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Echeverrias Protestant
Epistemology:
A Catholic Response
James K. A. Smith
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay
in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.1
Introduction
There was a time in his life when Ludwig Wittgenstein saw things the
way Eduardo Echeverria does. Earlier in his career, Wittgenstein wrote
a work called the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that espoused the sort
of representationalist realism and correspondence theory of truth that
Echeverria defends.
1
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe
(New York: Macmillan, 1953), 115.
2
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 114. For those unfamiliar, the Investigations is
less a book and more what Wittgenstein himself described as an album of notes and observations, published in numbered paragraphs, not unlike Pascals Penses.
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questioning reality itself. Indeed, not only are alternatives not entertained;
they cannot even be understood.
Thus the later Wittgenstein looks back on his younger self and makes
the observation from which my epigraph is drawn: A picture held us
captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. Much hinges on that word
seems: the younger, representationalist Wittgenstein of the Tractatus
inherited a vocabulary that came loaded with an epistemology that just
seemed to be the way things are. Any rejection of this epistemology was
taken to be a nonsensical rejection of the way things are. In the face of such
rejections, the representationalist just keeps saying, louder and louder,
with increased perturbation: This is how things are! Reality just is realist, says the realist.3
My experience reading Echeverrias critique of Whos Afraid of Relativism?
feels like the later Wittgenstein reading the younger Wittgenstein. While
I am grateful for Echeverrias serious, charitable engagement with my
book, at the same time it feels like an adventure in missing the point. I do
not think that stems from a lack of rigor or charity or care on Echeverrias
part. (And my evaluation is meant to be descriptive, not uncharitable.) I
think the problem stems from the fact that he is, if youll permit, captive to
a picture, and his own languageand, indeed, most of the language of the
philosophical establishmentseems to inexorably confirm that picture for
him. Repeating that picture over and over to me supposedly counts as a
critique. It does not.
For further discussion of this point, see James K. A. Smith, Whos Afraid of Relativism?
Community, Contingency, and Creaturehood (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 2425.
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what I want to do with them apart from actually engaging their arguments. But that is to review some other book.
Echeverria faults me for not responding to earlier critiques like Poiriers (note 36), but
I only respond to critiques worth responding to. Poiriers article is such an egregious misunderstanding of my argument that I could not be bothered to respond to it. Similarly, he
suggests that I do not really get Plantingas critique of Rorty, whereas, as I argue in the
book, I get Plantingas critique and believe it is wrong (regarding what he takes to be platitudinous). Echeverria assumes that if I really understood it, I would agree.
4
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5
I then go on to expound on referentialism in much more detail in chapter 2 of the book.
One could also say that Wittgenstein is trying to displace propositionalism, a picture
in which truth is simply identified with (and reduced to) propositions. The burden of the
early sections of the Philosophical Investigations is to show the limits of this picture. While
Wittgenstein does not reject propositional truth, he shows that the way propositions
mean anything is dependent on all kinds of nonpropositional meaning. Again, see Whos
Afraid of Relativism? 3972.
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everyday assumptions about how we relate to the world. Because the I/O
picture has settled into our everyday attitude, it is natural for us to have
realist worries. Indeed, the picture fools us into thinking that if we reject
correspondence or representationalism, were rejecting reality. And it is very
hard to break out of this picture. As Taylor comments, It is not enough to
escape its captivity just to declare that one has changed ones opinion on
these questions. One may, for instance, repudiate the idea of a representation, claim that one has no truck with this, that nothing lies between us and
the world we know, and still be laboring within the picture.6
If one is captive to such a picture, any claims about reality are taken to
be hypocritical lapses back into an inescapable realism: This is how things
are! This is where Echeverrias critique is of the Smith-cannnot-havewhat-he-wants variety. However, this is only because Echeverrias unwitting and unrecognized adherence to the I/O picture leads him to construe
any claims about reality in terms of correspondence. For someone with a
realist hammer, every about claim is a correspondence-nail.
This is why Echeverria thinks he can ramp up the antithesis by suggesting my Wittgensteinian view is inconsistent with what those creeds
affirm to be true about reality.7 This is either (or both) because he mistakenly concludes that a Wittgensteinian view precludes claims about reality
or because he (equally mistakenly) assumes the creeds enshrine an epistemology. As I show in chapter 2 of the book, however, the Wittgensteinian
view does not preclude predication, and as William Abraham has argued,
the creeds do not enshrine an epistemology: The canonical heritage,
Abraham emphasizes,
is not and never has been an epistemology . [T]he church offers no formal
theory as to how it knows that it possesses the truth about God, the human
situation, the activity and purposes of God, and the like. More importantly,
6
Citing Charles Taylor, Merleau-Ponty and the Epistemological Picture, in The
Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, ed. Taylor Carman and Mark B.N. Hansen
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 26, 28. In a related article, Taylor points
out that this epistemological picture is mechanistic: If we see [perception] as another process in a mechanistic universe, we have to construe it as involving as a crucial component
the passive reception of impressions from the external world. Knowledge then hangs on a
certain relation holding between what is out there and certain inner states that this external reality causes in us. Taylor, Overcoming Epistemology, in Philosophical Arguments
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 34.
