Académique Documents
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SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 203605
P/C INSP. LAWRENCE B. CAJIPE, P/C INSP. JOELL. MENDOZA, P/C INSP.
GERARDO B. BALATUCAN, PO3 JOLITO P. MAMANAO, JR., P03 FERNANDO
REYS. GAPUZ, PO2 EDUARDO G. BLANCO, PO2 EDWIN SANTOS and PO1
JOSIL REY I. LUCENA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On December 28, 2009 the DOJ issued a resolution after preliminary investigation
finding probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in the police action
that led to the shooting of Jun and Lia for two counts of murder. On March 15, 2010
the DOJ filed the information before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parafiaque
City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and 10-0281. On the following day, March 16,
petitioner HPG officers filed an omnibus motion for judicial determination of
probable cause with a prayer to hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants for
their arrest. They also sought the annulment of the DOJ resolution on the ground of
violation of their constitutional rights. Further, they asked that the information be
quashed on the ground that the facts it alleged did not constitute an offense.4
On June 16, 2010 the RTC dismissed the case against petitioner HPG officers for
lack of probable cause against them, given that the witnesses made no mention of
seeing anyone from the HPG group taking part in the shooting and killing of Jun and
his daughter. Instead, the RTC found that the evidence tends to show that
petitioner HPG officers were requested and acted merely as blocking force in a
legitimate police operation and Lilian had not refuted this. On the other hand the R
TC issued an arrest warrant for the accused SAF officers, having found probable
cause against them. Lilian moved for reconsideration of the dismissal order covering
petitioner HPG officers but the RTC denied the same on September 24, 2010.5
As narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), on July 28, 2009 Lilian I. De Vera (Lilian)
filed a complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ) charging with multiple
murder the following Philippine National Police (PNP) officers connected with the
PNP Highway Patrol Group (HPG): petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C
Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr.,
P03 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, PO2 Eduardo G. Blanco, P02 Edwin Santos, and PO1
Josil Rey I. Lucena (collectively, petitioner HPG officers). The other HPG members
were P/C Supt. Perfecto Palad and P/C Supt. Eleuterio Gutierrez, Jr. Another group
of accused consisted of police officers from the PNP Special Action Force (SAF).1
On January 21, 2011 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 117756
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part.6 On June 15, 2012 the CA
granted the petition. It ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in failing to
evaluate the sworn statements of the witnesses on whom the DOJ relied on. The R
TC based its finding of lack of probable cause primarily on the absence of evidence
directly linking the petitioner HPG officers to the shooting of the victim and their
physical presence at the crime scene.7
In her complaint Lilian alleged that joint elements of the SAF and the HPG conspired
in carrying out a plan to kill her husband, Alfonso "Jun" S. De Vera (Jun) and their
7-year-old daughter, Lia Allana. Lilian said that at around 9:30 p.m. on December
5, 2008 she called Jun to tell him that she was on her way to Pasay City to meet
him and their daughter. She got to Pasay City but the two did not show up. After an
hour, Lilian called their house helper who assured her that Jun and Lia had already
left. Lilian tried calling Jun but she got no answer. She again called their house
helper, who informed her that there had been a shootout in their subdivision.2
In a special civil action filed before it, however, the CA pointed out that Indiana and
Ronald Castillo executed affidavits stating that petitioner HPG officers joined the
SAF officers in pursuing and shooting Jun while he was bringing Lia to a safer place.
The CA said that, with this evidence, it is for the petitioner HPG officers to rebut
such testimonies at the trial.8 The CA thus ordered the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the petitioner HPG officers.9On October 5, 2012 the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration of its decision and the urgent motion to quash warrants
of arrest and/or motion to suspend the implementation of the warrants of
arrest,10 hence, this petition.
Lilian decided to go home. When she arrived at the entrance of their subdivision,
the police had blocked the area and did not allow civilians to pass through. She got
a call from her house helper who told-her that Jun and Lia had been involved in the
shootout. A certain Hilario Indiana approached Lilian and advised her to go to the
hospital where Lia had been rushed. When she got there, she learned that Lia had
died of gunshot wound on the head. Jun was found dead near a passenger jeepney
with a gunshot wound on his head.3
Witnesses to the shootout said that Jun and Lia were riding in his Isuzu Crosswind
van when police officers wearing Regional SAF vests suddenly fired at the van. Jun
got out, went to the passenger side, and tried to carry Lia out to safety as she had
been wounded. The police officers went after Jun, however, and shot him on the
head.
recommendation to the OSG, advising it of the last day for filing such an action.
There is no reason the OSG cannot file the petition since the People is given sixty
days from notice to the public prosecutor within which to file such an action before
the CA or this Court.
Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People
112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Paraaque,
the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate
review.
Although a purely academic exercise in view of its above rulings, the Court has
taken a look into the merit of the RTC's order of dismissal since it clashes with the
findings of the DOJ investigating prosecutors.
The OSG relies on the affidavits of Indiana and Ronald V. Castillo (Castillo) in
claiming that probable cause exists against petitioner HPG officers.
In the sworn statement he made before the police on December 9, 2008 Indiana
said: "x x x. Tapos narinig ko ang sigaw 'Bro ang driver tumakas andyan sa jeep,
duon nilapitan ng isang naka-Vest na meron pangalan sa likod RSAF at nakabunet
at pinutukan ang driver sa ulo. Tapos nagsalita ang nagsabing RSAF 'Bro may bata
pala.' Kinuha ng RSAF ang bata at dinala sa kanilang sasakyan na kulay puti ng
sasakyan. x x x."13
On the other hand, witness Castillo said in his sworn statement: "x x x. May
dumaang sasakyang papuntang gate ng UPS JV, mayroong sumigaw na mga pulis
'PLATIN NYO, PLATIN NYO.' Biglang hinabol ng dalawang pulis ang nasabing
sasakyan at pinagbabaril. May ilang sandali ay bumalik ang dalawang pulis at sinabi
nila ng 'NAPATAY NA NAMIN ANG DRIVER NG GATE A WAY CAR, ANDOON SA TABI
NGJEEP'."14
It is clear from Indiana's testimony that the man he saw shoot Jun was an RSAF
officer, identified by his assault vest and accompanied by another RSAF officer who
also wore such a vest. Castillo did not see the act of shooting but confirmed that
two police officers gave chase and took shots at the fleeing vehicle then turned back
to announce to their companions that they had killed the driver of the get-away car.
The HPG men belonged to another unit and there is no claim that they wore another
unit's vest. More telling is the crime laboratory report which revealed that none of
the HPG operatives discharged their firearms during the shootout.15 It did not also
help the prosecution's case that, per Indiana's testimony, the SAF police officers
involved in the shootout carried long firearms, specifically M16 rifle, M16 baby
armalite, and M14.16 But the National Police Commission issued two certifications
dated January 14 and 19, 2010 to the effect that the petitioner HPG officers had not
been issued long firearms from 2007 up to 2010.17
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts
as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.18 The
prosecution evidence fails to establish probable cause against petitioner HPG
officers.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 15,
2012 and Resolution dated October 5, 2012 in CAG.R. SP 117756 and AFFIRMS the
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City in Criminal Cases 10-0280 and
10-0281 that dismissed the case against petitioners. The Court ORDERS the
DISMISSAL of the charge against the petitioners P/C Insp. Lawrence B. Cajipe, P/C
Insp. Joel L. Mendoza, P/C Insp. Gerardo B. Balatucan, PO3 Jolito P. Mamanao, Jr.,
PO3 Fernando Rey S. Gapuz, P02 Eduardo G. Blanco, PO2 Edwin Santos, and PO2
Josil Rey I. Lucena. The Court further ORDERS the withdrawal of the warrants for
their arrest.
SO ORDERED.
III.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FILED
BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.9
We deny the petition.
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural
infirmities which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause. It
appears that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal
but likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be
discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioners complete
disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her
notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided
by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x
x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of
the appeal itself.10 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a
mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme
Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision
or final order from which an appeal may be taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically
provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an
appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil
action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition
under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an
outright dismissal.12
The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the
task of determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned
lawyers to follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any
error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the clients cause.13
Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require
her counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for noncompliance. Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to
respondents Comment to the petition.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still
dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts.14 Although the Supreme Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which an application will be directed.15 Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly
and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.16
On August 2, 2011, petitioners counsel submitted his explanation for noncompliance and asked for more time within which to comply with the Courts
resolution, because of heavy workload and his failure to contact petitioner who
apparently transferred residence. In a Resolution23 dated
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an
appeal of the trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so
for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated
earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of
appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her
motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner
attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of
appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her
motion for reconsideration.17 A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed
decision, final order or judgment.18 Failure to comply with such requirement shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.19
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and
evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders,
resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence
that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying
on the case records of the lower court.20
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of the
Rules and the Courts lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution21 dated September 15,
2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of
service on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper
verification in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of
the Rules, and a valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat showing that the affiant
exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as
required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as
amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13SC; and (c) her counsels contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated
10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days from notice. x x x22
August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested,
admonished petitioners counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again,
petitioner failed to file the required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the
counsels explanation why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioners
counsel claimed that he could not prepare the required reply because the
documents needed had been destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He, likewise, pointed
out that he exerted earnest efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that
point.24 After the Court required him again to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for not complying with the Courts resolutions, and since his
efforts to communicate with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be
relieved of all his duties and responsibilities as counsel on record.25 In a
Resolution26 dated December 10, 2012, we required petitioner herself to comment
thereon, but no such compliance was made to date.1wphi1
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice.27 It is the
duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign,
to determine which court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for
appeal.28 Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client's cause.29 It should be
stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.30 The
requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules
with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
February 5, 2014
of the offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused
Willie Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered
immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as
representative sample which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is
ordered turned over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper
disposition.6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles
driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an
ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as the police officers have already acquired
prior knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for transportation
of dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information turned
out to be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles more
than five hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride.7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to
transport them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only
accommodated the request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his
fishing boat. It likewise dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of
knowledge of the illegality of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he
was just transporting wooden tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla.
