Digester: Annie Ballesteros

CASE TITLE: Province of Batangas v Alberto Romulo

Date of Case: May 27, 2004
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J p
DOCTRINE: A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated automatic release of
the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.
Petitioner: The Province Of Batangas, Represented By Its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas
Respondents: Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as Chairman of the Oversight
Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
FACTS:
Gov. Mandanas from Batangas assails as unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committee's Resolutions Nos.
OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued
pursuant to the GAAs. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD
resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999,
2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release, violate the Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991.
P5 billion pesos of the IRA was earmarked for the LGSEF in the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
2000 and re-enacted budget for 2001. OCD resolutions were promulgated providing for the allocation
schemes covering the P5 B and the implementing rules and regulations. The LGSEF is released to the
LGUs only upon their compliance with the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines
and mechanisms, prescribed by the Oversight Committee.
The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding based on the criteria laid
down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for
appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight
Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon approval that the Oversight Committee
would direct the DBM to release the funds for the projects.
Issue

Petitioners Contention

Respondents
Contention

Whether
the
assailed
provisos in
the GAAs
of 1999,
2000 and
2001,
earmarkin
g for each
correspon
ding year
the

Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it

mandates that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be
automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286
of the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin
that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be
"automatically and directly" released to them "without
need of further action" are, likewise, cited.

Section 6, Article X of
the Constitution does
not specify that the "just
share" of the LGUs
shall be determined
solely by the Local
Government Code of
1991. The phrase "as
determined by law" in
the same constitutional
provision means that
there exists no
limitation on the power
of Congress to
determine what is the

To subject the distribution and release of the fivebillion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as the
LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the
implementing rules and regulations, including the
mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the
Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit

Suprem
e Court
Holding
The
assailed
provisos
in the
GAAs of
1999,
2000
and
2001
and the
OCD
resolutio
ns

amount of
five billion
pesos of
the IRA for
the
LGSEF
and the
OCD
resolutions
promulgat
ed
pursuant
thereto,
transgress
the
Constitutio
n and the
Local
Governme
nt Code of
1991.

directive of the Constitution that the LGUs' share in

the national taxes "shall be automatically released to
them." The petitioner maintains that the use of the
word "shall" must be given a compulsory meaning.
To vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to
determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF,
which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema
to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
In 2001, the release of the LGSEF was long delayed
because the Oversight Committee was not able to
convene that year and no guidelines were issued
therefor. The possible disapproval by the Oversight
Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs would
result in the diminution of the latter's share in the IRA.
Improper amendment to Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing
of the IRA among the LGUs. The provision allocates
the IRA as follows: Provinces 23%; Cities 23%;
Municipalities 34%; and Barangays 20%. 8 This
formula has been improperly amended or modified,
with respect to the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA
allotted for the LGSEF, by the assailed OCD
resolutions as they invariably provided for a different
sharing scheme.
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal
amendment by the executive branch of a substantive
law. In the Letter dated December 5, 2001 of
respondent Executive Secretary Romulo addressed to
respondent Secretary Boncodin, the former endorsed
to the latter the release of funds to certain LGUs from
the LGSEF in accordance with the handwritten
instructions of President Arroyo. There were portions
of the LGSEF which were not released to the
petitioner as of the time of petition.

"just share" of the

LGUs in the national
taxes. In other words,
Congress is the arbiter
of what should be the
"just share" of the
LGUs in the national
taxes.
Congress may enact
other laws, including
appropriations laws
such as the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001,
providing for a different
sharing formula.
Section 285 of the
Local Government
Code of 1991 was
merely intended to be
the "default share" of
the LGUs to do away
with the need to
determine annually by
law their "just share."

violate
the
constituti
onal
precept
on local
autonom
y. (See
Ratio
below)

The LGUs have no

vested right in a
permanent or fixed
percentage as
Congress may increase
or decrease the "just
share" of the LGUs in
accordance with what it
believes is appropriate
for their operation.
There is nothing in the
Constitution which
prohibits Congress from
making such
determination through
the appropriations laws.
Other procedural
arguments: Petitioner
has no legal standing
and that the issue is
moot and academic.

RATIO:
The entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible.
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution
and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not

automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs
"shall be automatically released to them." Being "automatic," connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. The LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the "just share"
accruing to them from the national coffers.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a
"withholding" of a portion of the IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos
LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time.
The Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the distribution and release of a portion
of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied
in the Constitution. It finds no statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee was created merely to
formulate the rules and regulations for the efficient and effective implementation of the Local Government
Code of 1991 to ensure "compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the
Constitution." The Oversight Committee's authority is limited to the implementation of the Local
Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither can it exercise control over the
IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated automatic release of the shares
of LGUs in the national internal revenue. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and
the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs. Fiscal autonomy
means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to
allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their
budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at
the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and
resources or not.
The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law and while Congress may amend any of the
provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local
Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because
Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a
separate legislation.
Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage sharing therein, which are
fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters of general and substantive law. To permit
Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would be to give Congress the unbridled
authority to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every
year.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of
money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit. Any provision therein which is intended to
amend another law is considered an "inappropriate provision." The category of "inappropriate provisions"
includes unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws, because
clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
Power of supervision v. Power of control. The Constitution confines the President's power over the LGUs
to one of general supervision. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The
distinction between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim: An officer in control lays down the
rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-

done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself
does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may
not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed.
Local autonomy 'means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through
a system of decentralization.' The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not
meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a
radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and
for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
Decentralization of administration. Decentralization means devolution of national administration but
not power to the local levels. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable' and 'ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.' At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises 'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of
local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that
event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
Dispositive Portion: The petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations
Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Digester: Trina Fernandez

CASE TITLE: NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BRGY vs. PAREDES
Date of Case: September 27, 2004
DOCTRINES:
The Liga as a government organization which serves as the vehicle though which the barangay
participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the the legislative local
levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, is subject to DILG supervision.
The DILG, as the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, has the limited
authority of seeing to it that the rules are followed. It cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have
the discretion to modify or replace them.
Petitioner:
Liga ng mga Brgy represented by Alex L. David in his capacity as President
Alex L. David for his own person
Punong Brgy. of Brgy. 77, Caloocan City, claims Presidency of Liga-Caloocan
Respondent:
1. Judge Paredes of Caloocan City
2. DILG represented by Sec. Barbers
3. Manuel A. Rayos
Punong Brgy. of Brgy. 52, Caloocan City, claims Presidency of Liga-Caloocan
FACTS:
First Petition:
Respondent Rayos filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of PI and/or TRO
and damages before the Caloocan RTC alleging irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the
proposed synchronized elections of the Liga ng mga Brgy committed by Petitioner David. The Executive
Judge issued a 72-hour TRO enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of the
Liga Caloocan City Chapter. But the TRO was allegedly not properly served on Petitioner David and so
the election for Liga-Caloocan was held on 14 July 1997 as scheduled and the latter was proclaimed
President, he took his oath and assumed the position of ex officio member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod.
Second Petition:
Respondent Rayos filed a petition for quo warranto, mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of PI
and/or TRO and damages against Petitioner David, Nancy Quimpo (the Presiding Officer of te
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan) and Respondent DILG Sec. Barbers, alleging that he was elected
President of the Liga-Caloocan on 14 July 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to
their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97. The presiding judge granted the TRO enjoinging David, Quimpo and
Sec. Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan
Chapters of the Liga only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo for 72 hours.
The two cases were consolidated.
Respondent DILG through Sec. Barbers filed an Urgent Motion invoking the Presidents power of general
supervision over all LGUs and asked to be appointed as INTERIM CARETAKER to manage and
administer Liga affairs until the new set of National Liga Officers are elected and assume office.

Petitioner David opposed the Urgent Motion on procedural grounds and avering that the Liga is not
subject to DILG control and supervision and that its request constituted undue interference.
Before the lower court could act on the Urgent Motion the DILG issued a Memo Circular stating that due
to the widespread confusion among the LG officials as to who were the qualified ex-officio members of
their respective sanggunians, and pending the appointment of the DILG as the Interim Caretaker by the
court, directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional directors and other concerned officers:
1.
Not to recognize and/or honor any Liga Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as
ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned until further notice from the Courts or this
Department.
2.
To disregard any pronouncement and/or directive issued by Mr. Alex David on any issue or matter
relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga Brgy until further notice from the Courts or this Department.
RTC Decision: The Urgent Motion is granted. The authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory
jurisdiction over LGUs including the different leagues created uner the LGC of 1991 finds basis in Sec.
1(a) of AO No. 2671. Petitioner Davids MR was denied.
DILG issed a Certificate of Appointment in favor of Respondent Rayos as President of the Liga-Caloocan.
This served as the latters legal basis for ex-officio membershio in the Sangguniang Panlungsod and to
qualify and participate in the National Chapter Election of the Liga.
Petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari under R. 65:

Section 1. The authority to act upon the following matters is hereby delegated to the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government:
a. Exercise of supervision directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities; through
the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to
the brgys (Book I, Title One, Chapter 3, Article One, Section 25, Local Government Code);

WON the Liga ng mga

Brgy is a govt
organization that is
subject to the DILG
Secretarys power of
supervision over local
govts as the alter ego of
the President

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

1.

Since the Secretary of

the DILG supervises
the acts of local officials
by ensuring that they
act within the scope of
their prescribed powers
and functions and since
members of the various
leagues, such as the
Liga in this case, are
themselves officials of
local govt units, it
follows that the Liga
members are subject to
the power of
supervision of the
DILG.

AO No. 267
does not apply to the
Liga precisely
because it is not an
LGU
2.
S. 507 of the
LGC provides that
the Liga shall be
governed by its own
Constitution and ByLaws which provide
that the members
could only be
removed for cause
by affirmative vote of
2/3 of the entire Liga
membership and not
by mere issuances
of the DILG.

Supreme Court
Yes, it is.
In Opinion No. 41,
1995, the DOJ ruled
that the Liga is a govt
organization, being an
association, federation,
league or union created
by law or by authority of
law, whose members
are either appointed or
elected govt officials.
The LGC defines the
Liga as an organization
of all brgys for the
primary purpose of
determining the
representation of the
Liga in the
sanggunians, and for
ventilating, articulating
and crystallizing issues
affecting brgy govt
administration and
securing, through
proper and legal
means, solutions
thereto.The Liga is an
aggroupment of brgys
which are in turn
represented therein by
their respective punong
brgys. The
representatives of the
Liga sit in an ex-officio
capacity at the
municipal, city and
provincial
sanggunians. As such,
they enjoy all the
powers and discharge
all the functions of
regular municipal
councilors, city
councilors or provincial
board members, as the
case may be. Thus, the
Liga is the vehicle
through which the brgy
participates in the
enactment of
ordinances and
formulation of policies
at all the legislative

WON respondent Judges

designation of the DILG
as interim caretaker of the
Liga has invested the
DILG with control over the
Liga and whether DILG
Memorandum Circular
No. 97-176, issued before
it was designated as such
interim caretaker, and
DILG Memorandum
Circular No. 97-193 and
other acts which the DILG
made in its capacity as
interim caretaker of the
Liga, involve supervision
or control of the Liga.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

The actions
contemplated by the
DILG as interim
caretaker go beyond
supervision, as it
altered, modified,
nullified or set aside the
actions of the Liga and
substituted its own
judgment over the
latter. Its actions were
actions of control:
1.
The
appointment of
Rayos as LigaCaloocan President
2.
Prohibiting the
recognition of the
duly elected officers
of the Liga
3.
Providing
supplemental
guidelines for the
synchronized
election of the Liga,
replacing the
implementing rues
adopted by the Liga
pursuant to its
Constitution and ByLaws

DILGs management
and administration of
the Liga affairs was
limited only to the
conduct of the
elections, its actions
were consistent with its
rule-making power and
power of supervision
under existing laws.[43]
He asserts that in
assailing the
appointment of the
DILG as interim
caretaker, petitioners
failed to cite any
provision of positive law
in support of their
stance.

Supreme Court
1.

*Note that the OSG

agrees with the
Petitioner

When the DILG

was appointed as
interim caretaker to
manage and
administer the affairs
of the Liga,
Respondent Judge
Paredes effectively
removed the
management from
the National Liga
Board and vested
control of the Liga on
the DILG. DILGs
prayer for
appointment as
interim caretaker of
the Liga to manage
and administer the
affairs of the Liga,
xxx reveals that
what the DILG
wanted was to take
control over the Liga.
Even if said
caretakership was
contemplated to last
for a limited time, or
only until a new set
of officers assume
office, the fact
remains that it was a
conferment of control
in derogation of the
Constitution.
2.
The acts of the
DILG went beyond
the sphere of general
supervision and
constituted direct
interference with the
political affairs, not
only of the Liga, but
more importantly, of
the brgy as an
institution. In
succession, the
DILG assumed
stewardship and
jurisdiction over the
Liga affairs, issued
supplemental
guidelines for the
election, and nullified
the effects of the

Supreme Court
3.

Furthermore,
the DILG assumed
control when it
appointed
respondent Rayos as
president of the LigaCaloocan Chapter
prior to the newly
scheduled general
Liga elections,
although petitioner
Davids term had not
yet expired. The
DILG substituted its
choice, who was
Rayos, over the
choice of majority of
the punong barangay
of Caloocan, who
was the incumbent
President, petitioner
David.
4.
In this
particular case, the
most that the DILG
could do was review
the acts of the
incumbent officers of
the Liga in the
conduct of the
elections to
determine if they
committed any
violation of the Ligas
Constitution and Bylaws and its
implementing rules.
If the National Liga
Board and its officers
had violated Liga
rules, the DILG
should have ordered
the Liga to conduct
another election in
accordance with the
Ligas own rules, but
not in obeisance to
DILG-dictated
guidelines. Neither
had the DILG the
authority to remove
the incumbent
officers of the Liga
and replace them,
even temporarily,

Dispositive Portion: Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 04 August 1997 is
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for being
unconstitutional and ultra vires.

Digester: Ernesto C. Herrera III

CASE TITLE: MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN V. DIR. OF LANDS
Date of Case: October 17, 1910
DOCTRINE: For the purpose of the establishment of new pueblos in this Archipelago, at the
beginning of its occupation by the Spaniards, an endeavor was always made to find, in favorable
places, a nucleus of inhabitants and, later, near the pueblos already established, barrios, which
ordinarily served as a basis for the formation of other new pueblos that became a populated as
the centers on which they were dependent. The Laws of the Indies was followed in the
establishment and laying out of new towns.
Petitioner: Municipality of Catbalogan represented by its President
Respondent: Director of Lands represented by the Attorney-General
FACTS:
1. The Municipal President of Catbalogan wanted to register a parcel of land where its courthouse
was located.
2. On June 19, 1908, He filed an application with the Court of Land Registration in which he asked
for registration in conformity with the Land Registration Act.
3. The Director of Lands through the Attorney-General opposed the application and claimed that the
property belonged to the United States and was under the control of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
4. The Court of Land Registration ordered that the land in question be awarded and registered in the
name of the municipality of Catbalogan.
Issue(s)
1. WON the lot
belongs to the
municipality of
Catbalogan

Municipality of
Catbalogan
1.
that the said land
was
acquired
by
possession and material
occupation for a large
number of years and is
at present occupied by
the applicant as a
municipal
corporation
duly
organized
(acquisitive prescription).
2.
The
land
in
dispute is a building lot
of which the pueblo of
Catbalogan had absolute
need at the beginning of
its organization for the
erection thereon of its
court-house.

Director of Lands
1. The lot in dispute is
a state land under
the control of the
Insular
Government.
2. The land in dispute
is common.

Supreme Court
1.
Since
Spanish
occupation, the policy of
the state has been to
form new pueblos and
seek out the nucleus of
inhabitants. The Laws of
the Indies was followed
in lay-outing new towns.
2.
While viceroys
had the power to
designate
common
lands, they could not
assign the location of
courthouses
and
churches because only
the
Provincial
government could do
so.
3.
Catbalogan was
the provincial seat of
Samar and as such had
designated the land
where its courthouse
would
be
erected

hence, the land in

dispute
has
been
considered
as
bien
propio
patrimonial
property
of
the
municipality.
4. Catbalogan has been
in possession and has
been
exercising
ownership of the land for
40 to 45 years. The
presumption therefore is
that it is the owner of the
land.
Dispositive Portion: Judgment of the Court of Land Registration is Affirmed declaring that the municipality
of Catbalogan is the owner of the land occupied by its court-house and that it is entitled to have the said
property
registered
in
its
name
in
the
Court
of
Land
Registration.

Digester: Ansis V. Pornillos

CASE TITLE: MONDANO vs. SILVOSA
Date of Case: May 30, 1955
DOCTRINE: In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to
Mondanos office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a crime of moral
turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final
conviction before a suspension may be issued.
Petitioner: Jose Mondano Mayor of Mainit, Surigao
Respondent: Fernando Silvosa, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS,
Members of the Provincial Board,
FACTS:
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for (1) rape
committed on his daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with his
daughter in a place other than the conjugal dwelling.
The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to
investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and
the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition
for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
Issue 1
Whether or not the
Governor, as agent of
the Executive, can
exercise the power of
control over a mayor.

RATIO:

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Gov. Silvosa invoked
the Revised
Administrative Code
which provided that he,
as part of the executive
and by virtue of the
order given by the
Assistant Executive
Secretary, is with direct
control, direction, and
supervision over all
bureaus and offices
under his
jurisdiction . . . and to
that end may order the
investigation of any act
or conduct of any
person in the service of
any bureau or office
under his Department
and in connection
therewith may appoint a
committee or designate
an official or person who
shall conduct such
investigations.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Governor has no power
to suspend a mayor
since it presupposes
that the governor has
control over a mayor.

Supreme Court: NO.

Governor only has
supervision over
city/municipal officers
and has no control
over them

In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the
officer in question. Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities.

Dispositive Portion: The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

Digester: Jasper Allen B. Barrientos

CASE TITLE: Hebron vs. Reyes
Date of Case: 28 July 1958
DOCTRINE: The Constitution, in limiting expressly the power of the President over local
governments to mere general supervision expresses a concession to the general demand for
some local autonomy.
Petitioner: Bernardo Hebron (Hebron), member of the Liberal party and mayor of Carmona, Cavite.
Respondent: Eulalio D. Reyes (Reys), member of the Nacionalista Party and vice-mayor of Carmona,
Cavite.
FACTS:
In 1951, Hebron and Reyes were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of Carmona Cavite.
On 22 or 24 May 1954, Hebron received a letter informing him that the President is directly assuming
the investigation of the administrative charges against him for alleged oppression, grave abuse of
authority and serious misconduct in office, and suspending him from office pending the termination of
the said investigation.
The same letter appointed Reyes Acting Mayor, in accordance with Section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
After holding hearings in connection with said charges, the provincial fiscal submitted his report thereon
on 15 July 1954 and thereafter, the matter remained pending in the Office of the President for decision.
Inasmuch as no decision appears to be forthcoming, and the term of Hebron was about to expire, on 13
May 1955, he instituted the an action for quo warranto, on the ground that Reyes was illegally holding
the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still refused to surrender the same.
Issue 1
Whether or not
the President has
the power to
directly suspend
a local elective
official in order to
create a strong
national
government.
NO.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court

Reyes was illegally

holding the Office of
Mayor of Carmona,
and had unlawfully
refused and still
refused to surrender
the same.

The Constitutional
provision giving the
President general
supervision over local
government units
contemplated a
certain measure of
control to be attached
to the said power.

In order to give
balance between
creating a strong
central
government and
providing for local
autonomy, the
power of the
President over
local governments
were limited to one
of general
supervision.

