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Antonio Ongpin, Market Director for Special Markets of Del Monte Philippines, Inc., the
publication of a "warning to the trade" paid advertisement in leading newspapers. DMC-USA
and Paul E. Derby, Jr., apparently upset with the publication, instructed private respondent
MMI to stop coordinating with Antonio Ongpin and to communicate directly instead with DMCUSA through Paul E. Derby, Jr.
MMI et al. further averred that:DMC-USA et al. knowingly and surreptitiously continued
to deal with the former in bad faith by involving disinterested third parties and by proposing
solutions which were entirely out of their controlthey had exhausted all possible avenues for
an amicable resolution and settlement of their grievances as a result of the fraud, bad faith,
malice and wanton attitude of DMC-USA et al., they should be held responsible for all the
actual expenses incurred by MMI et al. in the delayed shipment of orders which resulted in
the extra handling thereof, the actual expenses and cost of money for the unused Letters of
Credit and the substantial opportunity losses due to created out-of-stock situations and
unauthorized shipments of Del Monte-USA products to the Philippine Duty Free Area and
Economic Zone the bad faith, fraudulent acts and willful negligence of DMC-USA et al.,
motivated by their determination to squeeze MMI et al. out of the outstanding and on-going
Distributorship Agreement in favor of another party, had placed Lily Sy on tenterhooks since
then the shrewd and subtle manner with which DMC-USA et al. concocted imaginary
violations by MMI of the Distributorship Agreement in order to justify the untimely termination
thereof was a subterfuge
DMC-USA et al. filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, invoking the arbitration clause.
The Regional Trial Court deferred consideration of DMC-USA et al.s Motion to Suspend
Proceedings as the grounds alleged therein did not constitute the suspension of the
proceedings considering that the action was for damages with prayer for the issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Attachment and not on the Distributorship Agreement DMC-USA et al. filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to which MMI et al. filed their comment/opposition.DMC-USA et
al. filed a reply. They later on filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental Pleading.Said motion was
admitted.
As a result of the admission of the Supplemental Complaint, DMC-USA et al. filed on
22 July 1997 a Manifestation adopting their Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Motion for
Reconsideration. The Motion to Suspend Proceedings was denied by the trial court on the
ground that it will not serve the ends of justice and to allow said suspension will only delay the
determination of the issues, frustrate the quest of the parties for a judicious determination of
their respective claims, and/or deprive and delay their rights to seek redress.On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:WON the dispute between the parties warrants an order compelling them to submit to
arbitration.
RULING: No.
There is no doubt that arbitration is valid and constitutional in our jurisdiction. Even
before the enactment of Republic Act 876, this Court has countenanced the settlement of
disputes through arbitration. Unless the agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of
the courts against the parties, which agreement would be void, the courts will look with favor
upon such amicable arrangement and will only interfere with great reluctance to anticipate or
nullify the action of the arbitrator. Moreover, as RA 876 expressly authorizes arbitration of
domestic disputes, foreign arbitration as a system of settling commercial disputes was
likewise recognized when the Philippines adhered to the United Nations"Convention on the
Recognition and the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958"under the 10 May 1965
Resolution No. 71 of the Philippine Senate, giving reciprocal recognition and allowing
enforcement of international arbitration agreements between parties of different nationalities
within a contracting state.
A careful examination of the instant case shows that the arbitration clause in the
Distributorship Agreement between DMC-USA and MMI is valid and the dispute between the
parties is arbitrable.However, this Court must deny the petition.The Agreement between
DMC-USA and MMI is a contract.The provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising
therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract.As a
rule, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties and produce effect as
between them, their assigns and heirs.Clearly, only parties to the Agreement,i.e., DMC-USA
and its Managing Director for Export Sales Paul E. Derby, Jr., and MMI and its Managing
Director LILY SY are bound by the Agreement and its arbitration clause as they are the only
signatories thereto.
Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and SFI, not parties to the Agreement and cannot
even be considered assigns or heirs of the parties, are not bound by the Agreement and the
arbitration clause therein.Consequently, referral to arbitration in the State of California
pursuant to the arbitration clause and the suspension of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
2637-MN pending the return of the arbitral award could be called for but only as to DMC-USA
and Paul E. Derby, Jr., and MMI and LILY SY, and not as to the other parties in this case, in
accordance with the recent case of Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty
Corporation,which superseded that of Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
In Toyota the Court ruled that the contention that the arbitration clause has become
dysfunctional because of the presence of third parties is untenable ratiocinating that contracts
are respected as the law between the contracting parties and that as such, the parties are
thereby expected to abide with good faith in their contractual commitments.