The other passenger of the ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to
inquire about the contents of the vehicle as he was merely an accommodated
passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were
caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by
each of them. Absent any convincing circumstance to corroborate their
explanations, the validity of their apprehension was sustained.8
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the
testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the
two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven
by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead
of the ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers.
However, the ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through
the untinted window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van.
Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden
tiles.
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car
for further inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white
crystalline granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla
to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he was with
Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass.9 His request was
rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned
out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.10 This discovery prompted the
operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to
overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the
mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the operatives noticed that his van was also
loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also
requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. At this instance, Mayor
Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon examination, the
contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.11
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial
court for failure on the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Dequillas and Yangs mere presence inside
the vehicle as passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also conspirators
of Mayor Mitra and Morilla.12
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld
the finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to
transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their
respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally transport
methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive
the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who
drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.13
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the
illegal contents of the sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles
was implausible due to the obvious disparity of texture and volume.14
Courts Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be
convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans allegation of
conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove
his culpability as alleged in the Information.15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure16 to substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the
Information itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement "the
above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group
as they all help one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the words used
in the Information.17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at
this point, is deemed to have been waived due to Morillas failure to assert it as a
ground in a motion to quash before entering his plea.18
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his
defenses to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate
courts. His failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.19
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.20 To determine conspiracy,
there must be a common design to commit a felony.21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group
involved in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of
the minds may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some
complete whole.22In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a
conclusion that Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport
the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs,
were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the
checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass
through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary
check. Noticing white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested
Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor
Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and
he just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the
said vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of
transporting the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under
the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another." 23 It
was well established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following
the lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act
of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks
containing dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent,
motive or knowledge.24
In a similar case of People v. Libnao,25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal
transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag
full of marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at
a checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425,26 the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from
six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683,27 the penalty was
amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty
thousand pesos. The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No.
7659,28 where the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
June 4, 2014
located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the
accused-appellants defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing
incident and that it was some other unknown person, and not the accusedappellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiopa stating that he was with the
accused-appellant and Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion
occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellants
culpability.5 Prosecution witness Dagangons positive identification of the accusedappellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of
murder.6 The RTC also rejected the accused-appellants defense of denial as it was
not supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accusedappellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000.7
REYES, J.:
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed
Decision8 dated July 27, 2011, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 1043900 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and
imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages;
[P]30,000.00 actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the
costs. This court has no jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not
impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED.2
The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19,
2000 in BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta
and a dance was being held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Celso
Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno
(Goloceno) testified that on said night, they were at the dance together with Sareno
at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno were inside the
dance area, Jerome Likiran3 (Jerome), the accused-appellants brother, punched
Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that
Jerome was armed with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a
hunting knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance
area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and shot him
several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back.
It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-hand as he was only three meters from
where Sareno was. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after
Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point.
Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular
area.4
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he
admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion
happened. Heand Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was
SO ORDERED.9
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accusedappellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated
from the RTCs conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and the
accused-appellant, and that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of
the crime. According to the CA, the information failed to contain the allegation of
conspiracy, and the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and
the accused-appellant ganged up on the victim.10
The CA, however, sustained the RTCs finding of treachery.11
The accused-appellant protested his conviction.12 According to him, the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accusedappellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant
and his culpability.13
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings of the trial court are, except for
compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully
supported by evidence and affirmed by the CA.14
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity
of the criminal.15In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more
particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accusedappellants argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant
considering that there was no evidence to show that the place where the crime
occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters away
from the accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover,
there was no distraction that could have disrupted Dagangons attention. He even
immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome during police investigation,
and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the police beforehand that
the accused-appellant was one of the suspects.16 Positive identification by a
prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is
entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial.17 Such positive identification gains
further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely
testify against an accused.18
The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder
committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing
his instantaneous death.19 The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on
record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person.20 At this
juncture, the Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two
assailants the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only
the accused-appellant who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense
witnesses also testified that Jerome died on March 12, 2005.21
The CA disregarded the accused-appellants contention and ruled that "the cause of
death was not made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was
admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of
death.22 And even assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held
the accused-appellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of the Courts
ruling in People v. Pilola.23
The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CAs
disregard of the accused-appellants argument.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated
upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of
Death issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and
reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of
fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area."24 Stipulation of
facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in
writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used
against the accused.25 In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement
was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its
admission.26 Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the
regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the
victim.27 Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause
DOA
Antecedent cause
Multiple GSW
Underlying cause
which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.39 There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby sentences the
accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral
damages, as these are in accord with the Court's judicial policy on the
matter.40 These, on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) actual damages
and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.41
The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is
nothing on record proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense.
Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages allowed
under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,42 and absent
any evidence supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of factual
basis.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy"
is hereby found guilty of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty often (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum. Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199689
Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered
drugs and money were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang.7 The
recovered drugs were then marked with the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident
was recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the recovered drugs and
money.8
Later that evening, at around ten oclock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang
submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp
Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao City, a request for laboratory examination of two
plastic sachets with white crystalline substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to
determine the presence of dangerous drugs;9 as well as both hands of Constantino,
one piece P500.00 bill, and five piecesP100.00 bills, to determine the presence of
the ultra violet powder.10 Per Chemistry Report No. D-08-200511 and Physical
Identification Report No. PI-04-2005,12 prepared by Police Senior Inspector
(P/SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria,13 Forensic Chemist, the contents of the two plastic
sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the other
specimens tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet fluorescent
powder.
Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely
framed-up.
2. The police officers categorically admitted that they did not personally know the
accused until they were at the alleged place of transaction.
The Courts response: Substantive law does not require this; the rules of evidence
do not. Did they know he was Jojit? Yes, from the description given the informant.
Domingo asked whether he was Jojit. He answered "Yes".
3. The arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of Article II, Section
21 of R.A. 9165 that requires that an inventory be taken and that photographs be
taken of the items seized.
The Courts comment: The Police Blotter Entry No. 0270 enumerates the items
seized. This, the Court holds to be substantial compliance. Even assuming, without
admitting, that not all the requirements may not have been complied with, these
omissions do not operate to exclude the evidence nor to cause suppression thereof.
They are directory, not mandatory provisions.
3 He was accosted by police officers who, at the time, he did not know to
be police officers;
4 They took him to the police station and produced the sachets;
5 Next day, while on the way to the Crime Lab, they forced him to hold
marked bills, although he was cuffed.
All told, it is a story that is meant to endeavor to explain the circumstances around
the accuseds arrest and apprehension. For one thing, it is self-serving; for another,
we are not told any reason why the police officers should have wanted to apprehend
him a supposedly guiltless man; third, the Court never heard the testimony of his
friend with whom he was supposed to have had a joy-ride that night. In sum, his
story does not convince this Court.15(Citations omitted.)
confiscated from him. Different people claim to have made the marking "NBT" on
the two plastic sachets and gave various explanations as to what the initials "NBT"
stand for. In short, Constantino argues that the prosecution failed to establish a
crucial link in the chain of custody of the shabu in this case.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with disfavor
by the courts, being a self-serving negative evidence. In view, however, of the
constitutional presumption that an accused is innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption by presenting the required quantum of evidence. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense.18
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence."19 And in the prosecution of these offenses,
the primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized
drugs and other related articles have been preserved from the time they were
confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court.20
Article II, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the procedure to be
followed in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof[.]
Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
Republic Act No. 9165 describes in more detail how the foregoing procedure is to be
applied:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.
The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn
over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.23
After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court
finds glaring inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly
confiscated from Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3
Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic
sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the two plastic
sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from
Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized
shabu at a very early stage.
To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the
illegal drug. In this case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic
sachets of shabu from Constantino in exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo
himself did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets of shabu. Instead, upon
arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo
turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who
was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2
Tamang who put the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu. Below are the
excerpts from PO3 Domingos testimony:
Q If that plastic sachets which was sold to you by Hermanos Constantino is shown
to you will you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, maam.
Q How were you able to identify the plastic sachets?
A There is an initials (sic), maam.
Q What initials are you referring to?
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items
is established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q During the buy bust operation you stated that the accused handed to the poseur
buyer in the person of PO3 Rolando Domingo two plastic sachets containing as you
claimed methamphetamine hydrochloride, have you seen these plastic sachets at
that time when they handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
A Yes, sir.
A Because I was present during that time when he placed his initial, sir.
Q Do you know when this Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials on those two plastic
sachets?
A After we conducted the buy bust operation, sir.
Q If these two plastic sachets will be shown to you again today will you be able to
tell that these two plastic sachets were the same plastic sachets that were handed
by the accused to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
Q How soon Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials after the conduct of the buy bust
operation?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you these two plastic sachets kindly tell us if these are the
plastic sachets that were handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan,26 the Forensic Chemist, also
declared before the trial court that the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets of
shabu were made by SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray (Tamaray), the duty officer who
received the specimens at the crime laboratory. P/SInsp. Tulauan testified:
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q When you received these two specimens Madam Witness, will you please tell us
the physical appearance of these items when you received the same?
A They were heat-sealed and with markings "A-1" and "A-2," your Honor.
B And will you please point to us these markings "A-1" and "A-2" when you received
these items Madam Witness?
A This is the markings "A-1" and "A-2," Maam.
INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to the markings "A-1" and "A-2" with the use of a black
pentel pen.
PROS. ISRAEL:
A Yes, Maam because he is the one who received the specimen from the one who
deliver it, Maam.
Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseurbuyer, despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu
purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before
turning over the custody of the same to another police officer. This lapse in
procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the drugs
actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before
the trial court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval,
supposedly received and marked the same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution
could have presented as witness either SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly
validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the prosecution chose to dispense
with the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished the importance of the
markings as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. As a
consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the shabu ultimately
presented as evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.30
Q In this second plastic sachet Madam Witness which you identified earlier, that
there is a marking "A-1," there is another marking NBT, what is this marking all
about Madam Witness?