Dispositive Portion:
The President has no "inherent power to remove or suspend" local elective officials (Lacson vs. Roque).
There is likewise neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to
remove municipal officials. Article VII, Section 10 (1) of the Constitution provides that the President shall
exercise general supervision over all local governments, but supervision does not contemplate control
(People vs. Brophy). In fact, the use of the said proviso, "as may be provided by law", in connection with
the said provision is a clear indication of the constitutional intention that it was not to be self-executing but
requires legislative implementation.
Further, Section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code in giving the President the power to
remove is subject to the condition that such removals must be accomplished only for any of the

causes and in the manner prescribed by law and the procedure, as laid out in Sections 2188, 2189,
2190, and 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code. These provisions clearly manifests a purpose to
exclude other modes of proceeding by other authorities under general statutes, and not to make the
operation of said provisions depend upon the mercy and sufferance of higher authorities. It is well settled
that laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those chosen by the direct
vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor.
The policy laid down is Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, requires speedy termination of
a case in which suspension has been decreed, not only in the interest of the immediate party but of the
public in general. The electorate is vitally interested, and the public good demands, that the man it has
elevated to office be, within the shortest time possible, separated from the service if proven unfit and
unfaithful to its trust, and restored if found innocent.
In the case at bar, Hebron was suspended in May 1954 and the records of the case were forwarded to the
Executive Secretary since 15 July 1954. Yet, the administrative decision on the charges against petitioner
was not rendered, either before the filing of the complaint herein, on May 13, 1955, or before the
expiration of petitioner's term of office, on December 31, 1955. Manifestly, petitioner's continued, indefinite
suspension cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of aforementioned provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The philosophy upon which our system of local governments is hinged rejects the theory of Reyes that
the President has the power to directly suspend a local elective official in order to create a strong national
government.
Article VII, Section 10 (1) of the Constitution provides that, The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as
may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Under the Jones Law the
Governor General had both control and supervision over all local governments, (Section 22, Jones Law)
The evident aim of the members of the Constitutional Convention in introducing the change, therefore,
must have been to free local governments from the control exercised by the central government, merely
allowing the latter supervision over them. But this supervisory jurisdiction is not unlimited; it is to be
exercised "as may be provided by law."
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, provincial governments had been in existence for over
thirty years, and their relations with the central government had already been defined by law. Provincial
governments were organized in the Philippines way back in the year 1901 upon the approval of Act No.
82 by the Philippines Commission on 31 January 1901. The policy enjoined by the President of the
United States in his Instructions to the Philippines Commission was for the insular government to
have "only supervision and control over local governments as may be necessary to secure and
enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." (McKinley Instruction in Philippines
Commission, 7 April 1900.) The aim of the policy was to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in
the art of self-government, with the end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management
and control of the administration of their local affairs. This policy is the one now embodied in the above
quoted provision of the Constitution. (Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 94 Phil., 964, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820, 4823,
4824.)
As early as 7 April 1900, President McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the least
degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government; that said supervision
and control should be "confined within the narrowest limits"; that in the distribution of powers
among the governments to be organized in the Philippines, "the presumption is always to be in
favor of the smaller subdivision"; that the organization of local governments should follow "the
example of the distribution of powers between the states and the national government of the
United States"; and that, accordingly, the national government "shall have no direct
administration except of matters of purely general concern."

If such were the basic principles underlying the organization of our local governments, at a time when the
same were under the control of the Governor-General (the representative of the United States, which has
delegated to us some governmental powers, to be exercised in the name of the United States), with more
reason must those principles be observed under the Constitution of the Philippines.
The legal procedure against a local office who might be guilty of dereliction of duty will have to be judicial,
not administrative. An action will have to be presented in court charging the official with violation of law or
neglect of his duties.
Local autonomy may thus be established to a limited degree. In the deliberations of the committee on
provincial and municipal governments of the Constitutional Convention held in Manila in 1934,
there was practical unanimity of opinion among the delegates that provincial and municipal
governments should enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. The first drafts prepared by the committee
provincial and municipal governments included provisions intended to protect the local governments
against the absolute control of the central government. Some difficulty was, however, encountered in
expressing objectively the necessary provisions protective of local autonomy. This was due to the other
desire of many of the delegates of establishing a strong central government. Concretely the
problem was how to keep some degree of local autonomy without weakening the national government.
The draft of the Committee on provincial and municipal governments was not considered satisfactory, and
so it was not incorporated in the Constitution. But the idea of giving local governments a more of
autonomy was not completely given up. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that the Constitution in
limiting expressly the power of the President over local governments to mere general supervision
expresses a concession to the general demand for some local autonomy. This idea of a compromise
or concession should serve as a guide in construing the extent of the powers of the President over local
governments.

Digester: Renz Ruiz

CASE TITLE: Ganzon v. CA2
Date of Case: August 5, 1991
DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution has not repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37.
Supervision" and "Removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other
notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter.
Petitioner: RODOLFO T. GANZON, Mayor of Iloilo City
Respondent: LUIS SANTOS, Secretary of the Department of Local Government
FACTS:
This petition originated from 10 administrative complaints filed against Mayor Ganzon by various city
officials in 1988, on various charges of abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and
immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Among others, Mayor Ganzon is claimed to have:
1) Removed a clerk assigned to the City Health from her position for allegedly supporting the rival
candidate during the elections
2) Padlocking the office of an Assistant Health Officer and withholding her salary without explanation or
justification
3) Padlocking the office of a Councilor without notice and harassing the latter with armed men when the
latter held office in the town plaza
Finding probable grounds, the respondent issued a preventive suspension 3 order on August 11, 1988 to
last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days. Later, another 60-day preventive suspension
arising from the arbitrary detention case was issued.
Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent in the RTC where he succeeded
in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the respondent issued a 3 rd 60-day preventive
2

Since my topic is under B. Brief History... of the Syllabus, let me quote here the relevant provision in the 1987 &
1935 Constitution (These were also quoted in the case):
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions (1987 Consitution)
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise
general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. (1935 Constitution)
3

...in meting out the suspensions, the Secretary acted in consonance with the provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code,
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local
Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his
verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation
shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be
imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the
preventive suspension shall be lifted.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local
Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an
elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

suspension against Mayor Ganzon and designating Vice-Mayor Malabor as acting mayor. The cases filed
in the CA were consolidated by the SC.
ISSUES

WON the
1987
Constitution,
in deleting
the phrase
"as may be
provided by
law" intend
to divest the
President of
the power to
investigate,
suspend,
discipline,
and/or
remove local
officials

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION
According to
petitioner, the
Constitution is
meant, first, to
strengthen selfrule by local
government units
and second, by
deleting the
phrase as may
be provided by
law to strip the
President of the
power of control
over local
governments.

RESPON
DENTS
CONTEN
TION
No
discussion

Supreme Court

NO, the Constitution does not divest President of

the power to discipline local officials.
Notwithstanding the omission, the charter did not divest
the legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative to provide administrative sanctions against
local officials.
The omission merely underscores local governments'
autonomy from congress.
Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the
guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit
the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and
as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean
local government units from over-dependence on the
central government.

The petitioners
submit that the
deletion (of "as
may be provided
by law") is
significant since:
(1) the power of
the President is
"provided by law"
and (2) hence, no
law may provide
for it any longer.

Also, in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the

local government under the general supervision of the
Executive.
Finally, the Charter allows Congress to include in the
local government code provisions for removal of local
officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise
removal powers, and as the existing Local Government
Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
The petitioners are under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, "supervision" is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
test of the latter."Supervision" on the other hand means
"overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties.
However, "investigating" is not inconsistent with
"overseeing", although it is a lesser power than
"altering".

WON third

None

None

Hence, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.

VALID, but succeeding suspensions precluded.

suspension
valid

A preventive suspension may be justified. Its

continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of
time raises a due process question.
The sole objective of a suspension is "to prevent the
accused from hampering the normal cause of the
investigation with his influence and authority over
possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and
other evidence.
Imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility Mayor Ganzon is to make his suspension
permanent.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Ganzon to suffer the
duration of his third suspension...We are precluding the
Secretary from meting out further suspensions based
on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding
findings of prima facie evidence.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED,
provided that the petitioner, Mayor Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of
any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11,
1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against
Mayor Ganzon.

Digester: M. Espinal
Vilas v. City of Manila
April 3, 1911
DOCTRINE: A change in sovereignty does not operate to destroy the municipal laws of the
affected territory and they continue in force until altered or repealed by the new government or
sovereign.
Petitioner: Verisimo Vasquez Vilas, Esperanza Otero Trigas, Ricardo Aguado (whose cases were all
elevated to the US Supreme Court upon consolidation)
Respondent: City of Manila
FACTS:
The petitioners were creditors of the City of Manila when it was still under Spanish sovereignty. They are
now trying to collect on their claims from the city which has since been reincorporated (in 1901), following
the cession of the Philippines to the United States under the Treaty of Paris. [During this era, decisions by
the Philippine Supreme Court were reviewable by the US Supreme Court if the dispute involved a United
States Treaty.]
Issue: What was the legal consequence of the cession upon the property rights and civil obligations of
the city incurred before the cession?
Petitioners Contention: That the obligations of the former municipal corporation passed on to the city as
now incorporated
Respondents Contention: That the liability of the city was effectively extinguished by the change of
sovereignty. Such stance is anchored on the analogous relationship between principal and agent,
whereby the agency is destroyed upon the death of the principal. The supposed death/annihilation of the
municipal entity was deemed so complete that, in one of the opinions in the court a quo, it was even held
that since the United States had already paid the consideration for the cession, the new municipal entity
created thus became free of any obligation to the creditors of the former entity and the suggestion was
that the petitioners claim may be pursued more properly against the Spanish Crown which has received
payment from the United States.
SC:
The respondents contention fails to convince. Their argument loses sight of the dual nature of municipal
corporations, which is both governmental and proprietary. In the latter character, the corporation is
deemed a corporate legal individual existing for private purposes. In view of the dual character of
municipal corporations, there is no reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of
military occupation or territorial cession. True, there arises a total abrogation of the political relations with
the former sovereign, but that body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights
continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.
The Charter of the City itself provides that the new entity shall possess all the rights of property enjoyed
by the City of Manila as organized under Spanish sovereignty and adds that all ordinances/orders in
force and not inconsistent thereto were to be preserved until modified or repealed. There is not the
slightest suggestion that the new corporation shall not succeed to the contracts and obligations of the old
and no reason for supposing that the reincorporation of the old municipality is intended to permit an
escape from the obligations of the old.
The US Supreme Court, in Shapleigh v. San Angelo, has earlier held: An absolute repeal of a municipal
charter is effectual so far as it abolishes the old corporate organization; but when the same or

substantially the same inhabitants are erected into a new corporation, whether with extended or restricted
territorial limits, such new corporation is treated as the successor of the old one, entitled to its property
rights, and subject to its liabilities.
Dispositive: Cases reversed and remanded. (Special mention was made of the Aguado case. Aguado
became a creditor by virtue of a contract for the supply of coal intended for the citys waterworks. A
special fund known as the Carriedo fund had been put up for the purpose of establishing the
waterworks project and for which the city had been the trustee. The case states that no evidence was
established whether the credit for the supply of coal had been given to the Carriedo fund or to the general
credit of the city. Nevertheless, the debt having been incurred by the city, it also must be regarded as a
city liability.)

Digester: Jel Gallego

LIDASAN v. COMELEC
October 25, 1967; G.R. No. L-28089
DOCTRINE: Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an
instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an
agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they
are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.
Several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality: population, territory, and income.
Petitioner: Bara Lidasan resident & taxpayer from Parang Cotabato, a qualified voter for 1967 elections
Respondent: Commission on Elections- description
FACTS:
1. 18 June 1966: Republic Act 4790, entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur" was enacted into law.
2. It was later found that barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in
the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of the municipality
of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. 15 Aug 1967: COMELEC adopted a resolution which resolved that these 12 barrios, situated in 2
municipalities in the province of Cotabato, will be transferred to the province of Lanao Del Sur to
form part of the new municipality of Dianaton.
4. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to the COMELEC that
the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation.
5. 20 Sept 1967: COMELEC, by resolution, stood by its own interpretation and declared that the
statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
6. Hence, this original action for certiorari and prohibition by Lidasan, praying that RA 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that COMELECs resolutions be nullified.
ISSUE
WON RA 4790 is
unconstitutional

PETITIONER
YES
RA 4790 is entitled
"An Act Creating the
Municipality of
Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao
del Sur", but
includes barrios
located in Cotabato.
It is unconstitutional
for embracing more
than one subject in
the title.

RESPONDENT
NO

SUPREME COURT
YES
Constitutional provision contains
dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain
from conglomeration, under one
statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill
is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of
the import of the single subject
thereof. Compliance of the latter is
imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text
of the bill.

It suffices if the title should serve the

purpose of the constitutional demand
that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of
the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And
this, to lead them to inquire into the
body of the bill, study and discuss
the same, take appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title
is whether or not it is misleading;
technical accuracy is not essential;
the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a
title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not
be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or
scope of the act, is bad.

Change in
boundaries of the
two provinces
resulting in "the
substantial
diminution of
territorial limits" of
Cotabato province is
"merely the
incidental legal
results of the
definition of the
boundary" of the
municipality of
Dianaton and that,
therefore, reference
to the fact that
portions in Cotabato

Title projects the impression that only

the province of Lanao del Sur is
affected by the creation of Dianaton.
Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del
Sur town. It is misleading and
deceptive for legislation has a twopronged purpose combined in one
statute: (1) it creates the municipality
of Dianaton purportedly from twentyone barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of
Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also
dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.
Transfer of a sizeable portion of
territory from one province to
another of necessity involves
reduction of area, population and
income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those

WON RA 4790
may still be
salvaged with
reference to the
nine barrios in the
municipalities of
Butig and
Balabagan in
Lanao del Sur
(with the
nullification of the
portion which
took away the 12
barrios in the
municipalities of
Buldon and
Parang in the
other province of
Cotabato)

are taken away

"need not be
expressed in the title
of the law."
YES
Rule is that where a
portion of a statute is
rendered
unconstitutional and
the remainder valid,
the parts will be
separated, and the
constitutional portion
upheld

of the other. This is as important

as the creation of a municipality.
And yet, the title did not reflect
this fact.
NO, RA 4790 is indivisible & null and
void in its totality.
The general rule is that where part of
a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is
valid, the valid portion if
separable from the invalid, may
stand and be enforced. But, the valid
portion must be so far independent
of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would
have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not
constitutionally enact the other. . .
Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid
statute, which carries out the
legislative intent. . . . The language
used in the invalid part of the statute
can have no legal force or efficacy
for any purpose whatever, and what
remains must express the legislative
will independently of the void part,
since the court has no power to
legislate.
Municipal corporations perform
twin functions. Firstly. They serve
as an instrumentality of the State
in carrying out the functions of
government. Secondly. They act
as an agency of the community in
the administration of local affairs.
It is in the latter character that
they are a separate entity acting
for their own purposes and not a
subdivision of the State.
Several factors come to the fore in
the consideration of whether a
group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an
independent municipality.
Amongst these are population,
territory, and income.
It is clear from the explanatory note4
of the House Bill 1247, creating the

The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective
income is sufficient to maintain an independent municipality.

town of Dianaton that these factors

were considered and they were
considering the original 21
barrios which comprise the new
municipality and not simply the 9
remaining barrios.
WON petitioner
has legal
standing to bring
this suit

Petitioner is not a
real party in interest.
He has no
substantial legal
interest adversely
affected by the
implementation of
RA 4790.

YES, Petitioner is a qualified voter.

He expects to vote in the 1967
elections. His right to vote in his own
barrio before it was annexed to a
new town is affected. Since
constitutional direction, the purpose
of a bill must be shown in its title for
the benefit, amongst others, of the
community affected thereby,16 it
stands to reason to say that when
the constitutional right to vote on the
part of any citizen of that community
is affected, he may become a suitor
to challenge the constitutionality of
the Act as passed by Congress.

Dispositive Portion: We vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent
Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

FERNANDO, J., dissenting:

Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton
in the province of Lanao del Sur. Fact that barrios found in 2 other municipalities of another
province were included does not of itself suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the
constitutional provision invoked. What Consti precludes is the insertion of riders in legislation, a
rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from
Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside
Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is
this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new municipality from barrios
named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
The Consti provision must be construed liberally as this has been the general disposition in
Courts as opposed to the strict and technical interpretation given the Court herein. For instance,
in Radiowealth v. Agregado, he noted that certain provisions of the Admin Code were interpreted
and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental
law. In re Guaria: "In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it our
duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language
of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy.

Digester: Roddel Paraos

CASE TITLE: Republic v City of Davao
Date of Case: September 12, 2002
DOCTRINE:
Sec 15 of the LGC defines an LGU as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be
exercised by it in conformity with law. It performs dual functionsgovernmental and proprietary.
Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and advancement of public
good/welfare as affecting the public generally. Here, the LGU acts as an agency of the national
government. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. Here, the LGU acts as an agent of
the community in administration of local affairs.
Civil Code of the Philippines, Book 1, Chapter 3, Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions; x x x
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines, represented by DENR Sec Heherson Alvarez et al.
Respondent: City of Davao, represented by Mayor Benjamin De Guzman
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing RTC Davaos decision which granted the writ of mandamus and
injunction in favour of respondent City of Davao, against petitioner Republic. The court also directed
petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in favour of respondent.
Respondent filed an application for Cert of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, Davao city
Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached were the
following: a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief project description; and c) a certification
from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical
area (ECA). The EMB denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an
environmentally critical area, and pursuant to sec 2, PD 1586, in relation to Sec 4 of PD 1151, the City
of Davao must undergo the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) before it can proceed with the project.
Respondent filed a petition for mandamus, and alleged that the project was neither an environmentally
critical project nor within an environmentally critical area, hence out of scope of the EIS system. Hence, it
was DENRs ministerial duty to issue a CNC upon submission of the required documents.
The RTC said that there is nothing in PD 1586 in relation to PD 1151 and LOI 1179 that requires LGUs to
comply with the EIS. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national govt, including GOCCs, as well
as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process. Since the LGU is
not an agency or instrumentality of the national govt, it is deemed excludedexpresio unius est exclusion
alterius.
The RTC also agreed with respondent that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an
environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. Hence, it was
mandatory for DENR to approve respondents application for CNC.
Supervening event: change of administration, respondent agreed with petitioner that it needs to secure an
ECC, rendering the petition moot and academic, but the SC still addressed the issue in the case.
WON LGUs
are part of the
EIS system

N/A

N/A

Yes, LGUs are part of the EIS system.

Sec 15 of the LGC defines an LGU as a

body politic and corporate endowed with

powers to be exercised by it in conformity
with law. It performs dual functions
governmental and proprietary.
Governmental functions are those that
concern the health, safety and
advancement of public good/welfare as
affecting the public generally. Here, the
LGU acts as an agency of the national
government. Proprietary functions are
those that seek to obtain special corporate
benefits or earn pecuniary profit and
intended for private advantage and
benefit. Here, the LGU acts as an agent of
the community in administration of local
affairs.
Sec 16 of the LGC shows the duty of the
LGU to promote the peoples right to a
balance ecology. Hence, an LGU, like the
City of Davao, cannot claim exemption
from coverage of PD 1586. An LGU has
the duty to ensure quality of the
environment, which is the objective of PD
1586.
The law must be interpreted in its entirety,
and the RTC failed to take into account
other parts of PD 15865.
Sec 4 of PD 1586 states that no person,
partnership or corporation shall undertake
or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized
representative. A person is either natural
or juridical. The State and its political
subdivisions (LGUs) are juridical persons,
hence not excluded from the coverage of
PD 1586.
5

WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program necessitates the establishment and
institutionalization of a system whereby the exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can be reconciled with the requirements of
environmental quality; x x x.
Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance between socioeconomic growth and environmental protection.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his
own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate
any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by
the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President may by
his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the
realignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.

