account or on behalf of any
other person whatsoever;
(c) Furnish to the COMPANY every three (3) months a list of the
buyers/customers in the Territory, specifying the names and address
of such customers as well as their individual daily supply/stock
requirements;
(d) He will faithfully and religiously abide by the COMPANY policy,
rules and regulations, particularly with respect to the pricing of all
Products to be sold and distributed by him;
(e) He will keep account of all his dealings hereunder and promptly
liquidate his account with the COMPANY with respect to the Products
sold by him in the Territory;
(f) He will not engage in any activity which will in any manner
prejudice either the business or name of the COMPANY, such as, but
not limited to, "Black marketing" operations;
(g) He will not withdraw cigarettes if the maximum volume allotted to
him by the COMPANY has been exceeded;
5. The DEALER shall put up a bond, or additional bond, with the COMPANY in such
amount or amounts, as in the judgment of the COMPANY, will be satisfactory. It is
agreed that the COMPANY can apply against said bond or additional bond, such
damages as may be suffered by the COMPANY by reason of breach on the part of
the DEALER of any of the latter's undertakings under this Agreement.
6. In the event that the DEALER should become incapacitated to discharge his
undertakings and responsibilities under this Agreement, for any reason whatsoever,
the COMPANY may designate for the duration of such incapacity, a substitute to
handle the sale and distribution of the Products in the Territory;
7. The COMPANY reserves its right to determine, from time to time, the amount of
credit granted or to be granted to the DEALER with respect to the Products to be
sold and distributed in the Territory.
8. This Agreement may be cancelled and/or terminated by the COMPANY should the
DEALER violate its undertaking under this Agreement especially with respect to
Paragraph 4(f) hereof. It is understood. however, that the failure of the COMPANY to
enforce at any time or for any period of time, any right, power or remedy accruing to
the COMPANY upon default by the DEALER of his undertakings under this
Agreement shall not impair any such right, power or remedy or be construed to be a
waiver or an acquiescence in such default; nor shall the action of the COMPANY in
respect of any default, or any acquiescence by it in any default, affect or impair any
right, power or remedy of the COMPANY in respect of any other default.
(9) In the appropriate cases, this Agreement shall constitute as a supplement,
revision or modification of any agreement between the company and the DEALER
now existing. However, should there be a conflict between the provisions of this
Agreement and any such existing agreement between the COMPANY and the
DEALER, this Agreement shall prevail.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused these presents to be
signed at the place and on the date hereinabove written.
TELENGTAN BROTHERS & SONS, INC.
(La Suerte Cigar & Cigarette Factory)
By:
(SGD.) ROBERT UY (SGD.) PURISIMO EMBING
Manager DEALER
(Signature of Witnesses & Acknowledgment Omitted)
Following the rule in the Mafinco case that in a petition for certiorari, the issue of whether
respondents are employees or independent contractors should be resolved mainly in the light of their
peddling contracts, so must We likewise resolve the status of the 14 members of the local union
involved herein mainly on their dealership agreements for verily, "a different approach would lead
this Court astray into the field of factual controversy where its legal pronouncements would not rest
on solid grounds." We must stress the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Accordingly, after considering the terms and stipulations of the Dealership Contracts which are clear
and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties in establishing the relationship
between the dealers on one hand and the company on the other as that of buyer and seller, We find
that the status thereby created is one of independent contractorship, pursuant to the first rule in the
interpretation of contracts that the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control. (Article 1370, New
Civil Code)
From the plain language of the Dealership Agreement, We find that the same is premised with the
prefatory statement "the factory has accepted the application of (name of applicant) and therefore
has appointed him as one of its dealers." Its terms and conditions include the following: that the
dealer shall handle the products in accordance with existing laws and regulations of the government
(par. ); that the dealer shall send his orders to the factory plant in cash in any amount or on credit up
to the amount of not more than P10,000.00 only at any given time (par. 2); that the factory shall
supply the dealer with a truck or a panel delivery and all expenses for repairs shall be borne by the
factory (par. 3); and that the dealer shall not receive any commission but shall be given a discount
for all sales and said discount shall be decided by the factory from time to time (par. 4).
It also provides that the dealer alone shall be responsible for any violation of any law (par. 5); that
the dealer shall be assigned to a particular territory which the factory may decide from time to time
(par. 6); that the dealer shall sell the products at the price to be agreed upon between the parties
(par. 7); and that the dealer shall post a surety bond of not less than P10,000.00 to guarantee and
secure complete and faithful performance (par. 8).
