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G.R. No.

107383
February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial,
rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner
of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion
to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages;
P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and
papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For
that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent,
ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only
ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers
(marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and,
therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other
things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the
documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of
the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains
that:
....
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from
using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the
said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness
and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner
Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence

against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under
oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence
against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her
husband's admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as
malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that
his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents
and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO
issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and
papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists.6Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to
the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 117740 October 30, 1998
CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO, CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and
ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1994,
finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners' extrajudicial partition of the decedent's estate.
The facts are as follows:
On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the
then Court of First Instance of Manila. In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792,
petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a
bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. On May 9, 1972,
petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,

and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the
true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa. On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de
Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.
Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late
mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530,
53671, and 64021. By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the
name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa
Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of
Carolina Abad Gonzales. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in
favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.
On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings
No. 86792. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this period,
their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. Private
respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad
with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the
exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
existence of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.
On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed
a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar
Tioseco. The trial court denied private respondents' motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but
allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.
Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671,
and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother's estate. Accordingly, on
October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by
petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of
TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said
properties.
After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;
(2) Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E.
Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal
heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed
to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria
Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that
may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during
the period they lived together as husband and wife;
(3) Denying the petition of decedent's collateral relatives, namely:
Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be
declared as heirs and excluding them from participating in the
administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;
(4) Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy
with a bond of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and
(5) Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all
property or properties, monies and such papers that came into his
possession by virtue of his appointment as administrator, which
appointment is hereby revoked. 1
The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter's motion for
annulment of certain documents. On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors' Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973
to be meritorious and accordingly
1. Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530,
53671 and 64021, all registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as

replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad,


TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No.
108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the
residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision,
Manila, to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;
2. Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445,
Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book of
Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales,
to be inexistent and void from the beginning;
3. Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671
and 64021 and issuance in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483
and 108484;
4. Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of
Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and
TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu thereof,
restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title in the name of
Ricardo Abad;
5. Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real
estate mortgages executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner
Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book
No. XX, Series of 1972, (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified
as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and (c)
Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doe. No. 144, Page No.
30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P.
Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the Register
of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from
the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and
6. Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife,
Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria
Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial court.
Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of time.
Because of this ruling, petitioners, instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of
Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R. On November 2, 1974, the appellate court
granted petitioners' petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latter's appeal. The trial
court, however, again dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was filed
out of time.
Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of
the trial court. On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed
out of time.
Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again
instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R.
No. SP-04352. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to
appeal to the Supreme Court. On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to
petitioners' appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents heirs of the
deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining
to the intestate estate of deceased.
The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court. On October 19, 1994,
the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of
merit. The orders of the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:

1. Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia,


Marian and Rosemarie, all surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural
children and the only surviving heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad;
2. Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six
(6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are
the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial partition of the
estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is
inexistent and void from the beginning, the cancellation of the
aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered
to restore and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in the name
of Ricardo Abad; and
3. Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa
Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed
out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitionerappellants.
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD,
MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED
RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
II. PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE
WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE
MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF
PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, submit the startling theory that
the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were
born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.
It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose
Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of
Cecilia and Marian. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim
that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The date of Jose Libunao's death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was
legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo
Abad's children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. Article 256, the applicable
provision of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. 4
To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua Institute
of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: engineer (mining)
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado 5
as well as Cesar Libunao's 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology,
which states:
Father's Name: Jose Libunao
Occupation: none
Mother's Name: Honoria Empaynado 6
Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were
accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so. These not being the case, they
conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.
Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos 7 stating that
to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and that
the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.

Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, 8 Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that
in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter
had become sterile as a consequence thereof.
With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate
children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria
Empaynado.
At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court's finding of facts.
It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. 9 Petitioners, however,
argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the
record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case. 10
This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.
First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least,
far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is "deceased" is not
necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished.
Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose
Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at that time, being merely
secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate would have been the best evidence as to
when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is
no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose
Libunao's death. More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain
Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria
Empaynado's first husband, the latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is
different. Jose Bautista Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao
was Honoria Empaynado.
As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient
existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the
advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and
e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. 12
Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the
finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners
conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be
sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And
the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by the
trial court:
In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed
out that: "The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as
stated in established precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law
would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if
death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a
patient should make to his physician. After one has gone to his grave, the living are not
permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light
communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.
Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by
the quantum of evidence required by law. On the other hand, the evidence presented by private
respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. We
quote with approval the trial court's decision, thus:
In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970,
and in all his individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969

and 1970, he has declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his
legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad
(Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).
xxx xxx xxx
In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years
old, and Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to
C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).
In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund account of P100,000,00
with the People's Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable
to either of them in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E). On January 5, 1971, Ricardo
Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable to his daughter
Marian (Exh. 37-A). On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had
(sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their
P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia,
under PBTC Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia
Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund intended for Cecilia was also
deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36). Ricardo Abad had also
deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his
daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has
(sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B). . .
With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are
precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable provisions are:
Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Emphasis supplied).
As to petitioners' claim that the properties m the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother
Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence presented by private
respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated earlier, the findings of
fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a
better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. 13 In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they
are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.
Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time. This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9,
1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time. Well-settled is the dictum that
the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and
Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Kapunan, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 179786


July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the production and submission in
court of the respondent husband's hospital record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one
of the issues is his mental fitness as a husband.

The Facts and the Case


On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 144 a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny
Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their
children to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed,
she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their
marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly
held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the
police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her
ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to
his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physicians handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following
up on this point, on August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnnys medical records when he was there confined.
The request was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by
subpoena duces tecum.2
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.
On September 13, 2006 the RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielenes motion. It also denied her
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA3 denied Josielenes petition. It ruled that, if courts were to allow the
production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant
disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The prohibition covers not
only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that,
although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to
his answer for the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.
Question Presented
The central question presented in this case is:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character
of the physician-patient communication.
The Ruling of the Court
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records of Johnnys
confinement, which records she wanted to present in court as evidence in support of her action to have their
marriage declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena, however, invoking the
privileged character of those records. He cites Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which
reads:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent
of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may
have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients
consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the
patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body,

enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any
fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired
between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.4
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as
the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physicians
testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patients
health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for
admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is
made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon
as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a
different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielenes request for subpoena duces tecum is premature.
She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnnys hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that
Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section
24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielenes motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant
prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or
any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of
making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as
are just. (Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed
are "not privileged."
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the
"testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states
that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding their
professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the
examination of the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital recordsthe results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patients records. Disclosing them
would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing
with the patient, without the latters prior consent.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been
confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering
that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene
invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible. When
part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of
the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary
to its understanding may also be given in evidence.1wphi1
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented
the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into
requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would
again be premature.
For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the
production in court of Johnnys hospital records.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17, 2007.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180643
March 25, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show
cause Letter1 dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order2 dated January 30, 2008 concurrently
issued by respondent
Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,3 Trade and Commerce,4 and
National Defense and Security5 against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract
with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16
Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People's Republic of China.
In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as follows:
(1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING
TO THE APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED
BY THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN GETTING IT CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE COURTS OF LAW THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE
FOR ANY ANOMALY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF
ANY IN THE BOT LAW AND OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATIONS.
(2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled RESOLUTION URGING
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE
CONTRACT
(3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
AWARDING THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM
ZHONG XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE
CORPORATION) WITH THE END IN VIEW OF PROVIDING REMEDIAL LEGISLATION THAT
WILL PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY.

10

(4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL
BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending
bills in the Senate, to wit:
1. Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT SUBJECTING
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING FUNDING IN THE
PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, GOODS, AND CONSULTING
SERVICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE
PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES;
2. Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT IMPOSING
SAFEGUARDS IN CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; and
3. Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled AN ACT
MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to
appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the
September 26 hearing, claiming he was "out of town" during the other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but,
on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be
financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege". In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,6 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,7 and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve.8
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The
pertinent portion of the letter reads:
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and
testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that
Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project, including his
conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time to
consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488
SCRA 1 (2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on the
following questions, to wit:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?

11

Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive
privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9,
2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the
exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to
the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of
conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in
the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the
confidentiality of her conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President,
he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing
the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented
11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing
questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November
2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22,
2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. The Letter reads:
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and
Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6,
Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
(Blue Ribbon).
The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus:
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with the task of
the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the
hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questions that were
asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and which was
confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after that
exhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only the three questions, where the
Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be
dispensed with.
Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up during the 26
September 2007 hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to what else I need to clarify, so that
as a resource person, I may adequately prepare myself.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among
others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his
conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible
loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of
petitioner's request that he "be furnished in advance" as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may
adequately prepare for the hearing.
In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioner's explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request
for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30,

12

2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office
of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said
Order states:
ORDER
For failure to appear and testify in the Committee's hearing on Tuesday, September 18, 2007;
Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007,
despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which
thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed the
inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily why he
should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L.
NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and
detained in the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear
and give his testimony.
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make a
return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.
SO ORDERED.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 9 He insisted that he has
not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to
testify on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance
notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According
to him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter "through the
issuance of declaration of contempt" and arrest.
In view of respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008
aSupplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to
restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order.
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees
from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing
prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees' show cause Letter and contempt Order were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his
conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to explore options in making
policy decisions." According to him, these discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials on the country's diplomatic relations and economic and
military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines." He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President
and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita10 and United States v. Reynolds.11Lastly, he
argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made
to him in official confidence under Section 712 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 2413 (e) of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner's testimony is material and
pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for petitioner
to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioner's arrest; and (4)
petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.
In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were ventilated:
1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the principle
of 'executive privilege'?
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege,
by order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in the exercise of her
executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China?
1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his
conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said
conversations "dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high government
officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the

13

Philippines" x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1
[2006])?
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of the
Constitution:
Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest)
Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern)
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed)
and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?
2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?
3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of petitioner for
non-compliance with the subpoena?
After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court within twenty-four (24) hours if
they are amenable to the Court's proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony
before the Senate Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators without prejudice to the
decision on the merits of this pending petition. It was understood that petitioner may invoke executive
privilege in the course of the Senate Committees proceedings, and if the respondent Committees
disagree thereto, the unanswered questions will be the subject of a supplemental pleading to be resolved
along with the three (3) questions subject of the present petition. 14 At the same time, respondent
Committees were directed to submit several pertinent documents.15
The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the Manifestation dated March 5,
2008. As to the required documents, the Senate and respondent Committees manifested that they would
not be able to submit the latter's "Minutes of all meetings" and the "Minute Book" because it has never
been the "historical and traditional legislative practice to keep them."16 They instead submitted the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of respondent Committees' joint public hearings.
On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on the following arguments:
(1) The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the principle of
"executive privilege."
(2) Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance with the lawmaking body's power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.
(3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-compliance with
theSubpoena dated November 13, 2007.
The Court granted the OSG's motion the next day, March 18, 2008.
As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No.
464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita17 when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:
First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order?
We grant the petition.
At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita18 becomes imperative. Senate draws in
bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied
under Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.

14

Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House
of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of
the state or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other,
they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the
power to conduct inquiriesin aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function. 19 Simply stated, while both
powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in
Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Court's
pronouncement inSenate v. Ermita20 is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is 'in aid of legislation' under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in this case has also been
settled inSenate v. Ermita, when it held:
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse
than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the
Court's certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Hence, this decision.
I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege
We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition
that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. 21 Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the
compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is
imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and
that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a
valid claim of executive privilege.22 This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a
recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
A- There is a Recognized Claim
of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the
United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of
Information Act23 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,24 the Philippines has retained its constitutional
origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the

15

case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In
this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermita's Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for
the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,25 and Chavez v. PEA.26 There
was never a mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,27 have comprehensively discussed the concept of
executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to
clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege.
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential
communications privilege.28 In United States v. Nixon,29 the U.S. Court recognized a great public
interest in preserving "the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the President's
performance of his official duties." It thus considered presidential communications as "presumptively
privileged." Apparently, the presumption is founded on the "President's generalized interest in
confidentiality." The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors
and to provide "the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in
the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately."
In In Re: Sealed Case,30 the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of
executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the
deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President
believes should remain confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated."
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications
privilege applies todecision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege,
to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation
of power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike
the deliberative process privilege, thepresidential communications privilege applies to documents
in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative
ones31 As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications
privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re: Sealed
Caseconfines the privilege only to White House Staff that has "operational proximity" to direct presidential
decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of
presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as "quintessential and non-delegable
Presidential power," such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to
grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the
power to negotiate treaties, etc.32
The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice33 tested the In Re: Sealed Case principles.
There, while the presidential decision involved is the exercise of the President's pardon power, a nondelegable, core-presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were deemed
to be too remote from the President and his senior White House advisors to be protected. The Court
conceded that
functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the President's pardon power, but
concluded that an organizational test was more appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that
would result from theIn Re: Sealed Case's functional test. The majority concluded that, the lesser
protections of the deliberative process privilege would suffice. That privilege was, however, found
insufficient to justify the confidentiality of the 4,341 withheld documents.
But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive privilege are made in older
cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military
or state secrets,34identity of government informers in some circumstances,,35 and information
related to pending investigations.36 An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign
relations. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.37 the U.S. Court, citing President George
Washington, pronounced:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on
secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands,

16

or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely
impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such
caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body was formed
confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of
Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a
negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v. PCGG38, this
Court held that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters." In Chavez v. PEA,39 there is also a recognition
of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully
discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief,40appointing,41 pardoning,42 and diplomatic43 powers. Consistent
with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements ofpresidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power."
2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in "operational
proximity" with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought "likely contains
important evidence" and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.44
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials" necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making
process" and, that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the People's Republic of China." Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate
to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.45 Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under
the "operational proximity" test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo's cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other
interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the
Constitution. The U.S. Court held:
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.

17

The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,46 where it was held that presidential
communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere
showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to
resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government "in the manner that preserves
the essential functions of each Branch."47 Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from
respondent Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in
the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight
function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled
that the "the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation." It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line
between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In
this regard, much will depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible
disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v.
Nixon48 that "demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial" outweighs the
President's "generalized interest in confidentiality." However, the present case's distinction with
the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is
requested and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that
the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to "limit the scope of its
decision." It stressed that it is "not concerned here with the balance between the President's
generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information." Unlike in
Nixon, the information here is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this
regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on
the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made.
Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or
sensitive national security secrets. In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims
executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive
and policy decision-making process and diplomatic secrets.
The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of matters which may present a
conflict of interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry if later on
an impeachment proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the present Senate inquiry.
Pertinently, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,49 it was held that
since an impeachment proceeding had been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate Select
Committee's immediate oversight need for five presidential tapes should give way to the House Judiciary
Committee which has the constitutional authority to inquire into presidential impeachment. The Court
expounded on this issue in this wise:
It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government,
invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations
by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. The Congress learned
this as to its own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as did the judicial branch, in a sense,
in Clark v. United States, and the executive branch itself in Nixon v. Sirica. But under Nixon v.
Sirica, the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turned,
not on the nature of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but,
instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the
material was sought, and the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment.
Here also our task requires and our decision implies no judgment whatever concerning
possible presidential involvement in culpable activity. On the contrary, we think the
sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend solely on whether the subpoenaed
evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's
functions.
In its initial briefs here, the Committee argued that it has shown exactly this. It contended that
resolution, on the basis of the subpoenaed tapes, of the conflicts in the testimony before it 'would
aid in a determination whether legislative involvement in political campaigns is necessary' and
'could help engender the public support needed for basic reforms in our electoral system.'
Moreover, Congress has, according to the Committee, power to oversee the operations of the
executive branch, to investigate instances of possible corruption and malfeasance in office, and

18

to expose the results of its investigations to public view. The Committee says that with respect to
Watergate-related matters, this power has been delegated to it by the Senate, and that to
exercise its power responsibly, it must have access to the subpoenaed tapes.
We turn first to the latter contention. In the circumstances of this case, we need neither deny that
the Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a general oversight
power, nor explore what the lawful reach of that power might be under the Committee's
constituent resolution. Since passage of that resolution, the House Committee on the Judiciary
has begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment. The investigative authority of the Judiciary
Committee with respect to presidential conduct has an express constitutional source. x x x We
have been shown no evidence indicating that Congress itself attaches any particular value
to this interest. In these circumstances, we think the need for the tapes premised solely on
an asserted power to investigate and inform cannot justify enforcement of the
Committee's subpoena.
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on
whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions.
There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand
jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee
is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the
predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability,
than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of
conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury
turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain
named individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one
of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need
for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original form, is
undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in the
circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been in the
Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments
has been substantially undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege violates
the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. 50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11)
hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of these
laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,51 Article 22952 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 3
(k)53 of R.A. No. 3019, and Section 24(e)54 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to
what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential55 and what our Constitution considers as
belonging to the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in
aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people's right to public information. The former cannot claim
that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people's right to information. The distinction between
such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public concern.
For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.

19

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information.
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a
right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they
do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be
balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those
pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of
careful review by numerous decided cases.
B- The Claim of Executive Privilege
is Properly Invoked
We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the
President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim
of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter." 56 A formal and
proper claim of executive privilege requires a "precise and certain reason" for preserving their
confidentiality.57
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that "this Office is constrained to invoke the
settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary
Neri accordingly." Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough
compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of "precise and certain reason," we find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not "to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged." The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that
an allegation be made "whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closeddoor Cabinet meetings, etc." The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even
intended to be comprehensive."58 The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People's Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President,
he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing
the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 59 the Congress must not require the executive to state
the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.
II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion
in Issuing the Contempt Order
Grave abuse of discretion means "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 60
It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated November
22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate
hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautista's letter, stating that his
non-appearance was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations
with President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an
expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he "be furnished in advance" copies of the
questions. Without responding to his request for advance list of questions, respondent Committees
issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering
his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would
appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing
respondent Committees that he had filed the present petition for certiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in view of
five (5) reasons.

20

First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers
from constitutional infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that
the invitations should contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry,"
along with "the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof." Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of
the Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of
Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send
him an advance list of questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees' January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that
only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the
deliberation. 61 Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides
that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness
before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to
answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members."
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who
did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a
cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. We quote the pertinent
portion of the transcript, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A). For clarification. x x x The Chair will call either a
caucus or will ask the Committee on Rules if there is a problem. Meaning, if we do not
have the sufficient numbers. But if we have a sufficient number, we will just hold a caucus
to be able to implement that right away becauseAgain, our Rules provide that any one
held in contempt and ordered arrested, need the concurrence of a majority of all members
of the said committee and we have three committees conducting this.
So thank you very much to the members
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A). May I recognize the Minority Leader and give him
the floor, Senator Pimentel.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is no problem, I think, with consulting the other
committees. But I am of the opinion that the Blue Ribbon Committee is the lead committee,
and therefore, it should have preference in enforcing its own decisions. Meaning to say, it
is not something that is subject to consultation with other committees. I am not sure that
is the right interpretation. I think that once we decide here, we enforce what we decide,
because otherwise, before we know it, our determination is watered down by delay and,
you know, the so-called "consultation" that inevitably will have to take place if we follow
the premise that has been explained.
So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Ribbon Committee should not forget it's the lead
committee here, and therefore, the will of the lead committee prevails over all the other, you,
know reservations that other committees might have who are only secondary or even tertiary
committees, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) Thank you very much to the Minority Leader. And I
agree with the wisdom of his statements. I was merely mentioning that under Section 6 of the
Rules of the Committee and under Section 6, "The Committee by a vote of a majority of all its
members may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the
Committee."
So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than willing to take that responsibility. But we only have
six members here today, I am the seventh as chair and so we have not met that number.
So I am merely stating that, sir, that when we will prepare the documentation, if a majority of all
members sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon rule wherein I do believe, if I am not
mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the documentation and then either in caucus or in session
asked the other members to sign. And once the signatures are obtained, solely for the purpose
that Secretary Neri or Mr. Lozada will not be able to legally question our subpoena as being
insufficient in accordance with law.

21

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution that the chair is suggesting is very well-taken. But
I'd like to advert to the fact that the quorum of the committee is only two as far as I remember.
Any two-member senators attending a Senate committee hearing provide that quorum, and
therefore there is more than a quorum demanded by our Rules as far as we are concerned now,
and acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as Senator Enrile pointed out. In any event, the signatures
that will follow by the additional members will only tend to strengthen the determination of this
Committee to put its foot forward put down on what is happening in this country, Mr. Chairman,
because it really looks terrible if the primary Committee of the Senate, which is the Blue Ribbon
Committee, cannot even sanction people who openly defy, you know, the summons of this
Committee. I know that the Chair is going through an agonizing moment here. I know that. But
nonetheless, I think we have to uphold, you know, the institution that we are representing
because the alternative will be a disaster for all of us, Mr. Chairman. So having said that, I'd like
to reiterate my point.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent with the intentions of
the Minority Leader. But let me very respectfully disagree with the legal requirements.
Because, yes, we can have a hearing if we are only two but both under Section 18 of the
Rules of the Senate and under Section 6 of the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee, there
is a need for a majority of all members if it is a case of contempt and arrest. So, I am simply
trying to avoid the court rebuking the Committee, which will instead of strengthening will weaken
us. But I do agree, Mr. Minority Leader, that we should push for this and show the executive
branch that the well-decided the issue has been decided upon the Sabio versus Gordon case.
And it's very clear that we are all allowed to call witnesses. And if they refure or they disobey not
only can we cite them in contempt and have them arrested. x x x 62
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published
rules of procedure." We quote the OSG's explanation:
The phrase 'duly published rules of procedure' requires the Senate of every Congress to publish
its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct
from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for onehalf of the Senate's membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each
term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by
the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
And fifth, respondent Committees' issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be
pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and
inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as "unsatisfactory" and
simultaneously issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his
readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because
he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first
rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of
peremptorily dismissing his explanation as "unsatisfactory." Undoubtedly, respondent Committees'
actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of
law. The same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioner's motion for
reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioner's
repeated request for an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to
which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with
utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity
of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.63 Respondent Committees should have exercised the same
restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch
of government.
In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been avoided if
powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of separation of
powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the government.
One last word.

22

The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required the parties to
consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise. The accusation is far from the truth. The
Court did so, only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases, to avoid
a piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to avert a constitutional crisis between the
executive and legislative branches of government.
In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co.,64 the court refrained from deciding the case because of its
desire to avoid a resolution that might disturb the balance of power between the two branches and
inaccurately reflect their true needs. Instead, it remanded the record to the District Court for further
proceedings during which the parties are required to negotiate a settlement. In the subsequent case
of United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co.,65 it was held that "much of this spirit of compromise is
reflected in the generality of language found in the Constitution." It proceeded to state:
Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary relationship to
one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather each branch should take cognizance of an
implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of
the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation.
It thereafter concluded that: "The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch
and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of government
that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of powers."
In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes once more that the basic principles of constitutional law
cannot be subordinated to the needs of a particular situation. As magistrates, our mandate is to rule
objectively and dispassionately, always mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes' warning on the dangers inherent in
cases of this nature, thus:
"some accident of immediate and overwhelming interestappeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will
bend."66
In this present crusade to "search for truth," we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles
which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary
interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and
supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent
unwarranted exercise of power. The Court's mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all
times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their
respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can
preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is
hereby nullified.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172835
December 13, 2007
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PENNSWELL, INC. Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation seeks, via the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the nullification of the 16 February 2006 Decision1 and the 25 May 2006 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329, which affirmed the Order3 dated 30 June 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 00-561.
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the
business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by Sales
Invoices No. 8846,4 9105,5 8962,6 and 8963,7 which correspond to Purchase Orders No. 6433, 6684,
6634 and 6633, respectively. Under the contracts, petitioners total outstanding obligation amounted
to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the

23

petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint8 for a Sum of
Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.
In its Answer,9 petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. In
particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for its
previous sale of four items, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by
respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had
previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which
merely altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner specifically identified the items in question,
as follows:
Label/Description

Item No.

Amount

P.O.

Date

1. a. Anti-Friction Fluid
b. Excellent Rust Corrosion
(fake)

MPL-800
MPL-008

153,941.40
155,496.00

5714
5888

05/20/99
06/20/99

2. a. Contact Grease
b. Connector Grease (fake)

COG #2
CG

115,236.00
230,519.52

5540
6327

04/26/99
08/05/99

3. a. Trixohtropic Grease
b. Di-Electric Strength
Protective Coating (fake)

EPC
EPC#2

81,876.96
81,876.96

4582
5446

01/29/99
04/21/99

4. a. Dry Lubricant
b. Anti-Seize Compound
(fake)

ASC-EP
ASC-EP
2000

87,346.52
124,108.10

5712
4763 &
5890

05/20/99
02/16/99 &
06/24/99

According to petitioner, respondents products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease,
Electric Strength Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid,
Contact Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner asseverated that had
respondent been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the
items complained of. Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a
conference was held between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed
that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner was
surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount
of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of respondents Complaint for Collection of a Sum of
Money against petitioner.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel10 respondent to give a detailed list of
the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.11 It appears that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine
Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondents
goods.
On 15 March 2004, the RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioners motion. It disposed, thus:
The Court directs [herein respondent] Pennswell, Inc. to give [herein petitioner] Air Philippines
Corporation[,] a detailed list of the ingredients or chemical components of the following chemical
products:
a. Contact Grease to be compared with Connector Grease;
b. Thixohtropic Grease to be compared with Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and
c. Dry Lubricant to be compared with Anti-Seize Compound[.]
[Respondent] Pennswell, Inc. is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to submit to [petitioner]
Air Philippines Corporation the chemical components of all the above-mentioned products for chemical
comparison/analysis.12
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to
disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what
petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to
divulge. Respondent maintained that its products are specialized lubricants, and if their components were

24

revealed, its business competitors may easily imitate and market the same types of products, in violation
of its proprietary rights and to its serious damage and prejudice.
The RTC gave credence to respondents reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June
2004, finding that the chemical components are respondents trade secrets and are privileged in
character. A priori, it rationalized:
The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299
SCRA 744, p. 764, that "the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that aside from
national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure."
Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and
privileged character, ingredients or chemical components of the products ordered by this Court to be
disclosed constitute trade secrets lest [herein respondent] would eventually be exposed to unwarranted
business competition with others who may imitate and market the same kinds of products in violation of
[respondents] proprietary rights. Being privileged, the detailed list of ingredients or chemical components
may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
expressly makes privileged information an exception from its coverage.13
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order
dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its
lubricants is to disregard respondents rights over its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that the
chemical formulation of respondents products and their ingredients are embraced within the meaning of
"trade secrets." In disallowing the disclosure, the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:
The Supreme Court in Garcia v. Board of Investments (177 SCRA 374 [1989]) held that trade secrets and
confidential, commercial and financial information are exempt from public scrutiny. This is reiterated in
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (299 SCRA 744 [1998]) where the Supreme
Court enumerated the kinds of information and transactions that are recognized as restrictions on or
privileges against compulsory disclosure. There, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that:
"The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) re also
exempt from compulsory disclosure."
It is thus clear from the foregoing that a party cannot be compelled to produce, release or disclose
documents, papers, or any object which are considered trade secrets.
In the instant case, petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] would have [respondent] Pennswell produce a
detailed list of ingredients or composition of the latters lubricant products so that a chemical comparison
and analysis thereof can be obtained. On this note, We believe and so hold that the ingredients or
composition of [respondent] Pennswells lubricants are trade secrets which it cannot be compelled to
disclose.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a proprietary or economic right over the ingredients or components of its
lubricant products. The formulation thereof is not known to the general public and is peculiar only to
[respondent] Pennswell. The legitimate and economic interests of business enterprises in protecting their
manufacturing and business secrets are well-recognized in our system.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information against the public. Otherwise, such
information can be illegally and unfairly utilized by business competitors who, through their access to
[respondent] Pennswells business secrets, may use the same for their own private gain and to the
irreparable prejudice of the latter.
xxxx
In the case before Us, the alleged trade secrets have a factual basis, i.e., it comprises of the ingredients
and formulation of [respondent] Pennswells lubricant products which are unknown to the public and
peculiar only to Pennswell.
All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
public respondent Judge in finding that the detailed list of ingredients or composition of the subject

