How Does Kant Prove That We Perceive, and Not Merely Imagine, Physical Objects?

Author(s): Kenneth R. Westphal

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Jun., 2006), pp. 781-806
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HOW DOES KANT PROVE THATWE PERCEIVE,

AND NOT MERELY IMAGINE,PHYSICAL OBJECTS?*
KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

I
In

the

OF Idealism

Refutation

and his notes

to it in the B Preface,
"the reality of
of proving

issue in terms
antiskeptical
that we
which
requires
proving
sense,"
and time.1
in space
physical
objects
imagine,

Kant

his

frames

outer

critic Maim?n

in space

of physical
objects
by our imagination.2
example,
Maimon's
analyses
"analytic

by

the Humean

reasserted

The

and

time

same

kind

both

Stroud,

rests

objection
and proofs,3

and

transcendental

objection,
is a deceptive
of objection

serious

I agree

with

recent

produced
today,

for

expositors.
of Kant's

misunderstandings
and Rorty
Stroud

fail to rebut

arguments"

illusion
is made

to his

and

to Kant
on

not merely
perceive,
Kant's
contemporary
that the appearance

that

(in effect)

recent

Maimon's

objection.4

to: k.westphal@uea.ac.uk,

Correspondence

*This

essay

is

dedicated

to

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j018.

Burkhard

wegf?hrender
Tuschling,
Philosoph.
1 Immanuel
der reinen Vernunft
(Critique
of Pure Rea
Kant, Kritik
appears inKants Gesammelte
son), Bxl-xli n., B276-7 n. Kant's first Kritik
Akademie
der Wis
"Ak"), 29 vols., K?niglich Preu?ische
Schriften
(hereafter,
to
work
The
numbers
in
citations
G.
senschaften
this
Reimer,
1902-).
(Berlin:
for example, Ak 3:137.5-13.
Others of Kant's
indicate volume:page.lines;
are cited by the initials of their German
from
titles. All translations
works
in all recent trans
from Ak is provided
Kant's works are mine; the pagination
lations of his works.
2Solomon
Gesammelte
Maim?n,
Werke, ed. Valerio Verra (Hildesheim:
Olms, 1965), 5:377-8, 386.
3For
show no trace of Kant's key doctrine of the
example, his writings
I found none, and neither did Achim
transcendental
of
unity
apperception.
zum
Idealismus
Salomon Maimons
Untersuchungen
(Stuttgart
Engstier,
Bad Cannstadt: Frommann-Holzboog,
1990), 94-5, 122-3.
4Recent reconstructions
fail to engage the core of Kant's proof, because
the concept
they focus on our possessing
"physical object," or on our using it,
or even correct use of it. Strawson
requiring our justified
though without
The Review
Metaphysics

of Metaphysics

59

(June

2006):

781-806.

Copyright

2006

by The Review

of

782

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL
Asking

imagine

how

physical
this. This

Kant
objects
I affirm.

that we

proves

in space

and

rather

perceive
time,

presumes

than merely
that Kant does

does not presume

this, however,
Affirming
that Kant proved
it in precisely
the way he proposed.
I contend
that
Kant's proof
in ways,
succeeds
and to an extent,
that even Kant did
prove

not

his proof need not appeal

to
his
of
Kant's
refute
proof
key
Indeed, parts
idealism.
This paper epitomizes
for transcendental
the key
arguments
in Kant's unofficial,
transcendental
for the
steps
sound,
proof
though
of Idealism:
conclusion
of his Refutation
"The mere,
namely,
though
appreciate.
transcendental

empirically
the existence

In part,
idealism.

determined
of objects

this

is because

consciousness

of my

in space

me."5

outside

own

existence

proves

II
The
concerns
course,
clusions
Kant

first
point,
important
by recent
neglected
reconstructions,
Recent
transcendental
method.
are, of
"analytic
arguments"
con
to justify substantive,
they attempt
analytic;
antiskeptical
the
of
self-conscious
Yet
by analyzing
possibility
experience.

stresses

that no analytic

argument

can justify

any

synthetic

prop

(The Bounds
of Sense
[London: Methuen,
1966]), Rorty ("Strawson's Objec
24 [1970]: 222, 224; "Verificationism
tivity Argument," Review
ofMetaphysics
5 [1971]: 3-14), and Stroud ("Tran
and Transcendental
Nous
Arguments,"
and
scendental
Naturalism',"
Philosophical
'Epistemological
Arguments
31 [1977]: 106, 110) focus too much on concept possession,
and spec
Studies
to capture
too vaguely,
the character
and point of
ify their "application"
fo
Kant's transcendental
proofs.
Similarly, Bennett's
"Objectivity Argument"
cuses on the "application" of concepts
in a way that reflects rather than re
in "Of Scepticism
with Regard to the Senses" (A Trea
jects Hume's analysis
David
and Mary J. Norton
ed.
Fate
Norton
tise of Human
Nature,
[Oxford:
in Bennett's
Oxford University
argu
Press, 2000], bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2) because
ment their "application" does not require their correct (truthful) application.
See Bennett,
Kant's
University
Press,
Analytic
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
in Transcendental
and "Analytic Transcendental
202-14;
1966),
Arguments,"
ed. Peter Bieri, Rolf-Peter Horstmann,
and Lorenz
and Science,
Arguments
1979), 52-5. On the inadequacy of "analytic tran
Kr?ger (Dordrecht: Reidel,
see Thomas Grundmann, Analytische
scendental
Transzenden
arguments,"
Eine Kritik
talphilosophie.
1994); David Bell, "Tran
(Paderborn: Sch?ningh,
in
and
Non-Naturalistic
scendental
Anti-Realism,"
Arguments
Problems
and Prospects,
ed. Robert Stern (Ox
Transcendental
Arguments:
R. Westphal,
ford: Oxford University
Press,
1999), 189-210; and Kenneth
Realism
Kant's
Transcendental
Proof of
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), chap. 1.
is provided
inWestphal, Kant's
The full analysis
5B275; Ak 3:191.18-20.
Transcendental
Proof.

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE
a priori.6
than
expansive
Kant's Refutation
osition

If recent

"analytic
the
possibility
analysandum
are refuted by Rorty's
ments
Furthermore,

of philosophical
not expansive

notions

they
Kant's,
of Idealism.

783

are

transcendental
of consciousness

are more

analysis
to

enough

arguments"
per se.

support
as

take
All

such

their
argu

that

objection,

of the Strawsonian
of which
type rest on considerations
Arguments
of which other words.
words can be understood
The rel
independently
evance of these considerations
if we admit the possibility
of a
vanishes
as an X but could not use the
being who could experience
something
lX' nor

word

any

equivalent

expression.7

not perturb
of Rorty's
the possibility
However,
imagined
being would
con
aims at identifying
the transcendental
Kant at all. Kant expressly
ditions
for the possibility
of human
and
necessary
self-consciousness,
more
us
the
transcendental
conditions
for
to
be
required
particularly,
aware

of our

some

events

Kant

engages

as determined

existence
happening
us with

in time, that is, to be aware

of
To
and
after
do
others.8
this,
before,
during
a series
of wildly
counterfactual
thought

to bring us
experiments
designed
tive capacities,
and their attendant
sessing

these

thought

some

to recognize
incapacities.
involves

experiments

of our key

Appreciating
"transcendental

cogni
and as
reflec

tion."9

Ill
Kant's
of our

forms

of space and time stresses

analysis
of intuition
and our use of concepts

the spatio-temporality
of space and time

in

an important
to make
inter alia,
semantic
order,
point about determi
one
nate
to
that
reference
item.
any
reference,
is,
particular,
single
our incapacity
to represent
Kant stresses
to ourselves
of
the absence
space

and

time.