However, in Salas, Jr., only parties to the Agreement, their assigns or heirs have the
right to arbitrate or could be compelled to arbitrate.The Court went further by declaring that in
recognizing the right of the contracting parties to arbitrate or to compel arbitration, the splitting
of the proceedings to arbitration as to some of the parties on one hand and trial for the others
on the other hand,or the suspension of trial pending arbitration between some of the parties,
should not be allowed as it would, in effect, result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure
and unnecessary delay.The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a
dispute. Clearly, the issue before us could not be speedily and efficiently resolved in its
entirety if we allow simultaneous arbitration proceedings and trial, or suspension of trial
pending arbitration.Accordingly, the interest of justice would only be served if the trial court
hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding.
Philrock, Inc.
vs.
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) and Spouses Vicente and Nelia Cid
G.R. 132848-49, June 26, 2001
FACTS:
The spouses Vicente and Nelia Cid purchased ready mix concrete from Philrock Inc.
The concrete delivered turned out to be of substandard quality. As a result, the spouses
sustained damages when the structures they built using such ready mix concrete developed
cracks and honeycombs.
Initially, the spouses filed suit for damages against Philrock and seven of its officers
and engineers with the Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case and
referred the case to the CIAC because the Cid spouses and Philrock Inc., had executed an
Agreement to Arbitrate with the CIAC.
At the CIAC, however, Philrock questioned the jurisdiction of CIAC over the 7 Philrock
officers and engineers arguing they were not signatories to the agreement to arbitrate. The
CIAC referred back the case to the RTC which, however, refused to reassume jurisdiction.
The spouses Cid opted to exclude the seven officers and engineers to pave the way for the
resumption of jurisdiction by the CIAC. The CIAC subsequently rendered judgment in favor of
the Spouses Cid directing the respondent Philrock to reimburse/refund the payments made
and awarded the Spouses Cid P50,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as nominal damages,
P50,000 as attorneys fees. Philrock elevated the CIAC decision to the Court of Appeals
contesting the jurisdiction of the CIAC and assailing the propriety of the monetary awards in
favor of the Spouses Cid. The Court of Appeals sustained the CIAC decision. Respondent
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the CIAC has primary jurisdiction over the case.
RULING : Yes
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in
the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with
construction contracts entered into by parties that have agreed to submit their dispute to
voluntary arbitrary. It ruled that after submitting itself to arbitration proceedings and actively
participating therein, petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
The Supreme Court sustained the award of actual damages. However, since actual
damages were proven and the Cids were amply compensated, the Supreme Court withdrew
the award for nominal damages. It also sustained the award of attorneys fees even if the
spouses represented themselves before the CIAC because they purportedly incurred litigation
expenses in pursuing their action before the CIAC, the Court of Appeals and also at the
Supreme Court.
postponing the availment of the Bid Documents and the submission of the comparative bid
proposals. Interested firms were permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal Documents
beginning June 28, 1996, upon submission of a written application and payment of a nonrefundable fee of P50,000.00 (US$2,000).
The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the proponent must
have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering,
design, construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project.The proponent would
be evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project, and its
capacity to secure external financing for the project. On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued
PBAC Bulletin No. 2 inviting all bidders to a pre-bid conference on July 29, 1996. On August
16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the Bid Documents.
out. Also, the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of latters
default grants PIATCO a financial advantage or benefit which was not previously made
available during the bidding process. The fact that substantial amendments were made on the
1997 Concession Agreement renders the same null and void for being contrary to public
policy. These amendments convert the 1997 Concession Agreement to an entirely different
agreement from the contract bidded out or the draft Concession Agreement.
The provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement constitute a direct government
guarantee which is prohibited by law. The fact that the ARCA superseded the 1997
Concession Agreement did not cure this fatal defect. It is clear that the ARCA provides for a
direct guarantee by the government to pay PIATCOs loans not only to its Senior Lenders but
all other entities who provided PIATCO funds or services upon PIATCOs default in its loan
obligation with its Senior Lenders. The proscription against government guarantee in any form
is one of the policy considerations behind the BOT Law. To declare the PIATCO contracts
valid despite the clear statutory prohibition against a direct government guarantee would not
only make a mockery of what the BOT Law seeks to prevent -- which is to expose the
government to the risk of incurring a monetary obligation resulting from a contract of loan
between the project proponent and its lenders and to which the Government is not a party to
-- but would also render the BOT Law useless for what it seeks to achieve - to make use of
the resources of the private sector in the financing, operation and maintenance of
infrastructure and development projects which are necessary for national growth and
development but which the government, unfortunately, could ill-afford to
finance at this point in time.
