Semiotics and Semantics

A Theory of Semiotics by Umberto Eco

Review by: Joseph F. Graham
boundary 2, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), pp. 591-598
Published by: Duke University Press
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Semiotics and Semantics*
Joseph
F. Graham
This book has a
relatively long
and
complex history extending,
in
both time and
place,
over
many
of the
major developments
which have
brought
the doctrine of
signs
to a
recent,
almost instant and rather
difficult
maturity.
As
explained
in the
foreword,
the work
began
more
than ten
years ago
with a
study
of visual and architectural
signs (Appunti
per
una
semiologia delle
comunicazioni
visive, published
in
1967).
A
second and somewhat more stable version
(La
struttura
assente, 1968)
was
to elaborate on the
theory
and to include a notable discussion of
structuralism. Corrections and revisions were then made in a series of
translations (the French
published
in
1972)
with some further
considerations to
appear
as a collection of
essays (Le
forme del
contenuto,
1971).
What is now in
English
was once
supposed
to be
just
another
rendition of La struttura
assente,
but it has since been so
thoroughly
rewritten as
finally
to warrant
being
translated back into Italian (Trattato
di semiotica
generale, 1976).
*Umberto
Eco. A
Theory
of Semiotics.
Bloomington:
Indiana
University Press, 1976.
591
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These details are mentioned here not for
any
real
curiosity,
either
bibliographical
or
biographical,
but
simply
to
suggest
some of what has
gone
into and even some of what is
gone
from this
general
treatise in
semiotics.
The
present
text is
actually
a
patchwork
of various
passages,
new and
old,
translated and
transposed,
with a
design
to
represent
both
constant and current interests in the
subject. Very
little remains from the
debate
(mainly
with
Levi-Strauss)
about the
epistemology
of structural
analysis,
whereas the discussion
(mostly
of Katz and
Fodor)
on the
semantic
component
for
generative grammar
has been
expanded.
But these
and other shifts of
emphasis
are
clearly significant
for their theoretical
substance as well as their local
relevance, especially
since the two
happen
to coincide. In a field so vast and
varied,
some
knowledge
of
geography
is
necessary,
and few know more than Umberto Eco.
The basic
question
is
raised,
near the
beginning
of the
introduction,
whether semiotics
be a
specific discipline
or
merely
a field of
studies,
the one
being inductive,
the other deductive in
conception
and
definition. This first
question
is never answered
directly,
but in
describing
his own
project,
near the end of that same
introduction,
Eco
imagines
a
landscape already
settled and labored
by previous
efforts. Here is the
broad field of
semiotics,
in the
present
state of the
art,
which he
proposes
not
only
to
survey
but also to
shape
in some
way, thereby leaving
his
mark. This idea is set
against
an
image
of the sea which
appears deep,
but
indifferent,
with
hardly
a trace of
any passage.
Here is the
discipline
at its
most
rigorous,
an abstract
theory
of
pure competence, perfectly
coherent
and consistent. There is no reason to doubt where Eco shows his
sympathy
and throws his
favor,
on solid
ground,
with an art of the
possible,
for
practical reasons,
full of
modesty,
but there is still reason to believe that
he is also drawn out
beyond
landmarks to a more ambitious if more
dangerous
task of full reconstruction. And
his,
after
all,
is a real
theory
of
semiotics,
not
simply
a review and
certainly
not a
preview;
it is a work for
specialists, drawing
on the work of other
specialists,
not
just
to
report
or
to collect some exotic information but to
provide
solutions
through
synthesis.
The
premise
has to be that a
variety
and
diversity
of
phenomena
can find
unity
in a
semiotics
both
special
and
general.
This is the
very
principle
announced
by
Peirce and
Saussure,
shared
by
Morris and
Jakobson,
as now served
by
Sebeok. And this is the
grand
tradition to
which Eco surel'
belongs,
but the times have
changed
so that the
conditions are more difficult than ever.
The
principle
of
unity
has become a real
problem
in
practice
due
to the
very expansion
of semiotics.
The
present generation
suffers from
success. It is now
virtually impossible
to follow each and
every
development
in the field with
any confidence,
even for those who
actively
participate
in one or more. Eco
provides
a
long
list with
specific
references. To know it all would be to know a lot of
zoology,
anthropology, sociology, psychology, linguistics, logic, folklore, art, music,
592
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film,
and literature. Eco
may
come as close as
anyone, probably second
only
to
Sebeok,
but his
purpose
is rather to
suggest
a method or a
model
which would
bring
most of this material into common focus. And
despite
vivid
examples
to illustrate and
thought experiments
to
elaborate,
the
procedure
is
essentially analytic
and the structure architectonic. The
problem
is no less
acute,
since the same
expansion
of
semiotics has
strained the
original
foundations and revealed
many
hidden faults. It has
even come to the
point
where the
very concept
of the
sign
itself
may
no
longer
hold. Eco
gives
some sense of this
crisis,
to the extent that he
argues
against
the established idea of the
sign, replacing
that
entity
with a
function,
but he does not
explain
the full context for his own
position.