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal to
its case as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.31
In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged, not because
the Court accords credence to his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution
failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Q There is another marking in this plastic sachet Madam Witness marked as NBT,
what is this marking all about?
A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Maam.
Q Is he authorized to make the necessary marking which was requested to be
examined Madam Witness?
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision dated April 15,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal
Case No. 10516, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr.
y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit," is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and is ORDERED to be immediately released from
detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.
A Yes, sir.
SO ORDERED.
Q And with respect also to that NBT marked and placed in that exhibit which you
have earlier identified, you did not see this duty officer placed his markings thereon,
is it not?
A Yes sir but I asked him who placed that marking and he said that he was the one
who placed the initial NBT, sir.28
The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria29 the importance of marking the
seized item right after seizure:
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs
or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the
marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding
handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking
of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or
contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody
imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.1wphi1 (Citation
omitted.)
On January 23, 2007, appellant assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
Version of the Prosecution
On November 26, 2006, a civilian informant tipped the San Fernando City Police
Station about the alleged drug pushing activity of appellant at his residence in
Pagdalagan Norte, San Fernando City, La Union. Hence, a team composed of Police
Officers Manuel Espejo (Espejo), Jose Arce (Arce) and Joselito Casem (Casem) went
to the area on the same day to conduct a surveillance. They stayed at a store about
10 meters away from appellants house and from there saw people coming in and
out. Another surveillance conducted by the same team on the following evening
confirmed that drug activities were indeed happening in that place.
The said police officers immediately reported the matter to their superior who
ordered them to conduct a buy-bust operation on November 28, 2006. Espejo was
designated as poseur-buyer while Arce and Casem were to serve as back-ups.
Following the usual procedure, Espejo was provided with a P1,000.00 bill bearing
the initials "MCE" as marked money.
At about 10:40 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area on a tricycle. Upon
arriving at the locus criminis, Arce and Casem posted themselves at a store near
appellants house while Espejo approached appellant who was standing in front of
his house. He told him, "Pards pakikuha ng isang bulto." Appellant looked at Espejo
and asked "where is your money?" After Espejo handed the P1,000.00 bill to
appellant, the latter went inside the house. He emerged after a while and gave
Espejo three plastic sachets placed in another plastic container. Convinced that the
white crystalline substance inside the plastic sachets is shabu, Espejo made the prearranged signal by putting his hand on top of his head. At once, Espejo introduced
himself together with Arce and Casem who already rushed to assist him, as
members of the San Fernando City Police. Forthwith, appellant was placed under
arrest and apprised of his constitutional rights.
Appellant was charged before the San Fernando, La Union RTC, Branch 29 with
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 committed as follows:
Thereafter, he was brought to the police station wherein a further search on him by
Espejo yielded aluminum foils6and the marked money.
That on or about the 28th day of November 2006, in the City of San Fernando,
Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above[-]named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
distribute, sell and deliver three (3) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet[s]
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu", with a
corresponding weight of ZERO POINT ZERO FORTY THREE (0.043) gram; ZERO
POINT ZERO SIXTEEN (0.016) gram; and ZERO POINT ZERO TEN (0.010) gram with
a total weight of ZERO POINT ZERO SIXTY NINE (0.069) gram to PO2 Manuel
Espejo who posed as the poseur-buyer thereof and in consideration of said shabu,
used marked money, a piece of One thousand peso bill (P1,000.00) with serial
number EB 893087, without first securing the necessary permit, license from the
proper government agency.
In the meantime, Espejo marked the three plastic sachets he bought from appellant
with the initials "MC-1," "MC-2" and "MC-3."7 Afterwards, the team brought the
Request for Laboratory Examination8 together with the confiscated items to the
Regional Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service. The results of the laboratory
examination on the specimen yielded positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.9
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
station, however, Espejo showed him three aluminum foils and three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance which were allegedly found on him.
On cross examination, appellant claimed to not know Espejo, Arce and Casem prior
to the November 28, 2006 incident. That except for the said incident, there was no
other reason for the said police officers to file a case against him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
According full faith and credence to the version of the prosecution, the RTC found
that the elements necessary to prove the illegal sale of dangerous drugs have been
sufficiently established.10 It debunked appellants denial after considering the
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in line with the presumption that
law enforcement officers have performed their duties in a regular manner.
Consequently, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in its Decision11 of January 31, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Sherwin Bis, GUILTY as charged and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of
Php500,000.00 and to pay costs.1wphi1
The three (3) sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.069 gram is hereby
confiscated and ordered turned over to PDEA for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, appellant questioned the RTC Decision on the ground that his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He also averred that the police officers failed
to regularly perform their official functions.
Concurring with the findings and conclusions of the RTC, the CA affirmed the said
lower courts judgment in its now assailed Decision13 of September 22, 2009,
disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 31, 2008 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 7555, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14
Unable to accept both lower courts verdict of conviction, appellant is now before
this Court for final determination of the very same issues he submitted before the
CA.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the appeal.
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23.
Upon motion7 of the appellant, however, said case was allowed to be consolidated
with Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial
conference of the cases was held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated
without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the
following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp.
Marilyn Dequito,12 and (3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13Thereafter, the
defense presented in court the testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y
Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case
The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of
P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential
informant went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was
engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an
employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant,
alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a
potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of their office.
P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust
against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day, which consisted of herself,
PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and PO1 De la Rosa.
P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she was able
to set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00 p.m.
on that day at Cindys Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only
supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team along for
security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting
place with the informant. The members of her team positioned themselves
strategically inside the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias
Don as the buyer of shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of
the NBI and he replied in the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein she
would buy 250 grams of shabu forP250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the
following day at Cindys Restaurant around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindys
Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when
she arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with
her. She brought five genuine P500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five
bundles of play money to make it appear that she had P250,000.00 with her. After
she showed the money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure
place. They agreed for the sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3,
1998 in front of alias Dons apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The
team proceeded to the Western Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for
coordination. Afterwards, the team held their final briefing before they proceeded to
the target area. They agreed that the pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to
scratch her hair, which would signify that the deal had been consummated and the
rest of the team would rush up to the scene. The team then travelled to the address
given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the
two vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo
and the informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of
the apartment gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a
male companion. Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told
him that she wanted to see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown
envelope he was carrying and she checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a
plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in size, which contained white crystalline
substance. After checking the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same
was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust money to alias Don and scratched
her hair to signal the rest of the team to rush to the scene. P/Insp. Fajardo
identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to flee but PO2
Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody of the
shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell
shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the
genuine P500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two
suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects rights
were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant
Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he
was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellants
companion was Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police
station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the
appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was present the entire time the
sale was being consummated. Upon receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a
green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to."
P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime
Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1 Agravante. She
handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then turned it over to
P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police officers previously
weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory
weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of
the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the
buy-bust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed
inside a brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the
appellant, she put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there
were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga"
but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who made them. When
she interrogated the appellant about the brown envelope, she found out that the
same was submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that
the appellant worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She
identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team recovered, which
sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also stated that after the
appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the two
suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant.
The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope. P/Insp.
Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As to the 12 sachets, the
same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo.22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardos. PO2
Trambulo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant
reported to them about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay
then tasked P/Insp. Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to
set up a meeting with alias Don at Cindys Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon
City. At that meeting, PO2 Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp.
Fajardo later told the members of the team that she convinced alias Don that she
was a good buyer of shabu and the latter demanded a second meeting to see the
money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo briefed P/Supt. Domantay about
what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was
furnished with five genuine P500.00 bills together with the boodle play money.
P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name "Benigno
Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindys
Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed
the boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways. P/Insp.
Fajardo later told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal would take
place in front of alias Dons rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After
an hour, the team went to Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They
then proceeded to the WPD station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp.
Fajardo conducted a final briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the
immediate back-up arresting officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp.
Fajardo to scratch her hair to indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo
was to signal the same to the other members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3,
1998. P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Dons
apartment, while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15
to 20 meters from the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at
the street perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with
another person. PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if
asking for something but P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see
something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp. Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the
latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to alias Don a green plastic bag
containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged signal. When PO2
Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team and rushed to
the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Dons male
companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic
sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was
tucked inside alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets with
his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the suspects of
their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter
retained possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of
white crystalline substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported
the progress of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were
booked and the required documentations were prepared. Among such documents
was the Request for Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2
Trambulo said that he was the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, along with the drug specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her
examination of the drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp.
Macario Taduran, Jr. initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was
already assigned to another office. The results of the examination of P/Insp.
Taduran were laid down in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito
first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and
retrieved the same from their office. She entered that fact in their logbook RD-1798. She then weighed the drug specimens and examined the white crystalline
substance from each of the plastic sachets. She examined first the specimens
marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequitos
examination revealed that the white crystalline substances were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined the contents of 12 heatsealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The 12
plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside
the 12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
P/Insp. Dequitos findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-1798.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary
evidence: (1) photocopies of the five original P500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust
money (Exhibits A-E); (2) Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998
(Exhibit F); (3) Initial Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the
specimen submitted for examination tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H);
(5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-1071-9832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6)
Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8)
Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1 to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC);
(10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11) Joint Affidavit of
Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report35 (Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical Examination36 (Exhibit HH); (15)
Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of
Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defenses Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of events. The appellants
brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defenses
counter-statement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II
at the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a
subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police
agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day
and night duties, and during regular office hours and in the absence of the
laboratory technician, he would weigh the specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would
receive subpoenas from the trial courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a
Special Order to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics
between 6:00 to 9:00 oclock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at
Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at
9:45 oclock that evening, where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the
latter a confidential informant of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 oclock in the morning, Donalds household help, Anatolia
Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was
asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and
thereafter two (2) men entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by
three (3) others. The door to Donalds room was kicked down and they entered his
room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him.