Nor

can we

perceive

space

or time as such,

though

of

509.24-510.25.
See Manfred Baum,
6B263-5, B810; Ak 3:184.26-185.19,
Deduktion
und Beweis
in Kants
Transzendentalphilosophie
(K?nigstein:
Hain bei Athen?um,
1986), 1, 175-81.
7Rorty, "Strawson's Objectivity Argument,"
224, compare 231.
8More
Kant's analysis seeks the transcendental
conditions
specifically,
that make
self-consciousness
for finite beings possessing
possible
spatio
temporal forms of intuition and a discursive
understanding,
though human
beings are the only instance of such beings we know of.
9Westphal, Kant's Transcendental
Proof
chap. 1.

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

784
course

we

sent.10

Kant's

can

other

different

beings

our

important
tence on

ab
ca

our

representational
capacities.
of the kind Rorty
have
imagines)
to
is
irrelevant
capacities
understanding
Kant's
of
observations
positive
implications

beings?of

(for example,

representational
The
knowledge.

human
about

point
human

of

pacities
Whether

of their being void, or even of their being

a key feature
concerns
of the representational

conceive

capacities

representational

spatio-temporal
semantic
and

cognitive

the distinction

between,
in human

bility and understanding

One key semantic

insight that undergirds

and the interdependence

concerns

an

Kant's

insis

of,

sensi

of the world.

knowledge
is that definite
de
point,
by Kant,
recognized
not
for
of
do
suffice
Putative
defi
scriptions
particulars.
knowledge
reveal
nite descriptions
aren't self-identifying:
they don't
intrinsically
or
are
whether
they
empty,
uniquely
satisfied,
Any rea
ambiguous.
or overt)
covert
token
indexicals,
description
sonably
specific
(sans
may

be

satisfied

by nothing

or by

several

Specificity
things.
of reference.
Whether

of de

a de
particularity
on
con
or
the
depends
equally
definite,
ambiguous
to pick out spatio
For human beings,
the only way
or
is
them
For
by sensing
temporal
particulars
(directly
indirectly).
reference
human
sensory
requires
singular
singular
cognitive
beings,
scription

cannot

guarantee

is empty,
scription
tents of the world.

presentation.
icals in some
in perceptual
ments).
temporal
sensing

Semantic
form, which
circumstances

to particulars
token index
requires
can play their role in human
only
cognition
can
instru
include
observational
(which

reference

are spatio
for human
circumstances,
Perceptual
beings,
circumstances.
by
spatio-temporal
particulars
Identifying
the
at least approximately
in part, identifying
them involves,

they occupy.11
spatio-temporal
regions
recourse
to spatio-temporal
Our ineliminable
specification
of
demonstrative
recent
of
the
"character"
flected
analyses
by
where

such

terms

can be used

is re
terms,

or understood

only by understanding
reference
frame they implicitly
spatio-temporal
reference
also re
for
us, singular
Conversely,
cognitive

the speaker-centered
presuppose.12

10A19-20, 22-3, 31, 172-3, 188, 214, 487/B34, 37-8, 46, 207-8, 214, 231,
261, 515.
11The
theories of reference was
of descriptions
insufficiency
cognitive
See Arthur Melnick, Space,
Kant's point of departure for the whole Critique.
in Kant (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 1-5, 25-6.
Time and Thought
12David
in Themes from Kaplan,
ed.
"On Demonstratives,"
Kaplan,
et al. (New York: Oxford University
Press,
1989), 481-563;
Joseph Almog
13 (1979): 3-21;
of the Essential
John Perry, "The Problem
Indexical," Nous
and Gareth Evans, The Varieties
of Reference
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1982), chap. 6.

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE

785

some
at least approximately
namely,
quires
predication,
ascribing
we sense, within
some
to any particular
identified
characteristics
least

determined
approximately
and
predication
spatio-temporal
Kant's
account
of the conjoint
and understanding

bility

reaches

at

spatio-temporal
determination
cognitive
this same

Moreover,
region.
are interdependent.13
of human
sensi
functioning
conclusion

(below,

section

9).

rv
to a greater
succeeds
extent
than even he appreci
proof
two sound,
it provides
transcendental
argu
genuinely
content
for (not "from") mental
externalism.
The first of these

Kant's
ated

because

ments

turns on the following

considerations:
Kant's
"formal" ide
arguments
alism requires
of experience
that the matter
be given to us ab extra.
is a transcendental
This
material
condition
of self-conscious
experi
ence.14

Another
is the

experience
Kant notes
conscious

from

in which

affinity
human

condition
of

the

of

self-conscious

manifold.15
sensory
are capable
of self

beings
us with a certain mini
provide
of
and
the contents
degree
variety
among
regularity
In any world
this minimum
of regu
lacking
degree
we could make
no judgments.
we
could
Therefore,
is one

experience

larity and variety,

not identify objects

material

transcendental

that any world

mal, recognizable
of our sensations.

selves

transcendental

or events;
and

them;
In this connection

that must

we could not distinguish

therefore,
we
not be self-conscious.
could
therefore,
Kant argues
that the fact that a complete

our

sensi

are

and

of associating
does
bility
understanding
capable
perceptions
not of itself determine
or per
it is possible
whether
for appearances
are
to
be
If
not
associated.16
there
may be
ceptions
they
associable,
sensa
of empirical
consciousness
episodes
fleeting
(that is, random
no
no
but
there
could
be
and
hence
tions),
integrated,
self-conscious,
In part this would
be because
those
sensations
irregular
no basis for developing
nor
for using
empirical
concepts
no
to
could
be
schematism
concepts
judge objects.
(There

experience.
would
afford
categorial

13Gareth
Journal
Evans,
"Identity and Predication,"
of Philosophy
72,
13 (1975): 343-63.
14
Transcendental
Idealism:
An Interpretation
Henry Allison, Kant's
and Defense
(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1983), 250.
15
Al 12-4.
no.

16A121-3.

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

786

in a world
of utterly
chaotic
categories
the
In
this
the
of
of the
necessity
associability
sensations.)
regard,
a
manifold
is
conditional
between
that
sensory
necessity,
holding

and

no

hence

manifold

use

and

of Kant's

self-conscious

any

human

if a hu
subject.
Necessarily,
of an object
via a
(or event)

aware
is self-consciously
subject
then
the content
of that manifold
is as
manifold
of sensory
intuition,
The associability
is its "affinity."
it
sociable.
of this content
Because
man

is necessary
finity

for

the possibility
is transcendental.

of self-conscious

the transcendental

status

such

af

in the
plainest
of a "logical
law of genera"
passage,
though here he speaks
following
of
the
instead of the "transcendental
manifold":
sensory
affinity
Kant makes

of this

experience,
issue

to us there were such a

If among the appearances
offering themselves
will not say of form (for they might be similar to one an
great variety?I
of exist
other in that) but of content, that is, regarding the manifoldness
even
most
acute
the
human
understanding,
through
ing beings?that
of one with another, could not detect the least similarity (a
comparison
case which
can at least be thought),
then the logical law of genera
would not obtain at all, no concept of a genus, nor any other universal
at all would
indeed no understanding
concept,
obtain, since the un
of gen
has to do with such concepts.
The logical principle
derstanding
a transcendental
era therefore presupposes
of
[principle
genera] if it is
I here understand
to be applied to nature (by which
that
only objects
sameness
are given to us). According
to that [latter] principle,
of kind is
in the manifold
of a possible
experience
(even
necessarily
presupposed
because without
it no
its degree a priori),
though we cannot determine
no
would
be
hence
and
concepts
experience
empirical
possible.17

that

Despite
satisfies

the very

the

there
contents

chaos"?there
conscious,

the

same

the sensory
where

Kant's

as

shift

"logical
that which

satisfies

In the extreme

manifold."

it is plain
that the condition
at this fundamental
level is

in terminology,
law of genera"
the

"transcendental

case

affinity

of

here

by Kant,
suggested
or variety within
detectable
humanly
regularities
this "transcendental
of our sensory
experience?call
self
and so no human
could be no human
thought,

is no

at all.18

Kant

establishes

this

necessary

transcendental

17
Ak 3:433.14-29
added).
A653-4/B681-2;
(emphases
18Kant's
argument about this "Logical Law of Genera" closely parallels
both
his argument about the transcendental
affinity of the sensory manifold:
concern
orderliness
the recognizable
of what we sense, and the constitutive
of our understanding.
for the very functioning
of that orderliness
necessity
and thus
is required for any synthetic unity of apperception,
This functioning
that is, for the occurrence
is required for any analytic unity of apperception,
a difference
between Kant's two
of any human "I think." There is, however,
cases: The Logical Law of Genera concerns
objects, while Kant usually states
of sensory
intuition in terms of the
transcendental
affinity of the manifold
see
contents of sensations
Plainly, if the Logical Law of
A90-1/B122-3).
(but

