Koha Digest # 67 (16.08.

1995)

EDITORIAL

HOW MUCH WILL KRAJINA COST KOSOVA?

by VETON SURROI

The last two days of the Croatian warring week-end, offensive "Storm" which liberated
Krajina, were followed in Kosova as if it were a foot-ball championship: in the evenings,
whoever had a satellite antenna, was closely following HTV (Croatian TV), centring the
attention on the whole list of towns and villages in which Croat "Rambos" were entering and
which were fled by Serb "Kninjas" and their families. Even the ones lacking interest so far,
started making deep geo-strategic analyses, making different comments in regard to the maps.
The reactions heard in the town ranged from the happiness because it was proven that the
Serbian army can be defeated (contrary to what the West was saying, trying to justify its own
noninvolvement) and up to the question, what can this bring to Kosova?

Following, are some brief points which can clarify the "Kosovan balance" of the Croat
offensive.

THE LOSS OF ONE "K"?

The first thought about the Serbian defeat in Croatia is that the international negotiators can
no more draw any parallel lines between the future constitutional position of Krajina (now
former Krajina) and Kosova. However unacceptable this parallel was from the previous
constitutional aspect (Krajina was not a federal unit of SFRY), the parallel was also
unapplicable in the way the positions were reached: Krajina, with a quite quick insurrection
(now finalized), Kosova with an ancient dispute with Serbia.

But, the loss of one "K" in the drawn parallel leaves the international negotiators with only
one "point of territorial pressure": the principle of the eventual victory of Karadzic (Mladic)
must be applicable in the case of Kosova. Again the principle of violence and force in
parallels which can't stand. And the orientation towards the "motherlands".

THE MILITARY AS MAIN NEGOTIATORS?

After four years under occupation, Croatian president Tudjman proved again that the best
negotiators are the military: the stronger, less the negotiations needed. A great minus for
Kosova.

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
-1-
FINAL DECISIONS

The complicated plans are not valid any more. They must be as simple as possible, and they
must split the people definitely. This is the bottom line of the Croat offensive, which solved
the Serbian issue in Croatia with only one strike. The Serbs in towns, outside Krajina, were
anyways not engaged in the insurrection, and can continue living as they have done so far.
The total number of Serbs in Croatia could reach (if Serbs are lucky) the symbolic 5%.
A message for Kosova: the territorial division between Serbs and Albanians. This message
should include also the presence of Serb refugees from Croatia: they must also become part of
the division balance. As usually in these areas: by force.

BOSNIA AND KOSOVA

The solution of the Serbian issue in Croatia will further make Croatia try and find a final
demarcation with the Serbs. Eastern Slavonia is not that important as Bosnia is: the final
Croat-Serb split will have the form of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, respectively, be in
the option of a Serb-Serb confederation or the Croat-Bosnian confederacy. The same way the
Serbs and Croats are settling their dues outside their states, there are opinions in Belgrade that
Belgrade and Tirana must do the same thing about Kosova. Split.

THE BIG SEEK THE STRONG

Croatia did what NATO planes should have done: defend Bihac. It also did something else:
freed itself from future negotiations about Krajina.

For the international community, so far inefficient, there is a new solution: the balance of
regional forces which arise from the former Yugoslavia. In the present split, Croatia gains the
role of a Western power (with the American-German support), Serbia that of an Eastern
power (with the Russian support). In the balance of the three main national issues arising
from the former Yugoslavia, the third point of the triangle is missing: Albanians and Albania.

INTERVIEW

MISHA GLENNY, Journalist

WHY I AM PESSIMISTIC (II)

Interviewed by ISO RUSI / Shkup

Misha Glenny is a trade-mark for the Westerners, about what he writes and says in regard to
the crisis in Yugoslavia. BBC's correspondent during the disintegration of the Former
Yugoslavia, Glenny was the lonely voice in his announcements about the bloody war which is
going on today. His two books about the former Yugoslavia are school text-books for
diplomats who deal with the region and "Bibles" for journalists who come to see what the
hell is going on in the Balkans and "understand" the situation in a fortnight. For over two
years he has been a free-lance journalist, based in Thessaloniki. At the end of this month he
will start an eight months residence in Washington, where invited by a foundation, he will be
finishing his new book. Naturally, the topic is, again, this part of the Balkans.

-2-
GLENNY: I don't know, we still don't know what is going to happen with the new realtion of
forces. The current situation in the Balkans has changed, too. There seems to be a wrong
impression that the Balkans have always been so, and will always be they way they are.
However, each time, it is different. The key issue is that for the first time in history, the
Muslim and Macedonian factors feel as independent historical subjects. This means that the
situation in Bosnia is much more complicated than, for example, in WWII. Because, they
refuse to have the same role they had during WWII - to go along with Croats. Today, they
hate Croats, the same way they hate Serbs - and the Croats hate them the same way they hate
Serbs.

Thus, Muslims want to be a subject for the first time.

Macedonians also want to become a subject for the first time. This means that for the first
time we have two people with independent politics, and this shows a totally new Balkans,
different from the one in WWII, it is a new line of forces of the West and Russia, and a new
order of forces in the Balkans proper, even though all of them are linked to the relations
existing in the past 50 years of Former Yugoslavia. Tradition, no doubt, but history goes
ahead.

KOHA: But, Bosnia is the continuation of the scenario of the destruction of Yugoslavia, with
unpredictable cruelty. The scenario was planned to be applied in Kosova and Macedonia.
This is clear. This is what was said after independence of Slovenia.

GLENNY: I believe that Kosova is not next, because the relation of forces there is a bit
different. There, the Serbs hold them all - before all, the weapons - while Albanians have no
option to raise their heads. They have Rugova's option, that of peaceful resistance, which
means that if Kosova Albanians are armed, then Serbs, who like Albanians even less than
Muslims, will have no problems to "Rwandaise" the situation in the Balkans. There will be a
lot of blood. This is why I say that the situation in Bosnia is very similar to the one in
Macedonia.