He saw that there were six (6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they
could get. One of them opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donalds]
possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2)
cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392
owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen contained in the envelope
marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from
the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his
wallet containing P2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the
apartment and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment
terrace.40 (Citations omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form41 dated
April 3, 1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe
Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3) Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List
of Hearings44 attended by Donald Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization
Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo A. Figueras dated March 27,
1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence46 taken by Donald Vasquez from 19961998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC
gave more credence to the prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was
not overcome. The trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence
that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive
to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial
court noted that the volume of the shabu involved in this case was considerable,
i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for illegal sale and illegal possession,
respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact helped to dispel the possibility
that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by the police officers.
Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police officers
regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the
latters bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the
police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or
asked help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and
identify in Court the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the
accused and the Affidavit dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from
Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to
testify and identify the Letter issued by the said Acting Deputy Director in order to
corroborate and strengthen his testimony that he was indeed authorized to keep in
his custody the said shabu to be presented or turned over to the Court as evidence,
and he should have filed the proper charges against those police officers who were
responsible for such act. But the accused did not even bother to do the same.
Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit of [Idabel] Pagulayan
and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director) presented by
the accused in Court could not be given weight and credence considering that the
said persons were not presented in Court to identify the said documents and that
the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the same, thus, it has no
probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y
SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III in Relation to Sec.
2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P5,000,000.00; and
2. In Crim. Case No. 98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to
Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND
(P4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby
forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), upon the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The
appellate court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp.
Fajardo on the conduct of the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and
categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any evidence that tended to prove any
ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely charge the appellant, the Court
of Appeals held that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties on the part of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila
in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years,
four months and one day of prision correccional in its medium period, as
maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on
two grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done
by the police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs
seized from him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant
or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact
that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest
against him. Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the
evidence obtained as a result thereof was inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti
of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the appellant posits that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further insists that he was able to prove
that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in his custody, given that he
was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory who was tasked with
the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we
resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of
his arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against
them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission
to the trial courts jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover
police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of
Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest
made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the
warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the
illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People v.
Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute
and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain
view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes
a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if]
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot
pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of
his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
IMPOSABLE PENALTY
prision correccional
prision mayor
reclusion temporal
reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)
Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the
appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant
should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty
imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper
imposable penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable
considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a
conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the
appellant was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such
fact, however, cannot be taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this
case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.66 Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which arises
under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum
period,67 was not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus, the same was
properly disregarded by the lower courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176830
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed
to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members
of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
informers.
x-----------------------x
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require
consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy,
this Court will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed
under the political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the
orders and resolutions of public respondents with regard to the indictment and
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu
(Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12
undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate
legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners
herein along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade
of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio
Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.4Recovered from the grave site
they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary investigation.26 However,
petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served
a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the
filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the death of the
following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro
Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin
Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo
Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as
state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success of the
prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge
Abando) on 28 February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to receiving a copy of the Resolution
recommending the filing of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their
temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R.
No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and
the 16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others
(including petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal
Case No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC
Makati).39 Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues
that common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the
crime of rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in
furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition
and the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed
its Comment on 27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral
arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper
remedy of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process
during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the
rebellion charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10
days.45 On 3 April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner
Ocampo under a P100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single
Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15
counts of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and
New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge
Abando held in abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the
proceedings during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28
January 2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March
2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Judicial Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the
Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.51 Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but
before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June
2008 transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution
dated 23 April 2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice
Raul Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge
Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of
the case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to
Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment
of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of
Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the
unconditional and immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of
a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further
incarceration.59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the
annulment of the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008
Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner Baylosis.61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases
with G.R. No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for
petitioner Echaniss immediate release, to which the OSG did not interpose any
objection on these conditions: that the temporary release shall only be for the
purpose of his attendance and participation in the formal peace negotiations
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and that his temporary release shall
not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition was later modified, such that his
temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his actual participation in the
peace negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis
under a P100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace
negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to petitioner
Ladlads motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing
on the motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August
2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May
2009 and 27 August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R.
Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment
thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos.
185636 and 185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December
201076 and on 21 January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis
filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July
2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG
interposed no objection to the grant of a P100,000 cash bail to them considering
that they were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding
negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and
fixed their bail in the amount ofP100,000, subject to the condition that their
temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the
peace negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the
innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.85 While the
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails
the opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the
investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent
who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the
complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to
be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own side of
the story cannot claim denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that
he was not served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the 12 undated
letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor
Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of
appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a
subpoena through his counsels addresses.93 Thus, they were deprived of the right
to file counter-affidavits.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits
of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no
probable cause for petitioners indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of
warrants for their arrest. As stated above, the trial judges appreciation of the
evidence and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the
requirement of personal determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the
documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the
accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged."118
Judge Abandos review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown
by the following portion of the judges 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by
the Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents:
Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent
documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and
Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains, this
court has the findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged.119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and
issuance of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily
questions of fact that are normally not within the purview of a petition for
certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of
a political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty."121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing
is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge
respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the
well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal
charges, including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion
of the public prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it
becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be
conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind
the alleged murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top
leaders of the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused
knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the
accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is
not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v.
CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were
indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with
leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of
its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been
simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of
the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in
double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first
jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is
for the same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or
the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent,
by a competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid
plea during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against
petitioners and several others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06944.1awp++i1 Even before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC
Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before
this Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for
the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality
and independence.130 When the indictment was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis
and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case
No. 06-944.131We eventually ordered the dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear
then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the P100,000 cash bond
posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty
until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.1wphi1
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis,
Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional
release from detention under the cash bond of P100,000 each shall continue under
the condition that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their
actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government or until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila,
whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the government to inform this Court the
moment that peace negotiations are concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila,
Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on
temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of
the proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G.
Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same
bail granted by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in
the peace negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until
the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse of minor victims
mother by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape against
the person of minor, [AAA], a13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards
her direction where she was sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all
the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason
other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor
victims mother who confronted the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased,
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant
as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges
filed against him.7 After the completion of the pre-trial conference on September 16,
2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and
sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December
2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAAs parents separated when she was [only eight years old9]. At the time of the
commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with
herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her
mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and
nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident].
AAAs mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking
advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of
[her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then
started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his
penis into AAAs anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA
immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December
2003] incident for fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in
the event that she would expose the incident to anyone.
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a
minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her
will.5
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than
once. According to AAA, in February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had
again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December
2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her half-siblings were
asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this
time, [Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it
was AAAs mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter
AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAAs mother immediately brought AAA
to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the
barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x
x x.
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from
the charge of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04-1558, for want of evidence.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection
Unit of the Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On
March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-030091. Her medico-legal report stated the following conclusion:
In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of
Lasciviousness and he is meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision
[correccional] as maximum.
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 oclock area, Type of hymen:
Crescentic
In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape,
and he is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped,
AAAs mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA
against him as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her
as she is the daughter of his live-in partner and that they all stay in the same
house.
Contrary to AAAs allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible
that the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the
layout of their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual
abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters
wide by ten (10) meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit
inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house is located was thickly
populated with houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice
but to sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he
could possibly still go about with his plan without AAAs siblings nor their neighbors
noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled
against him by AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as
an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her
parents separation.10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape
but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December
2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the
Decision11 reads as follows:
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum
of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave
more weight to the prosecutions evidence as against Parejas baseless denial and
imputation of ill motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present
AAAs mother to testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had
to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack
of evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAAs testimony for
being hearsay evidence as she had no personal knowledge of what happened on
March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals,
which on January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal
Case Nos. 04-1556 and 04-1557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by
Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in
Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-1556 to 04-1557 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the
following errors as he did before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such
an offense is not analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be
worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological
wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which
her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim
cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the
traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
The private complainants actuations after the incident negate the possibility that
she was raped.18
Parejas main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony
of AAA in convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is
attacking the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA
acted as if nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Parejas conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAAs testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it
was riddled with inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow
certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People
v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of
the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of
a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position
to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower
courts findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting
the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the
RTC. (Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique
opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a
vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court."21 While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no
substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate
courts on the matter of AAAs credibility.
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential
matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The
inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter
pertaining to AAAs ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of
rape becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of
the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other
words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the
accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the
date of the commission of the crime."26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the
rape is not an essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v.
Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings therein are applicable to his case. However, the
factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Parejas case. In
particular, the main factor for Ladrillos acquittal in that case was because his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him was violated when the Information against him only stated that the crime was
committed "on or about the year 1992." We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule
110, of the Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the
offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint
will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The Information is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accusedappellant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12)
months of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991
and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts.
Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the
commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date
of the commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accusedappellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute
the charges against him. At most, accused-appellant could only establish his place
of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time
he supposedly committed the rape.
xxxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that
accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and
conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of
evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the
Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents
were not specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short,
unlike "on or about the year 1992." Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had
only moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore
negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in
Ladrillo contributed to his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were
not enough to reverse Ladrillos conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness testimony that
militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial
court. Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial
courts judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in
relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they
exert a powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.31 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the
crime charged against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi,
which, together with the other evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he
committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations
against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Parejas concern about AAAs lone testimony being the basis of his
conviction, this Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be
sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and
reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the
accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single
witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAAs sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA,
considering that their house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other,
that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her
younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Parejas living conditions could have prevented him
from acting out on his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed
that many of the rape cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion.
Lust is no respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and
space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the
cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to
quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of
family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible
to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor
incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while
the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children
sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions
and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellants contention that there
can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape
can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that "lust is no
respecter of time and place," and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of
places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was
raped. He said that "the ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of
her strength and courage to thwart any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish
her purity." Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that
any commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors,
thus, giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said,
AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the
possibility that he indeed committed the crimes. AAAs belated confession, he
claimed, "cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her
credibility."37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by
shifting the blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse.