WON the
project involved
is
environmentally
critical or within
an
environmentally
critical area

Yes it is within an
environmentally
critical area

No it is not within an
environmentally
critical area, nor is it
an environmentally
critical project

Sec 1 of the same law shows that it

intends to implement the policy of the
state to achieve a balance between socioeconomic development and environmental
protection (sustainable development), and
that this can only be possible if we adopt a
comprehensive and integrated
environmental protection program where
all sectors of the community are involved.
LGUs as part of the machinery of the govt
cannot be deemed outside the scope of
EIS system.
The arguments above presuppose that the
project is environmentally critical, or within
an environmentally critical area. But
respondent City of Davao has
sufficiently shown that the said project
is not.
RTC found that the Artica Sports Dome is
not within an environmentally critical area,
nor is it an environmentally critical project
after considering the evidence6. The SC
said that none of the exceptional
circumstances when the court may
disregard findings of the RTC is present.
Under Art II, sec 1 of the IRR of PD 1586,
the declaration of certain projects or areas
as environmentally critical, and which shall
fall within the scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System, shall be by
Presidential Proclamation, in accordance
with Section 4 of PD 1586. Pursuant to
this, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued
proclaiming certain areas and types of
projects as environmentally critical and
within the scope of the Environmental
Impact Statement System.
The SC said that the Artica Sports Dome
does not come close to any of the projects
or areas enumerated in such
Proclamation. Neither is it analogous to
any of them. The project then is not
environmentally critical, or within an

Evidence submitted by the respondent:

1. Certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area;
2. Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO-West) that the project area is within the 1830% slope, is outside the scope of the NIPAS (R.A. 7586), and not within a declared watershed area; and
3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project site is thirty-seven (37) kilometers southeast of the southernmost extension of the
Davao River Fault and forty-five (45) kilometers west of the Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside the required minimum buffer
zone of five (5) meters from a fault zone.

environmentally critical area. Hence,

DENR has no choice but to issue a CNC,
a ministerial duty which can be compelled
via mandamus.
Dispositive Portion: Petition DENIED. RTC decision granting the writ of mandamus and directing the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to issue in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of
Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the
construction of the Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED.
No separate opinions.

Digester: JFD MADARANG

PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. COMMISSIONERS, COA et al
28 September 2010 : J. CARPIO
DOCTRINE: An LGU is under the Presidents general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X
of the Constitution. Under said general supervision, the Presidents authority is limited to seeing
to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. He does not have the discretion to
modify or replace the rules.
Petitioner: Negros Occidental is represented by Gov. Isidro Zayco
Respondent: Commission on Audit officers and employees: Commissioners, Director, Cluster IV-Visayas,
Regional Cluster Diirectors, Provincial Auditor
FACTS:
In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution No. 720-A
allocating P4M of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits
of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. Philcam Care won the bidding for the insurance
coverage.
Then-Gov. Coscolluela and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. The total
premium amount was paid on 25 January 1996.
In 1997, after a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension
suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as
provided under AO 103, and for violating RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law.
In a Memorandum, then Pres. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the
amount of P100K. Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead issued
Notice of Disallowance.
Upon appeal, the COA affirmed the Provincial Auditor's disallowance.
Issue
WON COA
committed grave
abuse of discretion
in affirming the
disallowance of
P3,760,000 for
premium paid for
the hospitalization
and health care
insurance benefits
granted by the
Province of Negros
Occidental to its
1,949 officials and
employees

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION
Payment of the insurance
premium for the health
benefits of its officers and
employees was not
unlawful and improper
since it was paid from an
allocation of its retained
earnings pursuant to a
valid appropriation
ordinance. Such
enactment was a clear
exercise of its express
powers under the
principle of local fiscal
autonomy.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION
Although LGUs are
afforded local fiscal
autonomy, LGUs are
still bound by RA
6758 (SSL) and their
actions are subject to
the scrutiny of the
Department of
Budget and
Management (DBM)
and applicable
auditing rules and
regulations enforced
by the COA.

LGUs are only agents of

the national government
and local autonomy

Grant of additional
compensation, like
the hospitalization

Supreme Court
Being an LGU, petitioner is
merely under the Presidents
general supervision
pursuant to Section 4, Article
X of the Constitution. The
Presidents authority is
limited to seeing to it that
rules are followed and laws
are faithfully executed. The
President may only point out
that rules have not been
followed but he cannot lay
down the rules, neither does
he have the discretion to
modify or replace the rules.
Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like
hospitalization and health
care insurance benefits does
not need the approval of the
President to be valid.
AO 103, which required prior
approval from the President
before granting additional

simply means
decentralization. An
LGU has fiscal control
over its own revenues
derived solely from its
own tax base.

and health care

insurance benefits,
must have prior
Presidential approval
to conform with the
state policy on
salary
standardization for
government workers.

benefits to government
personnel, only applies to
government
offices/agencies, including
government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, as
well as their respective
governing boards under the
Executive branch, as stated
in its Sec. 2. LGUs are not
included. This is consistent
with Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE AND SET ASIDE (the)
Decision(s) of the Commission on Audit.

Digester: Romero
CASE TITLE: Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc.
Date of Case: March 16, 2011
DOCTRINE: It cannot be said that the power to reclassify agricultural land was first delegated to
the city and municipal legislative bodies under LGC Sec. 20. Said section only articulates a power
of local legislatures, which previously had only been implied or inferred.
Petitioner:

Department of Agrarian Reform

Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. on behalf of alleged 300 farmerbeneficiaries of subject property; intervened only in the proceedings in the CA.

Respondent:

E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc (EMRAS) owner of disputed properties

FACTS:
1965: EMRAS bought 372 hectares of unirrigated land in Dasmarinas, Cavite to develop it into a
residential subdivision.
1972: EMRAS applied for authority to convert and develop 372 hectare property into a residential
subdivision.
1972: Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite passed Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A approving EMRAS
application.
1988: RA 6657 (CARP Law) took effect. Note: To be exempt from the CARP, the subject property should
have already been reclassified as residential prior to date of effectivity. [Sec 3(c) of CARP Law]
1990: DAR Secretary sent out notices of acquisition covering 303 hectares of EMRAS property for
acquisition under CARP Law.
EMRAS filed petition to nullify notices of acquisition with DARAB.
DARAB: Notices of acquisition null and void. EMRAS property is exempt from CARP because subject
lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before 1988, therefore no longer convered by CARP.
DAR SECRETARY: Affirmed notices of acquisition.
OFFICE OF tHE PRESIDENT: EMRAS property remained agricultural. Subject of CARP acquisition.
CA: In favor of EMRAS. Subject property already converted as residential by the Municipality of
Dasmarinas prior to effectivity of CARP Law. Notices of acquisition declared void.
Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court

Whether the
subject
property
could be
placed under
the CARP.

Municipal Ordinance
29-A did not
reclassify subject
property from agri to
non-agri. The power
to reclassify lands is
an inherent power of
the Legislature under
the Public Land Act,

Cites jurisprudence
(Ortigas & Co v Feati
Bank) wherein SC
ruled that a municipal
council is empowered
to adopt zoning and
subdivision
ordinances or
regulations under

No, subject property could not be placed

under the CARP. The application for
subdivision covering the subject
property was categorically and
unconditionally approved by the
Municipality of Dasmarinas. Because of
this, subject property already zoned and
reclassified as residential.

which, absent a
specific delegation,
could not be
exercised by an LGU.
The Local Autonomy
Act of 1959 (in effect
when Municipality of
Dasmarinas
approved Ordinance
29-A) merely
delegated to cities
and municipalities
zoning authority. It
was only Sec. 20 of
LGC of 1991 that
extended to cities
and municipalities
limited authority to
reclassify lands.

Sec. 3 of the Local

Autonomy Act.
The Municipality
could validly zone
and reclassify the
subject property in
the exercise of its
police power in order
to safeguard health,
safety, peace, good
order, and general
welfare of the people
in the locality.
EMRAS mentioned
that residential
subdivisions and
industrial estates
surround the area of
their property.

Zoning classification is an exercise by

the local govt of police power, not the
power of eminent domain.
*see extensive discussion on Police
Power below
A Zoning ordinance is defined as a local
city or municipal legislation which
logically arranges, prescribes, defines,
and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as
present and future projection of needs.
Ordinance 29-A constitututes partial or
limited zoning, for they are applicable to
a specific property in the city or
municipality to be devoted to for a
certain use.
*see extensive discussion below for
meaning of partial zoning
Public Land Act is immaterial to the
case. The power of the President under
the PLA is limited to the classification of
lands to the public domain that are
alienable or open to disposition. Subject
property involved here is no longer part
of public domain and is privately owned
by EMRAS.
Reclassification is the act of specifying
how agricultural lands shall be utilized
for non-agri uses (such as residential,
industrial, commercial), embodied in the
land use plan.
Under the present LGC, the authority to
reclassify agricultural lands primarily
resides in the sanggunian of the city or
municipality (Sec. 20). However, the
Local Autonomy Act of 1959 (in effect
when dispute in case happened) was
silent on authority to reclassify
agricultual lands.
SC says that power to reclassify
agricultural land is an implied power of
the local legislature under the Local
Autonomy Act. This is how they came
up with this conclusion:
The specified non-agri use of land must
be embodied in a land use plan. The
land use plan is enacted through a
zoning ordinance. Thus, zoning
ordinances take precedence over

reclassification.
When city or municipal boards and
councils approved ordinance delineating
an area as residential pursuant to power
under the Local Autonomy Act, they
were at the same time reclassifying any
agricultural lands within the zone for
non-agri use. Hence, ensuring
compliance and implementation of their
zoning ordinance.
Therefore, the approval by municipal
concils of an application for subdivision
through an ordinance should already be
understood to include approval of the
reclassification of the land, covered by
said application, from agri to non-agri.
Liberal application of zoning power of
city and municipal councils, as to
include the power to accordingly
reclassify lands within their zones, is in
accord with legislative intent behind the
Local Autonomy Act to increase the
autonomy of local governments.
It cannot be said that the power to
reclassify agricultural land was first
delegated to the city and municipal
legislative bodies under LGC Sec. 20.
Said section only articulates a power of
local legislatures, which previously had
only been implied.

Extensive Discussion on ZONING:

- Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or
zones.
- It is comprehensive where it is governed by a single plan for the entire municipality and prevails
throughout the municipality in accordance with that plan.
- It is partial or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the municipality or to certain
uses. Fire limits, height districts and building regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or
use regulation that are antecedents of modern comprehensive zoning.
- Zoning has been defined as the confining of certain classes of buildings and uses to certain
localities, areas, districts or zones.
- Zoning also acquired a technical and artificial meaning: Zoning is the separation of the
municipality into districts and the regulation of buildings and structures within the districts so
created, in accordance with their construction, and nature and extent of their use. It is a
dedication of districts delimited to particular uses designed to subserve the general welfare.
Extensive discussion on RECLASSIFICATION:
- It is different from Conversion.
- Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other
use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.

- Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.

Discussion on POLICE POWER:
- Police power need not always be expressly delegated, it may also be inferred.
- The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born
with civilized government.
- It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" and "Salus populi est
suprema lex"
- Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
- Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan
del Norte, 163 SCRA 182).
- Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of
such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
- A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the
mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation.
- General Rule: municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and
purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as
empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of
the people.
- The so-called inferred police powers of municipal corporations are as much delegated
powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing
out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional fact that the
corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such
powers.
- Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: Police power is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people.
- The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate
with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safely,
comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights.
o It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and
almost every function of the municipal government.
o It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not
limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of
them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants
of the corporation.

Dispositive Portion: Petitions for Review filed by the Buklod Nang Magbubukid Sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc.
and the Department of Agrarian Reformare DENIED. The CA Decision is AFFIRMED.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, Jr., Sergio Tadeo (Assoc. of Brgy. Captains of Cabanatuan) and Nelson
Alcantara (Brgy. Captain, QC), petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Paquito N. Ochoa and Secretary Corazon Juliano-Soliman of the DSWD,
respondents.
GR 195770
July 27, 2012
Facts:
Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition:
o Questioning the constitutionality of RA 10147 (2011 Gen. Appropriations Act) provision
allocating P21 Billion for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP).
o Enjoining Respondents from implementing CCTP on the ground that it amounts to a
"recentralization" of government functions that have already been devolved from the
national government to the LGUs.
In 2007, DSWD implemented a poverty reduction strategy dubbed Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino.
In 2008, DSWD issued A.O.16 (s. 2008) setting the implementing guidelines for the project,
renamed as Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) also referred to as CCTP.
CCTP provides cash grants to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to
meet certain human development goals. Eligible households selected from priority target areas
are granted health and education benefits for a total annual subsidy of P15k.
AO 16 also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among DepEd, DOH, DILG, the
National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and LGUs. DSWD as lead implementing agency
oversees and coordinates the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the program while
the LGU is responsible for the availability of health and education supply, and providing technical
assistance for the Program implementation, among others.
DSWD executed MOAs with each participating LGUs to outline the obligation of both parties
during the 5-year implementation period.
Congress then provided funding for the project as follows: P298K in 2008, P5 Billion in 2009, P10
Billion in 2010, and P21 Billion in 2011.
Issue:
WON THE CCTP BUDGET ALLOCATION UNDER THE DSWD VIOLATES ART. II, SEC. 25 & ART.
X, SEC. 3 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IN RELATION TO SEC. 17 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 BY PROVIDING FOR THE RECENTRALIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES ALREADY DEVOLVED TO
THE LGUS
Held:
No. Petition is dismissed.
Petitioners:
The manner by which CCTP is implemented is questionable (i.e., primarily through a national
agency - DSWD, instead of LGU).
It is the LGUs responsibility to deliver social welfare, agriculture, and health care services.

Giving DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the manner by which
services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with would have enhanced its
delivery of basic services. This results in the "recentralization" of basic government
functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the avowed policy of
decentralization.

Ratio:
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments
( Sec 3, Sec 14 Art 10 1987 Constitution):
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system
of decentralization xxx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar
bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of
the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of
the units in the region.

To fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them into
self-reliant communities, Section 17 LGC vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions
pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall xxx discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise xxx discharge such other functions and responsibilities as
are necessary to xxx provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

However, par (c) of Sec 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationallyfunded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government
under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive
orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under
this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and
services.

This express reservation of power by the national government means that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU.
Ganzon v. Court of Appeals - while it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall
promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local

autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into "mini-states." With local
autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of the national
government over the affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever "the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units."

Pimentel v. Aguirre - Defined the extent of the local government's autonomy in terms of its
partnership with the national government in the pursuit of common national goals. Thus:
o

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at
the local levels. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies
effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.

o

Decentralization of administration - when the central government delegates administrative

powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and make
local governments more responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities. The President exercises general supervision
over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political power in favor of LGUs

declared to be autonomous. The autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. This amounts to selfimmolation, since the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.

It is thus clear that the LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services. The national government is not
precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national
development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.

Digester: Stan Geronimo

CASE TITLE: CSC vs. Yu
Date of Case: 2012
DOCTRINE: devolution
Petitioner: (name and short description)
Respondent: (name and short description)
FACTS:

Castillo occupied the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) in the DOH regional office in
Zamboanga.
Yu occupied PHO I position in the same office.
LGC 1991 came into effect.
DOH regional offices were devolved to the LGUs (specifically, Basilan).
Devolution carried with it the TRANSFER of the plantilla items PHO II and PHO I to the devolved
units.
Devolution obliges the Governor to re-appoint the incumbents of the plantilla items that were
devolved from DOH to Basilan.
Governor did not re-appoint Castillo, despite the automatic transfer rule during devolution.
As a consequence of non-reappointment, Castillo remained working at DOH.
Governor later on appointed Yu to occupy the devolved PHO II position in the Basilan hospital,
the one previously occupied by Castillo.
A law was passed re-nationalizing the hospitals in Basilan.
The PHO II position occupied by Yu was transferred back to DOH.
The PHO II position was also converted to Chief of Hospital II position.
The DOH Secretary did not re-appoint Yu to the Chief of Hospital II position.
The DOH Secretary compelled Yu to continue occupying the PHO II position.
The DOH Secretary appointed another person to occupy the Chief of Hospital II position.
Yu questioned her non-reappointment, saying that she has a vested right to the Chief of Hospital
II position.
CSC said that she has no vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position.
CSC's theory: the PHO II position was NEVER devolved to the Basilan hospital.
CSC's theory: that because Castillo remained in the DOH during the devolution, PHO II position
was retained in DOH.
CSC's theory: when Yu was appointed to a PHO II position in Basilan hospital, it was a different
position.
CSC's theory: the Chief of Hospital II position which was a conversion from the PHO II position in
the DOH was the plantilla item of Castillo.
Castillo had already retired by the time of the re-nationalization.

WON the PHO II

position occupied by Yu
was a devolved position.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

The PHO II position was

never devolved to LGU
Basilan.

The PHO II position was

devolved to LGU
Basilan.

The PHO II position

remained with the DOH,
along with Dr. Castillo.

Said position became

VACANT when Dr.
Castillo was not reappointed by the
Governor.

Supreme Court
(see below)

The PHO II position that

Dr. Yu occupied in the
LGU of Basilan was a

When Dr. Yu occupied

newly created position.

Hence, Dr. Yu has no
vested right in the reclassified PHO II
position in the DOH,
which was converted to
a Chief of Hospital II
position.

the PHO II position, she

acquired vested right in
the re-classified PHO II
position, as Chief of
Hospital II.
DOH Secretarys
appointment to the
Chief of Hospital II
position is invalid.

SUPREME COURT
What is the policy of LGC on devolution/decentralization?
Provide a responsive and accountable LOCGOV structure through system of decentralization.
NG agencies, including DOH, are mandated to devolve LGUs: provision of basic services & facilities
What is devolution?
the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
What is the manner of devolution prescribed by the LGC? (Sec. 17)

transfer of records, equipment, and other assets to LGUs

transfer of personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions and responsibilities
NG personnel to be absorbed by LGUs to which they belong or in whose areas they were
assigned
Collatilla: That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of
similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit
shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure

How does EO No. 503 ensure the implementation of devolution?

1. Mandatory absorption of NGA personnel by LGU
2. LGUs shall create equivalent positions of affected personnel, except when not administratively viable
3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions unless the LGU opts to
absorb the personnel concerned.
4. NG personnel not absorbed are retained by NGA, subject to civil service law
5. Devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive
concerned immediately upon their transfer
What is the mandatory duty of the Governor in the devolution?
Mandatory to absorb the PHO II position
Mandatory to reappointment Castillo, the incumbent to the PHO II position
What is the only instance when LGU may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel?
When absorption is not administratively viable, such as when it will result to duplication of functions.
In such a case, the NGA personnel will be retained by the NGA.

What is the evidence showing that PHO II position was devolved to the LGU?
Certification by Governor: said position was included in 1992 OSCAS received from DBM with
budget appropriation
Declaration by Governor during formal turn over program: the item position of PHO II was among
the positions turned over to the Provincial Government of Basilan
What is the argument of CSC in support of Governor?
Only 53 plantilla positions, not 54, were devolved.
PHO II position was devolved.
Why was Governor's refusal to reappoint Dr. Castillo whimsical?
No showing that absorption was not administratively viable.
What was the effect of Governor's refusal to reappoint?
did not prevent the devolution of Dr. Castillo which, together with that of the PHO II position, took effect by
operation of law.
How was the dilemma resolved?
Governor requested that Dr. Castillo be DETAILED to DOH
Detail was confirmed by Sec. of Health Juan Flavier through Department Order
Dr. Castillo drew salary from the devolved position
What is the rule on compensation of DETAILED officers/employees?
Officials and employees on detail with other offices shall be paid their salaries, emoluments, allowances,
fringe benefits and other personal services costs from the appropriations of their parent agencies and in
no case shall such be charged against the appropriations of the agencies where they are assigned or
detailed, except when authorized by law.
What is a detail?
Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6):
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of
an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying
professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the
detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee
shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
What was Dr. Castillo's recourse if she felt aggrieved by the detail?
Right to appeal to CSC
Why did Dr. Castillo not appeal?
We could only surmise that, since Dr. Castillo was looking at only three more years from the time of her
detail until her retirement in 1996
considering that she obviously would not suffer any diminution in salary and rank, she found it pointless to
pursue the matter

Neither did Dr. Castillo find need to raise a howl when, at the behest of Governor Salapuddin who was
determined to replace her, DOH officials categorized her as a devolution non-viable employee, along with
216 others nationwide, by the mere fact that she was not accepted by the LGU of Basilan and not
because of an actual non-viability
When did Dr. Castillo cease to be a detailed employee?
in 1994, when Governor Salapuddin formally manifested his intention to stop the drawing of Dr. Castillo's
salary from the LGU in anticipation of his appointment of Dr. Yu to the PHO II position, Dr. Castillo ceased
to be a detailed employee at the DOH Regional Office but was re-absorbed by the DOH as a devolution
non-viable employee
What is the consequence of re-absorption?
consequently, paid salaries and benefits from the Miscellaneous Personnel Benefits Fund that had been
set aside under the Office of the Secretary of Health precisely for such employees.
Was the PHO II position devolved?
While Dr. Castillo was retained by the DOH, the PHO II position was devolved to the LGU.
Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position PHO II.