He
might expect
his readers to know that
situation,
since he
already expects
so
much,
and
yet
that
very
situation could
only
be taken for
granted
if it
were also
given
as such. But in this
case,
the
problem
and the solution are
not
separate,
like a situation and a
strategy,
for
they
rather constitute a
new and different
complex
as a direct result of the confrontation between
semiotics and semantics. In some
sense,
Eco has created his own
problem
by forcing
such a crucial
issue, though
much to his own
credit,
so that he
may
well be excused for the
trouble, though
not without
consequence.
The reader
may
wonder
why
all the
fuss,
unless he
already
knows and then
refuses such a smooth resolution.
The
shape
and the
purpose
of the
book,
its combined
strength
and
weakness,
are more
easily
if not
just
better understood
against
the
background already presumed.
The situation of semiotics is
necessarily
historical as well as
theoretical,
and the mark of its
maturity
lies in that
necessity together
with its
difficulty.
Quite
contrary
to received
opinion,
modern science cannot afford to
forget
its
past. Through
the efforts of
Eco and
others,
the
original
idea for semiotics has now
emerged
in full
force to encounter the
empirical
wealth and rational
power
of established
disciplines.
It has at the same time
developed according
to its own
dynamic, working
out the flaws and strains of its constitution. A
simple
story
of semiotics could be told about a
rivalry
between two
presiding
spirits
who returned
years
after the birth to claim their due. In this
fairy
tale,
Saussure and Peirce would
represent ordinary language
and formal
logic
now in
dispute
over the nature of
meaning.
The course of events
during
the last ten
years,
so
clearly
reflected in the revisions of this
book,
does establish a trend
leading away
from a
European
structural
linguistics
and toward an American
logical
semantics. The real dilemma for Eco is not
so much
having
to choose between these
two,
for he
actually
tries to strike
a
compromise
and even to effect a reconciliation
by dividing
his
theory
in
two,
with
signification
on one side and communication on the other. And
he has an almost
unique capacity
to succeed in his
very ability
to move
back and
forth,
equally
familiar with
linguists
and
logicians,
both
European
and American. His
problem
is rather
different, though
he is still
caught
in his own
project;
it is another
problem
of
consequence.
His
593
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theory
would in effect
deny
the
very history
on which he has to
rely.
In his initial and
probably
essential
thesis,
Eco
requires
that a
general
semiotics contain two
major parts
or
components:
a
theory
of
codes and a
theory
of
sign production,
which
correspond directly
to the
difference between
signification
and communication. His text is also
divided
accordingly,
with
long
central
chapters
for
each,
flanked
by
shorter
introductory
and much shorter
concluding chapters.
To
distinguish
his
principal
distinction from
others,
he
just
maintains that it should not
be confused with
any
of the
following: langue/parole, competence/
performance, syntactics (semantics)/pragmatics;
and he then claims
to solve their common
problem
so as to dissolve the others into his
own. The
history
of that
problem
can
actually
be read off that same list of
alternatives, though hardly by chance,
for it is
simply
assumed without
mention.
Saussure
began
with
langue (language)
and
parole (speaking)
to
define the
proper object
of
linguistics.
The former is a social
unity,
a
general system
of
signification
shared
by
a
given community, something
potential
and fixed like a
code;
the latter is an individual
activity,
an act of
communication
by
a
specific person
to
produce something
actual and
variable like a
message.
Saussure then describes
language
(in
the technical
sense of
langue)
as a
system
of
signs
in which the structure determines the
elements,
as would not be the case with units of definite or
separate
substance,
like so
many tags
for so
many things.
This
principle
of structure
is
argued against
a naive but stubborn
theory
which
represents language
as
a
nomenclature,
with labels attached to items. As conceived
by Saussure,
the
linguistic sign
is
uniquely
constituted
by
a
signifier
and a
signified,
an
expression
and a
content,
neither of which have
any
real
identity apart
from their
special
relation in
language
which is
doubly arbitrary,
since
they
are both
heterogeneous
and discrete.
