Political Philosophy

Allen Jeffrey Gurfel

Honors Essay

I.

In Chapter 7 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia Robert Nozick presents the Wilt
Chamberlain argument. Imagine your preferred patterned distribution of resources, D1.
Now suppose basketball player Wilt Chamberlain, a great gate attraction, enters into a
contract stipulating that 25 of every ticket sold is paid directly to him. By the end of the
season Chamberlain has $250,000, much higher than the average income. Is he entitled to
this income? Is the new distribution, D2, unjust? If so, why? asks Nozick, noting that no
person had any claim of distributive justice against Chamberlain in D1, that all persons at D1
were free to dispose of their just shares as they pleased
a
, and that their choices to do so by
seeing Chamberlain play were voluntary. If D1 was a just distribution isnt D2 also just?
Third parties still have their shares. And certainly those who freely transferred 25 to
Chamberlain have no claim on any portion of that 25. Nozick concludes that no end-state
principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without
continuous interference with peoples lives. Any favored patter would be transformed into
one unflavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in various ways; for example, by
people exchanging goods and services with other people, or giving things [the transferors are
entitled to] to other people Any distributional pattern is overturnable by the voluntary
actions of individual persons over time.

II.

In Chapter 1 of Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality G.A. Cohen offers a response to
Nozicks Chamberlain argument, specifically aiming to defend socialism against the challenge
it poses.

Cohen cites Nozicks own account of just distributions: Whatever arises from a just
situation by just steps is itself just. Importing Nozicks position that steps are just if they are free
of injustice, and that they are free of injustice if they are fully voluntary on the part of all
agents who take them, Cohen paraphrases: Whatever arises from a just situation as a result of fully
voluntary transactions on the part of all the transacting agents is itself just. Cohen claims that this
principle is too strong to be accepted without much more defense than [Nozick] provides.
Instead he suggests a more plausible principle: Whatever arises from the just situation as a result of
fully voluntary transactions which all transacting agents would still have agreed to if they had known what the
results of so transacting were to be is itself just. This qualification is motivated by the observation
that individuals enter into transactions for reasons, assessing the benefits to themselves of
those transactions and acting accordingly.
b
Cohen argues that according to this plausible

a
There is an assumption here that a person can rightfully divest himself of the share allocated to him by D1.
Cohen touches on this in section 4 of this chapter.
b
This principle is intuitively plausible at least in a case like the following: a seller S is aware both that a buyer B
believes B will derive a certain benefit from the transaction and that B is thoroughly mistaken, ignorant of
some negative consequence N of the transaction, but S chooses to transact without informing B of N. If,
however, S and B are both ignorant of N, then transacting is not intuitively immoralbut it remains to
seriously consider whether the transaction is a just.
principle the transactions in question may be unjust. The transactors are not aware that their
actions will result not only in undesirable inequalities in the distribution of resources but also
in inequalities of power. Nozick would have us believe of third parties that their shares are
unaffected, but in fact inequalities of wealth and power have third party consequences.

Cohen correctly points out that Nozick is begging the question if he simply assumes
that any restriction on such transactions are unjust, for it will be clear that [the transactors]
rights are violated only if the entitlement they received was of the absolute Nozickian sort,
and this cannot be assumed. Whatever principles underlie D1 will generate restrictions on
the use of what is distributed in accordance with them. These underlying principles are
principles of justice, which Nozick fails to canvas and investigate.

Cohen turns to consider liberty. For even if Nozick admits the justice of some given
pattern of distribution he may still reply that however just it may or may not be, it is
incompatible with liberty. Nozick believes that a socialist society would have to forbid
capitalist acts between consenting adults. But presumably, in a socialist society a law against
capitalist acts would be like a present law against eating cheese on Marsit doesnt happen
anyway. In a socialist society individuals view capitalism as unfair and instead value cooperation,
equality, and community. In other words, the socialist subject would freely choose not to
engage in capitalist acts. Cohen admits that this assumes a certain view of human nature, but
a view Nozick has not argued against.

Even so, while a majority of the population may desire socialism and have the
subjectivity necessary to make it work, a sizable minority may be highly capitalist-minded. If
the minority is large enough their capitalist activity will undermine the socialist project and
thus will need to be prohibited. And Cohen concedes that any but the most utopian
socialist must be willing under certain conditions to restrict the liberty of a few for the sake
of the liberty of the many. For Nozick this would constitute a violation of moral side
constraints. Nozick does not, according to Cohen, justify his deferral to side constraints, and
so the socialist has nothing for which to apologize in being willing to restrict freedom in
order to expand it.
c


Finally, Cohen considers the case of Z, a laborer at the bottom of the economic heap
forced into a position of choosing between labor and starvation. For Nozick Z is not forced
if his position is the result of just actions undertaken by the other market participants A
through Y. Cohen correctly points out that this makes absolutely no difference. Z is in an
identical position either way and that position is one of severely limited freedom and liberty.
Liberty is not merely a matter of nominal, formal rights, of words on a page. Liberty must be
accompanied by power, by a real ability to exercise that liberty.