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE
condition

for

self-conscious

787

a key
by identifying
experience
even to
to be self-conscious,
inability
in a world
of transcenden
concepts,

human

of ours: our
incapacity
cognitive
or employ
think, even to generate
Kant's
tal chaos. We can recognize
counter-factual
ing the radically
how
utterly
nizing
incapacitating
our own thought,
and
experience,

insight only by carefully

case he confronts
us with:
transcendental

chaos

consider

by recog
would
be for

self-consciousness.

so is the transcendental
of sen
is satisfied,
affinity of the manifold
there could be transcendental
sory intuition.
However,
perhaps
affinity
intuition only to the extent that there were
of sensory
among the manifold
and
detectable
humanly
variety among sensory contents, without
regularities
our being able to identify objects in nature. To this extent, the Logical Law of
the satisfaction
of these
is a stronger principle.
The extent to which
Genera
two principles
Kant claims that
could in fact diverge is difficult to determine.
failure to satisfy either principle has the same consequence,
namely, human
In that case, there could be no syn
simply could not function.
understanding
thetic unity of apperception,
and so no analytic unity of apperception,
and so
no self-consciousness
of the form expressed
The diffi
by "I think" (B131-9).
whether
cult point
is to determine
could function
human understanding
while using only the categories
of quality and quantity; judgments using these
two categories
could potentially
be made
in circumstances
that satisfied the
of
of
the
manifold
transcendental
sensory
affinity
intuition, though not the
this issue would
require minute
Logical Law of Genera.
Resolving
investiga
tion of Kant's Transcendental
Deduction.
two central points suf
Fortunately,
fice here.
the transcendental
First, both principles,
affinity of the sensory
manifold
and the Logical Law of Genera, provide
transcendental
proofs of
mental content externalism,
In either case,
though of slightly different kinds.
this is a major anti-Cartesian
result.
transcen
Second, Kant's antiskeptical
dental proof of realism sans phrase needn't appeal to the bare possibility
of
the analytic unity of apperception.
It can appeal to the perhaps stronger, cer
of Kant's Refutation
of Idealism,
that we are
tainly more
explicit premise
aware of our own existence
as empirically
in time (B275).
determined
can be clari
The substantive
between Kant's two principles
difference
fied by considering
for what is at bottom the
why he uses two designations
same principle.
concerns
The transcendental
affinity of the sensory manifold
the bare minimum
level of regularity and variety among the contents
of our
sensations
that is required to enable us to identify kinds or genera at all.
Once satisfied,
there is then a reflective
issue, addressed
by Kant's Transcen
dental Law of Genera, concerning
the extent to which
the kinds or genera we
the transcendental
identify can be systematized.
Thus, satisfying
affinity of
the sensory manifold
is a precondition
for our generating any empirical
intui
tions at all, while
the reflective
issue addressed
by Kant's Transcendental
Law of Genera presumes
that we have sufficiently
coherent
intui
empirical
or
we
tions to identify spatio-temporal
to
where
objects
events,
try
system
atize the characteristics
of them we have identified.
This contrast, however,
did not preclude Kant from highlighting,
in the passage just quoted, the tran
constitutive
issue of the affinity of the sensory manifold while ex
scendental,
law of genera.
plaining the status of his transcendental
Genera

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

788
This

transcendental
on the sensory
a certain
Below

constraint

a conditionally
necessary
we ex
to us by whatever

establishes
proof
contents
provided

of regular
degree
our understand

perience.
(a priori
indeterminable)
our sensations,
contents
of
and
the
among
variety
ity
under
consequently
judgments;
ing cannot make
cannot

self-conscious.

be

there

variety,

is then

(Above
a reflective

this minimal
issue

about

that

condition

level

of regularity
to which
the extent

can be systematized.)
because
it is both
is peculiar

we
and
our

of the world

experience
This

condition
and

yet
formal,
The transcendental

nor

neither

transcendental
but

and

rather material.

intuitive,
conceptual
is transcendental
of the sensory manifold
a priori condition
of the possibility
it is a necessary
of self
because
It is formal because
it concerns
the orderliness
conscious
experience.
or content
it is satis
of sensation.
of the matter
ultimately
However,

fied

neither

and

time

affinity

by Kant's a priori
as forms of human

intuitive
intuition,

conditions

of experience,
space
a
the
by
priori conceptual
of judgment.
As Kant twice

nor

our categories
of experience,
or the "object"
its
is due to the "content"
satisfaction
acknowledges,
of sensation
is given us ab extra,
the matter
Because
of experience.19
we
we do not and cannot
also cannot
it. Consequently,
gen
generate
conditions

or variety
of regularity
among
degree
our
of
The contents
of our sensations.
the contents
sensations,
along
to
must
be given
similarities
and differences,
their recognizable
with
a
is
us by something
this
than ourselves.
other
genu
Consequently,
erate

or otherwise

insure

any

we
content
externalism:
for mental
argument
inely transcendental
aware
contents
"mental"
of any purported
cannot
be self-consciously
some
aware
at
contents
that concern
least
"mental"
of
without
being
and derive

from

something

other

than and outside

of us.20

19
Al 12-3, A653-4/B681-2.
20
can justify conclusions
much
stronger
proofs
Thus, transcendental
he claims that the most
than Rorty recognizes;
they can show are interrela
See "Strawson's Objectivity Argument,"
tions among thoughts.
236; "Verifica
5 (1971): 3-14. Part of why
tionism and Transcendental
Arguments," Nous
in this regard is that the tran
his own achievement
Kant fails to recognize
is a formal,
manifold
of
the
scendental
sensory
transcendental,
affinity
of self-conscious
for the very possibility
condition
experi
though material
idealism does not provide
ence. The architectonic
of Kant's transcendental
of such issues, see Kenneth R.
For a concise discussion
for such conditions.
of Experi
for the Possibility
Conditions
"Must the Transcendental
Westphal,
e
Kantiane
ence be Ideal?" in Eredit?
questioni
emergenti
(1804-2004):
ed. Cinzia Ferrini (Naples: Bibliopolis,
2004), 107-26. Sig
irrisolti,
problemi
content ex
makes
the same case for mental
the later Wittgenstein
nificantly,
See
invoking Kant's specific cognitive psychology.
ternalism, though without
and Transcendental
R. Westphal,
Kenneth
Chaos,"
"Kant, Wittgenstein,
28, no. 4 (2005): 303-23.
Investigations
Philosophical

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE

789

V
Kant's
his first

semantic

proof
by his

mented

point about
of mental
content
proof

that we

determinate

externalism,
can only make

and

reference,
cognitive
are reinforced
and
causal

legitimate

aug
judg

a
substances.
This argument
spatio-temporal
provides
of mental
content
transcendental
external
stronger
proof
second,
ism. It proceeds
in two steps: The Paralogisms
of Rational
Psychology
cannot make
that we
causal
about
prove
any legitimate
judgments

ments

about

merely

temporal
that we

prove

or events, while
the Analogies
of Experience
objects
can make
causal
about
legitimate
only
judgments
substances.

spatio-temporal
Kant
contends

to substance.21
that causality
is strictly
related
our knowl
in
the
both
argues
(in
Paralogisms
against
editions)
we have no
that in psychology
self, and he argues
edge of a substantial
we
no
If
evidence
of any extended
have
of a
evidence
substance.22

Kant

self, then none of us can use any of the Principles

to make
about ourselves.
Thus we cannot
Analogies
judgments
we
in psychology
causal
because
any determinate
judgments
substantial

identify

any

causally
time.
sense, namely
The main
target
nalist

active

substance(s)

within

the sole

form

to be sure, is traditional
of the Paralogisms,
even when
this, Kant indicates
stating
criticism:
the concept
of a simple nature

but

psychology,23
of his
aspect
pirical
in an objectively
be a predicate
the empirical
elaborates
quickly

of the
justify
cannot
of inner

ratio
an em
cannot

valid

Kant
experiential
judgment.24
of his criticism
aspect
by criticizing
of substance
either one
regarding

use of the category

empirical
self or one's psychological
states:
the only empirically
usable
concept
of substance
in
is the permanence
of an object
but
experience,
given
no such permanence
can be demonstrated
in the case of the "I."25
any

a priori
that there can be no synthetic
argues
soul at all, of any kind.
doctrine
of
Any rational
or
to
make
priori
purports
empirical,
synthetic
as a judgmental
Such judgments
intuitions
require

Kant

21

B183,
176.19-20.

