Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA
LOLARGA,
in
her
capacity
as
Superintendent
of
City
Schools
of
Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO,
AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondent
NARVASA, J.:p
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as
follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or
modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions,
may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by
law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling
on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by
this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass
concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass
concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call
for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions"
consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through
their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to
work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the
week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon
Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the
basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90)
days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran,
Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal
investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order
dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the
hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of
the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of
Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario),
which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt
to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly
docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No.
95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teachermembers so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human
Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as
teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were
docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October
11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was
served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C.
Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and
suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were
"the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission
thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of
the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they
need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga,
school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined
to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and
all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the
Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His
motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and
that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated
in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions
"without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service
Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner
Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them,
and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and
Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear
and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied
due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a
violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost
respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the
reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has
commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos.
95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following
general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary
sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR
complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same
issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil
Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or
not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try
and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The

function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded
the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are
the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or
adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity
from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions,
in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate
is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct
meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an
official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired
into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or
track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise,
for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to
pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
. . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve
on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it
cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and
conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has
no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the
failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by
the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if
any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears
that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had
occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and
are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded
the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the
Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually
the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and
functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the
latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the
complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against
them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result
in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if
it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance;
that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent
Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for
prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR
from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity
as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to,
and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In
said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned
premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo
that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR
Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR
Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners
to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection,
and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and
again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation
for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this
Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain
business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21
September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should
be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had
meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss
was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this
wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed
by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The
motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to
investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly
and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of
women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to
man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our
resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from
further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the
petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR.
The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense
with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991,
requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The
Commission
on
Human
Rights
was
created
by
the
1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987,
in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the
Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court.
In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has
observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment,"
but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the
extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried,
could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the
University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?"
The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of
the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to
elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and
social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . .
Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by
it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right,
innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to
include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the
term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and
inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific
provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the
country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others,
comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of
Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on
21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest

upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of
grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were
required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August
1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and
also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task,
hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the
Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the
right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights
that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and
political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished
this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other
violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under
the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which
cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This
particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps,
at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined
as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts
of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human
rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past
regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a
matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with
human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee,
so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of
political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed
Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference
was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later
on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of
which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified
in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our
concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and
political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of
the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need
arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to
marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be
envisioned initially by this provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to
fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific
group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the
concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those
that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different
rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has
specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much
we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not
pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate
torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and the persons who are allegedly
guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights
Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little
individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and
political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on
Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general
sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures,
and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for
instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of
tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against
the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that
"Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking
into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-saristores and carinderia, as
well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More
than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway.
The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed
to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order
for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human
rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing
in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in
accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be
understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with
the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never
derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf
of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate
agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the
demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standion the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially
consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case
before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act
already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580.
The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from
further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining
order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.