Either party may terminate the contract without cause by giving 15 days notice in writing; however, in
the event of breach or failure to comply with any of the conditions, the factory may terminate or
rescind the contract immediately (par. 9 and 10).
The Dealership Supplementary Agreement reiterates that the Company "hereby constitute and
appoints the DEALER as its authorized dealer for the sale and distribution of the COMPANY
products" and "the DEALER hereby accepts such appointment" (par. 1). It also provides that the
geographical area in which the dealer shall undertake his responsibilities is Greater Manila and
Suburbs. However, the Company may change or subdivide the territory as the business exigencies
and the policy of the Company will dictate (par. 2).
Under said supplementary agreement, the dealer undertakes to: (a) diligently canvass for buyers of
the Company's products; (b) refrain from selling or distributing goods of similar nature; (c) furnish the
Company every 3 months a list of buyers/customers, specifying their addresses and individual daily
supply; (d) abide by the Company policy, particularly with respect to pricing; (e) keep account of all
his dealings and promptly liquidate his accounts; (f) refrain from engaging in any activity which will
prejudice the Company from withdrawing cigarettes beyond the maximum volume allotted to him
(par. 3.)
In case of incapacity of the dealer, the Company may designate a substitute (par. 6). The Company
also reserves the right to determine, from time to time, the amount of credit granted or to be granted
to the dealer (par. 7).
It is likewise immediately noticeable that no such words as "to hire and employ" are present. The
Dealership Agreement uses the words "the factory has accepted the application of (name of
applicant) and therefore has appointed him as one of its dealers"; whereas the Dealership
Supplementary Agreement is prefaced with the statement: "For and in consideration of the mutual
covenants and agreements made herein, by one to the other, the COMPANY and the DEALER by
these presents, enter into this Supplementary Agreement whereby the COMPANY will avail of the
services of the DEALER to handle the sale and distribution of the cigarette products". Nothing in the
terms and conditions likewise reveals that the dealers were engaged as employees.
Again, on the basis of the clear terms of the dealership agreements, no mention is made of the
wages of the dealers. In fact, it specifies that the dealer shall not receive any commission from the
factory but the latter shall give the dealer a discount for all sales either on consignment or in cash
(par. 4).
Considering the matter of wages, the term "wages" as defined in Section 2 of the Minimum Wage
Law (Rep. Act No. 602) as amended, is as follows:
(g) 'Wage' paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of calculating
the same, which is payable by an employer under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done or for services rendered or to be rendered,
and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor,
of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the
employee ...
Section 10(k) of the same law also provides:
(k) Notification of wage conditions. It shall be the duty of every employer to notify his
employees at the time of hiring of the wage conditions under which they are
employed, which shall include the following-
(1) The rate of wages payable;
(2) The method of calculation of wages;
(3) The periodicity of wage payment; the day, the hour and place of payment; and
(4) Any change with respect to any of the foregoing items."
then, par. (h) of Sec. 10 of said law provides that such "wages" must be paid to them periodically at
least once every two weeks or twice a month. Considering the foregoing, the dealer's discount lacks
the foregoing characteristics of the term "wage". Since it varies from month to month depending on
the volume of the sales, it lacks the characteristic of periodicity in the manner and procedure
contemplated in the Minimum Wage Law.
Respondents, in effect, admit the clarity of the terms and conditions of the agreements which
covenant that the relationship between the dealers and the Company is one of buyer and seller of La
Suerte products, and therefore, one of an independent contractorship when they claimed that the
dealership arrangement as established under the Dealership Agreement and the Dealership
Supplementary Agreement is essentially a legal cover, cloak or disguise to hide the continuing
Employer-Employee relationship established prior to 1964. (Respondents' Joint Memorandum, p.
34).
Precisely, there was need to change the contract of employment because of the change of
relationship, from an employee to that of an independent dealer or contractor. The employees were
free to enter into the new status, to sign or not to sign the new agreement. As in the Mafinco case,
the respondents therein as in the instant case, were free to reject the terms of the dealership but
having signed it, they were bound by its stipulations and the consequences thereof under existing
labor laws. The fact that the 14 local union members voluntarily executed with La Suerte formal
dealership agreements which indicate the distribution and sale of La Suerte cigarettes signifies that
they were acting as independent businessmen.