Echeverria also notes that Lindbeck later backed away from some of his stronger claims
in Nature of Doctrine (and suggested that such strong readings were misunderstandings).
My argument is that if Lindbeck really understood Wittgenstein and Winch, he should
have stuck to his guns.
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canonical theists [like Abraham] insist that the failure to canonize an epistemology was a wise omission both for the good of the church and for the
good of epistemology.8
What you would never guess from Echeverrias review is that my book
is fundamentally about meaning, building on Wittgensteins account of
meaning as use in which he criticizes his own representationalism in the
Tractatus and unpacks his own account of correspondence as resting on a
social understanding of meaning. I will not repeat that long, careful argument here sinceyou guessed itthat is why I wrote the book. Therefore,
readers should at least be skeptical of any review essay that treats the
notion of meaning as use and the social conditions of knowledge as if
these are pesky asides when, in fact, this is the heart of the argument. It is
odd to read a review of a book about Wittgenstein, Rorty, and Brandom
and find them mentioned only sporadically and almost tangentially. The
reader should wonder: Is something amiss here?
I find this particularly puzzling because I would have thought that a
Roman Catholic such as Echeverria would be more interested in the way
that I make ecclesiology the heart of epistemology, emphasizingin the
wake of Wittgenstein and Brandomthat we are never lone individual
knowers but always already dependent on a community of practice and the
tradition handed down to us. It is ironic that the epistemology Echeverria
defends is more Protestant than the one he criticizes in my work.
Correcting Echeverria
I do not pretend that the foregoing will be enough to convince realists.
That is why I wrote the book. I have no illusions that many readers of
just this exchange will remain skeptical; fair enough. However, I would
not want readers to come away with a simply mistaken impression on
some matters, so, finally, let me correct a few of Echeverrias more specific
claims.
First, realists tend to confuse pragmatism with skepticism. Thus
Echeverria mistakenly maintains that I claim that we could not know
in any sense whatsoever that God exists necessarily. I nowhere say that,
nor does such a claim follow from the things I do say. My whole point is
that we could only know this the way we know other things: dependent
on a community of discourse that makes such knowledge possible. More
specificallygiven that I am skeptical about arguments for the existence
of GodI say we know this by means of revelation, which is given to
On this second mistake, see William J. Abraham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine
Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 1617.
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Given Smiths epistemic concept of truth, which fails to distinguish the conditions of justification from the conditions of truth [a distinction I reject as
specious], he must say that it is true only for those of us who have been
inculcated into the community of practice that is the church (CCC, 112).
Although this is not an anything goes subjectivism, reality is only reality
for those who come to know certain things under the ecclesial conditions of
knowing (emphases added).
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12
Most germane to this conversation would be the essays collected in Without Proof or
Evidence: Essays of O. K. Bouwsma, ed. J. L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1984). I am grateful to Chuck Bouwsma, his son, for entrusting to me
some of O. K.s works during a recent conversation. I hope my work extends O. K. Bouwsmas
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I have been trying in these paragraphs to represent a certain source of misunderstanding, an obstacle to misunderstanding. It may also be represented
in this way: Philosophers are people who investigate what sorts of things
there are in the universe. They are, of course, scrupulous in these investigations beyond the scrupulosity of any other investigator. They stand at
the gate and wait, fearing to tread where angels rush in. And what do they
ask? They ask questions such as: Are there angels, universals, pure possibilities, uncrusted possibilities, possibilities with a little mud on them, fairies,
creatures made of beautiful smoke, relations, the Lost Atlantis, real equality among tooth-picks, sense-data, ghosts, selves in prison with two feet,
everlasting shoe-makers, heaven, thinking horses, pure uncontaminated
acts, absolutely independent tables, the minds of stars, the spirits of an age,
perfect circles, the geometrical point of a joke, the devil, floating impressions, categorical donts, one simple called Simon, perspectives waiting to
take their places as the penny turns, gods, any ding-dong an Sich with a
bell so one can find it in the dark, trees, houses, and mountains of the mind,
itches of necessary connection, two impossibilities before breakfast, blue
ideas, enghosted pieces of furniture, etc.
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bottle, for instance, from which with the use of a spoon, one could pour off
the creamNow, theres America for you!this particular form of invention he seems not to have been interested in. He was more inclined to recommend a few old home remedies and common herbs, garden variety simples
which he was insistent one should not confuse. And as for those readers in
general who want answers to their questions and who, if they already have
answers, want better reasons, the author gives neither better reasons for the
old answers nor any answers, and those readers who keep their questions
may be considered either fortunate or unfortunate as the case may be.
I have tried to show how it is that this book should disappoint some readers, supposed that they had expectations in reading it. I have suggested that
the reason why such readers have such expectations is that it is, or is read as,
a book in philosophy. And it is a book of philosophy, surely? Well, it is and
it isnt.17
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