25

lubricant products which petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] seeks to be disclosed are trade secrets of
[respondent] Pennswell; hence, privileged against compulsory disclosure. 14
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before us, on the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CHEMICAL
COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENTS PRODUCTS ARE TRADE SECRETS OR
INDUSTRIAL SECRETS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.15
Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and
ingredients of respondents products to conduct a comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner assails
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the matters are trade secrets which are protected by
law and beyond public scrutiny. Relying on Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, petitioner argues that
the use of modes of discovery operates with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of the trial
court. Furthermore, petitioner posits that its request is not done in bad faith or in any manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress respondent.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.16 The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value.17 A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information. 18 Generally, a trade secret is
a process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for example, a machine
or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list.19 It is indubitable that trade
secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a trade secret or similar
innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an injunction will be granted
to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the information "in confidence" or
through a "confidential relationship."20 American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors21 to
determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the
business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.22
In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 23 the issue was the
legality of an employees termination on the ground of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. The Court
laid down the rule that any determination by management as to the confidential nature of technologies,
processes, formulae or other so-called trade secrets must have a substantial factual basis which can
pass judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected the employers naked contention that its own determination as
to what constitutes a trade secret should be binding and conclusive upon the NLRC. As a caveat, the
Court said that to rule otherwise would be to permit an employer to label almost anything a trade secret,
and thereby create a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss an employee on the pretext that the
latter somehow disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact there be none at all to speak of.24 Hence, in
Cocoland, the parameters in the determination of trade secrets were set to be such substantial factual
basis that can withstand judicial scrutiny.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondents special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of
general manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares,
merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids,
alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others. It is
unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondents products proceed from a
formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants, respondent expended efforts,
skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be wrested from
respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioners defense against a collection for a sum

26

of money. By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients
constitute the very fabric of respondents production and business. No doubt, the information is also
valuable to respondents competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondents business, and to
place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondents lubricants are opened to
public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in
nothing less than the probable demise of respondents business. Respondents proprietary interest over
the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our
conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be revealed have a commercial value to respondent.
Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the information grants it a competitive advantage; we also find
that there is clearly a glaring intent on the part of respondent to keep the information confidential and not
available to the prying public.
We now take a look at Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect
documents or things upon a showing of good cause before the court in which an action is pending. Its
entire provision reads:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of documents
or things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of by any party upon a
showing of good cause therefor before the court in which an action is pending. The court may order any
party: a) to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, which are not
privileged;25 which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action; and which
are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon designated land or other property in
his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged.26 The documents
must not be privileged against disclosure.27 On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of privileged
matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged character, could not
be received in evidence.28 Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be specifically
described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in the partys possession, custody or control.
Section 2429 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit:
(a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c)
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e)
public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by
Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits. 30
We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding
of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary
rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords
to trade secrets is evident in our laws. The Interim Rules of Procedure on Government Rehabilitation,
effective 15 December 2000, which applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations,
partnerships, and associations pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A,31 as amended; and (2) cases
for rehabilitation transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the RTCs pursuant to

27

Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code, expressly provides that the
court may issue an order to protect trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information belonging to the debtor.32 Moreover, the Securities Regulation Code is explicit
that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required or authorized to require the revelation of
trade secrets or processes in any application, report or document filed with the Commission.33 This
confidentiality is made paramount as a limitation to the right of any member of the general public, upon
request, to have access to all information filed with the Commission.34
Furthermore, the Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to trade secrets under the following
articles:
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn
the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.
Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge,
employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner
thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of
the latter.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, has a
restrictive provision on trade secrets, penalizing the revelation thereof by internal revenue officers or
employees, to wit:
SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. - Any person who causes or procures an
officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding
the business, income or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the
discharge of his official duties, and which it is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes or
prints in any manner whatever, not provided by law, any income, profit, loss or expenditure appearing in
any income tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos (P2,000), or
suffer imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, or both.
Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990,
enacted to implement the policy of the state to regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation, manufacture,
processing, sale, distribution, use and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that present
unreasonable risk and/or injury to health or the environment, also contains a provision that limits the
right of the public to have access to records, reports or information concerning chemical
substances and mixtures including safety data submitted and data on emission or discharge into
the environment, if the matter is confidential such that it would divulge trade secrets, production
or sales figures; or methods, production or processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or
distributor; or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such
manufacturer, processor or distributor.35
Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this Court has declared that intellectual and industrial
property rights cases are not simple property cases.36 Without limiting such industrial property rights to
trademarks and trade names, this Court has ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual property are
intimately connected with economic development.37 The protection of industrial property encourages
investments in new ideas and inventions and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction of human
needs. It speeds up transfer of technology and industrialization, and thereby bring about social and
economic progress.38 Verily, the protection of industrial secrets is inextricably linked to the advancement
of our economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets.1wphi1 There is a
privilege not to disclose ones trade secrets.39 Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and
banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as
embodied in the Constitution.40 We said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed
that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant
to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure. 41
Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade
secrets of employers. For instance, this Court upheld the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical
company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company, on the
rationalization that the company has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing

28

strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors. 42 Notably, it was in a laborrelated case that this Court made a stark ruling on the proper determination of trade secrets.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 7743 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is
true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall
indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not
apply to respondent. Respondents specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -are not consumer products. "Consumer products," as it is defined in Article 4(q),44 refers to goods,
services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This
is not the nature of respondents products. Its products are not intended for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and
engines.
Petitioners argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the
disclosure of the active ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground. 45 Respondents products are
outside the scope of the cited law. They do not come within the purview of a drug 46 which, as defined
therein, refers to any chemical compound or biological substance, other than food, that is intended for use
in the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of disease in man or animals. Again, such are not the
characteristics of respondents products.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical
formulation of respondents products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both
courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such factual
findings are generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over
again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. 47 We need not delve into the factual
bases of such findings as questions of fact are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual
findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the
Supreme Court.48
We do not find merit or applicability in petitioners invocation of Section 1249 of the Toxic Substances and
Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, which grants the public access to records, reports or
information concerning chemical substances and mixtures, including safety data submitted, and data on
emission or discharge into the environment. To reiterate, Section 1250 of said Act deems as confidential
matters, which may not be made public, those that would divulge trade secrets, including production or
sales figures or methods; production or processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor,
or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or
distributor. It is true that under the same Act, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may
release information; however, the clear import of the law is that said authority is limited by the right to
confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or distributor, which information may be released only to a
medical research or scientific institution where the information is needed for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment of a person exposed to the chemical substance or mixture. The right to
confidentiality is recognized by said Act as primordial. Petitioner has not made the slightest attempt to
show that these circumstances are availing in the case at bar.
Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for
doing justice.51 We do not, however, find reason to except respondents trade secrets from the application
of the rule on privilege. The revelation of respondents trade secrets serves no better purpose to the
disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can
be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondents goods in trade in the normal course of
business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On
the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. If
we were to weigh the conflicting interests between the parties, we rule in favor of the greater interest of
respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive
economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public. 52 To the mind
of this Court, petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of confidentiality
which shields respondents trade secrets.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 February 2006, and the Resolution dated
25 May 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are AFFIRMED. No costs.

29

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131636
March 5, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ARTEMIO INVENCION Y SORIANO, appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us for automatic review1 is the Decision2 dated 22 September 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9375, finding accused-appellant Artemio Invencion y
Soriano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-year-old daughter
Cynthia P. Invencion, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay Cynthia the sum of
P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
Artemio was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape in separate
complaints docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9363 to 9375, all dated 17 October 1996. The cases were
consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief were Elven Invencion, Eddie Sicat,
Gloria Pagala, Dr. Rosario Fider, and Atty. Florencio Canlas. Presented as rebuttal witnesses were Gloria
Pagala and Celestino Navarro.
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife.
Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he was sleeping in one room with his father
Artemio, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries. Looking
towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a pumping motion. After about two minutes, his
father put on his short pants.3
Elven further declared that Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily
prohibited Cynthia from entertaining any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven
and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino Navarro.4
Eddie Sicat, a 40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac,
testified that on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by
the house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard somebody crying. He then peeped
through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of Artemios house. He saw Cynthia
lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a pumping motion. Eddie observed
them for about fifteen seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to catch fish. 5 He reported
what he had witnessed to Artemios stepfather, Celestino, later that morning. 6
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio, testified that she and
Artemio started living together in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law
relationship, they had six children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March 1982, she and Artemio parted
ways permanently. Later, Gloria and her children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemios mother died
sometime in 1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned by Celestino and
located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.7 On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that
Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition.
The latter confessed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to their daughter
Cynthia.8
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September
1996. She found Cynthia to be five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal
lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any
foreign body inserted in her private part.9
Atty. Florencio Canlas, an NBI agent, testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her
mother, complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her
father Artemio. She then executed a written statement, 10 which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty.
Canlas.11
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida,
took the witness stand and testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day
when he testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m., he and his secretary went to the
house of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and
its windows were shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on

30

the front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and
his children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside. 12 Atty. Salamida then
concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he declared having seen
what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the sawali wall of the house in
the early morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.
On rebuttal, Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live was a small hut with some
destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When she went there to visit her children sometime in December
1995, there was a hole in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot where people passed by
to fish in a nearby brook.13 When she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was
informed of Cynthias pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the huts sawali walls were
not yet repaired.14
The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro, stepfather of Artemio, testified that he is the owner of the
small house where Artemio and his children used to reside. At the time that Artemio and his children,
including Cynthia, were living in that house, the huts old sawali walls had some small holes in them, thus
confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was arrested on the basis of Cynthias complaint
before the NBI, Celestino made some repairs in the hut by, among other things, placing galvanized iron
sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls. Thereafter, a person named Alvin
occupied the house.15
In its Decision of 22 September 1997, the trial court convicted Artemio in Criminal Case No. 9375. It,
however, acquitted him in all the other twelve cases for lack of evidence.
In his Appellants Brief, Artemio contends that the trial court erred in
I
x x x BELIEVING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II
x x xNOT DISMISSING THIS CASE FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE [HIS]
GUILT x x x BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son,
should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.16 Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as
the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against
him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
In another attempt to cast doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, Artemio points to the
following inconsistencies in their testimonies: (1) as to the time of the commission of the crime, Elven
testified having seen Artemio on top of his sister one night in March 1996, while Eddie Sicat testified
having seen them in the same position between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. in the second week of March 1996;
(2) as to the residence of Cynthia in 1996, Gloria testified that the former was living with her in Guimba
from November 1995 to September 1996, while Elven and Eddie declared that she was in Sapang
Tagalog in March 1996; and (3) as to the residence of Artemio, Jr., Gloria stated that he was living with
the appellant, but later she declared that he was living with her in Pura.
Artemio also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was
impossible for Elven and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia. In his Reply
Brief, he likewise urges us to disregard the testimonies of rebuttal witnesses Celestino and Gloria.
According to him, Celestino had an ax to grind against him (Artemio) because he had been badgering
Celestino for his share of the lot where the hut stands, which was owned by Artemios deceased mother.
On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with another
man.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of Artemios
conviction and sentence, but recommends that a civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000 be awarded in
addition to the awards of moral and exemplary damages.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the culpability of Artemio.
It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the
witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This is so because
the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness
or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion, the sudden pallor of a discovered lie, the
tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer, the forthright tone of a ready reply, the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of

31

the solemnity of an oath, or the carriage and mien.17 This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as where
there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or misconstrued by the
court, or where the trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts. 18We do not find any of
these exceptions in the case at bar.
As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,19 otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant.20 The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father;
he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he
was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth." 21
Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section
10(c) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court22 expressly allows leading questions when the witness is a child of
tender years like Elven.
The alleged ulterior motive of Elven in testifying against his father also deserves scant consideration.
Such insinuation of ill-motive is too lame and flimsy. As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender
age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public trial had he not been compelled by a
motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters virtue. There is no indication that Elven
testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any showing that he was unduly
pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father. The rule is that where
there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence. 23
We find as inconsequential the alleged variance or difference in the time that the rape was committed,
i.e., during the night as testified to by Elven, or between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. per the testimony of Eddie.
The exact time or date of the commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a
rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved.
Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be
considered grounds for acquittal.24 In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed
as testified to by Elven and Eddie.
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of both Elven and Gloria do not impair the credibility of
these witnesses. We agree with the trial court that they are minor inconsistencies, which do not affect the
credibility of the witnesses. We have held in a number of cases that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
witnesses that refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy the witnesses credibility. 25 On the
contrary, they may even be considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on the
material points in the testimonies. What is important is that the testimonies agree on essential facts and
substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent whole.26
Artemios allegation that it was impossible for both Elven and Eddie to have seen and witnessed the
crime because the room was dark even at daytime was convincingly disputed by rebuttal witnesses Gloria
Pagala and Celestino Navarro. Furthermore, as observed by the OSG, even if the hut was without
electricity, Elven could not have been mistaken in his identification of Artemio because he had known the
latter for a long time. Moreover, Elven was at the time only two meters away from Cynthia and Artemio.
Even without sufficient illumination, Elven, who was jostled out of his sleep by Cynthias loud cry, could
observe the pumping motion made by his father.27
The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently proved. Nothing in the
records suggests any reason that would motivate Gloria to testify falsely against Artemio, who is the
father of her other children. Moreover, we have repeatedly held that no mother would subject her child to
the humiliation, disgrace, and trauma attendant to the prosecution for rape if she were not motivated
solely by the desire to have the person responsible for her childs defilement incarcerated. 28 As for
Celestino, he testified that the lot where the hut stands is owned by his daughter Erlinda, and not by
Artemios mother.29 At any rate, even without Celestinos testimony, Artemios conviction would stand.
The remaining issue for our resolution is the correctness of the penalty of death imposed by the trial
court. The death penalty was imposed because of the trial courts appreciation of the special qualifying
circumstances that Artemio is the father of the victim and the latter was less than 18 years old at the time
the crime was committed.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which is the governing law in this
case, pertinently reads:

32

Article 335. When and how rape is committed.


The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
To justify the imposition of the death penalty in a rape committed by a father on a daughter, the minority
of the victim and her relationship with the offender, which are special qualifying circumstances, must be
alleged in the complaint or information and proved by the prosecution during the trial by the quantum of
proof required for conviction. The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 9375 reads as
follows:
That on or about the month of March 1996 at Sapang Tagalog, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Artemio
S. Invencion did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by using force and intimidation
have carnal knowledge of his daughter Cynthia P. Invencion who was sixteen (16) years old, in
their house.
CONTRARY TO LAW.30
Although the relationship of Cynthia with her father Artemio was alleged in the complaint and duly
established by evidence during trial, the allegation in the complaint regarding her age was not clearly
proved.
In the very recent case of People v. Pruna,31 we set the guidelines in appreciating age either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented and offered in
evidence to prove Cynthias age. The statement in the medical certificate showing Cynthias age is not
proof thereof, since a medical certificate does not authenticate the date of birth of the victim. Moreover,
pursuant to Pruna, Glorias testimony regarding Cynthias age was insufficient, since Cynthia was alleged
to be 16 years old already at the time of the rape and what is sought to be proved is that she was then 18
years old. Moreover, the trial court did not even make a categorical finding on Cynthias minority. Finally,
the silence of Artemio or his failure to object to the testimonial evidence regarding Cynthias age could not
be taken against him.
It must be stressed that the severity of death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once
carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting

33

rules of procedure and evidence.32 Accordingly, in the absence of sufficient proof of Cynthias minority,
Artemio cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the death penalty. He should only
be convicted of simple rape and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the civil liability of Artemio, the awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000 are insufficient. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon
the finding of the fact of rape,33 should also be awarded. In simple rape, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall not be less than P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, in Criminal Case No.
9375 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that that accused Artemio Invencion y Soriano is held
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim Cynthia Invencion the sums of P50,000 as indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110107 January 26, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOLORES LORENZO Y CORSINO, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
For having allegedly killed her husband on 30 July 1990, accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo y Corsino, a
policewoman, was charged with the crime of parricide in an information 1 filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, on 30 March 1992. The information was docketed as Criminal Case No.
2060-92-TUG and raffled to Branch 5. The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows:
That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, PO1 Dolores C. Lorenzo, armed with a bolo and a
fan knife, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack and chop one, Agapito Lorenzo, her own husband,
inflicting upon him several injuries on the different parts of his body which caused his death.
That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was present.
After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 24 February 1993 2 its judgment finding the appellant guilty of
the crime of parricide and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of
the victim P50,000.00.
At the trial, the prosecution presented barangay captain Isabelo Liban and SPO1 Jose Eclipse as its
witnesses. The defense presented the appellant herself and Romeo Racheta. The versions of both the
prosecution and the defense are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The prosecution's evidence tells the following story:
Agapito Lorenzo and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in Looban, Barangay 12, Balzain,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Among their neighbors are Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta and
Robert Santos.
In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse of the Tuguegarao PNP Station was in Balzain,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan because that was his post for the night. At about a little past 10:00 o'clock that
evening, a tricycle driver went to Policeman Eclipse and reported to him a stabbing incident in said
Barangay 12;
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he met PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a
policewoman of his own Station who immediately surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife
and told him, "I killed my husband".
The two proceeded to where the victim was. In front of the store of Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban,
Policeman Eclipse saw Agapito sprawled on the ground with blood all over his body.
Policeman Eclipse called for Barangay Captain Liban to come out of his house. In the presence and within
the hearing of said barangay official, Policewoman Lorenzo again said, "I'm surrendering because I killed
my husband".
Policeman Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the lifeless body of Agapito Lorenzo to a
funeral parlor while he and Policewoman Lorenzo went to the Tuguegarao PNP Station. Policeman Eclipse
turned over Policewoman Lorenzo together with the bolo and knife to the Desk Officer, SPO3 Urbano
Aquino. Eclipse then orally made his report to the Desk Officer which was noted down in the Police Blotter.

34

The defense painted another picture of the incident. It's theory is that it was not Policewoman Lorenzo but
a certain Robert Santos who killed Agapito. Here is the defense's version of the incident.
In the afternoon of July 30, 1990, Agapito Lorenzo and his neighbor Robert Santos were in the former's
house passing the time over a bottle of beer grande. When Policewoman Lorenzo arrived home from work,
Agapito, in the presence of Robert Santos, met her with the following intemperate questions: "Your mother's
cunt, why do you arrive only now? Where did you come from? To avoid further scandal, Policewoman
Lorenzo just keep quiet, went to change her clothes and proceeded to the kitchen to prepare supper.
Finding nothing to cook, she asked permission from her husband to go to market.
Policewoman went to market and then immediately went back home to cook what she bought. While
cooking in the kitchen, she heard a heated exchange of words between Robert Santos and her husband in
the sala of their house pertaining to some bullets and a hand grenade which the latter gave Robert Santos.
Policewoman Lorenzo went to the sala to pacify the quarelling men only to meet Robert Santos running out
of the house with a bolo and being chased by Agapito Lorenzo who was holding a knife in his hand and
whose clothes were splattered with blood. When Agapito overtook Robert, a struggle for the possession of
the bolo ensued between the two men.
While wrestling, Agapito dropped his knife. Policewoman Lorenzo picked it up and tried to stab Robert with
it but she was so overwhelmed by nervousness that she collapsed into unconsciousness. Seconds later
on, she regained consciousness and found herself beside her dying husband.
Policewoman Lorenzo stood and picked up the knife and bolo. It was at this precise time when Policeman
Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident.
Policewoman Lorenzo gave the knife and bolo to Policeman Eclipse. The Policeman invited her to go with
him to the Tuguegarao PNP Station. She obliged. When the two arrived at the police station, Policeman
Eclipse, in the presence of Policewoman Lorenzo, reported to the Desk Officer that the latter killed her
husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her composure, she did not say anything. 3
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found nothing on
record which showed that their impartiality had been vitiated or compromised or that they had any motive
to falsely impute upon the appellant the commission of the crime. It further declared that when the appellant
surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that she killed her
husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing more was needed to prove her culpability. 4
The trial court held that the confession was admissible for it was not made in violation of paragraph 1,
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. 5 The appellant was neither under police custody nor under
investigation in connection with the killing of her husband.
The trial court rejected the story of the defense and characterized it as "palpably a put-up scenario . . . . [A]
story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails common sense." 6
First, accused Policewoman Lorenzo testified that it is not true that she confessed to Policeman Eclipse in
the presence of Barangay Captain Liban that she killed her husband. If her denial is true, why did she not
correct or even protest when Policeman Eclipse reported to the Desk Officer that she confessed having
killed her husband? Why did she not even try to correct the entry in the police blotter containing said
inculpatory report? On the contrary, by some inexplicable quirk, she even let the cat out when she presented
in evidence Exhibit "1".
Second, accused put forth the theory of her defense: it was not she but Robert Santos who did her husband
in. This theory is shot. If this is true, why did she not tell it to Policeman Eclipse and Barangay Captain
Liban at the scene of the crime? Why did she withhold such a very vital information when she was brought
to the Tuguegarao PNP Station shortly after the incident? But the biggest "why" is: Why did not the accused,
wife of the slain man and policewoman at that, file a criminal case against Robert Santos?
The accused's explanation was: she was still uncomposed when she turned over the knife and bolo to
Policeman Eclipse and even when she was in the police station. She did not also file a case against Robert
Santos because she found herself the suspect and later on the accused.
These reasons do not cut ice. They are for the birds. No one with an ordinary intelligence would buy such
reasons.
Third, the accused never filed a counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation of this case. Not that
a counter-affidavit is obligatory but that it afforded the accused the best opportunity to explain her innocence
and to identify the "real killer" of her husband. Why did she not grab this chance as normal people in the
same situation would have done?
Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. According to Policewoman Lorenzo, when she saw her
husband Agapito chasing Robert out of the house, Agapito's clothes were already bloodied. Since there is

35

no proof at all that Robert ever sustained any wound, the implication is that Agapito was already hacked
and stabbed by Robert inside the former's house.
It is therefore, difficult to believe that Agapito who already sustained several wounds could chase Robert
and even harder to imagine that he wrestled with Robert for the possession of the latter's bolo. But why,
it may be asked, should Agapito still try to divest Robert of his bolo when he (Agapito) was holding a knife
which he could have easily used against the latter during the alleged clinching between the two?
Finally, it is very unnatural for "assailant" Robert to have left his bolo before running away from the scene
of the crime. This is a concoction to provide an explanation for the possession of the accused of a knife
and a bolo.
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta are even at variance at a very vital point.
Thus, Policewoman Lorenzo said that when Agapito was able to overtake Robert in front of the store of
Barangay Captain Liban, the two struggled for the possession of the bolo of Robert. Witness Racheta
however said that when Agapito chased Robert, he caught up with him when he was already cornered.
When Robert could no longer run anywhere else, he turned around, faced Agapito and hacked and stabbed
him many times. Such inconsistency in the version of the two defense witnesses cannot but heighten one's
conviction that the defense theory is a conjured one. 7
The appellant appealed from the judgment to this Court and in her brief 8 contends that the trial court erred
in:
I. . . . GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ISABELO LIBAN
AND SPO1 JOSE ECLIPSE.
II. . . . NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT." 9
She discusses these jointly and, in support thereof, she asseverates that the testimonies of Liban and
Eclipse are inconsistent on material points, for while Liban declared in court and stated in his sworn
statement that he (Liban) came out of his house and heard the appellant confess to Eclipse that she killed
her husband, Eclipse testified that Liban did not come out of his house. One of them, she continues, did
not tell the truth and argues that a testimony on her alleged confession, which would be devoid of any
evidentiary value without corroboration.
She pleads that this Court discredit both Liban and Eclipse because the testimony of Liban was improbable
while that of Eclipse "was not so firm and resolute as to what was actually allegedly told him by the accused."
At one time, while testifying, he declared that the appellant told him that she "accidentally injured her
husband," but on another, he testified that the appellant told him that she "killed her husband." 10 Also, as
shown in the entry in the police blotter, 11 Eclipse was reported to have disclosed that the appellant
"voluntarily surrendered and asked him to bring her to the police station because she allegedly killed her
husband named Agapito Lorenzo, Jr. together with Robert Santos who first stabbed him"; yet, in his
testimony in court he pinned down only the appellant and mentioned nothing about Santos. Furthermore,
she charges the prosecution with suppression of evidence in not presenting as a witness another police
officer who Eclipse said accompanied him to the scene of the crime and who used a vehicle which they
rode in going to the police
station. 12
Meeting squarely the ratiocinations of the trial court in describing the story of the defense as a "probably
put-up scenario," the appellant asserts that it was error for the trial court to hold her failure to correct the
entry in the police blotter against her since there is nothing in the records which clearly shows that she
heard Eclipse making the report to the desk officer and that she saw the entry. The appellant also
contends that the trial court erred when it made capital of her alleged failure to file a criminal complaint
against Robert Santos since it was the police's duty to arrest and prosecute Robert Santos, Eclipse
having known of Robert Santos' killing of her husband. Besides, she was in detention all throughout and
suffering from trauma. She avers that the trial court erred when it held against her the failure to file her
counter-affidavit, since that was not obligatory and her non-filing was in accord with her constitutional
right to remain silent. Finally, she contends that the conclusions drawn by the trial court in its evaluation of
her testimony and that of her witnesses are mere speculations.
The appellee agrees with the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court and prays that the
challenged decision be affirmed.
The pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellant's arguments is the issue of the witnesses'
credibility. It is a well-entrenched rule that when such is the issue, appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the

36

question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. 13 The trial court has the singular opportunity to observe and consider certain
potent aids in understanding and weighing the testimony of witnesses, such as the emphasis, gesture,
and inflection of the voice of the witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these are not
incorporated into the record, the appellate court cannot avail of them and must therefore rely on the good
judgment of the trial court. 14 The appellant has not convinced us that the trial court plainly overlooked
proved facts or circumstances which, if considered, may affect the result of this case. We thus accept its
assessment of the evidence as correct and consider it binding, there being no showing that it was
reached arbitrarily. 15 Our own evaluation thereof yields no cause for the application of the exception to
the settled rule.
We agree with the trial court that prosecution witness SPO1 Jose Eclipse told the truth when he declared
under oath that the appellant surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him that
she killed her husband. Eclipse happened to be on his way to the scene of the stabbing incident which
was reported to him by a tricycle driver while he was in the performance of his official duty at his assigned
post in Barangay Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Eclipse and the appellant both belonged to the same
police unit, the PNP at the Tuguegarao station. There is nothing in the records, and more specifically in
the cross-examination of Eclipse and the direct examination of the appellant, which suggests, even
remotely, that Eclipse had any improper motive to implicate a fellow police officer in the commission of a
serious crime or the slightest bias against the appellant which would blemish his objectivity and
truthfulness.
If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant because of esprit de corps.
Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his official and public duty as a peace officer. It is
settled that the absence of evidence as to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion
that none existed and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature and
against the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify against the accused. 16
The appellant's emphasis on the inconsistency in the testimony of Eclipse as to what she actually told
him, i.e., that she "injured" her husband or "killed" him, is misplaced; the latter word was used when the
court asked him for the precise term used by the appellant. 17
Nor is there merit to the claim that Isabelo Liban's testimony must corroborate Eclipse's testimony or the
confession of the appellant since without such corroboration Eclipse's testimony would have no probative
value. This theory could only be a product of a misunderstanding of Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made
by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus
delicti.
Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the testimony of the person to
whom the confession is made, and the corroborative evidence required is not the testimony of another
person who heard the confession but the evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly required by
law, 18 the testimony of a single person, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court as to the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. 19 In determining the value and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. 20
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not question its presence
because she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established in this case. Corpus delicti is the body
(material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the
charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime
was committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a
man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the
act. Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not mean that every element of the crime charged
must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that
there should be some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession.
Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition
to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such
confession. Otherwise stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish the
corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. 21

37

Since the corroboration of Isabelo Liban's testimony was unnecessary, we need not discuss its intrinsic
merits, more especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a-vis the testimony of Eclipse which
inconsistencies we, nevertheless, find to be on minor matters. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility
because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 22
The claim of suppression of evidence has no merit. The testimony of the other policeman whom Eclipse
requested to get a vehicle could only be corroborative in some respects but not of the fact of the
surrender of the blood-stained bolo and fan knife and of the appellant's telling Eclipse that she killed her
husband since it was explicitly shown that he was with Eclipse at the precise time of the surrender. The
prosecutor and the defense counsel asked no further questions of Eclipse to elicit more on the presence
of the other policeman. In any event, even if the latter were present, his testimony would only be
corroborative. Furthermore, it has never been shown that the said policeman was not available to the
defense. The presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply when the testimony of the witness not
produced would only be corroborative, or when the said witness is available to the defense because then
the evidence would have the same weight against one party as against the other. 23
We do not, however, agree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's declaration that she
killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and
33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between an admission and a confession.
These sections reads as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or admission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 24 Wharton 25 defines
confession as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to
the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or
circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt.
Underhill 26 distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which
constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts acknowledged raise an
inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
While Wigmore 27 says:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of
the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it. 28
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible against the appellant and,
having been duly proved, together with the other facts and circumstances, the burden of the evidence
was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it,
to prove that she was not guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown, the trial court characterized her
story as "palpably a put-up scenario
. . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and assails common
sense." The five reasons enumerated by it to support this conclusion are founded on or are inferred from
facts duly established by the prosecution or are otherwise solidly based on common experience, logic,
and common sense.
The trial court had stated that if indeed the appellant never confessed to Eclipse that she killed her
husband, she should have protested when Eclipse reported to the desk officer that she had confessed to
the killing of her husband or she should have attempted to correct the entry in the police blotter containing
this inculpatory report. The appellant demonstrated her penchant for falsehood when, in order to refute
this statement, she asserted in her brief that nothing in the record clearly shows that she heard Eclipse