We ruled earlier that the terms and stipulations of the dealership agreement leave no room for doubt
that the parties entered into a transaction for the distribution and sale of La Suerte products whereby
the distributor/sever or dealer assumes the status of an independent contractor. We note that the
applicant who is appointed dealer "is willing and able to do as such for the main purpose of
extensively selling the products of the FACTORY in the said territories under certain expressed
terms and conditions" among them: "1. That the DEALER shall handle for saleand distribution
cigarette products of the factory ..."; "2. That for the purpose of selling cigarettes or products of the
factory, the dealer shall send his order to the factory plant in Paraaque, Metro Manila either in cash
or on credit ..."; "4. That the dealer shall not receive any commission from the factory but the latter
shall give the dealer a discount for all sales either on consignment or in cash ..."; "7. (b) He shall
not sell or distribute goods of a similar nature or such as would compete and interfere with the sale
of the products of the factory in the territory, either on his account or on behalf of any other person
whatsoever ..."; "8. That the dealer shall sell the products of the factory at a price to be agreed upon
between both parties."
It is not disputed that under the dealership agreement, the dealer purchases and sells the cigarettes
manufactured by the company under and for his own account. The dealer places his order for the
purchase of cigarettes to be sold by him in a particular territory by filling up an Issuance Slip. The
Issuance Slip is approved by the Sales Manager and after the sale is approved, a Sales Invoice is
then issued to the dealer. On the basis of the approved Issuance Slip and the Sales Invoice, the
dealer secures the delivery of his order from the warehouse of the company and upon delivery of the
cigarettes from the warehouse, the dealer has the 'obligation to pay whether the cigarettes are
disposed or not. The dealer on his own account sells the cigarettes in any manner he deems best
without constraint as to time. The dealers do not devote their full time in selling company products.
They are likewise engaged in other livelihood and businesses while selling cigarettes manufactured
by the company.
The sales to the dealers are either on cash or credit basis. Where it is on cash basis, the amount is
paid immediately upon the delivery of the products from the company's warehouse. If it is on credit,
the dealer would usually settle his account within one week from the time the credit is extended to
him. Upon payment of the purchase price, a company official receipt is issued to him.
Private respondents contend that there are essential differences between the dealership agreement
and that in actual practice and operation, then proceeded to point them in the attempt to prove the
control of La Suerte over the sales effort of the dealers. They also contend that the dealership
agreement, as stated earlier, is essentially a legal cover, a cloak or disguise to hide the continuing
employer-employee relationship established prior to 1964.
We reject both contentions as being without merit.
In the first place, We cannot accept nor consider evidence varying the terms of the agreement other
than the contents of the writing itself pursuant to Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides that:
Section 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and,
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing except
in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by
the pleadings.
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term 'agreement' includes wills.
If there are changes by reason of actual practice and operation, certiorari is not the proper
proceeding or remedy therefor.
In the second place, petitioner's claim that respondent local union relies heavily on
evidence dehors the record or extraneous evidence found in cases other than the one at bar, as the
testimony in the Limarez case, NCR Case AB-3-4960-80 cited extensively (pp. 63, 64, 65-66, 66-67,
68-69, 70-72, 73-76, 77-83, 84-85, 86-87, 89, 90-94, 97-98, 107, Comment of Local Union) and that
practically all the appendages to the Comment of Local Union constituting the main bulk thereof
(Annexes 1 to 52) were evidence introduced in other cases and not in the case at bar, is meritorious.
We reject said evidence dehors the record and the appendages raised for the first time on appeal as
extrinsic, beyond the scope of this review.
Private respondents contend that under the dealership agreement, the totality of the powers
expressly reserved to the company, respecting essential aspects or facets of the sales operation of
the dealers, clearly establish company control over the manner and details of performance. And they
cite the following: "(1) The dealer shall be assigned to a particular territory which the factory shall
decide from time to time (par. 6); (2) The dealer shall handle for sale and distribution cigarette
products of the company. . . without however incurring any expense in doing so, without previous
written consent of the factory being first had and obtained (par. 1); (3) In cases of credit order, the
dealer can only get or order the supply of cigarettes up to the amount of not more than P 10,000.00
only at any given time during the existence of this contract, unless allowed by the factory to get more
(par. 2); (4) The company shall give the dealer a discount for all sales . . . and said discount shall be
decided by the factory from time to time (par. 4); (5) It is however agreed and understood that the
company may, from time to time, upon written notice thereof to the dealer, change or divide the
territory as the business exigencies and policy of the factory with respect thereto will dictate (par. 2,
Annex 10); (6) Each dealer will faithfully and religiously abide by the company policy, rules and
regulations, particularly with respect to pricing of all products to be sold and distributed by him (par.