A182-84/B225-7,

A204/B249;

22A381, B291, B293-4.

23
A342/B400,
B405-6; Ak 3:263.16-20,
24A361.
25A349-50.

Ak

266.16-25.

about
principles
the soul, whether
judgments
connecting

3:137.30-138.4,

the
a

a priori.
link, but

163.1-32,

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

790
there

are no

cause

we

suitable

to be

intuitions

or abiding
a doctrine

intuit nothing
permanent
is not
rational psychology

quently,
our cognitive

in inner

found

in inner
but

be
experience,26
Conse
sense.27

a discipline

limiting

aspirations.28

VI
An
imate
about

important
though
causal
judgments

neglected
is that we

or abiding

can

of Kant's
only

make

of legit
analysis
such judgments

of being
able to
importance
or events
that is, objects
substances,
and why we can only identify
such sub

substances.

spatio-temporal

feature

identify
"permanent"
that persist
changes,
through
stances
and time
within
space

The

are made

evident
by a
of
Kant's
widely
Experience.
Analogies
neglected
set of mutually
form a tightly
three Analogies
integrated
supporting
can be used
each of which
with
the other
only together
principles,
treats the persistence
of substance
two.29 The First Analogy
through
state
treats only
the
Second
of
changes
(transformations);
Analogy
feature

conjointly,

of Kant's

causal processes
within
and it is the
any one substance;
rule-governed
treats causal
Third Analogy
alone which
interaction
between
any two
substances.
Kant is express
about
this.30 Hence
only with
(or more)
to Hume's
skepticism
directly
our knowledge
of causal
because
there
does he
powers,
only
a transeunt
in a
account
of causality,
that something
the view

the Third
about
defend

Analogy

does

Kant

respond

to influence
that substance
active
substance
goes out beyond
causally
a
or causally
to
effect
in a dis
affect
else, that is,
something
change
events
have ex
the thesis
that all physical
tinct substance?in
brief,
ternal

causes.31

Despite

the

complexities

of

these

issues,

the main

26
B421-2; Ak 3:275.13-20.
A398-9; Ak 4:248.28-249.11;
27
compare A349-50, A361, A381, A398-9, A402-3;
A366; Ak 4:230.18-28;
Ak 4:221.1-15,
227.21-8, 251.12-20; B420; Ak 3:274.15-24.
28
Ak
compare
?89,
3:274.36-275.4;
B420; Ak 3:274.24-6; KdU
B421;
5:460.20-32.
29Paul
and the Claims
Cam
of Knowledge
Guyer, Kant
(Cambridge:
228, 239, 246, 274-5;
Press,
224-5,
1987), 168, 212-14,
bridge University
Westphal, Kant's Transcendental
Proof, ??36-9.
5:181.
30BUl;KdU,Ak
the Oxford En
311 retain the archaic spelling of "transeunt" because
in the sense
indicates
it
is
used
and
precisely
exclusively
Dictionary
glish
here indicated.

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE
Kant makes

point
ples

the necessarily
can be summarized

about

of the Analogies

that we witness

Determining
quires

discriminating

the one

joint

either

from

791
use

of the

briefly.
coexistence

the other,

three

princi

or succession

and both

re

determinations

require that we identify objects that persist through both the real and
the apparent
involved
in the sequence
of appearances
changes
or
We cannot
ascertain
either
time
directly
perceive

ness.

we wit
or space

section
order in which we apprehend
appear
(above,
2), and the mere
an
ances
or events.
not determine
does
order of objects
objective
we can determine
which
Consequently,
capacities,
given our cognitive
states
under
and

of affairs

which
states coexist,
and which
others,
precede
only
the condition
that we identify
substances
that
interact
enduring
in one another.
thus produce
of state
The existence
of
changes

substances
is necessary
for us to determine
the
identifying
enduring
or events occupy,
to determine
of spatial
locations
that objects
variety
of
local
and
translational
and
to deter
changes
place
(both
motion),
mine

the nonspatial
any one such

make
case

To
undergo.
the present

objects
changes
(transformations)
identification
requires
discriminating

use of all
its possible
which
requires
alternatives,
conjoint
in
to
defended
the
these
principles
Analogies.
Failing
employ
as
would
leave
Kant
in
A
the
Deduc
us,
says
principles
successfully
but a blind play of representations,
that is, less
tion, with
"nothing
from

three

than a dream."32
That
recalling
Senses,"33

Kant
Hume's
and

distinguishing
order of events.

is correct

about

these

important

theses

can be seen

by
in
"Of
with
to
the
perplexities
Scepticism
Regard
certain
facts Kant notes about the requirements
for our
the subjective
order of apprehension
from the objective

that apprehending
Kant notes
the manifold
features
con
is successive,
the
features
of
the
house
exist
although
a
Hume
for when
him a letter,
delivered
concurs,
porter
currently.34
he recognized
that the porter
stairs
climbed
that must
still exist
of a house

beyond

the bounds

of Hume's

study,

and

that

the door

to his

study

must still exist behind his back, if he heard the porter's knock and the

32A112,Ak 4:84.30-1.
33
bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2.
Hume, Treatise,
34A190/B236.

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

792
as the porter
squeaky
hinge
are manifold.36
observations

door's
Hume's

Note
both

first

existence

perduring

objects.
defined

these

that

these

Second,
in accord

with

"cause"

and

concepts

observations
and

causal

ascriptions
own
Hume's

implications
that we

of

ascribe

to ordinary
physical
cannot
that
be
concepts

properties
require

concept-empiricism,
These
concepts
object."37

the
namely,
are thus a

of

empiricism,
a priori concepts,
are very special
to be self-conscious
quired for anyone

priori

acknowledge

The

"physical
recent
of concept
the widespread
rejection
worth
that
Kant's
shows
that these
it is
analysis
noting

In view

priori.

acquire
sition.

entered.35

that requires
concept
In brief, Kant's Categories
any

use is re
their legitimate
or
at all, and so to learn, define,
or acqui
for its meaning
experience
as
count
what may be called pure a
because

concepts.
Hume

notes
that ascribing
continued
existence
and causal
as
our
to
sensory
objects
outstrips
observations,
physical
properties
these characteris
Hume
understands
them.38 Nevertheless,
ascribing
Third,