Edward Dayog
PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE
July 19, 2000
The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local
government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials
execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their
cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks
and using available resources to achieve their goals.
Petitioner: 1. Aquilino Pimentel; 2. Roberto Pagdanganan, Intervenor (provincial governor of Bulacan,
national president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines, and chairman of the League of Leagues
of Local Governments)
Respondent: 1. Alexander Aguirre, Executive Secretary; 2. Emilia Boncodin, Secretary of Budget and
Management
FACTS:
- 12/27/1997: The President of the Philippines, in light of the impending economic crisis (Asian Financial
Crisis of 1997), issued Admin Order 372, sections 1 and 4 of which provide:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement
measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on
the following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted
out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings
funded by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly
essential to Philippine commitments in the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet;
e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions
and agencies in the performance of their regular functions and those that are funded by grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the
Philippine Centennial celebration and those involving regular competitions/events;
g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from
government received by the person concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law or those already
being undertaken on a regular basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by
law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities.

3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs

4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue
allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
- This petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was brought to annul Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it
requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services; and enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4.
Issue 1:
W/N Sec. 1, AO 372 is a
valid exercise of the
President's power of
general supervision
over LGUs.

Petitioner's
Contention: No.

Respondent's
Contention: Yes.

1. The President, in
issuing AO 372, was in
effect exercising the
power of control over
LGUs. The Constitution
vests in the President,
however, only the power
of generalsupervision
over LGUs, consistent
with the principle of local
autonomy.

AO 372 was issued to

alleviate the "economic
difficulties brought about
by the peso
devaluation" and
constituted merely an
exercise of the
President's power of
supervision over LGUs.
It does not violate local
fiscal autonomy,
because it merely
directs local
governments to identify
measures that will
reduce their total
expenditures for nonpersonal services by at
least 25%.

2. The government
failed to satisfy the
requisites before it can
intervene in LGU fiscal
matters as provided for
in LGC 284.
Issue 2:
W/N Sec. 4, AO 372 is a
valid exercise of the
President's power of
general supervision
over LGUs.

Petitioner's
Contention: No.

Respondent's
Contention: Yes.

The directive to withhold

10% of the LGUs' IRA is
in contravention of Sec.
286 of the Local
Government Code and
of Sec. 6, Art. X of the
Constitution, providing
for the automatic
release to each of these
units its share in the
national internal
revenue.

The withholding of 10%

of the LGUs IRA does
not violate the statutory
prohibition on the
imposition of any lien or
holdback on their
revenue shares,
because such
withholding is
"temporary in nature
pending the assessment
and evaluation by the
Development
Coordination Committee
of the emerging fiscal
situation."

Supreme Court: Yes.

Sec. 1, AO 372 is
merely advisory in
character, and does not
constitute a mandatory
or binding order that
interferes with local
autonomy. The language
used, while
authoritative, does not
amount to a command
that emanates from a
boss to a subaltern.

Supreme Court: No.

A basic feature of local
fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the
national internal
revenue. This is
mandated by no less
than the Constitution.
LGC 286 specifies
further that the release
shall be made directly to
the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after
every quarter of the year
and "shall not be subject
to any lien or holdback
that may be imposed by

the national government

for whatever purpose."

OBITER (But important to the topic)

1. Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one
of general supervision. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
2. Mondano v. Silvosa: In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
3. Taule v. Santos: He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of
their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over
an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"
4. Limbona v. Mangelin: "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments 'more responsive and accountable Decentralization of power, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
5. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national
government.
6. Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the
exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head
of the economic and planning agency of the government.
7. LGC 284 provides for requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no
case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal
year preceding the current one.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition partially granted.
J. Kapunan's Dissent:
1. Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4
does not conclusively show that, on its face, the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the
IRA shares of the LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding
is merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality,

especially in light of the reasonable presumption that administrative agencies act in conformity with the
law and the Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has
not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the
determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate
adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function.
2. As chief fiscal officer of the country, the President supervises fiscal development in the local
government units and ensures that laws are faithfully executed. The goal of local economy is not to
"end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local
government units," but to make local governments "more responsive and accountable" to "ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by
the President not only of his power of general supervision, but also in conformity with his role as
chief fiscal officer of the country in the discharge of which he is clothed by law with certain powers to
ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the
release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory mandates.
3. The phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of the funds is
mechanical, spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must first be determined, and the money for their
payment collected. (J. Kapunan refers to LGC 284 which empowers the President to adjust IRAs, subject
to several requisites.)
Majority's Refutation

1. RE Prematurity: This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall
on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real
issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether
they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara, this Court
held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law
or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

2. RE President's power as CFO: Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically
been authorized by law and have not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the other
hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local
Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are
indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any legal or
constitutional basis.

3. RE Release and adjustment of IRA: It must be emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372,
this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make
necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this
Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely

glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such reduction is subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the
leagues of local governments. Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the
national government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local development plans
x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that no such interaction or consultation
was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372.

Digester: Krissy Flores

CASE TITLE: TAN v. PERENA
Date of Case: Feb. 18, 2005
DOCTRINE: Sec. 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the
national government. Of course, local governments are similarly empowered under Sec. 16 of the
LGC. The national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to
be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the welfare of their
constituents. However, the national government undoubtedly has the ability to implement police
power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of
regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdiction.
A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void.
Petitioners:
1. Leonardo Tan defendant; applied on Nov. 8, 1995 with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for
the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay,
Daanbantayan
2. Robert Uy an agent of Tan
3. Lamberto Te Mayor of Daanbantayan
Respondent:
1. Socorro Y. Perena plaintiff; a duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in Daanbantayan
since the 1970s and whose franchise was valid until 2002
FACTS:
1974 Presidential Decree 449 (PD 449) or the Cockfighting Law of 1974 was enacted. Sec. 5(b) thereof
limits the number of cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities: Only one cockpit shall
be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a population of over
100,000, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated.
1991 The LGC was enacted, where the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, any law to the
contrary not withstanding, to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breding of gamecocks.
1993 The Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu enacted Municipal Ordinance
No. 6 (MO6), which served as the Revised Omnibus Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules
and regulations governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan. Sec. 5: There shall be allowed to operate
in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu, not more than its equal number of cockpits based upon the
population provided for in PD 449, provided, however, that this specific section can be amended for
purposes of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so warrants.
Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7
(MO7), which amended Sec. 5 (above): There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of
Daanbantayan not more than three cockpits.
Nov. 8, 1995 Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission (MGC) for the issuance of a
permit/license to establish a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan. The MGC favorably
reccomended to Mayor Te that a permit be issued to Tan.
Jan. 20, 1996 Mayor Te issued a Mayors Permit allowing Tan to establish/operate/conduct the business
of a cockpit in Combado for the period of Jan. 20, 1996 to Dec. 31, 1996.
Perena, a duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in Daanbantayan since the 1970s, filed a
Complaint for Damages with a Prayer for Injunction against petitioners:
1. There was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit;

2. Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado but in Malingin, less than 5km away form her
own cockpit.
3. The unlawful operation of Tans cockpit caused injury to her own legitimate business
4. Demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages
5. Prayed that the Mayors Permit be declared null and void
6. Prayed that a permanent writ of injunction be issued against petitioners, preventing Tan from
conducting cockfights within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan to pursue
such activity.
RTC: initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners: Under the LGC, the sangguniang bayan of each municipality now had the power and authority
to grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the establishment, licensing, operation and
maintenance of cockpits.
Respondent: The amendment in MO7 violated Sec. 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint. MO6, prior to its amendment was, by specific provision, an
implementation of the Cockfighting Law. Yet, questions could be raised as to the efficacy of the
subsequent amendment under MO7, since under MO6, an amendment allowing additional cockpits could
be had only if the municipal population so warrants. Since the case was only for damages, the RTC
cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. There was no evidence to show that respondent had
actually suffered damages and no bad faith in the issuance of the permit to Tan as it was pursuant to MOs
that nonetheless remained in force.
In denying Respondents MR, the RTC stated that MOs 6 and 7 were valid and legal for all intents and
purposes. Also valid is the Sangguniang Bayans Resolution No. 78-96, conferring on Tan a franchise to
operate a cockpit for 10 years. While the ordinances seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law,
any doubt in interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the LGU, following
the principles of devolution under the LGC.
CA: Sec. 447(a)(3)(V) of the LGC vesting unto the Sangguniang Bayan the power to authorize and
license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the Cockfighting Law, as these two laws are
not necessarily inconcistent with each other. The LGC merely transferred to the Sangguniang Bayan
powers that were previously conferred on the MGC. MO7 should be held invalid for allowing, in
unconditional terms, the operation of not more than three cockpits in the municipality, clearly dispensing
with the standard set forth in PD 449 (but this issue is mooted by the expiration and non-renewal of the
Mayors Permit). Respondent is not entitled to damages. Tan enjoined form operating a cockpit and
conducitng any cockfights within the municipality.
Issue 1:
Whether the validity of a
municipal ordinance
may be determined in
an action for damages
which does not even
contain a prayer to
declare the ordinance
valid.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
The CA, in invalidating
MO7, embarked on an
unwarranted collateral
attack on the validity of
a muncipal ordinance.
Perenas complaint did
not pray for the nullity of
MO7.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT:
The CA did not
expressly nullify MO7.
However, it enjoined Tan
from operating a cockpit
and conducting
cockfights in the
municipality. Absent the
invalidity of MO7, there
would be no basis for
this injunction. So it
seems that the CA did
deem MO7 a nullity.
The Complaint is not

only an action for

damages but also one
for injunction, which
requires a judicial
determination whether
there exists a right in
esse which is to be
protected and if there is
an act consituting a
violation of such right
against which injunction
is sought. Also, to
warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be
both a right of action for
a legal wrong inflicted
by the defendant and
damage resulting to the
plaintiff therefrom
(damnum et injuria).

Issue 2:
Whether the
Cockfighting Law was
repealed by the LGC
(Whether a second
cockpit may be legally
allowed in
Daanbantayan).

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Yes, repealed. MO7 is
valid. The Cockfighting
Law was repealed by
the LGC (citing Sec.
5(b) of LGC). Said
provision vests on LGUs
the power and authority
to issue franchises and
regulate the operation
and establishment of
cockpits in their
respecitve
municipalities, any law
to the contrary
withstanding.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
No, based on Sec. 5(b)
of the Cockfighting Law.

Petitioners averment in
its Answer that MO7 is
valid can be considered
as an affirmative
defense, hence, it
became a justiciable
matter for the RTC.
SUPREME COURT:
No. While the LGC
expressly repealed
several laws, the
Cockfighting Law was
not among them. Sec.
534(f) of the LGC is not
an express repealing
clause because it fails to
identify/designate the
acts that are intended to
be repealed. Implied
repeals are disfavored
and will not be so
declared unless the
intent of the legislators
is manifest or unless the
repugnancy between
the two laws is not only
irreconcilable but also
clear and convincing.
The clear import of Sec.
447(a)(3)(v) is that it is
the Sangguniang Bayan
which is empowered to
authorize and license
the establshment,

operation and
maintenance of cockpits
and regulate
cockfighting and
commercial breeding of
gamecocks,
notwithstanding any law
to the contrary.
History of laws:
The power (generally
unqualified by
restrictions) of the
municipal council to
authorize/license
cockpits was repeatedly
recognized even after
the establishment of the
Republic in 1946.
However, in the 1970s,
there was a desire for
stricter licensing
requirements of
cockpits, hence the
enactment of the
Cockfighting Law in
1974. In said law, it wa
the city or municipal
mayor who was
authorized to issue
licenses for the
opeartion and
maintenance of
cockpits, subject to the
approval of the Chief of
Constabulary or his
authorized
representative. Thus,
the sole discretion to
authorize the operation
of cockpits was
removed from the
LGUs. PD 1802
reestablished the
Philippine Gamefowl
Commission and
provided that city and
municipal mayors with
the concurrence of their
respective sangguniang
panglunsod/bayan were
given the authority to
license and regulate
cockfighting under the
supervision of the City
Mayor or the Provincial

Issue 3:
Meaning of the qualifier
any law to the contrary
notwithstanding
provided in Sec. 447(a)
(3)(v).

Issue 4:
Does the qualifier in the
LGC similarly allow the
Sangguniang Bayan to
authorize more cockpits
than allowed under the
Cockfighting Law?

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Governor. The latter was

subsequently amended,
transferring the
supervision from the
mayor or governor to
the PGC.
SUPREME COURT:
PGC v. IAC (construing
Sec. 4 of PD 1802): The
conferment of the power
to license and regulate
municipal cockpits in
municipal authorities is
in line with the policy of
local autonomy
embodied in the
Constitution. The PGC
did not possess the
power to issue cockpit
licenses; it only had
review and supervision
powers, as
distinguished from
control. The regulation
of cockpits was vested
in the municipal
authorities, subject only
to the guidelines laid
down by the PGC.
The qualifier serves
notice that it is the
sangguniang bayan
concerned alone which
has the power to
authorize and license
the establishment,
operation and
maintenance of
cockpits, and regulate
cockfighting and
commmercial breeding
of gamecocks within its
territorial jurisdiction.
SUPREME COURT:
No. While the
sanggunian retains the
power to authorize and
license, its discretion is
limited in that it cannot
authorize more than one
cockpit per city or
municipality, unless
such cities or
municipalities have a
population of more than

100,000, in which case

two cockpits may be
established.
Considering that Sec.
447(a)(3)(v) speaks
essentially of the identity
of the wielder of the
power of control and
supervision over cockpit
operation, it is not
inconsistent with
previous enactments
that impose restricitons
on how such power may
be exercised. There is
no dichotomy between
affirming the power and
subjecting it to
limitations at the same
time.
Sec. 5(d) of the
Cockfighting Law arises
from a valid exercise of
police power by the
national government. Of
course, local
governments are
similarly empowered
under Sec. 16 of the
LGC. The national
government ought to be
attuned to the
sensitivities of
devloution and strive to
be sparing in usurping
the prerogatives of local
governments to regulate
the welfare of their
constituents. However,
the national government
undoubtedly has the
ability to implement
police power measures
that affect the subjects
of municipal
government, especially
if the subject of
regulation is a condition
of universal character
irrespective of territorial
jurisdiction (ex.
Cockfighting is a
traditionally regulated
activity due to the
attendant gambling

involved, which is
essentially antagonistic
to the aims of enhancing
national productivity and
self-reliance).
Sec. 447(a)(3)(v) cannot
be construed as vesting
an unlimited discretion
to the sanggunian to
control all aspects of
cockpits and
cockfighting in their
respective jurisdiction
because then, the
national government
would be effectively
barred from imposing
any future regulatory
enactments pertaining
to cockpits and
cockfighting unless it
were to repeal the Sec.
447(a)(3)(v).
A municipal ordinance
must not contravene the
Constitution or any
statute, otherwise it is
void. MO7 contravenes
the Cockfighting Law in
allowing 3 cockpits in
Daanbantayan. Thus, no
rights can be asserted
by petitioners arising
from the ordinance.
Dispositive Portion: Petition denied. Injunction proper.

BATANGAS CATV, INC., vs. CA, BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD & BATANGAS
CITY MAYOR
September 29, 2004 | Sandoval Gutierrez, J
Digest by: Monica G.
An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid Why? Magtajas v. Pryce: Municipal government are only agents of
the national government. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal.
Petitioner: Batangas CATV, Inc. - cable service provider in Batangas
Respondent: Batangas Sangguniang Panlungsod & Batangas City Mayor original respondents, CA
since CA decision subj to R45.
FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, the Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod (Panlungsod) enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV permit to construct, install and operate a CATV in
Batangas City. Sec. 8 of the said resolution authorizes petitioner to charge its subscribers the
maximum rates specified therein. However, any increase of rates would be subject to the
approval of the Panlungsod.
In 1993 petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month without
approval of the Panlungsod. The Batangas City mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to
cancel its permit if it doesnt secure the approval of the Panlungsod for the rate increase.
Petitioner filed for injunction assailing the Panlungsods authority to regulate rates charged by
CATV operators because under EO 205, it was the National Telecommunications Commission
which had the sole authority to regulate CATV operation in the Philippines. The trial court
GRANTED the petition holding that the sole agency which can regulate CATV operations was the
NTC and that LGUs cannot exercise regulatory powers over it without appropriate legislation.
The CA REVERSED: The Certificate of Authority to operate a CATV system is granted by the
NTC, but this does not preclude the Panlungsod from regulating the operation of the CATV in
their locality under the powers vested upon it by the LGC of 1983. Sec. 177 (now 457 in RA 7160)
provides:
Section 177. Powers and Duties The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:
a) Enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the community and the inhabitants thereof,
and the protection of property therein;
d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being carried on
and exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the city
Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, LGUs can
perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies. Thus, local government
units can exercise powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the
power that is expressly granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance; and (4) essential to the promotion of the general welfare of
their inhabitants.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue 1
W/N a LGU can
regulate the
subscriber
rates charged
by CATV (cable
tv) operators
within its
territorial

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
NO
While the LGC of
1991 extends to
LGUs to perform
any act that will
benefit their
constituents, it

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
YES
> Resolution No.
210 was enacted
pursuant to Sec.
177(c)&(d) of the
LGC of 1983
which authorizes

SUPREME COURT
NO
1. For more than two decades the NTC has
assumed regulatory power over the CATV
industry. Presidential issuances have
reinforced the NTCs powers:
> Pres. Marcos issued PD 1512 which

jurisdiction

does not
authorize them to
regulate CATV
operations since
pursuant to EO
205, only NTC
has that authority.

LGUs to regulate
businesses,
including the
CATV industry.

granted Sining Makulay the exclusive

franchise to operate CATV system in any
place within the Philippines. It terminated all
franchises, permits, or certificated for CATV
systems previously granted by local
governments and national government
instrumentalities. Pres. Marcos subsequently
issued letter of instruction 894 vesting upon
the Chairman of the Board of
Communications direct supervision over
Sining Makulay. Thereafter he issued EO
546 integrating the Board of
Communications and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau to form
the NTC.
>Sining Makulays franchise was cut short
by the People Power Revolution. Pres.
Aquino issued EO 205 opening the CATV
industry to all. It mandated the NTC to grant
Certificates of Authority to CATV operators
and to issue the necessary IRRs.
>Pres. Ramos issued EO 436 restating
NTCs regulatory powers over the CATV
operations:
Sec. 2 The regulation and supervision of the
cable television industry in the Philippines
shall remain vested solely with the NTC.
2. Note, however, that this does not mean
LGUs are stripped of their general power to
prescribe regulations under the general
welfare clause of the LGC.
>When EO 436 decrees that the "regulatory
power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it
pertains to the "regulatory power" over those
matters which are peculiarly within the
NTCs competence, such as, the
determination of rates, issuance of
certificates of authority, etc.
>There is no dispute that the Panlungsod
has been empowered to enact ordinances
and approve resolutions under the general
welfare clause of the LGC of 1983. It
continues to posses such power is clear
under Sec. 16 & 458 of RA 7160 (LGC of
1991).
>The general welfare clause is the
delegation in statutory form of the police
power of the State to LGUs. Through this,
LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect
the lives, health, and property of their

Sub-issue 1
W/N Resolution
210 was a valid
enactment

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
YES
> On the premise
that RA 7160
repealed EO 205
(regulatory power
of NTC)

constituents and maintain peace and order

within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation
maybe regulated by LGUs under the general
welfare clause, primarily because the CATV
system uses public properties. The physical
realities of constructing CATV system allow
an LGU a certain degree of regulation over
CATV operators.
SUPREME COURT
NO
In enacting Resolution No. 210, the
respondents strayed from the well
recognized limits of its power because:
1. It violates the mandate of existing laws.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of
an LGU acting as an agent of the
national legislature. Necessarily, its act
must reflect and conform to the will of
its principal.
US v. Abendan: An ordinance enacted
by virtue of the general welfare clause
is valid, unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippine
Islands, or an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against
public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of common right.
De la Cruz v. Paraz: Ordinances
passed by virtue of the implied power
found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with
the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, and not inconsistent
with the laws or policy of the State.
Resolution No. 210 contravenes EO
205 and EO 436 insofar as it permits
respondent Panlungsod to usurp a
power exclusively vested in the NTC,
i.e., the power to fix the subscriber
rates charged by CATV operators.
Where the state legislature has made
provision for the regulation of conduct,
it has manifested its intention that the
subject matter shall be fully covered by
the statute, and that a municipality,
under its general powers, cannot
regulate the same conduct.
o Keller v. State: Where there is no
express power in the charter of a
municipality authorizing it to adopt
ordinances regulating certain matters

which are specifically covered by a

general statute, a municipal
ordinance, insofar as it attempts to
regulate the subject which is
completely covered by a general
statute of the legislature, may be
rendered invalid. x x x Where the
subject is of statewide concern, and
the legislature has appropriated the
field and declared the rule, its
declaration is binding throughout the
State.
EO 205, a general law, mandates that
the regulation of CATV operations shall
be exercised by the NTC, an LGU
cannot enact an ordinance or approve
a resolution in violation of the said law.
Municipal ordinances are inferior in
status and subordinate to the laws of
the state. An ordinance in conflict with
a state law of general character and
statewide application is universally held
to be invalid
Why? Magtajas v. Pryce: Municipal
government are only agents of the
national government. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal.
Contrary to respondents assertions,
RA 7160 did not repeal EO 205,
impliedly or expressedly.
o It was not included in Sec. 534 of RA
7160 as one of the laws repealed by
the RA.
o It was not impliedly repealed as the
RA and EO may be harmonized. The
NTC, under EO 205, has exclusive
jurisdiction over matters affecting
CATV operation, including
specifically the fixing of subscriber
rates, but does not preclude LGUs
from exercising its general power,
under RA 7160, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order
or safety and general welfare of their
constituents. In effect, both laws
become equally effective and
mutually complementary.
As a specialized agency, the NTC is in
a better position than the LGU to
regulate given the complexities that
characterize the CATV industry.
2. It violates the States deregulation policy
over the CATV industry.

