International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy

Author(s): James Marshall

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb., 1949), pp. 83-90
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950316 .
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CITIZEN DIPLOMACY
JAMES MARSHALL

United States National Commissionfor UNESCO

One wonders what the ghosts of Talleyrand and Franklin would say
were they to visit the diplomaticconferencesof today. Whereis the suave
approach,the graceful phrase concealingbloody warningsdropped by a
king to the music of a minuet or passed by an ambassadorto a minister
of state over the after-dinnerport? How surprisedthey would be at the
blunt Bevin with his frequentlyunconcealedill humor, at Molotov, rude
and blustering,at Byrnes publicly changinghis course in midstream,at
Marshallannouncingstate policy in speeches rather than to plenipotentiaries or throughofficialdocuments.
How surprisedTalleyrand and Franklin would be to think of international relationscarriedon pursuantto sloganssuch as "open covenants
openly arrived at." How their shrewd eyes would have twinkled at the
credulity of people who believed that they had democratizedforeign affairs through such a slogan. The old school diplomats would scarely
have confusedheadlineswhich report in large black type the speeches of
the diplomats,or the political gossip columnswhich purportto repeat the
whisperedasides of statesmen, with covenants democraticallynegotiated.
The fact is that although we have gained publicity for foreign affairs,
and that in itself is important, we have not democratizedforeign affairs.
They are still the business of technicians. They remain the preserve of
foreignoffices.
Of all administrative departments, the diplomatic and the military
have been the least receptive of democraticpatterns. As to foreign relations, this has been the result of two fallacies: (1) the idea that things
diplomaticare necessarilyand essentially top secret; (2) the misconception that the Bevins, the Molotovs, the Byrneses, and the Marshallscan
conduct foreign relationswithout being requiredto give a blow by blow
accountingto public opinion. The former is untrue; the latter no longer
possible. But we still romanticizeabout the confidentialcharacterof the
material of diplomacyand the skilful intrigue which we deem to be the
art of the statesman.
There are, however, in certain democraticcountries roots from which
more democraticforeignrelationscould grow. The great institution of the
question put by a memberof the House of Commonsto the prime minister or the minister of foreign affairs not merely brings informationto
the public, but inevitably humbles any would-beautocrat in the British
Foreign Office.The equally important institution of Congressionalhear83

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ings also has a sobering effect on administrative officers. For a Congressional committee can not only call the Department of State on the carpet;
it can give an opportunity to the interested public to express its views
concerning the principles of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations.
Such parliamentary questions and committee studies represent one
aspect of democratizing administration. They afford the opportunity for
a public canvassing and examination of the acts and aims of the administrators. They make the public partners in knowledge; they give to the
public the facts upon which they may base critical analyses and make
recommendations to the administrators. They fall short, however, of a
most fundamental element in democratic procedure. For to be able to
question administrators after the fact, after they have acted, is insufficient. Action itself remains untouched by the democratic process. Not
until there is broader participation in the planning, the development, and
the execution of foreign policy can it be said that the people take part in
their own foreign relations.
Occasionally, in especially dramatic situations, the people make their
opinions felt. Thus it was the strong popular reaction to the by-passing
of the United Nations by President Truman that resulted in the Vandenberg amendments to the proposals to aid Greece and Turkey. But in
most situations it is the middle levels of foreign offices which, untouched
to any great degree by the lay public, mark the trails which become the
roads of international policy.
"How can you expect the layman to take part in the planning, development, and execution of foreign policy?," the foreign office official will inquire. That is the question asked by technicians in all fields. The jurist
asked it as to lay arbitrators; yet we know today that commercial transactions are facilitated by arbitration, and labor disputes which are sometimes fought but rarely settled in courts are more frequently solved in a
satisfactory manner by lay arbitration or mediation. The physician and
the psychiatrist often ask similar questions of education; yet we know
that public health and mental hygiene cannot progress except as teachers
devote themselves to these problems in the schools. The engineer and the
plant manager put the same question in industry; yet we know now that
the psychological effect of worker participation in planning is to increase
efficiency.
Professional pride, professional defensiveness, tends in every field to
discount the layman. It tends to build up a cult of expertness, an almost
mystical cloud-throne guarded by the cherubim of a special technical
language. In the field of politics, in its extreme form, this separatism of
technicians leads to the police state with its NKVDs and its Gestapos to