However, this Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be
expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure
of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will
not imply that the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that
person was intimidated into submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is
committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse,
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAAs lack
of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his
threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by
Pareja is also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape,
cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance with societys
expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an
irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly
improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the
world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not
true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was
charged and convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of
Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of
rape with the recognition of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a
womans organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to cover
gender-free rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of
rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of rape by sexual assault as
differentiated from the traditional rape through carnal knowledge or rape through
sexual intercourse."44Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on
rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt
force or penetrating trauma upon examination of AAAs hymen, "cannot be given
any significance, as it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical
trauma were inflicted." Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAAs hymen
sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual
abuse that occurred in December, was not by penetration of the vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the
basis of the sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to
conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAAs
anus at the time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the
medical examination actually bolsters AAAs claim of being raped by Pareja on more
than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution
failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge,
Pareja cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young
and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially
of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse,
also known as "organ rape" or "penile rape."45 The central element in rape
through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.46
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in
the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisin correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by
sexual assault is "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person."
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his
penis into her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the
February 2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in
December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault.
In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found,
clear, positive, and probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is
rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual
assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material
differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the
first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently,
to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was
rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness
under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule
120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is
prisin correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the
penalty next lower in degree,62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and
1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from
the proper penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of
Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, is the medium period of prisin correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the
prosecution against Pareja, especially AAAs testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC
found AAAs declaration on the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough
to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above.
However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt,
was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second
count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February
2004 incident, the RTC considered AAAs confusion as to whether or not she was
actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Parejas favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated
that aside from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina.
However, she was not able to give a clear and convincing account of such insertion
during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what
followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that
Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that
Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the
material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the
February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Parejas acts of placing himself on top of AAA
and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we
have discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked
both her breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted
by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with
the attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases
against him because she was angry that he caused her parents separation. Pareja
added that these cases were initiated by AAAs father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. "AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by
such imputation of ill motives.1wphi1 It is highly unthinkable for the victim to
falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge."58Furthermore,
motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from
giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim.59 In People v.
Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she
has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong
done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are
given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as
follows: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages;
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count of acts of lasciviousness.
All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness,
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He
is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum; and is
ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as
moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of
lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
February 5, 2014
bolo one David Ordonez, who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.5
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8,
2000, the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the
CA through the records.6 The parties failed to raise any objection to the
discrepancy.7
On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases were
jointly tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial,
the petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a
reverse trial of the case.9
During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that
transpired on November 8, 2000.
Version of the Defense
To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the
testimonies of Rodolfo, Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.
Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00
p.m., on November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together
with their companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw
stones at his house and tricycle. Through the back door of his house, Rodolfo went
down to the basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw
him, threatened to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the
palm of his left hand. Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the
"so/era" of his house, and hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two
brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and David lying on the ground,
Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his
house until the policemen arrived.
Testimony of Joey
Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m.,
on November 8, 2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at
their house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin,
David and Philip breaking into their gate, which was made of wood and interlink
wire and located five ( 5) to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He then heard
his father Rodolfo say to the three men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na
natin pag-usapan,"10 and David retorted in their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda
ka gayam dita, patayin taka."11
Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at
around 10:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside
saying "Sige banatan ninyo na."12 He opened his door and saw David, Erwin and
Philip throwing stones at the house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones. Briones got
mad and scolded the three men, "Why are you hitting my house? Why don't you hit
the house of your enemy, mga tarantado kayo!"13David, Erwin and Philip then
aimed their stones at the petitioners' house. Balbino heard David calling out to Joey,
"Joey, kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo
magpatayan,"14 but no one came out of Rodolfo's house. The stoning lasted for
about thirty (30) minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the
gate towards the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako
at papasok kami."15 David, Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and
damaged Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo
say to David in Filipino that they could just talk about their problems with him the
following day. But David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a ''panabas."
Rodolfo parried the blow with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled
for the possession of the ''panabas."
Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his
right foot, causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from
where Rodolfo got "something shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw
the two brothers fall to the ground.
Version of the Prosecution
As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who
survived the hacking.
Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his
brother David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the
petitioners' compound. He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions
when, suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey
with a bolo. While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3)
meters away from where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then
hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin
inside the petitioners' compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and
stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.
In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's
version of the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version
of the events due to material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense
witnesses. It denied the petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear,
convincing and satisfactory supporting evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence
and assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the
justification for his act";17 that self-defense is an affirmative allegation which must
be proven with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking
it.18 The RTC held that the petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, Erwin and David.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance/s that attended the commission of the
crimes, the Court hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer -In Criminal Case
No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from
Three (3) years and one day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of
prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordonez moral
damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging
from Eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years
of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
David Ordonez Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Costs against the accused.
The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19
The CA's Ruling
Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle.1wphi1 They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which
was only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled
by Rodolfo and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and
stabbed by Rodolfo and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside
the petitioners' gate were saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come
out."16
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital.
David died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the
crimes charged. As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no
unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke the actions of the petitioners; that
"aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there is a real
threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that
person is seeking to defend."20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims
that David challenged Joey to a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of
November 8, 2000, the CA held that these acts do not constitute unlawful
aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no real or actual danger existed as
the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own home.
wounds on his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds
on his back and stomach causing his death. These wounds logically indicated that
the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal
aggression on the part of the petitioners.21
The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded by the RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim.
Case No. Br. 20-1561, appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are
each ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages.22
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELFDEFENSE DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS
OF SELF-DEFENSE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE
SAID INCIDENT.23
Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of
October 24, 2005.
At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a
petition for review under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to
the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not
reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions,
among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court's judgment
or the appellate court's misapprehension of the adduced facts.24
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this
case. Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when
supported by the evidence on record.25 We find that both the RTC and the CA fully
considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they
have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the
petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated homicide and homicide.
In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain
facts and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present
case, we uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of
these crimes fully established during the trial.
The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to
kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the
victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code is present."26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the
accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or
infanticide.27
The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of
wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors;
the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the
killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by
the victim.28 The CA aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David
suffered and which eventually caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab
wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution's theory that the petitioners
purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin.29
In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the
victim Erwin Ordonez would have caused his death were it not for immediate
medical attendance."30
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of
the acts for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven,
would have exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the
petitioners to show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin,
respectively, were attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the persons resorting to self-defense.31
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a
threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.32 The element of unlawful
aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded.
We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the
ranges provided by law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.
In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages
awarded by the CA, we awardP25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate
damages, in lieu of the actual damages they sustained by reason of the crimes.
Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that temperate or moderate damages may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.
Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate
of six percent ( 6%) per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid.34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are
also ordered to pay Erwin Ordonez and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount
of P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the
civil indemnity, moral and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to
its Budget Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker
I,4 respectively, at the time material to this case.
On March 20, 1995, at about past noon,5 Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records Officer I
and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporters Division, was invited
by Castro to attend Atienzas birthday party somewhere along Bocobo Street,
Ermita, Manila. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked
him to assist the latter in searching for the CA decision6 in the case entitled "Mateo
Fernando v. Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc."7 (Fernando), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36808R.8
Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office followed a few minutes later by Dario
and searched for the aforementioned decision which was found compiled in Volume
260 of the CA Original Decisions. As Dario was scanning through the said volume,
Atibula observed that he was comparing its pages9 to the discolored papers he was
holding.10 Dario likewise scanned Volumes 265 and 267,11 and placed check marks
on the papers he was holding.12
On March 24, 1995, after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound
along Maria Orosa Street.13 As they walked side by side towards the jeepney stop,
Dario requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of the
volumes of the CA Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and immediately
left.14
On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange
for Volume 260,15 which the latter turned down. Atienza then ridiculed him saying,
"duwag ka, pera na nga ito ayaw mo pa," to which Atibula retorted, "ikaw ang
duwag dahil nagpapakita ka ng kabuktutan."
In convicting petitioners, the RTC found that "the evidence x x x of the prosecution
is replete with situations and/or events to prove [petitioners] guilt,"66 namely: (a)
Atienza requested Atibula to take out Volumes 260, 265 and 267 of the CA Original
Decisions from the CA Reporters Division, which the latter rejected despite offer of
remuneration; (b) Volume 266 was subsequently discovered to be missing; (c)
access to the missing volume appears to have been acquired by entering through an
opening in the premises of the CAs Reporters Division because the air conditioning
unit occupying the space thereat was taken out for repair earlier; (d) Castro
returned Volume 266 after its loss;67 (e) Volume 266 bore badges of tampering
evidenced by the "non-continuity of the front and the back cover flaps x x x and the
pages of the book/volume differences in the cutting marks on the sides of the
volume and the presence of artificial aging on [its] sides";68 and (f) two (2) new
documents which materially amended the original decision and resolution in the
Fernando case were inserted in the said volume.69 The RTC further added that the
manner by which petitioners committed the felonious acts reveals a community of
criminal design, and thereby held that conspiracy exists.70
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed their conviction to the CA.
experience.77 It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an
unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the
test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient
to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proven must be
consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.78
Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no
sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the
elements of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1)79 of the RPC and Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6)80 of the same code, or
of petitioners supposed conspiracy therefor.
To this end, the Court examines the participation of and evidence against each
petitioner and forthwith explains its reasons for reaching the foregoing conclusions.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision71 dated November 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs judgment of
conviction in toto. It held that while there is no direct evidence showing that the
petitioners committed the crimes charged, the testimonies of Atibula and NBI Agent
Atty. Daganzo with respect to what had transpired before and after Volume 266 was
taken from its shelf, when viewed together with the other circumstances in the
case, constitute circumstantial evidence which sufficiently point to the guilt of
petitioners.72 In addition, it found that Atienzas defenses were self-serving negative
evidence which cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his
participation,73 adding too that while there was no proof of previous agreement
between petitioners to unlawfully take Volume 266 out of the office of the CA
Reporters Division and falsify the subject documents, their conspiracy may be
inferred from the fact that Castro was in possession of the missing Volume 266
which was eventually discovered to have been falsified.74
75
should be treated as hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity
of the relevant claims. Consequently, there exists no sufficient circumstantial
evidence to prove Castros guilt.