Sub-issue 2
W/N EO 205
violated the
constitutional
prohibition
against
impairment of
contracts

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

When the State declared a policy of

deregulation, the LGUs are bound to
follow. To rule otherwise is to render the
States policy ineffective. Being mere
creatures of the State, LGUs cannot
defeat national policies through
enactments of contrary measures. In
the case at bar, petitioner may increase
its subscriber rates without
respondents approval.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

SUPREME COURT

YES
> Resolution No.
210 is in the
nature of a
contract between
petitioner and
respondents, it
being a grant to
the former of a
franchise to
operate a CATV
system. To hold
that E.O. No. 205
amended its terms
would violate the
constitutional
prohibition against
impairment of
contracts.

NO
>
There is no law specifically
authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to
operate CATV system. Whatever authority
the LGUs had before had been withdrawn
when Pres. Marcos issued PD 1512
"terminating all franchises, permits or
certificates for the operation of CATV system
previously granted by local governments."
>
The protection of the constitutional
provision as to impairment of the obligation
of a contract does not extend to privileges,
franchises and grants given by a
municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra
vires.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 12, 1999 as well as its Resolution dated May 26, 1999 in CA-GR CV No. 52461,
are hereby REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED.

Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary

13 December 2005
(Digest adopted from ustlawreview.com; Important points underlined by K. Guangko)
DOCTRINE: Under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior
consultation with the affected local communities and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Lack of either requisite makes the projects implementation illegal.
Petitioner: Province of Rizal, Municipality of San Mateo, et. al. (the local governments want the subject
dump located in San Mateo to be closed)
Respondent: Executive Secretary, Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources, Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Secretary of Public Works and Highways et. al. (Executive Department wants to
keep the dump open)
FACTS:
This case sprouted from the Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 November 1988 signed by Secretaries
of DPWH and DENR together with the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) Governor. The same
provided that DENR allowed the utilization of its land in Pintong, Bocaue, Rizal as a sanitary landfill by
MMC. However, on 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote to Gov. Cruz
of MMC, the DPWH, the Executive Secretary, and the DENR, informing them of the SB resolution
banning creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. The letter also asked that
addressee's side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold in abeyance all and
any part of your operations with respect to the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on
these letters.
It was also found that the land subject of the MOA was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area.
Thus, in a memorandum (31 May 1989) and two reports (19 June 1989 and 22 January 1990) submitted
by the forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the Community Environment and
Natural Resource Office (CENRO), DENR-IV, Rizal Province, showed that there was no permit issued to
MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes, that the use of the areas greatly affected
1192 families residing and cultivating areas surrounding the dumping site. Respondents LLDA informed
the MMA that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of a
dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its program of upgrading the water
quality of Laguna Lake. Another report by the Regional Technical Director to the DENR found respiratory
illnesses among pupils of a primary school located approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the
constant presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools playground.
In February 1990, DENR granted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (formerly MMC) an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the garbage dumpsite. On 31 July 1990, less than six
months after the issuance of the ECC, DENR suspended the ECC in a letter addressed to the respondent
Secretary of DPWH, stating that it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from
improper development of the site. On November 1993, the DENR Secretary sent a letter to MMA
recommending that the all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong Bocaue be
dismantled. Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government agencies, the
Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No.
635, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land Embraced Therein for
Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority.
On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied

the petition for lack of cause of action. On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners
filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Nio phenomenon
would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed Reservation. On 28 January
1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution, calling attention to the continued expansion of the
dumpsite. As a result, MMDA officials agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. The municipal
mayors allowed the use of the dumpsites until 20 July 1999. On 20 July `999, the Presidential Committee
on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial Government of
Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of Antipolo allowing the use of the dumpsite until 31
December 2000. However, on 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed DILG Secretary Alfredo Lim
and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of
uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic.
Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of violence erupting in the affected
areas, the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining Order on 19 January 2001. On 24 January
2001, SC issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for, effective immediately and until further
orders. Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as The Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by President Estrada.
Issues

PETITIONER:

RESPONDENT:

Supreme Court:

W the San Mateo

Landfill will
remain
permanently
closed

Various reports of
the effects of the
dump on the
environment and on
the residents
(polluted sources of
potable water;
respiratory
illnesses, etc.)

Declared that the

reason for the
creation of the
Marikina Watershed
Reservation to
protect the Marikina
River as source of
supply of the City of
Manila no longer
exists

Two self-evident truths: (a) the San

Mateo site has adversely affected its
environments; (b) sources of water
should always be protected. Before
Proclamation 635, Congress
enacted the National Water Crisis
Act that sought to address the
protection and conservation of
watersheds. Respondents actions
defy all logic.

W the local
governments have
the power to control
or regulate the use
natural resources
located in the public
domain

Legality of
Proclamation 635

Marikina Watershed
Reservation and thus
the San Mateo Site
are located in the
public domain and
the power to control
or regulate its use is
national and not local
government.

Proclamation 635
violates the LGC.

Proclamation 635 is
not subject to the
provisions of LGC.

San Mateo Dump CLOSED.

The Constitution, the Administrative
Code of 1987, and Executive Order
No. 192 (Charter of DENR) entrust
the DENR with
the guardianship and safekeeping of
the Marikina Watershed Reservation
and our other natural treasures.
However, although the DENR, an
agency of the government, owns the
Marikina Reserve and has
jurisdiction over the same, this
power is not absolute, but is defined
by the declared policies of the state,
and is subject to the law and higher
authority They have ignored their
responsibility as guardians and
protectors of this tormented piece of
land.
Under the LGC, two requisites must
be met before a national project that
affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented:
prior consultation with the affected

local communities and prior

approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Lack of
either requisite makes the projects
implementation illegal.
*Full discussion below.
*The Local Government Code gives to local government units all the necessary powers to promote the
general welfare of their inhabitants. The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and
were in fact fulfilling their mandate. Section 16 allows every local government unit to exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare, which involve promoting health and safety, enhancing the right of the people to a
balanced ecology and preserving the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Lack of either requisite
makes the projects implementation illegal.
Approved on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 was enacted
pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid
waste management system which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize
environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage
resource conservation and recovery. It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste
Management Plan with regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling,
composting and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and
public information, and the funding of solid waste management projects.
The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework, which should
include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within
eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary landfills located
within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed area. Any landfills subsequently developed must
comply with the minimum requirements laid down in Section 40, specifically that the site selected must be
consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in
an area where the landfills operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources
such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by
the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED

Digester: Justin Batocabe

CASE TITLE: Veloso v. COA
Date of Case: September 6, 2001

DOCTRINE: LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of
the COA.

Petitioner: Luciano Velosos et. Al. three term councilors of Manila

Respondent: COA

FACTS:
1) City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment
of Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected
for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in the Same Position. It gave gratuity the equivalent of the salary for 3
terms to the Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Councilor if they were able to serve 3 consecutive terms at the end of
their terms.
2) Atty. Espina, Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila, issued Audit Observation Memorandum stating
the ff:
a) the reward was without legal basis
b) it was excessive and constituted double compensation
c) appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA ordinance was classified as Maintenance and
Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal Services
3) After evaluation of the AOM, the Director, Legal and Adjudication Office the ordinance was upheld,
finding that there is no double compensation.
4) Upon review of the COA it opined that the monetary reward under the EPSA is covered by the term
compensation. Though it recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs, it emphasized the limitations thereof
set forth in the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It explained that the SSL does not authorize the grant
of such monetary reward or gratuity. It also stressed the absence of a specific law passed by Congress
which ordains the conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity to the former councilors
5) Petitioners now go to the SC

Issue 1
whether the COA has

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
YES COA had authority

the authority to
disallow the
disbursement of local
government funds

*the power and

authority of the COA to
audit government
funds and accounts
does not carry with it in
all instances the power
to disallow a particular
disbursement.

*Citing Guevara v.
Gimenez, petitioners
claim that the COA has
no discretion or
authority to disapprove
payments on the
ground that the same
was unwise or that the
amount is
unreasonable. The
COA's remedy,
according to
petitioners, is to bring
to the attention of the
proper administrative
officer such
expenditures that, in its
opinion, are irregular,
unnecessary,
excessive or
extravagant.

* While admitting that

the cited case was
decided by the Court
under the 1935
Constitution,
petitioners submit that
the same principle
applies in the present
case.

COA held that it is

vested by the
Constitution the power
to determine whether
government entities
comply with laws and
regulations in
disbursing government
funds and to disallow
irregular
disbursements

As held in National
Electrification
Administration v.
Commission on Audit, the
ruling in Guevara cited by
petitioners has already
been overturned by the
Court in Caltex Philippines,
Inc. v. Commission on
Audit. The Court
explainedthat under the
1935 Constitution, the
Auditor General could not
correct irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures of
public funds, but could only
bring the matter to the
attention of the proper
administrative officer. Under
the 1987 Constitution,
however, the COA is vested
with the authority to
determine whether
government entities,
including LGUs, comply
with laws and regulations in
disbursing government
funds, and to disallow illegal
or irregular disbursements
of these funds.

*Under the Constitution and

the Admin Code the COA's
audit jurisdiction extends to
the government, or any of
its subdivisions,
agencies, or
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or
controlled corporations with
original charters. Its
jurisdiction likewise covers,
albeit on a post-audit basis,
the constitutional bodies,

commissions and offices

that have been granted
fiscal autonomy,
autonomous state colleges
and universities, other
government-owned or
controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries, and such
non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity
from or through the
government.

* Pursuant to its mandate

as the guardian of public
funds, the COA is vested
with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to
government revenue and
expenditures and the uses
of public funds and
property. This includes the
exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the
techniques and methods for
such review, and
promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and
regulations. The COA is
endowed with enough
latitude to determine,
prevent and disallow
irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable
expenditures of government
funds. It is tasked to be
vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use
of the government's, and
ultimately the people's,
property.
*LGUs, though granted
local fiscal autonomy, are
still within the audit

jurisdiction of the COA.

Issue 2 whether the

COA committed grave
abuse of discretion in
affirming the
disallowance
of P9,923,257.00
covering the EPSA of
former three-term
councilors of the City
of Manila authorized by
Ordinance No. 8040

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

COA acted out of

bounds when it
declared the EPSA as
it effectively nullified a
duly-enacted
ordinance which is
essentially a judicial
function.

(same contention as
above)

Supreme Court

NO GADALEJ by COA

SC found that Ordinance

No 8040 amounted to
double compensation

*the COA's assailed

decisions were made in
faithful compliance with its
mandate and in judicious
exercise of its general audit
power as conferred on it by
the Constitution. The COA
adheres to the policy that
government funds and
property should be fully
protected and conserved
and that irregular,
unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or
uses of such funds and
property should be
prevented

Dispositive Portion:

Petition DISMISSED. Commission on Audit decision AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The recipients
need not refund the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration that they already received, as the parties
acted in good faith.

Digester: Arnel Abeleda

CASE TITLE: Aldaba v. COMELEC
Date of Case: January 25, 2010
DOCTRINE: A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only
in the immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population,
and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.
Petitioner: Victorino Aldaba, Carlo Fajardo, Julio Morada and Minerva Morada (Taxpayers, registered
voters and residents of Malolos City)
Respondent: Commission on Elections
FACTS:
1. Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four (4 legislative
districts). The 1st Legislative District comprised of the ff.:
a. City of Malolos
b. Municipalities of (1) Hagonoy, (2) Calumpit, (3) Pulilan, (4) Bulacan, and (5) Paombong.
2. 1 May 2009, R.A. 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter, by creating a separate
legislative district for the city.
3. At the time the legislative bills for R.A. 9591 (HB 3693 and SB 1986) were filed in Congress in 2007,
the population of Malolos City was 223,069.
4. The population of Malolos City on May 1, 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that HB
3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) that the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using
the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
5. Petitioners filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
Issue

Aldaba

Comelec

Supreme Court

WON the Congress

use of projected
population is nonjusticiable as it involves
a determination on the
"wisdom of the
standard adopted by
the legislature to
determine compliance
with a constitutional
requirement."

:
There exists a
justiciable issue.

:
Congress use of
projected population is
non-justiciable as it
involves a determination
on the "wisdom of the
standard adopted by the
legislature to determine
compliance with a
constitutional
requirement."

Questions calling for

judicial determination
of compliance with
constitutional
standards by other
branches of the
government are
fundamentally
justiciable. The
resolution of such
questions falls within
the checking function of
this Court under the
1987 Constitution to
determine whether
there has been a grave
abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the
Government.
Whether or not the City
of Malolos has a
population of at least
250,000, whether
actual or projected, for
the purpose of creating
a legislative district for
the City of Malolos in
time for the 10 May
2010 elections

The City of Malolos

failed to meet the
minimum population
threshold of 250,000.

The City of Malolos failed

to meet the minimum
population threshold of
250,000.D14:D23Undated
Certification of Regional
Director Alberto Miranda
of Region III of the NSO
serves as the authority
that the population of the
City of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year
2010. It was "issued
upon the request of
Mayor Danilo A. Domingo
of the City of Malolos in
connection with the
proposed creation of
Malolos City as a lone
congressional district of
the Province of Bulacan."

The Certification of
Regional Director
Miranda, which is
based on
demographic
projections, is without
legal effect because
Regional Director
Miranda has no basis
and no authority to
issue the Certification.
The Certification is also
void on its face because
based on its own
growth rate assumption,
the population of
Malolos will be less
than 250,000 in the
year 2010. In addition,
intercensal
demographic
projections cannot be
made for the entire
year. In any event, a
city whose population
has increased to
250,000 is entitled to
have a legislative
district only in the
"immediately following
election" after the
attainment of the
250,000 population.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No. 9591
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Dissenting Opinion (Abad):

1. Nothing in Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution prohibits the use of estimates or

population projections in the creation of legislative districts. The standard to be adopted in
determining compliance with the population requirement involves a political question. In the absence of
grave abuse of discretion or patent violation of established legal parameters, the Court cannot intrude into
the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature.
2. EO 135 cannot apply to this case for the following reasons:
a. The President issued EO 135 specifically to provide guidelines on the issuance of Certification of
Population sizes pursuant to the following provisions of the Local Government Code: Section 7 (the
creation and conversion of local government units); Section 386 (the creation of a barangay), Section 442
(the creation of a municipality); Section 450 (the conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangay into
a component city); Section 452 (the creation of highly urbanized cities); and Section 461 (the creation of
urbanized cities). Since R.A. 9591 is not concerned with the creation or conversion of a local government
unit but with the establishment of a new legislative district, which is by no means a local government unit,
the same is not governed by the requirements of EO 135.
b. RA 9591 is based on a "legislative" finding of fact that Malolos will have a population of over 250,000
by the year 2010. The rules of legislative inquiry or investigation are unique to each house of Congress.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Executive Department can dictate on Congress the kind of evidence
that will satisfy its law-making requirement
c. Certification issued by the NSO Region III Director, whose office has jurisdiction over Malolos City,
partakes of official information based on official data. The Regional Director did not make the projection
by counting the trees from the mountaintops. The data are based on evidence that is admissible even in a
court of law.
i. The majority opinion uses the following formula: 175,291 x 37.80% (arrived at by
multiplying the 3.78 annual growth rate by 10 for the 10 years between 2000 and 2010) = 241,550. It uses
a growth rate of 37.80% per 10 years to substitute for the stated official growth rate of 3.78% per year. It
ignores logic and the natural cumulative growth of population.
ii. In contrast, the NSO Regional Directors computation applies the growth rate of 3.78% per
year, which is more logical in that the base is adjusted annually to reflect the year to year growth. Thus:
Base
Rate
Growth
175,291

x 3.78% =

181,917

181,917

x 3.78% =

188,793

188,793

x 3.78% =

195,929

195,929

x 3.78% =

203,335

203,335

x 3.78% =

211,021

211,021

x 3.78% =

218,998

218,998

x 3.78% =

227,276

227,276

x 3.78% =

235,867

235,867

x 3.78% =

244,783

244,783
x 3.78% =
254,036
3. There is no showing that Congress enacted RA 9591 to favor the interest of any candidate. A city
can aspire to have one representative who will represent its interest in Congress.
4. Contrary to petitioners claim, RA 9591 is a reapportionment bill. It does not require the conduct of a
plebiscite for its validity. As the Court held in Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, the holding of a
plebiscite is not a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. A plebiscite is necessary
only in the creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units, which
is not the case here.

NAVARRO V. ERMITA GR No. 180050

10 February 2010
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. R65 Certiorari.
Digester: Joeyboy Lacas
DOCTRINE: The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the
criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria
prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10 Art X of the Constitution.
PETITIONERS:
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA
They are taxpayers and residents of Surigao del Norte
They have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as Vice-Governor and members of
Provincial Board, respectively.
RESPONDENTS:
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines;
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Senate President;
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by the House Speaker;
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new province of Dinagat Islands.
FACTS:
1. Mother province of Surigao del Norte was created via RA 2786 in 1960.
2. Surigao del Norte is composed of 3 groups of islands: (a) Mainland & Surigao City, (b) Siargao Island &
Bucas Grande, and (c) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities.
3. Under Section 461 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code), a province may be created if:
a. Income: at least 20M based on 1991 constant prices certified by Department of Finance;
b. And EITHER of the following:
Territory: a contiguous** territory of at least 2000 sq km, certified by the Lands
Management Bureau, OR
Population: not less than 250,000 inhabitants, certified by the NSO
** Territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
4. Dinagat Islands Statistics (as of 2000)
Income
82.69 M

Territory
802.12 sq km composed of Hibuson
Islands and 47 other islets

Population
106,951 based on the NSO 2000
Census of Population

5. 2006 Congress enacted RA 9355, creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.

6. 02 Dec. 2006 Plebiscite held to determine whether the LGUs directly affected approved of the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province: 69T++ affirmative
votes, 63T++ negative votes.
7. A new set of provincial officials were appointed by PGMA. Another set of provincial officials was elected
in May 2007.

8. Petitioners prayed that RA 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent appointments
and elections to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared
null and void.
Other pertinent laws:
Section 10, Article X
Constitution
Article 9, IRR of
1991 LGC

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Article 9. Provinces .(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be created
unless the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty
Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two
(2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified
by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special
accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified
by National Statistics Office; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall
be properly identified by metes and bounds.