3, sub-par. (d), Annex 10); (7) The dealer shall put up a bond or additional bond with the company in
such amounts as in the judgment of the company may be satisfactory (par. 5, Annex 10); (8) In the
event that the dealer should become incapacitated for any reason whatsoever, the factory may
designate for the duration of said incapacity a substitute to handle the sale and distribution of the
products in the territory (par. 6, Annex 10); (9) The company reserves the right to determine, from
time to time, the amount of credit granted or to be granted the dealer (par. 7, Annex 10); (10) This
agreement may be cancelled and/or terminated by the company should the dealer violate its
undertaking under this Agreement, especially par. 7(f) hereof (par. 8, Annex 10); (11) That either
party may terminate this contract without cause by giving to the other party 15 days notice in writing
(par. 9, Annex 9); and (12) In the event of breach of this contract, the company may terminate this
contract without notice to the dealer (proviso in par. 9, Annex 9). "
1

Disputing private respondents' above contention that the company exercises company control over
the manner and details of the sales operation of the dealers and not merely over the result of the
work of each dealer, petitioner maintains that:
1. The allocation of a definite territory to be assigned to a dealer or distributor is standard practice in
dealership agreements, whether international or domestic. Allocation of area responsibility and
territorial and customer restrictions are common features of dealership agreements. Thus, a
company may be appointed exclusive distributor or dealer of a product in the Philippines, the Asian
region or in the Far East in the same way that some Philippine manufacturers appoint exclusive
dealers for the United States or Canada;
2. In the Shriro case, the expenses for handling and delivery of the goods to the customers are all for
the account of the company (See Social Security System vs. Hon. Court of Appeals & Shriro (Phil.)
Inc., 37 SCRA 579) and there, the Supreme Court did not consider the facts as indicia of an
employment relation;
3. In limiting a credit order for cigarettes up to the amount of P 10,000.00 only at any given time
during the existence of the contract, unless allowed by the factory to get more, the company merely
controls the result of the work of the dealer. The credit order is limited because in a dealership
contract, the transaction is one of buy and sell and once an order is made, specially a credit order,
the risk of loss is passed on to the dealer;
4. In the Mafinco case, the peddlers are given also a discount and the Supreme Court held that the
peddling contract is not a contract of employment but signifies an independent contractor
relationship.
5. The change or division of the territory to which a dealer is assigned as the business exigencies
and policy of the factory with respect thereto will dictate from time to time is no indicia of company
control over the means and methods for in the Mafinco case the peddlers are also assigned definite
area routes or zones.
6. That the dealers shall abide with the company policies and rules, particularly in pricing of products
is a standard practice in dealership agreements and more so in franchising agreements. The fact
that a person has to conform with standards of conduct set by the company does not declassify such
a person as an independent contractor so long as he can determine his own day to day activities. In
independent contracts, there is always the element of control as to what shall be done as
distinguished from how it should be done.
7. The posting of a surety bond under par. 8 of the Dealers Agreement is similar to the giving of a
cash bond under par. 7, Peddlers Contract in the Mafinco case wherein it is ruled that the Peddlers
Contract involved therein is not an employment agreement.
8. The right to designate a substitute dealer in the event of the incapacity of the regular dealer is no
indication of an employer-employee relationship. It is just business prudence to provide for substitute
dealers in case of the regular dealer's incapacity.
9. That the company may determine from time to time the amount of credit granted or to be granted
the dealer is more a control over the result rather than the means as in Shriro case where the
company even reserves the right to approve or reject a sales order, whether on cash or on credit
basis.
10. The power to cancel or terminate should the dealer violate its undertaking under the agreement
on the basis of the company's opinion that the dealer must engage in any activity which will in any
manner prejudice either the business or name of the factory is a standard practice in dealership
agreements.
We agree with the petitioner. We hold further that the terms and conditions for the termination of the
contract are the usual and common stipulations in independent contractorship agreements. In any
event, the contention that the totality of the powers expressly reserved to the company establish
company control over the manner and details of performance is merely speculative and conjectural.