38

making the report and that she read the entry in the police blotter. She conveniently forgot that on crossexamination she admitted having heard Eclipse making the report but claiming that she did not protest
because she was not in her right senses and was in a state of shock at the time. Thus:
Prosecutor Saguncio:
Q Did the desk officer ever talk to you?
A No, sir.
Q So it was only PFC Eclipse who talked to the desk officer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Within your hearing and you heard PFC Eclipse talked to the desk officer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And what did PFC Eclipse report to the desk officer?
A The one that is appearing in the excerpt of the police blotter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Q When you said that you heard Pat. Eclipse reported to the desk officer you meant to say that you heard
him telling the police officer that you killed your husband Agapito Lorenzo, Jr. together with Robert Santos
who first stabbed him, is that not so?
A Yes, sir.
Court:
Proceed.
Pros. Saguncio:
Q You heard this and you did not make any comment?
A Yes, sir, but because at this time I was not in my right senses because I was then shocked at that time.
29

The appellant's failure to assert, at any part of the entire event, from the time she went with Eclipse to the
police station up to the time she was committed to jail and even thereafter until she took the witness
stand, that it was not she who killed her husband only serves to reinforce and strengthen this Court's
respect for the trial court's finding that her story that "it was not she but Robert Santos who did her
husband in, "is shot." We find it incredible that a peace officer and a wife of the victim would not forthwith
denounce or reveal the identity of the assailant if it were true that it was not she who killed her husband.
This Court has held that the testimony of the accused is not credible where he has adopted an attitude of
indifference relative to the crime he is accused of and where he failed to inform the police authorities and
the fiscal during the investigation that it was not he but somebody else who committed the murder. 30
Even granting for the sake of argument that the appellant only surrendered a blood-stained bolo and a fan
knife but did not admit that she killed her husband, we find in this case several circumstances whose
concordant combination and cumulative effect 31 point to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty party. These circumstances are the following:
1. A tricycle driver reported to Eclipse a stabbing incident and the latter immediately proceeded to where
it took place;
2. Eclipse met the appellant who had with her a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife;
3. The appellant surrendered to Eclipse the blood-stained bolo and the fan knife;
4. The appellant's husband lay dead nearby with nine chop wounds, thirteen stab wounds, and nine
incised wounds on different parts of his body, with abrasions and multiple contusions as well; 32
5. Eclipse accompanied the appellant to the police station and, in her presence, the former reported to the
desk officer that she surrendered to him and told him that she had killed her husband; the desk officer then
entered this report in the police blotter;
6. Although the appellant heard the report, she did not protest to Eclipse or except to the report; and
7. The appellant never asked the police authorities to investigate Robert Santos for his complicity in the
killing of her husband; despite the unhampered opportunities for her to denounce Santos as the alleged
killer of her husband, she implicated Santos only when she testified on 21 January 1993, 33 or after the
lapse of nearly two and one-half years after the incident.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. The requirements then of Section
4, Rule 133 34 of the Rules of Court on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant
are present. 35
To be appreciated in the appellant's favor, however, is the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

39

The penalty for parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death, which
are both indivisible penalties. In the light of the mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty which should
be imposed upon the appellant should be reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Rule 3, Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The challenged decision is then in accordance with the facts and the applicable laws.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in
Criminal Case No. 2060-92-TUG is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 144293
December 4, 2002
JOSUE R. LADIANA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the
accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation.
However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation,
even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 10, 2000
Decision1 and August 4, 2000 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No.
16988. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, sentencing
the said accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum[;]
(b) suffer all the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Francisco San Juan, in the total amount of Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P56,500.00); and (d)
pay the costs."3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan in an Information 4 dated August
5, 1991. However, the anti-graft court issued an Order5 dated October 14, 1991, noting that "besides the
allegation that the crime was allegedly committed by the accused while he was taking advantage of his
official position, nothing else is in the Information to indicate this fact so that, as the Information stands,
nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest jurisdiction [in] this Court over the accused and over the
crime for which he is charged."
Further, the Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show adequate facts
to vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Subsequently, an Amended Information,6 still
charging petitioner with murder, was filed on April 1, 1992. The accusatory portion reads as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then
a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station,
Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his
jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was
removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of
vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of
persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has
no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and sho[o]t Francisco San Juan
with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby
causing the death of Francisco San Juan."7
During his arraignment on May 8, 1992, petitioner, assisted by his counsel de parte, 8 pled not
guilty.9 After due trial, the Sandiganbayan found him guilty of homicide, not murder.
The Facts

40

In their Memoranda, both the prosecution and the defense substantially relied upon the Sandiganbayans
narration of the facts as follows:
"The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely: Caridad M. San Juan, PO2 Leopoldo Cacalda, Dr.
Rogelio M. Javan, SPO2 Percival A. Gabinete, and Maria T. Cortez. Their respective testimonies, in
essence are as follows, to wit:
"1. CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN (hereinafter, Caridad) declared that she is the wife of
Francisco San Juan (hereinafter Francisco), the victim in the case at bar. Caridad testified that
Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, until he was shot and
killed by accused Ladiana, who happens to be also a distant relative of the decedent.
"Caridad recounted that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her house when an
unidentified woman came and told her that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana.
She immediately called up her sister-in-law before rushing to Jacinto Street where the
gruesome incident allegedly transpired. Thereat, many people were milling around, and
Caridad saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying in the middle of the road and being
examined by [SPO2] Percival A. Gabinete.
"Caridad recalled that it was around 11:00 oclock a.m. when she reached the place of
the subject incident. At that point in time, she was not even allowed by the police to
touch, much less get near to, the cadaver of Francisco. Caridad, expectedly, was crying
and one of her aunts advised her to go home.
"Caridad maintained that she was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana
because this was what the woman actually told her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had
given himself up to the police authorities.
"Caridad went on to narrate that, on December 30, 1989, she was at the police station,
where she gave her written statement before police investigator PFC Virgilio Halili
(hereinafter, Halili).
"Additionally, Caridad presented the Death Certificate of her husband and testified that
he was eventually buried at the Lumban Cemetery. She declared that she had incurred
about Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for the funeral, burial and other incidental
expenses by reason of the death of Francisco.
"On cross-examination, Caridad testified that, on December 29, 1989, she was in her
house and that she did not hear any gunshot between 10:30 and 11:00 oclock a.m.
Caridad also admitted she did not witness the killing of her husband.
"On questions propounded by the Court, Caridad narrated that her husband suffered two
gunshot wounds - one on the upper right temple and the other on the left cheek.
However, Caridad stated that she was told that the wounds were the entry and the exit
points. She also told the Court that her husband was wearing short pants at the time of
his death and that she found some bruises on his knees.
"Finally, Caridad recalled that, on the date of the incident, her husband was with his close
friend, a certain Rodolfo Cabrera, and some other persons, and that they went to Jacinto
Street to repair the steel humps which were used to block the street during school days
for the protection and safety of the school children.
"2. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. (hereinafter, CACALDA) declared that he is a
policeman assigned at the Lumban Police Station in Lumban, Laguna. He has been designated
as the radio operator of the station since 1989.
"Cacalda recounted that, on December 29, 1989, at around 11:00 oclock a.m.,
somebody, whose name he could no longer recall, reported to him about an existing
trouble along Jacinto Street in Barangay Salac Cacalda responded by going to the scene,
where he was accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. Thereat,
Cacalda saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying face up on the road. Cacalda did not
examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when [SPO2] Percival A.
Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived.
"Cacalda had gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco that it was
accused Ladiana who shot and killed Francisco. Cacalda immediately left to look for
accused Ladiana. However, he eventually saw accused Ladiana already inside the jail of
the police station and thereafter learned that said accused had surrendered to the police
authority.

41

"Cacalda recalled that he was later on investigated by Halili because he was the
responding policeman who went to the scene of the incident. Consequently, Cacalda
executed a written statement in relation to the subject incident.
"On cross-examination, Cacalda testified that he was a radio operator and not an
investigator of the police station. He also testified that he did not witness the incident
subject matter of the case at bar.
"Cacalda went on to testify that the people milling around the place of the incident told
him that accused Ladiana had already left. Because of this development, Cacalda
proceeded to accused Ladianaa house but was told that he had already gone to the
police station. Cacalda accordingly went to the police station where he saw accused
Ladiana already locked inside the jail. He also saw a stab wound on accused Ladianas
right bicep but he did not anymore ask him how he sustained the said injury.
"3. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA (hereinafter, Javan) declared that he is a physician and
the Municipal Health Officer of Lumban, Laguna.
"Javan recounted that he was the one who performed the necropsy on the cadaver of
Francisco and that he had prepared the corresponding reports and/or documents relating
thereto. Javan made a sketch representing the anterior and posterior views of the body of
Francisco, and labeled and placed red markings on the gunshot wounds found on the
said cadaver. The marking Gunshot wound A is the point of entry, which is one (1)
centimeter in diameter and situated two (2) inches behind the left ear. The marking
Gunshot wound B is the point of exit of Gunshot wound A, which is two (2) centimeters
in diameter and found above the right cheekbone and one (1) inch below the right eye.
Javan also testified that there is another gunshot wound and the point of entry and exit
are labeled as Gunshot wound C and Gunshot wound D, respectively. Gunshot wound
D is one and one-half (1-1/2) centimeters in diameter and located at the left cheek, three
and one-half (3-1/2) centimeters below the left eye, while Gunshot wound C is one (1)
centimeter in diameter and found at the right lateral aspect of the neck, at the level of the
adams apple.
"According to Javan, the assailant must be behind the victim when he inflicted Gunshot
wound A. As regards Gunshot wound C, the assailant likewise must be behind the
victim, at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches away.
"Lastly, Javan testified that he was not able to retrieve any bullet during the examination.
However, judging from the size of the wound and the point of entry, Javan opined that the
firearm used was probably a caliber 38.
"On questions propounded by the Court, Javan testified that Gunshot wound A could
have been fired first because the trajectory is on the same level so much so that the
assailant and the victim could have been both standing. Javan inferred that Gunshot
wound C could have been inflicted while the victim was already falling down. Javan then
stressed that both wounds are fatal in nature.
"4. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE (hereinafter, Gabinete) declared that he is a
police officer and a resident of No. 4055 Villa Josefina Subdivision, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
"The testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the
defense that he was part of the group of policemen who proceeded to the place of the
subject incident and that he found the body of Francisco lying along the road.
Additionally, the defense admitted the existence of the receipt issued by Funeraria de
Mesa dated January 3, 1990 in the sum of Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P6,500.00).
"5. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ (hereinafter, Cortez) declared that he is a retired Assistant
Prosecutor of Laguna.
"Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an
admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the
counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez.
In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on
Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was
then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab
wound on the arm of accused Ladiana.

42

"However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally,
Cortez testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in
the said counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and
identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counteraffidavit.
"After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and
rested its case.
"On May 31, 1995, this Court issued a resolution admitting all the documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution.
"On August 20, 1996, accused Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer
to Evidence dated August 16, 1995, claiming that: (i) a review of the documentary and
testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution allegedly failed to show that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged; (ii) at best, the evidence submitted by the
prosecution are allegedly hearsay in character, considering that the supposed eyewitness
in the person of Rodolfo Cabrera was never presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution
was allegedly merely able to prove the fact of death of the victim, but not the identity of
the person who caused said death.
"On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order of even date holding that the filing of a
demurrer to evidence is no longer appropriate considering that accused Ladiana received
a copy of this Courts resolution dated May 31, 1995 on the admission of the
prosecutions documentary exhibits as early as May 25, 1995.
"On September 2, 1996, in view of his perception that the evidence submitted by the
prosecution is allegedly inadequate to sustain a conviction, accused Ladiana, through
counsel, waived his right to present controverting evidence. Instead, he asked for time to
file a written memorandum. Thus, both parties were given time within which to do so,
after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
"Thereafter, this Court received on October 25, 1996 by mail the Memorandum for the
defense. As for the prosecution, it opted not to file any."10 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit,11 in which he had admitted to having
fired the fatal shots that caused the victims death,12 may be used as evidence against him. It
underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity and the
voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.13 In short, it ruled that the document had
sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim. However, it found no evidence of
treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.14
Hence, this Petition.15
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
"I. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may convict the accused-petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide even in the absence of any eyewitness who personally saw the
sho[o]ting of the victim by the accused, basing it only on the testimony of the prosecutor who had
administered the oath on the Counter-affidavit filed by petitioner-accused.
"II. Whether or not the prosecution has presented proof beyond reasonable doubt to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused and his right against self-incrimination
on the basis of the Counter-affidavit whose execution was admitted by the counsel of the
petitioner, but not by the accused personally.
"III. Whether or not the Counter-affidavit of the accused-petitioner which was considered by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision as similar to an extrajudicial confession may [be] admitted against
him as evidenc[e] of guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if he was not assi[s]ted then by counsel
and while he was under custodial investigation.
"IV. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is constitutionally and legally correct in issuing the Order
of August 23, 1996 denying the Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated
August 16, 1995 filed by the accused in accordance with Sec. 15 of Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure in relation to Rule XXI of the Revised Rules of Sandiganbayan.

43

"V. Whether or not accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which
fact was admitted by the prosecution as it even used the same as proof of the guilt of the
accused."16
In short, petitioner raises the following questions in this appeal: (1) whether the Counter-Affidavit he
executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the
crime, (2) whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to
Evidence, and (3) whether he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Counter-Affidavit
Undeniably, the resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the CounterAffidavit17 submitted by petitioner during the preliminary investigation. He argues that no counsel was
present when the Affidavit was executed. In support of his argument, he cites the Constitution thus:
"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him."18
It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only
to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations. 19 Indeed, the rights
enumerated in the constitutional provision "exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody
interrogation of accused persons."20
Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.21
In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary
investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and
independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations.
We disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 22
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be
considered as being under custodial investigation. In fact, this Court has unequivocally declared that a
defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. 23 It explained as
follows:
"His [accused] interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended
at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence, with
respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutors
office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under custodial interrogation laid down by
the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under
custodial interrogation."24
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his
Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts that it
was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional
rights of a person under custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the 1987
Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor -- unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include: 1) the right to
refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such
refusal; 3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; and 4)
while testifying, the right to refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some
crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.25

44

We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit as


an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
"SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact
not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which
one is charged.26Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act
charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession.27
The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the
latter was attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:
"[K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt
upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking
pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na
siya ay tinamaan;"28
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latters
death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense.
Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence
against him.
Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted it to the
public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court
how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his
defense.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by
mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular,
not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. 29 Yet,
petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them
unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight
against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.30
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has admitted to the
authorship, the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. We quote verbatim the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan:
"PJ GARCHITORENA
Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was your client
who took the oath before the Fiscal at the preliminary investigation?
ATTY. ILAGAN
We will admit that, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the voluntariness
of the execution of the counter-affidavit dated July 31, 1990? Companiero?
ATTY ILAGAN
Admitted, your Honor."31
The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. To be sure, the unbroken
stream of judicial dicta is that, in the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions of their
counsels, save when the latters negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the former are
deprived of their day in court.32 Also, clients, being bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot
complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had their lawyers proceeded
differently.33 A counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of
evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or
pieces of evidence, or the manner of arguing the case. This Court, however, has ruled several times that
those are not even proper grounds for a new trial, unless the counsels incompetence is so gross that the
clients are prevented from fairly presenting their case.34
Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was
justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor.35 Petitioner should have relied on the

45

strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be
weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. 36
Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he
could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. As discussed earlier, the
declarations contained in his Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against
him.37 The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised the theory of self-defense,
because this argument had already been laid out in his Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary,
because the admission was clear and unequivocal.
Neither do we believe petitioners claim that the anti-graft court "miserably failed to give equal effect or
treatment to all the allegations found therein (Counter-Affidavit) choosing deliberately and without
reasonable basis the parts which are incriminating in character, and ignoring without sufficient legal basis
the exculpatory assertions of the accused."38
The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are utterly
insufficient to discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. It is hornbook doctrine
that self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.39 It cannot be
entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is also doubtful. 40 The
question whether the accused acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by
the lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan.41
By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense enumerated in the
law.42Had petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and cogent
evidence to prove those elements. But, as found by the court a quo, he not only failed to discharge the
burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to
present any evidence at all.43 So, we do not see how the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its
treatment of his Counter-Affidavit.
Verily, if the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of any other
circumstance that eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his
admission of the killing.44 Upholding this principle does not in any way violate his right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty. When he admitted to having killed the victim, the burden of proving his
innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful
justification for the killing.
Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime
charged.45As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact of death and its
cause were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the
Certificate of Death,46 the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination47 and the Medico-Legal Findings.48 The
intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.49
Second Issue:
Denial of Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
Petitioner then argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in not giving due course to his Motion for Leave to
File Demurrer to Evidence. He brands this denial as legally and constitutionally wrong. 50
We disagree. Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. 51 And, unless
there is grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial courts resolution
may not be disturbed.52
Final Issue:
Voluntary Surrender
After vigorously arguing against his own Counter-Affidavit, petitioner, in a surprising change of tenor,
implores this Court to consider his voluntary surrender to the police authorities as a mitigating
circumstance. He argues that two of the prosecution witnesses testified that he had surrendered to the
police authorities after the shooting incident.53To buttress his argument, he contends that the "main
reason for his voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally justified in defending
himself as a policeman when he fought the victim after he was attacked by the latter." 54 It goes without
saying that this statement only reaffirms the admissions contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so
vehemently tried to discredit.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender
has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters
agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary.55 To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made

46

in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they
acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be
incurred in searching for and capturing them.56
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are
statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people that he
had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that
when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any
finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the killing.1wphi1
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to report the
shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be
deemed to have voluntarily surrendered.57 In the absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the
existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate
petitioners penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112983 March 22, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL, and RENE SAGVAMAIJTE (at large), Accused, HECTOR MAQUEDA
@ PUTOL, Accused-Appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
As against a bustling city life, Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his
Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the metropolis
of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba, Benguet. Perhaps they
thought they were in a veritable paradise, beyond the reach of worldly distractions and trouble when in
the early morning of 27 August 91, in the, sanctity of their own home, Horace was brutally slain and
Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima facie evidence
pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victimsformer houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the That illusion
was shattered ghastly crime.
As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the
information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries 1 filed on 19 November 1991 with
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.
Only Richard Malig was arrested On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard Malig, the
prosecution filed a motion to amend the information 2 to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda
alias Putol because the evaluation Of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in
the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the Prosecutor further asked that accused
Richard Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no
sufficient evidence against him. 3
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda
were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9 April 1992, he filed an
application for bail. 4He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State
witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
On 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations 5 with only Salvamante and Maqueda as
the accused. Its accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 27th Of August, 1991, at Tagadi; Upper Tadiangan Municipality of
Tuba, Province Of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the, above-named accused, Conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, armed with lead pipes, and with intent of gain and against the will and consent of
the owners thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house
of Spouses TERESITA and WILLIAM HORACE BARKER and with violence against and
intimidation of the persons therein ransack the place and take and carry away the
following articles, to ,it:
[An enumeration and description of the articles follow]

47

all having a total value of TWO HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (P204.250.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to, the said Teresita and William
Horace Barker; that on the occasion and by reason of the said robbery; both accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously repeatedly strike Teresita Barker and William Horace
Barker with lead pipes on the different Parts of their body, leading to the death of William
Horace Barker and inflicting various physical injuries on the former which required
medical attendance for a period of more than thirty (30) days and have likewise
incapacitated her from the performance of her, customary labor for the same period of
time.
Contrary to Law.
Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded entered a
plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992. 6
In its decision 7 Promulgated on 31 August 1993, the trial Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical Injuries and sentenced him to Suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the
death of William Horace Barker, court found accused Hector P41,681,00 representing actual expenses,
P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs."
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and
Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor Daniel
Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its
evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Accused Hector
Maqueda took the witness stand and presented SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief and
Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness.
The version of the prosecution, as culled from the trial court's detailed and meticulous summary thereof,
is as follows:
Between 10:30 and 11:00 pm. of 26 August 1991, the spouses Horace William Barker and Teresita
Mendoza Barker repaired to their bedroom after Teresita had checked, as washer wont, the main doors of
their house to see if they had been locked and bolted.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the following day, 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp of the Barkers who
shared a room with her cousin and fellow househelp, Julieta Villanueva, got up, opened the door to the
garage, went to the lavatory to wash her face, and proceeded to the toilet. When she opened the door of
the toilet and switched. on the light, she saw Rene Salvamante. She knew Salvamante very well because
he and his sister Melanie were the former househelps of the Barkers whom she and Julieta Villanueva
had replaced and because Salvamante had acquainted her on her chores.
Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she Was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and
she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified
at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free from Salvamante, Norie fled towards the garage and
shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.
Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the
door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants with 'his right hand brandishing a lead
pipe standing two meters in front of her. At the trial, She pointed to, accused Maqueda as the man she
saw then. (She got scared and immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if someone
was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it and shouted for help.
The shouts awakened Teresita Mendoza Barker. She rose from her bed and went out of the room,
leaving behind her husband who was still asleep; She went down the Stairs and proceeded t, the dining
room. She saw Salvamante and a companion who was a complete stranger to her. Suddenly the two
rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipes. Despite her pleas to get what they want and not to
hurt her, they continued to beat her up until she lost consciousness. At the trial, she pointed to accused
Maqueda as Salvamante's companion.
Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at theback of her right hand. She fell to the
concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After a few
seconds, ,he went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta.
Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw that the door
knob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering. While
locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough,

48

that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water
flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs.
At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, 27 August 1991, Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting
shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of
the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he
and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing
thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder
Speaking in Tagalog, the taller man asked Mike and Mark whether the road they were following would
lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for
Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men bearded it,
Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right
hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he bearded it. In the Investigation
conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the
hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man.
At 9:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991, Norie and Julieta gathered bough courage to leave the room where they
had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In
the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the
house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they
returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier. They just stayed
near the road.
Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio City
Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the
City Health Department, also arrived. The team conducted an initial investigation only because it found
out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which, however, was
difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker
house and Cambod prepared a sketch (Exhibit "JJ") showing its location.' They went around the house
and found a lead pipe (Exhibit "AA") at the toilet, a black T-shirt (Exhibit "CC"), and a green hand towel
(Exhibit "DD"). He also discovered another lead pipe (Exhibit "BB") at the back of the door of the house.
He then interviewed the two househelps who provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team
then left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod prepared a
report of his initial investigation (Exhibit "KK").
Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry
scattered on the floor and an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the house,
particularly at the riprap wall, and observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone had passed
through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba, Benguet. Upon his
request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the Barker house to secure the premises.
Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival.
At 5:00 p.m. of that same day, members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at theBarker house to
conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker
house.
The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the Baguio
City Police were first brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, and then to the court.
The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio
City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, MunicipalHealth Officer of Tuba, Benguet. H,
found in it twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the
cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate (Exhibits "P," "O," and "R").
The wounded Teresita Barker was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where she
was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first
saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that
she sustained multiple lacerations primarily an the left side of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear,
and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regained
consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that Mrs. Barker's injuries were caused by a
blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left unattended, she would
have died by noontime of 27 August 1991 due to bleeding or hemorrhagic shock.

49

On 1 September 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station, Benguet, came to the hospital bed of
Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had
assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the
investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to conduct it
without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover, her
eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double vision.
On 3 September 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged from
the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She requested
Glen Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP (Exhibit "U"). The Tuba PNP gave
them to Enriquez (Exhibit "V"). Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio cassette recorder
(Exhibit "W-3"), and some pieces of jewelry (Exhibit "W-2") were missing. The aggregate value of the
missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these missing items (Exhibit "X.).
Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City. It was revealed that she
sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. she then sought treatment at
the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York (Exhibit "L") where she underwent an unsuccessful
operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical Center (Exhibit "M").
On 29 November 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, Executive Vice President of the BCF, ordered Glen Enriquez
to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the, whereabouts of accused
Rene Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain,
Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in September 1991; however,
they already left the place.
On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, Melanie Mendoza, and three others went back to Guinyangan to find
out whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Barangay Captain Requeron
that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol"
returned to Guinyangan,
On 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol," who is none other
than accused Hector Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran,
Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, Proceeded to Guinyangan. The
Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the
Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the. headquarters of the
235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio
F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to
him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay (Exhibit "LL") wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house on 27
August 1991.
On 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "GG-6"). He
stated therein that "he is willing and volunteeringto be a State witness in the above entitled case, it
appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk
with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27
August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor
Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused
on trial (Exhibit "II").
In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of Prosecutor Zarate and obtained permission
from the latter to talk to Maqueda. Salvosa then led Maqueda toward the balcony. Maqueda narrated to
Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor;
Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof
that Salvamante revealed to him that his zeal purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he
initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house,
one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed; then
Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe providedhim by
Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had
followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went
upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of
jewelry.

50

Maqueda further divulged to Salvosa that they then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked
toward the road where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a passenger
jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two Persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and
Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked until
they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for Manila. 8
Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. Hi, testimony is summarized by the trial
court in this wise:
Accused Hector Maqueda denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that O"
August 27, 1991 he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located at Lot
1, Block 21 Posadas Bayview Subdivision, Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. He was
employed as a caretaker Since July 5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to
August 27, 1991, It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. A,
caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the employees in the factory and whenever his
employer was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all
Sleep inside the factory.
On August 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that
day. He slept inside the factory that night and on August 27, 1991, he was teaching the
new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron.
On December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon Province as it
was his vacation time from his job at the polvoron factory. He was to be back at work
after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, Quezon, he
saw accused Rene Salvamante. He knows accused Salvamante as they were childhood
playmates, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him
that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each other. He again saw accused
Salvamante after Christmas day on the road beside their (Salvamante) house.
Salvamante invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon Province and roam around. He agreed
to go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose Maqueda who resided at Sabangdos,
Calauag, Quezon. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda
to accompany him /Salvamante) in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from
Baguio City. Accused Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio as the latter's
mother told him about it. They were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's
aunt. They had their meal and then went to visit accused Maqueda's brother. After that
occasion, he never saw accused Salvamante again. After his Christmas vacation, he
went back to work a the polvoron factory until February 29, 1992. One of his co-workers
Roselyn Merca, who was a townmate of his asked him to accompany her home as she
was hard up in her work at the factory. Hence, he accompanied Rosely home to
Guinyangan, Quezon. He was supposed to report back for work on March 2, 1992 but he
was not able to as he was arrested by members of the CAGFU at the house of Roselyn
Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail,
then to the Tuba Police Station, Tuba, Benguet. There he was told to cooperate with the
police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He
was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamante, he would be freed and he
could also become a state witness: He told them that he could attest to the fact that he
accompanied accused Salvamante in selling the cassette recorder.
On March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet
where he has remained under detention up to the present. 9
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda Castience and
SP03 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where Maqueda worked, testified
that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired
Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights
before Maqueda was investigated and that Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang
Salaysay (Exhibit "LL"). 10
Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita
Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this
matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on
circumstantial evidence. It stated thus:

51

Since we have discarded the positive identification theory of the prosecution pinpointing
accused Maqueda as the culprit, can we still secure a conviction based on the confession
and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on circumstantial evidence?
In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence, the
following requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than One circumstance; 2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People
vs. Pajarit, G.R. No. 82770, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678). There must be an
unbroken chain of circamstances which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author of the crime (People
vs. Abuyen, G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992, 213 SCRA 569).
The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused
are:
1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer any
objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could well and
easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it produced a
resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that accused Maqueda could
have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.
2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the
company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only prosecution
witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had to ask for directions
from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were strangers to the place
3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they from
the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established that he
Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went out together during the
Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied Salvamante in selling the black
radio cassette recorder.
4. His Motion to Grant Bail (Exhibit "HH") contains this statement that he is willing and
volunteering to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in appearing
that he is the least guilty along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial confession trade
to the police at Although he claims that he did not his signature would lean his as he was
just told that release from detention, this is a flimsy excuse which cannot Had he not
understood what the motion meant, he could have easily asked his sister and brother-inlaw what it meant seeing that their signatures up already affixed on the motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that
fateful morning and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa as to what
he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to already bloster the
increasing circumstances against the accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak
defense and easy of fabrication (People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, October 19,
1992, 214 SCRA 712). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that the
accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People
vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, October 29, 1992, 215 SCRA 247). This defense easily
crumbles down as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce the
needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty of the
crime. 11
The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit: "LL") of Maqueda taken by
SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested.
Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction. In his 14-page brief, he pleads that we acquit him
because the trial court committed this lone error:
. . . IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 12
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are anchored on
his alibi that at the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro

52

Manila, ad the failure of the star witnesses for the Prosecution to identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker,
when investigated at the hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and
that when initially investigated, the two housemaids gave a description of Salvamante's companion that
fitted Richard Malig.
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing.
The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that
Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, were not
able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and
the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his attention
and arguments on these.
From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession
the Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor
Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an
extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. There is a distinction between. the former
and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which read as
follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or
of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. 13 Wharton distinguishes a
confession from an admission as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his
guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts,
to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and
is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. 14
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for
conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken without the
assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had already benefited in
court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the court, the
Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial investigation. Hence, Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
is not applicable, 15 i.e., the police investigation was " no longer within the ambit of a custodial
investigation." It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson 16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a
person under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial
court went on to state:
At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no
longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a
witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet,
despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still
confessed when he did not have to do so. 17
The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the
aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since

53

voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and,
hence, theSinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court
admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of
the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. It said:
In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the
tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People
vs. Fule, G.R. No. 83027, February 28, 1992, 206 SCRA 652). 18
While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had
been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no
longer Has] the right to remain silent End to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then there would be a
hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive
application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III
of the Constitution,
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1),
Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an
offense." The direct and primary source of this Section 12(1) is the second paragraph of Section 20,
Article II of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right . . .
The first sentence to which it immediately follows refers to the right against self-incrimination reading:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
which is now Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The incorporation of the second paragraph of
Section 20 in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 constitution was an acceptance of the landmark doctrine laid
down by the united States Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona. 19 In that case, the Court explicitly
stated that the holding therein "is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles
long recognized and applied in other settings." It went on to state its ruling:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly
stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can
be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he
may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to a questioned. 20
It may be pointed out though that as formulated in the second paragraph of the aforementioned Section
20, the wordcustudial, which was used in Miranda with reference to the investigation, was excluded. In
view thereof, in Galman vs. Pamaran, 21 this Court aptly observed:
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by
having it inserted between the words "under" and "investigation," as in fact the sentence

54

opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the
entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.
Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by
making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in
custody. 22 Accordingly, as so formulated, the second paragraph of Section 20 changed the rule adopted
in People vs. Jose 23 that the rights of the accused only begin upon arraignment, Applying the second
paragraph of Section 20, this Court laid down this rule in Morales vs, Enrile: 24
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the first sentence requires the arresting officer to inform the person to be arrested of the reason
for the arrest and show him "the warrant of arrest, if any." The underscored phrase simply means that a
case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court
had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. From the foregoing, it is clear that the right to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under the second paragraph of Section 20 are available
to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense.
This paragraph was incorporated into Section 12(1), Article III of the present Constitution with the
following additional safeguards: (a) the counsel must be competent and independent, preferably of his
own choice, (b) if the party cannot afford the services of such counsel, he must be provided with one, and
(c) the rights therein cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Then, too, the right to be heard would be a farce if it did not include the right to counsel. 25 Thus, Section
12(2), Article III of the present Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In People vs. Holgado, 26 this Court emphatically
declared:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
shall be-held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by
counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires and he is
poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly
limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint
or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to
counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities and other law enforcement
agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they
had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are
supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel.