arbitrator had no
jurisdiction over the case and, assuming that he had, the complaint is dismissible for lack of
merit as petitioner was not illegally dismissedbitrator rendered an Award in favor of Apalisok.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the arbitrator. Respondents appealed
to the CA, ruling in their(respondents) favor. It held that the voluntary arbitrator did not have
jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint and accordingly nullified and set aside.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator had jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint
RULING: Yes
Petitioner, citing Article 262 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended which reads:
ARTICLE 262. JURISDICTION OVER OTHER LABOR DISPUTES. The Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall hear and decide all
other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.Her option not
to subject the dispute to the grievance machinery of RPN did not amount to her relinquishing
of her right to avail of voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling it for she and respondents in
fact agreed to have the dispute settled by a voluntary arbitrator when they freely executed the
above-said Submission Agreement. She thus concludes that the voluntary arbitrator has
jurisdiction over the controversy. Petitioner contends in any event that even assuming that the
voluntary arbitrator had no jurisdiction over the case, it would not be in keeping with settled
jurisprudence to allow a losing party to question the authority of the voluntary arbitrator after
it had freely submitted itself to its authority.
The above quoted Article 262 of the Labor Code provides that upon agreement of the
parties, the voluntary arbitrator can hear and decide all other labor disputes.Contrary to the
finding of the Court of Appeals, voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling the dispute was not
forced upon respondents. Both parties indeed agreed to submit the issue of validity of the
dismissal of petitioner to the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator by the Submission
Agreement duly signed by their respective counsels.As the voluntary arbitrator had jurisdiction
over the parties' controversy. The Supreme Court set aside the the Court of Appeals Decision
REINSTATED the voluntary arbitration Award.
agreement of the parties, Atty. Parlade designated Engr. Loreto C. Aquino to assist him in
assessing the technical aspect of the case.
The RTC of Manila then dismissed the case and transmitted its records to the CIAC.
After conducting hearings and two (2) ocular inspections of the construction site, the arbitrator
rendered judgment against petitioners(Spouses David).Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the arbitrators decision but deleted the award for lost rentals.
ISSUE:Whether or not CIAC has the jurisdiction over the case.
RULING: Yes
Executive Order No. 1008 entitled, Construction Industry Arbitration Law provided for
an arbitration mechanism for the speedy resolution of construction disputes other than by
court litigation. It recognized the role of the construction industry in the countrys economic
progress as it utilizes a large segment of the labor force and contributes substantially to the
gross national product of the country.Thus, E.O. No. 1008 vests on the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or
connected with construction contracts entered into by parties who have agreed to submit their
case to voluntary arbitration. Section 19 of E.O. No. 1008 provides that its arbitral award shall
be appealable to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the drawing on the letters of credit during the pendency of the arbitral
proceeding is proper.
RULING:
As a fundamental point, the pendency of arbitral proceedings does not foreclose resort
to the courts for provisional reliefs.The Rules of the ICC, which governs the parties arbitral
dispute, allows the application of a party to a judicial authority for interim or conservatory
measures.Likewise, Section 14 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 876 (The Arbitration Law)
recognizes the rights of any party to petition the court to take measures to safeguard and/or
conserve any matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration. In addition, R.A. 9285,
otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, allows the filing of
provisional or interim measures with the regular courts whenever the arbitral tribunal has no
power to act or to act effectively.
agreements,
FTAAs
or
permits
and
surface
owners,
occupants
and
disputes which raised question of facts or matters requiring the technical knowledge and
experience of mining authorities.
An agreement to arbitrate is a separate and distinct contract from the main contract.
Further a submission to arbitration is a contract. A clause in a contract providing that all
matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitration is a contract. The
provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the
parties is a part of that contract and is itself a contract. The doctrine of separability, or
severability as other writers call it, enunciates that an arbitration agreement is independent of
the main contract. The arbitration agreement is to be treated as a separate agreement and
the arbitration agreement does not automatically terminate when the contract of which it is
part comes to an end.The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially significant to
the determination of whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies the arbitration
clause. Indeed, the doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the main contract, also referred to as
the "container" contract, does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Irrespective
of the fact that the main contract is invalid, the arbitration clause/agreement still remains valid
and enforceable.
Philippines. On April 7, 1997, the parties executed, in Korea, an Amendment for Contract No.
