Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R No. 188078

March 15, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA MORADA,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision
dated 25 January 2010.1
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected in the Decision, that
Congress reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics
Office (NSO), projecting Malolos Citys population in 2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to
the other sources of Malolos Citys population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population PMS 3
Progress Enumeration Report2) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July
2008,3 and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 20084) which Congress allegedly used in enacting
Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators
Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably
within the ambit of this Courts judicial review power,5 then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary
questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are
entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the
authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional
limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law
alleged to violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation:
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040 improves existing conditions, this Court could
perhaps, in the exercise of judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political and therefore
non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by
the courts[:]
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which the court cannot
consider on the ground that it is a political question.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the
legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought
before it.
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does not render it
political instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a
transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no
reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense of duty,
Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution.6 (Emphasis
supplied; internal citations omitted)
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court has no power
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELECs theory, this Court would be reduced to
rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the population
indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation
in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.7
Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos
Citys compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On Mirandas
Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135s requirements that (a) for
intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared
official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population
estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be
issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using Mirandas own growth rate
assumption of 3.78%, Malolos Citys population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional
threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos Citys population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda
issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable as it neither
makes Miranda the NSO Administrators designated certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects
for failing to use demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the projection as of
the middle of 2010.1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report, the Certification of the City of
Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008,
reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of
Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the population census of
Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007 Census results
(showing Malolos Citys population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
adopts Malolos Citys claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year
2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement."8 This unbecoming
attack by the governments chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the governments census authority
has no place in our judicial system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called data
"sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the performance of its functions.
The Certification of the City of Malolos Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its ambit
certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate the water

districts so-called population census to the level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the
existence of NSO. This will allow population data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other
utilities to enter into legislative processes even though these private entities are not in the business of generating
statistical data and thus lack the scientific training, experience and competence to handle, collate and process
them.
Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the Malolos City Water
District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census, much less during off-census years.
The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct population census are local government units (that is,
province, city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and
under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data processing.9
By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population figures,10 the
COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135s stringent
standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial
government decisions and, in this case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating
congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC
invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of Mirandas certificate.11 It is hardly
alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an
express prohibition.12 Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of
an NSO certification of a citys population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for purposes of
converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent component city.13 Congress itself confirms the wisdom and
relevance of EO 135s paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with the
population requirement in the creation and conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an
NSO certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less important than the creation of local
government units in enhancing our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the same
stringent standards.
Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches
the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor
proved that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.
Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population
requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First
Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.15 This
contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was
impracticable for Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos
city lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an
insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional
mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the practicable alternative
for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos Citys legislative district. Although unorthodox,
the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and
population floor, ensuring efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Commission on Elections dated 22
February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180050

February 10, 2010

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the
Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE
SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355,
otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina aver that they are taxpayers and residents of
the Province of Surigao del Norte. They have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as Vice- Governor and
members of the Provincial Board, respectively. They claim to have previously filed a similar petition, which was
dismissed on technical grounds.1 They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if
uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area.
The facts are as follows:
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The
province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and
Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao,
Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon.
Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO),2
the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000 was 481,416, broken down as follows:
Mainland 281,111
Surigao City 118,534
Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354

Dinagat Island 106,951

Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a province may be created
if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the
Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a
contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities,
which do not contribute to the income of the province.
On April 3, 2002, the Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, advised the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in the proposed
Province of Dinagat Islands.3
In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the assistance of an
NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of the house
bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants
in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003,
Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as
official, for all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576.4
The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of
Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land
area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.
On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the
bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2,
2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the
local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct
and independent province comprising the municipalities of Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San
Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.5
On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat
Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite.6
On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected during the synchronized
national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1, 2007, the elected provincial officials took their oath
of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate existence.7
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because
it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code.
Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and that all subsequent appointments and
elections to the new vacant positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared null and void.
They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the return of the
former districts to the mother Province of Surigao del Norte.

Petitioners raised the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, CREATING THE NEW PROVINCE OF DINAGAT ISLANDS, COMPLIED
WITH THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 461 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CREATION OF DINAGAT AS A NEW PROVINCE BY THE RESPONDENTS IS AN ACT OF
GERRYMANDERING.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESULT OF THE PLEBISCITE IS CREDIBLE AND TRULY REFLECTS THE MANDATE OF THE
PEOPLE.8
In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat Islands raises
procedural issues. She contends that petitioners do not have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of
the creation of the Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its creation and are without
substantial interest over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she alleges that the petition is moot and academic
because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has already commenced; hence, the petition should be
dismissed.
The contention is without merit.
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,9 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court,
in the exercise of its discretion, brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering
its importance and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.10
Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision
if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.11 The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if
it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.12
The main issue is whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a province because it
failed to comply with the land area or the population requirement, despite its compliance with the income
requirement. It has a total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the statutory
requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the
total population of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement is a
population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.

Petitioners allege that in enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law, the House of Representatives and the Senate
erroneously relied on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, which states that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands."13 The preceding italicized provision contained in the Implementing Rules
and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated as an exemption to the land area requirement in Section 461
of the Local Government Code. Petitioners assert that when the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with
the law that they seek to implement, the law prevails.
On the other hand, respondents contend in their respective Memoranda that the Province of Dinagat Islands met
the legal standard for its creation.1avvphi1
First, the Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province
of Dinagat Islands for the years 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.25.
Second, the Lands Management Bureau certified that though the land area of the Province of Dinagat Islands is
802.12 square kilometers, it is composed of one or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the required land area of
2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code.
Third, in the special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte, with the assistance of a
District Census Coordinator of the NSO, the number of inhabitants in the Province of Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or
almost three years before the enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006, was 371,576, which is more than the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
In his Memorandum, respondent Governor Ace S. Barbers contends that although the result of the special census
conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte on December 2, 2003 was never certified by the
NSO, it is credible since it was conducted with the aid of a representative of the NSO. He alleged that the lack of
certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of NSO officials, who testified during the deliberations on
House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, and who questioned neither the conduct of the special
census nor the validity of the result.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is granted.
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."14
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria for the creation of a
province, thus:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.15
As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires a contiguous territory of at
least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. However, the territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not
contribute to the income of the province.
If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does "territory," under Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code, include not only the land mass above the water, but also that which is beneath it?
To answer the question above, the discussion in Tan v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)16 is enlightening.
In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein contended that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new Province of
Negros del Norte, was unconstitutional for it was not in accord with Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, and Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code. Although what was applicable then was the 1973
Constitution and the former Local Government Code, the provisions pertinent to the case are substantially similar
to the provisions in this case.
Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio (barangay in the 1987 Constitution) may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units
affected.
The requisites for the creation of a province in Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 are similar to the requisites in
Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but the requirements for population and territory/land area are
lower now, while the income requirement is higher. Sec. 197 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local
Government Code, provides:
SEC. 197.Requisites for Creation.A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five
hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual
income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive
years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time
of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two or more islands.

The average estimated annual income shall include the income allotted for both the general and infrastructure
funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.17
In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein filed a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping the COMELEC from
conducting the plebiscite scheduled on January 3, 1986. Since the Court was in recess, it was unable to consider
the petition on time. Petitioners filed a supplemental pleading, averring that the plebiscite sought to be restrained
by them was held as scheduled, but there were still serious issues raised in the case affecting the legality,
constitutionality and validity of such exercise which should properly be passed upon and resolved by the Court.
At issue in Tan was the land area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, and the validity of the plebiscite, which
did not include voters of the parent Province of Negros Occidental, but only those living within the territory of the
new Province of Negros del Norte.
The Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area of the proposed new province
and those living in the parent province. However, the Court did not direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because
the factual and legal basis for the creation of the new province did not exist as it failed to satisfy the land area
requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new Province of Negros del Norte, was declared
unconstitutional. The Court found that the land area of the new province was only about 2,856 square kilometers,
which was below the statutory requirement then of 3,500 square kilometers.
Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local Government Code speaks of the required territory of the
province to be created, what is contemplated is not only the land area, but also the land and water over which the
said province has jurisdiction and control. The respondents submitted that in this regard, the marginal sea within
the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province.
The Court stated that "[s]uch an interpretation is strained, incorrect and fallacious."18 It held:
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so stated therein the "territory need
not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of
the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used,
has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b)
touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [n]ext, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p.
307). "Contiguous," when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes
physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute
may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue
League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be
"contiguous" is the "territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to
use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also
territorial waters. It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant
to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning
intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of
construction (In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).19
The discussion of the Court in Tan on the definition and usage of the terms "territory," and "contiguous," and the
meaning of the provision, "The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands," contained in
Sec. 197 of the former Local Government Code, which provides for the requisites in the creation of a new

province, is applicable in this case since there is no reason for a change in their respective definitions, usage, or
meaning in its counterpart provision in the present Local Government Code contained in Sec. 461 thereof.
The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR),20 thus:
ART. 9. Provinces.(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be created unless the following requisites on
income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area which must be contiguous with an area
of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it
added the italicized portion above stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands." Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision
stated or implied. Under Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land
area requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population
requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including any exemption
from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code.21 There is no dispute that in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails,
because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.22
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "[t]he land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" is null and void.
Respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that rules and regulations have the force
and effect of law as long as they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law. They contend that the
exemption from the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers is germane to the purpose of the Local
Government Code to develop political and territorial subdivisions into self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.23 They assert that in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor,24 the Court declared as valid the implementing rules and regulations of a statute,
even though the administrative agency added certain provisions in the implementing rules that were not found in
the law.
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, the provisions in the implementing rules and regulations,
which were questioned by petitioner therein, merely filled in the details in accordance with a known standard. The
law that was questioned was R.A. No. 9207, otherwise known as "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and
Land Utilization Act of 2003." It was therein declared that the "policy of the State [was] to secure the land tenure
of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing,

socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes." Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207 created the National
Government Center Administration Committee, which was tasked to administer, formulate the guidelines and
policies and implement the land disposition of the areas covered by the law.
Petitioners therein contended that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixed the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq.
m., R.A. No. 9207 did not provide for the price. In addition, Sec. 3.2 (c.1) of the IRR penalizes a beneficiary who
fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a
price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed
provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified.
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., the Court held:
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented,
that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate
legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies,
and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statutes
objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved
property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the
details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing
the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely
omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter
possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters.
The Committees authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of
administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard
may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable.
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract
to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committees authority to formulate guidelines and policies to
implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions governing the
disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about
prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be
found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.25
Hence, the provisions in the implementing rules and regulations that were questioned in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. merely filled in the necessary details to implement the objective of the law in accordance with a
known standard, and were thus germane to the purpose of the law.
In this case, the pertinent provision in the IRR did not fill in any detail in accordance with a known standard
provided for by the law. Instead, the IRR added an exemption to the standard or criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code in the creation of a province as regards the land area requirement, which exemption is not
found in the Code. As such, the provision in the IRR that the land area requirement shall not apply where the