55

Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue
of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer
must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, 27 and since the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer Or law enforcement agency to
investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless,
he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the
jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno after the former's arrest was taken in
palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As disclosed by a
reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The
statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly
inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution which reads:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand
on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights..
Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but
in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was
given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government,
declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and
that government has the duty to protect; 28 or restriction on the power of government found "not in the
particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind
the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited. 29 They are the fundamental safeguards against
aggressions of arbitrary power, 30 or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of
the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships
between individuals. 31
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence
against the former Under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs; People, 32 this Court
held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in
evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it.
The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By
analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions.
To be added to Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly
.stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing
that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a
state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond
moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even if we
disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled
by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances were
duly proved in this case:
(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after
the crime in question was committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie
Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime;
(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the
place sometime in September 1991;
(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least
guilty."
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;

56

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e.
the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 33 We
do not hesitate to rule that all the requisites of Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court are present in
this case.
This conclusion having been reached, the defense of alibi put up by the appellant must fail. The trial court
correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 34 Through the unrebutted
testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established
that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad,
Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible
for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed.
Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron
factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he started working on 5 July
1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision Of
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Of Benguet in Criminal Case, No.91-CR-1206 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.
SO ORDERED,
G.R. No. L-28237 August 31, 1982
BAY VIEW HOTEL., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
KER & CO., LTD., and PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD., defendants-appellees.
Mariano V. Ampil, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.
Alfonso Felix, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
&
TEEHANKEE, J.:
This appeal was originally brought before the Court of Appeals but was certified to this Court pursuant to
the appellate court's resolution of October 13, 1967 since it involved purely questions of law.
Sometime in January, 1958, plaintiff-appellant Bay View Hotel, Inc., then the lessee arid operator of the
Manila Hotel, secured a fidelity guarantee bond from defendant-appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., for its
accountable employees against acts of fraud and dishonesty. Said defendant-appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., is
the Philippine general agent of Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. a foreign corporation duly licensed to do
insurance business in the Philippines.
When one of the bonded employees, Tomas E. Ablaza, while acting in his capacity as cashier, was
discovered by plaintiff-appellant to have had a cash shortage and unremitted collections in the total
amount of P42,490.95, it filed claims for payments on the said fidelity guarantee bond but defendantappellee Ker & Co. denied and refused indemnification and payment. To enforce its claims, plaintiffappellant instituted its complaint, dated August 30, 1965 docketed as Civil Case No. 63181 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
In its answer, defendant-appellee Ker & Co. justified its denial of the claims of plaintiff-appellant on
various reasns, such as non-compliance with the conditions stipulated in the insurance policy; nonpresentation of evidence regarding the various charges of dishonesty and misrepresentation against
Tomas E. Ablaza and non-production of the documents to prove the alleged loss. Ker & Co. likewise
averred that it was merely an agent and- as such it was not liable under the policy.
On June 22, 1966, counsel for Ker & Co. filed a request for admission, furnishing plaintiff-appellant's
counsel with a copy thereof requesting admission of the following facts: 1wph1.t

57

1. On February 14, 1967, the Bay View Hotel, Inc., applied to the Phoenix Assurance
Co., Ltd., for a fidelity guarantee bond through a proposal form, a true copy of which is
annexed to our answer as Annex "A" thereof.
2. Such a policy was actually issued on January 22, 1958 by the Phoenix Assurance Co.,
Ltd., in favor of the Bay View Hotel, Inc., and was renewed from time to time with
amendments. A true copy of the policy as it finally stood at the time of the alleged
defalcation is annexed to our answer as Annex 'B ' thereof.
3. This claim filed by the Bay View Hotel, Inc., under this policy was denied on behalf of
the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd., by a letter dated 18th June, 1965 sent by registered
mail to the Bay View Hotel, Inc. on June 22, 1965. A true copy of this letter of denial is
annexed to the present request as Annex "C" hereof. "
When plaintiff-appellant failed to make any answer to the request for admission within the period
prescribed by the rules, defendant-appellee Ker & Co. filed a Motion to Dismiss on Affirmative Defense,
dated July 6, 1966, insisting that since under Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, plaintiff-appellant was
deemed to have impliedly admitted each of the matters enumerated in the request for admission, it
followed that the proper party in interest against whom plaintiff-appellant might have a claim was the
principal Phoenix Assurance Co. (Phoenix) and not the agent Ker & Co.
Plaintiff-appellant filed an opposition, dated July 19, 1966 arguing that the proper remedy, under the
circumstances was not to dismiss the complaint but to amend it in order to bring the necessary or
indispensable parties to the suit. Defendant-appellee Ker & Co. filed a reply to the opposition reiterating
its stand that since it merely acted as an agent, the case should be dismissed and plaintiff-appellant
should file the necessary action against the principal Phoenix.
On August 1, 1966, plaintiff-appellant filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, attaching
copy of the complaint, as amended, this time impleading Phoenix as party defendant. On August 16,
1966, defendants- appellees filed their joint answer to the amended complaint. Again, Ker & Co., Ltd.,
argued that it was merely an agent and therefore not liable under the policy. On the other hand, Phoenix,
averred that under Condition 8 of the insurance policy, plaintiff-appellant was deemed to have abandoned
its claim in view of the fact that it did not ask for an arbitration of its claim within twelve (12) months from
June 22, 1965 the date of receipt of the denial of the claim.
On August 24, 1966, defendants-appellees filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court
granted in its decision of November 4, 1966, ordering the dismissal of the case. After denial of its motion
for reconsideration, plaintiff-appellant filed the present appeal, raising the following assignment of
errors: 1wph1.t
I
The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in extending the legal
effects, if any, of the request for admission filed by Ker & Co., Ltd. to the Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd., which was not a party-defendant at the time said request was filed
and for whom no similar request was ever filed.
II
The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in giving legal effects to a
request for admission by the defendant-appellee under the original complaint after the
said original complaint was, with leave of court, amended.
III
The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that "Condition
No. 8 of the Policy No. FGC-5018-P requires that should there be a controversy in the
payment of the claims, it should be submitted to an arbitration" despite the admissions by
the parties and the established fact that Condition No. 8 of said Policy No. FGC-5018-P
provides for Arbitration if any dispute shall arise as to the amount of company's liability."
IV
The lower court erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for
Summary Judgment and dismissing the complaint.
The first two errors assigned may be taken jointly. Plaintiff-appellant argues that since the implied
admission was made before the amendment of its complaint so as to include Phoenix, it follows that
Phoenix has no right to avail of these admissions, and that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in extending to Phoenix the legal effects of the request for admission filed solely by Ker & Co.

58

The argument is untenable, Admission is in the nature of evidence and its legal effects were already part
of the records of the case and therefore could be availed of by any party even by one subsequently
impleaded. The amendment of the complaint per se cannot set aside the legal effects of the request for
admission since its materiality has not been affected by the amendment. If a fact is admitted to be true at
any stage of the proceedings, it is not stricken out through the amendment of the complaint. To allow a
party to alter the legal effects of the request for admission by the mere amendment of a pleading would
constitute a dangerous and undesirable precedent. The legal effects of plaintiff- appellant's failure to
answer the request for admission could and should have been corrected below by its filing a motion to be
relieved of the consequences of the implied admission with respect to respondent Phoenix.
Moreover, since an agent may do such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose
of the agency, admissions secured by the agent within the scope of the agency ought to favor the
principal. This has to be the rule, for the act or declarations of an agent of the party within the scope of
the agency and during its existence are considered and treated in turn as the declarations, acts and
representations of his principal 1 and may be given in evidence against such party.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that since the motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of defendantappellee Ker & Co. alone, there was no motion for summary judgment as far as Phoenix was concerned
and the trial court's decision dismissing the case should not have included the principal Phoenix.
But the motion for summary judgment was filed after the complaint had been amended and answer
thereto had been filed. The issues, therefore, with respect to Phoenix had already been likewise joined.
Moreover, a reading of the said motion for summary judgment, more particularly the prayer thereof,
shows that Phoenix did join Ker & Co. in moving for the dismissal of the case and prayed "that the
present action be dismissed as against Ker & Co., Ltd., because being purely and simply the agent of the
insurer, it is not liable under the policy and as against the Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. because by failing
to seek an arbitration within twelve months from the date of its receipt of the denial of its claim on June
22, 1965, plaintiff Bay View Hotel, Inc., is deemed under condition 8 of ,, tie policy, to have abandoned its
claim against said defendant phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd."
The main issue raised by plaintiff-appellant is with respect to Condition No. 8 of the insurance policy,
photostatic copy of which was submitted to the trial court and reproduced as follows: 1wph1.t
If any dispute shall arise as to the amount of company's liability under this Policy the
matter shall if required by either party be to the decision of two neutral persons as
arbitrators one of, whom shall be named by each party or of an umpire who shall be
appointed by the said arbitrators before entering on the reference and in case either party
or his representative shall neglect or refuse for the space of two months after request in
writing from the other party so to do to name an arbitrator the arbitrator of the other party
may proceed alone. And it is hereby expressly agreed and declared that it shag be a
condition precedent to any right of action or upon this Policy that the award by such
arbitrators, arbitrator or umpire of the amount of the loss shall first be obtained. The costs
of and connected with the arbitration shag be in the discretion of the arbitrators, arbitrator
or umpire. 2
Plaintiff-appellant maintains that Condition No. 8 of the policy provides for arbitration only "if any dispute
should arise as to the amount of company's liability" consequently, the reference to arbitration is not a
condition precedent to the filing of the suit contrary to the insurer company's posture. Plaintiff-appellant
points out that in the instant case, there is a total and complete negation of liability. There is no dispute as
to the amount of company's liability because this presupposes an admission of responsibility although not
to the extent of the cost thereof, while here the insurer denies liability wholly and totally.
We find in favor of plaintiff-appellant. The provisions of Condition No. 8, more specifically the portion
thereof which reads, "if any dispute shall arise as to the amount of company's liability under this policy ...,"
do not appear to require any extended interpretation. Condition No. 8 requires arbitration only as to
disputes regarding the amount of the insurer's liability but not as to any dispute as to the existence or
non- existence of liability. Thus, Condition No. 8 comes into play only if the insurer admits liability but
cannot agree with the insured as to the amount thereof and cannot be invoked in cases like that at bar
where the insurer completely denies any liability. Defendants-appellees' contention that plaintiffappellant's failure to request arbitration proceedings is a bar to its filing of the suit at bar against the
insurer company cannot be sustained, specially considering the established principle that contracts of
adhesion such as the insurance policy in question are to be strictly construed in case of doubt against the
insurer.

59

As to appellee Ker & Co., Ltd., however, there appears to be no serious contradiction as to the fact that it
merely acted as the agent of its principal, Phoenix. Considering that there was full disclosure of such
agency since the insurance policy was actually issued by Phoenix, We find no error in the dismissal of the
case against said defendant Ker & Co., Ltd.
Accordingly, the dismissal of the case against Ker & Co., Ltd., is hereby affirmed and maintained, while
the dismissal of the case against Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd. is hereby set aside and the case is
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and determination on the merits. No costs.
Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Separate Opinions
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur in the resolution of the issues in regard to the respective liabilities of Ker & Co., Ltd. and Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd. However, I do not subscribe to the view expressed in the following paragraph of the
main opinion: 1wph1.t
Moreover, since an agent may do such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment
of the purpose of the agency, admissions secured by the agent within the scope of the
agency ought to favor the principal. This has to be the rule, for the act or declarations of
an agent of the party within the scope of the agency and during its existence are
considered and treated in turn as the declarations, acts and representations of his
principal and may be given in evidence against such party.
The authority cited for this view, to wit, Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, reveals that the same
is being justified under one of the recognized exceptions to the rule of res inter alios acta. To my mind,
this rule of evidence finds no application herein.
Section 26 of Rule 130 allows the admission against the principal of any act or declaration of the agent
within the scope of his authority during its existence. It has no reference to a principal using in his favor
an admission secured by the agent from a third party. In the case at bar, Phoenix is not being held bound
or made liable by any act or declarations of Ker Instead, Phoenix seeks to profit from something done by
Ker. While this may be correct, its justification must be based on some legal ground other than Section 26
of Rule 130. The act or declaration involved herein is that of petitioner Bay View. The question is not
whether such act or declaration is admissible in evidence against some other entity with which Bay View
is in privity, but rather, whether it may be utilized by Phoenix against Bay View itself. Clearly, res inter
alios acta does not come into play herein.
Case against Ker & Co., Ltd., affirmed and maintained, while case against Phoenix Assurance Co., Ltd
set aside and case remanded to court of origin for further proceedings and determination on the merits.
G.R. No. 132550
February 19, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMON MARIO Y MINA, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
It has been consistently held that when a woman, especially one who is the daughter of the accused,
cries rape, she has, in effect, said all that is necessary to establish that rape was committed against
her.1 However, does this principle still hold true if the victim cannot recall how the alleged rape was
committed as she was asleep and never woke up throughout the incident? We answer in the negative.
On April 28, 1997, accused-appellant Ramon Mario y Mina was charged with the crime of rape before
the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch 81. The information reads:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1997, at around 12:00 midnight, in [B[arangay Agtongo,
[M]unicipality of Romblon, [P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had
carnal knowledge of his daughter EMILY MARIO, a fourteen year old girl, against her
will.1wphi1.nt
Contrary to law.2
Upon his arraignment, on July 8, 1997, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.
The version of the prosecution is primarily anchored on the testimonies of Emily Mario, the victim, and
Ramil Mario, the victim's brother.
Emily is the eldest child among the six children of accused-appellant and Edita Mario.3 She was fourteen
(14) years old and a Grade V or Grade VI student when she was allegedly sexually ravished. At around

60

10:00 p.m. of May 6, 1997, she was in their house and was about to go to sleep beside her younger
siblings when accused-appellant approached her and asked if he could sleep beside her.4 She refused.
Angered by her refusal, accused-appellant kicked her.5 Accused-appellant then returned to his bed while
Emily to sleep beside her siblings6 on the floor of their house.7 Accused-appellant's wife was not then
around because she was staying in the Municipality of Romblon during weekdays as a helper in the
house of a certain Rene Fajilagutan.8
When Emily awoke at around 3:00 a.m., she was surprised to see that she was no longer on the floor but
already lying on her parents' bed.9 She felt her whole body ache and her vagina was painful, wet and
sticky.10Dumbfounded, she looked around and saw accused-appellant wrapped in a blanket and lying on
the floor.11Thereupon, accused-appellant told her: "Madasok lang da gapaindi pa." (It already entered but
still you refused or It is just being inserted but still you refuse). 12 Realizing that she was violated during
her sleep, Emily cried.13 She recalled that it was already the third time that her father raped her; once
when she was in grade III and again when she was in Grade V. 14
Emily went back to sleep and got out of bed at around 5 a.m. to prepare breakfast. 15 Accused-appellant
was no longer around at that time since he went to work.16 After finishing breakfast, she and three of her
siblings, including Ramil, then eleven years old, proceeded to school. 17 On their way to school, Ramil told
Emily of what he witnesses the previous night.18 He recounted that at around midnight, he woke up to
urinate.19 After relieving himself, he tried to sleep again but could not.20 It was at this point when he saw
accused-appellant lift Emily from the floor and lay her on the bed.21 Accused-appellant next opened the
skirt of Emily and took off her dress and her panty.22Thereafter, accused-appellant took off his brief, held
his penis and inserted it into the vagina of Emily, making pumping motions. 23 Accused-appellant then
stood up, put back the clothes of Emily as well as his own clothes. 24
After lunch break, Emily decided to skip her afternoon classes to report the incident to her mother. 25 At
around 3 p.m., she left for the town of Romblon to see her mother.26 Emily told her of the reprehensible
act committed by her father.27 Her mother got angry and commented that accused-appellant is stupid and
mindless.28 Her mother instructed her to stay in Romblon while she proceeded to their house to confront
accused-appellant.29 Emily spent the night at her grandaunt's house in Bagtasan. 30 The following day, she
was brought by her mother to the police station where she filed a complaint for rape against accusedappellant.31 Thereafter, they proceeded to the hospital where Dr. Victorio Benedicto, the Rural Health
Physician, examined her.32
Dr. Benedicto testified that after examining Emily, he issued a medico-legal certificate where he noted
that the victim's vagina easily admitted a thumb; that it had scars at 2, 5 and 7 o'clock positions; and that
the victim suffered no external physical injuries.33 She opined that a hard object could have previously
penetrated Emily's vagina and that she was no longer a virgin.34
The prosecution also presented Teodino Martinez, the Provincial Warden of Romblon, who declared that
accused-appellant was incarcerated in the provincial jail during the pendency of this case.35 He was,
however, able to escape on April 26, 1997. On that day, a group of Seventh Day Adventists conducted a
bible study at the provincial jail.36 As the group was leaving the premises of the provincial jail, accusedappellant surreptitiously mingled with them pretending to be one of them and, thus, was able to evade the
prison guards.37 For three days, the jail authorities searched for accused-appellant. On April 29, 1997, he
was surrendered to the authorities by his two (2) brothers, Editho and Raymundo Mario.38 Martinez
conducted an investigation surrounding accused-appellant's escape. Accused-appellant told him that the
reason why he left the jail was to look for his wife to ask for forgiveness. 39
On the other hand, the defense had a totally different account of what transpired.
On March 6, 1997, accused-appellant went home from work.40 He found his children at home except his
eldest, Emily, who had already gone out of their house. 41 Emily was used to going out to watch betamax
movies in other people's houses or attend overnight dances and parties, 42 sometimes sleeping in her
friend's house and would return the following day.43 Knowing that Emily would not come home that
evening, accused-appellant, after checking on his other children who were already sleeping, retired to
bed at around 8:30 p.m.44 He woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day, prepared breakfast for his children
and proceeded to work.45 Later on, he was informed by his neighbor, Ben Mindoro, that Emily returned to
their house at around 8:00 a.m. that day and did not go to school.46
To refute the testimony of Ramil Mario, the defense put to the witness stand Raymundo Mario
(accused-appellant's brother), Noemi Selosa (the wife of Raymundo Mario), and Valentina Mindoro
(accused-appellant's aunt).

61

Noemi Selosa testified that on March 10, 1997, she accompanied Edita Mario and Ramil Mario to the
police station.47 Ramil Mario gave his statement before the police investigator with regard to what he
witnessed on the night of March 6, 1997.48 When Ramil finished giving his statement, the investigator
noted that his story did not tally with the account previously given by Emily to the police that she was
raped by accused-appellant.49 Instead, Ramil told the police that he did not see his father rape Emily.
Because of this, Edita Mario instructed Ramil Mario to tell the police that he saw accused-appellant
take off the shorts of Emily and rape her. She was able to convince her son that if he would do what he
was told, "his father could be released from jail."50 She also warned him that if he did not follow what she
told him, she would not let him eat.51 Ramil Mario complied with her mother's instructions.52
Raymundo Mario testified that in the afternoon of March 10, 1997, Ramil Mario, his nephew, went to
his house after giving his statement at the police station.53 When Ramil saw his uncle, he cried and
hugged him.54 Raymundo Mario asked what was wrong55 and Ramil Mario said that his mother forced
him to tell the police that his father raped Emily. She also assured him that if he made that story to the
police, his father would be released from jail.56
Valentina Mindoro told the court that she lives in the house of Raymundo Mario and Noemi Selosa. 57 In
the afternoon of March 10, 1997, Ramil Mario arrived in their house crying. 58 He approached his uncle,
Raymundo Mario, and asked him why his father had not yet been released from jail as he (the father)
was not at fault.59 It was then that Ramil Mario admitted that he was coached by his mother to testify
against his father.60
In its Decision, dated December 12, 1997, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of raping his
daughter and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused RAMON MARIO Y MINA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of Rape under the aforequoted Information, dated April 14,
1997, and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is ordered to pay
the victim, his daughter Emily Mario, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.61
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following as his lone assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.62
In finding accused-appellant guilty, the trial court considered the alleged statement made by accusedappellant: "Madasok lang da gapaindi ka pa" (It already entered but still you refused or It is just being
inserted but still you refuse), as an admission that he raped his daughter. We do not agree.
An admission under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court63 applies to statements made by an
accused which directly or impliedly point towards an acknowledgement of guilt for the crime charged. 64
In order that an admission may be appreciated against the accused, the statement must have been clear
and unequivocal such that a reasonable construction of the same would lead to an acknowledgement of
the fact sought to be proven.65 Being merely an inference, an admission, standing alone, is insufficient to
authorize a conviction unless backed up by some other proof which would show the culpability of the
accused.66
We agree with the finding of the trial court that accused-appellant's statement: "Madasok lang da gapaindi
a pa" (It already entered but still you refused or It is just being inserted, but still you refused,) 67 is an
admission under Section 26 of Rule 130. However, would this admission, standing alone, create an
inference that accused-appellant raped his daughter68 in that he was able to actually penetrate her vagina
with his sex organ? For one thing, there was no mention at all that what was inserted was accusedappellant's sex organ. Neither was there an indication that the insertion was made into her sex organ.
While the victim claims that she was raped, she admittedly did not awake during the entire length of the
episode when she was being undressed and her panty removed, when her legs were spread, when his
body was pressed against hers, when his penis entered into her private parts and when accusedappellant was doing pumping motions into her vagina. In recalling the events that transpired on March 6,
1997, Emily testified:
Q
Now, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, do you recall what happened to you?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
What happened?
A
My father said, can I sleep beside you?

62

Q
When he said those words, where were you?
A
At the side, beside my younger siblings.
Q
Now, what happened after that?
A
I said, I don't want to sleep with you.
Q
Because you did not want to sleep with your father, what happened?
A
My father got angry.
Q
When he became angry with you, when he got angry, what happened?
A
He counted one (1) up to three (3)
Q
Up to three (3)?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
When he counted, what did you do?
A
I remained in the place where I was sleeping and I kept quiet.
Q
When you remained in the place where you were lying and you kept quiet, what happened?
A
He approached me and kicked me on my feet.
Q
Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what part of your body was hit?
A
Here, sir (Witness is pointing to her right lower leg).
Q
When you were hit by this kick of your father, what did you do?
A
I still kept quiet and he returned to his bed and when he returned again I ran towards the
center where my siblings were lying.
Q
When he returned again, what did he do, what happened?
A
He said, why would you not let me sleep beside you, there's nothing wrong with it, you are
my child.
Q
When he told you that, what happened?
A
I kept quiet on my place and I did not answer him.
Q
What did you do after that?
A
There I felt asleep beside my siblings.
Q
And what time did you wake that evening?
A
When I woke up it was already 3:00 o'clock in the morning.
Q
Where were you lying when you woke up at about 3:00 o'clock that early morning?
A
I was already on bed.
Q
When you woke up on bed, what did you feel if you felt any?
A
My whole body was aching and my vagina was also aching and wet and sticky.
Q
At 3:00 o'clock, did you see where your father was?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Where?
A
On his bed.
PROS. ROCERO:
Your Honor, the witness did not say bed, she said sa kanyang higa-an.
COURT:
Answer.
A
I saw father where he was sleeping.
xxx
Q
Miss Mario, aside from asking you for him to sleep with you the night of March 6, 1997 you
do not know any other things that your father did to you?
A
No more.
Q
That your father raped you that evening of March 6 or in the night of March 6, 1997, you
only got that information from your brother?
A
And I also came to know about it because at 3:00 early in the morning, he said, "madasok
lang da gapaindi pa" meaning, it already entered but still you refused".
Q
This was stated by your father at 3:00 o'clock in the morning?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And so, if not for the statement of your father, you do not know about it?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And so, the actual incident that happened you do not know because you were asleep?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And what do you understand by rape? Do you understand what is rape?

63

A
Yes, sir.
Q
What is rape?
A
Raping the girls.
Q
What do you mean by ginagahasa?
A
Used.
Q
What is ginagamit?
A
Had sexual intercourse.
Q
And you only came to know that you were raped by your father, from whom?
A
From Ramil, and I also came to know about it because he was the only one there and he
had raped me before.
Q
You are talking of the time when you were Grade III?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
When did Ramil tell you that you were raped by your father?
A
The following morning.
Q
What time?
A
In my estimate it was already 6:30 o'clock.
Q
6:30 o'clock in the morning of March 7?
A
Yes, sir, it was March 7 because the incident happened March 6 and if it is already 12:00
o'clock past it was already March 7.
Q
And that was the only time that you came to know about it?
A
What?
Q
That you were raped by your father?
A
Because before when I was studying in Grade III he raped me and when I was studying in
Grade V he raped me again.
Q
But we were talking of raped on March 6, 1997, without the information given to you by
Ramil Mario at 6:30 o'clock in the morning of March 7, 1997 you really do not know what
happened to you?
A
No, sir.
Q
What do you mean by saying "no, yes sir"?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And you are sure about that?
A
Yes, sir.69
It is clear from her testimony that she was not aware of what happened between the time she fell asleep
until she woke up in the bed of her parents. Her conclusion that she was raped by accused-appellant was
only deduced from the latter's statement "Madasok lang da gapaindi ka pa."
Be that as it may, her testimony adequately establishes the fact that on that fateful night, her father did
something to her which made her whole body ache and her most private part feel wet and sticky.
Possibly, it was rape, if his penis penetrated her vagina. Possibly it could only be acts of lasciviousness if
the penetration or insertion was caused by another object like accused-appellant's fingers. The probing
fingers could have involuntarily produced a wet and sticky feeling on the part of the victim by the
stimulation of her private parts. Whether victim's body ached, it cannot be reasonably ascertained if she
was telling the truth or simply exaggerating. The facts at hand would more persuasively support the
theory that the offense committed by accused-appellant was acts of lasciviousness.70Foremost is that
Emily was not awakened by the molestation of his father. Unlike in rape where the perpetrator would
normally place his weight atop his victim, penetrate his organ into her vagina and make thrusting motions
which would readily awaken the victim if sleeping, where only the finger of the assailant or some other
object is inserted into the victim's private parts, which is less obtrusive, there is the possibility of the victim
not awaking throughout the act.
Indeed, it is perplexing that the victim would remain asleep as she was being undressed, intruded into
and subjected to a push and pull movement made on her private parts. There is no pretense that she was
drugged or otherwise rendered unconscious to facilitate the alleged rape. The case of People vs.
Corcina71 cited by the Solicitor General to support his claim that carnal knowledge is possible with a
woman without her knowledge due to deep slumber, is not on all fours with the factual circumstances of
the present case. In Corcina, the victim was a married woman who already had a daughter and, as such,
accustomed to sexual intercourse.72 The victim in the said case awoke in the middle of the rape since she
felt the weight of a man on top of her.73 In the present case, Emily was totally unaware of her being raped.