Issue 1
W/N the creation
of the Province
of Dinagat
Islands violates
Sec. 10 Article X
Constitution?

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
Yes. Creation of
the Province of
Dinagat Islands is
both invalid and
unconstitutional.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
Creation of the
Province of Dinagat
Islands met all the
statutory
requirements.

Supreme Court
Creation did not meet
the requirements
provided by law.

Dissent,
Nachura
Economic viability
is the primordial
consideration in
the constitution of
provinces, not
population or
territory

a) Failure to
comply with the
minimum
population
requirement

a) Population of
Dinagat Islands is
371T++ such
data was obtained
from Special
Census of 2003,
which even though
not certified by
NSO, was
conducted with the
aid of NSO

a) Did not meet

minimum population
requirement
Special Census of
2003 NOT certified
by the NSO as
required by LGC, and
respondents failed to
prove that with the
population count of
371T++, the

a) Agrees that
population
requirement was
not met

b) Failure to
comply with the
minimum land
area requirement

representative

population of the
mother province
would not be reduced
to less than the
minimum
requirement
prescribed by law

b) According to Art.
9 of the IRR, land
area requirement of
2000 sq km need
not be complied
with if territory is
composed of more
than one island.

b) Art. 9 of the IRR

went beyond the
criteria prescribed by
Section 461 of the
Local Government
Code when it added
the italicized portion
above stating that "[t]
he land area
requirement shall not
apply where the
proposed province is
composed of one (1)
or more islands."
Nowhere in the Local
Government Code is
the said provision
stated or implied.
Under Section 461 of
the Local
Government Code,
the only instance
when the territorial or
land area
requirement need not
be complied with is
when there is already
compliance with the
population
requirement. The
Constitution requires
that the criteria for
the creation of a
province, including
any exemption from
such criteria, must all
be written in the
Local Government
Code.21cralaw There
is no dispute that in
case of discrepancy
between the basic
law and the rules and
regulations
implementing the
said law, the basic
law prevails, because
the rules and

b) IRR is valid.
The stipulation in
paragraph (b),
however, qualifies
not merely the
word contiguous
in paragraph (a)(i)
in the same
provision, but
rather the entirety
of the latter
paragraph.
Paragraph (a)(i)
of the provision,
for ready
reference, reads:
a contiguous
territory of at
least two
thousand (2,000)
square(i)
kilometers, as
certified by the
Lands
Management
Bureau.
This whole
paragraph on
contiguity and
land area, I
repeat for
emphasis, is the
one being
referred to in the
exemption from
the territorial
requirement in
paragraph (b).
Thus, if the
province to be
created is
composed of
islands, like the
one in this case,
then, its territory
need not be
contiguous and

regulations cannot go
beyond the terms
and provisions of the
basic law.
Hence, the Court
holds that the
provision in Sec. 2,
Art. 9 of the IRR
stating that "[t] he
land area
requirement shall not
apply where the
proposed province is
composed of one (1)
or more islands" is
null and void.

need not have an

area of at least
2,000 sq km. This
is because, as
the law is worded,
contiguity and
land area are not
two distinct and
separate
requirements. the
law, by providing
in paragraph (b)
of Section 461
that the territory
need not be
contiguous if the
same is
comprised of
islands, must be
interpreted as
intended to
exempt such
territory from the
land area
component
requirement of
2,000 sq km.
Because the two
component
requirements are
inseparable, the
elimination of
contiguity from
the territorial
criterion has the
effect of a
coexistent
eradication of the
land area
component. The
territory of the
province of
Dinagat Islands,
therefore,
comprising the
major islands of
Dinagat and
Hibuson, and
approximately 47
islets, need not
be contiguous
and need not
have an area of
at least 2,000 sq
km following
Section 461 of

the LGC.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise
known as [An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The
proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL
and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.

Digester: Ivan Galura

CASE TITLE: Navarro v. Ermita
Date of Case: April 12, 2011
DOCTRINE: It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local
government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to
their constituents, and the criteria prescribed by the Local Government Code (LGC), i.e., income,
population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its
collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on
which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the
creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent
of the framers of the LGC.
Petitioner: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA (Taxpayers and
Residents of Surigao del Norte (Vice Gov, and Members of Provincial Board)
Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the
Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of
Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS,
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO
VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands
Movants-Intervenors: CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON.
ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D.
GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL (Elected officials of
Surigao de Norte province in the last election)
FACTS:
1. Please see facts in Navarro v. Ermita (2010) digest
2. Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010
3. This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movantsintervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties.
4. COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was declared final and
executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status as a non-province. Consequently, the
results of the May 2010 elections would have to be nullified, and a special election would have to be
conducted for various positions (Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for Surigao del Norte. Hence the
intervenors became real parties in interest with the declaration finality of the 2010 case decision. Hence,
the imperative to grant this Urgent Motion.
Issue 1

Navarro

Intervenors

Supreme Court

1. Creation of Province
of Dinagat Isalnds is
Invalid and
Unconstitutional (RA
9355)

1. Met the requirements

With the formulation of

the LGC-IRR, which
amounted to both
executive and legislative
construction of the LGC,
the many details to
implement the LGC had
already been put in

place, which Congress

understood to be
impractical and not too
urgent to immediately
translate into direct
amendments to the
LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity
and viability of Dinagat
to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A.
No. 9355, following the
exemption from the land
area requirement,
which, with respect to
the creation of
provinces, can only be
found as an express
provision in the LGCIRR. In effect, pursuant
to its plenary legislative
powers, Congress
breathed flesh and
blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2)
of the LGC-IRR and
transformed it into law
when it enacted R.A.
No. 9355 creating the
Island Province of
Dinagat. The acts of
Congress, in passing
RA 9355, definitively
show the clear
legislative intent to
incorporate into the LGC
that exemption from the
land area requirement
- Failed to comply with
min Land Area
Requirement

The passage of R.A.

No. 9355 operates as
an act of Congress
amending Section 461
of the LGC

Please see Pertinent

Laws. It bears
scrupulous notice that
from the above cited
provisions, with respect
to the creation of
barangays, land area is
not a requisite indicator
of viability. However,

with respect to the

creation of
municipalities,
component cities, and
provinces, the three (3)
indicators of viability and
projected capacity to
provide services, i.e.,
income, population, and
land area, are provided
for.
But it must be pointed
out that when the local
government unit to be
created consists of one
(1) or more islands, it is
exempt from the land
area requirement as
expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section
450 of the LGC if the
local government unit to
be created is a
municipality or a
component city,
respectively. This
exemption is absent in
the enumeration of the
requisites for the
creation of a province
under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is
expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGCIRR.
There appears neither
rhyme nor reason why
this exemption should
apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact,
considering the physical
configuration of the
Philippine archipelago,
there is a greater
likelihood that islands or
group of islands would
form part of the land
area of a newly-created

province than in most

cities or municipalities.
The exemption from
territorial contiguity,
when the intended
province consists of two
or more islands,
includes the exemption
from the application of
the minimum land area
requirement

It is, therefore, logical to

infer that the genuine
legislative policy
decision was expressed
in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and
Section 450 (for
component cities) of the
LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted
in Section 461 (for
provinces). Thus,
when the exemption
was expressly
provided in Article 9(2)
of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was
intended to correct the
congressional
oversight in Section
461 of the LGCand
to reflect the true
legislative intent. It
would, then, be in order
for the Court to uphold
the validity of Article 9(2)
of the LGC-IRR.

Dispositive Portion:
The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and 4.The
petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

III. CREATION & ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Digester: John Michael Gabriel Vida
CASE TITLE: League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.
(G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 and 178056)
Date of Case: November 18, 2008
DOCTRINES:
As provided by Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress shall prescribe all the
criteria for the creation of a city (or any other political units) in the Local Government Code
(LGC) and not in any other law, including Cityhood Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to ensure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. In
short, the criteria for creation of cities and other political units must follow the guidelines
provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners:
League of Cities of the Phils. (LCP)
Jerry P. Treas (LCP President)
Cities of Iloilo (represented by Mayor Jerry Treas) and Calbayog (represented by Mayor Mel
Senen Sarmiento)
Cities of Tarlac, Santiago, Iriga, Ligao, et al (petitioners-in-intervention)
Respondents:
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) due to involvement in conducting of plebiscites
Municipalities of Baybay (Leyte), Bogo (Cebu), Catbalogan (Western Samar), Tandag (Surigao
del Sur), Borongan (Eastern Samar), Tayabas (Quezon), Lamitan (Basilan), Tabuk (Kalinga),
Bayugan (Agusan del Sur), Batac (Ilocos Norte), Mati (Davao Oriental), Guihulngan (Negros
Oriental), Cabadbaran (Agusan del Norte), Carcar (Cebu), and El Salvador (Misamis Oriental).
Note: the 16th municipality, Naga (Cebu) was not impleaded in the case as a respondent.
FACTS:
The case involves consolidated petitions for prohibition from the petitioners LCP et al, assailing the
constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws and enjoining COMELEC and the respondent municipalities from
holding any plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws in question.
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress then enacted into law RA 9009, which amended Sec. 450 of the LGC
and in effect, increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from
P20 million to P100 million, with the view of restraining a mad rush for municipalities to convert into
cities to secure larger Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs). However, the House of Representatives (HOR)
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were
not approved in the 11th Congress from the increased income requirements of RA 9009. However, the 12 th
Congress ended without acquiring the Senates approval of Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, however, the HOR re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 into Joint Resolution No.
1, and forwarded the same to the Senate for approval. The Senate, however, failed to approve the new
Joint Resolution. With the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 of the municipalities filed individual
cityhood bills which contained a common provision which exempted them from the income requirements
of RA 9009. These Cityhood Bills were approved by the HOR on December 2006 and the Senate on

February 2007 (except for Naga, Cebu which was passed on June 2007). These Cityhood Bills lapsed
into law from March July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws directed the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine WON the voters in each of
the respondent municipalities approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Issue 1:
WON
the
Cityhood
Laws violate Section 10,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution.

Issue 2:
WON
the
Cityhood
Laws violate the equal
protection clause.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

The Cityhood Laws are

unconstitutional
for
violation of Section 10 of
Article X of the 1987
Constitution
by
unlawfully
exempting
the
respondent
municipalities
from
compliance with the new
minimum
income
requirements provided
by the LGC.

The Cityhood Laws do

not violate Section 10,
Article
X
of
the
Constitution.

Furthermore,
the
wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities
will reduce the IRA
share of other existing
cities as more cities are
going to share in the
same amount of internal
revenue set aside by
Sec. 285 of the LGC.
PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
The Cityhood Laws in
question are violative of
the Equal Protection
Clause
of the 1987
Constitution,
as
it
unreasonably provides
special treatment to the
respondents
by
exempting them from
compliance with the
minimum
income
requirement imposed by
the LGC.

Furthermore,
the
respondents invoke the
principle
of
nonretroactivity of laws to
prevent application of
RA 9009 on the 16
Cityhood Bills that stood
to be affected by RA
9009.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
The Cityhood Laws are
not violative of the Equal
Protection
Clause,
asserting the validity of
the common exemption
provision from RA 9009
provided in the Cityhood
Bills.

SUPREME COURT:
The Cityhood Laws
violate Sections 6 and
10, Article X of the
Constitution. First, the
application of the P100
million requirement of
RA
9009
for
municipalities should be
applied
prospectively
and not retroactively as
RA 9009 took effect in
2001,
while
the
Cityhood Bills became
law more than 5 years
later in 2007. (other
reasons provided below)

SUPREME COURT:
Even if Congress wrote
the exemption in the
Cityhood Laws into the
amendments introduced
in Sec. 450 of the LGC,
the exemption would still
be unconstitutional for
violation of the Equal
Protection
Clause.
(reasons
provided
below).

On Issue 1:
The Supreme Court stated that:
1. The application of the P100 million requirement of RA 9009 for municipalities should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively as RA 9009 took effect in 2001, while the Cityhood Bills became
law more than 5 years later in 2007.

RA 9009 became effective on June 30, 2001, specifically amending Section 450 of the LGC by
increasing the income requirement for conversion of municipalities into cities to P100 million.
There was no written exemption from this new income requirement. Furthermore, prior to the
enactment of RA 9009, from a total of 57 municipalities, 33 Cityhood Bills passed into law.
However, Congress did not act on the remaining 24 Cityhood Bills during the 11 th Congress.
Furthermore, the 12th Congress adjourned without approving the Joint Resolution that was
supposed to exempt the 24 municipalities whose Cityhood Bills were not acted upon during the
11th Congress. During the 13th Congress, however, 16 of the 24 municipalities filed individual
Cityhood Bills with a common provision, stating that these municipalities-turned-cities shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. The fact still
remains, however, that Congress passed on these Cityhood Laws way after RA 9009 has been
passed, and therefore the respondents cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.

2. The Constitution requires Congress to prescribe all criteria for the creation of a city in the LGC and
NOT in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that the creation of local government
units (LGUs) must follow established criteria in the LGC and not in any other law. The intent of the
Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same
uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Any deviation from these criteria is a
violation of Section 10, Article X. The amendments introduced by RA 9009 regarding the new
income requirements took into effect on 2001, and therefore going forward, any municipality
desiring to become a city must satisfy the new income requirements. No exceptions were
provided in Sec. 450, as amended.
Also, the Cityhood Laws common exemption clause is unconstitutional as it clearly violates Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution as the constitutional provision states that any exemption must be
written in the LGC, and not in any other law, i.e. the Cityhood Laws.
3. The Cityhood Laws also violate Sec. 6, Art. X of the 1987 Constituion as these prevent a fair and just
distribution of national taxes to local government units.
The Court also noted that a city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being
equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of
P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in the LGC,
must be strictly followed because these criteria are material in determining the "just share" of
local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income
criterion in Sec. 450 of the LGC, they prevent a fair and just distribution of the IRA, effectively
violating Sec. 6, Article X of the Constitution.
4. The criteria prescribed by Sec. 450 of the LGC (as amended by RA 9009) is described as clear, plain
and unambiguous, and therefore there was no need to resort to any statutory construction.
Furthermore, the intent of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA
9009 remained only as intent and was not written into the amendments introduced into Sec. 450 of
the LGC.
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 did not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement, not even to the respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending
when the 11th Congress passed RA 9009. Since Sec. 450 of the LGC (as amended by RA 9009)
is clear, plain and unambiguous regarding the increased income requirement, there is no reason
to go beyond verba legis in applying the provision.
The Court also stated that even though Congress did discuss exempting the respondent
municipalities from RA 9009, Congress did not write this intended exemption into RA 9009, which
it could have easily done, but it did not do so, passing the bill into law as RA 9009 without such
exemption given to the 24 municipalities.
5. The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills are not considered as extrinsic aids
in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

The Court also stated that since Congress is not a continuing body, any unapproved cityhood bills
are considered as mere scraps of paper, with any hearings and deliberations becoming
worthless upon adjournment of Congress. Therefore, such hearings and deliberations cannot be
used to interpret bills that are enacted into law in subsequent Congresses. As provided by Sec.
123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of Senate and Sec. 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives
regarding Unfinished Business, all unfinished business at the end of the term of a Congress are
deemed terminated. Therefore, any deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved
Cityhood Bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the
unapproved resolution exempting the municipalities, have no legal significance and do not qualify
as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.

On Issue 2:
1. Even if Congress wrote the exemption in the Cityhood Laws into the amendments introduced in Sec.
450 of the LGC, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
The exemption provisions provided in the Cityhood Laws contain no classifications or guidelines
to differentiate the supposedly exempted municipalities from other municipalities in general. The
exemption, therefore, would be based solely on the fact that 16 of the municipalities had Cityhood
Bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. The Court states that this is not a
valid classification to entitle an exemption from the increased income requirement.
According to the Court, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial
distinctionsm rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the
law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Furthermore, as
ruled by the Court in the earlier cases of De Guzman, Jr. vs COMELEC, and Tiu vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, the Equal Protection Clause stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution permits a
valid classification under the following conditions based on what is considered as a reasonable
classification:
a. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions,
b. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law,
c. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
d. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court found that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
Cityhood Bills in the 11th Congress and those that did not have pending bills, Furthermore,
municipalities that did not have pending Cityhood Bills were not informed that a pending Cityhood
Bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition to exempt them from the P100 million income
requirement, therefore depriving them of a supposed chance to avail of the exemption. Also,
the fact of a pendency of a Cityhood Bill in the 11th Congress violates the requirement that a valid
classification must not be limited to existing conditions only, as the fact itself is a specific condition
that will never happen again (with the 11th Congress already over). The exemption is basically a
unique advantage based on an arbitrary date (which was the filing of a Cityhood Bill within the
11th Congress, which was basically over) against other municipalities that may want to convert
into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. Finally, limiting the exemption only to the 16
municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all parties similarly
situated.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions and declares UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws,
namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409,
9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

DISSENTING OPINION (J. REYES)

1. The Cityhood Laws do not violate Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.

Justice Reyes argues that the intent of RA 9009 is to exempt the respondent municipalities from
the new income requirement, as the Cityhood Laws provide a uniformly worded exemption
clause, which states: Exemption from R.A. 9009. Furthermore, it was pointed out that
Congress intended that the then pending cityhood bills would not be covered by the income
requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No. 9009. It was made clear by the Legislature that
R.A. No. 9009 would not have any retroactive effect. The inclusion of the exemption clause was
therefore cited as the clear-cut intent of the Legislature of not giving retroactive effect to R.A. No.
9009, with Congress making its intent express through the Cityhood Laws. Justice Reyes
furthermore points out that the Legislatives intent (based from the interpellations of Senators
Pimentel and Drilon) should be the controlling factor.
Further to this, J. Reyes also points out that the petitioners were not able to discharge their onus
probandi of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality accorded to the Cityhood Laws,
stating that laws will only be declared invalid if the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt, and such declaration is unconstitutionality is done: a) as a last resort, b) when
absolutely necessary, c) when the statute is in palpable conflict with a plain provision of the
Constitution, and (d) when the invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt.
J. Reyes then points to the arguments of the majority opinions first ground, stating that Congress
was aware that the 16 Cityhood Bills were pending prior to the passage of RA 9009, and
therefore Congress intended the higher income requirement not to apply to the respondents.
Anent the second point, J. Reyes states that the Cityhood Laws merely carry out the supposed
intent of RA 9009 to exempt the respondent municipalities. Regarding the third point, J. Reyes
then argues that, while it is true that LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes, it is
qualified by the phrase as determined by law. Regarding the fourth point, J. Reyes argues that
Congress meant not to incorporate its intent in the bill that would become RA 9009, since
according to Senator Pimentel, it was notnecessary to put that provision because what we
are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Furthermore, J. Reyes states that
courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law if
the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice. Finally, J. Reyes
argues on the last point that hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th or 12th
Congress may still be used as extrinsic aids or reference because the same cityhood bills, which
were filed before the passage of RA 9009, were being considered during the 13 th Congress.
2. The Cityhood Laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause under Sec. 1, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution by granting special treatment to respondents in exempting them from the imposed
minimum income requirements imposed by RA 9009.
Justice Reyes states that the equal protection guarantee does not take away from Congress the
power to classify, as long as such classification is based on reasonable classification. For the
classification to be reasonable:
a. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions,
b. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law,
c. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
d. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
However, Justice Reyes rules that, based on the parameters, the Cityhood Laws do not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.
First, J. Reyes argues that the respondent municipalities had pending Cityhood Bills before the
passage of RA 9009, and that the peculiar conditions of the respondents are considered sufficient
grounds for legislative classification, as (according to a cited sponsorship speech by then-Senator
Lim) fairness dictates that the respondents be given a legal remedy to allow them to prove that
they fulfill the requirements of the LGC for city status prior to the amendments brought forth by
RA 9009. Furthermore, J. Reyes states that courts cannot question the wisdom of classifications
made by Congress as it is a prerogative of the Legislature.