KLP-970301 dated March 5, 1997 amending the terms of payment. The contract and its
amendment stipulated that KOGIES will ship the machinery and facilities necessary for
manufacturing LPG cylinders for which PGSMC would pay USD 1,224,000. KOGIES would
install and initiate the operation of the plant for which PGSMC bound itself to pay USD
306,000 upon the plants production of the 11-kg. Later PGSMC entered into a Contract of
Lease with Worth Properties, Inc. (Worth) for use of Worths 5,079-square meter property with
a 4,032-square meter warehouse building to house the LPG manufacturing plant. after the
installation of the plant, the initial operation could not be conducted as PGSMC encountered
financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials, thus forcing the parties to agree that
KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with the terms and conditions of the
March 5, 1997 contract. PGSMC informed KOGIES that PGSMC was canceling their Contract
dated March 5, 1997 on the ground that KOGIES had altered the quantity and lowered the
quality of the machineries and equipment it delivered to PGSMC, and that PGSMC would
dismantle and transfer the machineries, equipment, and facilities installed in the Carmona
plant. KOGIES filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PGSMC before the
Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court (RTC).
On May 30, 2000, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the RTC Orders
and dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by KOGIES. The CA found that the RTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed July 23, 1998 and September 21, 1998
Orders. Moreover, the CA reasoned that KOGIES contention that the total contract price for
USD 1,530,000 was for the whole plant and had not been fully paid was contrary to the
finding of the RTC that PGSMC fully paid the price of USD 1,224,000, which was for all the
machineries and equipment. According to the CA, this determination by the RTC was a
factual finding beyond the ambit of a petition for certiorari.
On the issue of the validity of the arbitration clause, the CA agreed with the lower court that
an arbitration clause which provided for a final determination of the legal rights of the parties
to the contract by arbitration was against public policy.
ISSUE: W/N the Arbitration clause is contrary to public policy.
RULING:
The arbitration clause which stipulates that the arbitration must be done in Seoul,
Korea in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the KCAB, and that the arbitral
award is final and binding, is not contrary to public policy. This Court has sanctioned the
validity of arbitration clauses in a catena of cases. In the 1957 case of Eastboard Navigation
Ltd. v. Juan Ysmael and Co., Inc., this Court had occasion to rule that an arbitration clause to
resolve differences and breaches of mutually agreed contractual terms is valid.
In BF
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that in this jurisdiction, arbitration has been held
valid and constitutional. Even before the approval on June 19, 1953 of Republic Act No. 876,
this Court has countenanced the settlement of disputes through arbitration. Republic Act No.
876 was adopted to supplement the New Civil Codes provisions on arbitration. And in LM
Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol Industrial Construction Groups, Inc., we declared
that:
Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling disputes, arbitrationalong
with mediation, conciliation and negotiationis encouraged by the Supreme Court. Aside
from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes, especially
of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the wave of the future in international civil and
commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between
the parties would be a step backward.
ISSUE: Whether or not a party in a voluntary arbitration dispute may avail of, directly in the
CA, a petition for review under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, instead of filing a petition to vacate the award in the RTC when the grounds invoked
to overturn the arbitrators decision are other than those for a petition to vacate an arbitral
award enumerated under RA 876.
RULING: The assigned errors reveals that the real issues calling for the CA's resolution were
less the alleged grave abuse of discretion exercised by the arbitrator and more about the
arbitrators appreciation of the issues and evidence presented by the parties. Therefore, the
issues clearly fall under the classification of errors of fact and law questions which may be
passed upon by the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner cleverly crafted its
assignment of errors in such a way as to straddle both judicial remedies, that is, by alleging
serious errors of fact and law (in which case a petition for review under Rule 43 would be
proper) and grave abuse of discretion (because of which a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
would be permissible).
Section 24 of RA 876 clearly provides that the RTC must issue an order vacating an
arbitral award only "in any one of the . . . cases" enumerated therein. Under the legal maxim
in statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the explicit mention of one thing
in a statute means the elimination of others not specifically mentioned. As RA 876 did not
expressly provide for errors of fact and/or law and grave abuse of discretion (proper grounds
for a petition for review under Rule 43 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, respectively)
as grounds for maintaining a petition to vacate an arbitral award in the RTC, it necessarily
follows that a party may not avail of the latter remedy on the grounds of errors of fact and/or
law or grave abuse of discretion to overturn an arbitral award.
Proper issues that may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 43 pertain to errors
of fact, law or mixed questions of fact and law. While a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
should only limit itself to errors of jurisdiction, that is, grave abuse of discretion amounting to a
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, it cannot be availed of where appeal is the proper
remedy or as a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
The remedy ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation availed of, entitled "alternative
petition for review under Rule 43 or petition for certiorari under Rule 65," was wrong. The
petition is DENIED.
arbitrators and referred the dispute to the arbitration committee to resolve the issue.
respondents violated the Milling Contract when they gave to independent planters who do not
belong to any association the 1% share, instead of reverting said share to the centrals.