In his
theory
of
codes,
Eco retains the force of
conventionality
which holds the
system
of
language together,
and even insists that it
apply
as the
general principle
for all
signification.
As a
result,
mere information
and natural inference are
excluded, simply
because
they
do not involve
any
correlation of
expression
and content
recognized by
a human
society.
Without such a
code,
there can be
signals
but no
signs
in this stricter
sense,
a sense more restrictive than either Peirce or Sebeok would
wish,
and
probably
more
idealistic, despite
realistic intentions. In the strictest
sense,
Eco
continues,
there are no
signs
but
only sign-functions.
Here is a radical
departure
from the tradition of
Saussure,
one
prepared though
not
justified by Hjelmslev,
who introduced both functions
and functives to
explain
the
workings
of the
sign.
This
particular
move is
crucial for the
attempt
to meet a series of difficulties encountered when
the model of
language
was first
applied
to other
systems.
The
analogy
failed on several
counts, revealing
how different
language really
was. There
was
simply nothing comparable
to its
complex structure,
with minimal
594
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units and double articulation. The idea of the
sign
as a
specific
and discrete
unit of
meaning
does not seem to
apply
with
material,
like
film,
where the
system
is
really
more functional than structural.
Another
problem,
foreseen
by Saussure, was the difference
among
various
types
of
sign,
those which Peirce had
distinguished
as icon,
index,
and
symnbol.
It has
proven
almost
impossible
to
identify
such
differences with
any consistency
or
regularity.
In a
fairly long critique
of
iconicity, again
Eco
argues
that the
concept
of the
sign
as a fixed
entity
should
give way
to the more flexible idea of
function,
and further
by
consequence
that the traditional
typology
would then
classify
modes of
sign production
instead of
signs.
The final
objections
to that
system
of
signs,
first described
by
Saussure,
have more to do with
language
as such. It
may
have served well
for
phonology,
but it was still
very
close to a naive semantics of
naming,
and then it had no real
syntax
at all. These faults
remained, through
Bloomfield and
Harris,
as
long
as
language
could
only
be conceived as
some elaborate
taxonomy. Chomsky
was able to
prove
the
inadequacies
of
that model for
any
full
representation
of
language.
He went on to set a
new task for
linguistics by proposing
a different
object
for
theory.
His was
to be a
grammar
of rules for
sentences,
rather than structures for
signs,
and
thus a
theory
of
competence.
There is no reason to rehearse the rest of the
transformational-generative program, especially
since it does not
figure
directly
in most work on semiotics.
Chomsky
has been indifferent himself
to the whole
problem
of
signs.
But his
impact
has been felt in the
European tradition,
even where Saussure is most
influential, though
it has
been received as one of several reasons to revise the idea of
langue.
In
France,
Benveniste and Greimas have been
quite receptive
to such criticism
and active in
promoting
a
compromise
similar to that now advocated
by
Eco. Benveniste in
particular
has
suggested
a dual
theory
of
language,
both
semiotique
and
semantique,
to include
signification
and
communication,
signs
and sentences. His
semiotic is the
system
of
Saussure,
internal and
structural;
his semantic is external and functional to accomodate not
only
the
syntax
of
Chomsky
but also the
pragmatics
of
Austin, Grice,
and
others. The
general
sense is
simply
that
language
has definite rules that
apply
to the use of sentences
by persons
for different
purposes,
and that as
a
consequence
the domain of
linguistics
has to be extended
beyond
those
narrow limits first
prescribed by
Saussure. And if this be
important
for
linguistics,
Eco would
add,
it is all the more
urgent
for
semiotics.
This concern for
linguistics may
seem
excessive,
even
obsessive,
since
language
is but one of
many systems
under
study
in semiotics. And
Eco does
oppose quite vigorously
the colonial and
imperial designs
of a
structuralism which would
impose
its
regime
in the name of science and
progress.
His
theory
of codes has breadth
enough
for text and
discourse,
and his
theory
of
sign production
does include
translinguistic phenomena
which
modify
codes in turn. There are sections on literature
(rather
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disappointing), rhetoric,
and
ideology
(more interesting). Though
he
stops
short of a full
critique
like that of
Kristeva,
who
appears
on the horizon at
the
end,
Eco has come some distance from the almost
complete
dependence
on Saussure and
Hjelmslev
where Barthes once
began.
Linguistics
has also
changed, however,
under similar conditions. But the
point
is not
priority
so much as
rigor,
and the fact remains that the
study
of
language
still holds the lead on that
count,
if
only
because it has
recently
attracted such keen
philosophical
interest. There is a whole new
league
in
town,
with teams of
logicians playing
at
linguistics.
