SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59690 October 28, 1987

LUIS HAGOSOJOS, petitioner
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ARACELI H. VDA. DE HAGOSOJOS,
FRED HAGOSOJOS, HEIDI HAGOSOJOS, HENRY HAGOSOJOS,
ARACELI HAGOSOJOS-ALINDOGAN, assisted by her husband,
RAMON ALINDOGAN, and LOURDES HAGOSOJOS-NICOLAS,
assisted by her husband, JOSE NICOLAS,respondents,

SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal and setting aside of
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 63307-R, entitled Luis
Hagosojos vs. Araceli Vda. de Hagasojos, et al., which set aside the
decision dated December 5, 1975, and the order dated July 12, 1976 of the
then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 363 2 approving
the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties.
The facts that gave rise to the present controversy are as follows:
Anastacio Hagosojos contracted two marriages during his lifetime. His first
marriage on February 14, 1920 with Jacinta Jaucian (according to the
Petition, while the Compromise Agreement copied in the Decision and
quoted in the Record On Appeal states the surname of Jacinta as
"Guardian") produced three off-springs, namely: the petitioner, Luis
Hagosojos, and the two other private respondents, Araceli HagosojosAlindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. More than five years after the
demise of Jacinta Jaucian on April 4, 1959, but without the conjugal
partnership assets of the first marriage having been partitioned and
distributed, he got married a second time on December 21, 1965, to Araceli
Hian Out of the second marriage were born the other private respondents,
Fred, Heidi, and Henry, all surnamed Hagosojos. On January 22, 1973,
Anastacio donated to Henry, who was then only seven years young, Lot
No. 2736, containing an area of 15,529 square meters, a portion of the
property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 which was part of
the conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage. The donation was

accepted on behalf of Henry by his mother, Araceli. There is nothing in the

records of this case as to whether or not the deed of donation was
registered.
On May 29, 1974, to compel the partition and distribution of the conjugal
partnership assets of the first marriage, the petitioner, together with his two
sisters, private respondents Araceli Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes
Hagosojos-Nicolas, filed the corresponding complaint against their father,
Anastacio. While the case was still pending however, Anastacio died on
August 21, 1974, which compelled Luis to file an amended complaint
substituting as defendant Araceli Vda. de Hagosojos in her personal
capacity and as guardian of the minors Fred, Heidi, and Henry Hagosojos.
For one reason or another, Araceli Hagosojos - Alindogan and Lourdes
Hagosojos - Nicolas surprisingly refused to side with their brother of full
blood, petitioner Luis Hagosojos, in the amended complaint, and were thus
impleaded as defendants.
The parties tried to settle their conflict amicably during the course of the
proceedings in the trial court. As a result, Araceli Vda de Hagosojos,
assisted by her counsel, drew up a compromise agreement which she
presented to the petitioner for approval. When Luis agreed, he and his
stepmother, Araceli, together with their lawyers, signed the Compromise
Agreement. On December 4, 1975, they submitted the same to the trial
court for approval. Accordingly, the trial court, on December 5, 1975,
rendered a decision providing inter alia that the whole property covered by
original Certificate of Title No. P-740 shall pertain to the children of the first
marriage, as stipulated in the Compromise Agreement.
On April 5, 1976, after the judgment had long become final, the private
respondents Araceli Vda. de Hagosojos and her children Fred, Heidi, and
Henry, filed a "Motion to Amend Decision Based On Mistake" wherein they
alleged, among others.
xxx xxx xxx
3. That the Compromise Agreement was vitiated by mistake in that defendant Araceli H.
Vda. de Hagosojos for herself and her co-defendants children in good faith signed the
Compromise Agreement not knowing that the portion of land designated as Cad. Lot No.
2736 covered by O.C.T. No. P-740 which had long been transferred to his son, defendant
Henry Hagosojos by donation was erroneously left out and substituted by a portion
covered by O.C.T. No. P-741 ... 3