proposed province is composed of one or more islands is not in conformity with the standard or criteria prescribed
by the Local Government Code; hence, it is null and void.
Contrary to the contention of respondents, the extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the
purpose of the law to develop territorial and political subdivisions into self-reliant communities because, in the
first place, it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision.
Further, citing Galarosa v. Valencia,26 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the IRRs issued by the
Oversight Committee composed of members of the legislative and executive branches of the government are
entitled to great weight and respect, as they are in the nature of executive construction.
The case is not in point. In Galarosa, the issue was whether or not Galarosa could continue to serve as a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond June 30, 1992, the date when the term of office of the elective members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired. Galarosa was the incumbent president of the Katipunang Bayan or
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon; and was appointed
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Sorsogon pursuant to Executive Order No. 342 in relation to Sec.
146 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the former Local Government Code.
Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code of 199127 states that the duly elected presidents of the liga [ng mga
barangay] at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of
Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panglungsod, and
sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of
the liga chapters which, in no case, shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned. The section,
however, does not fix the specific duration of their term as liga president. The Court held that this was left to the
by-laws of the liga pursuant to Art. 211(g) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991. Moreover, there was no indication that Secs. 49128 and 494 should be given retroactive effect to
adversely affect the presidents of the ABC; hence, the said provisions were to be applied prospectively.
The Court stated that there is no law that prohibits ABC presidents from holding over as members of the
Sangguniang Bayan. On the contrary, the IRR, prepared and issued by the Oversight Committee upon specific
mandate of Sec. 533 of the Local Government Code, expressly recognizes and grants the hold-over authority to the
ABC presidents under Art. 210, Rule XXIX.29 The Court upheld the application of the hold-over doctrine in the
provisions of the IRR and the issuances of the DILG, whose purpose was to prevent a hiatus in the government
pending the time when the successor may be chosen and inducted into office.
The Court held that Sec. 494 of the Local Government Code could not have been intended to allow a gap in the
representation of the barangays, through the presidents of the ABC, in the sanggunian. Since the term of office of
the punong barangays elected in the March 28, 1989 election and the term of office of the presidents of the ABC
had not yet expired, and taking into account the special role conferred upon, and the broader powers and
functions vested in the barangays by the Code, it was inferred that the Code never intended to deprive the
barangays of their representation in the sangguniang bayan during the interregnum when the liga had yet to be
formally organized with the election of its officers.
Under the circumstances prevailing in Galarosa, the Court considered the relevant provisions in the IRR
formulated by the Oversight Committee and the pertinent issuances of the DILG in the nature of executive
construction, which were entitled to great weight and respect.
Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law within the laws four corners.30 If the
language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms.31 If

a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic
aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law,32 or may consider the implementing rules and
regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive construction.
In this case, the requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code
are clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence, the
provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or more islands from the landarea requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code and, therefore, is null
and void.
Whether R.A. No. 9355 complied with the requirements of Section 461 of the Local Government Code in
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement specified by the Local Government
Code. What is disputed is its compliance with the land area or population requirement.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land area of eighty
thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and
approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land area
requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than 250,000
inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the
population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in Dinagat
Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as required
by the Local Government Code.34 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the population count of
371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less
than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province.35
Respondents contended that the lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of the officials of the
NSO during the deliberations on the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, since they did not object to
the result of the special census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte.
The contention of respondents does not persuade.
Although the NSO representative to the Committee on Local Government deliberations dated November 24, 2005
did not object to the
result of the provincial governments special census, which was conducted with the assistance of an NSO district
census coordinator, it was agreed by the participants that the said result was not certified by the NSO, which is the
requirement of the Local Government Code. Moreover, the NSO representative, Statistician II Ma. Solita C.
Vergara, stated that based on their computation, the population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants would be
attained by the Province of Dinagat Islands by the year 2065. The computation was based on the growth rate of
the population, excluding migration.
The pertinent portion of the deliberation on House Bill No. 884 creating the Province of Dinagat reads:

THE CHAIRMAN (Hon. Alfredo S. Lim): . . . There is no problem with the land area requirement and to the
income requirement. The problem is with the population requirement.
xxxx
Now because of this question, we would like to make it of record the stand and reply of National Statistics
Office. Can we hear now from Ms. Solita Vergara?
MS. VERGARA. We only certify population based on the counts proclaimed by the President. And in this
case, we only certify the population based on the results of the 2000 census of population and housing.
THE CHAIRMAN. Is that
MS. VERGARA. Sir, as per Batas Pambansa, BP 72, we only follow kung ano po yong mandated by the law.
So, as mandated by the law, we only certify those counts proclaimed official by the President.
THE CHAIRMAN. But the government of Surigao del Norte is headed by Governor Robert Lyndon Ace
Barbers and they conducted this census in year 2003 and yours was conducted in year 2000. So, within
that time frame, three years, there could be an increase in population or transfer of residents, is that
possible?
MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, but then we only conduct census of population every 10 years and we conduct
special census every five years. So, in this case, maybe by next year, we will be conducting the 2006.
THE CHAIRMAN. But next year will be quite a long time, the matter is now being discussed on the table.
So, is that the only thing you could say that its not authorized by National Statistics Office?
MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir. We have passed a resolutionorders to the provincial officesto our provincial
offices stating that we can provide assistance in the conduct, but then we cannot certify the result of the
conduct as official.
THE CHAIRMAN. May we hear from the Honorable Governor Robert Lyndon Ace Barbers, your reply on the
statement of the representative from National Statistics Office.
MR. BARBERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning.
Yes, your Honor, we have conducted a special census in the year 2003. We were accompanied by one of
the employees from the Provincial National Statistics Office. However, we also admit the fact that our
special census or the special census we conducted in 2003 was not validated or certified by the National
Statistics Office, as provided by law. So, we admit on our part that the certification that I have issued
based on the submission of records of each locality or each municipality from Dinagat Island[s] were true
and correct based on our level, not on National Statistics Office level.
But with that particular objection of Executive Director Ericta on what we have conducted, I believe, your
Honor, it will be, however, moot and academic in terms of the provision under the Local Government
Code on the requirements in making one area a province because what we need is a minimum of 20
million, as stated by the Honorable Chairman and, of course, the land area. Now, in terms of the land area,
Dinagat Island[s] is exempted because xxx the area is composed of more than one island. In fact, there are
about 47 low tide and high tide, less than 40? xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Governor. xxxx

xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. Although the claim of the governor is, even if we hold in abeyance this questioned
requirement, the other two requirements, as mandated by law, is already achieved the income and the
land area.
MS. VERGARA. We do not question po the results of any locally conducted census, kasi po talagang we
provide assistance while theyre conducting their own census. But then, ang requirement po kasi is, basta
we will not certifywe will not certify any population count as a result noong kanilang locally conducted
census. Eh, sa Local Government Code po, we all know na ang xxx nire-require nila is a certification
provided by National Statistics Office. Yon po yong requirement, di ba po?
THE CHAIRMAN. Oo. But a certification, even though not issued, cannot go against actual reality because
thats just a bureaucratic requirement. Ang ibig kong sabihin, ipagpalagay, a couple isang lalaki, isang
babae nagmamahalan sila. As an offshoot of this undying love, nagkaroon ng mga anak, hindi ba, pero
hindi kasal, its a live-in situation. Ang tanong ko lang, whether eventually, they got married or not, that
love remains. And we cannot deny also the existence of the offspring out of that love, di ba? Kayayon
lang. Okay. So, we just skip on this.
MS. VERGARA. Your Honor.
REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Please, Ms. Vergara.
MS. VERGARA. Yong sinasabi nyo po, sir, bale we computed the estimated population po ng Dinagat
Province for the next years. So, based on our computation, mari-reach po ng Dinagat Provinceyong
requirement na 250,000 population by the year 2065 pa po based on the growth rates during the period
of .
THE CHAIRMAN. 2065?
MS. VERGARA. 2065 po.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. . . . [T]his is not the center of our argument since, as stated by the governor, kahit ha
huwag na munang i-consider itong population requirement, eh, nakalagpas naman sila doon sa income
and land area, hindi ba?
Okay. Lets give the floor to Congresswoman Ecleo.
REP. ECLEO (GLENDA). Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is in connection with the special census. Before this was done, I went to the NSO. I talked to
Administrator Ericta on the population. Then, I was told that the population, official population of Dinagat
is 106,000. So, I told them that I want a special census to be conducted because there are so many houses

that were not reached by the government enumerators, and I want to have my own or our own special
census with the help of the provincial government. So, that is how it was conducted. Then, they told me
that the official population of the proposed province will be on 2010. But at this moment, that is the
official population of 106,000, even if our special census, we came up with 371,000 plus.
So, that is it.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Your insights will be reflected in my reply to Senate President Drilon, so that he can also answer the letter
of Bishop Cabahug.
MS. VERGARA. Mr. Chairman, may clarifications lang din po ako.
THE CHAIRMAN. Please.
MS. VERGARA. Yon po sa sinasabi naming estimated population, we only based the computation doon sa
growth rate lang po talaga, excluding the migration. xxxx
MR. CHAIRMAN. Nong mga residents.
MS. VERGARA. Yes, sir, natural growth lang po talaga siya.36
To reiterate, when the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official
population of only 106,951 based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population. Less than a year after the proclamation
of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1,
2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813,37 which was still below the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants.38
In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the creation of
the Province of Dinagat Islands.
The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established
in the Local Government Code.39 Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.40
Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province
prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.
Whether the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering
Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering on the ground
that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a population of 118,534 inhabitants, from the new province
for complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. According to petitioners, if Siargao
were included in the creation of the new province, the territorial requirement of 2,000 square kilometers would
have been easily satisfied and the enlarged area would have a bigger population of 200,305 inhabitants based on
the 2000 Census of Population by the NSO. But House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, because its inclusion
would result in uncertain political control. Petitioners aver that, in the past, Congresswoman Glenda EcleoVillaroman lost her congressional seat twice to a member of an influential family based in Siargao. Therefore, the

only way to complete political dominance is by gerrymandering, to carve a new province in Dinagat Islands where
the Philippine Benevolent Members Association (PMBA), represented by the Ecleos, has the numbers.
The argument of petitioners is unsubstantiated.
"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to
give an unfair advantage to the party in power.41 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for
the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party.42 The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each
legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.43
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and about 47
islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation
that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman.
Allegations of fraud and irregularities during the plebiscite cannot be resolved in a special civil action for certiorari
Lastly, petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 9355 was ratified by a doubtful mandate in a plebiscite held on December
2, 2005, where the "yes votes" were 69,9343, while the "no votes" were 63,502. They contend that the 100%
turnout of voters in the precincts of San Jose, Basilisa, Dinagat, Cagdianao and Libjo was contrary to human
experience, and that the results were statistically improbable. Petitioners admit that they did not file any electoral
protest questioning the results of the plebiscite, because they lacked the means to finance an expensive and
protracted election case.
Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature; hence, they cannot be
the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed
only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.44 Petitioners should have filed the proper action with the Commission on Elections. However,
petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of the correct remedy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355, otherwise known as [An Act Creating the Province
of Dinagat Islands], is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and
the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180050

April 12, 2011

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the
Philippines, represented by the SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE
SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte;
GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, Respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON.
SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and HON.
CESAR M. BAGUNDOL, Intervenors.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 20, 2010 filed by
Movant-Intervenors1 dated and filed on October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment,
and (b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution.
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a brief background of the relevant
antecedents
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands).2 On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the
mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).3
The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.4 With the approval of the people from
both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials
who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.5
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158)
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.6 The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their
motion for reconsideration was also denied.7
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for
certiorari8 seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a
new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people
of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12

square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.
Constitution, Article X Local Government
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision9 granting the petition.10 The Decision declared R.A. No.
9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a
province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as
null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.11
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution12 dated May 12, 2010,13 the Court denied the said motions.14
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second
motions for reconsideration, accompanied by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were
eventually "noted without action" by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.15
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which provides

RESOLUTION NO. 8790

WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were previously components of the First
Legislative District of the Province of Surigao del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the
Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and its creation was ratified on 02 December 2006 in the Plebiscite for
this purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections,
allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one (1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10)
Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16 September 2009;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled "Rodolfo Navarro, et al., vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the President of the Philippines, et al." rendered a Decision, dated 10
February 2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the criteria for the
creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the
1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the above decision of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House of Representatives representing the
lone congressional district of Dinagat Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3)
position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said position, (5) position of the Vice
Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have
already been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within the remaining period before the
elections on May 10, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on whether the Decision of the Supreme
Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to declare
that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current system configuration is in line with
the reconsidered Decision, meaning that the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del
Norte remain as two (2) separate provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province of Dinagat Islands will, for
the positions of Member, House of Representatives, Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, bear only the names of the candidates for the said positions.
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of
Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said position. Likewise, the whole
Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of
the candidates for the said position[s].

Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to vote for the candidates of
Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member, House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte, and candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile,
voters of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the
whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor and Vice Governor, Dinagat
Islands. Given this situation, the Commission will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice Governor,
Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election will result in
[a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte.
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert
to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election
will have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice
Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be
conducted.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be
affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed,
they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No.
9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since
Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a
special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. Moreover, as residents of
Surigao del Norte and as public servants representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and
strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as part of the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the
province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts
will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they
claim that their rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights
would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main
arguments to challenge the above Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of
Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,16 the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution,
citing several rulings17 of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10,
2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even for the sake of argument that they had notice
of the pendency of the case, they pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple resident
of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second
District of Surigao del Norte, and Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte,
and that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they were elected as Governor of Surigao
del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of
Surigao del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had
become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion.
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties, and
neither on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch
as the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and
the aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to
treat Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of movants-intervenors could not be considered as a second motion for reconsideration to warrant the
application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.18 It should be noted that this motion
prays for the recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July
20, 2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their motion for leave to intervene and to admit
motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended intervention. Their
motion for reconsideration of this denial elaborated on movants-intervenors interest in this case which existed
only after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention and their motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution.
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support the claim that this was a
ploy of respondents legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of
the Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be
nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest for movantsintervenors only with the specter of the decision in the main case becoming final and executory. More
importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with no other remedy
as regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective positions. Thus, to the Courts mind,
there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.

It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back on
October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it
may be argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality prior to the May 10, 2010
elections, the election of the local government officials stated therein would only have to be postponed. Given
such a scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect with respect to the
reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have remained candidates for the
respective positions they have vied for and to which they have been elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Because constitutional cases are often public
actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to
this interest in the constitutional question raised.19
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall
Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 is denied with finality.
Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the
May 12, 2010 Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the May 10, 2010
polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances,
movants-intervenors should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their interest in this
case became manifest only after the case had already been decided. The consequences of such a decision would
definitely work to their disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties to the
dispute. Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is
imperative that the movants-intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not only a court of law, but
also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire repercussions of this controversy should be weighed
on the scales of justice, rather than dismissed on account of mootness.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.20 The second exception attends this case.
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,21 where technicalities of
procedure on locus standi were brushed aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court. Along parallel lines, the motion for
intervention should be given due course since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in
the outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and because of the novelty, gravity, and
weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution of
movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right
that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial system, such that courts
should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to question the judgment and its effects, and
ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.22

Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances.23 The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final.24 In this case, the compelling
concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected
by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct
interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units. In this manner,
the thrust of the Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to decentralization and
the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated, will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court finds that the first and
second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are
economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The
criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results.
In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria,
placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is
economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts
from congressional debates are quoted hereunder
HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled because we thought
CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the economic viability of the new local
government unit, the new province?
xxxx
HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double than the House version, because we
also believe that economic viability is really a minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the
viability of the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger point for economic
development, population will naturally increase because there will be an immigration. However, if you disallow
the particular area from being converted into a province because of the population problems in the beginning, it
will never be able to reach the point where it could become a province simply because it will never have the
economic take off for it to trigger off that economic development.
Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it could pay for overhead and provide a
minimum of basic services to the population. Over and above that, the provincial officials should be able to trigger
off economic development which will attract immigration, which will attract new investments from the private
sector. This is now the concern of the local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply
by telling them, "Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand," you will never be able to become a
province because nobody wants to go to your place. Why? Because you never have any reason for economic
viability.
xxxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?

HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers

HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land area because
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500 square meters, ah, square kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of administrative efficiency and delivery of basic
services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was instituted, there is only one central
government and then everybody falls under that. But it was later on subdivided into provinces for purposes of
administrative efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative efficiency is no longer there precisely
because the land areas that we are giving to our governors is so wide that no one man can possibly administer all
of the complex machineries that are needed.
Secondly, when you say "delivery of basic services," as pointed out by Cong. Alfelor, there are sections of the
province which have never been visited by public officials, precisely because they dont have the time nor the
energy anymore to do that because its so wide. Now, by compressing the land area and by reducing the
population requirement, we are, in effect, trying to follow the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which
is to deliver basic services and to make it more efficient in administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the province is able to do it without being
a burden to the national government. Thats the assumption.
HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we said, if we go on a minimum income
level, then we say, "this is the trigger point at which this administration can take place."25
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a municipality, a city, and a province as
provided both in the LGC and the LGC-IRR, viz.
For a Barangay:
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out of a contiguous territory which has a
population of at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities
and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities
where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That
the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural communities, barangays may be
created in such communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or
more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for barangays, based on the criteria
prescribed in this Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of municipalities
within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay
consolidation plan can be prepared and approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior
recommendation of the sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by Act of Congress, subject to
the limitations and requirements prescribed in this Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in the indigenous cultural
communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community
is located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants, except in
municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political subdivisions as may be
created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where such territory shall have a population of at least
five thousand (5,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not
reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or more islands. The
territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.
Municipality:
LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the provincial treasurer, or at least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the
last two (2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at least twenty-five thousand
(25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50)
square kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population or
income of the original municipality or municipalities at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund of the municipality
concerned, exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as
such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A municipality shall not be created unless the
following requisites are present:
(i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,
as certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) inhabitants, as certified by
NSO; and
(iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified
by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and
bounds.
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
City:
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has
either of the following requisities:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one
hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1)
or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs at
the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the
creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:
LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the
immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The

average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs
at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the
creation shall be borne by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation of barangays, land
area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component
cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income,
population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands,
it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the
local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in
the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood
that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in
Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy considerations underpinning the principle of
local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units.

This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR26 and in the Whereas clauses of Administrative
Order No. 270,27 which read
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments;
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine
and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals;
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the President to convene an Oversight
Committee for the purpose of formulating and issuing the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the
efficient and effective implementation of all the provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and consultations with all the concerned sectors of
society and consideration of the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local Government Code
of 1991, has completed the formulation of the implementing rules and regulations; x x x
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010
Decision could prove to be counter-productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an
intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities which, in themselves, also consist
of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land
area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be made to
comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This
would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province with contiguous land
area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant
communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would
prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the
islands are separated by bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats
the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area
requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,28 with respect to his
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise the distinguished Senator about the
action taken by the House, on House Bill No. 7166. This was passed about two years ago and has been pending in
the Senate for consideration. This is a bill that I am not the only one involved, including our distinguished
Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor the bill, being the Chairman then of the Local Government.

So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less interested in the creation of the
new provinces, because of the vastness of the areas that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any objection. And as I have said a while ago,
that this has been pending in the Senate for the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South
Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will support this bill, and he says, that he will incorporate this in the
Local Government Code, which I have in writing from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we
in the House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the whole Philippines to create a new
province, and that is quite the concern of the respective Congressmen.
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to stop the mother province from voting
against the bill, if a province is going to be created.
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not willing to create another province,
when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra says, what will happen to Palawan? We wont have one million
people there, and if you look at Palawan, there will be about three or four provinces that will comprise that island.
So, the development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated November 2, 1989. This was practically
about a year after 7166 was approved by the House, House Bill 7166.
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
"Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your House No. 7166 was incorporated in
the proposed Local Government Code, Senate Bill No. 155, which is pending for second reading.
Thank you and warm regards.
Very truly yours,"
That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised that the Senate has adopted
another position.
So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House, thats the only bill that is involving
the present Local Government Code that we are practically considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we
do not approve it, as approved by the lower House. This can be [an] irritant in the approval of the Conference
Committee Report. And I just want to manifest that insofar as the creation of the province, not only in my
province, but the other provinces. That the mother province will participate in the plebiscite, they can defeat the
province, lets say, on the basis of the result, the province cannot be created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I
dont see why, we should put this stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they are
seeking.
So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because, this is an approved version of the
House, and I will not be the one to raise up and question the Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the
House that are interested in this bill. And they have been approaching the Speaker about this. So, the Speaker
reminded me to make sure that it takes the cudgel of the House approved version.

So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not, because its the wish of the House, but
because the mother province will participate anyhow, you vote them down; and that is provided for in the
Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with regards to the creation of the city to be
urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why should we not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words,
we dont want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they are left in the devolution of powers,
when they feel that they are far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware of their situation. But the province
of South Cotabato has a very unique geographical territorial conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the
Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is in the North; while these other municipalities are in the East and in the
West. And if they have to travel from the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one hundred
forty kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same distance. And from the North side, it is
about one hundred kilometers. So that is the problem there. And besides, they have enough resources and I feel
that, not because I am interested in the province, I am after their welfare in the future. Who am I to dictate on
those people? I have no interest but then I am looking at the future development of these areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there, but I can foresee what the creation
of a new province will bring to these people. It will bring them prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it
will encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now, they are concentrating in South Cotabato, especially in
the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite interested and even the AID people are
asking me, "What is holding the creation of a new province when practically you need it?" Its not 20 or 30
kilometers from the capital town; its about 140 kilometers. And imagine those people have to travel that far and
our road is not like Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there
that are just one municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the income. Of course, they dont
have the population because thats a part of the land of promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday
because they feel that there are more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it will enhance the development of the
Philippines, not because I am interested in my province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the
twilight years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my people well. No personal or political interest here. I
hope the distinguished Chairman of the Committee will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has
already approved because we dont want them to throw the Conference Committee Report after we have worked
that the house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and not even considered by the Senate. And on top of
that, we are considering a bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look into the legislative history of the Senate
version on this matter of creation of provinces. I am sure there was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it.
Maybe the House version was incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion, their amendments were
introduced and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria
were introduced.
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when we reach a book, Title IV, on the
matter of provinces, we will look at it sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want [to]
achieve can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We will review our position on the matter, how we
arrived at the Senate version and we will adopt an open mind definitely when we come into it.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan?

CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James, especially on economic stimulation of a certain
area. Like our case, because I put myself on our province, our province is quite very big. Its composed of four (4)
congressional districts and I feel it should be five now. But during the Batasan time, four of us talked and
conversed proposing to divide the province into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever tread on those areas. That is, maybe
youre acquainted with the Bondoc Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long
stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay, very few governors ever tread [there] before, even today. That
area now is infested with NPA. That is the area of Congressman Andaya.
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be extended to these areas. With a
big or a large area of a province, a certain administrator or provincial governor definitely will have no sufficient
time. For me, if we really would like to stimulate growth, I believe that an area where there is physical or
geographical impossibilities, where administrators can penetrate, I think we have to create certain provisions in
the law where maybe we can treat it with special considerations.
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government Data as far as provinces are
concerned. It is very surprising that there are provinces here which only composed of six municipalities, eight
municipalities, seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan, Tuguegarao, there are six municipalities. Ah, excuse me,
Batanes.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are there in Batanes province?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.
CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not even one congressional district. But
tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region 9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.

CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin.

CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with a population of 63 thousand. But we
do not hold it against the province because maybe thats one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The
land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on requirements of, we set a minimum for
every province, palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case we
would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng
minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code?
Growth. To devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in
their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing province because of some geographical
id[i]osyncracies, as you called it, stimulate the economic growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from the
national government to a particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve the same purpose?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province. Usually, tinitingnan lang yun, provision
eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You are entitled to, say, 20% of the area.
Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of Camiguin and Siquijor, but Camiguin
is composed only of five municipalities; in Siquijor, its composed of six, but the share of Siquijor is the same share
with that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously and even with sympathy because of
the explanation given and we will study this very carefully.29
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest intention
of Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing
them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the national budget. It should be remembered that, under
Sections 284 and 285
of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area, population, and local
revenue.30
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice,
then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law,31 or
may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive
and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed
incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of
both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 53332 of the LGC. As Section 533 provides, the
Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient
and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the
principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also mandated by the Constitution that a
local government code shall be enacted by Congress, to wit

Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with the view to attain decentralization and
countryside development. Congress saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a
new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the needs of the Philippines as an
archipelagic country. This accounts for the exemption from the land area requirement of local government units
composed of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC, with respect to the
creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of
provinces. Hence, the void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of Representatives, particularly the
chairpersons of their respective Committees on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the
Oversight Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces
consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section
461 of the LGC, and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To be sure, the Oversight
Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The
Oversight Committee evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned sectors of
society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the LGC when the IRR was
formulated.33 Undoubtedly, this amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and
respect from this Court,34 but to legislative construction as well, especially with the inclusion of representatives
from the four leagues of local government units as members of the Oversight Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC,
the many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be
impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC. But Congress,
recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355,
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can
only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress
breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of
Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into
the LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it
consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was
amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four
times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the
plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of
Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of

becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League
of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections35
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of
the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute
is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and
should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of
powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each
others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end,
courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to
ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is
nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated and filed on
October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT the Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The May 12,
2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID
and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the
officials thereof are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-inintervention.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499

November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF
BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-inintervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056

November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-inintervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30
June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to
convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No.
29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16
municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament that
the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities
under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five
years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Preliminary Matters

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,14 like the
Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner
League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the
League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16
which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the
Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City
and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of
more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, which now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three
cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the
11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the
income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon
during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood
bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million
prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed
into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective
on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills
which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity
of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being
applied retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including
the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not
even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the
creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely
in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20
million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the
Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,

Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a
fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share
in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such
criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes.
Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they
prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear
and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's
four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to
its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may
resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills
were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality
desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the
letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the
various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended
exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is
fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment
to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a
municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government
Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress

cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local
Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private
corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private
corporation through a special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere
scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during
the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These
hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent
Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become
functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next
Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had
to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the
filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may
be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last
adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at
the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no
adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are
deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations
during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities,
have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent
Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100
million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of
the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be
assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which
are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption
provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those
that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills
should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the
equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood
bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those
entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and
applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and
municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than
municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally
non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they

been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities,
even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if
their income is less than P100 million.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at
the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that
a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower
Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date
to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme
Court held:
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation
and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed.
Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession
subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt
existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing
establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a
business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an
economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who
enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation
to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed
at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right
to conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and
unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage
based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all
other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision
found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act
Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499

December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF
BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056

December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,

vs.
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL
SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR. J.:
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent,1 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within
the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.2 Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of
the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute
is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.3 Withal, courts ought not to interpret and
should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.4
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of
government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of
statutes.5 This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of
powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each
others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end,
courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To
doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to
ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.6 Consequently, before a law duly challenged is
nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.7
BACKGROUND
The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas8 assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,9 each converting
the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.
By Decision10 dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the
sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal
protection clause.
Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues,
the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which
became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.11 By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court
denied the motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its "Resolution" dated March 31,
2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008
and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents "Motion for
Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" dated
December 9, 2008 and dismiss the "Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case.
Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion as follows:
By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit.
The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited
pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T.
Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due
course. x x x
On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead
that Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009" and "Motion for Leave to File
and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain
Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon."
Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of
the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause with
Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of
judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act on the
aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009
Resolution."12
Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of
the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will now rule on this
incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted,
indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises
upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per the
Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have
already been passed upon" reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying
Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by the tie
vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly
argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall
be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether
or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the
petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and
actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute
resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated groundthat the "basic issues
have already been passed" suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial motion on the
sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon" betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of
whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the
motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the
vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the
inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not
the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6
vote, should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the
laws in question is, on the merits, secured.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members" contemplated in Sec. 4
(2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that:
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by
the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis added.)
Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total."13 In plain language, this means 50% plus
one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the
view that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential
value."14
As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a
case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the
main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of
the majority was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by
way of a motion for reconsideration."15
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the
complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision
is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or
order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a
Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually
took part in the deliberation of the motion.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to
be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases "shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant
cases and voted thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that
reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock.
On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of
the precipitate16 entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for
reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take
another hard look at the underlying decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and
against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its
own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby.17 In the performance of their duties, courts should
not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools
crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be
prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed
with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.18 Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of
justice so require.19
While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court
said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan20 is most apropos:
To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should
be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with
severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and
existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive
of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already
declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now.
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2,
2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November
18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.
This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.
The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief
During the 11th Congress,21 fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives.22 Of the
fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 215723 to amend Sec. 450 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed
amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million
average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended
by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that "[a] municipality x x x may be converted into a
component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices."
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint
Resolution No. 2924 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA
9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives re-adopting H.
Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on November 6,
2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a
wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason,
he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to
become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.25
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income
requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually
lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval,
to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the
LGC of 1991.26
Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek leave and be allowed to intervene.
Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in question, petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an order issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting
plebiscites in the affected areas. An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain the poll body from
proclaiming the plebiscite results.
On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions and the petitions-in-intervention. On
March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral arguments.
The Issues
In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10.
Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection clause.

In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the
twin posers in the affirmative and accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they do
from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the
ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires
that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.
Petitioners threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded cogency,
would veritably curtail and cripple Congress valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions.
By constitutional design27 and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions
or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.28 But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law,
create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as
much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.29 The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless
provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions "in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to the approval of the voters in the
unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income,
now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that
these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they
are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the
respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
Petitioners posture does not persuade.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the term "barrio"
in lieu of "barangay," "may be" instead of "shall," the change of the phrase "unit or units" to "political unit" and
the addition of the modifier "directly" to the word "affected," the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction
of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a
law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political
units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the
lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation.
Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose
the criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law,
specifically on the subject provision, explains:

Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or
change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was
obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan.30 Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the
Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that "the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature."31 Pelaez, however, conceded that "the power to fix such common boundary, in order to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative natureinvolving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities."32
Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect
creates a new municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be
inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature.
Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the
doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to "criteria established in the local government code,"
thereby declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries "subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."33 x x x (Emphasis added.)
It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference
cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.34 Be it noted that at the time of
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly,
had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then
they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by
Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 335 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a
much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be
embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the
element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the
existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the
amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At
the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood
laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in
enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the
Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and
increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that
petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the
alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis--vis the
respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by
reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to
subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform
provision of the cityhood laws:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex
hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in
accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other;
otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the
LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100
million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009,
adhered, in the final analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art.
X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.36
Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are those detailed in
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading "Requisites for Creation." The section sets the minimum income
qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164
of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income "of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive
years" as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was
superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that "[a] municipality or cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x." RA 9009 in turn
amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis37 or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.38 To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that
the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,39 resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.40
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom
assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.41
The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced
from Senator Pimentels sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his statement
regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement
for municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, viz:
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed
amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush
of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was approved, there were
only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion x x

x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no
municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement,
which, under the [LGC], is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right
to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills on
cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income
threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor
exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying
that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have
pending cityhood bills, thus:
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a
number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the
standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills
that are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy
of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not
know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that
a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we
are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not
think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be
affected.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the following complementary legislative
intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of
PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as
the cityhood bills are concerned.
Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of
the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do
the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income requirement
of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a
statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that
best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.43 In
fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.44 Torres v. Limjap
could not have been more precise:
The intent of a Statute is the Law. If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of
the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and
give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced
when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow
the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x.45 (Emphasis
supplied.)
As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.46 Consequently, to him
who would assert the unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be
declared invalid if a conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt.47 Unfortunately for petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden.
It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering joint resolution were undertaken in
the 11th and/or the 12th Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly those
on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, are without significance and would
not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the 13th Congress, Congress
not being a continuing body.
The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood billswhich were already being
deliberated upon even perhaps before the conception of RA 9009were again being considered during the 13th
Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And specific reference to the cityhood bills
was also made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not
a continuing legislative body. What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress
and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa,
were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.48
And of course the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16 municipalities in question
would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other
proceedings on the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be conveniently reduced to pure
rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing
body and that unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress.
This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal protection grounds.
To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of
exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the
Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws."
Petitioners challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes undue favor as
well as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.

The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair
discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a
separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue
discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due
process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.49 This constitutional protection extends to all persons,
natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are,
however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned.50
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause,
precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs
claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the
respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is
presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their
property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the
uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point,
the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.
As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality.
It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges
conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state
from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent
in the right to legislate is the right to classify,51 necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by
a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class.52 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on
substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income
criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other
municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before
the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the
amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC
of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by
Congress. As aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H. Joint
Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted with the "changing of the
rules in the middle of the game." Some excerpts of Senator Lims sponsorship speech:
x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied for city status, confident that each has
met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly the income threshold of P20 million.
Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while the rest twenty-four (24) in all failed to
pass through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way to the May
elections x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into law, effectively raising
the income requirement for creation of cities to a whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24
cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded
were swift and overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act on the measures.
Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of President Estrada x x x and the May 2001
elections.

