Arab Muslim Attitudes Toward The West - Furia - Lucas

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International Interactions, 34:186207, 2008

Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0305-0629
DOI: 10.1080/03050620802168797
Arab Muslim Attitudes Toward the West:

Cultural, Social, and Political Explanations
1547-7444 Interactions,
0305-0629
GINI
International
Interactions Vol. 34, No. 2, May 2008: pp. 139
Arab
P.
A. Anti-Western
Furia and R. E.
Attitudes
Lucas
PETER A. FURIA
Department of Political Science, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA
RUSSELL E. LUCAS
Department of Political Science, Florida International University, Miami, Florida, USA
We utilize pooled data from Zogby Internationals 2002 Arab

Values Survey (carried out in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) in order to test for cultural,
social and/or international political influences on Arab Muslim
attitudes toward Western countries (Canada, France, Germany,
UK, and USA). We find little support for cultural hypotheses to the
effect that hostility to the West is a mark-up on Muslim and/or Arab
identity. We find only limited support for social hypotheses that
suggest that hostility to the West is predicted by socioeconomic deprivation, youth, and/or being male. We find the strongest support
for a lone political hypothesis: hostility toward specific Western
countries is predicted by those countries recent and visible international political actions in regard to salient international issues
(e.g., Western foreign policies toward Palestine).
KEYWORDS Clash of Civilizations, Palestine, Arab, public
opinion, anti-Americanism.
Mark OKeefe (Executive Director, Pew Forum on Religion and Public

Life): You, of course, did not predict 9/11, but one could say that you did
predict the context in which a 9/11-type incident would emerge.
The authors are equally responsible for the contents of this article. The authors would like to thank the
Research Council and the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Oklahoma and the Jack D.
Gordon Institute of Florida International University for their support.
Address correspondence to Peter A. Furia, Assistant Professor Political Science, Wake Forest
University, Box 7568 Reynolda Station, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA. E-mail: furiapa@ wfu.edu
186
Arab Anti-Western Attitudes
187
Samuel Huntington: I wouldnt argue with that.1