The key issue is that even though there is no war of Serbs and Croats around Macedonia,
nevertheless, Macedonia remains a very unstable state, because it is surrounded by four
neighbors which have no normal relations with it. Even more, one of the neighbors
categorically denies its recognition (Greece); the other recognizes the state, but not the people
(Bulgaria); the other acknowledges the people, but not the state (Serbia); Albanians
acknowledge the people - even though there are problems with Berisha in this aspect - while
the state, because of the Albanian minority in Macedonia, has not such good relations with
Macedonia. Both Macedonia and Bosnia are of strategic importance in the Balkans. I believe
that Muslims and Macedonians entered the Balkans game too late, because each time there
are problems in the Balkans, the war takes place either in Bosnia or Macedonia, because of
strategic reasons: Macedonia is small, it has no way out to the sea, it is more and more
isolated from the neighbors, it has a new ethnicity - the Macedonians, who are used to, at
least in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, rule over the minorities, the Albanians.
Albanians, on the other hand, who have nothing to ask for in Kosova, because of the threats
of Serbia, find themselves in a chaotic situation in Albania, because politics is moving up and
down between Berisha and the Socialists - when people are after money, they are simply not
interested what will happen in Kosova and Western Macedonian, they are only interested to
know whether there will be dollars or not, because in Albania they think that they are under

-3-
the level where nationalism is a motivating factor in politics. Albanians in Western
Macedonia, who objectively are in the best situation compared to the other Albanians, for the
first time in history, have a key role in the solution of the Albanian issue. Before, this role
belonged to the Albanians in Kosova or in Albania. Today, Western Macedonia is important
for Albanians, they know the Macedonian state is weak and at the same time they request the
realization of their rights. I believe it is good for them to revindicate their rights without
violent repression, and I also believe that this is very important both for the Albanian and
Macedonian communities to find a common solution and compromise in their mutual
relations.

In regard to Bosnia, it is obvious that Serbia and Croatia have pushed war out from their
territories, but the presupposition of the causes of war is precisely the internal collapse of the
three communities.

This is why I believe that Macedonia, which doesn't have much influence and many friends,
but which has a very important position in southern Balkans, must try to find solutions for all
disputable issues between Albanians and Macedonians, because if this is not attempted, then
the communities will be destroyed and the state will break apart. I still remember the images
of December last in Tetova, when Albanian masses were requesting the opening of the
University and the very well armed Macedonian police. Those were very tense moments and
it was then that I saw that there was no communication between Albanians and Macedonians.
Immediately afterwards, I went back to Shkup to watch the football game between Macedonia
and Cyprus, and there were many symbols of the newly created Macedonian state. The people
from Cyprus wouldn't believe us that something of the kind existed, because since they are
under Greek influence, they believed that Macedonia was Greek. Football games are the place
where the most flagrant expression of nationalism comes on the surface, and what I saw,
deeply impressed me. Today in Shkup, you see Macedonians in the state of Macedonia, half
an hour far is Tetova and the Albanian community, while in this game - naturally I couldn't
check it personally - I think that there were no Albanians, even though the team belongs to the
whole state, the whole association. This is also a huge problem. As I see it, there are no
institutions which integrate the two communities: they are either Albanian or Macedonian.

KOHA: This resembles pre-war Bosnia.

GLENNY: Yes, but there is an essential difference, and this is that Serbs and Croats were
very well armed. The Macedonian state is weak and can't defend itself, and Albanians don't
have many weapons either.

KOHA: Nevertheless they'd split.

GLENNY: The problem of separation is grounded on the fact that the secession of Albanians
from Macedonia would strengthen the Albanian state in the Balkans, and this wouldn't be
allowed, first of all, neither by Serbs, Greeks, nor Bulgarians. Second, if Macedonia is
divided, then what will happen with Shkup or Ohër which used to be an Albanian town.

KOHA: Maybe it will become Bulgarian, rather...

GLENNY: Yes, but the Albanians who live in Ohër, do you think they will allow the
Bulgarians to come there under the pretext of saving the most orthodox town of Western
Bulgaria? What will happen with Shkupi which is one of the biggest Albanians towns in the

-4-
world? Will you transfer all these Albanians to Western Macedonia and all Macedonians
from Tetova to Shkup...

KOHA: Maybe a solution as Brussels...

GLENNY: That maybe yes... This is serious problem. People always criticize me, because
they say - yes, he always says there will be war in Macedonia, and that there will be war in
Macedonia very soon. Maybe I do exaggerate, but I do it on purpose, for one good reason: if
nothing is undertaken here, then there will be war, because they are already headed to war -
maybe this could occur in autumn, maybe next year, or maybe two or five years later - but
without a political agreement, there is no way to evade war in the future. This is what I offer,
that the world is not interested about the situation which is extremely hot and which is very
similar to the one in Bosnia, and the world wishes to simply forget. There is a serious
problem in Macedonia, which is being caused by Europe. Even though they know Macedonia
has a problem with Greece, that the Greeks are stopping its recognition, they play it deaf and
give up on it. They simply don't want to talk about it, they claim that there is no war here, and
that maybe there will be no war. They are fearing what occurred in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, two
weeks before war started, all were drinking, having fun and playing together and were
convinced that there would be no war, because "we know how bloody would the war be".

KOHA: Isn't this similar to this here?

GLENNY: Not quite.

KOHA: No, but people are having a good life. As before war in Bosnia, in "Top-Lista
Nadrealista" and "K-15"...

GLENNY: There are no weapons... right now, there are no weapons.

KOHA: Weapons come easy.

GLENNY: True. What will happen in Albanians withdraw from the Parliament and form
their own parliament in Tetova? Then the Macedonian state would defend itself. They
defended themselves from the University with the police, which according to the standards
here is extremely well armed. They proved that they can also kill. Really, one man was killed,
but when it would come to the Parliament, and if hypothetically, the Macedonian police
would disperse it and kill, let's say, five Albanians? How would the Albanian state react in
this occasion? I would say they wouldn't send any Kalashnyikov they produce in Albania, but
I don't doubt its troops will come in, if they are not in already.

KOHA: Tell us one thing. Comparing the experiences of the Former Yugoslavia with what is
happening in Macedonia, you can nevertheless foresee how will the situation develop. What
do you think about the West's evaluation about Macedonia's domestic policy, that it is a oasis
of peace, a wise politics, etc...

GLENNY: No, No... They don't even care about it. Americans in Washington and the
Pentagon, in the State Department are concerned about Macedonia's links with Turkey.
Americans consider the Turks the main factor in the area, but also in Iraq, Iran, Central Asia,
the former Soviet Republics, the Aegean. I am very disappointed with Europe. It is very
interesting to me that Americans have almost stopped all actions here, in the key place of the

-5-
southern Balkans, and there is no attention for concrete cases... I know that foreign ministries
in England, France and Germany are worried about what is going on and are trying to do
something. There is also the problem with Greece, that of the veto, and also because there is
something more urgent in Bosnia and that Bosnia is threatening not only with more blood, but
also with inconceivable things, such as the destruction of the NATO, etc. They simply, don't
have people, they have no time to care, to show interest for Macedonia. Big powers have
plans, but they are very unclear, and only if something bigger than Bosnia occurs, then will
they be incited to enter with a larger diplomatic capital, to solve it in their interest. But, they'll
do nothing regarding Macedonia before the eventual war starts.