The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport
changing the rules in the middle of the game.
Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x x. They filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking
exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. For the second time, [however], time ran out from
them.
For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of
the [13th] Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x
I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they could be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the
[LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I
immediately set the public hearing x x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I
delivered the sponsorship x x x.
x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was when the then
acting majority leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of House Joint
Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader for the House to first approve the individual
Cityhood Bills of the qualified municipalities, along with the provision exempting each of them from the higher
income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to the certification issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen
(14) municipalities deemed to be qualified for city-status.
Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the
House of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a provision of exemption from the
higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year, December 21, the House transmitted
to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your Committee immediately
conducted the public hearing x x x.
The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.
In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution
No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. The
proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness.
Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component city based on the old
requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x x x 53
(Emphasis supplied.)
In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lims speech, which respondent LGUs found
themselves in were unsettling. They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because
of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened. Now, then, to
impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be
indeed "unfair," to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a
legal remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city
status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar
conditions of respondent LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification.

To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the
congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification.54 By the same token,
they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend.
That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to
reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.
The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities
from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of
the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that
fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then the cityhood bills
covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of
those became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood laws were
not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal
investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment.
While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification, inherent
in the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing existing
inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address
the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the
inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other
municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33
other municipalities, which had already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old
Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other former
municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption
from the PhP 100 million requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent
LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset
they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection
clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause.
The irony is not lost to the Court.
Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the time
of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more
precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100
million criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of
RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991.
Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the nonretroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration
of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.
Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that
had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of
1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still
municipalities out there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities
that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have
to comply with the PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009.

A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged,
cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been
organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting events need
not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the
cityhood laws in question.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision
of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of
this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:
(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills
which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws
to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt
respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body.
The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference
inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being
considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid
of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills
long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming
for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the
original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.
And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not
overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the
Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14,
2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The
June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and
9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

August 24, 2010

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF
TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 177499
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF
BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 178056
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S.
SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY
OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN,
CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21
December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City,
and Oroquieta City.
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws
for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the
Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration. On 28
April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents second motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in
due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason,
the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of
the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009.
Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the
18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.
A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.1 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including
the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood
Laws.

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the
same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation
from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20
million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the
Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million
income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their
cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides:
"Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby
amended to read as follows: x x x." RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by
amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. Considering the Legislatures primary intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities wanting
to be converted into cities," RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA
9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code.
The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a single word or
phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by
increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this income
requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city
must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover,
where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.2
B. Operative Fact Doctrine
Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional
law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the
invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood
Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to
contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and
sets a gravely dangerous precedent.
Under the minoritys novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite
being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a
mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an

open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the
Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that
an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an
unconstitutional act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,3 the Court stated:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void,
Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil
code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it. (Emphasis supplied)
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact
doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its
judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative
fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because
they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood
Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the "new cities" or
their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean
that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have
relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality.
C. Equal Protection Clause
As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial distinction between municipalities
with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from
another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does
not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the

11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills.
In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally
related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into
cities.
Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition
existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the minority
concedes that "the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be repeated."
Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an
arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other
municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification
must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption
provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration
Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision
is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or
order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
(Emphasis supplied)
The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION
MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE
CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.
IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied)
The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting
of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts prior majority
action on the main decision stands affirmed.4 This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court
en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in
Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc."
The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial
of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18
November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive.5 The judgment stands in full
force.6 Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008,

as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the
second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior
decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008
Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left
undecided because there remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a
majority of the Court en banc concurred in declaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short,
the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the
concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.7 These prior majority
actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote
cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.
The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008
Decision final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court
en banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment be made in
due course.1wphi1
The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not
constitute a rule with precedential value."8
Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that is the
18 November 2008 Decision striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands
affirmed. And assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which was
unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless
remains binding on the parties.9
Conclusion
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x city shall be created x x x except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." This provision can only be interpreted in
one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government
Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code,
provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress power to
make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress
did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislatures
law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an
exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." In other words, Congress exceeded and
abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and REINSTATE the
18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389,
9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

February 15, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu;
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur;
Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of
Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte;
Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), Represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar,
Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and
Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:

For consideration of this Court are the following pleadings:

1. Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 dated and filed on September
14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al.; and
2. Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010"].
Meanwhile, respondents also filed on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing. This motion was, however, already denied by the Court En Banc.
A brief background
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen
(16) laws,1 each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking
to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.
In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote,2 granted the petitions and struck
down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection
clause.
In the Resolution dated March 31, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a 7-5 vote,3 denied the first motion for
reconsideration.
On April 28, 2009, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution, with a vote of 6-6,4 which denied the second motion for
reconsideration for being a prohibited pleading.
In its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court En Banc clarified its April 28, 2009 Resolution in this wise
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of
the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court,
the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion
for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect,
the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration
was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18
November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration
in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.5
Then, in another Decision dated December 21, 2009, the Court En Banc, by a vote of 6-4,6 declared the Cityhood
Laws as constitutional.
On August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution, by a vote of 7-6,7 resolved the Ad Cautelam Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion to Annul the Decision of December 21, 2009, both filed by petitioners, and the Ad

Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City,
Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City, reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision. Hence, the aforementioned
pleadings.
Considering these circumstances where the Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality
of the 16 Cityhood Laws, and especially taking note of the novelty of the issues involved in these cases, the Motion
for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010 deserves favorable action by this Court on the basis
of the following cogent points:
1.
The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
Article X, Section 10 provides
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the
exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009,
which took effect on June 30, 2001, viz.
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant
prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
xxxx
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds,
transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to the amendment, Section 450 of the LGC required only an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last two (2) consecutive years, based on 1991 constant
prices.
Before Senate Bill No. 2157, now R.A. No. 9009, was introduced by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, there were 57 bills
filed for conversion of 57 municipalities into component cities. During the 11th Congress (June 1998-June 2001),
33 of these bills were enacted into law, while 24 remained as pending bills. Among these 24 were the 16
municipalities that were converted into component cities through the Cityhood Laws.
The rationale for the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be gleaned from the sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel
on Senate Bill No. 2157, to wit
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed
amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the Local Government Code. However, it is a fact that
there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the Local

Government was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more
municipalities applying for conversion to the same status. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before
long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement,
which, under the Local Government Code, is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality
to have the right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds.
What has been happening, Mr. President, is, the municipalities aspiring to become cities say that they qualify in
terms of financial requirements by incorporating the Internal Revenue share of the taxes of the nation on to their
regularly generated revenue. Under that requirement, it looks clear to me that practically all municipalities in this
country would qualify to become cities.
It is precisely for that reason, therefore, that we are seeking the approval of this Chamber to amend, particularly
Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, the requisite for the average annual income of a municipality to be
converted into a city or cluster of barangays which seek to be converted into a city, raising that revenue
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the last two consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.8
While R.A. No. 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws, desiring to become component cities which
qualified under the P20 million income requirement of the old Section 450 of the LGC. The interpellation of Senate
President Franklin Drilon of Senator Pimentel is revealing, thus
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a
number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the
standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill, on the assumption that it is approved,
retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy
of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law tomorrow, that it will apply to those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old version of the Local Government Code and are now pending in the Senate?
The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in
the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we
are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not
think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.
THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be
affected.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you Mr. Chairman.9
Clearly, based on the above exchange, Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No.
9009. When the LGC was amended by R.A. No. 9009, the amendment carried with it both the letter and the intent
of the law, and such were incorporated in the LGC by which the compliance of the Cityhood Laws was gauged.
Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending cityhood bills, both the
letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress,
when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the
express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon and Senator
Pimentel, it cannot be denied that Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from
complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory R.A. No. 9009. Indeed, these
municipalities have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces. It is also acknowledged that they were centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In
this regard, it is worthy to mention the distinctive traits of each respondent municipality, viz
Batac, Ilocos Norte It is the biggest municipality of the 2nd District of Ilocos Norte, 2nd largest and most
progressive town in the province of Ilocos Norte and the natural convergence point for the neighboring towns to
transact their commercial ventures and other daily activities. A growing metropolis, Batac is equipped with
amenities of modern living like banking institutions, satellite cable systems, telecommunications systems.
Adequate roads, markets, hospitals, public transport systems, sports, and entertainment facilities. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 5941, introduced by Rep. Imee R. Marcos.]
El Salvador, Misamis Oriental It is located at the center of the Cagayan-Iligan Industrial Corridor and home to a
number of industrial companies and corporations. Investment and financial affluence of El Salvador is aptly
credited to its industrious and preserving people. Thus, it has become the growing investment choice even besting
nearby cities and municipalities. It is home to Asia Brewery as distribution port of their product in Mindanao. The
Gokongwei Group of Companies is also doing business in the area. So, the conversion is primarily envisioned to
spur economic and financial prosperity to this coastal place in North-Western Misamis Oriental. [Explanatory Note
of House Bill No. 6003, introduced by Rep. Augusto H. Bacullo.]
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte It is the largest of the eleven (11) municipalities in the province of Agusan del
Norte. It plays strategic importance to the administrative and socio-economic life and development of Agusan del
Norte. It is the foremost in terms of trade, commerce, and industry. Hence, the municipality was declared as the
new seat and capital of the provincial government of Agusan del Norte pursuant to Republic Act No. 8811 enacted
into law on August 16, 2000. Its conversion will certainly promote, invigorate, and reinforce the economic
potential of the province in establishing itself as an agro-industrial center in the Caraga region and accelerate the
development of the area. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3094, introduced by Rep. Ma. Angelica Rosedell M.
Amante.]
Borongan, Eastern Samar It is the capital town of Eastern Samar and the development of Eastern Samar will
depend to a certain degree of its urbanization. It will serve as a catalyst for the modernization and progress of