There are days that mark great historical divides, and Sept. 11, 2001, is
one of them. It isnt just what happened that day, but how the world has
changed since . . . There has been no peace since, only an uneven struggle
against terrorists who have killed thousands of innocent civilians in New York
and Washington, in Madrid and London, all in the name of Islam. It is
nothing less than a clash of civilizations. (Macdonald, 2006, p. A21)
Since the publication of Samuel Huntingtons 1993 Foreign Affairs article The
Clash of Civilizations (and his 1996 book of the same title which rendered his
argument empirically testable) academic political scientists have repeatedly
demonstrated that the civilizational fault lines mapped by Huntington fail to
explain patterns of militarized interstate conflict (Huntington, 1993, 1996,
2000; Henderson, 1997; Russett et al., 2000; Russet and Oneal, 2001, Chiozza,
2002). Since 9/11, however, media invocations of Huntingtons concept of a
clash of civilizations have become about five times more frequent than they
were prior to 9/11.2 Must academics simply accept that previous empirical
analyses of the clash thesis seem to have fallen on deaf ears? Perhaps. But
while International Relations scholars have thus far (reasonably) addressed
the clash thesis at the interstate-dyad level, they have not yet addressed the
narrower individual-level question with which post-9/11 popularizers of the
clash thesis are so concerned. Specifically, Macdonald and apparently
many others worry that due to particularly intensely-felt cultural identities,
Arab Muslim individuals are systematically hostile to the West as such.
Although the popular formulation of cultural hypotheses is not particularly
rigorous, we think that, given its prominence, it should be subjected to empirical evaluation alongside various social and political alternatives.
Insofar as the clash of civilizations hypothesis is seen as a hypothesis
about terrorism, we do not possess the type of behavioral data that would
allow us to directly evaluate it at the individual level in the manner that, e.g.,
Russett and Oneal (2001) and Chiozza (2002) have refuted Huntingtons more
general claims in regard to states. That is, although numerous data sources
allow us to test the claim that civilizational fault lines predict patterns of militarized interstate disputes (i.e., among the 200 or so current members of the
international state system), we have no parallel archive on the presence and
absence of individual terrorist behavior (i.e., among the 7 billion or so current members of humankind).3
Yet if, as per Huntington and his contemporary popularizers, our question concerns the attitudinal context in which a 9/11 type-incident would
emerge, our methodological options improve considerably. For 9/11
brought about a small wave of opinion research on Muslim attitudes toward
the West. Specifically, we now have several surveys about how Muslims
around the world feel about the United States, a few of which also inquire
188
P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas
into attitudes toward other Western countries, and at least one of which
also measures attitudes that might plausibly be interpreted as indicative of
civilization consciousness.
Thus, if the question is whether Arab Muslim civilization consciousness
in particular promotes hostility to Western civilization in particular, we can
utilize public opinion data to test whether that observation is correct. In other
words, we can examine whether the intensity of Arab Muslims ethnic and
religious identifications serve as a predictor of their hostility to the West.4
Alternatively, we can examine whether Arab Muslim attitudes toward the
West are better predicted by various social and/or (international) political
hypotheses (Lipset, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Skocpol, 1979; Kaplan, 1994; Friedman,
1999; Chomsky, 2001; Wright, 2002; Furia and Lucas, 2006; Urdal, 2006).
While we are not the first to examine Islamic and/or Arab consciousness in conjunction with social and political variables drawn from wellestablished social science paradigms such as modernization theory and
rational choice theory, most scholars who have previously done so have
been Comparative Politics scholars primarily interested in domestic political
questions.5 Mark Tessler is a partial exception. In addition to using survey
data to explore the relationship between Islam and attitudes toward democracy (Tessler, 2002), he also examines the relationship between what he
calls identification with politicized Islam and foreign policy preferences
(Tessler, 2003; Tessler and Nachtwey, 1998). He finds that politicized
Islamic attitudes do have a bearing on attitudes toward democracy and
foreign countries, while personal Islamic piety does not.6
Our analysis can also in some respects be seen as picking up where Furia
and Lucas (2006) leave off in our broadly rationalist (or, at least, political)
account of the determinants of Arab foreign policy opinion. We there examine
frequency tables from the Zogby International 2002 Arab Values Survey in
order to assess how prevailing opinion in each country surveyed stands in
regard to the thirteen non-Arab countries that the survey asks about. While circumspect about what this analysis of 91 subject-country/object country dyads
can tell us, they argue that prevailing Arab opinions about Western countries
have little to do with a clash of civilizations and much to do with specific countries concrete foreign policy behaviors in the region (Furia and Lucas, 2006).7
We here ask whether, all else equal, Arab Muslim individuals with high
levels of Muslim or Arab civilization consciousness are systematically hostile
to countries that Huntington counts as Western. If so, then the post-9/11
popularization of the clash of civilizations thesis will be understandable.
While Huntingtons critics might still claim that broad-based Arab-Muslim
hostility toward the West qua the West is unrelated to terrorism, they
could not then easily deny that such hostility exists. If, on the other hand,
Arab-Muslim civilization-consciousness turns out to be unrelated to or, for
that matter, even positively related to amity for the West, then the post-9/11
upsurge in clash of civilizations chatter will seem unfortunate indeed.
189
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Although the present analysis was in large part motivated by the post-9/11
popularization of the clash of civilizations thesis, and while we think
the novelty (or notoriety) of that thesis deserving of special attention, we by
no means wish to suggest that it is more significant than the relatively familiar social and political hypotheses in conjunction with which we evaluate it. Specifically, we here evaluate six distinct hypotheses about the
sources of Arab-Muslim attitudes toward the West, only two of which are
cultural in character. Three of the six, which we group under the rubric of
social explanations, are closely related to well-established modernization
school and/or Marxist school theories of comparative politics (see, e.g.,
Lipset, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Skocpol, 1979; Inglehart, 1997). A final political
hypothesis is exemplary of both classical realist and contemporary rationalist hypotheses on international politics (see, e.g., Morgenthau, 1954;
Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1990).
That said, our first hypothesis does attempt to capture precisely what
most popular commentators refer to when they credit Huntingtons clash of
civilizations thesis for its early recognition of the background ideational
context responsible for terror attacks by (Arab) Muslims against the West
in particular:7
Hypothesis 1: (Arab) Muslims who possess high levels of Islamic consciousness
will be systematically hostile toward Western countries in general.
We place parentheses around the word Arab because, despite the fact that
Huntington draws multiple fault lines within other religious traditions, he
has for the most part stressed the relative cohesiveness of Islamic civilization as a whole.8 Insofar as he and others continue to do so, therefore, our
analytic focus on Arab Muslims in particular must be justified by data limitations rather than by basic theoretical considerations.9
It is nonetheless important to note that the decisions that survey
research and grant-making organizations make about what to study are
likely influenced by the same popular preconceptions that we examine in
our paper. In particular, the fact that all 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were not
only Muslims but Arabs has inspired not just Arab-specific data but Arabspecific explanations of Muslim hostility to the West. Put another way, the
limitations of our data with respect to Hypothesis 1 may actually be viewed
as an asset with respect to Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Arab Muslims who possess high levels of Arab consciousness
will possess systematically negative attitudes toward Western
countries in general.
190
One might attribute this slight variation on the clash thesis to various
public intellectuals, including Irshad Manji (2005), Fareed Zakaria (2003)
and Fouad Ajami (2006). For Manji, it is not so much Muslims in general
but Arab-Muslims influenced by the sturdy customs [of] . . . Arab warriors, who are systematically bellicose and/or hostile to non-Arabs (Manji,
2005, p. 143). In Zakarias view as well, Muslim hostility to the West is
centered in the Middle East, deriving less from Islam than from a continuing tendency of Arabs to embrace patriarchy, strongmen [and] romanticism and to thus remain stuck in primitive political and social
arrangements (Zakaria, 2003, p. 131). Fouad Ajami, for his part, (2006,
p. xi) avers that a culture of terrorism has put down roots in Arab
lands. Ajami continues,
It was not an isolated band of misguided young men who came Americas
way on 9/11. They emerged out of the Arab worlds dominant culture
and malignancies. There were the financiers who subsidized the terrorism. There were the intellectuals who winked at the terrorism and justified
it. There were the preachers from Arabia to Amsterdam and Finsbury
Park who gave it religious sanction and cover. And there were the
Arab rulers whose authoritarian orders produced the terrorism and
who looked away from it so long as it targeted foreign shores (Ajami
2006, p. xii).
As none of these commentators goes so far as to argue that Islam has