There are indeed striking similarities between the Peddler's Contract in the Mafinco case and the
Dealer's Agreement and Supplementary Dealer's Agreement in the case at bar. Thus:
1. Use of company facilities La Suerte provides dealers with truck or panel delivery (par. 3,
Dealer's Agreement) whereas in Mafinco, the company also provides peddler with delivery truck
(par. 1, Peddling Contract);
2. Salary of drivers Dealer in this La Suerte case pays salary of driver (par. 3, Dealer's
Agreement). In Mafinco, the salary of drivers is for peddler's account (par. 2, Peddling Contract);
3. Expenses of operation and maintenance La Suerte pays for expenses and repair pertaining to
the truck or panel delivery (par. 3, Dealership Agreement). In Mafinco, the company furnishes
gasoline and oil to run trucks and bear costs of maintenance and repair (par. 4, Peddling Contract);
4. Profit Margin In instant La Suerte case, no commission given. Company gives a sales discount
(par. 4, Dealership Agreement). In Mafinco, no commission is also given. Peddler given a sales
discount (par. 6, Peddler's Contract);
5. Collateral Dealer in La Suerte gives a surety bond (par. 8, Dealer's Agreement). In Mafinco,
peddler gives a cash bond (par. 7), Peddler's Contract);
6. Payment Dealer required to promptly liquidate account (par. 3, (e), Supplementary Dealer's
Contract). In Mafinco, peddler liquidates everyday at the end of each day, otherwise his cash bond
shall answer for unliquidated account (par. 8, Peddler's Contract);
7. Termination In La Suerte case, no fixed period but either party may terminate after 15 days
written notice (par. 9, Dealer's Contract). In Mafinco, the contract is for one year but either party may
terminate earlier upon 5-day written notice (par. 9, Peddler's Contract);
8. Government licenses Dealers secure own municipal license and Mayor's permit (Annexes 23 to
24, Comment of Local Union). In Mafinco, peddler secure own licenses to peddle (Committee
Report, 70 SCRA 157);
9. Working hours Dealers have to get quotas daily but no fixed time. In Mafinco, peddlers get their
trucks in the morning and have to report daily (Report of Committee, 70 SCRA 154-156). No fixed
time;
10. Territory Dealer assigned a particular territory (par. 6, Dealer's Agreement). In Mafinco,
peddlers have a fixed territory in Manila, see whereas clause of Peddler's Contract, subject to
prearranged routes, areas and zones agreed upon by Peddler's Association (Committee Report, 70
SCRA 156);
11. Supervision Supervisors also for market analysis in La Suerte case. In Mafinco, Liaison
Officer or Supervisors for market analysis (Committee Report, 70 SCRA 156);
12. Basic Agreement In the instant La Suerte case, the dealer is "appointed" (not hired as in
employment contract) "to handle" products without commission but with sales discount through sales
invoices which state "sold to" dealer (Annex B, Petition; Annex D, Petition). Payments duly receipted
(Annex E, Petition). In Mafinco, the peddler is "desirous of buying and selling" (70 SCRA 143).
On the second issue-whether or not the withdrawal of 31 union members from NATU affected the
petition for certification election insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned, We reserve the Order
of the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, it appearing undisputably that the 31
union members had withdrawn their support to the petition before the filing of said petition. It would
be otherwise if the withdrawal was made after the filing of the petition for it would then be presumed
that the withdrawal was not free and voluntary. The presumption would arise that the withdrawal was
procured through duress, coercion or for valuable consideration. In other words, the distinction must
be that withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is
convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are
deemed involuntary.
The reason for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing of the
petition, the names of employees supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the
opposite party. Logically, any such withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness in the absence of
proof to the contrary. Moreover, it becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to
the filing of the petition, hence the subscription requirement has not been met.
When the withdrawal or retraction is made after the petition is filed, the employees who are
supporting the petition become known to the opposite party since their names are attached to the
petition at the time of filing. Therefore, it would not be unexpected that the opposite party would use
foul means for the subject employees to withdrawal their support.
In recapitulation, We hold and rule that the 14 members of respondent local union are dealers or
independent contractors. They are not employees of petitioner company. With the withdrawal by 31
members of their support to the petition prior to or before the filing thereof, making a total of 45, the
remainder of 3 out of the 48 alleged to have supported the petition can hardly be said to represent
the union. Hence, the dismissal of the petition by the Med-Arbiter was correct and justified.
Respondent Director committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the Med- Arbiter.
With the above pronouncements, the resolution of the third issue raised herein is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolution dated January 15, 1980 of
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations and the Resolution dated November 18,1980
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for certification election is ordered
dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.