Next, J. Reyes argues that the exemption of the respondents from the increased income
requirement was desiged to ensure that fairness and justice were given to the respondents, as
their cityhood bills were not enacted by Congress due to intervening events and reasons beyon
their control. Therefore, J. Reyes states that these Cityhood Laws promote equality and reduce
the existing inequality between the respondents and the "other thirty-two (32) municipalities"
whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress.
Next, J. Reyes argues that the Cityhood Laws are curative or remedial statutes, as they seek to
prevent an apparent injustice which would be committed to respondents. J. Reyes states that
the cityhood laws are not contrary to the spirit and intent of RA 9009 because Congress intended
said law to be prospective, not retroactive, in application. Furthermore, J. Reyes states that to
deny respondents the same rights and privileges accorded to the other thirty-two (32)
municipalities when they are under the same circumstances, is tantamount to denying respondent
municipalities the protective mantle of the equal protection clause, and in effect, the petitioners
themselves are pushing for another violation of the equal protection clause.
Finally, J. Reyes argues that the Cityhood Laws, in carrying out the clear intent of RA 9009, apply
to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were
compliant with the prior form of Section 450 of the Local Government Code that prescribed an
income requirement of P20 million. In short, J. Reyes argues that there exists a separate class of
municipalities those who have applied for cityhood prior to RA 9009s enactment (which
basically covers the 57 applicants for cityhood).
Justice Reyes then points out in his dissenting opinion the argument that the Cityhood Laws enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality, and that the petitioners bear the burden of overcoming the presumption.
It was also pointed out that the onus probandi, however, was shifted by the majority to the respondents in
asking them to prove the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws, in violation of the basic rules of evidence.

Digester: (Dave Cagashatian)

CASE TITLE: League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC
Date of Case: Dec. 21, 2009
DOCTRINE: Before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with,
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as
to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
Petitioner: League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, Jerry Trenas (Iloilo City
Mayor in his personal capacity as tazpayer)
Respondent: (Municipality of Baybay, Leyte, Municipality of Bogo, Cebu, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Western Samar, Municipality of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Municipality of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Municipality of Tayabas, Quezon, Municipality of Lamitan, Basilan, Municipality of Tabuk, Kalinga,
Municipality of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Municipality of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Municipality of Mati, Davao
Oriental, Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, Municipality of Carcar, Cebu, Municipality of El
Salvador, Misamis Oriental
FACTS:
1. On November 18, 2008, by a 6-5 vote, the SC declared the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
2. The respondent LGUs filed a motion for reconsideration which the SC also denied in a resolution dated
March 31, 2009, stating that the basic issues have already been passed upon.
3. The LGUs filed a second motion for reconsideration on the ground of new and meritorious arguments.
4. The SC, voting 6-6, again denied the second MR in a resolution dated April 28, 2009, ordering that "No
further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course."
5. Still, the LGUs filed another motion on May 14, 2009: "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28,
2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31,
2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon."
6. In a Resolution dated June 2, 2009, the SC declared the LGUs' latest Motion expunged in light of the
entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009.
7. Justices De Castro and Bersamin wanted to recall the entry of judgment and grant the LGUs' MR of
the April 28, 2009 Resolution as the entry was effected before the Court could act on the LGUs' May 14,
2009 Motion.
8. The LGUs filed this present Motion (Motion for Reconsideration of June 2, 2009 resolution).
Issue

League of Cities

COMELEC

Supreme Court

issue 1: Whether or not

the Cityhood Laws
violated Sec. 10 of Art
X, Constitution (LGUs
shall be created, etc
according to criteria set
in the LGC subject to
approval in a plebiscite)

1. YES. The
Constitution, in clear
and unambiguous
language, requires that
all the criteria for the
creation of a city shall
be embodied and
written in the LGC, and
not in any other law.

1. NO.

1. NO. The power to

create political
subdivisions or LGUs is
essentially legislative in
character.
2. Since Congress
wields the vast poser of
creating political
subdivisions, surely it
can exercise the lesser
authority of requiring a
set of criteria,

standards, or
ascertainable indicators
of viability for their
creation. Thus, the only
conceivable reason why
the Constitution
employs the clause "in
accordance with the
criteria established in
the local government
code" is to lay stress
that it is Congress
alone, and no other,
which can impose the
3. When the 1987
Constitution speaks of
the LGC, the reference
cannot be to any
specific statute or
codification of laws, let
alone the LGC of 1991.
At the time of the
adoption of the 1987
Constitution, BP 337,
the then LGC, was still
in effect. Had the
framers of the 1987
Constitution intended to
isolate the embodiment
of the criteria only in the
LGC, then they would
have actually referred to
BP 337. Also, they
would then not have
provided for the
enactment by Congress
of a new LGC, as they
did in Art. X, Sec. 335 of
the Constitution.
4. Consistent with its
plenary legislative
power, Congress can,
impose the criteria of
viability which don't
need to be embodied in
the LGC, though it is the
ideal repository to

ensure, as much as
possible, the element of
uniformity. Congress
can even, after making
a codification, enact an
amendatory law, adding
to the existing layers of
indicators earlier
codified, just as it may
reduce the same. Here,
the amendatory RA
9009 increased the
already codified income
requirement from P20M
to P100M.
5. The passage of
amendatory laws is no
different from the
enactment of laws, i.e.,
the cityhood laws
specifically exempting a
particular political
subdivision from the
criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in
enacting the exempting
law/s, effectively
decreased the already
codified indicators.
6. Following the LCP's
argument, RA 9009,
which increased the
income requirement,
would also be
unconstitutional.
7. Ratio legis est anima.
The spirit rather than the
letter of the law. RA
9009 really intended
that the LGUs covered
by the Cityhood Laws
be exempted from the
new income
requirement, as borne
by the statements by
sponsor Sen. Pimentel

during Senate
deliberations on the
then bill. Even though
these deliberations were
in the 11th and 12th
Congresses, they can
still be considered even
if Congress is not a
continuing body
because they are part of
RA 9009 legislative
history and thus can be
consulted in interpreting
the law.
issue 2: Whether or not
the Cityhood Laws
violated Sec. 6 of Art X,
Constitution (LGUs shall
have a just share in the
national taxes
automatically released
to them)

1. YES. The wholesale

conversion of the
municipalities into cities
will reduce the share of
existing cities in the
Internal Revenue
Allotment as more cities
in effect will share the
same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all
cities under Sec. 285 of
the LGC.

1. NO. (No arguments

stated in the decision)

NO. No deprivation of
property results by
virtue of the enactment
of the cityhood laws.
The LCPs claim that the
IRA of its member-cities
will be substantially
reduced on account of
the conversion into
cities of the respondent
LGUs would not suffice
to bring it within the
ambit of the
constitutional guarantee.
Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the
part of the LCP
member-cities to
already stake a claim on
the IRA, as if it were
their property, as the
IRA is yet to be
allocated. For the same
reason, the
municipalities that are
not covered by the
uniform exemption
clause in the cityhood
laws cannot validly
invoke equal protection.
For, at this point, the
conversion of a
municipality into a city

will only affect its status

as a political unit, but
not its property as such.

issue 3: Whether the

Cityhood Laws violate
the equal protection
clause

1. YES. (No arguments

stated in the decision.)

1. NO. (No arguments

stated in the decision
but this is an implied
argument: Distinction
between municipalities
with pending cityhood
bills when RA 9009 was
enacted and
municipalities that did
not have pending
cityhood bills at the time
is a valid classification.)

1. NO. Right of equal

protection does not
require absolute
equality. It is enough
that all persons or things
similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as
to rights or privileges
conferred and
responsibilities or
obligations imposed. It
does not preclude the
state from recognizing
and acting upon factual
differences between
individuals and classes.
It recognizes that
inherent in the right to
legislate is the right to
classify, implying that
the equality guaranteed
is not violated by a
legislation based on
reasonable
classification.
2. Classification, to be
reasonable, must (1)
rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) be
germane to the purpose
of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing
conditions only; and (4)
apply equally to all
members of the same
class. Here, all these
requisites have been
met by the laws
challenged as arbitrary
and discriminatory
under the equal
protection clause.

3. The respondent
LGUs, subjected only to
the P20M income
criterion instead of the
new income
requirement in RA 9009,
are substantially
different from other
municipalities desirous
to be cities. These LGUs
had pending cityhood
bills before the passage
of RA 9009. And years
before RA 9009,
respondents LGUs had
already met the income
criterion exacted for
cityhood under the LGC
of 1991. Due to
extraneous
circumstances,
however, the bills for
their conversion
remained unacted upon
by Congress.
4. Respondent LGUs
saw themselves
confronted with the
"changing of the rules in
the middle of the game."
They were qualified
cityhood applicants
before the enactment of
RA 9009. Because of
events they had
absolutely nothing to do
with, a spoiler in the
form of RA 9009
supervened. To impose
on them the much
higher income
requirement after what
they have gone through
would appear to be
indeed "unfair."
Fairness dictateS that
they should be given a
legal remedy by which

they would be allowed

to prove that they have
all the necessary
qualifications for city
status, using the criteria
set forth under the LGC
of 1991 prior to its
amendment by RA
9009.
5. The power of the
Legislature to make
distinctions and
classifications among
persons is neither
curtailed nor denied by
the equal protection
clause. A law can be
violative of the
constitutional limitation
only when the
classification is without
reasonable basis.
6. Cityhood Laws ws an
attempt on the part of
Congress to address the
inequity dealt the
respondent LGUs.
These laws positively
promoted the equality
and eliminated the
inequality, doubtless
unintended, between
respondent
municipalities and the
thirty-three (33) other
municipalities whose
cityhood bills were
enacted during the 11th
Congress.
7. The common
exemption clause in the
cityhood laws is an
application of the nonretroactive effect of RA
9009 on the cityhood
bills. It is not a

declaration of certain
rights, but a mere
declaration of prior
qualification and/or
compliance with the
non-retroactive effect of
RA 9009.
Note: Another reason to
uphold Cityhood Laws:
operative fact doctrine:
there are already new
cities organized after the
cityhood laws were
enacted, with new sets
of officials and
employees.

Dispositive Portion: Respondent LGUs' motions granted; Cityhood Laws declared constitutional.

DIGESTER: MARFIL
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES et. al (with petitioners-in-intervention), v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS et. al.
Aug 24, 2010, G.R. No. 176951
(J. Carpio, En Banc)
Petitioners: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, CITY OF ILOILO, CITY OF CALBAYOG, and
JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners-in-Intervention: CITIES OF TARLAC, SANTIAGO, IRIGA, LIGAO, LEGAZPI, TAGAYTAY,
SURIGAO, BAYAWAN, SILAY, GENERAL SANTOS, ZAMBOANGA, GINGOOG, CAUAYAN, PAGADIAN,
SAN CARLOS, SAN FERNANDO, TACURONG, TANGUB, OROQUIETA, URDANETA, VICTORIAS,
CALAPAN, HIMAMAYLAN, BATANGAS, BAIS, CADIZ, and TAGUM
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
BOGO, CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF
TAYABAS, QUEZON
BRIEF
For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam* motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of
21 December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam*
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City,
Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City. The Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and
accordingly reinstates its November 18, 2008 Decision, thus declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws**
unconstitutional.***
*Ad Cautelam (means "as a precaution"; not necessary but filed nonetheless as a precautionary
measure)
**16 Cityhood Laws: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
***Note that the Court, through the majority, did not detail the stand of the petitioners and respondents,
but immediately discussed the issues of the case. Justice Velasco's dissenting opinion, however,
discussed the stand of the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention.
FACTS
On November 18, 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16
Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.
On March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first
motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the
respondents second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the November 18, 2008 Decision became
final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21,
2009.
However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling
reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the
constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in its Decision on December 21, 2009.
Petitioner's Stand (taken from dissenting opinion)
In this recourse, main petitioners pray, without prejudice to the resolution of their motion to annul the
December 21, 2009 Decision, that the Court reconsider the same decision and declare the
aforementioned 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. As in their underlying petition for prohibition, they
latched their case primarily on two grounds: First, the Cityhood Laws sought to create cities which do not

meet one of the criteria, or, to be precise, the verifiable income norm stipulated in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. Second, the said Cityhood Laws, by granting
a different treatment to respondent local government units (LGUs), via an exemption from the standard
PhP 100 million floor income requirement set under RA 9009, infringe the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. As argued, the circumstance that the Cityhood Laws in question were filed and deliberated
upon in the 11th and/or 12th Congress, or before the enactment of RA 9009 during the 12th Congress,
does not constitute a substantive distinction exacted under the equal protection guarantee that would
warrant a preferential treatment of respondent LGUs.
In their motion to annul, petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. would urge the Court to
declare as void its December 21, 2009 Decision on the argument that it had no jurisdiction to issue the
same, the earlier November 18, 2008 decision being now immutable, having in the meanwhile become
final and executory, as in fact an entry of judgment has been made thereon.
Further, in a bid to have the December 21, 2009 Decision declared as a nullity, petitioners argue, as a
preliminary consideration, that the Court no longer has jurisdiction to modify, reconsider or set aside a
final and executory, ergo unalterable judgment, like the November 18, 2008 Decision.
Petitioner-in-Intervention's Stand (taken from dissenting opinion)
For their part, intervening petitioners, in their separate, but similarly worded Manifestation with
Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, adopted in toto the arguments raised in main
petitioners motion to annul and in the latters ad cautelam motion for consideration. All expressed dismay
over the consequent reduction of their share in the internal revenue allotment (IRA), since more cities will
partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.
Court did not discuss respondents' stand.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. W/N the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution? (YES!)
2. W/N respondent municipalities are exempted from the income requirements for the creation of new
cities as set by Sec. 450 of LGC, as amended by RA 9009? (NO!)
3. W/N the 16 municipalities have already been "constitutionalized" by virtue of the operative fact
doctrine? (NO!)
4. W/N the 16 Cityhood Laws violated the Equal Protection Clause? (YES!)
5. W/N the split vote of the Court on the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18
November 2008 Decision final? (YES!)
RATIO:
R1: 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for
the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must
follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution.

R2: Respondent municipalities are not exempted from the income requirements.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from
P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that
moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy
the P100 million income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though
their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all
enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased
income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such
exemptions in the Cityhood Laws from the new income requirements set by RA 9009 clearly violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood
Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code.
R3: Operative doctrine did not constitutionalize 16 municipalities.
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play.
The minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood
Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees
operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative
fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton
enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court
can declare them unconstitutional.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general
rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. The operative fact doctrine never validates or
constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law
remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of
nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine
affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional
because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation
of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies
by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and
effective.
R4: 16 Cityhood Laws violated the Equal Protection Clause.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine
the level of income of a municipality.
Further, the classification criterion - mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress - is not
rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities.
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific
condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again.
This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,
as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
R5: Split vote of the Court on the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18
November 2008 Decision final.
Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such
deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied.
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the
denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no
reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive.
The judgment stands in full force. Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc
Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009
denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tievote on the main decision where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is
no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the
second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that
is the 18 November 2008 Decision striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008
Decision stands affirmed. And assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18 November
2008 Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents second motion for
reconsideration, nevertheless remains binding on the parties.
FALLO
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and
REINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws,
namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409,
9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.
Dissenting opinion (J. Velasco):
I find it rather startling that the majority opinion, without so much as taking stock of the legislative history
of the 16 Cityhood Laws in relation to RA 9009, at least to determine the intent of the law, would conclude
that Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power when it enacted the said cityhood laws as an
exception to RA 9009. It cannot be emphasized enough that if Congress has the plenary power to create
political units, it surely can exercise the lesser power of requiring a menu of criteria and standards for their
creation. As it is, the amendatory RA 9009 increasing the codified income requirement from Php 20 million
to Php 100 million is really no different from the enactment of any of the Cityhood Law exempting the unit
covered thereby from the codified standards.
The majoritys contentionthat the exemption from the income requirement accorded by the Cityhood
Laws to respondent cities is unconstitutional, being violative of the equal protection clausedoes not
commend itself for concurrence. As articulated in the December 21, 2009 Decision, the equal protection
clause is not violated by an enactment based on reasonable classification, the reasonableness factor

being met when the classification: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same
class. As then amply explained in the said Decision, all these requisites have been met by the laws
assailed in this proceeding as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause. And I
presently reiterate my submission that the exemption of respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million
income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality brought about by the passage of the amendatory
RA 9009, which, from the records, appears to have been enacted after the affected LGUs, with pending
cityhood bills, had qualified under the original PhP 20 million income norm.
The allegation that Congress made, under the premises, an unreasonable classification in favor of a few
privileged LGUs cannot be accepted. As respondents aptly observed, the classification was enforced, not
on a single instance, but on sixteen (16) instances which spanned several months involving erstwhile
municipalities spread across the archipelago, from the municipality of Batac in the North to the
municipality of Lamitan, Basilan in Southern Mindanao.
The majority resolution has made much of the invocation in the December 21, 2009 of the operative fact
doctrine, stating the observation that the minority has adopted a theory that an unconstitutional law, if
already implemented prior to its declaration, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be
continued despite being unconstitutional. In context, the assailed invocation was no more than a
recognition that the creation of cities, or at least some of them, pursuant to the Cityhood Laws, has been
approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the units affected. And as a result of such
approval, official transactions with long term implementability may have been entered into which cannot
be easily undone without legal and financial complications. Thus, the advisability on practical
consideration, on top of strictly legal grounds consideration, of positing the constitutionality of the
Cityhood Laws in question. What the majority deems as a minority did not say that a law otherwise
invalid, cannot be invalidated by operation of the operative fact doctrine.

JANINE BAREO
LCP v COMELEC
Feb. 15, 2011
DOCTRINE: The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power
to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again
exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. The Cityhood laws are declared constitutional.
Petitioner: League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP)
Respondent: COMELEC and various Municipalities
FACTS
These consolidated cases were filed by the LCP for prohibition assailing the constitutionality of 16 laws,
each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to
enjoin the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites pursuant to such laws.
The court had several decisions on this case:
1. November 18, 2008 Decision Cityhood laws are unconstitutional for violating sections 6 and 10,
Article X, and the equal protection clause
2. March 31, 2009 Resolution First MR denied
3. April 28, 2009 Resolution denied the 2nd MR because it is a prohibited pleading
4. June 2, 2009 Resolution- clarified the April Resolution and said that the 2 nd MR was no longer a
prohibited pleading because the court allowed it.
5. Dec 21, 2009 Decision declared the Cityhood laws as constitutional
Thus, the petitioner (LCP) filed an MR to annul the Dec 2009 decision.
Article X, Section 10 provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted
into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Prior to the amendment, Sec 450 only required an average annual income of P20million. Also, there were
57 bills filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. 33 bills were enacted into law while
24 were pending. Among these 24 were the 16 municipalities converted into component cities through the
Cityhood Laws.
ISSUE 1: WON the Cityhood Laws violate sec 10, Art X - NO
Nov 2008 decision (Cityhood laws violate sec

SC Decision (No violation of Sec 10, Article X)

10, Article X)
The exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood laws
are unconstitutional because they are not written
in Sec 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009

Congress intended that those with pending

cityhood bills would not be covered by the P100
million imposed by RA 9009.
The exemption clauses found in the individual
Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that
intent to exempt respondent municipalities from
the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to
alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was
again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it
provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units
income, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect
to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an
amount of P100 million. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from
such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh
and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy,
especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective
provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly
exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.
ISSUE 2: WON the Cityhood laws violate sec 6, Art X and the equal protection clause - NO
SC Decision (No violation)
Nov 2008 decision (Cityhood laws violate sec
6, Article X and the equal protection clause)
The Cityhood Laws infringed on the "just share"
that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall
receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be
automatically released to them.

After the implementation of the Cityhood Laws,

their respective shares increased, not decreased.
There was valid classification, and the Cityhood
Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.

PETITIONER

SC

There is no substantial distinction between

municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not
have pending bills, such that the mere pendency
of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality
from another for the purpose of the income
requirement

33 municipalities were converted into component

cities almost immediately prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the
Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16
municipalities covered thereby from the
disadvantaged position brought about by the
abrupt increase in the income requirement of R.A.
No. 9009, acknowledging the "privilege" that they
have already given to those newly-converted

component cities, which prior to the enactment of

R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same
footing
or
"class"
as
the
respondent
municipalities. Congress merely recognized the
capacity
and
readiness
of
respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their
respective provinces.