xxx xxx xxx

They claimed that Lot No. 2736 consisting of 15,529 square meters could
no longer be validly given to the children of the first marriage, In lieu of Lot
No. 2736, the private respondents then offered to the petitioner as property
pertaining to the children of the first marriage, several parcels of land which
were among the properties originally assigned in the Compromise
Agreement to the heirs of the second marriage. The trial court, on June 18,
1976, denied the private respondents motion and ruled that, "the court
arrived at the unalterable conclusion that it has no power or authority to
amend, alter or modify the judgment entered on December 5, 1975 based
on a compromise agreement dated December 4, 1975, signed not only by
the opposing parties but by their respective counsels. 4
Undaunted by this initial setback, the private respondents on June 23,
1976, filed a "Motion to Set Aside Compromise Agreement" based on the
same ground as their earlier motion. They followed up the motion with a
"Supplemental Pleading" on July 7, 1976 in which they interposed the
additional argument that the decision of December 5, 1975 (approving the
Compromise Agreement) had not yet become final and executory since
"there was no project of partition yet submitted by the parties and approved
by the Court. x ... " 5 The petitioner opposed. So, on July 12, 1976, the trial
court issued an order denying the private respondents' supplemental
pleading. 6
Unconvinced by the trial court's rulings, the private respondents elevated
the case to the respondent Court of Appeals, which, in a four-page decision
promulgated on April 30, 1981, reversed the judgment of the trial court. 7
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition and assigned four errors
allegedly committed by the respondent appellate court, to wit:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMMITTED A MISTAKE THAT
VITIATED THEIR CONSENT.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED SERIOUSLY IN HOLDING

THAT THE JUDICIAL AGREEMENT MAY STILL BE SET ASIDE ON
GROUND OF MISTAKE AFTER IT HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS MOST GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE DONATION OF LOT NO. 2736, PERTAINING TO
THE HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE BUT DONATED TO HENRY
HAGOSOJOS IS NULL AND VOID.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS INCURRED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO EXTEND RELIEF TO ARACELI AND
LOURDES HAGOSOJOS, AS HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
PARTIES TO THE CASE. 8
We find the petition impressed with merit.
1. The private respondents assert that mistake vitiated their consent in
entering into the Compromise Agreement with the petitioner. They insist
that respondent Araceli H. Vda. de Hagosojos in signing the Compromise
Agreement dated December 4, 1975, forgot that Lot No. 2736, one of those
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740 had already been donated
by Anastacio Hagosojos to his minor son, Henry Hagosojos, and thus could
no longer be assigned in the Compromise Agreement to the children of the
first marriage. Thus, the private respondents argue that the trial court's
judgment approving the Compromise Agreement is null and void and must
perforce be set aside. This claim, which was upheld by the respondent
appellate court, is unfounded.
We find the alleged mistake of respondent Araceli and of her lawyer not a
mistake at all. It is more of negligence, which is inexcusable, and certainly
can not be inflicted on the petitioner and his sisters of the full blood. It is
inexcusable because the Compromise Agreement was prepared by the
private respondents' lawyer without any intervention whatsoever on the part
of the petitioner or his counsel. Moreover, the deed evidencing the alleged
donation of Lot No. 2736 to private respondent Henry Hagosojos, was an
the while in the possession of his mother. There is no gain-saying the

conclusion that had she and her counsel exercised, in the preparation of
the Compromise Agreement, the standard of care required of an ordinarily
prudent man to bestow upon his important business, 9 then the entire
controversy would have been obviated.
II. The second assignment of error is well founded in law and
jurisprudence. For indeed the respondent Court of Appeals erred in setting
aside the decision dated December 5, 1975 of the trial court. That decision
which approved the Compromise Agreement had long become final and
executory. 10 It may no longer be set aside nor in any manner modified.
Even if the private respondents in fact committed in good faith a mistake or
were excusably negligent and thus there would have been a valid ground to
justify the setting aside of the questioned decision by the trial court, the
equitable relief afforded by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court would remain
unavail ling to them. Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 38 state:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from
judgment or other proceeding thereof. When a judgment or
order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a
party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this
rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to
be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or order was entered. or such proceeding was taken;
and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the
facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of
action or defense, as the case may be.
In the instant case, while the decision of the trial court was received by the
respondents as early as December 5, 1975, the private respondents filed
their "Motion To Amend Decision Based On Mistake" only on April 5, 1976,
or one hundred twenty one (121) days after they learned of the assailed