nothing to do with hostility to the West (or, for that matter, that Arab Christians
do have anything to do with it) we regard Hypothesis 2 as a friendly
amendment to Hypothesis 1. Moreover, by only examining Arab consciousness on the part of Arab Muslims, we avoid the methodological
complications of attempting to simultaneously test Hypotheses 1 and 2 on
different samples.10
Perhaps the best known set of alternative hypotheses about ArabMuslim hostility to the West can be grouped under the rubric of social
explanations. A wide range of contemporary commentators, for example,
have suggested that hostility to the West is a mark-up on individual-level
socioeconomic deprivation (Friedman, 1999; Chomsky, 2001; Sardar and
Davies, 2002; Wright, 2002). Echoing well-known general theories of why
men rebel against their own governments (Lipset, 1968; Gurr, 1970;
Skocpol, 1979; Inglehart, 1997), these contemporary commentators suggest
that relatively low socioeconomic status is likewise a predictor of Arab
hostility toward the economically powerful West. Conversely, individuals
higher in socioeconomic status, and, in particular, relatively well-educated
individuals, are thought not only to be less willing to rebel against their own
governments but more accepting of international cultural differences.
Broadly speaking, the main difference between modernization and Marxist
191
theorists concerns not whether they think that non-Western elites are
systematically friendly to the West, but rather, whether or not they think
such friendliness is justified (Friedman, 1999; Sardar and Davies, 2002).
Hypothesis 3: Arab-Muslims lower in socioeconomic status will possess
systematically hostile attitudes toward the West.
Closely related to the hypothesis that the clash of civilizations is really

a clash of economies is the claim that it is most properly a clash of generations (Kaplan, 1994; Friedman, 1999; Wright, 2002; Urdal, 2006). On this
view, a population boom has led to meager economic prospects for youth
in Arab and other developing countries, and, in turn, made youth systematically hostile toward powerful status quo actors in domestic and international politics (Kaplan, 1994). Although some of the same modernization
school authors noted above argue that youth are more comfortable with
globalization and foreignness than are their elders (Inglehart, 1997; Norris,
2000), the predominant view of authors writing specifically on Arab-Muslim
youth seems well-represented by Hypothesis 4:
Hypothesis 4: Arab-Muslim youth will be systematically hostile to the West.
A final set of social explanations for Arab-Muslim hostility toward the

West might cautiously be termed socio-biological (Fukuyama, 1998;
Farrington, 1999; Wright, 2002; Manji, 2005; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Ajami,
2006; Rizzo et al., 2007).11 For these authors, it is Arab-Muslim men in particular
who are likely to express anger and hostility toward the outside world.
Hypothesis 5: Arab-Muslim males will be systematically hostile to the West.
Despite the familiarity of Hypothesis 5, prior research on the (in)significance of attitudinal gender differences in the Middle East suggests that its
confirmation is particularly unlikely (Tessler et al., 1999).
In our view, the fact that Arab publics have quite favorable attitudes
toward some Western countries (e.g., France), yet very unfavorable attitudes toward others (e.g., the United States), makes all of the aforementioned explanations of these attitudes problematic. We are thus most
sympathetic to those scholars who see amities and enmities as a mark-up
on political rather than cultural or social variables (Morganthau,
1954; Waltz, 1959, 1979; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Holsti, 1996). In the context of the Cold War, for example, Ole Holsti concluded that Americans
evaluated the USSR more on what the Soviets did rather than who they
were. (1996, p. 78 emphasis in the original). The assertion that Arab
Muslims similarly evaluate Western countries on the basis of their concrete
foreign policy actions in the Middle East is of course a well-known
192
alternative to the view that Arab Muslims are hostile to Westerners qua
Westerners because of who they are.
Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant (1999), for example, argue that individual
Arab attitudes about the IsraeliPalestinian conflict do far more to predict
attitudes about regional peace than do sociological factors such as gender.
Similarly, in our dyad level analysis, Furia and Lucas (2006) argue that
Arab societies evaluate non-Arab societies largely on the basis of relatively
recent and specific foreign policy behaviors (Furia and Lucas, 2006, p. 599,
see also Telhami, 2002). While the above authors are more likely to invoke
realist theories of international relations than rationalist claims about differing ideal points in regard to specific foreign policy issues, the underlying
implication is essentially the same: Muslim Arabs possess concrete political
objections to the regional foreign policies of (some) Western countries, and,
in turn, it is only logical that they would evaluate those countries less favorably than they would countries that pursue policies of which they approve.
What no one has as yet tested, however, is whether the intensity of
Arab individuals preferences about foreign policy issues is in fact determinative of their attitudes toward Western countries active in the region.
With Hypothesis 6, we formalize and generalize the claim that individual
Arab Muslims concerned with a specific foreign policy issue (i.e., the
IsraeliPalestinian conflict) will evaluate countries not on the basis of who
they are but on the basis of what they do in regard to that issue.
Hypothesis 6: Muslim-Arabs who care about a specific foreign policy issue will
assess individual Western countries on the basis of that countrys
actions regarding that issue.
DATA AND VARIABLES

If we only wanted to examine Muslim attitudes toward America in particular
we would have no dearth of data, including many well-known surveys on
anti-Americanism by Pew, Gallup, and others. However, if we do not
consider the U.S. alone as an appropriate proxy for Huntingtons West, we
are limited to surveys and/or parts of surveys of Arab publics in particular,
only a few of which operationalize anything even vaguely resembling
civilization consciousness.12 We have thus turned to the 2002 Arab Values
Survey (AVS) conducted by Zogby International (Zogby, 2002).13 Zogby
asked respondents in seven sovereign Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) about their attitudes toward
thirteen non-Arab countries.14 Given that we are here concerned with post9/11 reformulations of the clash thesis, we naturally focus on attitudes
among Muslim Arabs, in particular toward the five object countries queried
about on the survey that Huntington categorizes as Western (e.g., Canada,
193