B. The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza
In similar regard, the prosecutions evidence on the circumstances in this case do
not sufficiently establish Atienzas guilt for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of
Public Document.
While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having
attempted to bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from
the Reporters Division,85 the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred
in a different document, that is Volume 266.
The discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged
dilutes the strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the
bribery attempt may be deemed as a demonstration of interest on the part of
Atienza over said subject matter and in this regard, constitutes proof of motive.
However, it is well-established that mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is
not sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is no other reliable
evidence from which it may reasonably be deduced that the accused was the
malefactor.86
In fact, even if Atienzas bribery attempt is taken together with the other
circumstance couched as a relevant link by the prosecution in this case i.e., his
averred encounter with Atibula, on May 11, 1995, or two (2) days after the
discovery of the loss of Volume 266, wherein the latter uttered
"[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami"87 the Court still finds the
evidence to be lacking. This allegation, even if proven as true, does not indicate that
Atienza howsoever affirmed the taking or even the falsification of Volume 266.
Clearly, the utterance was made by Atibula who did not bother to state Atienzas
response thereto or any other subsequent action connected therewith so as to
bolster a finding of guilt. Neither can this circumstance be properly linked to the act
of Castro inviting Atibula to Atienzas party. It would be a stretch to conclude that
this mere invitation, without any other proof of Castros participation, was
instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably connected to Atienza and his own
alleged participation in the above-stated crimes.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners conspired
in this case.1wphi1 While direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it
may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action,
and community of interests,88 records are, however, bereft of any showing as to
how the particular acts of petitioners figured into the common design of taking out
the subject volume and inserting the falsified documents therein. Hence, the
prosecutions theory of conspiracy does not deserve any merit.
All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked
constitute an unbroken chain of events which lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioners are, to the exclusion of the others, indeed the culprits. As
such, their conviction, tested under the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
was not warranted. To be sure, proof beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of
proof that, after investigation of the whole record, produces moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind of the accuseds culpability.89 Such moral certainty is, however,
lacking in this case due to the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
presented.
C. Jurisdictional Defect: Falsification Case
Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 01-197426 (i.e., the falsification case) since Falsification of
Public Document under Article 172(1)90 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years91) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2)92 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129,93 otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended
by RA 7691.94While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect95 for the first time in
the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law
and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties
or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well-settled that lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time
on appeal.96
D. A Final Word
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which, the presumption of
innocence prevails and the accused should be acquitted.97 This, despite the fact that
his innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness or even absence of defense. If
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty
and is not sufficient to support a conviction, as in this case. Courts should be guided
by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.98
Accordingly, there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a
conviction, the Court hereby acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however, to any
subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with the incidents
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioners Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document on the ground of reasonable
doubt, without prejudice to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in
connection with the incidents in this case. The bail bonds posted for their provisional
liberty are consequently cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the
sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in
possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand
Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo
Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino
in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had
some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period
of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale
or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which
reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond
ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in
the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency,
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of
Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of
petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who
is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For
every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted
any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which
he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then
dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement
to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s
to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of
FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period
AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant
Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner
and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30,
2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court
the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION
AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES
THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER
ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR
THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02
MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY,
IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE
INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated
the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of
the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He
now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its
submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best
evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified
upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that
petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The
established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain
the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the
date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the
matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time
on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner 6 and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the
period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after
almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked
petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's
cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the
commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the
failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information
ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces
of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance
with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he
was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could
have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the
deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property; x x x
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where
the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or
full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand
need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not
even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since
even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property],
would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under
this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that
the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b),
thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus,
the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand,
thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence
of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon
demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as
that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to
prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave
petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the
receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty
(60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the
proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the
same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the
private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by
petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts,
which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is
even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is
affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by
the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of
evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this
case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of
crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these
penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the
Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on
this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the
case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the
matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral
arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties
that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today,
based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago
in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that
would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in
amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through
this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another
branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation
without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which
reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of
a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should
be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is
present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation
wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is
deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph
is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive
the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with
the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this
time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara
opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief
Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige
lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and
specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be
entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a
sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for
an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be
harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their
book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that
justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with
the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties
prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe
or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may
fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all
cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class
of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should
be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be
based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 .
However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to
the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy
fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property
be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a selfamending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to
amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the
further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it
aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of
Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the
legislature lowered it toP50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered
the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,
from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties
do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their
corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but
does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does
not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does
not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it
is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those
who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties;
however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00
would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which
violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that
the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the
thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the
proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to
conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them
to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down
as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more
than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental
penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by
Congress.
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court
cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because
in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the
state court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute
and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the
maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a
$5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of
his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are
different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a
higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the
crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed
upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member
of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping
of the employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is
so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are
dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal,
may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the
penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public
official, thus:
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the
United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar
Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of
the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be
done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1)
Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty;
(2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods,
if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money
due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now
becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be
commensurate to the act of embezzlement of P20,000.00 compared to the acts
committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the
injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary amount,
the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now
become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation,
the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or
property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act
of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious
Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the
damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the
value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of
the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the
element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an
inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and
this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine
not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to
the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the
penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with
a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is
unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal
entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty
that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2
months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused
exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1
day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of
the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not
exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal,P200.00 will now
become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the
existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation
will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense
is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications
on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either
expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the
property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317
(Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public
monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be
affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure
of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible
public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the
penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or
forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the
crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far
as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and
310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this
particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be
some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in
no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code
by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the
present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature
which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or
to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which
will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised
Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court
that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend
the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic,
and cultural settings were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that
it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of
such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or
rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The
Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and
spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a coequal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable
breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the
Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused
by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that
was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to
the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity
due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a
thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper
penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil
indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would
sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206
that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which
is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum
amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also
does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon
the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended
party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted
so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed
as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh,
being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel
punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the
courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other
interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is
that the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that
the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount
of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A
conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper
penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has
no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is,
arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the
death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground
that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of
the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the
imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the
intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot
declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity
to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute
cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded
directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its
severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public
sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed
in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must
be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45
Yeah.
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
Yes.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the
current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken
into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated
and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe
should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no
resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor
studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This
function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar
concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined
utilizing all of those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
xxxx
Yeah, but ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of
Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg
the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yes.
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
That is legislative in nature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Consumer price index.
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make
the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the
view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active
duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present
controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three
years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for
inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed
conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the
validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts
adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously
adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides,
Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and
my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation.
Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the
powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and
the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil
indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the
offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties
are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further,
since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only
pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not
proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the
ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in
the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with
Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00,
which exceedsP22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within
the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than
the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the
maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years,
the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial
duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent
powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious
approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare
trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of
petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March
22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty
imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department
of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
latter, who then stabbed Lino on the left side of his chest, near the region of the
heart. Lino fell face down on the ground. After that, Ricardo walked away, while
Randolf threw the broken bottles at the fallen Lino.
Linos injuries were described as follows:
Fairly nourished, fairly developed male cadaver, in rigor mortis, with postmortem
lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctive lips and nailbeds are
pale.
HEAD, CHEST AND LEFT KNEE:
(1) Lacerated wound, left parietal region, measuring 2 by 0.7 cm, 5 cm
from the midsagittal line.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Credibility of witnesses is determined by the conformity of their testimonies to
human knowledge, observation and experience.
The Case
Ricardo Medina Jr. (Ricardo) appeals by petition for review on certiorari the
affirmance of his conviction for homicide with modification of the penalty and civil
liability by the Court of Appeals (CA) through the decision promulgated on July 7,
2003.1 He had assailed his conviction handed down under the decision rendered on
January 31, 2001by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 266, in Pasig City.2 His
brother and co-accused, Randolf Medina (Randolf), was acquitted by the RTC for
insufficiency of evidence.
Antecedents
This case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe (Lino) between 9:00 and
10:00 oclock in the evening of April 3, 1997 at Jabson Street in Acacia,
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. The stabbing was preceded by a fight during a basketball
game between Ross Mulinyawe, Linos son, and Ronald Medina, the younger brother
of Ricardo and Randolf. In that fight, Ronald had hit Ross with a piece of stone.
Hearing about the involvement of his brother in the fight, Randolf rushed to the
scene and sent Ronald home. Ross was brought to the hospital for treatment. Once
Lino learned that his son had sustained a head injury inflicted by one of the
Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the Medinas accompanied by his
drinking buddies, Jose Tapan and Abet Menes. He had a bread knife tucked in the
back, but his companions were unarmed. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf
whom he confronted about the fight. The two of them had a heated argument.
Although Randolf tried to explain what had really happened between Ross and
Ronald, Lino lashed out at Randolf and gripped the latters hand. Tapan almost
simultaneously punched Randolf in the face. Lino, already holding the knife in his
right hand, swung the knife at Randolf who was not hit. Randolf retreated towards
the store and took two empty bottles of beer, broke the bottles and attacked Lino
with them. Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was happening, and confronted
Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered their house to get a
kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a thrust at Ricardo but failed to hit the
(2) Abrasion, left parietal region, measuring 1.2 by 0.6 cm, 8 cm from the
anterior midline.
(3) Abrasion left maxillary region, measuring 2 by 0.3, 4.5 cm, from the
anterior midline.
(4) Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 3.6 by 1.4 cm, 5.5 cm
from the anterior line, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards,
and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space, piercing the
pericardial sac and left ventricle.
