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The Decline of Latin American Student Activism

Author(s): Daniel C. Levy


Reviewed work(s):
Source: Higher Education, Vol. 22, No. 2, Student Political Activism and Attitudes (Sep., 1991),
pp. 145-155
Published by: Springer
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Higher Education22: 145-155, 1991.


? 1991 KluwerAcademicPublishers.Printedin the Netherlands.

The declineof Latin Americanstudentactivism


DANIEL C. LEVY
Departmentof EducationalAdministrationand Policy Studies, State Universityof New Yorkat Albany,
Albany,N.Y. 12222, U.S.A.
Abstract.If Latin America once representeda worldwide referencepoint for potent student activism,
the region now stands out for the decline of activism. While other regions experience new forms and
impacts of activism, Latin America's decline should be understood within two broad contexts:
macropolitical and higher educational.
The macropolitical context subsumes at least three major causal factors. One is the role of
authoritarian rule, especially powerful in the 1970s but leaving a legacy that itself works against
activism. Second, we must consider the more complex and mixed impacts of the redemocratizationthat
has swept the region. The third factor is the general decline of the left both domestically and
internationally.
On the highereducation side, decades of unprecedentedgrowth in student numbershave fragmented
the student body, especially as growth is accompanied by extraordinary institutional proliferation.
Many of the newerinstitutionsare inhospitablefor student activism. Privatizationhas had an especially
strong demobilizing effect. The institutional changes are accompanied by a changingprofile of fields of
study, away from some most associated with student politics. Finally, the concentration of top social
scientists in researchcenters apart from the universities- and from the students - is also crucial.

Introduction
As other regions witness increased student activism in the closing years of the
century, Latin America - long seen as the extreme in such activism - witnesses a
notable decrease. This article explains the decrease in terms of two clusters of
factors. The first is the macropolitical context. The second, surer in its limiting
effects,is the highereducationcontext. Both clusterswill show how diversificationis
crucial in understandingthe decline.
Perception of decline stems partly from images of extraordinaryactivism that
wereformed when most of the literatureon LatinAmericanstudentswas written,in
the 1960s and early 1970s. The literaturewas itself a response to what can now be
interpretedas a temporarypeak in student politics. Since that time, however, very
little has been written,so that extant literaturewould leave readerswith eitherfalse
impressionsor, at best, a lack of explanationfor the changes.' And these changes
involve not just a fall from the peak but a longer-termtransformationthat requires
attention.

Macropoliticalcontext
Too often works on student activism consider the macropolitical context only
insofar as it is the object of protest; yet the context also largely determines
propensities, orientations,and, crucially,permissiblebounds of activism.

146
Authoritarianrule
The point about bounds was made painfullyclearin recenttimes, particularlyin the
1970s. It has already been analyzed (Levy 1981) but must be summarized here,
despite the fact that democracies have subsequently swept the region, because
extended militaryrule was so crucialto the decline of activism in the 1970sand also
the 1980s and because the legacy of that rule still has a telling effect.
Historically, authoritarianrule in Latin America usually allowed for pockets of
autonomy, of which the universitywas a leading example. Startingwith Brazil in
1964,however, militariesassumed power with intentions not just to save the status
quo and quickly turn government back to trustworthy civilians but to remake
society throughextendedrule. Repressionand exclusionwerecentralcharacteristics
of their policy toward the university and beyond. So on the one hand student
activism on campus was prohibitedwhile, on the other, relatedstructuresin which
students had participated beyond the campus (e.g., political parties) were also
outlawed. Violations of prohibitions were often dealt with brutally.The impact on
studentactivismwas especiallyprofound becauserepressioncame in preciselythose
nations where activism had gone furthest in the years just before the coups and
because these nations (Brazil, Argentina 1966 and 1976, Chile and Uruguay 1973)
accountedfor well over half the highereducationenrollments;and the figu:'eswould
expand if we include aggressive military rule in Central America and, at times,
certain other South American nations in the 1970s.
As to the chilling legacy of repressive military rule, I would emphasize a few
points consistentwith a widerliteratureon politicalculture.Many youth see politics
as dirty, and are apathetic. Accordingly, fewer than half those eligible voted in
renewed Argentine student elections (1984), and surveys show distrust of student
political leaders (Mollis 1989, pp. 344-345). Then too, long military rule showed
many the ultimate weaknessof student activists,particularlyas most of the latter's
goals were diametricallyopposed to the military'spolicies within and beyond the
university. Additionally, the military'sbrutality taught many that leftist activism
carriesgreat risks, and that things could indeed be much worse than they are under
centrist or even rightistcivilian regimes. Finally, extended militaryrule helped the
development of some rightist student groups:juxtaposed to groups of decidedly
differenttendencies, these contribute to fragmentingdiversification.
Democratization
To be sure, democratizationhas allowed renewed student activism. To deny that
would be to deny the obvious in pursuitof an unqualifiedthesis about decline. Even
in the opening up process, while militariesstill governed, student activityincreased.
Regime power and legitimacyto represswas waning; dynamics were underwayin
which 'softliners'and realists(about transition)were ascendant within the regimes
themselves(O'Donnell, Schmitter,and Whitehead 1986).The processwas especially long in Brazil; students were demonstrating fairly freely and voting in their