III.

I have now outlined Nozicks Wilt Chamberlain argument and Cohens responses. In
this section I will take those responses and use them as starting points in mounting further
challenges to Nozick.


c
I will later return to this argument concerning moral side constraints and their justifications.
i.

Let us consider the following state of affairs. A state that guarantees absolute
property rightsin other words, liberty la Nozickextends full civil rights to a class of
people who were previously enslaved. These newly free individuals own no property. In
order to access essential goods, such as food, water, and shelter, they must sell the only thing
they have to sell: labor. Although the market wage for a certain job may be $15 per hour,
these individuals can be hired for $1, working 15-hour days, as even this would be preferable
to starvation and death. This is the case of Z as outlined by Nozick. Cohen responds, but he
does not push the example to its logical extreme. It is certainly open to those hiring to hire
individuals of this group at obscenely exploitative wages. Their objective conditions now
may even be worse than they were under slavery. But another option is available to those
hiring: dont hire members of this group at allinstead leave them homeless, sick, and
starving. In other words, leave them to die. And even worse: leave them to die beside
warehouses of unsold, rotting produce. For Nozick this is justice, liberty, and freedom.

It does no good to note that, since the oppressed groups starting position was
slavery, some compensation, some reparations are due. For this state of affairs or one very
near to it can be brought about at any moment should a group with sufficient economic
power choose to do so. What is it called when one group systematically immiserates or
exterminates another? Genocide, and we tend not to call it just. It is in fact a paradigmatic
case of the most profound injustice.

It may seem that these are question-begging assertions about justice and injustice.
Consider, however, the suspicion wed rightfully express toward a proposed moral theory
that commanded rape, murder, and theft. Or a moral theory that prescribed a principal
whereby the right action is that which brings about the most suffering for the greatest
number. Or a moral theory that recommended eating cheese on Mars as the quintessential
human good.

Nozick is committed to endorsing as just (even if not moral) the state of affairs
described above. Such an endorsement follows from his commitment to a certain
conception of freedom, or liberty. Just as we cant (or can we?) rule out the absurd moral
theories mentioned above, so we cant rule out this conception of liberty. But we can and
should demand a very good, even flawless, argument. Absent that, we should reject that
conception of liberty if we are more certain that the above state of affairs is unjust than we
are that Nozicks arguments for his conception of liberty are solid.

ii.

Above I suggested that normative theories can rightly be judged by whether their
consequences align or conflict with our most basic intuitions. These judgments can be
decisive when we are substantially and properly more sure of our intuitions than we are of the
arguments grounding a given normative claim.
d
As Rawls wrote, Moral philosophy is

d
This isnt an un-exceptionable, logical ruleIm well aware that in this world there are those who are
completely certain of the most absurd things. I intend properly to suggest, to recommend, an attempt at unbiased
reflection regarding ones moral intuitions. For example, if your moral view finds support across geographies,
Socratic. Socrates shtick is precisely leading his interlocutors to conclusions they cannot
accept.

Now Id like to outline two ways of reasoning when presented with a view on justice
and the state.

If a given theory justifies an intuitively unjust, morally impermissible state of affairs,
that is a point (or more) against it. If there is a nearly identical theory, leading to a nearly
identical State, that avoids the need for such an absurd shrugging of the shoulders in the face
of obvious and profound cruelty, oppression, and paradigmatic injustice, then that theory
should be preferred, especially if the grounds that justify the amended theory are precisely
those that were used to justify and argue for the original theory. In other words, one might
ground the right to property in principles, arguments, or considerations X, Y, and Z, and
from there derive a theory regarding the proper limits of the state. A challenger might take
up those principles X, Y, and Z and attempt to show that the original theory fails to fully
draw out their conclusions. The challenger draws those conclusions, and from there derives
an appropriately revised theory regarding the proper limits of the state. There are several
ways to judge between the two final theories. First, whose lines of reasoning from XYZ to
rights to a theory of the state are sounder? Second, which theory, if either, is (more) free of
internal, seemingly irreconcilable contradictions? Third, which theory allows us to criticize
states of affairs like the one Ive described above as obviously, blatantly unjust or better
yet, prevents such a state of affairs from coming about? Or, which theory is line with our
most strongly held, pre-philosophical moral intuitions? I shall exemplify this presently.