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liquidate presumptuous laymen. In its more moderate expression, the

political technician and the bureaucrat simply treat the layman as one
who lives on the wrong side of the tracks of wisdom.
Fortunately, we have had some recent successful experiences in the participation of laymen in foreign relations. These may not supply sufficient
criteria for final judgment as to the effectiveness of democratic procedures
in that field. But they point a way. Just as we can say that a citizen army
can be a top-flight instrument of war, we now can add that there is evidence that a citizen diplomacy is a promising implement of peace.
In 1945, the State Department invited three or four voluntary organizations especially interested in the agenda to send representatives to the
Chapultepec Conference held in Mexico City by the Western Hemisphere
nations. This was a first hesitant experiment in citizen diplomacy. At the
San Francisco Conference, the United States made another trial of this
new technique. It invited 42 national organizations to send consultants to
the Conference which was to draw the United Nations Charter. These
organizations represented, among others, labor, business, agriculture,
education, lawyers, women, veterans, religious, civic, and peace groups.
They represented thirty to forty million Americans associated in voluntary organizations expressive of their interests as private citizens.
Almost daily during the course of the San Francisco Conference, these
consultants met with members of the American delegation, their advisers
or technical experts, and discussed Conference developments with them.
They submitted memoranda on various points at the request of the delegation. They gave the delegation the feel of the nation on issues which
arose-a much more personal and direct feel than could be had through
the filter of editorial writers and commentators.
These consultants, these laymen participating in the planning and development of critical international relations, made a number of specific
proposals to the American delegation which found their way into the
Charter. For example, under the leadership of Judge Joseph M. Proskauer,
the efforts of the consultants resulted in the inclusion of the human rights
provision. The inclusion of education in the field of the Economic and
Social Council was in large measure due to the work of the consultants
led by Dr. William G. Carr and Dr. George Zook.
The presence and participation of these consultants at San Francisco
contributed immeasurably to American understanding of the Charter, to
American eagerness to join the United Nations, and to the overwhelming
approval of the Charter by the Senate. The support of the U. N. by the
people of this country is largely attributable to the challenge given to the
consultants by their invitation to the San Francisco Conference. Furthermore, these consultants, and more indirectly the organizations they

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represented, had staked out something of a vested interest in the United

Nations as a result of the time, thought, and effort they had devoted to the
creation of the Charter.
A second instance of the democratization of foreign affairs is to be found
in the United States National Commission for UNESCO. This institution
grows out of the provision of the UNESCO constitution. Article VII provides that "each member state shall make such arrangements as suit its
particular conditions for the purpose of associating its principal bodies interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters with the work of
the Organization, preferably by the formation of a National Commission
broadly representative of the Government and such bodies." Such
National Commissions, or national cooperating bodies, according to the
constitution, are to act "in an advisory capacity to their respective delegations to the General Conference and to their Governments in matters relating to the Organization and shall function as agencies of liaison in all
matters of interest to it," and are to be consulted by their governments in
the selection of delegates to UNESCO. These clauses stem largely from
proposals made in this country and pushed by the United States delegation to the Conference in London which prepared the draft of the UNESCO
constitution in 1945.
How did the State Department treat the opportunity to apply on a permanent basis the experiences with the consultants at San Francisco? How
did it make use of this invitation to gain popular support for UNESCO
and bring democratic procedures into one phase of international relations? It drew closer its cloak of bureaucratic pride. It consulted its little
entourage of trusted advisers, who regarded not only diplomacy but also
education, science, and culture as the domain of the expert. It caused to
be introduced into Congress a joint resolution authorizing the Secretary
of State "to designate, for such periods of service as he may determine, not
to exceed 30 persons broadly representative of the educational, scientific,
and cultural interests of the United States, to serve on the National Commission."
In other words, the Department of State intended to keep a tight hold
on popular participation through hand-picked individuals. But this is
quite different from the United States "associating its principal bodies
interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters with the work of
the Organization." The bodies themselves could be represented only by
persons of their own choice.
A number of organizations which had been urging the establishment of
UNESCO appeared before Congress to protest this attempt to create a
house organ of the State Department out of the opportunity for popular
participation in our international cultural relations. The whole point of a
national commission would have been missed if the principal bodies in