Eco now
faces a different
type
of
competition,
which he
surely welcomes,
as he
shifts his
allegiance
from Saussure
(the linguist)
to Peirce
(the logician).
It
was
actually Chomsky
who
opened
the
way
for
logic, though
he
argued
from the
beginning
that the
syntax
of natural
languages
was autonomous
and thus irreducible to either
logic
or semantics. A sentence could
very
well be
grammatical
and
yet illogical
or
meaningless.
But once the work
began (with
Katz and Fodor)
on the semantic
component
for a
generative
grammar,
it became more and more difficult to hold
any
of the lines
between
syntax, semantics,
and
pragmantics,
which had served as a
bulwark
against
the horde of
problems gathered
around
meaning.
In the
breach of
generative
semantics,
the entire
analytic
tradition has been
introduced and
applied
to
linguistics, including Frege, Russell, Tarski,
Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Montague, Putnam,
and
Kripke.
At issue is
simply
the
representation
of
meaning
in natural
language,
but that issue in itself is
hardly simple, being
rather
split
between
meaning (in
a more restrictive sense)
and reference,
ever since
Frege
first
proposed
to
distinguish
the two as Sinn and
Bedeutung. Taking
sides on
this central and crucial matter in the
philosophy
of
language,
which
Saussure had tried to
avoid,
Eco
presents
a revision of the
interpretive (as
against generative) theory
of semantics still defended
by
Katz. This
is
essentially
the
design
for
something
like a
dictionary
within
generative
grammar;
it is both
compositional
and intensional, providing
definition
and distinction for the
specific range
of
linguistic meaning.
The rest is left
to
performance
and reference. Eco later
presents (under sign production)
a
pragmatic theory
of mentions.
Here,
he follows the distinction drawn by
Strawson,
in
argument against
Russell,
between sentences and statements,
such that mention or reference involves the actual use rather than
any
property
of a
given expression.
There are virtues and vices in each of these
proposals,
but they
may
never be discussed
adequately, just
because the center of debate has
since
changed ground.
It would seem as if the
ground
itself were
shifting,
to the extent that
many
of the most basic
concepts
are now
subject
to
serious doubt. A new
logic
of intension has redistributed terms like
a
priori, necessary,
and
analytic, proving
certain
propositions
to be
necessary
and
synthetic.
It has been further shown that some of the most
common
words in natural
languages
have reference without
any
definite description.
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Words such as
"tiger"
and "lemon" have denotation like
proper
names but
no
designation
like
concepts.
The effect on
linguistics
has been to
reassign
the
place
of reference and to
bring knowledge
of
language
and
knowledge
of the world closer
together,
such that
they may
be
indistinguishable
at
the limit.
One can
easily imagine
Eco
already
back to work at
revision,
so
that next time we will have some
coverage
of modal
logic,
natural
kinds,
and other hot
topics.
This is meant neither to
disparage
his effort nor to
suggest
that the latest is
always
the best. There
is, however,
no
escape
from
the historical condition of current work in
linguistics,
where
things
move
very
fast. And as
long
as semiotics
depends
on or derives from
linguistics,
we will all have to
keep up
- and for
help
in that we
may
thank Umberto
Eco. But we
may
come to ask where this will
eventually
lead.
Already,
in
France,
there have been some notable defections. Barthes has abandoned
the
field,
and others are bound to follow. Has the
great
adventure come to
an end so soon? Has it failed? These are serious and
sobering questions
which have no
easy
answers. We
might
even take heart at these latest
indications of
change
in the
discipline.
Exit all amateurs! When the
going
gets tough.
. . . And then this book could mark a new
beginning.
We will
have to start
again, learning
the skills of formal
logic,
and
revising
our
sense of
purpose.
This last
may
be the most
difficult,
for until now it has
been
possible
to follow the trends without
losing
all contact with the
common
language
of an educated audience. Eco is
certainly
readable but
fully comprehensible only
if
you
work at it
seriously.
And this
type
of
accessibility may
not
last,
for his
attempt
to
bring
it all
together may
well
be the last. Semiotics will
perhaps disperse
in
maturity.
We
might
then
choose to
go
our
separate ways, leaving
behind a monument to
past
grandeur,
when we still believed in the
possibility
of one
theory
for
everything
that
signified,
a
general
science of
signs.
Whatever
may happen
indeed,
this work will have
definitely
contributed to that
happening.
SUNY-Binghamton
597
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. ... .
ox:
4.
F*.O
.. ... ...
. . ...... ....
..... .
V /Mw
~~IX
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