64

The testimony of prosecution witness, Ramil Mario, on what transpired between the time that the victim
slept on the floor until she woke up on the bed of her parents, leaves much to be desired. The trial court
did not give much credence to it, being incoherent. This was shown when Ramil Mario was recalled to
the witness stand as the prosecution's rebuttal witness in view of his uncle Raymundo Mario's earlier
testimony that Ramil was coached by his mother to testify against his father. Judge Placido Marquez had
to conduct a very lengthy clarificatory examination of this witness in order to determine if he really
understood the statements he was making. Towards the end of the Judge's examination, he made the
following observations:
COURT:
The truth to this Court I will be frank with you there is a ring of truth to your
statement that your mother told you to say to the police station that you saw your
father doing this things like pumping motion on Emily telling you so that your
father will be released from jail it is the Court's perception. You may not
understand this because you are too young but we have to tell you this but maybe
after your college graduation you can read the transcript and this Court told you
this that you see Ramil the mother your mother might be using your love for your
father see so that you would be manipulated to tell the police what he did so that
your father will be released because you love your father. That is all Ramil, I am not
sure if you understand. Most likely you must understand. For the record at least. 74
Furthermore, the defense counsel's cross-examination of Ramil Mario during rebuttal reveals why the
testimony of this eyewitness was discounted by the trial court. Although already 11 years old, he did not
know what the word "year" means. He did not know that his birthday, or Christmas day comes once in a
year. When asked what are the months and the year, he could only give eight (8), mentioning December
ahead of October. Thus:
ATTY. MADRONA ON ADDITIONAL CROSS EXAMINATION:
x
x
x
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
You are now 11 years old Mr. Mario?
PROS. SY:
10.
COURT:
11.
A
Yes, sir.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
And what is your birthday?
A
January 6, 1986.
Q
So that you were 1 year old on January 6, 1987, correct?
PROS. SY:
No. Is not as simple as it seem. We don't know whether he knows how to compute.
ATTY. MADRONA:
That is the question.
PROS. SY:
Why don't we asked him on January 6, 1987, what is your age?
COURT:
Clarify. Your satisfy.
ATTY. MADRONA:
Yes, we will satisfy.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
On January 6, 1987, how old were you?
A
I was 10.
PROS. SY:
That is what I said before and I am saying it now that this little boy from Alas does not
know what is a year.
ATTY. MADRONA:
No. The question was only a span of one (1) year. And yet the he must have heard
1987, Your Honor.

65

COURT:
Let us asked him, clarify.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
Do you know the difference between 86 and 87?
A
No, sir.
PROS. SY:
Your Honor please, why don't we asked the witness directly how many months a year
and what are the month in the year. What does he understand by a year.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
You have gone to school. Have you finished Grade 3?
A
No, sir.
COURT:
Q
You are still going to school?
A
Still going to school.
Q
What school?
A
In Alad.
Q
Alad Elementary school?
A
Lamao Elementary school.
Q
Grade 3?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
Q
So, you are now absent?
A
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
Now, do you know what is a month from January to December?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Please tell us?
A
Enero, February, March, May, July, August, December, October, no more.
PROS. SY:
It is now very obvious, Your Honor, as we have said earlier he does not know.
ATTY. MADRONA:
Now, Your Honor, we will asked one question and we will leave the matter to the Court.
Q
Do you know your birthday only comes once a year?
PROS. SY:
He only blew his candle once a year. It does not prove, Your Honor that this witness does
not know what year and month by asking him whether his birthday happens once a year
he might relate that his birthday happens blowing candle over a cake once a year.
COURT:
Answer.
A
I don't know.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
How about Christmas, do you know that christmas comes once a year also.
PROS. SY.
What is the point? Does he understand what is a year and how many months a year
when he cannot mention a month and a year he could only count 8 months and it is not in
the order
COURT:
Answer.
A
No, sir.
ATTY. MADRONA continuing:
Q
How about the birthdays of your brothers and sisters, you also know that it comes
once a year also?
PROS. SY:
If he cannot understand his own birthday much more the birthdays of his brother and
sister.
COURT:
Answer.

66

A
No, sir.
ATTY. MADRONA:
We are though with the witness, Your Honor.75
Based on the foregoing, it is evident why the trial court doubted the testimony of the prosecution's sole
eyewitness. Due to his inability to comprehend simple questions, Judge Marquez correctly entertained the
thought that Ramil Mario might not have witnessed the alleged rape committed on March 6, 1997 but
was only coaxed by his mother into testifying against his father. Thus, the trial court's appreciation of this
witness' testimony is reflected in its decision:
xxx. The testimony of Ramil Mario is no longer needed because "(t)ruth is established not by
the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies" and "the lone testimony of the
victim in the crime of rape if credible is sufficient to sustain a conviction." It is axiomatic that
"witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered." For "after all, there is no law which requires that
the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except when the law so expressly
requires."76
On the other hand, Dr. Victorio Benedicto testified that Emily was no longer a virgin at the time he
conducted the medico-legal examination since her vagina easily admitted the introduction of a thumb.
There were no fresh lacerations on the victim's vagina but only scars at 2, 5 and 7 o'clock positions. The
absence of fresh lacerations renders doubtful the prosecution's assertion that Emily was raped on March
6, 1997. The medico-legal findings indicating old scars in her vagina tend to buttress the claim of Emily
that she was raped by her father when she was 8 years old. Unfortunately, this incident is not included in
the information.
What has been established is that an object was inserted into her vagina which resulted in her having felt
pain and that she noticed to be wet and sticky after she found herself on his parents' bed alongside
accused-appellant who blurted out "(M)adasok lang da gapaindi a pa."77 What was inserted into her
vagina could be accused-appellant's finger or another object not necessarily his penis; hence, what was
committed was the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
This crime was not alleged in the information against accused-appellant. Nevertheless, an accused may
be convicted of a lesser crime than that with which he is charged if such lesser offense is necessarily
included in the one charged.78
Considering that the crime of acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos is necessarily included in
rape, the accused who is charged with latter crime may be convicted with the former. 79
The alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 1580 of the Revised Penal Code should be
appreciated against accused-appellant. In crimes of chastity such as rape and acts of lasciviousness,
relationship is considered as aggravating.81 It was expressly alleged in the information and duly proven
during trial that the offended party is the daughter of accused-appellant; hence, relationship aggravates
the offense committed by accused-appellant.
The felony of acts of lasciviousness is punishable by prision correccional.82 There being one aggravating
circumstance (relationship), the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period shall be imposed
upon appellant.83
Under Section 1 of Art. No. 1403, the Court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense, arresto mayor in this case. The maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of
the Code, which we have previously determined to be prision correccional in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that accusedappellant RAMON MARIO Y MINA is found GUILTY of the crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 6 years
of prision correccional as maximum and the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54470 May 8, 1990
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD VDA. DE PADILLA, substituted by her legal heirs,
namely: AUGUSTO A. PADILLA, ALBERTO A. PADILLA, CRESENCIO R. ABES (representing the
deceased Isabel Padilla Abes) MIGUEL A. PADILLA and RAMON A. PADILLA, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

67

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for private respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The only legal issue raised by the petitioner in this thirty-year-old case is whether the indemnity for the
death of private respondent's son, the late Nicanor A. Padilla should be computed on the basis of his life
expectancy, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did, rather than the life expectancy of private
respondent, his only legal heir, as the petitioner contends.
On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 P.M., Starlight Flight No. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines (hereafter PAL)
took off from the Manduriao Airport in Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 persons on board, including the
plane's complement. The plane did not reach its destination but crashed on Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour
and fifteen minutes after takeoff .The plane was Identified as PI-C133, a DC-3 type aircraft manufactured
in 1942 and acquired by PAL in 1948. It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its illfated flight. It
had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla who was a passenger on the star crossed flight. He was 29
years old, single. His mother, Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla, was his only legal heir.
As a result of her son's death, Mrs. Padilla filed a complaint (which was amended twice) against PAL,
demanding payment of P600,000 as actual and compensatory damages, plus exemplary damages and
P60,000 as attorney's fees.
In its answer, PAL denied that the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's
flight crew, and that, moreover, the damages sought were excessive and speculative.
On November 23, 1964, the trial court issued a pre-trial order requiring the parties to file on or before
January 30, 1965 a stipulation of facts, or a negative manifestation in case they failed to submit a
stipulation.
On June 8, 1965, the parties submitted a partial stipulation of facts providing as follows:
1.
Plaintiff is the widow of the late Alberto R. Padilla Filipino, of legal age, and a resident of and with postal
address at No. 970 (formerly No. 247) Gral. Solano St., San Miguel, Manila, while defendant Philippine
Air Lines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized, registered and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
the Philippines, engaged, as a common carrier in the business of carrying or transporting by air
passengers and goods, offering its services to the public as such for compensation, with offices at Makati
Bldg., Makati, Rizal.
2.
Nicanor A. Padilla was born on January 10, 1931. He was a son by lawful marriage of plaintiff and Alberto
R. Padilla, who died on September 2, 1948.
3.
Nicanor A. Padilla finished the elementary grades in 1943, high school in 1947, graduated the Reserve
Officer's Course (Infantry Basic Course) Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1949, and graduated with the
degree of Bachelor of Literature in 1951 and the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1954, all in Ateneo de
Manila.
4.
He was admitted by the Supreme Court of the Philippines to practice law on January 28, 1955, and from
January 1958, to the time of his death on November 23, 1960, he was associated with the law offices of
Senator Ambrosio Padilla, brother of his father, Alberto R. Padilla.
5.
At the time of his death, he was the President and General Manager of the Padilla Shipping Co., Inc. He
was also Vice-President and Treasurer of the Allied Overseas Trading Co., Inc.
6.
He was a member of the Board of Directors of the Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) International
and Chairman of its Committee on Governmental Affairs for the term 1960-1961. This Committee on
Governmental Affairs published a pamphlet entitled "Good Government is our Business," for which the
deceased was named "Jaycee of the Month of January 1960."
7.
Nicanor A. Padilla, while travelling and being transported and flown as a paid passenger on one [of]
defendant's aircraft, a DC-3 with registry No. PI-C133, on "Star Light Flight" No. 26 bound for Manila from
the City of Iloilo on November 23, 1960, was killed when said plane crashed in the area of Mount Baco,
Oriental Mindoro

68

8.
Nicanor A. Padilla died single, leaving as his nearest of kin and sole heiress to his estate his mother the
plaintiff herein with whom he was residing at the time of his death at 970 Gral. Solano St., Manila.
9.
The aircraft (PI-C133) that crashed on Mt. Baco, Oriental Mindoro on November 23, 1960, was a twinengine passenger plane of the Philippine Air Lines of the DC-3 type. It was manufactured by Douglas
Aircraft Corporation of the United States for the U.S. Army and was purchased from the latter by the
Commercial Air lines, Inc., on September 25, 1946. The defendant Philippine Air Lines acquired the plane
from the Commercial Air Lines, Inc., on October 15, 1948. The aircraft was registered by Philippine Air
Lines with the Civil Aeronautics Administration as PI-C142 on May 10, 1949. On October 15, 1953, PIC142 met with a non-fatal accident at Piat, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. PAL requested the Civil Aeronautics
Administration for a change in the identification mark. Said request was granted and the registration
number was changed from PI-C142 to PI-C133 on July 29, 1954. As [ofl November 22, 1960, the day
before the fatal crash on Mt. Baco, PI-C133 had a total flying time of 17,996:33 hours.
10.
PI-C133 was issued a certificate of airworthiness by the Civil Aeronautics Administration on September
13, 1960 which was to expire on September 12, 1961; a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "I"
and made a part of this stipulation.
11.
Other facts on which the parties cannot agree will be subject to proof at the trial. (pp. 34-39, Record on
Appeal; p. 11 7, Rollo.)
On January 15, 1966, the parties submitted another partial stipulation of facts:
1.
That in the book written by Salvador B. Salvosa, M.S. University of Michigan and member of the Actuarial
Society of the Philippine, entitled; "Filipino Experience Mortality Table," the complete life expectancy of
Filipinos appear on page 3 thereof, a photostat of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
2.
That in said Exhibit "A", the columns under the heading "Age x," refers to the age of the individual, and
the columns "oe x" refers to the corresponding number of years the individuals expected to live. Thus,
under the column "Age x," a person aged 29, the corresponding life expectancy of said person under
column "oex" is "42.60" years; and under said column "Age x" a person aged 60, corresponding life expec
tancy of said person under column 'oex' is "17.90" years;
3.
That Salvador B. Salvosa's "Filipino Experience Mortality Table," including the table of life expectancy are
used by the Philippine International life Insurance Co., the Sterling Life Insurance Co., the Cardinal Life
Insurance Co., and Star life Insurance Co., and that the same has been approved by the Insurance
Commissioner for the use of life insurance companies doing business in the Philippines as shown by a
certificate issued by said Commissioner which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B";
4.
That the book of Nelson and Warren, Consulting Actuaries of St. Luis and Kansas cities, Missouri,
entitled: "Principal Mortality Tables", contains a table of comparison of complete life expectancy based on
principal mortality tables used by life insurance companies, a photostat of which is likewise attached
hereto as Exhibits "C", "C-l", "C-2", and "C-3";
5.
That of the life expectancy based on the different systems mentioned in said Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2"
and "C-3", the following are also used in the Philippines for life insurance purposes: (a) the American
Experience appearing in Exhibit "B", 'fifth columns on both pages, the first column corresponding to the
age of the individual (pages 12 and 13 of the book); (b) the Standard Industrial, appearing in the same
Exhibit "B", "sixth column on both pages (pages 12 and 13 of the book); and (c) the 1941 Commissioner
Standard Ordinary, or CSO 1941 for short, appearing in Exhibit "B-1", third column, on both pages (pages
14 and 15 of the book).
6.
That the materiality and applicability [sic] of the life expectancy tables shown in Exhibit A or Exhibits "C",
"C-1", "C-2" and "C-3" are left to the judgment of the Honorable Court. (pp. 39-42, Record on Appeal; p.
117, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1970, a third joint partial stipulation of facts was submitted by the parties to the trial court

69

which reads, thus:


JOINT FIRST PARTIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant through their respective counsel, respectfully submit the following partial
stipulation of facts:
1. Defendant in November, 1960 and even before was authorized and rated to repair aircrafts of U.S. and
foreign registries and as such holds the following:
Description Exhibit
a) US FAA Air Agency 1
Certificate
b) US FAA Repair Station
Operations Specifications
(2 pages) PI- 2 and 2-A
c) CAA Rating Grant to operate
Repair Station with ratings on
[sic] (i) Aircraft Metal
propeller Hubs Overhaul Shop,
(ii) Aircraft Engine Overhaul Shop. 3
d) PI.-CAA Rating Grant to operate
a repair station with ratings on
(i) Aircraft of Composite Construction;
(ii) Aircraft of all Metal Construction;
(iii) Aircraft Instrument. 4
2. Defendant maintained and repaired aircrafts of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and commercial carriers
like PANAM Northwest Airways, KLM and other foreign airlines.
3. Also in 1960 defendant was maintaining and following a CAA approved system of aircraft maintenance
control using worksheets and work card which record the specific job on any particular aircraft. They are:
a) Preflight inspections consisting of the
(i) Through Check: the visual inspection of an aircraft prior to flight and performed in stations where
maintenance men are assigned.
(ii) Terminating Check: the visual inspection of the aircraft performed in stations were aircraft terminated
a flight and where maintenance men are assigned.
(iii) After Maintenance Check: the visual inspection of an aircraft preparatory to any flight following the
completion of any check from Check No. 1 to Cheek No. 6, to wit:
(a) Check No. 1 known as daily inspection check;
(b) Check No. 2 which is accomplished every 125 hours;
(c) Check No. 3 which is accomplished every 250 flying hours;
(d) Check No. 4 which is accomplished every 500 flying hours;
(e) Check No. 5 which is accomplished every 1,250 flying hours;
(f) Check No. 6 which is a series broken down into 6- A, 6-B, 6-C, 6-D, 6-E and 6-F;
4. The Quality Control Division is the custodian of all worksheets for the checks performed and under PICAA regulations, is required to keep the records for at least 90 days.
5. The forms used and accomplished for the various checks were:
Description Exhibit
a) Preflight check sheet,
including DC-3C Daily
Airplane and Engine
Routine and Cleaning Routine; 5,6 & 6-A
b) Check No. 2, consisting of
37 work control cards; 7-A to 7-KK
c) Check No. 3 consisting of
49 work control cards; 8, 8-A to 8-XX
d) Check No. 4 consisting of
a work control card; 9, 9-A to 9-F
e) Check No. 5 consisting of 00, 10-A to
9 work control cards; 10-H
f) Check No. 6-A consisting of 11, 11-A to

70

112 work control cards; 11-(G)


g) Check No. 6-B consisting of 12, 12-A to
114 work control cards; 12-(J)
h) Check No. 6-C consisting of 13, 13-A to
117 work control cards 13-(I)
i) Check No. 6-D consisting of 14,14-A to
110 work control cards; 14-(E)
j) Check No. 6-E consisting of 15,15-A to
120 work control cards; 15-(E)
k) Check No. 6-F consisting of 16,16-A to
118 work control cards 16-(M)
The parties reserve their right to agree to additional stipulation of facts and/or to adduce evidence on other
matters not covered by this stipulation.
All exhibits mentioned and identified are attached to this stipulation. (pp. 42-46, Record on Appeal; p. 117,
Rollo.)
During the hearing on September 4, 1972, the parties stipulated that they were reproducing the testimonial
and documentary evidence presented in Civil Cases Nos. 5728 and 2790 of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, arising out of the same accident. Certified copy of said transcript of stenographic notes were then
submitted to the trial court.
A fourth partial stipulation of facts was submitted by the parties, reading as follows:
PARTIAL STIPULATION OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant respectfully submit the following partial stipulation of facts:
1. For the convenience and brevity of these proceedings, considering that defendant's evidence on the
basic issues of fortuitous event and extraordinary diligence of the carrier consists of the witnesses and
documents presented in Civil Case No. 5720 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo entitled "Pedro R. Davila
vs. Preciosa C. Tirol," now pending appeal before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-28512, defendant has
proposed to reproduce in this case the testimonies of same witnesses and documentary evidence Identified
and marked in the course of the same proceedings, as reflected in the corresponding transcript of
stenographic notes, to wit:
Transcript of
Witnesses Stenographic Notes At Pages Exhibit
a Mario Rodriguez October 30, 1962 1 - 67 37
October 31, 1962 67 - 153 38
January 7, 1963 17 - 74 39
October 14, 1963 6 - 11 40
b. Pedro N. Mallari March 19, 1963 17 - 39)
c. Arturo Camatoy March 19, 1963 39 - 75) 41
d. Ponciano Saldaa March 19, 1963 75 - 88)
e. Melecio Joson March 20, 1963 91 - 161) 42
f. Alfredo Subesa March 20, 1963 162 - 166)
g. Eduardo Estrella October 14, 1963 11 - 27)
h. Vicente Sison October 14, 1963 27 - 74)
i. Felipe Paculaba October 15, 1963 4 - 15
j. Antonio Lopez October 15, 1963 15 - 25) 43
k. Isaac Lamela October 15, 1963 26 - 55)
l. Ramon Pedrosa December 19, 1963 6 - 83 44
m. Cesar Mijares December 20, 1963 15 - 89 45
n. Jaime Manzano February 6, 1964 3 - 15) 46
o. Offer of documentary evidence February 6, 1964 18 - 76)
2. The transcript of stenographic notes are attached hereto and marked as above set forth.
3. If aforenamed witnesses were called to testify in this case, they would give the same testimony as
shown in the afore-mentioned transcript of stenographic notes on direct examination, cross-examination
and re-direct examination, as the case may be plaintiffs counsel hereby adopting the manifestations,
objections, cross and recross examination by the plaintiff's counsels in Davila vs. PAL, supra and so far
as the joint hearings held on December 20, 1963 and February 6, 1964, also of plaintiff's counsels in

71

Abeto, et al. vs. PAL, Civil Case No. 5790, also of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
4. All the documentary evidence marked in the course of the hearings shown in the transcripts of
stenographic notes attached hereto have already been marked correspondingly before the Commissioner
of this Honorable Court on a hearing held on May 24, 1968 with the same exhibit identification.
5. Defendant reserves its right to present evidence on the question of damages.
6. Plaintiff reserves her right to present such further evidence as she may deem proper in rebuttal. (pp.
47-50, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)
In addition to the stipulations of facts, private respondent Padilla testified that her son, Nicanor Padilla,
prior to his death, was 29 years old, single, in good health, President and General Manager of Padilla
Shipping Company at Iloilo City, and a legal assistant of the Padilla Law Office; that upon learning of the
death of her son in the plane crash, she suffered shock and mental anguish, because her son who was
still single was living with her; and that Nicanor had a life insurance of P20,000, the proceeds of which
were paid to his sister.
Eduardo Mate, manager of the Allied Overseas Trading Company, testified that the deceased, Nicanor
Padilla, was one of the incorporators of the company and also its vice-president and treasurer, receiving a
monthly salary of P455.
Isaac M. Reyes, auditor of the Padilla Shipping Company, declared that the deceased was the President
and General of the firm and received a salary of P1,500 monthly.
The trial court in its decision stated that on March 19, 1970, it was manifested in court that "the parties
agreed that they will abide with whatever decision the Supreme Court may have in similar cases involving
the same airplane crash accident then pending before other courts pending decision in Supreme Court"
(p. 51, Rec. on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo)
On August 31, 1973, the trial court promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc. to pay the
plaintiff Natividad A. Vda. de Padilla the sum of P477,000.00 as award for the expected income of the
deceased Nicanor; P10,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
(pp. 59-60, Record on Appeal; p. 117, Rollo.)
On Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 56079-R) dated July 17, 1980, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed in toto.
As pointed out at the outset, the lone issue is whether or not the respondent court erred in computing the
awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor A. Padilla rather than on the life
expectancy of private respondent, and thus erred in awarding what appears to the petitioner as the
excessive sum of P477,000 as indemnity for loss of earnings.
Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United
States" that "the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is, as established
by authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter (p. 19, Brief
for the Defendant-Appellant; p. 119, Rollo).
However, resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available
locally to settle a controversy. Even in the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is
only persuasive.
For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under
Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, the award of damages for death is computed on the
basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, not of his beneficiary. The articles provide:
Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of
this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the
breach of contract by a common carrier.
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi- delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant,
had no earning capacity at the time of his death; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Davila vs. PAL, 49 SCRA 497 which involved the same tragic plane crash, this Court
determined not only PALs liability for negligence or breach of contract, but also the manner of computing
the damages due the plaintiff therein which it based on the life expectancy of the deceased, Pedro Davila,
Jr. This Court held thus:

72

The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he died. At that age one's normal
life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to the formula (2/3 x [80-30]) adopted by this Court in the case
of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. However, although the deceased was in
relatively good health, his medical history shows that he had complained of and been treated for such
ailments as backaches, chest pains and occasional feelings of tiredness. It is reasonable to make an
allowance for these circumstances and consider, for purposes of this case, a reduction of his life
expectancy to 25 years.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) different sources, namely,
from managing a radio station, from law practice and from farming, the expenses incidental to the
generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one source. Together with his living
expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year, seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net
yearly income of P7,800.00. This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which
should be awarded to the plaintiffs in this particular respect. (pp. 504-505, Rollo.)
The petitioner's recourse to our decision in Alcantara vs. Surro, 93 Phil. 472, undermines instead of
supporting its stand here, for the indemnity in that case was also based on the life expectancy of the
deceased and not of his beneficiaries.
The petitioner's contention that actual damages under Article 2206 of the Civil Code must be proven by
clear and satisfactory evidence is correct, but its perception that such evidence was not presented in this
case, is error.
The witnesses Mate and Reyes, who were respectively the manager and auditor of Allied Overseas
Trading Company and Padilla Shipping Company, were competent to testify on matters within their
personal knowledge because of their positions, such as the income and salary of the deceased, Nicanor
A. Padilla (Sec. 30, Rule 130, Rules of Court). As observed by the Court of Appeals, since they were
cross-examined by petitioner's counsel, any objections to their competence and the admissibility of their
testimonies, were deemed waived. The payrolls of the companies and the decedent's income tax returns
could, it is true, have constituted the best evidence of his salaries, but there is no rule disqualifying
competent officers of the corporation from testifying on the compensation of the deceased as an officer of
the same corporation, and in any event, no timely objection was made to their testimonies.
Following the procedure used by the Supreme Court in the case of Davila vs. PAL, 49 SCRA 497, the trial
court determined the victims gross annual income to be P23,100 based on his yearly salaries of P18,000
from the Padilla Shipping Company and P5,100 from the Allied Overseas Trading Corporation.
Considering that he was single, the court deducted P9,200 as yearly living expenses, resulting in a net
income of P13,900 (not P15,900 as erroneously stated in the decision). Since Nicanor Padilla was only
29 years old and in good health, the trial court allowed him a life expectancy of 30 years. Multiplying his
annual net income of P13,900 by his life expectancy of 30 years, the product is P417,000 (not P477,000)
which is the amount of death indemnity due his mother and only forced heir (p. 58, Record on Appeal; p.
117, Rollo).
While as a general rule, an appellee who has not appealed is not entitled to affirmative relief other than
the ones granted in the decision of the court below (Aparri vs. CA, 13 SCRA 611; Dy vs. Kuizon, 113 Phil.
592; Borromeo vs. Zaballero, 109 Phil. 332), we nevertheless find merit in the private respondent's plea
for relief for the long delay this case has suffered on account of the petitioner's multiple appeals. Indeed,
because of the 16 year delay in the disposition of this case, the private respondent herself has already
joined her son in the Great Beyond without being able to receive the indemnity she well deserved.
Considering how inflation has depleted the value of the judgment in her favor, in the interest of justice, the
petitioner should pay legal rate of interest on the indemnity due her. The failure of the trial court to award
such interest amounts to a "plain error" which we may rectify on appeal although it was not specified in
the appellee's brief (Sec. 7, Rule 51, Rules of Court).
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The decision of the trial court is affirmed with modification. The
petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death indemnity in the sum of P417,000
(not P477,000), with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31,
1973, until it is fully paid. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 85247 July 30, 1993

73

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
EDWIN MARCELINO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Liberato T. Cabaron for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The questions presented in criminal cases are mainly if not exclusively factual. Where a conviction is
appealed, the task of the higher court is usually limited to the ascertainment of whether the factual findings
of the trial court have been correctly reached. Such findings are received with respect and even as binding
unless the record shows that they are flawed and should therefore be reversed.
In the case at bar, the trial court convicted Edwin Marcelino of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act and sentenced him "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P20,000.00."
1
He is now before this Court to challenge the factual findings that led to his conviction.
As found by Judge Jose D. Azarraga of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Marcelino was caught red-handed
at a buy-bust operation conducted by a NARCOM team at half past six in the evening of January 22, 1987,
near the University of San Agustin in Iloilo City, where the police had earlier begun a surveillance because
of confidential reports of rampant drug pushing there.
The team was headed by Lt. Eleuterio Salde, with Sgt. Benito Bonete, Sgt. Rodrigo Gabasa, and CIC Felix
Arroyo as members. Gabasa was to act as the buyer and was given a P50.00 bill and a P10.00 bill, both
marked, for the mock transaction. He testified that he approached Marcelino that night and said he wanted
to buy P50.00 worth of marijuana. Marcelino left to get it after receiving the marked money from him.
Marcelino returned after five minutes with a plastic bag which he handed to Gabasa. Seeing the delivery,
the other team members, who had deployed themselves unobtrusively some ten meters away, now moved
toward the two. As Bonete approached, Marcelino recognized him and immediately took flight. Bonete said
he fired two warning shots and Marcelino stopped in his tracks as they surrounded and captured him. They
then took him to police headquarters for investigation. 2 The seized plastic bag was sent to the PC Crime
Laboratory for examination and was later found to contain marijuana. 3
Bagasa and Bonete were corroborated by Salde. Forensic Chemist Zenaida Sinfuego of the PCCL testified
on the result of her laboratory examination. 4
Marcelino took the stand and denied the charge. He claimed he was going home that night after watching
a basketball game when Bonete and another man accosted him and told to come with them to police
headquarters. He said he would have to get his parents' permission first, whereupon Bonete boxed him on
the chest and pulled out a gun. Frightened, Macelino took to his heels but stopped when he heard two shots
from behind him. Bonete and his companion then manhandled him right there on the street. They kicked
his waist and pistol-whipped the back of his head. Bonete took a plastic bag from his pocket and gagged
Marcelino with it. Then he was forced into a jeep. On the way to the police station, he pleaded to be allowed
to pass by his house as he said he was under probation, but they rejected his request. He was stripped
and divested of the P30,000 he was carrying when they reached the police station. 5
Marcelino was corroborated by Melvin Hiponia, age 11, who said he followed the pursuers when he heard
the two shots and saw how they mauled and arrested Marcelino and put the plastic bag in his mouth. 6
The trial court, in finding for the prosecution, considered the evidence for the defense to be contrived. It is
this conclusion that the appellant now questions.
In his brief, Marcelino argues that he would not have sold marijuana to a person he did not know and in a
public place at that. He wonders why Bagasa would have given him P60.00 for only P50.00 worth of
marijuana, and even before he could deliver it, considering that they were total strangers. Moreover,
Marcelino did not offer the marked money as an exhibit. He contends that the trial court should have given
more credence to his testimony and the corroboration of Hiponia as being more conformable to human
experience and the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.
These arguments are unacceptable. The appellant raises questions of credibility, which are factual in
nature. We have said time and again that these are issues best resolved by the trial judge because he has
the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and to determine by their demeanor whether they are
telling or falsifying the truth. 7 We do not find his assessment incorrect.
Many cases decided by this Court have shown that drug-pushers do not confine their transactions only to
known customers; even strangers are accommodated provided they have the money to pay. 8 Notably, the
appellant contradicts himself when he also argues in his brief that he would not have transacted with Bagasa