KOHA: How do you evaluate the situation in Macedonia today?

GLENNY: I believe that everything will depend on it. Honestly, I believe there are two huge
issues in the Balkans when related to the destruction of the Former Yugoslavia: the first one
is the Serbian issue, and the second one is the Albanian. We have been constantly seeing a
terrible attempt to solve the Serbian issue in Yugoslavia. I believe that Croats and Serbs will
allow the solution of this problem only if Muslims are not granted a state, or even if they do,
their state will be small, a miniature, in the very core of Bosnia. Nevertheless, the West made
a difference between the Croat and Serb nationalism, and I believe this is wrong. Serbs are
isolated now, and the story that it will become Greater Serbia - and which can be read in
"New York Times" and "Washington Post", that Serbia has won - I believe is wrong. In fact,
not only Muslims, but also Serbs have lost in this war. Because no one wishes to recognize
the "RSK" nor "RS", even though finally there will be a Bosnian Union, or something similar.
But, "RSK" will never be recognized.

KOHA: You mean, internationally?

GLENNY: Yes... then there are the sanctions. They will not be lifted, because the US is not
only considering Serbia to be the main one to blame, but the only one to blame, and this is,
according to me, a big mistake, because I believe that Croatia is also guilty of this war - even
Slovenia. America will not allow the sanctions against Serbia be lifted. And, as long as we
have a traumatized Serbian society, with a huge arsenal of weaponry, we will have an
immanent destabilization of the Balkans space. I believe that all states in the former
Yugoslavia, apart from Slovenia, are para-states.

KOHA: Please explain.

GLENNY: They are missing the basic characteristics of the state. Croatia has not its territory.
In Bosnia, there is a list of para-states: Republic of Herzeg- Bosnia, Abdic's state,
Dudakovic's state, Gorazde, the Republika Srpska, which is not recognized by the
international community neither by Serbia, but which has weapons and is an essential
characteristic of a state, then Macedonia...

Any other state in Europe, including Azerbeijan, is member in more institutions than
Macedonia. Then, Macedonia was not recognized by the UN with the name it chose itself. In
regard to Serbia, which in Yugoslavia is historically the only state, it faces the problem of the
sanctions. FRY is not recognized by the international community, but another Serbia's issue is
Kosova. If Serbs still believe that they can treat Albanians as they did so far, then they are
really wrong. Another of the Albanian issues is the demographic one. Regardless of whether
Serbs and Macedonians like Albanians or not, the latter will be numerically stronger, if not

-6-
the strongest in the Balkans within 10 or 15 years. They will represent a serious factor. This
means that either Macedonians or Serbs will be forced to seriously talk with Albanians - or
their states will be threatened in this sense.

KOHA: How will you present Macedonia in the newest book you are planning to write?

GLENNY: Macedonia will have a very important place in this book about Balkans
nationalism in the past century - whether it differs from other nationalisms and if it does -
then why? Is this natural for Balkans people... In all of this, Macedonia has maybe the key
role. Since 1978, Macedonia has been a mysterious curiosity of European nationalism.
Precisely in the recent years when the creation of modern people is insisted on. There are also
actual problems which are inter-linked with constitutional issues and have to do with relations
of communities. I can't recall any other example in Europe, which has so many important
issues, apart from maybe Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will also be given quite an
important part in the book.

KOHA: How do you thing the events in Macedonia will develop?

GLENNY: If I say that I don't see good prospects, they'll say: "what is this guy talking
about?.." Anyhow, I will say what I have repeated so often - if war in Bosnia continues, which
is very possible - I am especially concerned about what is happening, because I believe the
three parties have chosen the war option in Bosnia and Croatia - then the economic and
political pressure in the country will be bigger. I believe that Albanians and Macedonians, for
the time being, are in no position to solve the basic matters of coexistence. Thus, the
possibility exists - this is a subjective matter whether it will happen or not - but there is a
possibility to reach an internal consensus.

Then there will be wear which will surpass the borders of the Former Yugoslavia. If there are
serious attempts of Albanian and Macedonian representatives to solve these problems, then I
would be optimistic. Because of what we have seen in the domestic policies of all Yugoslav
republics in the past five years; because the international factor hasn't split - it seeks
solutions... We would be crazy to draw any optimism in regard to Macedonia. Through my
pessimism which, I admit, is politically expressed, I draw the attention of the world that if it,
as so far, ignores the problem of Macedonia, politically and economically, then it will have to
pay even more than it is paying so far politically, diplomatically and militarily in the West,
Russia and Bosnia.

EX-YU

KOSOVA, A ZONE NOT TO BE TOUCHED

Dr. Ranko Petkovic, professor of international affairs and Editor in Chief of "Medjunarodni
Problemi", about the recent in events in Croatia, about Bosnia and their reflection on
Kosova, declares to "KOHA":

WHY DIDN'T SERBIA ENTER THE WAR

The Croat authorities which decided to reintegrate the territories of the "RSK" have counted

-7-
on the fact that "RS" nor Yugoslavia would see themselves involved. "RS", which had
promised assistance to "RSK" didn't do that because it itself lacks people which would defend
the frontline in B&H and because assisting "RSK" militarily, would be considered as an
aggression of a sovereign and independent state. In regard to FRY, with the acceptance of the
Vance-Owen plan and its orientation to not get implicated in the conflict between Knin and
Zagreb, it announced that it will not get involved militarily, so there would be no expansion
of the conflict nor possibilities to strengthen the sanctions and other forms of pressure against
it.

ON KOSOVA AND THE REFLECTION OF THE SITUATION

When it refers to Kosova, I must say that the danger is limited to B&H and the border
between Yugoslavia and Croatia. If there is any initiation of a conference on the former
Yugoslavia, the first item on the agenda would be to stop the war, then the creation of statal
entities and the mutual recognition of the former Yugoslav republics and at the same time, the
regulation of problems which refer to the rights of ethnic collectives and human rights in the
Former Yugoslavia in general, and especially in places where these problems remain open, as
in Kosova or those parts of Croatia fled by the Serb population.

Comparisons between Kosova and Knin were made within Lord Carrington's plan which
foresaw a high level of autonomy in parts where minorities represent the majority of the
population. This idea was comprised in the Z-4 Plan of the Contact Group, which now fails to
be a possibility after the Croat action. With respect to Kosova, maybe this is the best solution
for it fulfils some of the international standards for the solution of the issues concerning
ethnic communities. It is understandable that the status of these communities is specific and
must be solved within the existing circumstances. In this sense, the parallel between Krajina
and Kosova could have made sense, however, on the other hand, the historical and geo-
political circumstances impose certain differences. Therefore, the ways to stabilize the
situation in Kosova must be sought, respecting both the requests of the Albanian population
and Belgrade's interest".