35
bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2, par. 20.
Hume, Treatise,
36For discussion
see Robert Paul
of this section of Hume's Treatise,
inHume: A Collection
"Hume's Theory of Mental Activity,"
of Critical
Wolff,
ed. Vere Chappell
1966), 99-128; Barry Stroud,
Essays,
(New York: Anchor,
Hume
1977), 96-117; Norman Kemp Smith, The Philos
(London: Routledge,
1941), 443-94; and Kenneth R.
ophy of David Hume
(London: Macmillan,
Dinge
(Frankfurt
Westphal, Hegel, Hume und die Identit?t wahrnehmbarer
am Main: Klostermann,
1998), ?4.
37
on
and Lewis White Beck, Essays
"cause," see B240-1
Regarding
Haven:
Yale
Kant and Hume
Press, 1978), 121-9; regarding
University
(New
bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2, pars. 23-8. Stroud
"physical object," see Hume, Treatise,
can be eliminated
claims that Hume's
by replacing
appeal to propensities
of certain "per
the occurrence
about
such talk with conditional
regularities
in the mind, given certain series of other perceptions
(Hume, 131).
ceptions"
causes of the use of the con
at best this provides only occasioning
However,
cept "body," but accounts neither for the definition nor the origin ofthat con
of
of the shortcomings
Hume's
cept. Moltke Gram overlooks
recognition
in accounting
either for our
association
of psychological
general principles
of or our beliefs about causal relations
objects
among physical
concepts
in
Studies
("The Skeptical Attack on Substance: Kantian Answers," Midwest
the problems
Hume
overlooks
8 [1983]: 366).
Rorty likewise
Philosophy
found in his study ("Strawson's
Objectivity
209). Hume awoke
Argument,"
slumbers only because he rethought Hume's first En
Kant from his dogmatic
for causality
to recognize
and espe
its implications
quiry deeply enough
in
the
Treatise
which
Hume
for
only
(bk. 1,
developed
cially
physical objects,
Kant's critics to study Hume with equal care.
pt. 4, sec. 2). It behooves
38
bk. 1, pt. 4, sec. 2, pars. 20, 22, compare par. 56.
Hume, Treatise,

HOW DOES KANT PROVE WE PERCEIVE?

tics
ence

to physical
is necessary
objects
of our beliefs
about
the world.39

too weak
saw,

to justify trusting his

that the coherence
namely,

is only

the tip of the

Without
possibility.41
never
from

in order
Hume

senses.40

Hume

of our beliefs

793
to preserve
finds

such

overlooked

the

coher

"coherence"
what

Kant

our surroundings
their very
existence,

about

At stake
is their very
we could
the capacity
to make
causal judgments
"derive"
the subjective
order of apprehension
(as Kant says)
nor could we distinguish
the objective
order of the world,42
be
issue.

our subjective
order of apprehension
and any objective
order of
events
the
and
in
which
those
things
they participate,43
including
events
called
them. We could not identify
sensed
objects
"perceiving"
we could not identify
at all, not even putatively;
the door on the basis
nor could we
as being aware
of its squeak,
ourselves
of the
identify
tween

on

door

of

In practice,
its squeak.
Hume
distin
clearly
the
in
order
which
his
occurred
from
guished
subjective
experiences
the objective
causal
order of objects
and events
to
his
that gave rise
cannot
his
account
for
this
experiences,
though
epistemology
ability.
concern
not merely
transcendental
Kant's
the possession
of
proofs
certain

the

basis

concepts

but

their use

in legitimate
(that is, true and justified)
sorts.44
of our
(In this regard, motions

of these
cognitive
judgments
own bodies
alter our perspectives

in ways

required

to distinguish

the

39
bk. 1, pt. 4 sec. 2, pars. 18-21.
Hume, Treatise,
40
bk. 1, pt. 4 sec. 2, par. 56.
Hume, Treatise,
41
This central feature of Kant's transcendental
is omitted
proofs
by
K?rner
der Mathematik
und der
Stephen
("Zur Kantischen
Begr?ndung
Kant-Studien
Naturwissenschaften,"
56, no. 3/4 [1966]: 463-73; and "The Im
of
Transcendental
inKant Studies
possibility
Deductions,"
Today, ed. Lewis
White Beck
[LaSalle, III: Open Court,
1969], 230-44),
by Jay Rosenberg
Journal
("Transcendental
Revisited,"
Arguments
of Philosophy
75, no. 18
and
[1975]: 611-24; and "Transcendental
Arguments
Epistemol
Pragmatic
and Science,
and by Robert
Arguments
ogy," in Transcendental
245-62),
to Hume: The Second Analogy as Transcendental
Stern ("On Kant's Response
in Transcendental
and Prospects,
Problems
ed.
Argument,"
Arguments:
Robert Stern [Oxford: Oxford University
Press
It is noted,
1999], 47-66).
"Transcendental
Quassim
however,
by the following:
Cassam,
Arguments,
and Transcendental
Transcendental
Synthesis
Idealism," Philosophical
Quarterly
37, no. 149 (1987): 355; and Barry Stroud, "Kant and Skepticism,"
The Skeptical
ed. Myles Burnyeat
of Califor
Tradition,
(Berkeley: University
nia Press, 1983), 429; and Stroud, "Kantian Argument,
Conceptual
Capacities,
and Invulnerability,"
in Kant
and Contemporary
ed. Paolo
Epistemology,
Parrini (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), 248.
42A193/B238.
43A193-5/B238-9.
44

See

above,

n.

4.

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

794
of events

order

from

the subjective
order of apprehension,
a
we can use
of
Because
example
viewing
house.45)
and substance
to spatial
the categories
of cause
only with
regard
we
a
can
and
and
because
order of
events,
identify
temporal
objects
events
the concepts
of cause and substance,
only by correctly
using
we
can
which
alone
the
order of apprehen
subjective
by
distinguish
objective
as noted

sion
we

in Kant's

from

order of events,
the objective
order of events
the objective
a
must
of
be
causal
order
sub
identify
perceptible
spatio-temporal

stances.

VII
I have

to the transcendental

alluded

content

mental

character

externalism,

causal

can

gitimate
judgments
their
yet sufficiently
explained
4-6), without
having
concerns
character
Their
transcendental
character.
mal

cognitive

conditions

man

which

for the very

can be known

experience,
a priori knowledge.46
Both
roles of such judgments
damental

other

Famously,

periences.
our

Kant

possibility
a priori,

of these

qualitative
verteilten

("distributed")
of apperception,

transcendental
their

for

being
of self-conscious

and

features

from which
stem

from

hu

follow
the fun

in our self-ascription
of our own ex
us
must
be able to
that each of
argues
as our own,
Iwould
"for otherwise
have

identify
representations
a self as I have
as multicolored,
diverse
term verschieden
Kant's
conscious."47
or quantitative

of
proofs
le
make
only
sections
(above,

of Kant's

and his proof

that we
about
substances
spatial

distinctness.
Kant

uses

("diverse")
not
While

it here

I am

of which

representations

connotes
as

to contrast

strong,
with

either
say, as
the ana

in the
to emphasise
the lack of such unity
lytic unity
we
at
in
which
would
indicated
most,
have,
only flick
circumstance,
no
of sensory
consciousness,
(Kant argues)
though
ering moments
he says this di
section
self-consciousness
4). Beforehand
(see above,
term: "For the empirical
which
consciousness
rectly, using a stronger
accompanies
persed

diverse

(zerstreut)

representations
(verschiedene)
to the
connection
and without

ject."48

45A192/B237-8.
46B25,40.
47B134; Ak 3:110.7-9; compare
48B133;Ak 3:109.16-18.

All

1-12.

is in itself
identity

dis

of the sub

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE

795

At an utter minimum,
is that, because
Kant's point
sensory
are fleeting,
occurrence
their mere
does not suffice

repre
for us

sentations

to identify or to recall them as our own.