judgment, or sixty one (61) days late.Likewise, their "Motion To Set Aside
Compromise Agreement" was filed on June 23, 1976, or two hundred (200)
days after they learned of the judgment, or one hundred forty (140) days
way out of time. Clearly then, both motions, even if we are to treat them as
petitions for relief from judgment, were filed unseasonably. The decision
affirming the Compromise Agreement has become final and executory. (As
a matter of law, a judgment on compromise becomes final and immediately
executory upon approval thereof by the proper court). 11
In a recent case 12 where the Petition For Relief was denied although filed
only one (1) day late, or sixty-one (61) days from receipt of the notice of
dismissal (in fact the private respondent learned of the dismissal on the
same day), we also denied the petition for review on certiorari. Speaking
through Justice Paras, this Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief in this case was filed
61 days from receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late.
In fact, the records show that counsel for private respondent
learned of the dismissal on the same day, April 29, 1967, when
he arrived late for the hearing so that the Petition for Relief was
at least eight (8) days late. The records further show that
counsel for private respondent did not move for reconsideration
of the Order of dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he
appeal, thereby allowing the decision to become final and
executory. As a last-resort, he could have availed of the sixty
day period provided for by Rule 38 to file a Petition for Relief
from Judgment but again he allowed this opportunity to lapse.
Indeed, to him is applicable, the well known maxim that "equity
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. (Henson
v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 586).
In the case of Turqueza v. Hernando (97 SCRA 488 [1980]) the
Supreme Court in disallowing the reopening of the case which
has become final, ruled that there is no justification in law and
in fact, for respondent judge's void act of ordering the reopening
of the case which has become final and executory.
Thus the Court held:

The Court has said time and again that the doctrine
of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice
that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of
courts must become final at some definite date fixed
by law. The law gives an exception or "last chance"
of a timely petition for relief from judgment within the
reglementary period (within 60 days from
knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment)
under Rule 38 supra, but such grace period must be
taken as "absolutely fixed, inextendible, never
interrupted and cannot be subject to any condition
or contingency. Because the period fixed is itself
devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the
equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were,
designed to give the aggrieved party another
and last chanceand failure to avail of such last
chance within the grace period fixed by the statute
or Rules of Court is fatal (Turqueza v.
Hernando, supra).
In expressly reiterating the abovequoted decision, the Supreme
Court in Arcilla v. Arcilla (138 SCRA 566 [1985]), held that the
Rule is that, for a petition for relief under Rule 38 to be
entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show
that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of
said Rule. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary
period specified in Sec. 3, of the same, otherwise on this
ground alone. the petition should be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, neither can private respondent
invoke "equity as a ground for the reopening of the case "there
being an express provision of law under which the remedy can
be invoked." (Barrios v. Thong & Co., 7 SCRA 535, 542-543
[1963]). The rule is, equity follows the law" and as discussed in
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence Vol. 2 pp. 188-189 (as cited in
Appellant's Brief, p. 20), the meaning of the principle is stated
as follows:

There are instances, indeed, in which a court of

equity gives a remedy. where the law gives none,
but where a particular remedy is given by the law,
and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by
particular rules, it would be very improper for the
court to take it up where the law leaves it and to
extend it further than the law allows.
xxx xxx xxx
Additionally, the private respondents' motion to set aside the Compromise
Agreement is fatally defective, because it is not verified and not
accompanied with affidavits showing the mistake relied upon and the facts
constituting their good and substantial cause of action. On this score alone
the trial court would have been correct in dismissing their motion. For in
order that relief from judgment may be granted under Rule 38 of the
Revised Rules of Court, there must be a strict observance of the
requirements. 13
III. There is merit in the third assignment of error. Paragraph 3 of the
Compromise Agreement explicitly provides that "on February 15, 1967, a
liquidation and partition of all the properties enumerated in paragraph, one
(l) among the heirs of the first and second marriage was made ..." 14 Among
those specifically designated in favor of the heirs of the first marriage was
the whole property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-740
comprised of six lots including lot No. 2736." 15 In view of that partition in
1967. Anastacio could no longer donate Lot No 2736 to Henry on January
22. 1973 because it had already been adjudicated "To The Heirs of the First
Marriage" as the Compromise Agreement specifically states. On the other
hand, even it he (Anastacio) is included among the "Heirs of the First
Marriage" he could not donate a specific lot by metes and bounds, but only
an aliquot part of the whole mass of properties which he and his three
children of his first marriage (with Jacinta Jaucian) co-owned. 16
Even in the unlikely event that the statement regarding the liquidation and
partition on February 15, 1967 would be found to be a mistake, still
Anastacio could not have validly donated Lot No. 2736 to Henry.
Considering that all the properties specified in the Compromise Agreement
were described conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage, it
follows that upon the death of Jacinta, the conjugal partnership evolved into

a co-ownership between her surviving spouse Anastacio, and her three

children, the petitioner and the two other private respondents, Araceli
Hagosojos-Alindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas. Anastacio became
the owner of 5/8 of the mass of properties while each of the three children,
of 1/8. Thus, even in such a situation, and pending the partition of the
properties owned in common and the adjudication in his favor Lot No.
2736, Anastacio could not validly donate the same at that time he claimed
he did within the purview of the law on co-ownership.
IV. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to be labor the fourth assigned
error. We find the trial court's decision approving the Compromise
Agreement sufficient protection to the interests and welfare of the two other
children of the first marriage, private respondents Araceli HagosojosAlindogan and Lourdes Hagosojos-Nicolas.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated April 30, 1981
of the Court of Appeals is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision dated December 5, 1975 and the Order of July 12, 1976 of the
then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon in Civil Case No. 363 approving
the Compromise Agreement, are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
private respondent Araceli H. Vda. de Hagosojos.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera and Padilla JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Edgardo L. Paras, with the concurrence of
Justices Venicio Escolin and Mariano A. Zosa, Sixth Division.
2 Both penned by Judge Severino de Leon.
3 Record on Appeal, 6; Rollo, 115.
4 Id. 19; Rollo, 128.
5 Id, 34; Rollo, 143.

6 Id, 35; Rollo, 144.

7 Rollo, 59.
8 Brief for Petitioner, i; Rollo, 172.
9 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol.
II, 563.
10 De los Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; Enriquez vs. Padilla,
77 Phil. 373: Bodiongan vs. Ceniza, et al., 102 Phil. 750;
Periquet vs. Reyes supra; Samonte vs. Samonte, No. L-40683,
June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 524 (1975); De Guzman vs. Court of
Appeals, No. L-52733, July, 2 3 198 5, 137 SC R 730 (1985).
11 De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals. supra.
12 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Ludivico D.
Arciaga, et al., No. L-29701. March 16, 1987.
13 Palomares vs. Jimenez, 90 Phil 773; J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
De la Cruz, No. L-4883, March 25,1953; Samonte vs.
SAmonte supra Ong Tiao Seng vs. C.A., No. L-41192-93,
January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 417 (1978); Concepcion vs.
Presiding Judge, Br. V, CFI of Bulacan, No. L-35489, December
15, 1982, 119 SCRA 222 (1982); Director of Lands vs.
Romamban No. L-36948, August 28,1984,131 SCRA 431
(1984); Arcilla vs. Arcilla. No. L-46674, September 16, 1985,
138 SCRA 560 (1985).
14 Records on Appeal, Id, 2; Rollo, 111.
15 Id
16 Mercado vs. Liwanag, No. L-14429, June 20, 1962, 5 SCRA
472 (1962); Santos vs. Buenconsejo, No. L-21036, June 23,
1965, 14 SCRA 407, (1965); Diversified Credit Corp. vs.
Rosado No. L-27933, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 470
(1968); Villanueva vs. Florendo, No. L-33158, October 17,
1985, 139 SCRA 3291(985).