EX-YU

THE ATTACK OK KOSOVA, MEANS THE END OF SERBIA

Predrag Simic, Director of the Institute for International Politics and Economy, comments
the recent events for "KOHA":

About "STORM"

Croatia really won a big prize getting uninhabited Krajina back, without having to fight for it
long. It is also evaluated in Zagreb that the relations with Muslims will be settled in the way
that the Sarajevo government will be under Zagreb's trusteeship, as the Government in Zagreb
already sees itself to be a regional power in the Balkans.

Krajina's fall and comments on Belgrade's treason

There are many speculations. Right now, about 150 thousand refugees are flowing into FRY.

-8-
40 thousand entered yesterday alone. I believe this will influence the general public and the
general impression is that this has not caused a great surprise for all of those who are
accommodating them in an organized way in different centers. We must await for the events
around the complete ethnic cleansing of Knin. According to UNPROFOR sources, there are
only some hundreds of Serbs remaining there, defended by UN troops. But they are also
expecting to be evacuated to FRY.

This means there will be no more Serbs there.

At all. I believe that this is the end of the history of the Serbs in Krajina.

The situation in Slavonia. There are statements that if Eastern Slavonia is attacked,
Belgrade will resist.

I believe that Slavonia will keep the current status of a buffer zone and it is not in the Croat
interest to risk a conflict with FRY, because regardless of the euphoria in Zagreb, military
experts there have it clear that the relations are such, that Croatia can't count on the military
superiority opposite to the Yugoslav Army, therefore I don't believe that Zagreb will start an
adventure in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja.

Two initiatives: London and Russia. The perception of Bosnia after Croat attacks and
possible solutions.

Zagreb is trying to calm the fear of the Muslims, who were relieved with the Croat action.
This offensive meant liberation because the elimination of the siege of Bihac changed the
military situation quite a bit. On the other hand, Sarajevo fears of Zagreb's intentions: will the
Croat embrace be more difficult than the Serb one. Zagreb doesn't hide its intentions to
establish a trusteeship over Sarajevo and thus reach its ultimate goal: Greater Croatia.

New initiatives in London and Moscow.

It is soon to talk about them, because the Contact Group is dismantling. Americans didn't
invite Russians to Washington, Yeltsin tried to have a solo-game by inviting Milosevic and
Tudjman to Moscow. Peter Tarnoff and Anthony Lake are right now in Europe, allegedly
bringing in new proposals for solutions, therefore it is early to talk about any prognoses.

The political situation in Belgrade and Milosevic's position.

There are no big political reactions so far, all are mobilized and willing to assist the refugees
as best as possible.

Karl Bildt's statement that what happened in Knin can happen in Kosova too.

I believe these are the most idiotic things of the Western propaganda which saw all these
conflicts as black or white, and naively described the situation in the Balkans. No one in
Serbia even thinks of this, because if this happens, it would be the end for Serbia. It is in
Serbia's interest to have Kosova in the present status and open the political process of solving
its problem and what the Westerners declare now about Kosova is foolish and ridiculous.

-9-
The reflection of all on Kosova.

I hope that it will have no reflection, because any reflection would be negative. The violence
the Croat military applied against Serbs in the past ten days shouldn't be repeated against any
people ever.

The perception of the future of this region.

I believe that there will be an increase of tension and I believe that political leaders of all
people in the Balkans must remain cool, because if control is lost over things, as the Contact
Group did, I fear a huge catastrophe.

EX-YU

CLEANSING OF "KRAJINA"

by ZARKO PUHOVSKI / W.R. / Zagreb

The situation is not calm yet, and so many things must be clarified. However, in regard to the
main issue, it is hard to discuss anything. In less than three days, the Croat armed forces
clearly won over the territories formerly occupied by Serbs, in the so called "Krajina". In one
weekend alone, Zagreb managed to achieve by force what the world's diplomacy couldn't in
the past three years - the reintegration of the state of Croatia.

The extraordinarily organized military action was also an excellent example of ethnic
cleansing. The rapidness of the Croat victory came a surprise for many diplomats and
political analysts. However, Serbs in Krajina, at least those of the leadership, were not
surprised by it at all. Since the beginning of the action, they were not only ready to fly to
Belgrade, but also to organize the massive exodus of the population from the self-proclaimed
Serbian state. Really, Knin's propaganda - that Serbs will never be able to live in peace in
Croatia - contributed to their exodus.

The military Croatian strategy was also designed to cause such a population movement -
targeting Knin and other towns will the inevitable treatment of civilians during the actions -
remain issues for future investigations.

At the same time, any Croat manoeuvre, opened the paths to flee. The Croatian army rejected
to totally besiege the towns or Serb positions, even in places where this was possible. The
exits in the region - signalized by the Croatian army and the UN forces - were not only used
by civilians, but also by complete Serb military units of Krajina, completely redeployed in
Bosnia.

The reason for such a mutual "understanding" between Serbs and Croats, is not hard to find.
Such a big possibility for such a huge Croatian attack - much less than their victory - was
based on the certainty that Belgrade will not intervene. Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic
gave up on the region of Krajina. However, this is the price to pay for the moderate policy of
Belgrade, which was evident in the proclamation which announced the offensive. In this
statement, President Tudjman, forgot to mention Eastern Slavonia, among the territories

- 10 -
which the Croat army was planning to liberate. Even more directly, in the last days, official
statements of the Foreign Ministry and that of Defense, stressed that Serb attacks against
Croat towns and villages are minor provocations of units which are under the control of the
Krajina rebels and not Belgrade.

The situation is extremely explosive. However, it seems that it is a consequence of the non-
willingness of Croatia to use the force to reintegrate this region. Apart from the partial
mobilization by both sides and the indirect "greetings" of both sides, the towns of Eastern
Slavonia, Vukovar, Ilok, as well as Baranja, will have the fate of remaining under the
Serb/Yugoslav rule, at least in the times to come. I believe it is too much to say that, since
these parts of the former "Krajina" are directly linked to the Yugoslav territory, the potential
Croatian attack would cause inevitably the intervention of the Yugoslav army (the rough Serb
attack on bordering Osijek proved more than a warning). Thus, while Croatia is gaining
territories along the seacoast which are strategically important, Serbia/Yugoslavia will keep
the richest areas, those with oil reserves.

Serbs in Bosnia failed to intervene in Krajina for obvious reasons. While the Croat leaders
tried to regain territories with as less Serbs as possible in them, the regime of the Bosnian
Serbs leader Karadzic, had the opposite problem: he had more lands (ethnically clean) than
population, and needed to populate them with fresh people, who as refugees, are heading
towards him.