Dispositive:
The Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on September
14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24,
2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO
1. The 16 Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement
from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence,
from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become
a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and
is thus patently unconstitutional.
2. The 16 Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or
determine the level of income of a municipality.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This
violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only.

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

2011 April 12
Motion for Reconsideration

While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the
criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to
yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects
contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside
development, and the concomitant national growth.

Facts:
th
1. At the 12 Congress, RA 9009 was enacted which amended Sec 450 of the LGC by increasing the
annual income requirement for the conversion of a municipality into a city from P20M to P100M. The law
did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

2. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives (HOR) adopted a joint resolution
exempting 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were pending when RA 9009 was enacted (These
th
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 Congress). The joint resolution, however, was not approved
by the Senate.

3. At the 13
approve it.

th

Congress, HOR re-adopted the said joint resolution but the Senate again failed to

4. Upon the advice of Sen. Pimentel, 16 municipalities instead filed individual cityhood bills which had a
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the new P100M income requirement under RA 9009.

5. All the cityhood bills were enacted and later lapsed into law without the Presidents signature
(various dates from March to July 2007)

6. These Cityhood Laws also directed COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the affected
constituents approved of the conversion.

7. League of Cities, et al filed petitions with the SC for prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction and TRO assailing the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws and enjoining the COMELEC from
conducting the plebiscites. The petitioners main contention is that the 16 municipalities should not be
exempt from the new income requirement under RA 9009.

8. 1. On February 15, 2011, the SC issued a resolution declaring the Cityhood Laws constitutional.

9. LCP et al filed present motion for reconsideration challenging the February 15, 2011 SC resolution.

Issues:

IssuePetitioner's ContentionRespondent's ContentionSupreme CourtWhether or not the Cityhood Laws

violated Sec. 10 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall be created, etc according to criteria set in the LGC
subject to approval in a plebiscite).
YES. The Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of
a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
NO.
NO. Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be
exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.

The responses of Senator Pimentel who sponsored the then Senate bill made it obvious that RA 9009
would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.

The exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of
the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondent LGUs, without exception, from the coverage of RA
9009. Thus RA 9009 and LGC were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being
embodied in the exemption clauses.Whether the P100M income requirement is arbitrary.NO. it is not
difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already complied with the
requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa, Laguna, Navotas, San Juan,
Dasmarias, Cavite, and Bian, Laguna; and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached
the income of P100m from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in
Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite.YES.

YES. 59 existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100M. The large
number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the P100M threshold income 5
years after RA 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim
that the P100M income requirement is not difficult to comply with.

The municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold income of P100M from local
sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to
Metro Manila. While the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different
provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are considerably very
distant from Metro Manila. This underscores the danger RA 9009 sought to prevent, i.e., that "the
metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would
have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the
Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income requirement.

No research or empirical data was buttressed to support the P100M figure. Nor was there proof that the
proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise. While the Constitution mandates that
the creation of LGUs must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that
the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently
producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization,
countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.

The increased income requirement ofP100M was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to
survive and remain viable as a component city. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection
clause.YES.
NO.
NO. LGUs covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven themselves
viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been
centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural,
mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots.

Except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both 2nd-class municipalities in terms of income, all the rest
are categorized by the DOF as 1st-class municipalities with gross income of at least P70M as of 2005.
Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, and Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial capitals.

The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this time,
indicate their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood. Whether or not the Cityhood Laws

violated Sec. 6 of Art X, Constitution (LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes automatically
released to them)
YES.
NO.
NO. The share of LGUs is a matter of percentage under Sec 285 of the LGC, not a specific amount.
Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%),
and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when
the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for cities.

The allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With
every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of IRA
entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that
received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Sec 285 and Sec 286 of the LGC.

Respondent LGUs are entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated
their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit
slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With their
conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.

LGUs do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their
development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of
encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively
be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if
commercial activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.
Dispositive Portion:

LCP's motion denied with finality; Cityhood Laws constitutional.

RZ Zamora
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
(April 7, 2010)
Doctrine: Section 5(3) of Article VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Population is just one of several other factors to be determined to compose a legislative district in a
province.
Facts: Senator Benigno Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens,
seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" via petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. There were originally four legislative districts in Camarines Sur each with a
population exceeding 250,000. RA 9716 reapportioned the composition of the first and second legislative
district of the province of Camarines Sur thereby creating an additional legislative district. This left the first
legislative district with a population of only 176,383 from its original 417,304.
Petitioner
Issue 1
(Substanti
ve): W/N
RA 9716 is
unconstituti
onal for
creating a
legislative
district in a
province
with a
population
less than
250,000.

Save in
the case
of a
newly
created
provinc
e, the
constitu
tion
requires
that
each
legislati
ve
district
created
by
Congre
ss must
be
support
ed by a
minimu
m
populati
on of at
least

Respondent
There is an apparent distinction between cities and
provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. The existence of a 250,000
population condition but only as to the creation of a
legislative district in a city and not to a province.

Supreme
Court
Section
5(3) of
Article VI
of the
Constituti
on
requires
a 250,000
minimum
populatio
n only for
a city to
be
entitled
to a
represent
ative, but
not so for
a
province.
Any law
duly
enacted
by
Congress
carries
with it the
presumpti

250,000
in order
to be
valid.
Under
this
view,
existing
legislativ
e
districts
may be
reapporti
oned
and
severed
to form
new
districts,
provided
each
resulting
district
will
represen
ta
populati
on of at
least
250,000.
Article
VI Sec.
5 (3)
Each
legislativ
e district
shall
compris
e, as far
as
practica
ble,
contiguo
us,
compact
, and
adjacent
territory.
Each
city with
a
populati
on of at

on of
constitutio
nality.
There
must be a
clear
showing
that a
specific
provision
of the
constitutio
n has
been
violated to
be
declared
unconstitu
tional.
There is
no
provision
requiring a
250,000
minimum
population
requireme
nt for the
creation of
a
legislative
district.
The use of
a comma
to
separate
the phrase
"each city
with a
population
of at least
two
hundred
fifty
thousand"
from the
phrase "or
each
province"
means
that the
250,000
minimum
population
is only
required

least two
hundred
fifty
thousan
d, or
each
province
, shall
have at
least
one
represen
tative.
Intent of
the
framers
of the
1987
constitu
tion was
to
create a
populati
on
minimu
m of
250,000
per
legislati
ve
district.
When
the
Constitut
ional
Commis
sion
fixed the
original
number
of district
seats in
the
House of
Represe
ntatives
to 200,
they
took into
account
the
projecte
d

for a city,
but not for
a
province.
Mariano
Jr. Vs
Comelec:
Issue was
the
constitutio
nality of a
law
converting
the
Municipalit
y of
Makati to
a Highly
Urbanized
City. Said
law also
created an
additional
legislative
district.
The
Mariano
case
limited the
applicatio
n of the
250,000
minimum
population
requireme
nt for
cities only
to its initial
legislative
district. W
hile
Section
5(3),
Article VI
of the
Constitutio
n requires
a city to
have a
minimum
population
of 250,000
to be
entitled to
a
represent

national
populati
on of
55,000,0
00 in
1986. 55
million
people
represen
ted by
200
district
represen
tatives
translate
s to
roughly
250,000
people
for every
one (1)
represen
tative.

RA
9716
violates
the
principl
e of
proport
ional
represe
ntation
provide
d in
Article
VI, Sec
5 par
(1), (3)
and (4)
of the
Constit
ution.7

ative, it
does not
have to
increase
its
population
by another
250,000 to
be entitled
to an
additional
district.
Sec.461
of LGC
Requisites
for
Creation.
(a) A
province
may be
created if
it has an
average
annual
income,
as
certified
by the
Departme
nt of
Finance,
of not less
than
Twenty
million
pesos
(P20,000,
000.00)
based on
1991
constant
prices and
either of
the
following
requisites:
(i) a

Article VI Sec 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative

contigu
ous
territory
of at
least
two
thousa
nd
(2,000)
square
kilomet
ers, as
certifie
d by
the
Lands
Manag
ement
Bureau
; OR
(ii) a
populat
ion of
not
less
than
two
hundre
d fifty
thousa
nd
(250,00
0)
inhabit
ants as
certifie
d by
the
Nation
al
Statisti
cs
Office.
The
requireme
nt of
population
is not an
indispens
able

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

requireme
nt, but is
merely
an alternat
ive
addition to
the
indispens
able
income
requireme
nt.
Records
of the
Constitutio
nal
Commissi
on show
population
was not
the sole
determina
nt of the
creation of
a
legislative
district.
Other
factors
were
considere
d.
The
factors
mentioned
during the
deliberatio
ns on
House Bill
No. 4264
to be
considere
d in the
creation of
legislative
districts:
(a) the
dialects
spoken
in the
grouped
municip
alities;
(b) the
size of

the
original
groupin
gs
compar
ed to
that of
the
regroup
ed
municip
alities;
(c) the
natural
division
separati
ng the
municip
ality
subject
of the
discussi
on from
there
configur
ed
District
One;
and
(d) the
balancin
g of the
areas of
the
three
districts
resulting
from the
redistrict
ing of
Districts
The
Constitutio
n, does
not
require
mathemati
cal
exactitude
or rigid
equality
as a
standard
in gauging

Issue 2
(Procedur
al): W/N a
petition for
declaratory
relief was
the proper
action in
court and
W/N
petitioners
have locus
standi.

The petitioners should not have availed of Certiorari and

Prohibition as a remedy but should have filed a petition
for Declaratory Relief because it was to declare a law
unconstitutional.
Petitioners have no locus standi as they have not proven
that they will incur any substantial injury by the
implementation of the law.

equality of
represent
ation. x x
x. To
ensure
quality
represent
ation
through
commonal
ity of
interests
and ease
of access
by the
represent
ative to
the
constituen
ts, all that
the
Constitutio
n requires
is that
every
legislative
district
should
comprise,
as far as
practicabl
e,
contiguou
s,
compact
and
adjacent
territory.
(Bagabuy
o vs.
COMELE
C)
The issue
is of
transcend
ental
importanc
e, the
rules of
procedure
must be
set aside.
(Jaworski
vs

PAGCOR)

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
Dissenting opinion: Carpio J,
RA 9716 is unconstitutional for going against Sec. 5 Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution for the
creation of legislative districts.
o Section 5(4) of Article VI mandates that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards" fixed in Section 5. These constitutional
standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2)
minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the
increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in
apportionment of legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area."
o The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting
power -- that each vote is worth the same as any other vote,
o In terms of legislative redistricting, this means equal representation for equal numbers of
people or equal voting weight per legislative district.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provided that Members of the House "shall be
elected from legislative districts in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x."
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" - the rule on proportional representation shall
apply uniformly in the apportionment of every legislative district.
"on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio"- means that the ratio of one legislative district for every
given number of people shall be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in provinces or
cities or in metro manila.
The law goes against democracy and the republican system of government.
That the Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of proportional
representation is evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio x x x."
Mariano vs. Comelec and Bagabuyo vs. Comelec is inapplicable because when it was acting as a
constitutional commission it exercised absolute power to relax the standards in Section 5, Article
VI.
The Court in Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the certification by the NSO that at the time of
the enactment of RA 7854, the population of Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two
representatives
Concurring and Dissenting: Carpio-Morales, J.

Concurs with the ponencia as to the transcendental issue

Substantive portion petitioners rely on both Article VI, Section 5 (3) but also on Section 5 (1) of
the same Article. Both provisions must be read together in light of the constitutional requirements
of population and contiguity.

Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with respect to
existing provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly created provinces
under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and territory requirements are met).

Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it
merely stated that Makatis legislative district may still be increased as long as the minimum
population requirement is met.

Bagabuyo vs. Comelec and Mariano vs. Comelec were both wrongly interpreted as the
population of the legislative districts at the time were above 250,000

The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles
the creation of a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing
population.

Digester: Marynette M. Gravador

CASE TITLE: MMDA vs. Garin (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Dante O. Garin
Date of Case: April 15, 2005
DOCTRINE: MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
Petitioner: MMDA, created under RA 7924, represented by OSG.
Respondent: Dante O. Garin, a lawyer.
FACTS:
Dante O. Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was
confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara St., Binondo, Manila. Before the expiration of the TVR (7
days), he wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license, and
expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed an original complaint with application for preliminary
injunction RTC Paraaque. Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a TRO, extending the validity of the
TVR as a temporary drivers license for 20 more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted,
and the MMDA was directed to return Garins drivers license.
Issue 1
WON
the
implementation
of
Sec. 5(f) of RA 7924
creating MMDA. which
authorizes
it
to
confiscate
and
suspend or revoke
drivers license in the
enforcement of traffic
laws and regulations is
valid.

Issue 2
WON the IRR for the
provision is valid.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
The powers granted
in the provision are
limited to fixing,
collection
&
imposition of fines
and penalties for
traffic violations.
Such powers are
legislative
and
executive in nature;
the judiciary retains
the
right
to
determine
the
validity
of
the
penalty imposed.

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
In the absence of
IRR, Sec. 5(f) of RA
7924 grants MMDA
unbridled discretion
to deprive erring
motorists of their
licenses,
preempting
judicial
determination of the
validity
of
the
deprivation, thereby
violating the due
process clause.
The
provision
violates prohibition
against
undue
delegation
of
legislative
authority, as it
allows MMDA to fix
&
impose
unspecified and
unlimited - fines
and other penalties
on erring motorists.

Metro
Manila
Council,
the
governing
board
and policy making

MMDA
Memo
Circular TT-95-001
is not valid, as it
was passed by the

RTC (14 Aug 1997)

Summary
confiscation of a
drivers
license
without giving the
driver
an
opportunity to be
heard; depriving
him of a property
right
(license)
without
due
process; not filing
in
Court
the
complaint
of
supposed
traffic
infraction, cannot
be justified by any
legislation and is
hence
unconstitutional.

There
was
no
quorum in ths 1st
Regular Meeting of
the MMDA Council,

body of MMDA, has

formulated the IRR
for the provision In
MMDA
Memo
Circular TT-95-001
dated 15 April 1995.
Issue 3
WON a writ of
preliminary injunction
should be issued

The doctrine of
separation
of
powers does not
preclude
admixture of the 3
powers
of
government
in
admin agencies.

Council
absence
quorum.

in
the
of
a

hence the Circular,

authorizing
confiscation
of
licenses
upon
issuance of a TVR,
is void ab initio.

For the writ: He

suffered
and
continues to suffer
great
and
irreparable damage
because of the
deprivation of his
license and the
TVR
and
the
confiscation of his
license have no
legal basis.

Temporary writ is
made
permanent;
MMDA to return his
license; MMDA to
desist
from
confiscating license
without giving driver
the opportunity to be
heard in appropriate
proceeding.

Additional Facts:
MMDA filed a petition in SC. During the pendency of the case, MMDA, through Chairman Bayani
Fernando, implemented Memo Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the
Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. (Erring motorists are issued an MTT, may be paid at any
Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate licenses. All motorists with unredeemed
TVRs were given 7 days from date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem
their license or vehicle plates.)
Issue 1

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

WON the issue has

become moot and
academic due to the
implementation of a
new circuar

Issue 2
WON the State may
withhold licenses thru
its exercise of its
police power and
WON MMDA can
exercise that police
power.

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
A license to operate
a motor vehicle is
neither a contract
nor a property right,
but is a privilege
subject
to
reasonable
regulation
under
police power in the

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:

Supreme Court
Case, has been
rendered moot and
academic by the
implementation
of
Memo Circular 042004.
MMDA, however, is
not precluded from
re-implementing
Memo Circular TT95-001, or any other
scheme that would
entail
confiscating
licenses.
Supreme Court
A license to operate
a motor vehicle is a
privilege that the
state may withhold
in the exercise of
its police power
(through
the
legislature).
MMDA
is
not

interest of public
safety and welfare.
Revocation
or
suspension of this
privilege does not
constitute a taking
without due process
as long as the
licensee is given the
right to appeal the
revocation.
Memo Circular TT95-001 was validly
passed
in
the
presence
of
a
quorum.
Though the circular
is the basis for the
issuance of TVRs,
the basis for the
summary
confiscation
of
licenses is Sec. 5(f)
of RA 7924 itself,
and that such power
is
self-executory
and
does
not
require the issuance
of any implementing
regulation
or
circular.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

vested with police

power. RA 7924
does not grant
MMDA with police
power, let alone
legislative
power,
and
that
its
functions are admin
in nature.
Sec. 5(f) grants
MMDA with the
duty to enforce
existing traffic rules
and regulations.
MMDA
was
intended
to
coordinate services
with
metro-wide
impact
that
transcend
local
political boundaries
or would entail
huge expenditures
if
provided
by
individual
LGUs,
especially
with
regard to transport
and
traffic
management. But
these are limited by
MMDAs enabling
law, other laws or
ordinance,
or
regulation
arising
from a legitimate
source.

Digester: Rachel Tacason

CASE TITLE: MMDA v. Viron Transpo Co
Date of Case: August 15, 2007
DOCTRINE: (MMDA has no police power)
It is the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the
Project subject of the case at bar.
No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not
authorized to implement cannot pass muster.
Petitioner: MMDA (Metropolitan Manila Development Authority)
Respondent: Viron Transportation Corp, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transportation
with a provincial operation and which has a bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two more in Quezon
City.
FACTS:
PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for
Greater Manila (the Project).
Pursuant to this EO, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the
numerous number of buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different
transport mode.
The Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.
Thus, the EO designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the project
Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief questioning the authority of the MMDA.
The other petitioner, Mencorp, also filed a Petition for Dec Relief praying that the Court declare
the EO unconstitutional.
The RTC initially sustained the constitutionality and legality of the EO pursuant to RA No. 7942
but on separate MR of Viron and Mencorp, the RTC reversed its decision.
Issue 1:
WON EO 179 is
unconstitutional?

PETITIONERS
CONTENTION:
The Presidents
authority to
undertake or to
cause the
implementation of
the Project is
derived from EO
No. 1258 and EO
No. 2929.
The EO is a valid
exercise of police
power

RESPONDENTS
CONTENTION:
MMDA is devioid
of authority to
order the
elimination of their
bus terminals
under the EO.
The EO violates
both the
constitution and
the Public Service
Act.
Neither is the

Supreme Court:
Under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as
amended, it is the DOTC, and not the
MMDA, which is authorized to establish and
implement a project such as the one subject
of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,
although authorized to establish or cause
the implementation of the Project, must
exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law,
is the primary implementing and
administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to
establish and implement a project such as
the Project in question.

Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication Defining its Powers and
Functions and for Other Purposes
9
Administrative Code of 1987

MMDA clothed
with such authority
under RA 7924.

By designating the MMDA as the

implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of
the authority conferred by law, rendering
E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the
designation of MMDA flies in the absence of
a specific grant of authority to it under R.A.
No. 7924.

Issue 2:
WON the MMDA
has police power

In light of the administrative nature of its

powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid
of authority to implement the Project as
envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not
have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly order the
elimination of respondents terminals.
The MMDA is not vested with police power.
Even assuming arguendo that police power
was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of
such power does not satisfy the two tests of
a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the
interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class,
requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Stated differently, the police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare and a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes
and the means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court
recognized that traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private, concern. But are the
means employed appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they
not duly oppressive?
The Court fails to see how the prohibition
against the existence of respondents
terminals can be considered a reasonable
necessity to ease traffic congestion in the
metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination
of respondents bus terminals brings forth
the distinct possibility and the equally
harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the
common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another.

Less intrusive measures such as curbing the

proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and
taxis entering Metro Manila and using the
streets for parking and passenger pick-up
points, as respondents suggest, might even
be more effective in easing the traffic
situation. So would the strict enforcement of
traffic rules and the removal of obstructions
from major thoroughfares.

WON EO 179
violates the
Public Service
Act

The MMDA cannot order the closure of

respondents terminals not only because no
authority to implement the Project has been
granted nor legislative or police power been
delegated to it, but also because the
elimination of the terminals does not satisfy
the standards of a valid police power
measure.
The establishment, as well as the
maintenance of vehicle parking areas or
passenger terminals, is generally
considered a necessary service to be
provided by provincial bus operators like
respondents, hence, the investments they
have poured into the acquisition or lease of
suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the
terminals would thus run counter to the
provisions of the Public Service Act.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared
NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.