74

because he knew some of his companions. We have also affirmed the conviction of drug-pushers who have
not hesitated to operate in billiard halls, public streets and markets, and other public places in open defiance
of the law. 9 Their own recklessness is certainly not evidence of their innocence.
The conduct of Bagasa regarding the money is, indeed, curious but this must have been part of the team
strategy of not unduly arousing Marcelino's suspicions. A different manner might have aborted the
operation. As for the non-presentation of the marked money as evidence for the prosecution, we have held
in several decisions that this is not a fatal omission. 10 It is less so in the case before us because the object
of the sham sale was itself offered as an exhibit.
It was Marcelino himself who invited attention to his past criminal record when he testified that he was on
probation. Further probing revealed that his conviction was for drug-pushing also and that another
information against him for a similar offense had been provisionally dismissed. These circumstances may
be taken as evidence against him under Rule 130, Section 34 of the Rules of Court, "to prove a specific
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."
Given the fact that the transaction took place in a public place and in the early evening (as the appellant
himself emphasizes), the Court finds it significant that only one witness corroborated Marcelino. The two
warning shots must have attracted attention and caused the people to see what was going on. Many
persons would have even come out of their houses. Those in the street would have paused to watch the
impromptu show. Yet, by the defense account, only Mervin Hiponia seems to have witnessed the incident.
Only this 11-year old boy, who was still playing tansan at half past six that night, heard the shots: if others
did, they must all have scampered in fright. He alone boldly followed the pursuers and witnessed the arrest
of the appellant. His playmates did not go with him. Apparently, no one else saw the incident in that busy
street near the university. No one else but the boy, whom the trial court disbelieved for his letter-perfect
testimony, saw the pistol-whipping of the appellant. Remarkably, there was no report of blood, and no
medical certificate of injuries, although Marcelino was allegedly hit several times in the back of his head
with a pistol.
We are satisfied with the trial court that the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome not because
the evidence of the defense is weak but because the evidence of the prosecution is strong.
The sentence must, however, be corrected. The penalty prescribed by the Dangerous Drugs Act for the
offense charged is life imprisonment, not reclusion perpetua. Reclusion perpetua carries accessory
penalties that do not attach to life imprisonment. This distinction was emphasized in Administrative Circular
No. 6-A-92 dated June 21, 1993, reiterating People v. Penillos 11 and People v. Baguio. 12
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified and the appeal is DISMISSED,
with costs against the appellant. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-31961 January 9, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO ODENCIO and GUIAMELON MAMA, accused-appellants.
Manuel P. Calanog for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
Florencio Odencio and Guiamelon Mama appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
North Cotabato, finding them guilty of two separate crimes of murder, sentencing each of them to two
reclusion perpetuas, and ordering them to pay P12,000 to the heirs of Prowa Talib and P12,000 to the
heirs of Kadir Oranen (Criminal Case No. 5276).
According to the prosecution, at about seven o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1968, while Prowa Talib
(Palua Talib), a forty-year old farmer, was in the yard of his house located at Barrio Simsiman,
Pigcawayan, North Cotabato, handing a pot of rice to his wife, Setie Mamalintao, who was near the stairs,
he was felled down by a volley of shots.
Setie rushed to the aid of her husband. When she looked in the direction where the gunshots emanated,
she saw Guiamelon Mama holding a gun near a coconut tree around six brazas away. Then, she heard
another volley of shots. She saw Florencio Odencio (Poren), also holding a gun near another coconut
tree around ten meters away in the yard of the house of her neighbor, Daongan Karaing. She noticed that
Kadir Oranen, who was nearby, had fallen to the ground around three arms' length from Daongan's
house. Kadir died instantly.

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Setie had known for a long time Florencio and Guiamelon who were friends and neighbors also residing
in Barrio Simsiman. Setie and Guiamelon had cultivated adjacent farmlands.
While Setie was comforting her husband, he allegedly told her that he was going to die. He directed her to
remember what had happened to him and that they had seen Guiamelon Mama and Poren armed with
guns. Prior to that shooting incident, Prowa Talib had reported to the barrio captain that Florencio
Odencio had stolen his lumber.
The two assailants fled westward. At the time the incident occurred, Japal Rongot was on his way to
Talib's house. He encountered Guiamelon and Joseph Odencio with both of whom he was well
acquainted. He asked Guiamelon why there were gunshots but the latter did not make any reply. Upon
reaching Talib's house, Rongot saw Setie crying and holding Talib on her lap. Setie told him that Talib
was shot by Guiamelon and she pointed to him Oranen's corpse which was about two arms' length from
Talib.
Ngelam Towa (Nilan Tuwa), another neighbor and the uncle of Setie heard, the gunshots on the occasion
in question. He hastened to Talib's house. Setie told him that Guiamelon Mama had shot Talib. She
advised her uncle not to use his flashlight because Guiamelon was still in the vicinity. Setie also told
Towa that Florencio Odencio had shot Oranen. Towa left Talib's house in order to get assistance from his
father-in-law. While crossing the trail his flashlight focussed on Florencio Odencio with two companions
leaving the scene of the crime.
Policemen arrived at Talib's house. Setie informed them that Guiamelon was the gunwielder. They
brought Talib to a medical clinic where he was interrogated by Patrolman Joaquin Saada Talib told
Saada that his assailants were Guiamelon, Florencio Odencio and Florencio's father, Joseph Odencio.
Due to the critical condition of Talib (nagaagonto), he was not able to sign his dying declaration (Exh. B)
as taken down by Patrolman Saada Talib was brought to the hospital. He died on the following day.
In that unsigned antemortem declaration, Talib revealed that Florencio Odencio suspected that he and
Oranen had masterminded the theft of Joseph Odencio's two carabaos, and that, on the other hand,
Guiamelon suspected Talib of having stolen the carabao of Damiog, the father-in-law of Guiamelon. It
was stated further in the same dying declaration that Talib had told Patrolman Saada that he wanted to
sign it but that he could not do so because of the wound in his arm. Talib also articulated his belief that he
was going to die because he could hardly breathe and his wound was painful.
On July 1, 1968 or within forty-eight hours after taking Talib's unsigned antemortem statement, Saada
executed an affidavit reciting the circumstances surrounding the taking thereof. Saada testified in court
on Talib's dying declaration.
The autopsy disclosed that Talib sustained eight gunshot wounds in the back or posterior chest wall. No
autopsy was performed on the body of Oranen who, as noted above, died at the scene of the crime.
On July 1, 1968, a complaint for double murder was filed in the municipal court against Guiamelon,
Florencio Odencio, Joseph Odencio and Angelico Aposaga, Poren's father-in-law. They waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. On September 19, 1968, an information was filed in the
Court of First Instance against Guiamelon Florencio Odencio and Joseph Odencio, The trial court
acquitted Joseph and convicted only Florencio and Guiamelon.
In his defense, Florencio, a thirty-two year-old farmer, denied that he shot Talib and that he had a
misunderstanding with Oranen and Talib with both of whom he was acquainted. Florencio testified that he
was in his house when the shooting occurred. He was arrested on the following day, June 30, 1968. He
surmised that he was implicated in the case because he did not support Mayor Doruelo, the incumbent
mayor, and, instead, he voted for Estaol, the candidate of the Liberal Party. Florencio's alibi was
corroborated by his wife and his brother-in-law, Antonio Cesar.
The other accused, Guiamelon Mama, a thirty-year-old farmer, adopted the same line of defense. He
declared that he was also in his house when Talib was shot; that he had no misunderstanding with Talib,
who is his father's brother-in-law, being the brother of his stepmother, his father's second wife; that he
was arrested while he was attending Talib's funeral, and that he came to know his co-accused Florencio
Odencio only in jail.
The accused presented Samuel Jubilan, a Constabularly Sergeant, who testified that he was present
when Patrolman Saada interrogated Talib and that the latter declared that he was not able to recognize
his assailant because it was dark. Saada said he did not know of that interrogation made by Jubilan.
In disbelieving the alibis of Florencio and Guiamelon, the trial court observed that the accused were
indubitably Identified as the assailants in Talib's dying declarations to his wife and Patrolman Saada.
Setie Mamalintao in her statement to the police declared that she was able to recognize Florencio and

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Guiamelon because there was a "big torch" in front of her house and Karaing's house (No. 19, Exh. 1, p.
11, Record).
The trial court noted that there "was a good amount of lighting in the yard of Prowa Talib because he was
preparing" supper when he was shot and that Setie was able to recognize the accused because she had
been acquainted with them for a long time. As stated above, two witnesses saw the accused in the
vicinity of Talib's house shortly after the shooting. Therefore, the contention of appellants' counsel de
oficio that they had not been sufficiently Identified as the killers cannot be sustained.
Another contention of counsel de oficio is that the trial court erred in finding that Guiamelon and Odencio
conspired to kill Talib and Oranen. That contention is belied by the evidence. Guiamelon and Odencio
were seen pacing back and forth near Talib's house on the day of the incident (No. 27, Exh. 1). They shot
the two victims in the same place and almost simultaneously, thus showing a coordination of efforts and
community of design.
On leaving the scene of the crime, they proceeded in the same direction (westward). They were animated
by the same motive, which was to liquidate the victims because the latter allegedly stole the carabaos of
the relatives of the accused. The record does not disclose any reason why Setie Mamalintao and
Patrolman Saada would frame up the appellants.
The manner in which they shot the victims shows treachery. The shooting was not the product of
momentary impulse. There was alevosia because the two malefactors, taking advantage of the cover of
night, stationed themselves in a place where they could shoot the victims with impunity without any risk to
themselves or without exposing themselves to any retaliation since the victims did not expect to be
assaulted at that time and place.
Appellants' counsel further contends that they were convicted on the basis of the wife's uncorroborated
testimony "which is open to suspicion due to inherent improbabilities'' and "motives to falsify the truth".
That contention is not correct. Talib's antemortem statement fortifies the testimony of his widow, an
eyewitness. We have stressed that two other witnesses saw the appellants leaving the scene of the
crime.
Moreover, Talib's dying declaration was sufficiently proven. The rule is that a dying declaration may be
oral or written If oral, the witness, who heard it, may testify thereto without the necessity, of course, of
reproducing exactly the words of the decedent, if he is able to give the substance thereof. An unsigned
dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by the witness who took it down. (See 5 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 315-316.)
We are satisfied that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As they were coconspirators, they are each liable for the two murders. There being no modifying circumstances
concomitant with the commission of the two assassinations, the trial court properly penalized each
murder with reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
The trial court's judgment is affirmed with the sole modification that the two appellants should be held
solidarity liable for the two indemnities of P12,000 each. In the service of the two reclusion perpetuas, the
forty-year limit fixed in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78794 November 21, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FELIPE ELIZAGA and MARCOS ELIZAGA (deceased), accused-appellants.
GANCAYCO, J.:
A person charged with conspiracy to commit a crime is presumed to be innocent, and the prosecution has
the burden to establish his guilt, his connection with, and participation in the conspiracy. This Court
reiterates this principle in this Decision acquitting herein appellant Felipe Elizaga of the crime of murder
and reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan in Criminal Case No. VIII-12
dated July 15, 1986.
The facts are as follows:
On October 8, 1967, while driving his jeep on Taquiqui Bridge in Gattaran, Cagayan, Tomas Foster saw
Wilson Stacy, a policeman, lying along a canal with a gunshot wound in his stomach. With the help of one
Romulo Tolentino, Stacy was carried into the jeep of Foster. They proceeded to the clinic of Dr. Pulmano
in Centro, Gattaran. On the way to the clinic, another man named Pedro Tapuro stopped the jeep to ride

77

with them. Tapuro, who was wounded in the arm, explained to Foster that he was the pilot of the canoe
which Stacy rode when the latter was shot.
When they arrived at the clinic, Dr. Pulmano immediately attended to the wounded policeman. While
Stacy was being treated, another policeman named Rodrigo Sales took his statement for the police
report. When asked as to what happened to him, Stacy answered, "I was shot by Marcos Elizaga, Iping
Elizaga, and Pabling Molina."
In as much as the clinic lacked the necessary medical facilities, Stacy had to be transferred to the
Calaminiugan Emergency Hospital. However, despite medical attendance, Stacy died on October 10,
1967.
On March 5, 1976, an Information was filed with the Court of First Instance of Aparri, Cagayan which
reads as follows:
The undersigned, Acting Provincial Fiscal, accuses Felipe Elizaga and Marcos Elizaga of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about October 8, 1967, in the municipality of Gattaran, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Felipe Elizaga and Marcos Elizaga, armed with
guns, conspiring together and helping each other, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Wilson
Stacy, inflicting upon him wounds on his body, which wounds caused his death. 1
Since Marcos Elizaga already passed away, only Felipe Elizaga, the herein appellant, appeared in court.
After due trial, Felipe Elizaga was convicted of murder in the Decision of the lower court dated July 15,
1986, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds accused Felipe Elizaga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Felipe
Elizaga is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of deceased Wilson Stacy the sum of Nine Thousand (
P9,000.00 ) Pesos as compensatory damages and the sum of Thirty Thousand ( P30,000.00 ) Pesos as
moral damages, and to pay the costs of this suit. 2
In his appeal, appellant Felipe Elizaga assigns the following errors on the part of the trial court:
First Error:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND CONSIDERING EXHIBIT "A" THE ALLEGED
DYING DECLARATION OF THE DECEASED WILSON STACY.
Second Error:
ASSUMING THAT THERE WERE THREE ASSAILANTS, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
CONSPIRACY AMONG THEM.
Third Error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF TREACHERY IN THE SHOOTING OF THE
VICTIM BY WHOEVER THE ASSAILANT WAS.
Fourth Error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION. 3
We disagree with the appellant that the lower court erred in admitting the dying declaration of Wilson
Stacy which is restated here as follows:
Q. Please state your name?
A. Wilson Stacy.
Q. What happened to you?
A. I was shot by Marcos Elizaga, Iping Elizaga and Pabling Molina.
Q. When and where were you shot?
A. Just right now at 4:30 PM this 8th day of October 1967, at the close traffic at Takiki Creek.
Q. How do you feel?
A. I think I am going to die if the Lord will not help me.
Q. In case you die do you want this statement of yours be brought to court for evidence?
A. Yes sir. 4
In order that a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, the following requisites must concur:
(a) That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending
death;

78

(c) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and


(d) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is the victim. 5
It is evident from the facts that the first, second, and fourth requisites of a valid dying declaration are
present in this case. With regard to the third requisite, there is no showing that the victim could not have
been a competent witness and so the presumption of competency must be sustained. As it has been
shown that all the above-mentioned requisites are present, the dying declaration of Stacy is clearly
admissible.
Having ruled on the admissibility of the dying declaration, the question now is this-"Can appellant Elizaga
be convicted of murder based on such dying declaration?" We answer in the negative. For an accused to
be convicted of murder, it is necessary that it be proved that he killed the victim or acted in conspiracy
with the one who killed him. This must certainly apply to appellant Elizaga.
Upon a careful examination of the records, We discovered that the conviction of appellant Elizaga was
based solely on the dying declaration of the victim Stacy. No eyewitness to the crime was presented in
court. Pedro Tapuro, the person who was actually with the victim when he was shot and who could have
given a detailed account of the whole incident, was never presented by the prosecution. Nobody testified
that he saw the appellant within the vicinity of the crime before, during, or right after the commission of
the crime. Neither did anyone attest that he saw the appellant in possession of a firearm or that he was
the gunman. On the contrary, two witnesses corroborated the defense of the appellant that in the morning
and afternoon of the day of the incident, appellant was in the store of Eustaquio Gumabao playing pool,
rendering it physically impossible for him to have killed the victim. One of these witnesses, Juanito Martin,
is even a colleague of the victim in the police force.
It is true that the dying declaration of Stacy is valid and admissible. However, this does not mean that it
will automatically convict the appellant of the crime of murder. Like any other dying declaration, its
credibility and weight should be determined by the court, applying the same rules used in testing the
weight and credibility of a testimony of a living witness. 6 In this particular case, it must be carefully
examined in order for the trial court to determine whether or not the same is sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In his dying declaration, Stacy mentioned three people as his assailants, namely: Marcos Elizaga, Pabling
Molina and Felipe Elizaga, appellant herein. Obviously, the said dying declaration does not prove that
petitioner was the one who fired the shot that injured and later killed the victim. This was admitted by the
lower court when it said:
True the evidence of the prosecution is bereft that accused Felipe Elizaga was the author of the multiple
gunshot wounds at the abdomen of deceased Stacy. And it is hard for the Court to believe that accused
Felipe Elizaga, Marcos Elizaga and Pabling Molina trained their respective guns in unison at one part of
the body, the abdomen of the late Stacy. ... 7
The only reason why the lower court found the appellant culpable was its belief that he was a coconspirator in the murder of the victim. Thus,
... Whoever among them whose (Marcos Felipe and Pabling) gun fire found its mark on the abdomen is of
no moment for (the) obvious reason that a conspirator is equally responsible for the acts of his coconspirator. The act of one is the act of
all. ... 8
Again, the finding of conspiracy was based by the lower court on the dying declaration of Stacy.
Therefore, the issue that has to be resolved in this case is whether or not there was conspiracy. The
Solicitor General submits that the lower court erred in making a finding of conspiracy. We agree.
Time and again, We have held that conspiracy, like any other ingredient of the offense, must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, not by mere conjectures. It is also a well-entrenched rule
that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish a finding of criminal conspiracy.
In this case, there is no factual basis for the finding of conspiracy by the lower court. There is no showing
of planning and concerted action on the part of the alleged
co-conspirators. No evidence was presented of the conduct of the supposed assailants before, during,
and after the crime from which it can be inferred that they were in conspiracy with each other. Indeed,
there is no concrete proof that appellant acted in any manner in conspiracy with the two other assailants.
At this point, it is but proper to quote the following observations of the Solicitor General:
Since a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it (Art. 8, par. 2, RPC), the proof necessary to show conspiracy requires

79

a showing:
1. That two or more persons came to an agreement;
2. That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and
3. That the execution of the felony be decided upon (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, llth ed., p. 137).
The record is bereft of any showing to support any of the above. There is no showing that a meeting of
the minds or agreement was arrived at by appellant and his two named companions, that there was an
agreement to bring about the death of Wilson Stacy and/or the wounding of Pedro Tapuro, or that the
perpetrators made up their minds or decided to commit the crime. In view of the paucity of evidence to
show conspiracy, we submit that conspiracy was not sufficiently established. 9
Since conspiracy has not been established, the individual responsibility of the appellant for the offense, if
he should be held responsible at all, must be determined from the nature of his participation in the
commission of the crime. As above-discussed, there is no evidence to this effect. There is no proof that
all the assailants were armed and if so, the kind of firearms they carried; as to who fired the fatal shot at
the victims, the role of the appellant during the incident, the motive for the killing; and such other material
details as may shed light on the killing and the degree of responsibility of the appellant. The court a quo
based on the aforecited dying declaration of the victim just assumed and concluded that it was appellant
who shot the victim in conspiracy with his two companions. No person can be convicted on mere
assumptions and conclusions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133964
February 13, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAMIL PEA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Ramil Pea was charged with murder in an Information which reads, thus:
That on or about the 8th day of December, 1995, in the municipality of Obando, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a
firearm with intent to kill one Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot the said Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer,
hitting the latter on the head thereby inflicting wound which directly caused the death of the said Jimbo
Pelagio y Ferrer.1
In the early morning of December 8, 1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver
working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When they reached their destination, he
ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle. Then, accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and
repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant
shot him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating
that a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana
rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and answer method, which he took down on
two sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio affixed his thumbmark on both sheets.
In his statement, Pelagio related how accused-appellant inflicted his injuries on him.
The owner of the tricycle, Wilfredo Lampa, after being informed that Pelagio had been shot, proceeded to
the hospital. There, Pelagio told him that it was accused-appellant who shot him and took away his
tricycle.
Francisca Pelagio, Jimbo Pelagios mother, also rushed to the hospital. Upon advice of the doctors,
Francisca brought her son to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. On February 6, 1996, Jimbo Pelagio
expired. According to Francisca, she spent P26,000.00 for his medical and funeral expenses.
For his part, accused-appellant claimed that he was in San Isidro, San Luis, Pampanga together with his
wife on the date of the incident. He went into hiding in the house of his uncle, Maximiano Guevarra, for
nine (9) months because he allegedly killed a certain Roger Wininsala. He came to know that he was
being accused of the murder of Pelagio, whom he did not know, only while he was in detention on a drug
charge.

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Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated by his uncle Maximiano Guevarra.


The trial court was not persuaded. On May 13, 1998, it rendered a decision, 2 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds RAMIL PEA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the victims mother, Francisca Pelagio, the amount
of P26,000.00 representing actual damages and the costs of suit.
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant shot Pelagio because
there is no evidence that a bullet was embedded in the skull of the victim. More specifically, the attending
physicians were not presented to testify that the victim died of a gunshot wound in the head.
Accused-appellant next claims that the evidence relied upon by the trial court is hearsay and
inadmissible. He argues that said evidence does not constitute res gestae. Particularly, he emphasizes
that "it was imperative on the part of the lower court that it should have appreciated the principle of res
gestae on the basis of the contents of Jimbo Pelagios statement reduced in handwritten form by SPO1
Bautista, and not on the dying declarations made by Jimbo Pelagio to SPO1 Bautista, Wilfredo Lampa
and Francisca Pelagio because these prosecution witnesses had all the time to contrive and improvise on
what was actually told them, allegedly by Jimbo Pelagio."3
The pivotal issue is whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses on the victims declaration can be considered as part of the res gestae, hence, an
exception to the hearsay rule.
The statement or declaration made by Pelagio, taken by SPO1 Bautista, reads:
T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency Hospital at kinukunan ka ng
salaysay?
S: Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEA sa ulo at kinuha and tricycle kong
minamaneho.
T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Pea?
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap na ika-4:15 ng umaga.
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Pea?
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.
T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Pea?
S: Opo.
T: Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
S: Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T: Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S: Si Rey Dagul.
T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Muntik na ho.
T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S: Ewan ko ho.4
The trial court ruled that Pelagios statement was a dying declaration since it was uttered at the point of
death and with consciousness of that fact due to the serious nature of his wounds. Thus, it admitted
Pelagios statement in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established in a long line of
cases. An ante-mortem statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1) at the time the
declaration was made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the
declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates
to facts which the victim was competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.5
The first element is lacking in the case at bar. It was not established with certainty whether Pelagio
uttered his statement with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain when he made his
statement, he expressly stated that accused-appellant only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.6
The significance of a victims realization or consciousness that he was on the brink of death cannot be
gainsaid. Such ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of death,

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all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining
serious injuries may be considered the incident speaking through the victim. It is entitled to the highest
credence.7
Granting that Pelagio, after giving his statement, later on realized that he was dying, his statement still
can not be considered a dying declaration. The crucial factor to consider is the contemporaneity of the
moment when the statement was made and the moment of the realization of death. The time the
statement was being made must also be the time the victim was aware that he was dying.
While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagios statement may nonetheless be admitted in
evidence as part of the res gestae. In People v. Marollano,8 this Court held:
The requisites for the admissibility of the victims ante mortem statement as part of the res gestae and
also as a dying declaration are present in this case, hence the same should be admitted under both
exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Citation omitted) While the admissibility thereof would naturally not be
affected whether viewed under either or both considerations, the advantage of resting the issue on the
aforesaid dual bases is that its admission would be invulnerable to a theorized absence of an element of
one of said exceptions. This is particularly important in this case, considering that the very identification of
the assailant and the accuracy thereof are essentially based on the declaration of the victim. (Emphasis
supplied)
A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.9
In People v. Naerta,10 this Court held that:
The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient
to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made
under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their
content.
Pelagios declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after a startling
occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.11
In People v. Hernandez,12 the infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of the body should
qualify by any standard as a startling occurrence. And the rule is that testimony by a person regarding
statements made by another as that startling occurrence was taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto, although essentially hearsay, is admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said
statements are natural and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, made before there had been
opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real fact that occurred, it being said that in these
cases, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the latter speaking of the event.
In this case, it is clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head of Pelagio qualified as a
startling occurrence. Notably, Pelagio constantly complained of pain in his head while his statement was
being taken by SPO1 Bautista, so much so that there was no opportunity for him to be able to devise or
contrive anything other than what really happened.
In People v. Putian,13 the Court held that although a declaration does not appear to have been made by
the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for that reason, is not admissible
as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the
commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued
in the declarants mind, it is admissible as part of the res gestae.
Indeed the defense admitted as much when it stated, thus:
We should stress that Jimbo Pelagios handwritten statement, or his declarations therein, were made
immediately after the res gestae or the principal act took place, and he had no time to contrive or devise,
while his statements directly concerned the occurrence in question and its immediate circumstances. We
should take note further that the handwritten statements contents are rather detailed in terms of the
specifics of the circumstances before, during and after the subject incident which elicits guarded
conclusion that notwithstanding Jimbo Pelagios physical condition at the Valenzuela Emergency
Hospital, he was conscious and lucid enough to intelligently respond rather spontaneously on the
questions propounded to him by SPO1 Bautista. These acts and statements made by Jimbo Pelagio
definitely constitute part of res gestae and not the testimonies and/or written statements of the three
prosecution witnesses in this case.14

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By stating, however, that the testimonies or the written statements of the three prosecution witnesses
were taken into consideration by the trial court as part of the res gestae betrays a misapprehension of
said principle. This Court agrees with the Solicitor General when it observed thus:
Since res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims or
spectators to a crime before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, they should
necessarily be the ones who must not have the opportunity to contrive or devise a falsehood but not the
persons to whom they gave their dying declaration or spontaneous statement. In other words, the witness
who merely testifies on a res gestae is not the declarant referred to in the second requisite whose
statements had to be made before he "had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood." (citation omitted)
Thus, even if there were intervening periods between the time the victim gave his account of the incident
to the prosecution witnesses and the time the latter first disclosed what the victim told them, the same will
not affect the admissibility of the victims declaration or statement as part of res gestae since it is sufficient
that such declaration or statement was made by the victim before he had time to contrive or devise a
falsehood.15
In any case, there is no reason why SPO1 Bautista would contrive or devise a falsehood especially on the
matter that Pelagio was shot on the head and that it was accused-appellant who shot him. As a police
officer, he was duty-bound to investigate and unearth the facts of the case. There is a presumption that
as an officer of the law, he sought only the truth. Besides, no motive was shown as to why he would
contrive or devise a falsehood against accused-appellant.
In his Investigation Report,16 SPO1 Bautista gathered that accused-appellant shot Pelagio from the
Radiologic Report conducted at the Valenzuela District Hospital wherein the presence of metallic
fragments was discovered. Moreover, the results of the C.T. Scan conducted on the victim showed the
presence of metallic fragments in his skull. In Pelagios Death Certificate,17 the underlying cause of death
was indicated as gunshot wound to the head.
There is, therefore, no merit in accused-appellants contention that there was no evidence that Pelagio
was shot in the head. It should be noted that accused-appellant pistol-whipped Pelagio repeatedly. The
Solicitor Generals following submission would, therefore, make sense:
Given the probability that he was already unconscious or his head had become numb due to severe head
injuries when accused-appellant shot him, it is not unlikely for the victim not to have known or felt being
shot and hit by accused-appellant on the head. This was probably the reason why in his initial declaration,
the victim merely stated that he was nearly shot by accused-appellant.18
Regardless, Pelagio categorically declared that it was accused-appellant who caused his head injuries
which eventually led to his death.1wphi1 SPO1 Bautistas testimony as well as Wilfredo Lampas and
Francisca Pelagios merely corroborated Pelagios statement that it was accused-appellant who caused
his head injuries.
The trial court found, thus:
The straightforward and consistent testimonies of the three vital prosecution witnesses bear the earmarks
of credibility. Further, there exists no ill motive on their part to prevaricate. This absence of evidence as to
an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no
improper motive existed and their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit (citation omitted), for
witnesses do not generally falsely impute to an accused a serious criminal offense were it not the
untarnished truth. (Citation omitted)
Settled is the rule that in the absence of any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued to impeach the findings of the trial court,
the appellate courts will not interfere with the trial courts findings on the credibility of the witnesses or set
aside its judgment, considering that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question for it had
heard the witnesses themselves during the trial. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter
that particularly falls within the authority of the trial court.19
However, this Court cannot agree with the trial court that the crime should be murder. While evident
premeditation and treachery were alleged in the information, the trial court did not state why the killing
was qualified to murder. The prosecution failed to establish the attendance of the qualifying
circumstances with concrete proof. The crime proved was only homicide.
In accordance with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant should be sentenced to
reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed
shall be the medium period of reclusion temporal, ranging from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,