adjacent towns considering the frequent interactions between the populace. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
2640, introduced by Rep. Marcelino C. Libanan.]
Lamitan, Basilan Before Basilan City was converted into a separate province, Lamitan was the most progressive
part of the city. It has been for centuries the center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan
people of Basilan. The source of its income is agro-industrial and others notably copra, rubber, coffee and host of
income generating ventures. As the most progressive town in Basilan, Lamitan continues to be the center of
commerce catering to the municipalities of Tuburan, Tipo-Tipo and Sumisip. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
5786, introduced by Rep. Gerry A. Salapuddin.]
Catbalogan, Samar It has always been the socio-economic-political capital of the Island of Samar even during the
Spanish era. It is the seat of government of the two congressional districts of Samar. Ideally located at the
crossroad between Northern and Eastern Samar, Catbalogan also hosts trade and commerce activates among the
more prosperous cities of the Visayas like Tacloban City, Cebu City and the cities of Bicol region. The numerous
banks and telecommunication facilities showcases the healthy economic environment of the municipality. The
preeminent and sustainable economic situation of Catbalogan has further boosted the call of residents for a more
vigorous involvement of governance of the municipal government that is inherent in a city government.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 2088, introduced by Rep. Catalino V. Figueroa.]
Bogo, Cebu Bogo is very qualified for a city in terms of income, population and area among others. It has been
elevated to the Hall of Fame being a five-time winner nationwide in the clean and green program. [Explanatory
Note of House Bill No. 3042, introduced by Rep. Clavel A. Martinez.]
Tandag, Surigao del Sur This over 350 year old capital town the province has long sought its conversion into a
city that will pave the way not only for its own growth and advancement but also help in the development of its
neighboring municipalities and the province as a whole. Furthermore, it can enhance its role as the provinces
trade, financial and government center. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 5940, introduced by Rep. Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr.]
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur It is a first class municipality and the biggest in terms of population in the entire
province. It has the most progressive and thickly populated area among the 14 municipalities that comprise the
province. Thus, it has become the center for trade and commerce in Agusan del Sur. It has a more developed
infrastructure and facilities than other municipalities in the province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1899,
introduced by Rep. Rodolfo "Ompong" G. Plaza.]
Carcar, Cebu Through the years, Carcar metamorphosed from rural to urban and now boast of its manufacturing
industry, agricultural farming, fishing and prawn industry and its thousands of large and small commercial
establishments contributing to the bulk of economic activities in the municipality. Based on consultation with
multi-sectoral groups, political and non-government agencies, residents and common folk in Carcar, they
expressed their desire for the conversion of the municipality into a component city. [Explanatory Note of House
Bill No. 3990, introduced by Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas.]
Guihulngan, Negros Oriental Its population is second highest in the province, next only to the provincial capital
and higher than Canlaon City and Bais City. Agriculture contributes heavily to its economy. There are very good
prospects in agricultural production brought about by its favorable climate. It has also the Tanon Strait that
provides a good fishing ground for its numerous fishermen. Its potential to grow commercially is certain. Its
strategic location brought about by its existing linkage networks and the major transportation corridors traversing
the municipality has established Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade in this part of Negros Oriental
with the first congressional district as its immediate area of influence. Moreover, it has beautiful tourist spots that

are being availed of by local and foreign tourists. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3628, introduced by Rep.
Jacinto V. Paras.]
Tayabas, Quezon It flourished and expanded into an important politico-cultural center in [the] Tagalog region.
For 131 years (1179-1910), it served as the cabecera of the province which originally carried the cabeceras own
name, Tayabas. The locality is rich in culture, heritage and trade. It was at the outset one of the more active
centers of coordination and delivery of basic, regular and diverse goods and services within the first district of
Quezon Province. [Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3348, introduced by Rep. Rafael P. Nantes.]
Tabuk, Kalinga It not only serves as the main hub of commerce and trade, but also the cultural center of the rich
customs and traditions of the different municipalities in the province. For the past several years, the income of
Tabuk has been steadily increasing, which is an indication that its economy is likewise progressively growing.
[Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 3068, introduced by Rep. Laurence P. Wacnang.]
Available information on Baybay, Leyte; Mati, Davao Oriental; and Naga, Cebu shows their economic viability,
thus:
Covering an area of 46,050 hectares, Baybay [Leyte] is composed of 92 barangays, 23 of which are in the
poblacion. The remaining 69 are rural barangays. Baybay City is classified as a first class city. It is situated on the
western coast of the province of Leyte. It has a Type 4 climate, which is generally wet. Its topography is generally
mountainous in the eastern portion as it slopes down west towards the shore line. Generally an agricultural city,
the common means of livelihood are farming and fishing. Some are engaged in hunting and in forestall activities.
The most common crops grown are rice, corn, root crops, fruits, and vegetables. Industries operating include the
Specialty Products Manufacturing, Inc. and the Visayan Oil Mill. Various cottage industries can also be found in the
city such as bamboo and rattan craft, ceramics, dress-making, fiber craft, food preservation, mat weaving, metal
craft, fine Philippine furniture manufacturing and other related activities. Baybay has great potential as a tourist
destination, especially for tennis players. It is not only rich in biodiversity and history, but it also houses the
campus of the Visayas State University (formerly the Leyte State University/Visayas State College of
Agriculture/Visayas Agricultural College/Baybay National Agricultural School/Baybay Agricultural High School and
the Jungle Valley Park.) Likewise, it has river systems fit for river cruising, numerous caves for spelunking, forests,
beaches, and marine treasures. This richness, coupled with the friendly Baybayanos, will be an element of a
successful tourism program. Considering the role of tourism in development, Baybay City intends to harness its
tourism potential. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baybay City> visited September 19, 2008)
Mati [Davao Oriental] is located on the eastern part of the island of Mindanao. It is one hundred sixty-five (165)
kilometers away from Davao City, a one and a half-hour drive from Tagum City. Visitors can travel from Davao City
through the Madaum diversion road, which is shorter than taking the Davao-Tagum highway. Travels by air and
sea are possible, with the existence of an airport and seaport. Mati boasts of being the coconut capital of
Mindanao if not the whole country. A large portion of its fertile land is planted to coconuts, and a significant
number of its population is largely dependent on it. Other agricultural crops such as mango, banana, corn, coffee
and cacao are also being cultivated, as well as the famous Menzi pomelo and Valencia oranges. Mati has a long
stretch of shoreline and one can find beaches of pure, powder-like white sand. A number of resorts have been
developed and are now open to serve both local and international tourists. Some of these resorts are situated
along the coast of Pujada Bay and the Pacific Ocean. Along the western coast of the bay lies Mt. Hamiguitan, the
home of the pygmy forest, where bonsai plants and trees grow, some of which are believed to be a hundred years
old or more. On its peak is a lake, called "Tinagong Dagat," or hidden sea, so covered by dense vegetation a
climber has to hike trails for hours to reach it. The mountain is also host to rare species of flora and fauna, thus
becoming a wildlife sanctuary for these life forms. (<http://mati.wetpain.com/?t=anon> accessed on September
19, 2008.)

Mati is abundant with nickel, chromite, and copper. Louie Rabat, Chamber President of the Davao Oriental Eastern
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, emphasized the big potential of the mining industry in the province of Davao
Oriental. As such, he strongly recommends Mati as the mining hub in the Region.
(<http://www.pia.gov.ph/default.asp?m=12&sec=reader&rp=1&fi=p080115.htm&no.=9&date, accessed on
September 19, 2008)
Naga [Cebu]: Historical BackgroundIn the early times, the place now known as Naga was full of huge trees locally
called as "Narra." The first settlers referred to this place as Narra, derived from the huge trees, which later simply
became Naga. Considered as one of the oldest settlements in the Province of Cebu, Naga became a municipality
on June 12, 1829. The municipality has gone through a series of classifications as its economic development has
undergone changes and growth. The tranquil farming and fishing villages of the natives were agitated as the
Spaniards came and discovered coal in the uplands. Coal was the first export of the municipality, as the Spaniards
mined and sent it to Spain. The mining industry triggered the industrial development of Naga. As the years
progressed, manufacturing and other industries followed, making Naga one of the industrialized municipalities in
the Province of Cebu.
Class of Municipality 1st class
Province Cebu
Distance from Cebu City 22 kms.
Number of Barangays 28
No. of Registered Voters 44,643 as of May 14, 2007
Total No. of Precincts 237 (as of May 14, 2007)
Ann. Income (as of Dec. 31, 2006) Php112,219,718.35 Agricultural, Industrial, Agro-Industrial, Mining
Product
(<http://www.nagacebu.com/index.php?option=com.content&view=article id=53:naga-facts-andfigures&catid=51:naga-facts-and-figures&Itemid=75> visited September 19, 2008)
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them.10 The Constitution, as the
expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in
the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive.
The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.11
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter
or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable
indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government unitsincome, population, and land area.

Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into
component cities when
it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified
income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of
the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as
engines for economic growth in their respective provinces.
Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A.
No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the
concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also
amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24,
2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses,
are not found in the LGC.
2.
The Cityhood Laws do not violate Section 6, Article X and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Both the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution impress that the Cityhood Laws violate
the equal protection clause enshrined in the Constitution. Further, it was also ruled that Section 6, Article X was
violated because the Cityhood Laws infringed on the "just share" that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
shall receive from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.
Upon more profound reflection and deliberation, we declare that there was valid classification, and the Cityhood
Laws do not violate the equal protection clause.
As this Court has ruled, the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification, provided
that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.12
The petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in
the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood
bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose
of the income requirement. This contention misses the point.
It should be recalled from the above quoted portions of the interpellation by Senate President Drilon of Senator
Pimentel that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was merely to stop the "mad rush of municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities" and the apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities
and without municipalities. It should be pointed out that the imposition of the P100 million average annual
income requirement for the creation of component cities was arbitrarily made. To be sure, there was no evidence
or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high
income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities. And to highlight such arbitrariness and the absurdity of the situation
created thereby, R.A. No. 9009 has, in effect, placed component cities at a higher standing than highly urbanized
cities under Section 452 of the LGC, to wit

Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities. (a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office, and with the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component cities of the province in which
they are geographically located. (Emphasis supplied)
The P100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009, being an arbitrary amount, cannot be
conclusively said to be the only amount "sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population," per Section 713 of the LGC. It was imposed merely because it is
difficult to comply with. While it could be argued that P100 million, being more than P20 million, could, of course,
provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a
municipality wanting to become a component city, it cannot be said that the minimum amount of P20 million
would be insufficient. This is evident from the existing cities whose income, up to now, do not comply with the
P100 million income requirement, some of which have lower than the P20 million average annual income.
Consider the list14 below
CITY

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME

1. Marawi City

5,291,522.10

2. Palayan City

6,714,651.77

3. Sipalay City

9,713,120.00

4. Canlaon City

13,552,493.79

5. Himamaylan City

15,808,530.00

6. Isabela City

16,811,246.79

7. Munoz City

19,693,358.61

8. Dapitan City

20,529,181.08

9. Tangub City

20,943,810.04

10. Bayawan City

22,943,810.04

11. Island Garden City of Samal

23,034,731.83

12. Tanjay City

23,723,612.44

13. Tabaco City

24,152,853.71

14. Oroquieta City

24,279,966.51

15. Ligao City

28,326,745.86

16. Sorsogon City

30,403,324.59

17. Maasin City

30,572,113.65

18. Escalante City

32,113,970.00

19. Iriga City

32,757,871.44

20. Gapan City

34,254,986.47

21. Candon City

36,327,705.86

22. Gingoog City

37,327,705.86

23. Masbate City

39,454,508.28

24. Passi City

40,314,620.00

25. Calbayog City

40,943,128.73

26. Calapan City

41,870,239.21

27. Cadiz City

43,827,060.00

28. Alaminos City

44,352,501.00

29. Bais City

44, 646,826.48

30. San Carlos City

46,306,129.13

31. Silay City

47,351,730.00

32. Bislig City

47,360,716.24

33. Tacurong City

49,026,281.56

34. Talisay City (Negros Occidental) 52,609,790.00

35. Kabankalan City

53,560,580.00

36. Malaybalay City

54,423,408.55

37. La Carlota City

54,760,290.00

38. Vigan City

56,831,797.19

39. Balanga City

61,556,700.49

40. Sagay City

64,266,350.00

41. Cavite City

64,566,079.05

42. Koronadal City

66,231,717.19

43. Cotabato City

66,302,114.52

44. Toledo City

70,157,331.12

45. San Jose City

70,309,233.43

46. Danao City

72,621,955.30

47. Bago City

74,305,000.00

48. Valencia City

74,557,298.92

49. Victorias City

75,757,298.92

50. Cauayan City

82,949,135.46

51. Santiago City

83,816,025.89

52. Roxas City

85,397,830.00

53. Dipolog City

85,503,262.85

54. Trece Martires City

87,413,786.64

55. Talisay City (Cebu)

87,964,972.97

56. Ozamis city

89,054,056.12

57. Surigao City

89,960,971.33

58. Panabo City

91,425,301.39

59. Digos City

92,647,699.13

The undeniable fact that these cities remain viable as component cities of their respective provinces emphasizes
the arbitrariness of the amount of P100 million as the new income requirement for the conversion of
municipalities into component cities. This arbitrariness can also be clearly gleaned from the respective distinctive
traits and level of economic development of the individual respondent municipalities as above submitted.
Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities does
not simply lie on the mere pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger
picture. The existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood
Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided
in its Section 2 (a), thus
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component
cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability
of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in accelerating economic growth and development in
the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to
become a component city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to exist.
Petitioners in these cases complain about the purported reduction of their "just share" in the IRA. To be sure,
petitioners are entitled to a "just share," not a specific amount. But the feared reduction proved to be false when,
after the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, their respective shares increased, not decreased. Consider the
table15 below
1avvphi1
CITY