Each sensory
representation
is at best only a momentary
bit of consciousness,
and can neither
pro
vide nor serve as a consciousness
less a self-consciousness)
of
(much
of
to
able
any plurality
sensory
any
representations.
Being
recognize
plurality

of sensory
of

that

recognition
aware of them.
requires

representations
of
plurality

The

recognition

as one's

own

intellectual
requires
as
and of oneself

representations,
of such representations
able to recognize
Being

as one's

own

a plurality
of
judgment.
as one's
own
is necessary
for gaining
any stable
even stable beliefs?about
what we experience.
The

intellectual

representations
knowledge?or

of apperception,
for
by the "I think," requires
expressed
a
the synthetic
of
unity
apperception
through which
plu
are integrated
as
and
one's
rality of sensations
together
recognized
The transcendental
own.49
of the sensory manifold,
that is, a
affinity

analytic
unity
its possibility

detectable
and variety
of regularity
the
humanly
among
degree
a
tents of what we sense,
is minimum
condition
for the possibility
of apperception.

any

synthetic
unity
section
the analytic
unity
4) blocks
the synthetic
of
unity
apperception.
sensory

manifold

is thus

to function,
standing
the
Moreover,

of apperception

than

chaos
because

Transcendental
condition

or use concepts
to develop
relevant
kind of recollection

more

states

a minimal

Transcendental

that some

current

required
at all.

state

con
of

(above,
it blocks

of the
affinity
for our under

of our

own

be caused

sensory
by some

requires
recollected
state.
It requires
that our present
recol
prior, putatively
a
own.
of
lection be, and manifestly
of
state
one's
Hume's
be,
prior
of memory
fails to meet
causal account
this requirement.50
This kind
of recollection
is required both for the recognition
of any stable object
or of any process

or transformation)
over any period
(whether motion
as
as
well
for
the
of
any personal
short,
recognition
of experiences,
or
however
brief or long, however
history
haphazard
mere
occurrence
a
it
be.
rec
Kant's
is
that
the
of
may
integrated
point
of time,

however

ollection-impression
sentational
state,

49B131-9.
50
Stroud, Hume,
Views
His
Mystery":
1990), 108-10.

within
the

object

a bundle
of which

or the mere
happens

inherence
to be

past,

of a repre
within

124-6, 135-40; Keith Yandell, Hume's

"Inexplicable
on Religion
Temple University
(Philadelphia:
Press,

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

796
Cartesian

do

mental

substance,
as our
states

those

identify
judgments
The
to reflect

suffice?for

and

so

like us?to
beings
to be able to base cognitive

on them.
thought
on the

experiment
implications
that

awareness,

empirical

own

not

here by Kant's
is
"otherwise"51
signalled
of our only having
of
episodes
fleeting
or analogously
Humean
is, sensations,

which
would
indeed enable us only
impressions,
a self as I have
diverse
representations
ored,
on
scious."
this
counterfactual
wildly
Reflecting
derscores

and

to have

"as multicol
I am

of which
state

of affairs

con
un

our endorsment
of Kant's
conclusions
support
is
for
of
necessary
any empiri
unity
apperception
we
self-conscious
and
that this
experience
enjoy,

should

that

the analytic
cally determinate

in the synthetic
is rooted
of apperception
unity of ap
this synthetic
unity alone we can grasp various
perception.
Through
as
in the perception
of
sensory
representations
belonging
together
or event,
can grasp various
it alone we
and through
any one object
or events
as belonging
to our own first
of objects
sensory
perceptions
analytic

unity

and its history.52

experience
The fundamental
role of this synthetic
for
unity of apperception
of
of the occurrence
of any analytic
the possibility
unity
apperception,
for any instance
of the
of the "I think," is supported
by Kant's proof

person

of the manifold
affinity
that legitimate
section
4) and his proof
substances
made
about
spatio-temporal
transcendental

either
could

of

these

occur,

apperception
no analytic
both
quently,

conditions

to be

intuition

sensory

(above,
can only be
judgments
sections
5 and 6). If
(above,
no human
"I think"
satisfied,
causal

for any synthetic

required
unity of
case no apperception,
not be satisfied,
in which
would
occur
could
either.
Conse
of
self-consciousness,
unity

fact

because

conditions

of these

conditions

that making
ticular
causally

proof
stronger
this is the case

51B134.
52B131-6.

fails

of

causal
active

judgments
substances

of mental
again

raises

content
issues

are genuinely

transcendental.53

requires
being
in space
thus
externalism.
central

to Kant's

The

to identify par
a second,
provides

able

Understanding
semantics.

why

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE

797

VIII
Kant's

complex
Kant's

semantics

are based

on his Table

for
Fortunately,
completeness
proof
has been brilliantly
reconstructed
by Wolff,54
consider
semantics
and Transcendental
Kant's
carefully
Kant

the Table
which

of Judgments.
of Judgments

enables

Deduction

us

much

to re
more

than heretofore.

a priori concepts,
the categories,
have a
of their schematization.
This logical
logical significance
independent
in
the
of
Table
is
with
enriched
significance,
catalogued
Judgments,55
holds

that our pure

53It
Deduction
tries to es
may appear that ?20 of Kant's Transcendental
tablish conditions
for the possibility
of human self-consciousness
that are in
of and prior to the conditions
for the possibility
of self-conscious
dependent
on
human experience.
condi
transcendental
?20 focuses
conceptual
only
the material
transcendental
that
conditions
tions, and it does not consider
are latent in Kant's account, especially
of transcendental
?20 consid
affinity.
ers Anschauungen,
not Empfindungen.
Any one Anschauung
already inte
some plurality of sensory Empfindungen.
if
grates ("synthesizes")
Hence,
there is any given empirical Anschauung
there must be
(as ?20 requires),
contained within that sensory
transcendental
affinity of the sensory manifold
intuition.
intuitions must stand under the
?20 argues, in brief, that empirical
because we have no other functions
of unity that could possibly
categories,
or
one
the
for
any
guide
synthesis
required by
empirical
intuition, because
into an intuition likewise requires that those sensa
sensations
synthesizing
tions exhibit transcendental
In these ways,
the Transcendental
De
affinity.
duction requires the broader issues highlighted
here.
of "cause" rather than "sub
?20 may appear to focus on our concept
en bloc, and so includes
it treats the Categories
stance."
"sub
However,
stance" as much as "cause," and it refers back to ?19 (as it should), where an
a key illustration of Kant's point.
example of a substance?a
body?is
I cannot enter further into the details of Kant's Transcendental
Deduc
tion here. See Baum, Deduktion;
Melnick Space, Time and Thought; Pierre
and
the Demands
Cam
Keller, Kant
of Self Consciousness
(Cambridge:
and
Robert
Kant's
bridge University
Press,
1998);
Theory of A
Greenberg,
Priori Knowledge
State University
(State College: Pennsylvania
Press, 2001).
are issued by Guyer, Claims,
and "The Transcendental
Important cautions
of the Categories,"
Deduction
in The Cambridge
to Kant,
ed.
Companion
Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
1992), 123-60; and by
Robert
Kant's
Transcendental
Deduction
Howell,
(Dordrecht:
Kluwer,
I believe
the Deduction
must be thoroughly
in light of
1992).
rethought
Michael Wolffs
brilliant work: Die Vollst?ndigkeit
der kantischen
Urteil
am Main: Klostermann,
auf die Ein
stafel (Frankfurt
1995); "Erwiderung
w?nde von Ansgar Beckermann
und Ulrich Nortmann," Zeitschrift
f?r phil
osophische
52, no. 3 (1998): 435-59; and "Nachtrag zu meiner
Forschung
Kontrovers mit Ulrich Nortmann," Zeischrift
f?r philosophische
Forschung
54, no. 1 (2000): 86-94.
54See references
to Wolff in the preceding
note.
139.11-37.
55A79, 147/B104-5,
186; Ak 3:92.16-19,

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

798
a transcendental

to the sensible
by relating pure concepts
significance
our
of intuition.56
manifold
forms
This
is the task of
provided
by
Kant's Metaphysical
of the Categories.
Deduction
this tran
However,
does not suffice
scendental
of the categories
for determi
significance
nate

reference
cognitive
to particulars
also

ence

must

categories

be

to particulars.
one
requires

"schematized"

sensory
appearances,
ence only in connection

Determinate
of two

in order

refer
cognitive
the
steps: either

further
to refer

to possible
determinate
refer
them

thereby
obtaining
singular
with
of spatio
sensory
presentation
singular
or the unschematized
can be referred
Categories

particulars;
temporal
to particular
of Kant's practi
moral
agents by using various
principles
kind of singular
cal philosophy.
reference
is not rele
(This second
not
vant to the present
shall
be
and
discussed
further
topic
here.)
Kant
and
or

closely
content

even

associates
(Inhalt)

significance
with a concept's

(Bedeutung),
"connection"

sense

(Sinn),

(Beziehung)
is secured
via our

to objects,
this referentiality
where
re
Kant's account
of "objective
of sensory
intuition.57
validity"
to be fully meaningful,
it must
be refer
that, for any concept

reference

forms

quires
able to possible

or actual

objects

of human

is secured

"referability"
forms of intuition
of Kant's

where
such
experience,
via our spatio-temporal

spatio-temporally,
This component
sensory
presentation.
singular
concerns
not "em
of semantic
referentiality,
meaning
and

theory
as understood
of mean
theories
content"
empiricist
by various
pirical
to
which
have
been
assimilated.58
Kant's
views
erroneously
ing,

and syn
both
proscribes
empirical
explicitly
the
bounds
of
of
objects
beyond
particular
knowledge
that a "merely
transcenden
When
Kant states
experience.59