Private property alone offers a system in which idleness is not rewarded at the
expense of industry, a system in which those who take on the burdens of prudence and
productivity can expect to reap some reward for their virtue which distinguishes them from
those who did not make any such effort. This is a long-standing justification of private
property. It relies on moral intuitions about just and unjust rewardeffort is appropriately
rewarded; virtuous and prudential behaviors are thus encouraged for the betterment of one
and all.

The principles invoked by this justification are now fair game. I might try to show,
then, that the very notion of just reward for effort and for undertaking the burdens of
prudence and productivity is completely empty, meaningless, incoherent, and without force
if a class of people are arbitrarily and systematically prevented from undertaking those very
burdens. Thus this line of argument for private property must clearly stipulate that
individuals not be arbitrarily prevented from undertaking the burdens that yield reward if it is
to succeed as a justification. If arbitrary discrimination constitutes precisely such a
prevention, then whatever conception of private property permits such discrimination is
surely not the conception of private property justified above. For such a conception cannot
permit such discrimination lest the principles of its justification completely collapse.

times, and cultures then all the more certain you can be. This may be a hopeless approach, but I want to
suggest that we can be more certain, for example, that random killing is wrong than we can be that homosexual
relationships or wearing short sleeves are wrong. It certainly is the case that more people come around to see
those latter two as morally permissible than to the opinion that murder is morally permissible.


The state that protects the right of private property consistent with the justification
offered above is the state that prohibits the sort of arbitrary discrimination that falls outside
of this conception of private property. Thus the prohibition does not constitute a limit on
private property as justified above and is, rather, completely in line with that conception of
private property.

The additional bonuses are 1) that the state is acting legitimately when it enacts laws
that prevent a state of de facto slavery from coming about and 2) that the theory has exactly
the principles and resources necessary to articulate what is fundamentally unjust about that
state of affairs which we perceive to be blatantly unjust by the use of our most basic moral
intuition.

That is the first approach. The second approach consists in mounting a direct
challenge against the foundational principles of the view presented. In the case of the
example above this would mean undermining the justification for property offered.

iii.

In this subsection I challenge Nozicks foundational principle.

Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them
(without violating their rights). So opens Anarchy, State, and Utopia. These natural rights are
negative, specifying what must not be done to an individual and not what must be done for him,
and they exist pre-politically. Part of the message of that opening proclamation is that there
are certain things that may not be done to individuals even if, by some standard, they are
socially optimizing. The rights that individuals have are moral bulwarks against behavior that
promotes even the most radiantor apparently radiantsocial end.





























a.

Nozick grounds his notion of liberty in self-possession, which I take to be equivalent
to self-ownership.
e
Whatever concept of liberty or freedom follows from this, it must be
admitted that our liberty is not coextensive with our power. After all, I have the power to kill but
not the liberty to do so. There is, then, a gap between the scope of our power and the scope
of our liberty. What accounts for this limit on our power? For Nozick, our exercise of our
power is limited by others equal self-ownership. But this is meaningless unless self-
ownership is given some sort of positive content. Call the set of actions within my power to
take A and the set of actions within my liberty to take L. There are countless distinct ratios
of A to L compatible with mutual limitations on individuals abiding by Le.g. you dont
appropriate my property by force, I wont appropriate your property by force; or, you wont
discriminate in your market transactions, I wont discriminate in my market transactions; or,
you can kill me in the night, I can kill you in the night. Here is the point: the assertion of
self-possession amounts to nothing but the claim that I exercise power over my body, but
absolutely nothing followsno normative claim followsfrom the fact that I exercise
power over my body. Whatever limitations L sets, these limitations are identical to an
enumeration of rights and obligations. Rights and obligations must be justified, but an appeal
to the fact that I control my body doesnt do the trick. Most specifically, importantly, and
relevantly, it does not follow from the fact that I exercise control over my body that I have a
claim to anything at all in the world beyond my body, let alone a claim to an unlimited
amount of such things checked only by my ability to acquire them. To restate the point:
self-possession is just shorthand for some enumeration of rights and obligations. It
provides no justification for any ration of A to L, even if it is capable of stating what the
content of L is.

b.

The reasoning above is a little fast and loose. Let us look closer at a specific
argument from Nozick. Whether we understand the principle of self-possession as the claim
that we own ourselves or as the claim that individuals are not ownable, one thing is clear:
slavery violates the principle. If it is slavery when one master compels my actions, it is
equally slavery when two masters, by agreement, compel my actions. This doesnt change
even when ten thousand masters compel my actions, my labor, under threat of force. This

e
It should be noted that it does not follow from the fact that we exercise power over our own bodies that we
own ourselves in the common sense of own. Certainly, however, no one else can own us. But if no one
else owns us, who does? The answer may be no one, an individual is not in the class of things that can be
owned at all.
doesnt change when those ten thousand masters decide commands by popular, democratic
vote.


A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises. Its justification is a
matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into on
coherent view.