CY 2006 IRA
(Before Implementation of Sixteen [16]

CY 2008 IRA
(Actual Release After Implementation of Sixteen

Cityhood Laws)

[16] Cityhood Laws)

Bais

219,338,056.00

242,193,156.00

Batangas

334,371,984.00

388,871,770.00

Bayawan

353,150,158.00

388,840,062.00

Cadiz

329,491,285.00

361,019,211.00

Calapan

227,772,199.00

252,587,779.00

Calbayog

438,603,378.00

485,653,769.00

Cauayan

250,477,157.00

277,120,828.00

Gen. Santos

518,388,557.00

631,864,977.00

Gingoog

314,425,637.00

347,207,725.00

Himamaylan 248,154,381.00

277,532,458.00

Iloilo

358,394,268.00

412,506,278.00

Iriga

183,132,036.00

203,072,932.00

Legaspi

235,314,016.00

266,537,785.00

Ligao

215,608,112.00

239,696,441.00

Oroquieta

191,803,213.00

211,449,720.00

Pagadian

292,788,255.00

327,401,672.00

San Carlos

239,524,249.00

260,515,711.00

San
Fernando

182,320,356.00

204,140,940.00

Santiago

508,326,072.00

563,679,572.00

Silay

216,372,314.00

241,363,845.00

Surigao

233,968,119.00

260,708,071.00

Tacurong

179,795,271.00

197,880,665.00

Tagaytay

130,159,136.00

152,445,295.00

Tarlac

348,186,756.00

405,611,581.00

Tangub

162,248,610.00

180,640,621.00

Urdaneta

187,721,031.00

207,129,386.00

Victorias

176,367,959.00

194,162,687.00

Zamboanga

918,013,016.00

1,009,972,704.00

What these petitioner cities were stating as a reduction of their respective IRA shares was based on a computation
of what they would receive if respondent municipalities were not to become component cities at all. Of course,
that would mean a bigger amount to which they have staked their claim. After considering these, it all boils down

to money and how much more they would receive if respondent municipalities remain as municipalities and not
share in the 23% fixed IRA from the national government for cities.
Moreover, the debates in the Senate on R.A. No. 9009, should prove enlightening:
SENATOR SOTTO. Mr. President, we just want to be enlightened again on the previous qualification and the
present one being proposed. Before there were three
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There are three requisites for a municipality to become a city. Let us start with the finance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Will the distinguished sponsor please refresh us? I used to be the chairman of the Committee on
Local Government, but the new job that was given to me by the Senate has erased completely my memory as far
as the Local Government Code is concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes, Mr. President, with pleasure. There are three requirements. One is financial.
SENATOR SOTTO. All right. It used to be P20 million.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. It is P20 million. Now we are raising it to P100 million of locally generated funds.
SENATOR SOTTO. In other words, the P20 million before includes the IRA.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. No, Mr. President.
SENATOR SOTTO. It should not have been included?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. The internal revenue share should never have been included. That was not the intention
when we first crafted the Local Government Code. The financial capacity was supposed to be demonstrated by the
municipality wishing to become a city by its own effort, meaning to say, it should not rely on the internal revenue
share that comes from the government. Unfortunately, I think what happened in past conversions of
municipalities into cities was, the Department of Budget and Management, along with the Department of Finance,
had included the internal revenue share as a part of the municipality, demonstration that they are now financially
capable and can measure up to the requirement of the Local Government Code of having a revenue of at least P20
million.
SENATOR SOTTO. I am glad that the sponsor, Mr. President, has spread that into the Record because otherwise, if
he did not mention the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, then I would
have been blamed for the misinterpretation. But anyway, the gentleman is correct. That was the interpretation
given to us during the hearings.
So now, from P20 million, we make it P100 million from locally generated income as far as population is
concerned.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. As far as population is concerned, there will be no change, Mr. President. Still 150,000.
SENATOR SOTTO. Still 150,000?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.

SENATOR SOTTO. And then the land area?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. As to the land area, there is no change; it is still 100 square kilometers.
SENATOR SOTTO. But before it was "either/or"?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is correct. As long as it has one of the three requirements, basically, as long as it meets
the financial requirement, then it may meet the territorial requirement or the population requirement.
SENATOR SOTTO. So, it remains "or"?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. We are now changing it into AND.
SENATOR SOTTO. AND?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is the proposal, Mr. President. In other words
SENATOR SOTTO. Does the gentleman not think there will no longer be any municipality that will qualify, Mr.
President?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. There may still be municipalities which can qualify, but it will take a little time. They will have
to produce more babies. I do not knowexpand their territories, whatever, by reclamation or otherwise. But the
whole proposal is geared towards making it difficult for municipalities to convert into cities.
On the other hand, I would like to advert to the fact that in the amendments that we are proposing for the entire
Local Government Code, we are also raising the internal revenue share of the municipalities.
SENATOR SOTTO. I see.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. So that, more or less, hindi naman sila dehado in this particular instance.
SENATOR SOTTO. Well, then, because of that information, Mr. President, I throw my full support behind the
measure.
Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (Emphasis supplied)16
From the foregoing, the justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes obvious, especially
considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component cities almost immediately prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities
covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase in the income
requirement of R.A. No. 9009, acknowledging the "privilege" that they have already given to those newlyconverted component cities, which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing

or "class" as the respondent municipalities. Congress merely recognized the capacity and readiness of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Petitioners complain of the projects that they would not be able to pursue and the expenditures that they would
not be able to meet, but totally ignored the respondent municipalities obligations arising from the contracts they
have already entered into, the employees that they have already hired, and the projects that they have already
initiated and completed as component cities. Petitioners have completely overlooked the need of respondent
municipalities to become effective vehicles intending to accelerate economic growth in the countryside. It is like
the elder siblings wanting to kill the newly-borns so that their inheritance would not be diminished.
Apropos is the following parable:
There was a landowner who went out at dawn to hire workmen for his vineyard. After reaching an agreement with
them for the usual daily wage, he sent them out to his vineyard. He came out about midmorning and saw other
men standing around the marketplace without work, so he said to them, "You too go along to my vineyard and I
will pay you whatever is fair." They went. He came out again around noon and mid-afternoon and did the same.
Finally, going out in late afternoon he found still others standing around. To these he said, "Why have you been
standing here idle all day?" "No one has hired us," they told him. He said, "You go to the vineyard too." When
evening came, the owner of the vineyard said to his foreman, "Call the workmen and give them their pay, but
begin with the last group and end with the first." When those hired late in the afternoon came up they received a
full days pay, and when the first group appeared they thought they would get more, yet they received the same
daily wage. Thereupon they complained to the owner, "This last group did only an hours work, but you have paid
them on the same basis as us who have worked a full day in the scorching heat." "My friend," he said to one in
reply, "I do you no injustice. You agreed on the usual wage, did you not? Take your pay and go home. I intend to
give this man who was hired last the same pay as you. I am free to do as I please with my money, am I not? Or are
you envious because I am generous?"17
Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of
respondent municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces,
temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into
component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government
units "enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as selfreliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals," which is the very
mandate of the Constitution.
Finally, we should not be restricted by technical rules of procedure at the expense of the transcendental interest
of justice and equity. While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it is
nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to dispel apprehensions and doubt,
as the following pronouncement of this Court instructs:
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the
constitutional limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn
duty. The courts invariably give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and
application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their
power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a
statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing
a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution to be in contravention of the Constitution x
x x, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statute with the constitution must be
irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative
body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable

doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the
constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.18
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed on
September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated August 24,
2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood LawsRepublic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394,
9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491are declared CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTBaguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176951

April 12, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu;
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur;
Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177499
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of
Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte;
Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178056
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of
Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as
Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar,

Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and
Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis--vis the
Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011.
To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondents presented against the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24,
2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404,
9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 constitutional.
Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the
Court could no longer modify, alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to
such judgment having long become final and executory. They submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6
and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.
The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the assailed February
15, 2011 Resolution, to wit:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY
2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE.
II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELEVANT SUPREME
COURT ISSUANCES.
III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RES
JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS.
IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES.
Ruling
Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit.
I.
Procedural Issues
With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the petitioners assail the
jurisdiction of the Court in promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution, claiming that the decision herein had
long become final and executory. They state that the Court thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles
of res judicata and immutability of final judgments.

The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying
the respondents second motion for reconsideration vis--vis the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a
prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of judgment on May 21, 2009.
The Court disagrees with the petitioners.
In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:
By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit.
The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited
pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 and the
Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED in view of
the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of
judgment be made in due course.
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Renato
C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario, Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P. Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave.1
Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To Amend Resolution
Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead That Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March
31, 2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit Attached Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The
Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon, arguing
therein that a determination of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for
reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate
opinion of then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections.2
Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009 Resolution,
viz:
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of
the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.
However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court,
the Court therefore allows the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion
for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect,
the Court allowed the filing of the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration
was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of the required number of votes to overturn the 18
November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion for reconsideration
in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.3
As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several pleadings and
documents, including respondents Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.

The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, asseverating that
their Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was not another motion for reconsideration of the
November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28, 2009 Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the
respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration. They pointed out that the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April
28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt of the April 28,
2009 Resolution; thus, the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their arguments with
respect to a tie-vote upon an issue of constitutionality.
In the September 29, 2009 Resolution,4 the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt.
As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.
The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad
Cautelam With Motion to Expunge", together with the Reply.
On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to
Expunge, to grant the respondents Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad
Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and to note the respondents Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with
Motion to Expunge.
On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. and voting
anew on the Second Motion For Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated its
Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as constitutional,5 disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the
Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14,
2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The
June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and
9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against the December 21,
2009 Decision.6 On the same date, the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul Decision of 21 December 2009.7
On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the petitioners.8
On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed their separate
Manifestations with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration.9 Similar manifestations with
supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by other petitioner-intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on
February 15, 2010;10 City of Batangas on February 17, 2010;11 and City of Oroquieta on February 24, 2010.12 The
Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motions.13 As directed, the respondents complied.