147
universitiesfor a decade before the nation directly elected its president (1989). In
fact, Brazil shows how student activists could assume important leadershiproles,
and set examples, in the wider struggle for redemocratization.Something similar
happened in Chile from 1983 to 1990, even though most student goals were of
limited institutional scope. (With qualifications we could even cite the role of
Mexican student activists since the mid-1980s in demanding unprecedented
democratization of their nation's civilian authoritarian regime.) As in Eastern
Europe, students in Latin America were spurredby the realizationthat an impact
was possible when regimeswere on the ropes.
Once democracies are established, authoritarian restrictions are naturally
replaced by ample freedom to be active. Students typically regain some representation within their institutions and a credible power of protest beyond as well.
Meanwhile, the re-establishmentof other organizations in civil society reopens
multiple routes for activism long characteristic of civil regimes (e.g., activism
associated with youth wings of political parties,sometimes en route to recruitment
to governmentpositions). Additionally, the center-righteconomic policies of most
of the post-militarydemocraciesin South America (Brazil, Chile, and Argentina)
and, especiallyby 1990,CentralAmerica,are logical targetsfor criticismby student
leftists,a point that applieswell also to the rightwardflow of the Mexicanregime.In
Guatemala, national university students protested President Cerezo's austerity
policies. In Nicaragua, where a center-right coalition replaced the sandinistas
(1990), student activistsformed even during the transition to demand demobilization of the contras, huge pay increases for faculty, and other measures that
suggested an active future.2
Grantedall this, the new democraticcontext also carriesfactors,admittedlymore
subtle, that cut against student activism.
First, most of the democraciesare brittle.Consequently,the authoritarianlegacy
is especially vivid. Even such relatively developed nations as Argentinaand Brazil
have had preciouslittleexperiencewith democracy;the formerhas sufferedthrough
repeatedperiods of militaryrule,as have manysmallernations. Furthermore,all the
new and renewed democracies,with the partial exception of Chile, have assumed
power amid terrible economic crisis. While the striking movement toward
neoliberaleconomic policy provokes some student protest, it is also a humiliating
illustration of the impotence of student politics on the national scale, as activists
have lobbied for quite opposite policies;credibilitydeclines.Then too, the crisishas
pushed student groups to focus on corporate self-protection, such as protesting
increasedprices in the cafeteria,medical services,and public transportation.That
may be activism, but hardly the romantic or inspired kind that builds great
movements. Beyond that, the crisisleads many to regardactivism as a luxuryor an
irrelevance;many become but part-timestudents as they work off campus.
Second, democracies have replaced not just modern authoritarianmilitaryrule
but also oligarchies,at least if we compare 1990to 1970and 1960as well as to 1980.
It was under such oligarchiesthat students often achieved their greatestimpact due
to the narrownessof the regimealongside the absence of other strong actors in civil
society (Silvert 1967).More to the point here, such potential impact, including the