Cause of death is Stab wound of the chest.3
On April 4, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City charged Randolf with
homicide.4 The information was amended with leave of court to include Ricardo as a
co-conspirator, alleging thusly:
On or about April 3, 1997 in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and employ personal
violence upon the person of Lino M. Mulinyawe, thereby inflicting upon the latter
stab wound, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
The Defense claimed that it was Lino who had attacked Ricardo with a knife, and
that Lino had accidentally stabbed himself by falling frontward and into his own
knife.
Judgment of the RTC
In its judgment rendered on January 31, 2001,6 the RTC acquitted Randolf but
convicted Ricardo of homicide. It found no evidence of conspiracy between Randolf
and Ricardo because their actions appeared to be independent and separate from
each other and did not show that they had mounted a joint attack against Lino. It
rejected Ricardos defense that the fatal stab wound of Lino had been self-inflicted,
ratiocinating that:
The fatal wound of the deceased is: stab wound, left mamary [sic] region,
measuring 3.6 by 1.4 cm, 5.5 cm from the anterior midline, 12 cm deep, directed
posteriorwards, downwards, and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space,
piercing the pericardial sac and left ventricle. (See Exh. J).
Randolf Medina testified that Lino Mulinyawe attacked him with a knife held with his
right hand. The trajectory of the stab wound sustained by Lino Mulinyawe at his left
mammary region as shown by the Medico Legal Report and Medico Legal
Examination on the cadaver of the deceased (Exhs. J and L) is incompatible and
inconsistent with the defense of the accused that when Mulinyawe was making a
thrust, he fell frontward and accidentally stabbed himself.
If the knife was held with the right hand of Lino Mulinyawe, the stab wound would
not have been from the anterior midline, 12 cm deep, directed posteriorwards,
downwards, and medialwards, thru the 4th left intercostal space, piercing the
pericardial sac and left ventricle. The trajectory of the stab wound would have been
leftward and upward the body of the deceased if he really fell frontward upon
it.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC disposed and decreed:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE
[PETITIONER] STABBED LINO MULINYAWE IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT:
1. THE PROSECUTION WITHHELD THE PRESENTATION OF THE ACTUAL
KNIVES DURING THE HEARING OF THE CASE WHICH PRESENTATION
AND BLOOD ANALYSIS ON THE TWO KNIVES COULD HAVE PROVEN THAT
LINO MULINYAWE FELL ON HIS OWN KNIFE.
2. THE MEDICO-LEGAL TESTIMONY CORROBORATED THE FACT THAT LINO
MULINYAWE FELL ON HIS OWN KNIFE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADOPTING THE TRIAL COURTS
OPINION THAT THE FATAL WOUND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SELF-INFLICTED
WHICH WAS THE DIRECT OPPOSITE OF THE OPINION OF THE ONLY MEDICO-LEGAL
EXPERT PRESENTED WHO POSITIVELY TESTIFIED THAT THE FATAL WOUND CAN
POSSIBLY BE SELF-INFLICTED.
Decision of the CA
III
Ricardo appealed, but the CA affirmed his conviction with modification of the penalty
and the civil liability under the decision promulgated on July 7, 2003,9 to wit:
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PETITIONER STABBED
LINO MULINYAWE, DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER SENTENCE BY DISREGARDING
THE PRESENCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE LACK OF AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDANT TO THE CASE.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
First of all, Ricardo argues that his stabbing and inflicting of the fatal wound on Lino
were not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The argument of Ricardo is a mere reiteration of his submissions that the CA had
already exhaustively considered and passed upon. He has not added anything of
substance or weight to persuasively show that the CA had erred in affirming the
RTC.
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the
absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent
facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and
evaluation.12 This is because the trial courts determination proceeds from its firsthand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and
attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique
position to assess the witnesses credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness,
honesty and candor.13 But here Ricardo has not projected any strong and compelling
reasons to sway the Court into rejecting or revising such factual findings and
evaluation in his favor.
Secondly, Ricardo contends that the State did not present as evidence in court the
two knives wielded by him and Lino despite repeated demands for their
presentation; that had the knives been presented, it could have been demonstrated
to the trial court that the smaller knife used by Lino had more blood stains than the
knife held by him and would fit the size of the mortal wound; that his assertion that
Lino had stabbed himself when he stumbled and lost his balance while swinging his
knife at Randolf would have been thereby validated; and that in his testimony, Dr.
Emmanuel Aranas of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Southern Police District, did
not rule out the possibility that the wounds sustained by Lino were self-inflicted.
The contention deserves no serious consideration.
To start with, the following findings of the CA indicate that the evidence supporting
the conviction for homicide was already overwhelming even without the
presentation of the knife held by the victim, to wit:
Reviewing the records, We find that appellants guilt as the perpetrator of the
unlawful killing of the victim Lino Mulinyawe had been adequately proven by
prosecution evidence, both testimonial and physical. The credible and categorical
testimonies of two (2) eyewitnesses during the entire incident on the night of April
3, 1997, Jeffrey and Sherwin, positively point to appellant as the one (1) who
delivered the single fatal stabbing blow upon the victim while the latter was trying
to counter the assault of appellants brother, co-accused Randolf who was then
holding a broken bottle.1wphi1 The lone knife thrust was directed at the heart of
the victim, the wound penetrating said vital organ up to 12 centimeters deep, the
direction, trajectory and depth of the stab wound clearly showing the intent to kill
him. The medico-legal findings of Dr. Aranas sufficiently corroborate the account of
said eyewitnesses that the victim was attacked frontally and the fatal stab wound
caused by a single-bladed kitchen knife such as the one (1) identified in court,
previously identified by the witness but only the photographs thereof were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution.
The totality of prosecution evidence more than satisfactorily proves the commission
of the offense and appellants authorship thereof. Contrary to appellants
contention, the non-presentation of blood samples from the victim and the accused
as well as the instrument which accused used in perpetrating his felonious acts do
not negate criminal liability it is enough for the prosecution to establish by the
required quantum of proof that a crime was committed and the accused was the
author thereof. The presentation of the weapon is not a prerequisite for conviction.
Such presentation and identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to
prove the guilt of the accused much more so where the perpetrator has been
positively identified by a credible witness. Appellants insistence, therefore, that the
presentation of the two (2) knives would prove his innocence is futile, irrelevant and
immaterial, in the face of positive identification by two unbiased and credible
eyewitnesses. Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter
prevails over a denial. Denial being negative evidence which is self-serving in
nature, cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution witnesses. More
so in this case where the defense of denial is not corroborated by disinterested and
credible witnesses: the mother of the accused whose presence in the crime scene
was not sufficiently established and Edgar Erro whose testimony is found to be
doubtful and not without bias.14
The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon actually used in the
killing did not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other
competent evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively
identified and incriminated Ricardo as the assailant of Lino.15 Hence, the
establishment beyond reasonable doubt of Ricardos guilt for the homicide did not
require the production of the weapon used in the killing as evidence in court, for in
arriving at its findings on the culpability of Ricardo the RTC, like other trial courts,
clearly looked at, considered and appreciated the entirety of the record and the
evidence. For sure, the weapon actually used was not indispensable considering that
the finding of guilt was based on other evidence proving his commission of the
crime.16
In addition, the witnesses incriminating Ricardo were not only credible but were not
shown to have harbored any ill-motive towards him. They were surely entitled to full
faith and credit for those reasons, and both the RTC and the CA did well in
according such credence to them. Their positive identification of him as the assailant
prevailed over his mere denial, because such denial, being negative and self-serving
evidence, was undeserving of weight by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear
and convincing proof.17 Hence, his denial had no greater evidentiary value than the
affirmative testimonies of the credible witnesses presented against him.18
And, thirdly, Ricardos attribution of serious error to the CA for not appreciating the
justifying circumstance of defense of a relative in his favor was bereft of any
support from the records.
In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the
following requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression;
and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person
making the defense took no part in the provocation.19 Like in self-defense, it is the
accused who carries the burden to prove convincingly the attendance and
concurrence of these requisites because his invocation of this defense amounts to
an admission of having inflicted the fatal injury on the victim.
In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon
seeing Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and
to aid in the defense of Randolf. But that theory was inconsistent with his
declaration at the trial that Linos fatal wound had been self-inflicted, as it
presupposes direct responsibility for inflicting the mortal wound. Thus, his defense
was unworthy of belief due to its incongruity with human experience.
Verily, the issue of credibility, when it is decisive of the guilt or innocence of the
accused, is determined by the conformity of the conflicting claims and recollections
of the witnesses to common experience and to the observation of mankind as
probable under the circumstances. It has been appropriately emphasized that "[w]e
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance."20
In fine, Ricardo has not convinced the Court in this appeal that the RTC and the CA
overlooked, or misappreciated, or misread some fact or circumstance of weight and
consequence that would have changed the outcome of the case in his favor.
The Court needs to raise the civil indemnity from PS0,000.00 to P75,000.00 in order
to conform to the current judicial policy on the matter.21The other awards of civil
liability are sustained because of the absence of any challenge against them.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review for its lack of merit;
AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 7, 2003 in all respects, subject to the
MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 May 2008, the Ajuy Municipal Police Office filed a Complaint for Murder
against Cordero and Cartagena in the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutors Office, which was
docketed as I.S. No. 2008-835.4
SECOND DIVISION
After examining the testimonies of additional witnesses, the Ajuy Municipal Police
Office filed a second complaint on 2 June 2008 which included Vicente Espinosa alias
"Bulldog" and Lindsey Buenavista alias "Bebe" (respondents).