TABLE 1 Percentage Favorable Evaluations of Western
Object Countries (Pooled Sample of Muslim-Arab
Respondents to the AVS)
France
Germany
Canada
UK
USA
1,733
1,397
1,365
839
601
62.16
50.11
48.96
30.09
21.56
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States).15 As all seven
of the sovereign Arab subject countries in which the surveys were carried
out possess a Muslim-majority population, filtering out non-Muslims only
slightly reduces sample-size, leaving us with an N of 2,788 Muslim Arab individuals for our pooled analysis.16
Our dependent variables consist of a series of five dichotomous variables
coded 1 if a respondent expressed either a very favorable or somewhat
favorable attitude toward the specific Western object country and 0 if a
respondent expressed a somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion.17 Table 1 depicts the percentage of individual Arab-Muslim respondents
in the pooled dataset that provided favorable evaluations of each country.
One of the great assets of the 2002 AVS is that it provides four different
measures of Islamic and Arab consciousness, each of which we analyze
in a separate logistic regression model. We see no clear-cut theoretical or
methodological reason for preferring one of these measures to another.18 We
thus designate as Model 1 the model which happens to come closest to providing post-9/11 invocations of the clash thesis with some empirical
justification: namely, the model that operationalizes Islamic and Arab
consciousness as a willingness to express a predominant sense of selfidentification as Muslim or Arab to an American (specifically to select either
of these self-identifications as the most important). Model 2 concerns
the willingness to express the same predominant sense of identification
to an Arab from another Arab country. Model 3 also examines identityconsciousness as respondents would express it to another Arab, but measures
respondents levels of identity-consciousness on a five-point scale ranging
from 1, representing a perception that a given identity category is not at all
important, for the respondent to 5 for its being very important. Finally,
Model 4 also assesses levels of identity consciousness, but, like Model 1, asks
the respondent to envision talking with someone from the United States.19
Among our three sociological hypotheses, only the socioeconomic
hypothesis is problematic to test in the context of the AVS. Due to the lack
of an AVS question on income, we must measure socioeconomic status with
reference to respondent education alone.20 Specifically, we use Zogbys
variable q903, for which completion of elementary education is coded as 1,
194
completion of middle school is coded as 2, completion of high school