148
heraldedcases related to toppling personalisticdictators, encouragedactivism. By
contrast, students are at best one group among many in today's democracies.
Student activity now often flows through other organizations, weakening student
movementsper se. Albornoz (1989, p. 412) shows how much all Venezuelangroups,
includingstudents, arecoopted by the main politicalparties.Silva Michelena(1986)
likewise finds that the student movement no longer serves as the voice of national
identity, as multiple mass media grow, and he accurately generalizes about the
decline of activism in the 'old democracies' (which, for the inclusion of Mexico
alongsideVenezuela,Colombia, and Costa Rica, I have called 'reconciliation'(Levy
1981) or 'civil' regimes). Thus, activism will not necessarily increase as new
democraciesinstitutionalizethemselves.
A third factor is how the moderation of the democracies fragments student
politics. Widespread revulsion, common for student bodies facing tottering
oligarchies and modern militaries, does not materialize here. For example,
disagreeementwith policies that do not vigorously pursue former human rights
violators is not nearly so intense as that over the violations themselves.
Moving the analysis beyond the form of government to the general political
climate, we see further reason for declining activism. After all, it is the general
population that is electing centrist to conservativegovernments.A salient political
fact is this: the left itself has been weakening.
Events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have reduced the attraction of
leftist groups, putting them on the defensive.So have Chinese reformsfollowed by
brutal repression. Closer to home, Cuba appears an embarrassinganachronism
more than an inspiration,and the sandinistadefeat is anothershock. Additionally,I
would emphasize:the discreditingof the left duringits reignpreceding(or, arguably,
even partlyprecipitating)militaryrule (e.g., Chile, Brazil,Argentina);the relatively
conservative drift of West European democracies;and an increasinglyfavorable
view of the United States.
The decline of the left contributes to the decline of student activism as that
activism has generallybeen leftist. The less leftist,the less distinctive.Moreover,the
decline of leftism is tied to a decline of beliefs in certaintiesand in optimistic views
about the likelihood of change.3
Of course, some students remain on the activist left. But as others do not,
movements diversifypoliticallyor are marginalized.Indeed, this marginalizationis
increasinglyaccompaniedby outrightrejectionby the bulk of the studentbody. This
is something different from the mix of sympathy and apathy with which many
students historicallyviewed activists. Moncada (1986, p. 366) contraststhe heyday
of activistpopularityin Ecuadorwith a contemporaryrealityof a movement that is
'dispersed, incoherent, confused, weakened and often stuck in violent electoral
disputes.' (Silie (1988, p. 179) echoes the idea for the Dominican Republic, where
most youth see student organizations as alien, not for them. Albornoz (1989, pp.
407-409) argues that Venezuela's once powerful left is almost gone, as former
activistsare in the system,and surveysshow high school studentsfavoringthe status
quo, distrustingpolitics, and dislikingstudentactivists.Bernales(1986,pp. 400-401)
reports that the terror of Sendero Luminoso (the guerrilla group) has had a

149
discrediting effect in Peru. More generally, Silva Michelena (1986, pp. 293-298)
finds moderationbreedinghostility to studentradicalism.In Chile, it is strikingthat
only the Communist Party has pushed co-government (which involves strong
student representation)for universities,and most leftistpartieshavejoined with the
center in keeping that party out of the ruling democratic coalition. Finally, in
Mexico, students did successfully mobilize to beat back academic reforms at the
National Universitybut activistsfailed in attemptsto seize the opportunityto build
an ongoing movement and press for co-governmentand other demands.
Higher educationcontext
A complete division between the macropolitical and higher education context
would be artificialas the former has affectedthe latter. Examplesinclude the ways
military repression of public higher education has spurred multiple types of
privatization. But none of the higher education changes has been caused solely by
macropolitical changes, and some have occurred rather independently. In any
event, shifts in the highereducation context have been more secular,less uncertain,
than the macropoliticalones. Moreover, they have more consistentlyundermined
student activism.

System growth
Tremendous growth in student enrollmentsfrom the 1950sat least into the 1970s,
dependingupon nation, drivingthe regionalcohort percentagesfrom 3%in 1960to
12%by 1975, has transformedthe higher education system. Though militaryrule
sometimes thwarted growth, other regimes and macropolitical forces (e.g., the
ideology of development)as well as broad socioeconomic forces promoted it.
Initially, surging numbersmay have contributedto activisimand a new sense of
power. But the stronger secular effect seems to have been divisive diversification.
Students increasingly come from different backgrounds from one another.
Commonality, objectivelydefined and subjectivelyperceived,has declined. So has
the aura of national leadership,and the claim of serving as a national voice. Such
settings are more naturalfor elite systems - and may well explain sharp differences
with the African cases discussedelsewherein this issue. Indeed, Brunner(1986, pp.
279-283) depicts such fragmentation, with the decline of student leadership and
unified student culture, as central for explaining diminished activism in Latin
America.4
Furthermore, admission of nonelite groups has meant that an increased
percentageof studentsmust work outside the university.This obviouslyundermines
any sense of unified community, as it emphasizesthe immediate practicalneeds of
many students.The weakeningeffect on studentactivism has been powerfulin such
systems as the Brazilianand the Dominican. And the effect is exacerbatedas other
university actors have increasingly become full time. For one thing, the core of