On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision.14
On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated
August 24, 2010.15 They followed this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.16 On November 19, 2010, the petitioners
sent in their Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution dated August 24, 2010"].17 On
November 30, 2010,18 the Court noted, among others, the petitioners Opposition.
On January 18, 2011,19 the Court denied the respondents Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.
Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged.
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents Second
Motion For Reconsideration was not a prohibited pleading in view of the Courts voting and acting on it having the
effect of allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that when the respondents filed their Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the expunging of their Motion To Amend Resolution
Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009
Resolution), the Court opted to act on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by
directing the adverse parties through its September 29, 2009 Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect
occurred when the Court, by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents Motion for Leave to File
and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply.
Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court: (a) rendered
ineffective the tie-vote under the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a majority to overturn; (b), re-opened the Decision
of November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c) lifted the directive that no further
pleadings would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and acted on the respondents Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the
respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration and ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009
Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws valid and constitutional).
It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the November 18,
2008 Decision on the basis of the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To be sure, the Reflections were
the legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the deliberations of the Court. The reference in the
December 21, 2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that there was still a pending incident after the April
28, 2009 Resolution that had been timely filed within 15 days from its receipt,20 pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,21
in relation to Section 1, Rule 52,22 of the Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this pending
incident, leading to the issuance of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from
constitutional infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August 24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the
November 18, 2008 Decision), to correct which the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution"
Dated August 24, 2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011 Resolution, reversing and
setting aside the August 24, 2010 Resolution.
It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with the
Rules of Court and its internal procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings.
It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances
from the shackles of technicality in order to render just and equitable relief.23

On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that
the succession of the events recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not
yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the principle of immutability of judgments did not yet
come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet warranted, especially
considering that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.
II.
Substantive Issues
The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the
Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.
The Court differs.
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable
disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its
amendment, and the P100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively articulated
in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate
President was cognizant of the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills
during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009,24 including the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate
Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in session, and the conversion bills were
then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009 would not
apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.
R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt
Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act
No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No. 29. Even so, the House of Representatives
readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,25 and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for
approval. Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1.
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint
Resolution No. 1, to wit:
MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL
House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the
requirement that they must have at least P100 million in income of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the
internal revenue share that they received from the central government as required under Republic Act No. 9009.
The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate to do away
with the income requirement of P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now

file bills specifically converting them into cities. The reason they want the Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo
Macias, chair of the House Committee on Local Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill for the
conversion of municipalities into cities unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. The House
leadership therefore wants to shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from the income requirement
to the Senate rather than do it itself.
That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution that would
qualify the municipalities concerned for conversion into cities on the matter of income alone. Then, at a later date,
the House would pass specific bills converting the municipalities into cities. However, income is not only the
requirement for municipalities to become cities. There are also the requirements on population and land area.
In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want converted into
cities piecemeal and separately, first is the income under the joint resolution, then the other requirements when
the bills are file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To repeat, this is a most unusual manner of creating
cities.
My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do regarding the
applications of certain municipalities to become cities pursuant to the requirements of the Local Government
Code. If the House wants to exempt certain municipalities from the requirements of the Local Government Code
to become cities, by all means, let them do their thing. Specifically, they should act on specific bills to create cities
and cite the reasons why the municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall
have completed what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific
bills creating cities.
In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the matter of
converting municipalities into cities and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do under the joint
resolution.
In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being undertaken to favor the
creation of certain cities. I am not saying that they are not qualified. All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass
and create cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let them do that. But they should do it following the
requirements of the Local Government Code and, if they want to make certain exceptions, they can also do that
too. But they should not use the Senate as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.
Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the House. Had they followed
the recommendation, for all I know, the municipalities they had envisioned to be covered by House Joint
Resolution No. 1 would, by now if not all, at least some have been converted into cities. House Joint Resolution
No. 1, the House, in effect, caused the delay in the approval in the applications for cityhood of the municipalities
concerned.
Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for the Senate to
request the House to follow the procedure outlined in the Local Government Code which has been respected all
through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law
and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of bills converting municipalities into cities.26
Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and
were all unanimously and

favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives.27 The bills, when forwarded to the Senate,
were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate.28 The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the
exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A.
No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being
embodied in the exemption clauses.
The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of P100 million from locally generated sources
is not arbitrary because it is not difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already
complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No
9264), Navotas (R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A. No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmarias in Cavite (R.A. No.
9723), and Bian in Laguna (R.A. No. 9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the
income of P100 million from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and
Bacoor in Cavite.
The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.
As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an
average annual income of P100 million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008
by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to
comply with the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect renders it fallacious and
probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to
comply with.
In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus:
Senator Osmea III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be converted into a
city?
Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that once converted
into a city, the municipality will have roughly more than three times the share that it would be receiving over the
internal revenue allotment than it would have if it were to remain a municipality. So more or less three times or
more.
Senator Osmea III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger share from the internal
revenue allocations?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Osmea III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original Republic Act No. 7160,
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made between a municipalitywhat a
municipality would earnand a city? Because essentially, to a persons mind, even with this new requirement, if
approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning P100 million and has a population of more than 150,000
inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it would not qualify as a city.
Senator Pimentel. Yes.
Senator Osmea III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality?

Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the "or". So, this is a matter that we can very
well take up as a policy issue. The chair of the committee does not say that we should, as we know, not listen to
arguments for the restoration of the word "or" in the population or territorial requirement.
Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentlemans "and", but perhaps we should
bring down the area. There are certainly very crowded places in this country that are less than 10,000 hectares
100 square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There might only be 9,000 hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be
unfair if these municipalities already earning P100,000,000 in locally generated funds and have a population of
over 150,000 would not be qualified because of the simple fact that the physical area does not cover 10,000
hectares.
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of municipalities. San Juan is a
specific example which, if we apply the present requirements, would not qualify: 100 square kilometers and a
population of not less than 150,000.
But my reply to that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?
Senator Osmea III. Because of the income.
Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the danger here, if we
become lax in the requirements, is the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of
funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao
or in the Cordilleras, or whatever.
Therefore, I think we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore the word "or" so
that if they do not have the 100 square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify in terms of population and
income, that would be all right, Mr. President.
Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the distinguished
gentleman is considering several amendments to the Local Government Code. Perhaps this is something that
could be further refined at a later time, with his permission.
So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions.
Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President.29
The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold
income of P100 million from local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro
Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are
spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao regions, and are
considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009
sought to prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of
funding because they would have more qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in
Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt increase in the income
requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of
countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result should be arrested early, to avoid the
unwanted divisive effect on the entire country due to the local government units closer to the National Capital
Region being afforded easier access to the bigger share in the national coffers than other local government units.

There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class
of their own. They have proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich
havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism spots. In his speech delivered
on the floor of the Senate to sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits,30
viz:
It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in terms of
income, all the rest are categorized by the Department of Finance as first-class municipalities with gross income of
at least P70 million as per Commission of Audit Report for 2005. Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with
Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial capitals.
The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this time, indicate
their readiness to take on the responsibilities of cityhood.
Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces. Borongan,
Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of income among all the municipalities in
their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number two; Bogo and Lamitan are number three; Carcar,
number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they pacesetters in their respective provinces, they are
also among the frontrunners in their regions Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in
Regions VIII, XIII, and CAR, respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively;
Bogo, number five in Region VII; Borongan and Carcar are both number six in Regions VIII and VII, respectively.
This simply shows that these municipalities are viable.
Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member cities,
considering that they became cities in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their creation.
The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income requirement
of P20 million was definitely not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and special
functions vis--vis the population of a component city. We also stressed that the increased income requirement of
P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain viable as a
component city. These observations were unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59)
members of the League of Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new
requirement of the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 became law.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009
was arbitrary. When the sponsor of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data
buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to
arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to prevent might soon become
a reality. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the
criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every
amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of
the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant national growth.
Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are espousing,
we may have to apply the same restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the petitioners,
and find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws
are R.A. No. 938731 and R.A. No. 9388,32 respectively converting the municipalities of San Juan and Navotas into
highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the

requirements imposed by the LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied
with the income requirement of P50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of P100
million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they obviously did not meet the requirements set forth under
Section 453 of the LGC, to wit:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as
highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San Juan and Navotas
as highly urbanized cities upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. A
further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did not qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a
population of only 125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000 under Section 452 of the
LGC. Such non-qualification as a component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations
on Senate Bill No. 2157.
The petitioners contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is not
acceptable.
In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section
285 of the LGC, not a specific amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of
population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of
existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the allocation for
cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either
increase or decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the
percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount
received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section 285
and Section 286 of the LGC.
As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the
Constitution and the LGC. The respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities.
They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of their respective provinces and are developing
continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500 municipalities. With
their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.
Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support
their development. They can spur their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of
encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet their potential will effectively be
stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial
activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.
III.
Conclusion
We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion
bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior
to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and

fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable
legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied
with finality.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners
consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances and
from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, 2
distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District

Municipalities/Cities

1st District Del Gallego

Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

Population
417,304

Cabusao

San Fernando

2nd District Gainza

Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

474,899

3rd District Caramoan

Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

4th District Iriga

Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates
the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District

Municipalities/Cities

1st District

Del Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

2nd District

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

Population
176,383

San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor

276,777

3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga

Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

439,043

4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan

Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga

Baao
Balatan

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Bato
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that
became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of
thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the
sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as
well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill
that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. His copetitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive
joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly
created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at
least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed
to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other
hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than
250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum
population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The
petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House
of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the projected national population of fifty five
million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200

district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the
population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the creation of a
province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur
failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided
in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section
5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present
petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects:
first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the
remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities and provinces
drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000
population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will show that the

same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000
minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of districts
in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the
province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the
petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were
they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a petition for
declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents,
therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that, by reason of
constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural rules,14 as well as
relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance
to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this
Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance
of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and
just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v.
Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to
name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the
latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the standing
requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v.
Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path
must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.24
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific
provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and
the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative,
with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled
to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was the law that
converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created
an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case
argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because

the resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a
total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of
the newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.28
(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its
initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a
minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by
another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should
not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is
not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for
an additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere
fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government
Code states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition
to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the
words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be
gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of
Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is

captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the
population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have.
Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer
to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the
use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the
sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire country into two
hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were
distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventythree (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats
were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a
Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be
appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned
among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based
on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that
our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000
inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73
provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed]
to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number
of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the determination of
the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records
show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was more affinity
with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First
District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was the only factor
considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set in Section 5 of the
Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces
and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.

Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with the northern
towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on the apportionment,
its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for
the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact,
Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more
potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are
lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in
politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He requested that
the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations that District I has
a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population
of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the
contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the
Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to
the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District
would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment and
districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the importance of the
towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee for the
possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He
stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the

summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own
constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however,
pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year, but
the transient population would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and
professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to
speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be
isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that
the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should
have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the
fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval
of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote.
With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats.
The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod,
Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City
alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on the distribution of
its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and
fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with
the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political
stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity"
considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that
municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner
Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v.
COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however,
does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x
x. To ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to
the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional
provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And
the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes
the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional
legislative district in a province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the
four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40
In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district
for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against
strict conformity with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first
and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new
legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted
upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured
District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One
and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the
erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of
discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative
districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered.
Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so
very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.