At the same time, the Serbian part of Bosnia is totally paralyzed. The flow of refugees has
blocked the roads, and thus the army or the troops can't move. And then, the internal war
between Karadzic and Mladic has confused Pale totally. This conflict was started by
Milosevic, after his recent letters with peaceful proposals, addressed only to Bosnian
President Izetbegovic and Ratko Mladic, but not Karadzic, as the leader of "civilians".
Anyhow, at a long run, Bosnian Serbs must be capable of preserving their superiority, not
only because of the new population, but also because Milosevic must give them a sign that he
hasn't forgotten Western Serbs.

At the international level, Croatia is now a "regional power". Since the international
community was also willing to support the strongest party during the disintegration of the
former Yugoslavia, today, it is willing to support Croatia. During the manoeuvres preceding
the Croatian offensive, Zagreb stressed the Serb actions in Bihac pocket - thus alluding to the
acknowledgement of geo-political interests of big powers towards a state (Croatia), justifying
its military action outside its borders. However, many other things can be feasible: not only
military aggressions, but also the possibility for the future Croat control of the Bihac pocket.
Naturally, the division of Bosnia represents a precondition for such a development of events,
a thing which unfortunately, is not that impossible - as official statements claim. The hope is
that Croatia's intervention will offer a break to Bosnia's government - or, at least to the
international community. Which, naturally, is wrong.

Regardless of the quick advance of Sarajevo troops against Fikret Abdic's forces, Bihac will
belong to Croat forces. As it was being attempted, Milosevic and Tudjman will split Bosnia:
the path to this was opened by Krajina.

Inside Croatia, the Serbian issue has been resolved, with much aggressiveness. Before the
war, there were over 600 thousand Serbs. Today, there are 100 to 150 thousand. The period of
ethnic-nationalistic euphoria will influence the whole political scene. Meanwhile hundreds of

- 11 -
thousands of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia will remain a permanent threat to regional
stability, it could be expected that Zagreb could crude its own version of "democracy".
without any doubt, the feeling of victory will lead towards the gradual stability of the political
situation. And, people will be calmed down. However, this will have its effects after the end
of the victorious atmosphere. For the time being, there is still full control over the media and
the platforms of the alternative voices - but, it seems as if there were very few voices to set
under control. Almost with all certainty, it can be said that parliamentarian elections will be
held shortly before this emotional period full of manipulations ends - and this will be in the
next two or three months.

The reply to the military action proves that there is no strategic opposition. All what
opposition parties could do these days, was to greet the president.

It is very doubtful that they will consolidate and offer any kind of resistance to Tudjman and
his HDZ party during elections, which are supposed to take place next spring. On a longer
term, more people will be insisting on real democratization and social equality, while the
government will not be able to reply justifying itself with the open front, which can now be
passed by local buses for less than an hour. Nevertheless, this debate will be the content of the
next elections, four years later.

Thus, Croatia will act as a local power and regional cop. This role has never brought luck to
the states which tested it.

And, international postures towards Croatia and Tudjman will be - as Franklin Roosevelt
explained to his client: "He might be a son-of-a-bitch, but he is our dog". In other words,
ethnic cleansing will be completed and the balance of the powers will be reached - with some
kind of an end to war. As always, peace will win over justice.

(Zarko Puhovski is professor of political philosophy at the University of Zagreb and vice-
chairman of the Croatian Helsinki Committee in Croatia)

CROATIA

WEEKEND FIGHTING

by STOJAN OBRADOVIC / Split

The Serbian rebellion in Croatia, directed by Belgrade, which started with the well-known
barricade revolution by the end of August 1990, was perceived by the majority as a
indubitable sign that this disintegration will not escape a huge tragic war. Five years later, the
Serbian para-statal creature, which meant a stab in the heart of Croatia, disappeared within
one weekend. The chief of the political department of the Croatian Ministry of Defense,
general Ivan Tolj said that "the so called RSK didn't crumple as a tower of cards, but was
rather removed as a web". In the first statements, the Croat soldiers who had gone through all
battles, this time declared: "It was so easy"! President Tudjman, who besides being father of
the nation, has now without any doubt become national hero, in his first appearance, as the
action was still going on, said that he had told his careful generals that this will be a much
easier action than they were expecting. According to the Minister of Defense, Gojko Susak,

- 12 -
the operation should have lasted eight days. Speaking in military terms, hundreds of killed
Croatian soldiers, were a minimal price Croatia paid to free its occupied territories, especially
knowing that it paid the insurrection, the aggression of the former Yugoslav Peoples Army
and the occupation of its territories with circa ten thousand killed civilians and soldiers.
In this action, Croatia engaged circa 100 thousand soldiers. Along the participation of HVO
and BH Army units, Susak stressed that in this action he potentially had at his disposal some
250 thousand people. Opposite to this, the army of the Krajina Serbs counted with 40
thousand soldiers. Croat euphoria and enthusiasm now seem understandable. Even the sole
Croatian action has political legitimacy, regardless of the criticism coming from the
international community. After five years, Croatia became almost integral and sovereign on
all its territory. What remains, as the Croat President will say, is petty. Nevertheless, it is
certain that by undoing the Knin knot, Croatia resolved its main problem. Knin was not only a
symbol of aggression and occupation or issue of national dignity - Knin is one of the key geo-
strategic points of Croatia, and without it, Croatia couldn't function normally. The fall of
Knin has been experienced, among others, also as an announcement of the end of the state of
war, which even though never proclaimed, Croatia has been living in the past five years.
Now, over one hundred Croat refugees started coming back home.