is coded as 3 and completion of university is coded as 4. Importantly,
inclusion of the education variable also allows us to control for the surveys
self-admitted (see Zogby, 2002, p. 99) coverage and response-biases vis a
vis relatively well-educated respondents. Assessing the socio-demographic
hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) presents no major difficulties, though it is worth
noting that Zogby only surveyed respondents between the ages of 21 and
64 (variable q701). We thus decided to create an age by decades variable
ranging from 1 to 5 and measuring whether a respondent was in their
twenties, thirties, forties, fifties or sixties. Per Hypothesis 5, we simply code
respondent gender (variable q22 in the AVS) as 0 for female and 1 for
male.
Last but not least, we operationalize our broadly political hypothesis
in relation to the issue of Palestine (the most concrete foreign policy issue
about which AVS respondents are asked). Specifically, respondents are
asked about the level of importance they personally attribute to the issue
of Palestine (q23), a variable measured on the same positive 1 to 5 scale as
that used for the level of consciousness variables. As suggested above,
however, Hypothesis 6 will most clearly be an improvement on the other
five hypotheses if and only if it turns out that individual-level concern for
Palestine is associated with differential evaluations of different Western
countries. Following Furia and Lucas (2006), we hypothesize that France
might be seen as playing a significant and relatively positive role in the
IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the U.S. and the UK as playing a significant and
negative role, and Canada and Germany as playing a role that is neither significantly positive nor negative. In order for Hypothesis 6 to be supported,
therefore, individual levels of concern for Palestine should turn out to be a.)
systematically positively related to attitudes toward France; b.) systematically
negatively related to attitudes toward the U.S. and the UK; and c.) unrelated
to attitudes toward Canada and Germany.
Finally, our analysis controls for the fact that, particularly in the Gulf
states, Arab and/or Muslim civilization consciousness might be particularly
appealing to guest-worker respondents who are not citizens of the country
in which they were queried. Specifically, we include a dichotomized version
of the original AVS variable q924, which measures whether a respondent to
the survey is a citizen of the particular Arab country in which the survey
was conducted.21
RESULTS
Tables 25 each provide summary statistics for five different logistic regression
equations (e.g., one equation per Western object country). Specifically, each
table presents a coefficient estimate, a standard error for the coefficient in
195
* .10; ** .05; *** .01.
LR chi2(7)
Pseudo R2
N
Islamic Consciousness
Arab Consciousness
Education
Age by decades
Male
Palestine (importance of)
Citizen (of subject country)
Constant
73.40***
.025
2380
.233 (.122)*
.564 (.108)***
.099 (.055)*
.176 (.050)***
.129 (.091)
.226 (.057)***
.070 (.152)
1.298 (.369)***
.107 (.129)
.579 (.118)***
.185 (.059)***
.140 (.054)***
.067 (.100)
.230 (.052)***
.060 (.173)
.856 (.396)**
68.66***
.026
2503
UK
USA
15.83***
.005
2427
.324 (.124)***
.001 (.105)
.019 (.053)
.001 (.047)
.078 (.088)
.093 (.056)*
.074 (.144)
.178 (.354)
France
95.57***
.030
2313
.035 (.124)
.774 (.107)***
.057 (.053)
.101 (.046)**
.001 (.088)
.032 (.058)
.290 (.144)**
.920 (.362)**
Germany
61.24***
.020
2270
.031 (.124)
.438 (.106)***
.000 (.055)
.110 (.046)**
.353 (.088)***
.028 (.058)
.269 (.145)*
.756 (.363)**
Canada
TABLE 2 Model 1 Predominant Civilization Consciousness as Expressed to an American and Other Predictors of Individual Muslim-Arab Attitudes
toward Various Western Object Countries
196
* .10; ** .05; *** .01.
Arab Consciousness
Education
Age by decades
Male
Constant
LR chi2(7)
Pseudo R2
N
.147 (.123)
.396 (.155)***
.180 (.059)***
.122 (.055)**
.064 (.100)
.280 (.058)***
.060 (.172)
.868 (.385)**
62.32***
.024
2477
USA
.082 (.156)
.429 (.103)***
.103 (.055)*
.157 (.050)***
.112 (.091)
.265 (.057)***
.067 (.153)
1.293 (.368)***
69.50***
.023
2353
UK
.412 (.155)***
.518 (.099)***
.034 (.054)
.010 (.048)
.059 (.089)
.061 (.057)
.030 (.147)
.184 (.361)
33.53***
.011
2400
France
.218 (.167)*
.375 (.099)***
.064 (.053)
.075 (.046)
.010 (.088)
.072 (.057)
.213 (.144)
.883 (.340)
42.99***
.014
2286
Germany
.084 (.117)
.014 (.098)
.013 (.053)
.111 (.047)**
.329 (.088)***
.057 (.057)
.252 (.145)*
.721 (.363)**
30.09***
.010
2246
Canada
TABLE 3 Model 2 Predominant Civilization Consciousness as Expressed to an Arab and Other Predictors of Individual Muslim-Arab Attitudes
toward Various Western Object Countries
197
* .10; ** .05; *** .01.
Arab Consciousness
Education
Age by decades
Male
Constant
LR chi2(7)
Pseudo R2
N
.151 (.049)***
.012 (.051)
.171 (.058)***
.145 (.054)***
.107 (.099)
.306 (.057)***
.031 (.166)
.290 (.398)
55.52***
.020
2598
USA
.215 (.044)***
.019 (.047)
.071 (.055)
.188 (.049)***
.063 (.090)
.324 (.057)***
.025 (.147)
.424 (.379)
84.06***
.027
2467
UK
.015 (.039)
.110 (.043)***
.009 (.053)
.005 (.046)
.045 (.087)
.057 (.055)
.129 (.140)
.042 (.363)
13.65***
.004
2516
France
.205 (.039)***
.050 (.043)
.041 (.053)
.116 (.045)***
.073 (.086)
.142 (.057)**
.138 (.138)
.041 (.367)
66.59***
.020
2390
Germany
.162 (.039)***
.139 (.043)***
.043 (.053)
.116 (.046)**
.280 (.087)***
.131 (.057)**
.111 (.140)
.285 (.373)
89.11***
.028
2347
Canada
TABLE 4 Model 3 Levels of Civilization Consciousness as Expressed to an Arab and Other Predictors of Individual Muslim-Arab Attitudes Toward
Various Western Object Countries
198
* .10; ** .05; *** .01.
LR chi2(7)
Pseudo R2
N
Arab Consciousness
Education
Age by decades
Male
Constant
47.69***
.018
2591
.080 (.041)*
.026 (.047)
.169 (.058)***
.152 (.054)***
.090 (.098)
.278 (.056)***
.104 (.163)
.489 (.395)
USA
63.82***
.021
2463
.129 (.037)***
.024 (.043)
.065 (.055)
.190 (.049)***
.090 (.089)
.271 (.055)***
.099 (.145)
.642 (.376)*
UK
25.92***
.008
2386
.025 (.034)
.056 (.040)
.077 (.053)
.123 (.045)***
.038 (.085)
.083 (.056)
.307 (.134)**
.484 (.368)
.059 (.035)*
.116 (.040)***
.025 (.053)
.013 (.046)
.054 (.087)
.088 (.054)
.034 (.137)
.157 (.065)
12.32***
.004
2510
Germany
France
43.26***
.013
2344
.011 (.034)
.065 (.040)
.004 (.053)
.123 (.045)***
.335 (.086)***
.063 (.057)
.297 (.136)**
.347 (.372)
Canada
TABLE 5 Model 4 Levels of Civilization Consciousness as Expressed to an American and Other Predictors of Individual Muslim-Arab Attitudes
Toward Various Western Object Countries
199
parentheses, and an indication of that coefficients statistical significance (if