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this country interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters had

been omitted. The voice of UNESCO would rarely reach the schoolroom
or the woman's club or the laboratory except through the releases of the
State Department or the pronouncements of its 30 representative favorites. Nor would the desire of great numbers of people to participate in the
development of the UNESCO program, in playingsa part in international
relations in their own fields, have been tapped by the official plan.
The Congress was induced to change the proposed organization of the
United States National Commission for UNESCO. It provided for a
National Commission of 100 members, 40 of whom were to be outstanding persons selected by the Secretary of State, including not more than 10
federal government employees, not more than 15 representatives of state
and local educational, scientific, and cultural interests, and not more than
15 persons chosen at large, and 60 "representatives of principal national
voluntary organizations interested in educational, scientific, and cultural
matters." The Commission is vested with power to review periodically
the list of organizations designating representatives "in order to achieve
a desirable rotation among organizations represented."
In addition, the National Commission is directed to call general conferences for the discussion of matters relating to UNESCO, to which
conferences organizations actively interested in the problems of UNESCO
shall be invited to send representatives, and special conferences of experts
to consider specific matters relating to UNESCO. In this way, representatives of popular organizations and experts, as well as individual national
and local leaders, are enabled to take part in the development of policy
and the domestic operation of the program of UNESCO.
The first meeting of the National Commission took place in September,
1946, with leadership taken by the representatives of national organizations. The interest was intense, and the National Commission spent the
greater part of three days in developing a program for the American
delegation to the UNESCO Conference. At the conclusion of the Commission meeting, the Executive Committee met with Assistant Secretary of
State William Benton to discuss the names of possible delegates to the
UNESCO Conference to be held in Paris in November, 1946. There was
also discussion of the principles to be applied in the selection of the delegation. As selected, the delegation was made up largely of persons who
were members of the National Commission and almost entirely of persons
who had been discussed and supported by the Executive Committee.
At the conference of UNESCO held in Paris in 1946, the American delegation was in large measure successful in establishing its point of view on
the program of the Organization. This does not mean, of course, that the
American delegation had its own way in everything. It did not. But because of the preparation that had been made by the National Commission

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and the staff of the State Department, it was one of the best prepared, if
not the best prepared, delegations at the conference on matters of program and policy. Where the United States delegation failed was on points
that had not been discussed by the National Commission-the matter of
administration, the matter of budgeting, the matter of the appointment
of the Director-General.
The failure of the United States delegation in these respects was due
in part to the inadequacy of the State Department's political preparations,
that is, its understanding of the temper of other delegations. But above
all, it was due to the fact that the delegation itself was not adequately prepared. And in the case of the director-generalship it can hardly be said
that the delegation had its heart in supporting the American candidate.
There was no one who did not respect him, but there was unquestionable
resentment in the delegation that the important matter of policy involved
in the selection of a Director-General had never been discussed with the
National Commission. The Department had therefore failed to gain both
the immediate wholehearted support of its delegation and the support of
the people at home who must play a fundamental r6le in making UNESCO
effective in this country.
At the Mexico City Conference in 1947, there was another example of
the danger of leaving cultural relations to State Department determination. The United States abstained from voting on the resolution to admit
Hungary to membership in UNESCO. Although the United States delegation was almost unanimously opposed to bringing into UNESCO the
political problems that beset the United Nations, State Department policy
overrode these objections and directed the delegation to refrain from
voting because United States policy in the United Nations had opposed
the admission of Hungary. This was an unfortunate introduction of power
politics into the cultural field, which most of the lay members of the delegation and some of the departmental advisers appreciated. It is unfortunate that the United States National Commission did not have an opportunity to express its view on this point.
Certainly the lesson of the consultants of San Francisco had application
here. Their participation demonstrated the strength of the following that
could be developed throughout the country when representatives of great
popular organizations took part in the Conference.
There are, of course, thousands of organizations in this country which
cannot find a place in the limited membership of the National Commission
for UNESCO. They, too, have a part to play in broadening international
understanding through education, science, and culture. Under the provisions of the enabling act, there have been a national conference in Philadelphia and regional conferences in Denver and San Francisco in which
members of these organizations found opportunities to become acquainted