On the other hand, one day after "Storm", the largest exodus of refugees in this war started.
According to different sources, between 100 and 200 thousand Serbs departed from their
para-state. According to the testimonies of the foreign reporters, they don't know where they
are headed to. Even though President Tudjman, as the attack against Krajina started, called
the Serb population not to abandon their fatherland, he guaranteed them amnesty, protection
and all the rights according to the Constitution and the Constitutional Law which regulates
the rights of minorities, it was clear that it was impossible to convince this population not to
share the fate of the leadership which brought them to this tragic position and ordered total
evacuation. Unfortunately, it was totally clear that after five years of confrontation, the
military option of integration of the Croatian space would mean only the return of the
territories and without any doubt the departure and no comeback of the people. This was
clearly proven by the preliminary action in Western Slavonia. The Vice-President in charge of
humanitarian issues, Ivica Kostovic, claimed that they had expected that at least one third of
the people would stay. Was this the optimal calculation of a future minority wished in
Croatia, so it can evade being accused for ethnic cleansing its territories, is not that important
right now. The fact that the Serbian issue in Croatia is tragic, but it has been solved
definitively, is decisive. From the request for the "independent state", a state within a state,
etc. - as all Serbs, from the crazy extremists in Knin up to the legal parties in Zagreb, were
perceiving the matter and were looking for a solution within Croatia, there are only a few
Serbs remaining in big urban centers, which is the least interested in having a special national
status. From out of 600 thousand Serbs who used to live in Croatia before the war, there are
certainly less than one fourth remaining. Whether the intentions different, that is another issue
and needs a thorough elaboration. However, this issue regards both Zagreb and Belgrade.
Milosevic's regime, is by all means the most responsible for the tragic situation the Serbian
people in Croatia are going through. For a long time it was clear that the so called RSK was a
paper tiger and that this chaotic para-state of misery and terror, didn't represent a special
problem for the professionalised Croatian army. The problem was whether Serbia would be
involved in this war or not. I depended on this whether the international factor, the US before
all, would accept a military option or would still continue insisting on finding a political
solution. The American politics which has a crucial role in the region, has several times, or
even with the intervention of Germany, stopped Croatia to solve the problems in Krajina
militarily. By the end of last year, in the times of Bihac crisis, which was again used as

- 13 -
justification to start the military action, Croatia decided to intervene militarily, and it had
been stopped through international political channels, and the same thing was repeated when
Croatia didn't want to extend UNPROFOR's mandate at the beginning of this year, when
American politicians stressed that an attack against Krajina would cause the intervention of
Serbia and the expansion of war outside the borders of the Former Yugoslavia, which was
clearly said not to be tolerated by the Americans. This time, e very certain sign that Croatia
would start the so many times announced military action was the American political
"evaluation" that Serbia will not intervene, which was evident in the "Spark" action of the
Croat Army in Western Slavonia. This makes many ask what has Milosevic blackmailed the
whole thing with? For the Croatian Serbs the result is the same, but it is not the same for the
final solution of the Former-Yugoslav crisis.

The military victory which eliminated the so called RSK, starting from Western Slavonia,
then by taking Grahovo and Glamoc, which was one of the key preconditions for "Storm",
even though brilliant in the military aspect, nevertheless surprises because of the weak
Serbian resistance. Bosnian Serbs haven't moved when the action in Western Slavonia took
place, even though they could have helped them, for sure. UN's spokesman in Zagreb,
Christopher Gunnes said that in Glamoc's operations there was any serious Serb military
presence. In the definitive attack against Knin, even though there were also some important
clashes, the Croatian Army entered the majority of the towns, including Knin so easily. As if
the decision not to defend Krajina at all had been taken long ago.

At the beginning of the operation, the last attempt for conversations in Geneva resembled
more listing conditions for the surrender of the Serbian delegation than the attempt for serious
talks. It is interesting that the American ambassador in Croatia, Peter Galbraith, one day
before the conversations in Geneva had been in Belgrade and received Milan Babic's consent
for the peaceful reintegration of Krajina according to Plan Z-4. Regardless of the fact that
Galbraith was in Belgrade, maybe even for the American alibi, while Babic was in favor of
everything which bought him time, it seems that everything regarding Krajina was directed
against its interests. It is not at all logical to believe that Milosevic couldn't strengthen the
Krajina leadership, and if in fact he wished to help, he could have convinced them to accept
seriously the conditions for reintegration according to Plan Z-4, which offered Serbs a strong
autonomy with international guarantees. Naturally, there are also some of those who believe
that Milosevic is so tired with war and sanctions, that he is forced to make many concessions,
first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, only to keep the power. The ones who claim to know him
stress that his only aim is power, even if the condition were Greater of Smaller Serbia.
However, some also fear that the biggest conditions for the rule of Milosevic's type, still
remains to be war. In the analyses these days, after the fall of Knin, the maps of the global
divisions of the former Yugoslavia which are alleged to Milosevic and Tudjman have become
actual again. This means naturally, the division of Bosnia but also implies some mutual
territorial concessions, e.g. Eastern Slavonia, which with its resources also allows the
strategic control of the Danube. One of Tudjman's close collaborators, the special envoy to
the Contact Group, Miomir Zuzulj, declared recently that it is a fantasy to believe that
someone can lead politics according to drawn maps. But he also said that new political
relations and processes can lead towards new maps! In these global speculations, one of the
preconditions for their realization is the massive displacement of population. Karadzic thesis
according to which he was telling Croatian Serbs to come to Bosnia and leave the "Ustasha
state" is very well known. There is no doubt that the Serb exodus, which is now seeking the
new existential space, will be used militarily for the continuation of the war in B&H so it can
also become a factor of change. But, now things are concentrating in Bosnia and that is

- 14 -
where the global Croat-Serb relations will be settled. Muslims, as their leadership is
convinced, believe that this will not be at their cost.

KOSOVA

Milos Nesovic, "Deputy-`Nacelnik' of Kosovo"

"SETTLEMENT IS ONLY TEMPORARY"!

Interviewed by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

KOHA: Rumors are that a number of Serb refugees will come to Kosova. You are also
chairing the crisis committee created especially for this matter. How are things?

NESOVIC: Committees for the reception of refugees coming from war seized territories are
organized at the level of the Republic of Serbia and give immediate assistance. There are not
only Serbs among the refugees, but also people of other nationalities. This is a civic state, all
have equal rights, and we try to act accordingly.

We have formed the municipal committees on the territory of Kosova, therefore we have 24
of those. Such committees were created on the levels of the "okrugs", that of Morava based in
Gjilan, of Prizren, Peja and Kosova which is the largest.

KOHA: Do you have an operation plan for the reception of refugees?

NESOVIC: So, we have created these committees and the "nacelniks of the okrugs" are
chairing them. We also have a coordinating body at the level of Kosova comprised of all
members from the okrugs and responsible people who can help us to provisionally
accommodate the refugees. We consider that the settlement is provisional. We saw that a
number of refugees was headed towards Nis, Vranje, Leskovac, etc. We had no special
organization of transportation towards Kosova. As far as we know, the main crisis committee
for the reception of refugees matches them with their relatives, or takes them to places where
they will settle provisionally. We know how difficult the situation is for them, especially for
those who belong to the peasants strata, who have lost all their assets and wealth created by
generations, and this differs them from the urban population who can't take along much...

KOHA: Have you any data on their social structure and will you take this into consideration
when you decide about their accommodation?