any) as measured by a two-tailed t test. At the bottom of each table, we list
the Model N, the likelihood ratio for the model (degrees of freedom in
parentheses) and a Pseudo R2 (McFadden) statistic of model fit. Given a
total of twenty-different equations to estimate we do not here present
predicted probability graphs. All models were estimated using Stata 9.
It should come as no surprise that the apparent effects of civilization
consciousness are fairly sensitive to the different ways in which civilization consciousness is operationalized in our four models. Even so, none
of the four models uncovers support for Hypothesis 1, which posits that
Islamic consciousness will exert a systematic negative effect on attitudes toward Western countries. In Model 1, this hypothesis receives borderline statistically significant support in regard to attitudes toward the
UK alone but fails to have even the predicted sign in regard to attitudes
toward either Canada or France. Indeed, as far as attitudes toward France
are concerned, Islamic consciousness shows up as a highly statistically
significant and positive predictor. More surprising to us is the consistency
of the evidence against Hypothesis 1 in Models 24. Specifically, it strikes
us as quite devastating to the reformulated clash thesis that 14 of 15 relevant coefficients exhibit a relationship in the direction opposite that predicted by Huntington (and that 5 of these 15 relationships are statistically
significant).
Hypothesis 2, in regard to Arab consciousness, fares considerably
better in Model 1 (receiving statistically significant support in regard to
all Western object countries except France). In Model 2, however, it finds
support only in regard to the U.S., the UK, and Germany, and is systematically contradicted in regard to France. Moreover, if not quite to the extent as
is Hypothesis 1, it too is repeatedly contradicted in Models 3 and 4. Specifically, it receives no statistically significant support, fails to so much as
correctly predict the sign of 7 out of 10 relevant coefficients, and predicts
relationships exactly opposite the highly statistically significant observed
relationships in 3 out of 10 instances (specifically, attitudes about Canada in
Model 3 and attitudes about France in Models 3 and 4).
Similarly, Hypothesis 3 is not merely unsupported but, in some
instances, systematically contradicted. As with the effects of Muslim identity
and Arab identity on attitudes toward the West, the effects of educational
attainment on attitudes toward the West are contingent on the particular
Western object country asked about. Only with respect to attitudes toward
Canada is the relationship between education and amity for Western
countries consistently in the predicted positive direction (and it never rises
to the level of even borderline statistical significance). Nor is there any
statistically significant relationship in any of the four models between
educational attainment and attitudes toward France or Germany. Educational attainment is, however, systematically negatively-related to attitudes
200
toward the United States across all models. (It also shows up as a borderline
significant negative predictor of attitudes toward the UK in Models 1 and 2.)
Hypothesis 4, the socio-demographic hypothesis, receives still less
support, and is in fact systematically contradicted in 11 out of 20 possible
cases. As 18 of 20 relationships are in the direction opposite that predicted
by the angry Arab youth hypothesis, it would appear that, if anything, it is
older Arab Muslims who are systematically hostile to the West. While
this overall pattern is consistent with the aforementioned modernizationtheoretic claims about a universal tendency of young people to be relatively
open to foreignness and/or to think of themselves as global citizens
(Norris, 2000), the fact that the two cases that buck the general trend are
cases involving France suggests considerable interpretive caution. We discuss
this matter further below.
Nor, finally, does the socio biological hypothesis find anything more
than idiosyncratic supportspecifically, in terms of the consistently and systematically negative attitudes of Arab Muslim men toward Canada (and only
Canada).22 No other relevant coefficients for this hypothesis are statistically
significant, and indeed, only 8 of the other 16 are in the direction predicted
by the hypothesis. Particularly surprising to those who might predict that
the United States would be the primary recipient of Arab male anger is the
fact that, while it is certainly the primary recipient of Arab anger, maleness
is a positive (though not significant) predictor of attitudes toward the United
States across all four models.
Particularly in contrast to the five hypotheses discussed so far, Hypothesis 6
fares very well across all four models. For example, we find that individuallevel support for Palestine is always a highly-statistically significant negative
predictor of attitudes toward the U.S. and the UK, and the hypothesis also
correctly predicts the sign of respondent attitudes toward France in all four
cases. Particularly as Hypothesis 6 is our own favored hypothesis, however,
it is important to concede that the coefficients in regard to France are only
borderline statistically significant in one of the four models, and, moreover,
that two of the eight coefficients that Hypothesis 6 predicts should not
exhibit statistically-significant coefficients do in fact do so: namely, those
pertaining to Canada and Germany in Model 3.
DISCUSSION
Whereas other analyses have discredited Samuel Huntingtons clash of civilizations thesis as a global nomothetic theory of militarized interstate conflict,
our results in regard to Hypothesis 1 discredit those ad hoc post-9/11 reformulations of the thesis that, with Huntingtons blessing, have gained even
more prominence than did the original global theory. Specifically, we have
demonstrated a complete lack of support for the hypothesis that Islamic
201
consciousness predicts hostility toward the West and at least a modicum of

support for the counterhypothesis that it in fact predicts amity for Western
countries. As with all of our hypotheses, however, much depends on the
particular way in which civilization consciousness is operationalized and,
above all, the particular Western country about which Arab publics are asked.
We draw a similar conclusion in regard to the related hypothesis that
Arab consciousness predicts hostility to the West. If the Western countries
in question are the United States and the United Kingdom, it must be conceded that two of the four models uncover support for the hypothesis. Yet
if the Western country in question is France, a full three of the four models
argue systematically against it. In other words, Arab consciousness is systematically predictive of amity for one of the very countries whose historical
role in the region would seem most insulting to the backward-looking
traditionalists thought to inhabit it. Thus, while the role of Arab consciousness in the region certainly appears worthy of future research, we recommend that that research take a different tack than the one suggested by,
e.g., Ajami, Manji, and Zakaria.
At first blush, the considerable evidence against Hypothesis 3 constitutes a rather direct refutation of the hypothesis that socioeconomic frustration is determinative of hostility to out-groups. To say nothing of the likely
presence of systematically higher acquiescence effects among lower education respondents to the survey, however, we must recall that some proponents of the socioeconomic frustration hypothesis posit that it is precisely
highly-educated low-income individuals who will be most likely to harbor
hostility (Ibrahim, 1980; Wright, 2002; Espositio and Mogahed, 2008; see
also Hafez, 2004, p. 9). In any event, while we look forward to future surveys that might allow researchers to explore various possible relationships
between income and education as potential predictors of Arab attitudes
toward foreign countries, we are ourselves particularly struck by the fact
that the role of education in the data we have is highly contingent on
the country in question: specifically, higher educational attainment is only
systematically predictive of hostility to the United States and the United
Kingdom the two countries that those who follow contemporary foreign
policy closely would be least likely to consider friendly to the region.
With respect to Hypothesis 4 as well, we would again emphasize the
distinction between attitudes toward the US and the UK on the one hand
(the two countries significantly favored by younger respondents across all
four models), and France (the one country never significantly favored by
younger respondents in any of the models). Obviously, our unrepeated
cross-sectional data cannot speak to general debates about whether these
patterns might be best interpreted as age and/or cohort effects, nor, of
course, can we do anything more than highlight the fact that those one
might expect to be most resentful of a former imperial power appear least
so. Our findings are, however, quite sufficient to refute the claim that
202
the Middle East features a generation of angry Arab youth systematically