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with the work of UNESCO and to bring to the National Commission their
views on the policy which the United States should pursue. The conferences were successful, hundreds of organizations and thousands of people
having participated.
In connection with UNESCO, as at the San Francisco Conference, the
United States has set up a pilot plant on citizen diplomacy. Other nations
have been slower to create national commissions. Some of them are working with "national cooperating bodies" interested in educational, scientific, and cultural matters. But great interest has been shown in the United
States National Commission. Just prior to the 1948 meeting of UNESCO
in Beirut, a meeting of representatives of national commissions was held.
It was presided over by Milton S. Eisenhower, chairman of the United
States National Commission.
Votes or plebiscites on the question of war or peace are impractical.
Events move at times too rapidly to make them appropriate. Momentary
passions may even make them dangerous. Nevertheless, if we believe in
the democratic principle that in the long run the people themselves rather
than those who occupy places in their governments are the best judges of
what is good for people, we must give the public better access to technicians of foreign affairs. This can best be done by admitting the people
themselves more and more to the planning stages of foreign relations and
to greater participation in international conferences. Secretary Byrnes
would have been greatly strengthened in Paris at the meeting of Foreign
Ministers if he had been accompanied by a group of consultants such as
was present by invitation at San Francisco. General Marshall would have
benefited in Moscow from a similar arrangement.
Such participation must be inadequate when limited to hand-picked
individuals. Such persons will inevitably tend to represent views which
the appointing officials wish to hear. Courtiers and kitchen cabinets soon
lose their sensitivity to the pulse and heartbeats of the mass of the people.
Where there are voluntary bodies, their representatives will give a more
genuine picture of the ideas of the people themselves. Such voluntary
bodies will prove the backbone of any organized popular participation in
international affairs.
The Information and Educational Exchange Act (the Smith-Mundt
bill) recently adopted by Congress provides for the participation of laymen in the informational and cultural relations of the State Department.
Two commissions are set up to represent the public interest, the Commission on Information and the Commission on Educational Exchange. They
are, among other things, directed to "formulate and recommend to the
Secretary policies and programs for the carrying out of this Act." Thus for
the second time Congress expressed its confidence in laymen to help formulate foreign policy.

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Again, in the Foreign Assistance Act provision has been made for a
Public Advisory Board consisting of the administrator and 12 additional
members appointed by the President subject to Senatorial approval. It
is unfortunate that neither act goes one step further, permitting voluntary
organizations to nominate members of the two commissions and of the
Public Advisory Board.
Both at the San Francisco Conference and in the United States National
Commission for UNESCO, business, agriculture, labor, education, science,
the arts, higher learning in the various fields of culture, the churches,
and women's groups have demonstrated their capacity to bring to the
responsible public officials the voice and support of the American people.
These experiments-and the provisions of the Smith-Mundt bill-indicate the road to democratizing foreign relations, one of the most resistant
fields to the entry of the layman.
It is questionable whether peace can be preserved by the efforts of
technicians, even the most high-minded. They sit alternately on pedestals
and in anxious seats, neither of which is favorable to a free flow of understanding with the public in whose name they purport to speak. If, however, as the constitution of UNESCO proclaims, "wars begin in the minds
of men, and it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be
constructed," the great resource of the minds of laymen must be tapped
and conduits prepared through which their energies may flow to the maintenance of an affirmative peace.
If, as we commonly believe today, it is men rather than states that are
the ultimate foundations of good will, then every possible means must be
explored to enable men to plan and participate in the expression of international good will. We shall continue to require the skills of Talleyrands
and Franklins. But to be effective in maintaining peace, they must now
speak the minds of citizen diplomats, of great masses of people, rather than
of dynasties, political parties, or ruling groups.