Kant's
thetic
sensory
tal" use

semantics

a priori

of categories
indicates
that this

is "in fact
uselessness

absolutely
pertains

no use," his full statement

to determinate
judgments

56
compare
B148-9,
A248/B305,
A147/B186,
A254/B309;
A76-7/B102,
Ak 3:91.2-13,
compare Ak
139.25-9,
208.16-29,
210.35-211.14;
A181/B224;
161.27-31.
3:118.7-16,
57B300.
58 For
Bounds
16, and by Eric
by Strawson,
of Sense,
example,
in
in
Proceedings
of the Sixth In
Themselves,"
"Thinking Things
Sandberg,
ed. Gerhard Funke and Thomas Seebohm
ternational Kant Congress,
(Lan
On the semantic sense of
Press of America,
ham: University
1989), 2.2:23-31.
see Greenberg, Kant's
Kant's term Beziehung,
Theory, 57-67, 69-71, 119 n.
Philos
of Analytic
17, 187-8; and Robert Hanna, Kant and the Foundations
ophy (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2002), 83-95, 136-7.
59
Ak 3:207.23-208.15.
A247-8/B304-5;

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE

799

use affords
neither
that is, the transcendental
particular
objects;
a priori knowledge
nor synthetic
of particular
This
objects.
empirical
in
Kant
himself
added
his
is clear from the specific
context,
though

about

that this use

clarification

the further

Nachtr?ge

is no real use
of his

the meaning
in the absence
of the condition

he clarified

Similarly,
something."60
no object
is determined

"to know

statement

that

of sensible

in
use

is known."61
The transcendental
"thus nothing
tuition, by adding
nor syn
no knowledge,
neither
of pure categories
affords
empirical
a
use"
This
is the "transcendental
thetic
priori, of particular
objects.
in his Cri
criticizes
and repudiates
of pure concepts
Kant repeatedly
of Pure

tique

metaphysical
tics affords
"connected"

pretensions

is the nerve

of his

to knowledge.

genuine
cognitive
significance
or referred
to particular
objects
and

sentation,

this

Reason;

thus provides

for singular

critique

Conversely,
only when
via

of

rationalist
seman

Kant's
concepts

sensory
singular
reference.

cognitive

are
pre

IX
The

of and the relations

these key points?
among
importance
our
of
the
character
representational
capaci
namely,
spatio-temporal
con
ties (above,
section
proof of mental
3); Kant's first transcendental
tent

of legitimate
causal
(section
4); the restriction
judg
to objects
in
5 and 6); the way
ments
and events
in space
(sections
a synthetic
of
which
the "I think" presupposes
unity
apperception
in genuine
the
role
of
and
sensory
presentation
(section
7);
singular
in
claim
Kant's
that
converge
(section
8)?all
cognitive
significance
externalism

is the act of relating

"Thought
bear on Kant's
these key points
of sensations
ing Kant's account
Kant
Kant's
of

espoused
considered

self-conscious

given
claim

intuition

to an object."62
How
consider
by

can be understood

and perceptual
synthesis.
a sophisticated
of sensationism.63
version
are not themselves
outer
sensations
view,
awareness

(except

under

highly

On
objects
unusual

60Ak
zu Kants Kritik
compare Be?o Erdmann, Nachtr?ge
23:48.16-17;
no.
der reinen Vernunft
cxxvii.
(Kiel: Lipsius & Fischer:
1881),
61Ak 33:48.14.
62
A247/B304; Ak 3:207.23-4.
63Rolf
"Kant's Sensationism,"
47, no. 2 (1981): 229-55;
George,
Synthese
and the Foun
"Kant on Space, Empirical Realism,
compare William Harper,
dations of Geometry,"
Topoi 3, no. 2 (1984): 143-61.

800

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

circumstances),
ing. In Kant's

they
although
sensation
usage,

cates

corresponding
can be put
view

Kant's

are basic

object

or processes

events

(Empfindung,
or a reality
we

of sens

its cognates)

and
(Real,

indi

Wirklichkeit).64

sense

adverbially:
(for example)
greenly;
we
sense
features
of
green
objects
green,
although
we
corre
sense
that
"the
colored
real"
less
of
or,
commonly,
light;
are momentary;
or acts of sensing,
to sensation.
Sensations,
sponds
can have self
are
We
of
sensations
extended.65
series
temporally
only

we

do not

sense

or event only insofar as we

inte
of any object
experience
a
that
when
of sensations
object
(or event),
plurality
perceiving
grate
of
several
and
and only insofar as we judgmentally
identify
integrate
articula
and judgmental
this integration
its sensed
features.66
Only
conscious

tion
or

enables
event,

through

us either

by enabling
The
sensation.

to experience
us to exploit

synthesis
of sensations

or to know

any particular
object
about
it provided
and
about the referential

information

that brings
is a function

role
representational
can make.67
we as human
ments
beings
of unity from our
derive
their functions

Only
twelve

of the kinds
the

categories,
basic
forms

of judg
which

of judg
our
our
can
in
of
sensations
expe
integration
ment,
judgmental
guide
or events.68
of any objects
rience or knowledge
of perceptual
and judgmental
Kant's doctrines
clearly
"synthesis"
identify

what

is now

called

"the binding

problem"

in neurophysiology

64B34, 74, 182, 207, 209, 609, 751; A20, 166, 373-4.
65B209.
66
reminds us that in contemporaneous
usage,
philosophical
George
Kant's related term "Erkenntnis"
cog
singular) designates
(in the distributed
to a particular object or event. See "Sensationism";
nitive reference
compare
Kant's taxonomy of representations
(A319-20/B376-7).
67
see Baum, Deduktion;
Paul Guyer,
"Psychol
"synthesis,"
Regarding
in
Deduc
Transcendental
Kant's
the
and
Transcendental
Deduction,"
ogy
Press, 1989), 47-68;
tions, ed. Eckart F?rster
(Stanford: Stanford University
Transcendental
Patricia Kitcher, Kant's
Psychology
(Oxford: Oxford Univer
Andrew Brook,
Kant's
Transcendental
Deduction;
sity Press, 1990); Howell,
Kant and theMind
Press, 1994); and Jay
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
to Kant's
Introduction
Kant: A Relaxed
Critique
of
Accessing
Rosenberg,
Oxford
York:
Pure Reason
University
Press, 2005).
(New
68
Transcendental
Idealism,
115-22,
See, for example, Allison, Kant's
2 vols. (London:
of Experience,
173-94; Herbert J. Paton, Kant's Metaphysic
Press, 1936), 1:245-8, 260-2,
George Allen & Unwin; New York: Humanities
76-83;
304-5, 2:21-4, 31-2, 42-65, 68-9; Hanna, Kant and the Foundations,
137-57; and J. Michael
58-73; Greenberg, Kant's
Theory,
Wolff, Urteilstafel,
in The Cam
of Intuitions,"
Young, "Functions of Thought and the Synthesis
toKant,
112-13.
bridge Companion

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE

a set of problems
re
is actually
"binding problem"
or cognitive
of sensory,
coordination
perceptual,
our neuropsychological
of
processes
cognition.69
of imagination,
Kant ascribed
the proper
power

of perception.
The
the proper
garding
information
within
To

the transcendental
of

coordination

or
of particular
percepts
objects
of the understanding,
Kant ascribed

into

sensations

events.