Petitioners contended that respondents unduly accorded the independent Planters more
benefits and thus prayed that an order be issued directing the parties to commence with
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the milling contracts.
Petitioners, without
impleading any of their individual members, filed twin petitions with the RTC for Arbitration
under R.A. 87. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of cause of action
because petitioners had no milling contract with respondents. RTC denying the motion to
dismiss, declaring the existence of a milling contract between the parties, and directing
respondents to nominate two arbitrators to the Board of Arbitrators
ISSUE: WON sugar planters associations are clothed with legal personality to file a suit
against, or demand arbitration from, respondents in their own name without impleading the
individual Planters.
RULING:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 876 provides:
Sec. 2. Persons and matters subject to arbitration. Two or more persons or parties may
submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing between them at
the time of the submission and which may be the subject of an action, or the parties to any
contract may in such contract agree to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
between them. Such submission or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any contract.
The first step toward the settlement of a difference by arbitration is the entry by the parties
into a valid agreement to arbitrate. An agreement to arbitrate is a contract the relation of the
parties is contractual- and the rights and liabilities of the parties are controlled by the law of
contracts. In an agreement for arbitration, the ordinary elements of a valid contract must
appear including an agreement to arbitrate some specific thing and an agreement to abide
by the award either in express language or by implication.
It was decreed in B.F. Corporation v. CA that an arbitration agreement must be written
and subscribed by the parties thereto. None of the petitioners were parties or signatories to
the milling contracts. This is fatal to their cause since they anchor their right to demand
arbitration upon the arbitration clause on the milling contracts.
There is no legal basis for petitioners purported right to demand arbitration when they
are not parties to the milling contracts, especially when the language of the arbitration clause
expressly grants the right to demand arbitration only to the parties of the contract.
ISSUE: WON there is legal ground to vacate the Second Partial Award.
RULING:
On petition for review, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ruling that in
treating the letter of the claimant as an application for a partial award and in furnishing the
parties with a copy of Secomb's article - which favoured the claimant by advancing its cause the chairman acted with partiality. The Supreme Court adopted the reasonable impression of
partiality standard and held that the act of furnishing the parties with Secomb's article,
considering the attendant circumstances, was indicative of partiality such that a reasonable
individual would have to conclude that it was favouring the claimant. Even before the
issuance of the second partial award for the reimbursement of the advance on costs paid by
the claimant, the chairman exhibited strong inclination to grant such relief, notwithstanding his
earlier categorical ruling that the tribunal had no power under ICC rules to order the
respondent to pay the advance on costs sought by the ICC or to give the claimant any relief
against respondent's refusal to pay. Secomb's article, "Awards and Orders Dealing with the
Advance on Costs in ICC Arbitration: Theoretical Questions and Practical Problems", states:
"As we can see, the Rules have certain mechanisms to deal with defaulting parties.
Occasionally, however, parties have sought to use other methods to tackle the problem of a
party refusing to pay its part of the advance on costs. These have included seeking an order
or award from the arbitral tribunal condemning the defaulting party to pay its share of the
advance on costs. Such applications are the subject of this article."
According to the Supreme Court, by furnishing both parties with a copy of the article
(although purportedly done to assist both parties), the chairman provided the claimant with
supporting legal arguments. This bolstered the impression that the chairman was predisposed to grant relief to the claimant. The court found the chairman's act clearly violated
Article 15 of the ICC rules and declared that "in all cases, the Arbitration Tribunal shall act
fairly and in partiality and ensure that each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its
case". Comment In furnishing both parties with a copy of an article, and in providing both
parties the opportunity to submit their comments, the chairman did not act with partiality nor
did he pre-judge the issue. It is quite common, even in litigation, for a judge to call the
attention of both parties to certain rules or decisions which the parties may have omitted in
argument, and to ask them to comment on their applicability or pertinence in the resolution of
an issue. Such action by itself does not amount to partiality or pre-judgment.
Indeed, the tribunal may have furnished the article in an effort to guide the parties, shorten
proceedings and conduct the arbitration in an expeditious manner. After the issuance of the
second partial award (but before the Supreme Court issued its resolution), the same tribunal
rendered a final award in favour of the claimant. After the court confirmed and ordered
enforcement of the final award, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court refused to
stay or enjoin its enforcement.