150
full-time professors tends to look askance at excessively nonacademic student
activities, as seen in their reaction to student demonstrationsat Mexico's National
University in the last few years. For another, full-time professors have their own
concerns and weight within the university,marginalizingstudents;in these same
recentyears Venezuelanuniversitieshave been closed more from the professoriate's
demands regardingsalaryand benefitsthan from student activism(Albornoz 1989,
p. 407), quite a turn around from the 1960's. Moreover, in these two nations and
many others, activist universityworkershave become the most disruptivedissident
political force on campus. Finally, however, Brunner(1986, p. 284) keenly notes
how so much of the affairs of large academic institutions are now handled by
professional bureaucrats, in routinized and technocratic ways that help make
student activism remote.
Growth has also underminedunity in termsof fields of study. The traditional'big
three' of medicine, law, and engineering, now account for only about one-third of
total enrollments (Levy 1986, pp. 268-271). Moreover, the literaturehas always
found activismlinked with only certainfields(Lipsetand Altbach 1967),and a huge
proportional decline has occurred in the fields most associated with student
activism. Law, with less than one-tenth of contemporary enrollments, is a key
example. Likewise, the 'academic' social sciences (e.g., sociology) are now
outdistancedthree to one by business-relatedstudies. Such diversificationis mostly
related to broad differentiation processes that help define development. Also
relevantis the increasingtechnificationand even conservativedriftof government,
along with privatizationof the economy.
Additionally, field diversificationrelatesstronglyto another form of diversification spurred by student growth: institutional proliferation. Though large universities have gotten larger, most growth has eventually channeled itself into
differentinstitutions.Crucially,national universitieshave lost theirrole, sometimes
held for a centuryand a half, as either monopolies or at least undisputedcenterand
leader of higher education systems. A country like Venezuela has alongside its
national university the following official categories of institutions: other public
autonomous universities,public experimentaluniversities,private universities,an
open university, pedagogical institutes, polytechnical institutes, both public and
private university institutes of technology, and both public and private colleges
(CNU 1982, pp. 17-46). Such proliferationhas made unified student movements
much harderto achieve.Not only do studentsat differentinstitutionshave different
backgrounds,aspirations,living conditions, and socializations, they are physically
separated. And many find themselves at institutions, such as technical institutes,
with no tradition, interest or tolerance for student activism. Even the newer
universityinstitutions,however, are somewhat less prone to activismthan are their
more venerablecounterparts,as Argentina shows (Cano 1985, p. 94).
Privatization
The most strikingaspect of institutionalproliferationaffectingstudentactivismhas
been privatization. A detailed account of how privatization weakens student

151
activism (Levy 1981, pp. 366-374) is updated, summarized,and augmented in the
ensuing paragraphs.
Whereasin 1960still only 15%of total enrollmentswerein privateinstitutions,by
1975it was 34%and has held relativelysteadysince. Everynation exceptCuba has a
privatesector, and three(Brazil,Colombia, and the Dominican Republic)have the
majority of their enrollments there. The numbers are significant as private
institutions typically allow no or minimal student representation on decisionmaking bodies. More importantly, they boast a general lack of activism (and
certainlydisorder)through protest.
Explanationsfor the lack of activism stem from the reasons actors have created,
supported, and chosen private institutions. Many governments have directly or
indirectly promoted privatization,partly because of the anti-governmentbent of
student activism in the publics. But, paradoxically,governmentspromoting public
growth have often exacerbatedfactors that lead others to see the publicsas failures,
and seek private alternatives.Many families have chosen privatespreciselybecause
they promise a lack of disorder.In turn, the privateinstitutionsareconservativeand
themselves would allow little activism. Even in the exceptional cases where private
institutionsallow studentrepresentationand voting, as by law in Peru,no flavor of
activism resemblesthe public sector.
The private sector's political orientations combine with socioeconomic ones.
Private students come disproportionately from privileged families disinclined
toward leftist politics, and seeking institutionsthat offer the best routes to the best
jobs. Many of these become the most selective institutions, and they specialize in
job-orientedfields suchas businessadministration,not normallylinkedto activism.
Again a mutuallyreinforcingdynamic develops between institutionalselection and
student self-selection.Then, as privateshold an edge in terms of privilegedclientele,
job prospects,academicprestige,etc., public institutions- and the studentpolitics at
them - become more marginalized.To choose the region'sthree oldest universities,
the national universitiesof Peru, Mexico and the Dominican Republicis to choose
three telling examples. Unlike their predecessors,public student activiststhere and
elsewheredo not speak from the pinnacle. Furthermore,each time activists block
academic reform at their public universities, they contribute to the lag behind
leading privates. No wonder activists usually fought hard against the creation of
growth of private sectors. But today's battle in Costa Rica is but a faint echo of the
great battles of recent decades. The activists have lost.
Two trends furtherbolster the depoliticizingeffect. One concerns democratization. The private-publicdifference had a less decisive impact when authoritarian
regimes blocked activism across-the-board. Inter-sectoraldifferences have been
much more decisivein civil systems,such as Venezuela'sand Mexico's,and so could
well assume increasedsignificancein the newdemocracies.The othertrendconcerns
subsectorson the privateside. In fact, some Catholic universitiesof the 'firstwave'
of privatization have seen, over time, a degree of activism, though rarely has it
approachedpublic sectordimensions.And this Catholicphenomenon may be more
than counterbalancedby the fact that the privateweighthas passedincreasinglyinto
secular institutions. The elite ones, which some prestigious Catholic institutions