NESOVIC: This will be included in our plan and we will surely take that data while they are
registered. We have thought of accommodating them here and we have thought of hotel
capacities which are not in function, a resort, a students dormitory and will try to do that
without any larger investment. We have great support from the citizens, and we expect them
to host some of the refugees, especially the village households, and we expect all citizens,
regardless of their nationality, to be involved in this... We don't know how many people
would come. This will depend on their expressed will. But, if all capacities are filled, then
they will be rerouted, which is normal, for if we have space, why shouldn't we receive them.
This is the ultimate obligation of the state, to provide them with a normal life.

- 15 -
KOHA: Recently some locations for refugees were built. Will refugees be settled here?
Albanians are fearing that this can be directed towards the change of the ethnic composition
and increase tensions?

NESOVIC: According to my opinion, I hope that the international community will do

something to take back these people to their homes, for I expect this to be a provisional
settlement. Then, I don't see why should this increase tensions if they come? Why should that
bother anyone? No one will be upset about their arrival. I don't believe that this would change
the ethnic structure and as far as I know there is no law on colonization. I don't know that any
refugees will settle in these buildings for colonization, I count on the fact that they will be
accommodated in some buildings in Brezovica, Istog, etc. We count on taking over these
buildings without upsetting the tourist enterprises, were want to use buildings which are not
being used. We also count on some students dormitories... We must be human and
understand... The least are coming to Kosova, maybe because they are afraid...

KOHA: The refugees to be settled in Mitrovica, would they get jobs in "Trepça", for
example?

NESOVIC: I just said that we don't know how long will these people stay here. If they'll go
back soon, then there is no need to think in this direction. However, the international
community will seemingly react much to slowly, therefore, why shouldn't they be employed.
It would be a relief of the burden for all of us, and the state itself, if they can profit.

MACEDONIA

THE SUMMER SCHEME ... AND MANY DILEMMAS

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

The political circumstances in Macedonia match: the summer heat is "eased" with rain, the
government, even though it is summer and the vacations are still on, takes "big decisions".
At first sight, what is happening in political scene in Macedonia can be reduced to the term:
"summer scheme". Formally, "politicians on duty", the government and the President of the
Republic, don't take the traditional summer vacations, which become obvious from the daily
protocol news on who received who, as well as statements from press conferences of the
government sessions. At first sight, there is summer conformability, that is why events, such
as is Matthew Nimitz's visit, despite the announcements that the solution to the Macedonian-
Greek contest is in the horizon, didn't cause any medial pomposity or a special reaction of the
public. On the other hand, Crvenkovski's government chose the culmination of the summer
season to make public its "program" to fight (organized) criminality.

Some 15 high officials of the Macedonian government lost their jobs in an action the media
first called "project", and then "broom" or "purge". Many things in the executive power and
administration in Macedonia have been very foggy since long ago. Even "birds on trees"
would talk of the crimes, bribery and corruption and the "nouveau rich", the disrespect of the
sanctions against "FRY" and about almost the only way to gain money in Macedonia... Not to
speak of ordinary things, as is tax and customs fees evasion. Less than a year ago, a high
ranked official came out in public stating that organized crime in Macedonia increased and

- 16 -
that even people of the government were involved there, including some ministers. His
ministry, but also the media under the government control, spent a lot of time, space and
energy to convince the public that his statements were only a result of his anger because of
the lost position. The pompous announcement of the Government's "project" to settle all
problems in regard to the disrespect of the laws, before all with those who steal from the state
and the cores of the organized crime contains many elements of what is being whispered
among the people for a long time, or of what the former policeman had confirmed too early.

In the middle of the summer vacations, which Macedonia's citizens are enjoying in Turkey
and not in Ohër, the government, strongly applying the market law, expelled those who were
selling everything at the markets from there. The protests of these people in front of
municipal and republican parliaments had no success. This was the first point in favor of the
government in its war against the "grey" economy. The change of some sub-secretaries in
some ministries, some chiefs of different sectors in government's administration, should have
confirmed the decision of the government to definitely, create order, above all, in state
finances. And it is precisely in the start that a mistake was committed in this action called
"project", "broom", "purge" - as you wish.
The justification for the replacement of the high-ranked government officials is reduced to:
"unsatisfactory performance". In times when everyone speaks of the involvement of different
ministers in corruption, the bill was paid by those "who were less guilty". It seems that the
undersecretaries who left, deserved their dismissal otherwise, however, were excellently used
by the government to "sell fog" to the dissatisfied population. The action of the government
which is trying to keep up the medial pompousness, reminds a lot of Tito's speeches or the
letters he used to send to the "working avantgarde" about "the bandits in our rows".

The government and the ruling party were very satisfied after the first step. The prime-
minister even, for the first time in the last couple of years, gave ten days of leave to his
ministers, which coincided also with the National Day, the Ilinden, which again, is another
story. Ilinden from 1903 and that of 1994, foundations of the Macedonian wish for statehood,
strangely enough passed silently. The President of the Republic visited a village in Western
Macedonia (that of Macedonians of Muslim confession). In Krusevo, the traditional
celebration of the Republic of Krusevo, the President of the Parliament delivered a speech in
the legendary "Meckin Kamen" stating that "Ilinden is the day in which each Macedonian,
anywhere he is, should be the biggest in the world", remarking that "however big he is, he
must pray there"! In times when protocol news were published, that cabinet members (?!) of
the President and Primer-minister visited the monuments erected for the ones who fought for
the statehood of Macedonia.

To have the irony even bigger, Shkup's streets were not decorated with national flags, as in
any National Day. And all these events suscitate new rumors and comments in media which
conclude that the actual Macedonian government is really after forgetting the "old" history
and promote the "new" one according to the "everything started with us" principle. How
much truth is there in all of this, remains to be seen on September 8, the referendum day.
Another polemic between the Liberals and Socialists in the pages of "Nova Makedonija", is
another proof of the fractures inside the coalition. In the monthly supplement "Liberal", there
was a comment on the last congress of the Socialist Party. The congress was attended also by
representatives of leftist parties of the Balkans, including SPS, JUL and the Bulgarian
socialists. A round table was also organized, and it in fact meant that this was a continuation
of a round table previously organized in Belgrade. This was a reason enough for the liberals
to accuse the socialists that they are "courting" actual governments in Serbia and Bulgaria.

- 17 -
The Socialists responded, again in "Nova Makedonija", among others reminding the Liberals
that it was precisely their chairman, Andov, the Speaker of the Parliament who received the
SPS delegation while in Shkup! And the reply was also a motive for the socialists to question
the status of the liberals in the coalition - who are acting at times as part, and at times as its
opposition.