83

accused-appellant shall be entitled to a minimum penalty, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree or prision mayor, in any or its periods, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.
As to the matter of damages, we hold that the trial court should have awarded civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.20 The award of P26,000.00 as actual
damages is upheld, being duly proven with receipts.21
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Ramil Pea is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim Jimbo Pelagio the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P26,000.00 as actual damages.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74740 August 28, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO SANCHEZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Aniceto L. Madronio, Sr. for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR, J.:
Appellant, with Juanito Zamora, was charged with the crime of arson in Criminal Case No. D-5402 before
Branch XLIV (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, in an Information the
accusatory portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about November 22, 1982, in the evening, in the barangay of Longos, municipality of Calasiao,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused Danilo Sanchez and Juanito Zamora aiding one another and conspiring with two others whose
identities are not yet known, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) set fire to the
residential house of Spouses Elpidio Nepuscua and Julieta Nepuscua worth P50,000.00 known to be
occupied at the time.
Contrary to Article 321 of the Revised Penal Code. 1
Only accused Danilo Sanchez could be served with the warrant of arrest. According to the return
indorsement dated 23 June 1983, his co-accused, Juanito Zamora, "could not be located in his indicated
address." 2
Accused entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. Trial then proceeded against him with the
prosecution presenting as its witnesses Demetrio Matabang, Pedro Parayno, Julieta Nepuscua and Cesar
Nepuscua. The lone eyewitness, Mr. Elpidio Nepuscua, could no longer be presented because he died on
13 December 1982. 3 He, however, signed a statement on 24 November 1982 before an investigator of the
Integrated National Police of Aguilar, Pangasinan wherein he implicated the accused as the person who
burned the house. 4 Upon the other hand, after the trial court denied 5 a Demurrer to Evidence, 6 the defense
presented as its witness the accused, Benedicto Mola and Herminigildo Mamaradeo.
On 20 March 1986, the trial court promulgated its decision 7 finding the accused guilty of the crime of Arson
as defined under Presidential Decree No. 1613 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment)" and to pay Julieta Nepuscua the sum of P50,000.00 representing the value
of the house. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Danilo Sanchez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arson as defined by Presidential Decree Number 1613 and considering the presence of the special
aggravating circumstance that the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant
of the property burned and the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, pursuant to Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree Number 1613, hereby
sentences accused Danilo Sanchez to serve and suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (Life
Imprisonment), to pay Julieta Nepuscua the sum of P50,000.00 representing the value of the house that
was burned, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Undaunted by his defeat and insisting on his innocence, accused immediately appealed the decision to the

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then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). 9 The records of the case were thus referred,
although erroneously, to the Intermediate Appellate Court on 12 May 1986. 10 The latter forwarded the
same to this Court on 5 July 1986. 11
In the Appellant's Brief, 12 accused imputes upon the trial court the commission of the following errors:
1. . . . in not considering the statement of Elpedio (sic) Nepuscua as hearsay evidence.
2. . . . in convicting the accused-appellant by considering the information made by Elpedio (sic) Nepuscua
to his wife Julieta Nepuscua and his son Cesar Nepuscua as part of the res gestae.
3. . . . in not giving credence to the defense of alibi interposed by the accused.
4. . . . in convicting the accused under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1613 considering that the
accused was charged under the provisions of Art. 321 of the Revised Penal Code. 13
The facts are not disputed.
Prior to 22 November 1982, the spouses Elpidio and Julieta Nepuscua were residents of Longos, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. They lived in a house valued at P50,000.00. On 21 November 1982, Julieta, her children and
three (3) grandchildren were evacuated by her husband to the house of his sister, Filomena Nepuscua,
allegedly because the accused and Juanito Zamora were angry with her (Julieta's) husband who reported
them to the police authorities for having cut, on 20 November 1982, the bamboo trees on a lot mortgaged
to them (Nepuscuas) by Maria Billota, mother of Juanito Zamora. At midnight of 22 November 1982, while
in the house of Filomena, Julieta was awakened first by a burst of gunfire and then by the barking of dogs
from the direction of their house, which was about 150 meters from Filomena's house. 14 She rushed to the
window and saw their house on fire. She woke up their children. 15
Elpidio and Juanita's only son, Cesar, who had arrived from Manila in the evening that same day and who
was also sleeping in the house of Filomena, witnessed the fire after being roused from sleep. He wanted
to go to their burning house but his mother prevented him from leaving as he could be harmed by those
responsible for the fire. The conflagration lasted for one and one-half (1 1/2) hours. Earlier that evening, he
was in their house but he left at about 11:30 o'clock for Filomena's house to spend the night there. At 3:00
o'clock in the early morning of 23 November 1982, Cesar left for Manila to report for work and to consult
with his uncle, Atty. Cirilo Nepuscua, about the burning of the house. 16
According to Julieta, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982, her husband arrived at the house
of Filomena and related to her that "on that evening of November 22, 1982, there were four (4) persons
who went near our house and they were carrying with them rice stalks or hay and then one of them called
out, saying "Tatay, tatay, bangon kayo ta ansakit so eges nen nanay, iyacar tayo ed hospital", which means,
"Father, father wake up because my mother is suffering from stomach (sic) ache and we will rush her to the
hospital." He further told her that on that same evening, Danilo Sanchez went up to the balcony of their
house carrying with him one (1) bundle of rice hay which he then set on fire thus causing the burning of
their house. 17
However, Cpl. Demetrio Matabang of the Integrated National Police of Aguilar, Pangasinan, testified that
although Elpidio reported the burning of their house to the police authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan on 23
November 1982, the latter did not mention the name of any suspect. 18
Later, Elpidio reported the incident to the 152nd P.C. Company Headquarters at Lingayen, Pangasinan; on
24 November 1982, both his and Julieta's sworn statements 19 were taken by Cpl. Matabang in the presence
of TSG Pedro Parayno of the said 152nd P.C. Company.
In his sworn statement, Elpidio narrated the burning incident. He categorically admitted therein that he
reported the incident to the Calasiao Police Station, but he did not mention the names of the culprits for
fear that he and his family would be placed in danger once the culprits discovered that they had been
identified as suspects. Thus:
23. Q Did you ever made (sic) a report to the Police Station of Calasiao, Pangasinan, that your house was
set fired (sic) by those subject persons named-above (sic)?
A Yes sir, I reported the same on the following morning, November 23, 1982, but I did not made (sic)
mentioned of (sic) any names, knowing that my life and the life of my family is (sic) in danger once those
persons involved will come to know that I suspected them in (sic) doing the same and besides my plan is
(sic) to report this to this PC Headquarters. 20
At the time the four (4) persons (allegedly, the accused, Juanito Zamora and two other unidentified persons)
arrived at the house, Elpidio was actually under the same and thus he was able to recognize the accused
and Zamora because of the illumination caused by the burning rice hay. 21 He also declared that:
22. Q When your house was already on fire and that those suspects have (sic) already left, what did you
do, any?

85

A I already run (sic) to the house of my sister where my family were (sic) and told them that it was Danilo
Sanchez, Juanito Zamora and two (2) unidentified others who burned our house.
Matabang and Parayno then indorsed the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
On 18 December 1982, Elpidio Nepuscua died. 22
It was only on 8 February 1983 that the Office of the Provincial Fiscal prepared the Information for Arson
against the accused and Juanito Zamora. It was actually filed in court on 28 February 1983. 23
There can, therefore, be no question that the only eyewitness to the burning of the house was Elpidio
Nepuscua. Unfortunately, he died even before the Information was prepared and filed. Thus, he could no
longer testify during trial.
The core issue then is whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt to overcome the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees every
person accused of a crime.
A careful scrutiny of the records discloses that the prosecution relied solely on the sworn statement of
Elpidio Nepuscua wherein he named the accused, Juanito Zamora, and two others whom he failed to
identify, as the parties who set his house on fire, and the testimony of his wife Julieta Nepuscua to the effect
that on 21 November 1982, she, her children and three (3) grandchildren were evacuated by Elpidio to the
house of her sister-in-law, Filomena Nepuscua, because herein accused and Juanito Zamora were angry
with Elpidio because the latter reported them for having cut on 20 November 1982 the bamboo trees that
were mortgaged to them (Nepuscuas) by Maria Billota, Juanito's mother. Julieta also declared that at 4:00
o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982 four (4) hours after the burning of the
house Elpidio told her that in the evening of 22 November 1982, four (4) persons carrying rice stalks
went near their house; one of them uttered "father, father wake up because my mother is suffering from
stomach (sic) ache and we will rush her to the hospital"; thereafter, Danilo Sanchez went up to the
balcony of their house carrying a bundle of rice stalks and set the same on fire. The court admitted in
evidence Elpidio's sworn statement and considered Elpidio's declaration to Julieta as part of res gestae.
In the light of the above facts, the first assigned error must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon, 24 affidavits must be
rejected, in judicial proceedings; the same would be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay. The reason for
this is that an accused has the Constitutional right "to meet the witnesses face to face" 25 or to confront
the witnesses against him. 26 To safeguard this right, Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides
that the examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under
oath or affirmation. The most that the trial court could have done was to admit the sworn statement of
Elpidio Nepuscua merely as part of the testimony of the peace officer who conducted the investigation;
assignment of any probative value to it could not be done without violating the hearsay rule and infringing
upon the above-stated right of the accused.
The second assigned error must likewise be resolved in favor of the accused. The so-called statement
uttered by Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife Julieta at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1982,
or four (4) hours after the burning, implicating accused, should not have been admitted as part of the res
gestae.
Section 42 of Rule 130 provides:
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
Res gestae means the "things done". 27 It "refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the
declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement." 28 A spontaneous exclamation is defined as "a
statement or exclamation made immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and
asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him. The admissibility of such exclamation
is based on our experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress
of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their
control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual
sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under
the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the

86

brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,' the utterance
may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him." 29 In a
manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded
as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself. 30 Or, stated
differently, ". . . the events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted
language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the language is assumed to preclude the
probability of its premeditation or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a
good deal of reason, as a guarantee of its truth." 31
There are, therefore, three (3) requisites for the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances. 32
In People vs. Ner, 33 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Concepcion, held:
. . . All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made
under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration 34 before he had
time to think and make up a story, 35 or to concoct or contrive a
falsehood, 36 or to fabricate an account, 37 and without any undue influence in obtaining it, 38 aside from
referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances. 39
The cases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling
event and the making of the declaration. What is important is that the declarations were voluntarily and
spontaneously made "so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of
design or deliberation . . ." 40
In the light of the foregoing principle on res gestae and the settled jurisprudence thereon, We find the
questioned statement of Elpidio Nepuscua to his wife to be lacking in spontaneity and to have been given
after he had the luxury of time to concoct a story or fabricate an account. If indeed he was at his house at
the time the accused and the latter's alleged companions came, and the burning took place at midnight,
considering that the house of Filomena where his wife and children were sleeping was only 150 meters
away, and there being no evidence at all that he was prevented through threats and intimidation by the
accused and his companions or that he was struck by fear which immobilized him from immediately
leaving the scene of the fire, no plausible reason may be summoned to justify or explain his nearly fourhour delay in reporting the incident to his wife and other members of his family. He could easily negotiate
that distance in less than five (5) minutes. Doubtless, the burning of their house was no ordinary event;
such a dastardly occurrence caused an irreparable loss of property and rendered them homeless. The
shock and excitement it naturally produced was more than enough to propel his feet to bring him to his
family as soon as possible. It behooved Elpidio to relay the tragic event to those dear to him without any
delay; thus, his conduct cannot be reconciled with human experience, ordinary habits of men and
common sense. It could, however, be easily reconciled if he were, in fact, with his family in the house of
Filomena during the fire. If he evacuated his family to the house of Filomena on 21 November 1982
because he was afraid of the accused and Juanito Zamora, there was no reason at all for him to risk his
life and limb by staying alone in their house. That he was not in the house at the time of the burning
seems to be supported by the conduct of the members of his family. As testified to by Julieta and her son
Cesar, they just looked out the window of Filomena's house while their own house was burning. They
never mentioned that they expressed fears as to Elpidio's fate, if in fact the latter was left in the house. All
that Julieta could do was to prevent Cesar from returning to their burning house for fear that the persons
who set it on fire would harm him. Cesar then left for Manila at 3:00 o'clock early the next morning, 23
November 1982, barely three (3) hours after the fire. He did not proceed to their house to find out what
had happened to his father. By that time, worry over Elpidio's fate did not seize or overcome both Julieta
and Cesar. If indeed Elpidio was in their house before the fire and he left the scene only four (4) hours
later, the conduct of his wife and son seemed too unnatural.
Another badge of untrustworthiness attributable to the alleged statement given by Elpidio to his wife is his
deliberate suppression of the names of the "suspects" when he reported the incident to the police
authorities of Calasiao, Pangasinan in the morning of 23 November 1982. The reasons given therefor are
palpably untenable. In the first place, there is no evidence that the accused and his companions had a
reputation for being violent; if they were known for their violence and Elpidio was so afraid of revealing
their names, then he would have kept their identities in pectoris. This he failed to do during the

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investigation at the P.C. Headquarters the following day despite the absence of any assurance of
protection.
After everything is said and done, it is clear to Us that serious doubts surround the questioned statement
of Elpidio to his wife, especially when viewed in the light of the probability of concoction he had every
reason to get even with the accused and Juanito Zamora.
Accused then deserves an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. This conclusion renders
unnecessary further disquisitions on the remaining assigned errors. It may however be pointed out that,
as to the fourth assigned error, the Fiscal who conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the
Information, 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Pedro T. Fernandez, charged the accused and Juanito
Zamora with the crime of Arson as defined and penalized under Article 321 (Other forms of Arson) of the
Revised Penal Code. He must have been unaware of P.D. No. 1613, entitled Amending the law on Arson,
which was promulgated on 11 November 1980, or more than two (2) years earlier, repealing clause of
which provides:
Sec. 9. Repealing clause. The provisions of Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code and all
laws, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
Decree are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
The proper charge should have been for a violation of P.D. No. 1613. However, the crimes defined and
punished in Article 321 are also included in said decree although, inter alia, the latter imposes varying
penalties depending on the nature, character or use of the property burned, and provides for the effects of
special aggravating circumstances. The allegations in the information sufficiently charge an offense
defined and penalized in P.D. No. 1613. Hence, having voluntarily pleaded thereto without any question,
the accused could be convicted for the violation of P.D. 1613. The inaccuracy or error committed by the
Fiscal was not a fatal defect. We take this opportunity, however, to advise Prosecutors to exercise utmost
care in the preparation of Informations to the end that no injustice would be done to the accused and no
prejudice would befall the State whose interest they are bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from in Criminal Case No. D-5402 of Branch XLIV of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
charged with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146710-15
March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD
DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738
March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that
he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The
warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues
embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the
relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner
believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a
six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but
surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto

88

Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled
"I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor
Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred
by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino
Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then
headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the
other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the
move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued
a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to
step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. 3 Two days later or on October
13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner. 4
Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner
take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus.
Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his
office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar
Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II
also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry. 9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling
coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker
Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses
of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started. 14
The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as
prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo,
Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors
led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as
defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of
Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the
House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was
covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were
the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings
was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she
was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents
involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000. 15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it
resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that
the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. 18
The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the
metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were

89

delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.


On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective
resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment
proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion. 20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of
people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue
in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in
the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more
people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President
where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National
Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to
the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands
of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000
strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders
gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner
exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering
his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope. 26 There was no turning
back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary.
Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser
Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive
Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and antiEstrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed
all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent
Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued the
following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be
a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges
that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: 31

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"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy
was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m. 33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of
Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent
request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001,
which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the
authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20,
2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.1wphi1.nt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys. 34
Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23,
in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio
Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo. 35
US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US
recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37 The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House
of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives
to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner
in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. 40 A few days later, she
also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act. 41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President. 42 The
next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes"
with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44
The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178. 45
Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio
and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against
the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to
run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up
from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001. 49 In another survey conducted by the ABSCBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted
President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55%
in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social
classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's
or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases

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previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of
Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines
Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 000-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the
following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and
Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 14671015, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos.
146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within
a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the
consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on
or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing,
Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban 52 recused themselves on motion of
petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag
that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but
nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file
their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement
for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court
resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office
of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited
for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for
decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II

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Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution
of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence,
are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases
at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended
the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14 th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by
foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the
Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the
shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the
courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of
powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the
United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled
out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of
'political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the
reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. 59 Heretofore, the judiciary
has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. 60
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the
so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this
Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of
habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v.

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President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at
bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political
question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited
cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful
revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63
declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning
that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial
scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the
EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. 64 In her oath, she categorically swore to
preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the
powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject
of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of
speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the
cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of
the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call
for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine
quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898,
provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas
or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of
association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to
send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved
when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried
over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution.
These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident.
The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring
individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth;
third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it
is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the
precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." 69 In this sense, freedom of
speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of
a society can take place without destroying the society."70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the
Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of
assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this
means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court
similar stressed that " it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the
people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."

94

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1
of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11 76
of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They
also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in
vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of
the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from
a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the
Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of
the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a
high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78 The validity of a
resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can
be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he
evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and
omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the
succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives.
Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of
Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in
tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and
Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The
call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to
open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16
was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number
grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the
morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA,
hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m.,

95

petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed,
seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)" 80 An hour later
or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not
be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time.
At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the
petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their
pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president.
According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of
"dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was
falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of
making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be
allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner
expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes)
guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had
reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the
five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara
and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful
and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily
agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of
January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition
period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and
his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. 87
Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on
the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that
he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear
his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa
red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm
tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when
he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective
on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the

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President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does
not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for
in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that
during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact.
The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the
petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes
and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of
the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic
of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security
of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.

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The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore
attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot
and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have
been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG
is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I
do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges
that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given
him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him

98

in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20,
2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer
to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases
at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press
release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing.
Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If
it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared
after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the
presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation
is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal
significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign
as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No.
3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate,
did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship
speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any
act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or
retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this
Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph
of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15
above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly
focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill.
There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with
pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be
obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to
prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code.
To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional
right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the
time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution,
such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings

99

against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.


There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records
show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction
to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates
of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section
12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private
prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and
the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against
petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability
claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of
the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent
Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers
and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress
shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within fortyeight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1
2
Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
3

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4
5
6

Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;

Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;96

7
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND
EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF
THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National
Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national
healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus
by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the
individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must
ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the
attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation,
to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national
interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which
states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both
Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader

101

Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence
and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of
the Philippines qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change
and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of
purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity
despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such
vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both
Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of
the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:

102

"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO


Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio
and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January
16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in
the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as
President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court
cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103
there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and
duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most
enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910
case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued
petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for
damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court,

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speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:


" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will,
unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the
execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free
from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the
contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of
the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed
in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is
properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal
and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or
his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever
country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the
state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages
which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine
Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all
in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a
case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he
decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men,
reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to
act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts,
not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of
his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from
suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief
executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials
of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust
as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then
came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive
immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The
King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel,
former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by
this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also
from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of
the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include
not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who
acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS
(or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive

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immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of
Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos
violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the
anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People
Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the
executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J.
Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity
provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking
out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence
that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him
that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in
Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution
was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that
he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the
events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual
bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a
better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings
and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional
Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation
of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz: 110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the
impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily
dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects
of it may continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been
aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are
inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The
cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with posttenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for

105

unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and
the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. 114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In
the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to
produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven
advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other
offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted
co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the
President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from
office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US
Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot
prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice."
In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the
president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the
occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones 117 where it held that the US President's
immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial
conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. 118
It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and
take positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 120 It set the rule that 'the
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel." 121 It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and
endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given
fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a
non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. 125 The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the
right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or
annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the
case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair

106

trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the
trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to
seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and
fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity
lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard offcourt evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage
of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al.,
we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case
does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc. 130
and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes,
its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For
sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a
fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the
seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a
b The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and
in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or
decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic
value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of
outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion.
To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of
justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be
provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system
of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
c The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a

107

common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the


functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to
those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in
the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit
government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free
exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial
courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a
right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the
integrity and quality of what takes place.
d Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right
to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal
trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials,
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the
press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these
are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant
Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed,
their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered
any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note,
did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting
from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin
the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to
offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. 131 He needs to show more weighty
social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a
special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has
been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has
yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be
unfavorable to the petitioner.1wphi1.nt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To
quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of
slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs." 132
News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged
the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be
influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news
reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light
of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good
faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the
theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman
flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation

108

prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are
reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they
believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking
slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the
majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more
threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been
categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to
do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce
calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose
judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of
number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the
rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the
right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts,
however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw
away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts
are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, under an information 1 dated July 13, 1992, which reads as
follows:
That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and
cooperating together and helping one another, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter
was drinking liquor with his friends as Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and carried away
using the PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the said Bienvenido
Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution
presented four witnesses. 2 On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.
The materials facts and events as found by the court a quo are:
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr.
were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his
child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat." 3
When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told
him "not to run because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with
them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and
informed the latter's mother of the abduction.
The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish

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that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former's
kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing.
On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on
August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped. 4
On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment 5 finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral suffering." 6
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly
illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does
not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In Kidnapping, what is important is to
determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not
exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by
the simple expedient of disposing of their victim's bodies.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty, which is the essential
element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy
with the two other unknown individuals "as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose." 7 Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances only. 8 The circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the participation
of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.
The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his two
companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and
neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two
companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to "Tarsing's Store" to check if a certain person
was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latter's presence
was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed
by the billiard hall with Bernal's companions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both
Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim
were drinking at "Tarsing's Store" on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them.
After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the store and asked for
"Payat." When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed "Payat," hew was handcuffed and taken away
by the unidentified men.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January
1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty
even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it
again because she (was) a married woman. 9 Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason for
Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled
with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused
was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. 10 Openda, Jr.'s revelation to
Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section

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38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:


Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so
far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to
assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is,
pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal. 11
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3)
that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his
aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true." 12
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is
admissible in evidence 13 because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own
detriment. 14
In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarino's testimony. He alleges that the latter
could not have seen the actual handcuffing because "Tarsing's Store" could not be seen from the billiard
hall. Sagarino's testimony shows that after Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back
with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed.
Q The three of them together?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what about you, where did you stay?
A I just stayed in the billiard hall.
Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see next?
A The two came back.
Q Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back?
A The companions of Bernal.
Q And what did these two men do?
A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda. 15
From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested. The lower
court correctly rejected this argument by holding that:
But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or Tarcing
store. On the contrary, he says that he had not known who the person was that Bernal referred to when
he requested one of this two companions to go see if that person was still there at the store, and that he
came to know that he was Openda, Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass by the billiard hall already
handcuffed, with the two unidentified companions of Bernal with him, on their way out to the main road. 16
If one had a direct view of "Tarsing's Store" from the billiard hall, Bernal would not have requested his
companion to check if Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out
by Bernal arose from the testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:
Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned (sic) with his child, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, because I was still in the store. 17
On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:
Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you able to see him again?
A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back and proceeded to Tarcing
Store and arrested Jun-jun Openda. When these two men brought out Jun-jun Openda, fifteen minutes
later, Bernal came.
Q Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)
A He was coming from outside.
Q He has with him his son?
A He was with nobody, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q He was alone?

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A Yes, sir. 18
The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other as to be
irreconcilable. Considering the proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a possibility that when
Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store, the latter could have already brought home his son before
proceeding alone to the billiard hall where he was seem by Segarino. 19
Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino's testimony by imputing revenge as his motive for
testifying. He alleges that on July 29, 1991, or six days before the alleged kidnapping, five policemen
arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car asking for Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza,
Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they were residents of the place and staying at the
billiard hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and went to the places he mentioned.
Q Minutes later do you know what happened?
A They came back.
Q What did you do after they came back?
A I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons they were looking (for) ?
Q What was their answer?
A They answered in the negative.
Q Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do ?
A I asked the police officers why they were looking for these persons.(?)
Q What was the answer of the policemen?
A The police officer said that those people were wanted by them because accordingly (sic) they were
marijuana pushers. 20
Bernal's position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made by
pursuing policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous.
The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any ill-motive against
Bernal. If the latter's allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been arrested by the police at the
time he gave his testimony in court. No such arrest was, however, made.
The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino sufficient
to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarino's forthright answers to the questions of the prosecutor and
defense counsel clearly establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping or Openda, Jr.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself. 21 This Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established rule that the findings
of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and
cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decided the question of credibility of
witnesses. 22
We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to resurface. Considering
the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.
Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, recommended to this Court
the penalty of seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as
maximum. The maximum penalty must be determined in accordance with rules and provision of the
Revised Penal Code. With respect to the minimum penalty, however, "it is left entirely within the discretion
of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without reference to the periods
into which it may be subdivided." 23 Consistent with this ruling, this Court imposes reclusion temporal, in
its maximum period, as the minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision
dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123924
December 11, 2003
HEIRS OF MIGUEL FRANCO, namely: MODESTA, LEONIDES ROMULA, EMMA, JOHNNY, RAMON,
BERNARDO, PACITA, all surnamed FRANCO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF FAUSTINA CABADING, represented by VICTORIA
CABADING, respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to overturn a Decision rendered by the Fourteenth

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Division of the Court of Appeals1 on 6 October 1995 in CA G.R. CV No. 37609. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 7 2 ("RTC") and ordered the
cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 issued in the name of Miguel Franco (whose heirs are the petitioners
herein), and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title for Lot No. 5172-B, PSD-64806, in favor of
the heirs of Quintin Franco3 ("Quintin"). Quintin was the patentee4 of a parcel of public land, surveyed as
Lot No. 5172, Cad. 85 Ext. ("subject property"), located at Lianib, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, and
containing an area of 70.6381 hectares. Being the patentee, Original Certificate of Title No. P-436
covering subject property was issued in Quintins name on 9 July 1954.
Quintin died intestate on 8 December 1967. His brother, Miguel Franco ("Miguel,"), filed a Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration on 17 October 1968, before the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte ("intestate court"), praying that he be appointed as administrator of Quintins estate.
This Petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. R-531, was opposed by Faustina Franco Vda. De Cabading
("Faustina"), the sister of the decedent, on the ground that Miguel was unfit to be the administrator. 5 She
prayed for her own appointment as administratrix instead of Miguel. Upon motion of Miguel, the intestate
court appointed him as special administrator of the estate on 3 December 1969. 6 However, on 23 July
1971, Faustina, then apparently joined by the other heirs of Quintin except Miguel,7 moved for the latters
removal as special administrator.
On 27 August 1973, the intestate court issued an Order 8 declaring inter alia that, based on the evidence,
Quintin was the absolute owner of the subject property. This finding was subsequently used by the
intestate court as one of the grounds for granting the motion to remove Miguel as special administrator,
per the Order dated 1 September 1973. In the latter Order, the intestate court said that since Miguel was
claiming ownership over half of the subject property, his conflicting interest rendered him incapable of
rendering a true and faithful account of the estate.9
Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the 1 September 1973 Order, wherein he alleged for the
first time that one-half of the subject property was transferred to him by virtue of a document entitled
"General Power of Administration" and executed by Quintin in 1967. It was also discovered that on the
basis of this "General Power of Administration" Miguel had filed a Petition dated 2 January 1972 before
Branch 1 of the Dipolog Court of First Instance, docketed as Misc. Sp. No. 2993, 11 seeking the
cancellation of OCT No. P-436. This Petition was granted in the Order12 of 6 January 1973, wherein it
was directed that the new transfer certificates of title be issued, one in the name of the heirs of Quintin
and the other name of Miguel. Thus, Miguel was able to obtain Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T20203, covering half of the subject property, on 13 February 1973.13
The other heirs asked the intestate court to cancel TCT No. T-20203 shortly after learning about it
through a Motion for Reconsideration filed in the estate proceedings. On 4 May 1977, the intestate court
issued an order14 cancelling TCT No. T-20203 issued in the name of Miguel, on the ground that Miguels
acquisition of the title was fraudulent. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order in its Decision 15 of 29
February 1984. According to the appellate court, the intestate court had no jurisdiction to settle questions
of property ownership.16 This Court, in a Resolution17 dated 1 October 1984, affirmed the ruling of the
Court of Appeals.
Consequently, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed before the RTC a complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3847, seeking the cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 in the name of Miguel, who had died in the
meantime.18 After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.19 The RTC found that the
"General Power of Administration" evinced an existing trust relation between Quintin and his brother
Miguel, with Quintin as the signatory thereof acknowledging that he was holding half of the property titled
in his name in trust for Miguel. Applying Article 145220 of the Civil Code, the RTC concluded that a trust
had been created by force of law in favor of Miguel to the extent of one-half of the property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered on 6 October 1995 the challenged Decision21 reversing the
RTC decision, ordering the cancellation of TCT No. T-20203 and directing the issuance of a new transfer
certificate of title in the name of the Heirs of Quintin. The appellate court concluded that Miguel had
succeeded in registering the property through fraud, surreptitious conduct, and bad faith. As basis, it
recited the following circumstances:
1. In his petition for the issuance of letters of administration, Miguel admitted that the subject property in
its entirety belonged to his brother, Quintin, with his inclusion of the entire property in the list of properties
left behind by Quintin, without asserting ownership over it or any part thereof; 22
2. The intestate court had declared that Quintin was the absolute owner of the subject property and
dismissed, for lack of sufficient evidence, the claim of Miguel to half of the property; 23