152
increasinglyresembleas they lose distinctivereligiousidentity, have been famously
incompatiblewith activism. But the main privategrowth especiallyin the 1980shas
come in nonelite secular institutions. These do not conform to all the traits
elaborated above but they are typically based on commercialfields, are populated
by part-timestudents,and are small and multitudinous- all of which aggravatesthe
fragmentation.

Researchcenters
A further major fracturing of the system that has hurt student activism is the
startling ascendancy of research centers. Many of these, including most that are
freestanding outside the universities, are private research centers (prcs), overwhelminglyconcentratedin the social sciences(Brunnerand Barrios 1987). Others
exist within the universities(urcs) themselves,especiallythe public ones; they cover
principallythe naturaland social sciences.
Prcs have surged largely as responses to authoritarian regimes, which made
criticalwork impossiblein most universities.Funding would come overwhelmingly
from internationalsources, with added protection sometimes afforded by church
connections. Prcs have dominated the social sciences, except economics, in
Argentinaand Chile;in Brazil,they would sharethe scene with universities.But the
prcs are not disappearingwith redemocratization.And they are increasinglysharing
the scene or dominating it in a wide range of other nations including Peru, the
Dominican Republic, and most in CentralAmerica. The main reason is clear:prcs
are a responselargelyto the difficultiesof the main universities,whetheror not those
difficultiesstem from regime repression.Most private universitiesdo not do much
academic social science and most public ones suffer from the problems elaborated
above, including disorder. On the other hand, urcs (also 'institutes' within
universities)reinforce the point about how researchcenters now exist in nations
throughout the region, and about how they grow largely because of the
'micropolitical'and otherproblemsof the universities.They are often at leastpartial
sanctuariesfrom the difficultiesplaguing the mainstreamfaculties.
Researchcenterswork against student activismin severalsignificantways. First,
overlayingeverythingelse, they lack students.Depending on one's definitionof prcs
and urcs, they have eitherno students or few students, or students in but peripheral
status.Teachingeitherdoes not exist, is limitedto nondegreecourses,or, even where
most prevalent,subordinatedto research.No students, no activism. Few students,
little activism, especially as these are almost always graduate students, often
carefully selected and much more academically oriented than 'undergraduates.'
(Indeed, graduate education representsa furtherfracturingof the student body.)
Again we see a mutual selection process that rules out much student activism.
Furthermore,the researchcenters tend to be very serious about academic work,
typically emphasizing objective and/or practical or theoretical over pointedly
ideological research;prc dependence on performancefor its soft money income in
fact denies much margin for tolerating disorder. Moderation and professionalism