April 7, 2014
principle that [the] "insufficiency of evidence must be resolved consistent with the
theory of innocence."8
Yes. They are Rey Pea, Lindsey Buenavista alias "Bebe" and certain alias "Remy".
xxxx
Thus, the private complainants filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice on 25 August 2008. The petition claimed that the Iloilo Provincial
Prosecutors Office gravely erred in:
1. resolving the preliminary investigation based on degree of "proof beyond
reasonable doubt" rather than degree of proof to establish "probable
cause" against the appellees;
2. holding that the evidence of the appellants are purely circumstantial or
indirect evidence;
3. refusing to give due credence to the straightforward, candid, positive
and, most importantly, unrebutted declarations of the appellants
witnesses, manifesting a clear bias in favor of appellees Vicente Espinosa
and Lindsey Buenavista; and
4. finding no probable cause against appellees Vicente Espinosa and
Lindsey Buenaventura.9
Meanwhile, the Information for Murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, Barotac Viejo, Iloilo (RTC-Branch 66), which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2008-4303.10 The RTC-Branch 66 also issued warrants of arrest against
Cordero and Cartagena.
On 29 August 2008, a group of armed assailants shot Cartagena and Cordero. While
Cartagena survived, Cordero died of gunshot wounds. Cartagena was arrested and
turned over to the custody of Col. Ricardo Delapaz, Iloilo Philippine National Police
Provincial Director. Thereafter, he was brought back to Iloilo City.
In his sworn statement11 dated 4 September 2008, Cartagena admitted that he was
involved in the killing of Rojas. Cordero shot Rojas while Cartagena drove the
motorcycle. He also claimed that Espinosa paid him and Cordero for killing Rojas.
Cartagena stated:
21. Can you tell me the reason why you and Edgar Cordero shot Vice Mayor Rojas?
Because Vicente "Etik" Espinosa alias "Bulldog" of Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo
paid us[.]
22. Do you really know Vicente "Etik" Espinosa alias "Bulldog"?
Yes. Because I was one of his bodyguards during the elections in May 2007.
23. You said that you are only one of his bodyguards. [D]o you know his other
bodyguards?
26. When did Vicente "Etik" Espinosa tell you to murder Vice Mayor Rojas?
Sometime after the end of the election[s] in May 2007.12
Cartagena also claimed that it was Buenavista who shot and killed Cordero on 29
August 2008.13
While the petition for review filed by the private complainants was pending, former
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales issued Department Order No. 360 on 14 May
2009 which created a panel of state prosecutors acting as Provincial Prosecutor to
conduct a new preliminary investigation of the Complaint for Murder filed against
Cordero and Cartagena.14
In its Resolution dated 9 October 2009, the panel found probable cause for Murder
against respondents. Espinosa then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On 12 October 2009, this Court granted petitioners Urgent Petition for Change of
Venue in Criminal Case No. 2008-4303 and ordered the immediate transfer of the
case from RTC-Branch 66 to the RTC-Branch 38, Iloilo City (RTC-Branch 38).15
On 24 February 2010, former Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera dismissed
the private complainants Petition for Review. The Resolution stated that in view of
the panels finding that there is probable cause to charge respondents with Murder,
the Petition for Review was now moot.
In accordance with the Resolution dated 24 February 2010, then Acting Secretary of
Justice Alberto C. Agra issued Department Order No. 409 directing the Regional
State Prosecutor of Iloilo, who was designated as Acting Provincial Prosecutor, to
"file an amended information for murder in Criminal Case No. 2008-4303, entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Dennis Cartagena and Edgar Cordero."16 Thus, on 14
July 2010, the Regional State Prosecutor, Region VI, filed with the RTC-Branch 38
an Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 2008-4303.
On 16 July 2010, Espinosa filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause.17 According to Espinosa:
x x x the sworn statement of Dennis Cartagena x x x is only admissible against
Cartagena and not against his co-accused or co-respondent. x x x [T]he
exclusionary rule on admission and on confession as provided for under Section[s]
30 and 33 of the Rules of Court can be invoked during the preliminary investigation
and reinvestigation of a case.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration, the motion for
inhibition and motion to expunge are hereby DENIED, respectively.
HOWEVER, in order to discontinue the lack of faith and trust of complainants private
and public, and petitioner on the impartiality and objectivity of the Presiding Judge,
he voluntarily inhibits himself from further hearing the case following the opinion of
the Supreme Court that
"at the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded
or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case."
(Gutang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 76). On the
other hand, the Supreme Court cannot tolerate acts of litigants who for any
conceivable reason seek to disqualify a judge for their own purposes under a plea of
bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment." (People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 44712,
October 28, 1991, 203 SCRA 171)
Let these cases be therefore returned/forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court
for their proper disposition by the Executive Judge.
SO ORDERED.22
In its Resolution dated 21 January 2011, the CA-Cebu dismissed the petition.
According to the court a quo:
A perusal of the Petition revealed there were congenital infirmities:
1. the Petition was filed one day after the 60-day regl[e]mentary period for
filing the Petition for Certiorari, in violation of Section 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
2. there was no proper proof of service of the Petition to the court a quo
and to private respondents. Certainly, registry receipts can hardly be
considered sufficient proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail[;]
3. the Petition failed to incorporate therein a written explanation why the
preferred personal mode of filing and service as mandated under Section
11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was not availed of. Verily,
the Explanation referred to Motion for Extension...;
4. there was no competent evidence regarding petitioners identity on the
attached Verifications and Certifications Against Forum Shopping as
required by Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and
5. the Notarial Certificate in the Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping of private complainant did not contain the office address of the
notary public, in violation of Section 2(c), Rule VIII of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.30
The petitioner and private complainants each filed a petition for review before this
Court.
The Issue
The basic issue raised in both petitions is the propriety of the CA-Cebus dismissal of
the OSGs petition for certiorari based on procedural lapses.
The Ruling of this Court
We note that the OSG failed to follow procedural rules. First, it admitted that it
erroneously computed the deadline for filing the petition. Second, the respondents
were furnished a copy of the petition after its filing. Third, the Explanation required
under Section 11, Rule 13 referred to a Motion for Extension and not a Petition for
Certiorari.
The CA-Cebu dismissed the Petition for Certiorari because of these procedural
errors. Petitioner and private complainants claim that the rigid technical rules should
have been relaxed by the CA-Cebu in view of the circumstances of the case.
Courts are constrained to adhere to procedural rules under the Rules of Court.
Section 6 of Rule 1, however, grants courts leeway in interpreting and applying
rules:
Sec. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.
However, we should point out that courts are not given carte blanche authority to
interpret rules liberally. In Building Care Corporation v. Macaraeg,31 we pointed out
that:
x x x the resort to a liberal application, or suspension of the application of
procedural rules, must remain as the exception to the well-settled principle that
rules must be complied with for the orderly administration of justice.32
The first procedural error was the failure to file the petition within the reglementary
period. Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended under A.M. No. 077-12-SC, provides a strict deadline for the filing of petitions for certiorari:
SECTION 4. When and Where to File the Petition. The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case
a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion.
xxxx
We deleted the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 that permitted extensions of the period
to file petitions for certiorari, since sixty (60) days is more than ample time to
sufficiently prepare for filing.33
However, in Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.,34 we allowed a liberal
interpretation of the foregoing rule:
Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that
the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso
facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely
prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the
deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an
extension of time to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express
prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this
Courts sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.
Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 077-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public
interest.35 (Emphasis supplied)
The 60-day period may be extended under any of the circumstances provided in the
earlier case of Labao v. Flores.36 The recognized exceptions are:
1. most persuasive and weighty reasons;
2. to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure;
3. good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default;
4. the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
5. the merits of the case;
6. a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules;
7. a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory;
8. the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
9. fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants
fault;
It was then that the private prosecutors noticed on Page 39 of the petition under
the "Copy furnished:" portion that the names of the private respondents Vicente
Espinosa and Lindsey Buenavista were not among the list of parties who were
furnished with copies of the petition as required by Rule 65. The copies sent to the
private prosecutors also did not include a copy of the OSGs Affidavit of Service.
Thereupon, Atty. Penetrante in a letter dated January 12, 2011 brought this matter
to the attention of the OSG thru ASG John Emmanuel F. Madamba as AS Melissa A.
Santos x x x.
Thereafter, in a reply letter dated January 14, 2011 ASG Madamba and AS Santos
informed Atty. Penetrante (a) that they have actually furnished the private
respondents with copies of the petition but the Affidavit of Services was attached to
the original of the petition that was filed with the [CA-Cebu], and (b) that they will
thereafter furnish her with the proof of service to private respondents as soon as
they have received the registry return receipts from the post office. x x x.39
As correctly pointed out by private complainants:
Indeed the actual date of filing of the petition as well as compliance with the rest of
the formal and procedural requirements of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
namely OSGs verification and certification on non-forum shopping, the "Copy
Furnished" portion showing service of copies of the petition on the public and
private respondent[s] by registered mail and the required "Explanation" why
personal service of the petition on the respondents was not resorted to were all in
the hands of the OSG. [These] were beyond the control or intervention of the
private petitioners and private prosecutors. After all, the OSG [is the] chief legal
counsel of the State and the People of the Philippines in the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court.40
It would be unjust to penalize private complainants for the negligence of the
OSG.1awp++i1 In Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp.,41 we
discussed the general rule and exceptions with respect to the effect of counsels
negligence on a client:
x x x [W]hile it is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client, this rule is not
without exception. In cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel, like in
this case, deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application would
result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property, or where the interest
of justice so requires, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the
lawyers gross or palpable mistake or negligence.42
The case of Building Care involved an appeal which was filed out of time because of
counsels negligence. We disallowed the belated filing because
x x x respondent nor her former counsel gave any explanation or reason citing
extraordinary circumstances for her lawyers failure to abide by the rules for filing
an appeal. Respondent merely insisted that she had not been remiss in following up
her case with said lawyer.43
The circumstances in Building Care are clearly different from the facts of this case.
In the present case, there was a transfer of documents from private complainants
original counsel, Atty. Penetrante to the OSG. This Court has always recognized the
fact that the OSG has a heavy workload. Further, the OSG only received the
documents on 3 December 2010 despite prompt submission of the required
documents.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals-Cebu dated 21 January 2011
and 3 October 2011 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to the petition for
review in CA-G.R. SP No. 05617 and to decide the same on the merits.
SO ORDERED.