In an interview to the new weekly "Fokus", Adburrahman Aliti, Chairman of PPD declared:
"I stand disdain, because I must!" In the interview, which is a bit thematic, because it is
largely linked to the "para-military affair" or rather the sentence of the "Albanian paramilitary
in Macedonia", Aliti stresses that there was no case, really, and that the activities for self-
defence in the times of the former YPA were known to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
that the whole affair had been framed by the police and that the trials shouldn't have taken
place: "The purpose of the government was to present Albanians as an unreliable factor,
which can destabilize the situation and in that regard, they created a spare dossier - that there
was an existing core, they did what they had to, they got the final image, that you see,
Albanians are preparing something". We would mention another statement of Aliti: "If we
had more strength, would we stand such despise in education, information and other areas?
We would not. But, I do, because I must". The fact that all actors of the "paramilitary affair"
are free, is a simple political gesture, is the best proof that its continuation is the result of a
political decision.

It is clear that the summer in Macedonia runs according to the first schemes (meteorological
and political) - it is at times "hot" at times "cold". But in both cases (better to use the term
applied by the government), it is transparent.

KOSOVA

THE FRUITS OF "STORM"

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

The Croatian "Storm", apart from being a blitzkrieg which brought one of the quickest
victories, and which united over 10 squared kilometers (almost as one Kosova) in Croatia,
expelled almost all the population of what was known as "Krajina". Between 200 and 250
thousand people seem to have been expelled and headed towards the Serbian held territories
in Bosnia, and a large part of them is also crossing the Drina. This is for sure one of the
largest exoduses which could have happened in the Balkans, and this will, probably, affect
Serbia quite a lot, which through the initiatives of the Commissariat for Refugees and special
programs, is trying to find space for a sea of people. By all means a large number of Krajina
people will settle in Bosnia, even more knowing that Bosnian Serbs have occupied so much
territory and have conducted ethnic cleansing, that they are missing people to populate the
areas. But, it seems that a considerable number of those wish to find a safe haven in Serbia,
far away from the battlefield.

In fact, the Krajina refugees, who have lost all they had and have no shelter, have not much to
choose, but rather others will choose for them. One of the chosen will be Kosova, and this has
been announced in Serbian media, even mentioning a concrete figure of 20 thousand people.
At the "Kosovo Red Cross", the one controlled by Serbs, its President Moracic tells us that a

- 18 -
number of them will, by all means, come to Kosova and that preparations for their
accommodation are being made. We have collected assistance for them and Serb citizens and
enterprises from Kosova are approaching us and offering their assistance for the Krajina
refugees, and we hope that also the Albanians as well as "Mother Theresa" will assist us since
"this is a human tragedy and assistance". Moracic, and the Secretary of this organization,
Ruzica Simic explained to "KOHA" that their organization is not in charge of the distribution
of the refugees, but that there is a Crisis Committee created for this purpose at the level of
Kosova, and which is chaired by the "deputy-nacelnik" Milos Nesovic, who is being assisted
by the government administration. Taking over this task, which apart from the understandable
element of involvement in registering and assisting the refugees, also proves that the
distribution of these refugees was placed directly under the umbrella of the Serbian
government. This activity, is by all means, liked to the activities of the Serbian Commissariat
for refugees, which is directly involved in the refugee crisis. However, in Buba Morina's
organization, they told us that it was very hard to locate her, for these days she is engaged in
the field, therefore we can't get an answer or a confirmation about this issue. UNHCR in
Prishtina is on leave, while the response from the officials of the Belgrade Office didn't
arrive.

In fact, the refugee crisis coincided with the time in which the colonist settlements were being
finalized, among others in Vushtrri. Even more, the Serbian organs adopted the law for the
colonization of Kosova with some 100 thousand Serbs, and while the population of Kosova
with Serbs seemed quite incredible then (having in mind the political and economic
situation), now the appearance of the Serb refugees from Krajina doesn't make this
impossible. This is because they have nowhere to go, they can't choose, for they have lost all
they had. Thus, in fact, the misfortune of these people after the last war, in the eyes of many
an agreement between the Croat and Serb leaders, makes these refugees object of a double
game. They were "cleansed" from their former territory which didn't acknowledge Croatia's
sovereignty, and now are brought in a territory in which according to Serbia's state plans
should also be "cleansed" of 90% dominating Albanians from a territory which also doesn't
acknowledge the sovereignty of this state!

But, where and how can this mass of people be settled in Kosova, and what can the
consequences be? It is well known that Kosova has the highest density of the population and
a compactness with the Albanian ethnic element. Kosova is also blocked economically,
especially due to the Serb compulsory measures after the suspension of autonomy. This is by
all means an obstacle for any settlement of Serb colonists, however, refugees with nowhere to
go, can't choose. It also should be born in mind that these people are quite traumatized and
that many of them lack autonomous possibilities to build their future. This can mean the
colonization of Kosova and the attempt to change the ethnic structure, with an element which
can absolutely be used by the Serbian government. If the first contingent of 20 thousand
people is to arrive, then this would imply, in case its needed, at least some 10 thousand new
policemen and military. People who have gone through hell, will be here with their families,
therefore "protection" from another possible ethnic conflict, to them would be a (calculated)
automatism! In fact, some analyses which comprise all hotels, resorts, dormitories, private
homes, etc. (and schools are not excluded, as confirmed by Moracic) evaluate that between 15
and 20 thousand beds can be available!

Despite the explanations of some Serb officials that this is only a "temporary settlement", as if
this reminds the Kosovans of a negative collective memory, the "syndrome of the Muhaxhers
(refugees)" from Toplica and Kurshumlia - when they were expelled once and they never

- 19 -
went back... And once mentioning coincidences, some time ago appeared the draft citizenship
bill, whose discriminating peculiarities have made it object of discussion in many human
rights organizations. It also foresees the loss of citizenship for all Albanian asylum seekers
abroad (350 thousand?), as this was announced also by interior minister, a Kosovan Serb,
Jokanovic. This is another element that strengthens what is called "elegant ethnic cleansing"
in Kosova. However, coincidences and parallelism, with all their risk, can also be seen in
Bildt's statement that by accepting the "fait accompli" which occurred with the expulsion of
Serbs from Croatia, a dangerous precedent can be established, and could serve Milosevic to
do the same thing in Kosova. To divide it and ethnically cleanse it!?

For the time being, it only looks like a dangerous threat, but the presence of Serb refugees in
Kosova seems to be imminent, with all the consequences it brings.

- 20 -
APPENDIX

J A V O R E / Albanian weekly

P.O. BOX 202

38000 PRISHTINA

Issued by the KOHA Editorial Board

English Edition: KOHA

Contact Person: Filloreta Bytyqi

Phone & Fax: +381 38 31 031

+381 38 31 036
Modem: +381 38 31 276

E-Mail: koha_pr@zana-pr.ztn.zer.de

- 21 -