153
have also been promoted decisively by study in the U.S. and Western Europe, a
common experience for those at research centers. Finally, the lack of student
activism fits what are actuallyquite hierarchicalorganizations.Urcs typicallyhave
much less participationby students or even junior professionals than do faculties
within the same universities. And prcs, rather ironically given the progressive
ideologies of many of the researchersforced out of the public universities,are run in
even more markedly top-down fashion; elections, for example, are rare. Overall,
most prcs are ratherconsensualorganizations,to which one affiliatesby choice, and
within which little dissidenceemerges.
The College of Mexico, the Corporation of Economic Research for Latin
America in Chile (CIEPLAN), the Center for the Study of State and Society in
Argentina (CEDES), the Institute for Peruvian Studies (IEP), the University
ResearchInstitute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ), and other prcs do not have student
activists. Nor do the urcs of the natural sciences, or apparently even the social
sciences, at national universitiesin Costa Rica, Mexico, and elsewhere.
But it is not just that those at the researchcenterseschew activism. It is that they
hold such a weight within the system. Unquestionably, Latin America's best
research and ideas in the social sciences (in terms of both scholarship and policy
relevance),and a vastlydisproportionateshareof the good professors,students,and
physical resourcesare at the prcs. A parallelexists, though less strongly,regarding
the urcs versusmainstreamteachingfaculties.Consequently,studentactivistsat the
public universityfaculties are once again marginalized.
Conclusion
One way to summarizeis to speculate very sketchily in a comparativemode. The
decline of Latin American student activism surely has much to do with development. On the macropoliticalside there is the diversity of participatoryvehicles in
civil society. On the higher education development side there is the enormous
differentiationstemmingfrom growthand otherfactors. From both sideswe see not
only diminished disposition toward activism but, crucially, diminished political
weight for potential activists at the public universities. In a very general way,
therefore, Latin America may suggest something about the long-run future of
Africa (and less-developed nations in Asia), where civil society is much less
developed and highereducationremainsmuch smaller,elitist, and undifferentiated
than in Latin America.On the other hand, changeswithin LatinAmericamay make
it fit somewhat more than before with the experiencesof the First World in termsof
lower levels of activism.
But such speculations must remain very loose for now, and very tentative.
Experiencebreeds wariness about even hints of developmental determinism.No
clearlinearprograssionexists. Furthermore,the macropoliticalside analyzedin this
article is still in considerable flux, with many consequences for activism still
uncertain.Democratization obviously promotes some activism, and austeritymay
provoke more; so could threats or realities of authoritarian comebacks, or,

154
conceivably, opportunitiesto dump the remainingdictatorshipin Cuba. In Central
America and elsewhere not only is formal democracy weak but civil society is
fragile.Even on the highereducation side, particularfeaturessuch as the dilution of
conservative vigor at some now venerable private universities, while public
universities hang onto the clear majority of enrollments, could cut against basic
tendencies toward declining activism. And then there are all the factors that are
presentlyunforseen. All the while, student activism is not dead.5
Nonetheless, I conclude by emphasizing that diminished student activism has
been a sure fact in Latin American politics over the last two decades. The
macropoliticalcontext provides some important explanationsfor that, even while
its effectsare mixed. The highereducationcontext, itself shaped by broaderpolitical
and socioeconomic tendencies,provides another set of explanationsand these are
overwhelminglyrelatedto diminishedstudent activism.
Notes
1. The only recent sources I know that thematically treat decline in more than one nation are Brunner
(1986) and Silva Michelana (1986), both of which make pioneering contributions, especially on
fragmentation within highereducation; nonetheless, my work attempts a contributionparticularly
regarding macropolitics and the role of privatization and research centers. The next most recent
piece would be Levy (1981), but it is weak on the highereducation context beyond privatization,and
its macropolitical analysis was based on the 1970s, with but a sketchy update in Levy (1989). One
review article covering earlier work is Peterson (1970); even then, students were not as active as
stereotypes had it. Unfortunately, the present contribution can give but the scantest attention to
several related matters including: the evolving forms lingering activism assumes; details on
individual nations and enormous variation across nations; comparisons to other regions.
2. In Panama students have also demonstrated for such measures as increased wages for professors,
but the most notable point so far has been a low profile both during and immediatelyafter the U.S.
invasion, whereas anti-U.S. protests were visible while Noriega was in power.
3. On the other hand, a new belief in certainty has arisen with neoliberal student movements.
Argentina's, lacking precedentin the nation's history, blossomed by the mid-1980s and assumed a
key role in seeking popular support for the new right. Argentina's conservative parties had
previously denounced student politicization, but then welcomed the anti-state ideology and its
explanations for public universityfailures (Gibson 1990).
4. I do not want to exaggerate prior unity. Even among activists, bitter splits (e.g., along national
political lines) were common in nations such as Chile by the 1960s.Mexico had hundredsof student
unions at one time (Mabry 1982, pp. 289-290).
5. Although this article has not attempted to document where activism persists, even so it has made
passing referenceto roles in ending recent militaryregimesand pressingfor democratization,and to
effective efforts to block policies (ranging from increased fees for student services to academic
reform) that would directly affect individual and corporate interests.

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