hostile to the West.
Our results in regard to Hypothesis 5 suggest a variation on a similar
theme in that the distinction between the US and the UK on the one hand
and France on the other appears to have been replaced by a distinction
between the U.S. alone on the one hand and Canada (the lone object country in regard to which we uncover statistically significant relationships) on
the other. As far as theory is concerned, a sociobiological account that is
particular to attitudes about Canada seems a contradiction in terms, and we
know of no account of gender socialization patterns that would exclusively
affect attitudes toward Canada either. To be sure, of the five countries asked
about, Canada is probably the one most likely to be characterized as having
a Venutian foreign policy (and the U.S. as the most likely to be characterized as having a Martian one) but we in any case leave this matter to
future researchers.
The one hypothesis about determinants of Arab attitudes toward
the West that is supported is the quintessentially political one: namely,
Muslim-Arabs who care about a specific foreign policy issue do seem
to assess individual Western countries on the basis of that countrys
recent and visible actions in regard to that issue. Our operationalization
of this hypothesis solely in reference to the issue of Palestine is of
course preliminary, but we hope that its relative success will encourage
others to test related hypotheses more rigorously. Particularly in conjunction with the lack of consistent support for the other hypotheses here
tested, we conclude a.) that Arab attitudes toward the West vary greatly
depending on the particular Western country in question and b.) that
politics explains more of that variation than does either society or
culture.
CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Peter A. Furia is an assistant professor of Political Science at Wake Forest
University.
Dr. Russell E. Lucas is an assistant professor of Political Science at Florida
International University.
NOTES
1. August 18, 2006 interview with Samuel Huntington. Full text available at Pew (2006c).
2. Per a Lexis-Nexis search of the content of major newspapers from 19962000 and 20022006.
3. One well-known solution to this problem involves selecting on the dependent variable of
participation in terrorist acts and thereafter attempting to impute why those who participated in terrorism
203
did so (Pape, 2003; see also Ibrahim, 1980). Whatever the reasonableness of these imputations, however,
it is clear that this approach tells us nothing about how levels of what Huntington calls civilization
consciousness among terrorists compare to those of non-terrorists (Huntington, 1996, pp. 36, 266271).
In turn, extant critiques of the view that individual terrorist behavior is unrelated to a clash of civilizations are not decisive.
4. In part because of its limited geographical scope, and in part because it seeks only attitudinal evidence of inter-civilizational clash, our test of Huntingtons thesis seems to us in many ways a
more generous one than previous behavioral analyses conducted by scholars of international politics
(Henderson, 1997; Russett et al., 2000; Russet and Oneal, 2001; Fox, 2001; Chiozza, 2002; Pape, 2003;
Roeder, 2003; Tusicisny, 2004).
5. Note also that, unlike some other scholars, Huntington does not argue that individual religious conviction or piety itself promotes hostility to out-groups (see, e.g., Harris, 2005). Although he
comes close to suggesting that Muslim piety in particular does so (see also Hirsi Ali, 2006; Hitchens,
2006), preliminary analyses of the 2002 Arab Values Survey data, if anything, support the opposite
view. The more general relationship between piety and international-policy preferences is certainly worthy of empirical study (preferably not limited to Muslim countries alone). See Daniels (2005) for a novel
quantitative approach.
6. Tesslers theoretical interest in Huntingtons thesis is more limited than our own, and his
already-published analyses necessarily rely on older data from fewer Arab publics, but we are much
indebted to his work in general and to his distinction between personal and political identification with Islam in particular. Per his distinction and implicit recommendation, we here focus on the
latter.
7. Nor, to reiterate, is our paper meant to be a definitive commentary on the clash thesis as
Huntington originally proposed it. In ignoring all but one of at least fifty-six directed inter-civilizational
dyads that Huntington (1993, 1996) thinks relevant to international politics, we are hardly testing
whether he has correctly divined the emerging world order. That claim, as far as we are concerned,
has been decisively rejected by the quantitative IR scholars mentioned above.
8. Although more recently, including in the interview quoted in the epigraph, Huntington himself has underlined his original remarks about subdivisions within Islam (e.g., between Arabic, Malay,
and Turkic traditions). See Pew, 2006c and Huntington, 1993, 1996.
9. For a clearer articulation of a view that all of Muslim civilization is at odds with the West, see
Hirsi Ali, 2006 and Hitchens, 2006.
10. Preliminary t-tests nevertheless suggest that Christian Arabs are not significantly different from
Muslim Arabs in their attitudes toward Western countries.
11. Although authors writing in a global context are often quick to attribute malefemale differences in out-group hostility to differential socialization (Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005), and although
several of the scholars mentioned above argue that the joint presence of Arabness and maleness is
particularly significant (see Rizzo et al., 2007), many Middle East specialists are (we think rightly) as wary
of cultural arguments as they are of biological ones. In any event, it seems to us that we can leave
the question of the sources of putative sex/gender differences in hostility to the West unanswered until
determining whether or not such differences obtain.
12. The Jordanian and Egyptian batteries of Pews 2005 survey, for example, asked about attitudes toward the U.S., Germany, and France, but, unfortunately, did not address respondents identity
orientations (see also Pew, 2006a). The Revisiting the Arab Street study by the Center for Strategic
Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan (2005) samples five Arab publics in regard to their attitudes