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3. OCT No. P-436, covering the entire subject property, was registered as early as 9 July 1954 but it was
only on 13 February 1973 that Miguel Franco obtained the TCT covering half of the property in his name.
His silence for 19 years had militated against his claim of ownership and may well be indicative of laches
on his part;24
4. The subject property was solely declared for taxation purposes in the name of Quintin;25
5. The "General Power of Administration," on which Miguel anchored his claim of ownership, had simply
documented a delegated power to administer property and could not be a source of ownership; 26
6. The Order dated 6 January 1973 of Judge Rafael Mendoza in Misc. Sp. Proc. No. 2993, which directed
the cancellation of OCT No. P-436 was issued without factual basis. Section 112 of the old Land
Registration Act which was the apparent basis of the Order contemplated only summary proceedings for
non-controversial erasures, alterations or amendment of entries in a certificate of title and therefore could
not be invoked if there is no unanimity among the parties, or if one of them had posed an adverse claim
or serious objection which would render the case controversial.27
After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners brought forth the
present petition. While asserting that the transfer and registration of one-half of the subject property in the
name of Miguel was not done through fraud or in bad faith, they point out that at no time did the
respondents question the execution or genuineness of the "General Power of Administration" which
purportedly admits of the existence of a trust relation between Quintin and Miguel. They also claim that
the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the recognition which Quintin had accorded to the rights and
interest of Miguel.
The findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals are contradictory; hence, the review of the case is in
order.28 After a thorough examination of the case, we hold that the petition lacks merit and affirm the
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Miguels claim of ownership to half of the subject property is belied by his statement in the Verified
Petition29 for issuance of letters administration that he filed on 17 October 1968. Therein, he stated:
"7. That said Quintin Franco left the following properties:
a A parcel of agricultural land located at Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte known as Lot No. 5172, Dipolog
Cadastre-85 Ext., Cad. Case No. 9. LRC Cad. Rec. No. 769, (S.A. 7612), covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P-436, under Tax Dec. No. 676, assessed at P26,120.00, with an area of 706,381 sq. m.
(citations omitted)
While he explicitly declared that the subject property belonged to Quintin, at the same time he was
remarkably silent about his claim that he acquired one-half thereof during the lifetime of Quintin. He
asserted his claim to the subject property quite belatedly, i.e., four years after he stated under oath and in
a court pleading that it belonged in its entirety to his brother. Thus, the statement and the accompanying
silence may be appreciated in more than one context. It is a declaration against interest 30 and a judicial
admission combined.
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in
dispute.31 In the same vein, a judicial admission binds the person who makes the same, and absent any
showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.32
In the case at bar, there is no showing of palpable mistake on the part of Miguel when he made the
admission. In his Motion to Admit Amended Petition, he merely alleged inadvertence in failing to state his
claim of co-ownership. Yet no evidence was adduced to prove the alleged inadvertence. And even
assuming there was indeed such a mistake, Miguel had ample opportunity to make the rectification in the
initial stages of the intestate proceedings.
Bearing on the weight of the combined declaration against interest and judicial admission is the
assumption, arising from his duty as special administrator of the estate of Quintin, that he had full
knowledge of the status and extent of the property holdings of the decedent.33 The following observation
of the Court of Appeals is worth citing:
"This tolerant silence militates against Miguel Francos claim of co-ownership. Juxtaposed with his
previous judicial admission of Quintin Francos absolute ownership of Lot No. 5172, it is not difficult to see
that the act of Miguel Franco in registering one-half of the property in his name was an insidious and
surreptitious, if not belated, maneuver to deprive the legal heirs of Quintin Franco of their lawful share and
interest in the property. As a matter of fact, Miguel Franco may well be charged with laches." 34
The statement under oath of Miguel was made in the intestate proceedings.1wphi1 It was presented in
evidence and utilized as such in Civil Case No. 3847.35 Thus from the substantive and procedural
standpoints alike, the statement being both a declaration against interest and judicial admission should be

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accorded the full evidentiary value it deserves.


Another important point, albeit simply corollary. The intestate court in its Order36dated 27 August 1973
declared that Quintin was the absolute owner of the property and accordingly denied Miguels claim of
ownership over half the subject property. The Order was apparently issued for the purpose of determining
which properties should be included for the inventory of the estate of Miguel. While the intestate court
does not have the authority to rule with finality on questions of ownership over the property of the
decedent, it is not precluded from making a provisional determination over such questions for purposes
relevant to the settlement of the estate, such as ruling whether or not to include properties in the inventory
of the estate.37 And yet, at no time did Miguel file a motion for the reconsideration of the 27 August 1973
Order of the intestate court which denied Miguels claim of ownership. It was the 1 September 1973 Order
of the intestate court, by virtue of which Miguel was removed as special administrator, that he
contested.38 While the 27 August 1973 Order is a provisional determination of ownership over the subject
property, yet conformably to ordinary experience any prudent claimant is expected to dispute such an
order which rejects his claim of ownership. Miguels inaction unmistakably bolsters the unshakeable
weight that should be accorded the statement as a declaration against interest and a judicial admission.
Now, the issue viewed from the perspective of the Torrens system of registration. Under the Land
Registration Act, title to the property covered by a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after the expiration
of one year from the entry of the decree of registration. The decree is incontrovertible and becomes
binding on all persons whether or not they were notified of, or participated in, the in rem registration
process.39 OCT No. P-436, covering the subject property in its entirety, was registered as early as 9 July
1954 in the name of Quintin. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership of registered land. 40
Whatever claim of ownership Miguel had raised should have been weighed against Quintins title.
Unfortunately, the Dipolog RTC, Branch 1 apparently ignored this fundamental principle when on 6
January 1973 it issued the Order directing the registration of half of the subject property in the name of
Miguel.
The undue haste which characterized Miguels success in obtaining judicial registration of his ownership
over half of the subject property is noticeable. His petition seeking the issuance of a title over his
purported half of the property was dated 2 January 1973, and yet incredibly, it was granted only four days
later, or on 6 January 1973. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted:
"The order dated January 6, 1973 of Judge Rafael T. Mendoza in Misc. Sp. Proc. No. 2993, directing the
Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. P-436 and to issue new separate transfer certificates of title for Lot
No. 5172-A and Lot No. 5172-B to the Heirs of Quintin Franco and Miguel Franco, respectively, was
therefore without factual basis. Besides, it would appear that the order was based on Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) which contemplates summary proceeding for non-controversial
erasures, alterations, or amendments of entries in a certificate of title. . . . "41
It is clear from reading Section 112 of the old Land Registration Act42 that the same may be utilized only
under limited circumstances.43 Proceedings under Section 112 are summary in nature, contemplating
corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.44 More
importantly, resort to the procedure laid down in Section 112 would be available only if there is a
"unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest."45 Such unanimity among the parties has been held to mean "the absence of serious controversy
between the parties in interest as to the title of the party seeking relief under said section." 46 Clearly, there
was no such unanimity among the parties in interest, namely, all the heirs of Quintin. The surreptitious
registration by Miguel of the property had worked to the prejudice of the other heirs of Quintin.
There is no document in existence whereby the ownership of any portion of the subject property was
conveyed by Quintin to Miguel. The "General Power of Administration" does not suffice in that regard.
Indeed, it does not contain any language that operates as a conveyance of the subject property.
The RTC ruling, from which petitioners draw heavy support, maintained that Miguel owned half of the
property because the document entitled "General Power of Administration" states that it "admits of an
existing trust relation between the signatory Quintin Franco on the one hand, and Miguel Franco on the
other hand."47 The RTC cited Article 1452 of the Civil Code which reads, thus:
Art. 1452. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is
taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
others in proportion to the interest of each.
Article 1452 presupposes the concurrence of two requisites before an trust can be created, namely: that
two or more persons agree to purchase a property, and that they consent that one should take the title in

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his name for everyones benefit.48 The aforementioned provision is not applicable in this case, as it clearly
speaks of an instance when the property is acquired through a joint purchase by two or more persons.
That circumstance is not present in this case since the subject property was acquired through Quintins
application for a patent. There is no proof that Miguel had joined Quintin in acquiring the property.
Lastly, as noted by the Court of Appeals, while tax receipts and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 49 The
subject property had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of Quintin, and this
fact taken in conjunction with the other circumstances inexorably lead to the conclusion that Miguels
claim of ownership cannot be sustained.
Thus, even without having to inquire into the authenticity and due execution of the "General Power of
Administration," it is safe to conclude that Miguel did not have any ownership rights over any portion of
the subject property and that the registration of half of the property in his name was baseless and afflicted
with fraud.
WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
decision of the Court of appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of
Appeals on June 30, 1995 1 which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence
filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.
The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against
herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the
aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero
and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the
niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of
petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any
ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin,
executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement 2 adjudicating unto himself,
allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a
consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin
Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora
Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for
reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora
Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the late
Teodora Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of the
plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which
was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees for the
willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora

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Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said
deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of the
spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. 3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the
following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a
family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed
records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes
Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and
Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place
of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to
the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin
and Teodora Guerrero. 4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these
exhibits to which a Comment 5 was filed by herein private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence on the ground that petitioners
failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172
of the Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding
her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that
it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation.
Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental
is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed
by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein
petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for crossexamination. 6
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing
the complaint for reconveyance. 7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence
presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are
all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners
failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and
filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's legitimacy, and
second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and
independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is
important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the
erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an
action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to
prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually fixes a civil status for the child born in
wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned
only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is
more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy
of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any
contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and
171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action
can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.

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Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no
longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock
from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as
to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts
occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none
even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. 9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot
be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further
consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is
rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on
herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is
disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise
appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the
issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does
not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue,
the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. 10 The presumption of
legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming
illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce
substantial and credible evidence to the contrary. 12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and unless or until it is rebutted, it
has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. 14
Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a
presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by
the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the
presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of
such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice
and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts
are thereby considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's relationship with Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive
examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison,
the baptismal, death and marriage certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family
picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in
the course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under
Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is
dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving
the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the
third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the

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declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant
may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must
be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant
and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he may not do by
declarant's own statements as to declarant's relationship to the particular family. The reason is that
declarant's declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly there must be
precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the
particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common
family must appear is not met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to
claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable
are quite different. In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he
was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship.
While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such
declarations do not derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an
artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong. The distinction we have note is
sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent
from reasons of necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to
both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship
of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. 18 As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate
of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of
some other member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general
requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of
the declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner
Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding
the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being such declaration is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20
More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that
declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent's
declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the declarant's
own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to require, as a foundation for the admission of the
declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary proof
would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result. For while the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility,
we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private
respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in
evidence. 22 It is elementary that an objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, 23 otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may
waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a
protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it
will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to the
witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the
evidence is, or may be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver if the
provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the question

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is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the
testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the
stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-examined
petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue
of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised. Instead,
private respondent's counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her
obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private respondent in her comment to
petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent at the time these
documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which
objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal consequences which
resulted therefrom. Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for
being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent's failure to object thereto, the same may be
admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora
Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora
Dezoller 30 (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents
as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were
made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo
Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the children of
Hermogenes Dezoller these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between
the declarant and herein petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facie showing is
sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to
consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants,
who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent
shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from
the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article
1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically
reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and
herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private
respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and
three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence should have
been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present
evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence." 33
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with
an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner,

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vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals 1
Decision promulgated December 1, 1994 2 and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995 3 in CA-GR
CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner's action for partition
and damages.
On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint 4 for partition and damages against
Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of
Aklan, Branch I. 5 On October 25, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party. 6
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision 7 in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:
8

Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad,
plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land
subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share from
said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year he stopped
receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive
prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed: 9
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioner's] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: 10
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants' motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack
of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of the
decision.
Hence, this petition. 11
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows: 12
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo,
Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of
the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of
the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3)
children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the
land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but
the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before
plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of
land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and
that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes,
Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4)
parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the
marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned
into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but
defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces
pertinent portions of the trial court's decision: 13
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

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Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who
is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being
elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a
member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That
she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She
knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were already
dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born
in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the
house of the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiff's parents['] house and she used to go there
2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the
plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the
father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already
dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That she knows all
these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and
mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad
because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and
after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land
was never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the picture
as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix
Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife of the
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed
to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants
in this case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified the
woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which
witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when . . . the picture [was] taken,
counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness
answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of
baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2.
The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also
identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass
by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes
by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B,
witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she can
identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes
Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified
having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes
are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That
she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were
married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she
knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of
land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting season.
That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes
possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any
share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the
one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness testified that upon
the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old,
until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the

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produce of the land while he was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later
on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants, Lourdes
and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents
of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father,
Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father
having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism
which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2
hut he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother
was already dead. Plaintiff's mother died when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided
for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the
defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited
by the defendants to live with them. So he and his wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof
that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he presented
a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying
plaintiff's daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family
picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's son.
According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the
defendants. That a few years after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house
for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to
handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts
every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are: East-Federico Inocencio;
West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove;
also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are: East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico
Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father
of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years
[sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and
North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square
meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference
to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the
cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by
Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel
3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of
Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in
the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes
Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain
Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan,
plaintiff answered he does not know because he was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the
death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime. That after the death of his father,
he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in
this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of
the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other
nephews and nieces. That [petitioner's] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

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First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of
Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being
his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his
father are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes
and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his
death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of
Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to Anastacia Briones who
is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of
the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and
with his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with
anybody before his death, he answered, "That I do not know", neither does he kn[o]w a person by the
name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes
Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife,
witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working. That
after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always
visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after
the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be
a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: "I do not know about that."
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he stated to
reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of their father was located there. When asked if he
was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness
answered that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad,
Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness
when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt,
Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew where
Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own
land because the Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which
is the alleged family picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the
picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the
said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is
75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already
dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941.
According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days
before he died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married
anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she
knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato
was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, she said, "Yes," but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them. According to
the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the
name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the court if
there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did
not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, "He did not."
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia
Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But
inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix
Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died
without a wife and children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has
[no] husband or children. According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in
their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of
Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that
Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941

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was still peace time, the witness could not answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A
which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she
answered; "Yes." and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According
to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will be baptized
and that the baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she
answered; "Maybe there was." When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying
the child, witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the church
and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latter's child was taken
during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the
man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being
carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not know
because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who
was at the right of the child held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight
neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason.
When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of
Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she
does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio
Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She
testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola's house whose
names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his
lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was already
sick. That according to her, about 1 1/2 months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She
also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to
Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she
was horn in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can
remember that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she
said she [was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot
because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried
in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of
Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that . . . she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in
this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that
according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15
days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that
Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from
her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single
because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was
married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was
in good physical condition. That she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics
but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the
sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and
Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a
marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one
Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to
the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were
destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Court's Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad,
Respondent Court ruled: 14
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is

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the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in
the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he
was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes
Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the
plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept.
6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes'
acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership
(Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D.
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the
defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their
father died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority,
still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same
by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: 15
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his
parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son
of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial
Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3,
1988.
4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a legitimate child can be attached collaterally by the private
respondents.
5. Whether or not of private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the
properties in question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?
The Court's Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's real properties requires
preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedent's estate. 16 His right as a coowner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting
marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such
burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and
Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will
not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the
contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had
to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case. 17
Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that
he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to
accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of
marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent

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documents. 19
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification 20 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all
records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage
contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof
that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. 21
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified
that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after
the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local
parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she
lived only thirty meters away. 22 On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad
gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal party held at the same house. 23 Her
testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. 24 It further gives rise to the
disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. 25 Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which
Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's father and mother. 26
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register,
or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 27
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification 28 that records relative to his birth were either destroyed
during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To
prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardo's
testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife
(Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's first daughter, and
Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying
petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they
do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private
respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her
holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was
requested to carry the child before she was baptized. 29 When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late
brother but not petitioner, his wife and the couple's children slyly explaining that she could not clearly
see because of an alleged eye defect. 30
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means
allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs.
Court of Appeals: 31
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is
allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,"
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity
or affinity, 32 her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by
itself, be used to establish petitioner's legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private
respondents' self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and
without issue in March 1941. Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in
1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the

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cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from
credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and his answers on direct examination
were noncommittal and evasive: 33
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said "them", to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children
before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited
with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he
has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed with the
defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified, that when the Japanese occupied Kalibo
in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with
their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half
months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but
denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes. 34
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl
Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes dies in March 1941. 35 The Japanese
forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; 36 thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied
until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery In Kalibo,
because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. 37
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private
respondents a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child. 38
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the
adverse party. 39 Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent
Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In
determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility. 40 Applying this
rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's favor.
It declared:
. . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being their
nephew . . . before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he started
demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the

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defendants . . . is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were taken at
a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his father's share. . . . His demand for the partition
of the share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. . . .
In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for the
partition . . . as he was already having a family of his own. . . . .
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff
[petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony
of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court sized
her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the
defendants who are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for
defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children. 41
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. 42 Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose
to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents' marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the
application of this doctrine to petitioner's cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties
openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private
respondents had been in possession in the concept of owners of the parcels of land in issue since
Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by
acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former
repudiates the co-ownership. 43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or
her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a coowner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such
time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence,
either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further,
the titles of these pieces of land were still in their father's name. Although private respondents had
possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land
during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held: 44
. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action
for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148
SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to
be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim
over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177728
July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

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For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and
Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.1 After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who
continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian
Dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the
City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, 2
Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter
alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and
that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent
portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING
OCTOBER 31, 2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL.
I AM THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO.
TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS NAME IS
RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE
WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT
AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia
(respondent), denied Jenies application for registration of the childs name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic
Act No. 9255 ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the
Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the Family Code of the Philippines"])
provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father,
either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten instrument, the child shall use the
surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the paternity between the father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of name against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch
73 thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation

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of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use
the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in a
"private handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons, respondent was declared
in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the circumstances of her common-law
relationship with Dominique and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had
acknowledged his yet unborn child.11 She offered Dominiques handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as
her documentary evidence-in-chief.12 Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified,
corroborating Jenies declarations.13
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the
Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255)
which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child
as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed
by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does
not contain any express recognition of paternity.1avvphi1
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF
MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A
"PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE
FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS
FATHERS SURNAME.15 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly require that the
private handwritten instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must be signed by
him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for
the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative Order that the
admission/recognition must be "duly signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted
provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that Dominiques handwritten
Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the childs paternity. 17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that respondents position, as affirmed
by the trial court, is in consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It further
submits that Dominiques Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity
of the child she was carrying in her womb."18
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname
of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument.
The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
childs paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. 19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must,
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition
by the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.

131

xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed
by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs birth. Second, the relevant matters in the
Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the
testimonial evidence Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino
whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child.
These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and
"NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation,
discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation.
In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved
by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father.
Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative
father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures
of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,

132

proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing
alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominiques Autobiography have
been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that Dominique,
during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at
his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently
establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument
wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration" in resolving questions
affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.23 (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor
childs best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his
birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to
immediately enter the surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of
petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of
Births.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148220
June 15, 2005
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTAVILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals
("appellate court") in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders3 issued by Branch
48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("trial court") in SP No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February
2000 directed Rosendo Herrera ("petitioner") to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing,
while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba ("respondent"), represented by his mother Armi
Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents mother.

133

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To
support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified,
Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was
also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute ("UP-NSRI"), a DNA
analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon
City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her
testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an
accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.4
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity
testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:
In view of the foregoing, the motion of the petitioner is GRANTED and the relevant individuals, namely:
the petitioner, the minor child, and respondent are directed to undergo DNA paternity testing in a
laboratory of their common choice within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order, and to submit
the results thereof within a period of ninety (90) days from completion. The parties are further reminded of
the hearing set on 24 February 2000 for the reception of other evidence in support of the petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that "under the
present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the
coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen, unconstitutional."
In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.6
On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He asserted that the trial court rendered the Orders dated 3 February
2000 and 8 June 2000 "in excess of, or without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitioner further contended that there is "no appeal nor any
[other] plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law." Petitioner maintained his
previous objections to the taking of DNA paternity testing. He submitted the following grounds to support
his objection:
1. Public respondent misread and misapplied the ruling in Lim vs. Court of Appeals (270 SCRA 2).
2. Public respondent ruled to accept DNA test without considering the limitations on, and conditions
precedent for the admissibility of DNA testing and ignoring the serious constraints affecting the reliability
of the test as admitted by private respondents "expert" witness.
3. Subject Orders lack legal and factual support, with public respondent relying on scientific findings and
conclusions unfit for judicial notice and unsupported by experts in the field and scientific treatises.
4. Under the present circumstances the DNA testing petitioner [is] compelled to take will be inconclusive,
irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen from the petitioner, unconstitutional. 7
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the
questioned Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the
trial courts evaluation of evidence. Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA
paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to
testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible
adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and
ordered dismissed, and the challenged orders of the Trial Court AFFIRMED, with costs to Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution dated 23 May
2001.9
Issues
Petitioner raises the issue of whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine
filiation. Petitioner asks for the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial
system and the prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit. 10
Petitioner further submits that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when it authorized the trial

134

court "to embark in [sic] a new procedure xxx to determine filiation despite the absence of legislation to
ensure its reliability and integrity, want of official recognition as made clear in Lim vs. Court of Appeals
and the presence of technical and legal constraints in respect of [sic] its implementation." 11 Petitioner
maintains that the proposed DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.12
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an overview of a
paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family Code
and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation.
An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship,13 support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have
to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child.14
A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our
jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father. 15
There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or impotency.16 The
putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.17 The childs
legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law. 18
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of
paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although likeness
is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or
must not look like his biological father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.
In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondents mother,
put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological father. Aware
that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of
letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion. He denied ever having
sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi
Alba countered petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to
show how much they resemble each other.
Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules, and
governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation
are allowed in this jurisdiction.
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the

135

names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree.The reputation or tradition existing in a
family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Courts rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA,20 a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the
putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made
in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be
effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the
writing of the putative father.21 A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence.22 Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to
the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation.23 However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a
fathers operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing.24 Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism 25 nor family pictures26 are sufficient to
establish filiation.
So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and filiation to
incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity and
filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that
blood grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.27
In Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,28 the result of the blood grouping test showed that the putative father
was a "possible father" of the child. Paternity was imputed to the putative father after the possibility of
paternity was proven on presentation during trial of facts and circumstances other than the results of the
blood grouping test.
In Jao v. Court of Appeals,29 the child, the mother, and the putative father agreed to submit themselves
to a blood grouping test. The National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") conducted the test, which indicated
that the child could not have been the possible offspring of the mother and the putative father. We held
that the result of the blood grouping test was conclusive on the non-paternity of the putative father.
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked whether DNA analysis may be
admitted as evidence to prove paternity.
DNA Analysis as Evidence
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human
cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA
profile can determine his identity.30
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual
is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom
the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins. 31 We quote
relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to
an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and DNA
is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an
individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from
buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (adenine), G (guanine), C
(cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individuals DNA determines
his or her physical makeup. And since DNA is a double-stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific
paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This gives
a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections that
differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests,
fingerprinting, or analysis/DNA fingerprinting/genetic tests or fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing
simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may

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proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the
RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used
in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; mtDNA
process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed
of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can match
two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime
scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same,
the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or
fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these
regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele", one inherited from each parent. In [a]
paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to produce
a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which
half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been inherited from the
biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types
in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the
child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.32
(Emphasis in the original)
Although the term "DNA testing" was mentioned in the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee, Jr.,33 it was
only in the 2001 case of Tijing v. Court of Appeals34 that more than a passing mention was given to
DNA analysis. In Tijing, we issued a writ of habeas corpus against respondent who abducted petitioners
youngest son. Testimonial and documentary evidence and physical resemblance were used to establish
parentage. However, we observed that:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when completely obtained in
aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in
this case to resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo35 discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be considered a
180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case,36 where we
stated that "DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our
courts." In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the
accuseds DNA profile. We affirmed the accuseds conviction of rape with homicide and sentenced him to
death. We declared:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.37
Vallejo discussed the probative value, not admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved from the issue of
according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in
conducting DNA analysis.
In 2004, there were two other cases that had a significant impact on jurisprudence on DNA testing:
People v. Yatar38 and In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa.39 In Yatar, a match
existed between the DNA profile of the semen found in the victim and the DNA profile of the blood sample
given by appellant in open court. The Court, following Vallejos footsteps, affirmed the conviction of

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appellant because the physical evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, showed appellant
guilty of rape with homicide. In De Villa, the convict-petitioner presented DNA test results to prove that he
is not the father of the child conceived at the time of commission of the rape. The Court ruled that a
difference between the DNA profile of the convict-petitioner and the DNA profile of the victims child does
not preclude the convict-petitioners commission of rape.
In the present case, the various pleadings filed by petitioner and respondent refer to two United States
cases to support their respective positions on the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence: Frye v.
U.S.40 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.41 In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of
murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. During trial, Fryes
counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic blood pressure deception test42
made on defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Fryes conviction and ruled that "the systolic blood
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological
and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the
discovery, development, and experiments thus far made." The Frye standard of general acceptance
states as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
In 1989, State v. Schwartz43 modified the Frye standard. Schwartz was charged with stabbing and
murder. Bloodstained articles and blood samples of the accused and the victim were submitted for DNA
testing to a government facility and a private facility. The prosecution introduced the private testing
facilitys results over Schwartzs objection. One of the issues brought before the state Supreme Court
included the admissibility of DNA test results in a criminal proceeding. The state Supreme Court
concluded that:
While we agree with the trial court that forensic DNA typing has gained general acceptance in the
scientific community, we hold that admissibility of specific test results in a particular case hinges on the
laboratorys compliance with appropriate standards and controls, and the availability of their testing data
and results.44
In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.45 further modified the Frye-Schwartz standard.
Daubert was a product liability case where both the trial and appellate courts denied the admissibility of
an experts testimony because it failed to meet the Frye standard of "general acceptance." The United
States Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded the
Frye standard. Rule 401 defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides the foundation for
admissibility of evidence. Thus:
Rule 401. "Relevant evidence" is defined as that which has any "tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence.
Rule 402. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Daubert cautions that departure from the Frye standard of general acceptance does not mean that the
Federal Rules do not place limits on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Rather, the judge must ensure
that the testimonys reasoning or method is scientifically valid and is relevant to the issue. Admissibility
would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the techniques
operation; and (5) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Another product liability case, Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael,46 further modified the Daubert standard.
This led to the amendment of Rule 702 in 2000 and which now reads as follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence

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or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
We now determine the applicability in this jurisdiction of these American cases. Obviously, neither the
Frye-Schwartz standard nor the Daubert-Kumho standard is controlling in the Philippines.47 At best,
American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions. Here, evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. 48
Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence.49 Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as
follows:
The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess may be received in evidence.
This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed,
even evidence on collateral matters is allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in issue."50
Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in Tijing, Vallejo and
Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. In our jurisdiction, the restrictive tests for
admissibility established by Frye-Schwartz and Daubert-Kumho go into the weight of the evidence.
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in giving credence to
DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.51]
We also repeat the trial courts explanation of DNA analysis used in paternity cases:
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he
has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do
not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.52
It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match
between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily
establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, 53
trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity ("W") prior to
a paternity inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father
compared to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference
population database, such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for W. Due to
the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal to 100%. However, the accuracy of W
estimates is higher when the putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared to
those conducted between the putative father and child alone.54
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity.
If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of
paternity.55 This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right
against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable
only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order
with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,

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contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This
privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in essence taken under duress (People vs.
Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just
a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence)
from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a
defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis,
Supra); the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of
lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145); morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof
(US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size
was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery
to submit for pregnancy test (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the
restriction on "testimonial compulsion."56
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim
his or her own defenses.57 Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities
of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established
by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June
2000 issued by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
SO ORDERED.

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