about the U.S., Great Britain, and France, but this coverage is less comprehensive than that of the Arab
Values Survey, as is its operationalization of attitudes related to civilization consciousness (CSS, 2005, pp.
6466). A partial 2005 replication of the 2002 Arab Values Survey by Zogby itself operationalizes civilization consciousness less comprehensively than the 2002 survey and, more important, queries respondents
about only one Western object country (the U.S.) rather than five.
13. The survey was carried out by Zogby International and the Arab Thought Foundation.
Frequency tables are published in Zogby (2002) and the full dataset is available for purchase. It is not
part of the World Values Survey, which was also conducted in 2002 in four Arab countries (but does not
contain data on attitudes toward Western object countries). For discussions of the WVS in regards to
Muslim and Middle Eastern publics, see Moaddel (2007).
14. Following Furia and Lucas (2006), we omit Zogbys sample of Israeli Arabs for various theoretical reasons: 1.) because we test their alternative explanation of the determinants of Arab opinion via
204
an independent variable on attitudes toward Palestine and 2.) because we include a control variable on
whether or not respondents are citizens of the states in which they reside that we suspect has a different
interpretation for Arabs in Israel than it does for other respondents.
15. Although what is sometimes referred to as Huntingtons kin-countries hypothesis is of less
interest to post-9/11 commentators, a previous version of this paper presented results on Arab-Muslim
attitudes toward the Muslim countries asked about in the survey as well (i.e., Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey). Although deleted for reasons of space, these analyses are available from the authors, as are
analyses of non-Western, non-Muslim countries (China, India, Japan, and Russia).
16. Rather than using Zogbys own (often quite substantial) weighting variables to adjust the
socio-demographics of the sample to national and regional norms, we analyze unweighted data and
introduce demographic controls directly into our analysis. We have also conducted subject country specific replications of each of our models (available from the authors) and confirmed that there are a.) few
significant differences between each of these country-specific samples and the pooled sample and b.) no
significant differences between the Egypt-specific results and the pooled sample. Given these various
checks, therefore, we do believe that our analysis is substantially representative of the views of Arab
Muslims in the Middle East.
17. Specifically, respondents were asked to answer the following question: I will read you a list
of countries. Please tell me if your overall impression of each is either: very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable, or if you are not familiar enough to form a judgment.
18. On the debate between measuring predominant (i.e., primary) identifications vs. levels of
identification, see Davis and Davenports (1997) critique of Inglehart (1997). As for preferring to analyze
Muslim Arabs identity consciousness as expressed to Arabs on the one hand and to Americans on the
other, the presumption that an analysis of foreign relations should focus on foreign expressions of identity-consciousness must be balanced against the facts that a.) the questions about expressions of identifications to fellow Arabs precede these on the survey and b.) Zogby International in 2005 replaced asking
about expressions of identity-consciousness to foreign Americans with a question about expressions to
foreign Europeans.
19. The final question, as exemplary of the scope and wording of the four, reads Now, suppose
you are talking with someone from the United States. Using the same scale of one to five, with one
being not at all important and five being very important, and the same list [family, the city or region
where you live, the country in which you live, your religion, being Arab, the social background of your
family], please tell me how important each of the following is in defining who you are to that American.
For additional information on question wording, see Zogby, 2002, chap. 6.
20. Even were such questions available, the intra-national income variation items typical of the
World Values Survey would be problematic to use in our pooled analysis given the disparities of wealth
between Arab states such as Egypt and Kuwait.
21. The original question includes a third category for non-Arab noncitizens of a particular subject
country, but our limitation of the present analysis to Arab Muslims renders this category an empty cell.
22. If not attributable to random noise, these patterns may also be an artifact of the systematically
low regard in which noncitizen Arab residents hold Canada and Germany. See here the coefficients for
the dichotomous citizenship variable.
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International Interactions, 34:186207, 2008

Arab Muslim Attitudes Toward the West:

We utilize pooled data from Zogby Internationals 2002 Arab

Mark OKeefe (Executive Director, Pew Forum on Religion and Public

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

Samuel Huntington: I wouldnt argue with that.1

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

As none of these commentators goes so far as to argue that Islam has

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

Closely related to the hypothesis that the clash of civilizations is really

A final set of social explanations for Arab-Muslim hostility toward the

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

DATA AND VARIABLES

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

completion of middle school is coded as 2, completion of high school

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Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

parentheses, and an indication of that coefficients statistical significance (if

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

consciousness predicts hostility toward the West and at least a modicum of

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

the Middle East features a generation of angry Arab youth systematically

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

Chomsky, Noam (2001). 911, New York: Seven Stories Press.

P. A. Furia and R. E. Lucas

Arab Anti-Western Attitudes

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