To cognitive
judgments
the proper
of our recognition
coordination
or characteristics
into the recognition
pects,
ject

or event.70

grative
does not

If contemporary
to our sensory

functions

from Kant's

detract

3), we

of objects
can only

individual

particular
more
ascribes

explicit

cannot

group apparent
their apparent

identification

cognitive
recognition
set of characteristics.
or time

space
sensory

qualities

identify

lar object
by
events
before

us.

this
Doing
substances

ob
inte

Kant allowed,
this
of a genuine
problem,
of ideas" and of sense

by
spatio-temporal
the spatio-temporal
region occupied
the
array
spatio-temporal
recognizing

simply

as

than

apparatus

keen

in our

features,

of any one

neurophysiology

a particular
object or event displays
we cannot perceive
Because
either

section

of

recognition
of
advocates
the
"new way
by
it detracts
from Kant's
nothing

widely
neglected
data. Moreover,
cial problem
involved
one

801

requires
identifying
one
that determine

of a cru
that

any

as such

(above,
into properties
coordinates.
We
by any particu
of objects
and
as
those
objects

another's
loca
interacting
and transformations
sections
5 and 6). In
tions, motions,
(per above,
this way, Kant's analysis
reaches
Evans's
that
conclusion,
predication
are mutually
and spatio-temporal
localization
To
interdependent.71
causally

this Kant

adds:
on

both

of these

coordinated

forms

of

identification

are

of physical
events
in space and time, on
can distinguish
our subjective
order of ex
from the objective
order of events
5 and 6).
sections
perience
(above,
can
we
or
these
events
at all,
Only by distinguishing
objects
identify
and only by identifying
them can we identify ourselves
both as distinct
parasitic
the basis

from

the causal

of which

them

consciousness

and

order

alone

as aware
(above,

we

of

them.

section

Our
1)

empirically

is precisely

determined
our

awareness

self
of

69Adina
"The Binding Problem," Neuron
24 (1999): 7-125. This
Roskies,
set of problems has only recently received attention from contemporary
epis
see The Unity of Consciousness:
and As
temologists;
Binding,
Integration,
ed. Axel Cleermans
sociation,
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
70
B152, B162 n.
A79/B105-06,
71
Evans, "Identity and Predication."

802

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

and

after

as being
aware
of
For reasons
others.

this

form

of self-consciousness

ourselves

on the basis

reasoning,
ori that we
environs
Kant's

at

have

by understanding
of the
proof

pirical"
transcendental

or fulfilled

tion

is refuted

content

is only
of objects

to raise
some

molar

scious

and

tors,
be satisfied

that

line of

can know

a pri
in our

objects

is a transcendental
in our physical

objects

human

can

only if transcendental
own
transcendental
by Kant's

This

experience
idealism
is true.

envi

can
experience
the transcendental

be

satisfied

be

satis

assump

for mental

9), because
for the

4-6,
(sections
conditions
transcendental

human

Con

this

of some

externalism
that

questions,
of physical

proof.
of perception

"reality"
realism
about

in space.

to follow

enough

knowledge

Kant's

us

outside

skeptical

for self-conscious

conditions

fied

occurring

"em
transcendentally
qualified,
merely
In part this is because
Kant's main
for
arguments
assume
idealism
rather than prove
that the transcen

realism.

dental

before,
during,
Kant
is right
that
herein,
us
for
human
possible
beings

is self-conscious

simply
least

of unqualified
It is not a proof

proof
rons.

both

who

events

summarized

of our consciousness
anyone
or even

sequently,

some

arguments
this argument
possibility

shows

of

self-con
fac

by mind-independent
of the sensory manifold

affinity

can

the degree
of
factor, namely,
by a mind-independent
orderliness
the manifold
of given material
of sensation.
This
among
a
ob
version
alternative"
of
the
thus
sound
"neglected
provides
proof
only

a model
to Kant's arguments,
and it thus provides
jection
the satisfaction
of such objections
struction
regarding
Kant
identifies.
conditions
transcendental

for the con

of

the

other

is a nice

story
what

Skeptics

and advocati

diaboli

may

retort

a proof.
The issue thus raised
requires
can properly
be
achieves
and what
proof

but hardly
Kant's

One of the deepest

proof.
to assimilate
has been
arguments"
sophical

Kant

that

runs

through

the entire

this

appreciating

of philo
expected
of "analytic
transcendental

errors

to the Cartesian
analyses
Kant
is the first great non
in sev
Cartesianism
rejected

Kant's

decidedly
rejected.
predicament
He decisively
Cartesian
epistemologist.
the Cartesian
eral ways.
First, Kant rejects
Hume,

that

sense-data

assumption,
tradition,

shared
namely,

by
that

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE
states

are
(sensations)
This assumption,

of

consciousness
sensory
of our self-consciousness.

states
with

inevitably

skepticism.
Kant also rejected
Cartesianism,
secondly,
not only regarding
forms of externalism,
mental
tion

and

4)

epistemic
bility of

also
automatically
when
conjoined

about
epistemic
justification
assumptions
(see be
of
leads to the ego-centric
insoluble
Car
predicament

infallibilist

low),
tesian

803

causal

certain
by espousing
sec
content
(above,

5, 6, 9), but
(sections
transcendental
conditions

judgment
Kant's
justification.
human
self-conscious

need

experience
no one

also

only
to know

regarding
for the possi
be satisfied
for

that they are

self-conscious;
nor
to
in order
satisfied
be self-conscious,
does anyone
need to know
or to use Kant's proof.
in order
to understand
that they are satisfied
On the contrary,
transcendental
due to the converse
rela
proofs work
any human

to be

their

tion between
tion

of

scious

the

essendi

experience.
self-conscious

experience
to be?the

ratio

the satisfac

cognoscendi:
the possibility

of

is the ratio

experience
Once Kant's

known

and

conditions

transcendental

human

is also

ratio

needs

essendi

of

of self-conscious

establishes
proof
this, then
if one understands
is?and

self-con
human

actual
anyone's
Kant's proof,
it

ratio

of there being perceptible,

cognoscendi
in
one's
objects
causally
physical
surroundings.
A third aspect
of Kant's non-Cartesianism
is his clear recognition
some
that any tenable
substantive
requires
premises
epistemology
active

that cannot
test

be proven

of Descartes's

scendental

evil

reflection

involves

counterfactual

sen, wildly
our key cognitive
2 and 4).
sections

deductive

by purely
deceiver.

capacities

This
our

means
is why

Kant's
on

reflecting
in order
circumstances
and

their

and do not pass

attendant

method

the

of tran

some

cho
carefully
some of
to identify

incapacities

(above,

and advocati
diaboli
dismiss
that do not meet
Skeptics
premises
infallibilist
standards.
infallibilist
models
Kant, however,
recognized
as
of epistemic
the
and
justification
skeptical
trap
philosophical
pipe
dream
the failure of Descartes's
ef
very well
they are. He understood
moro
To this I add: Descartes's
skepticism
geom?trico.
is
not
but
five
distinct
vicious
circulari
argument
infected,
by one,
by
a radically
ties.72 Kant was right to develop
to
non-Cartesian
approach
fort

to refute

skepticism
Not
edge.

and
only

to the philosophical
does Kant advocate

72Kenneth
R. Westphal,
Research Archives
Philosophy

of our empirical
knowl
analysis
a fallibilist
account
of empirical

"Sextus Empiricus
Contra
13 (1987-88): 91-128.

Ren?

Descartes,"

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

804
he

knowledge,73

advocates

as well:

knowledge
establishing
nitive capacities
and incapacities
constructive
mutual
assessment.74
constructive

are

ing
model
duces

inventory
is a collective
undertaking,
Any form of justification
is inherently

cog

requiring
on
based
we

because

fallibilist,

fallible.

the traditional

conclusion

every

transcendental

of our human

inherently
beings
did not
Kant's non-Cartesian
insights
to prove
his antiskeptical
conclusions
for this was

of

the basic

assessment

mutual

human

account

fallibilist

from

model

rational

him

prevent

from

also

first principles

try

Kant's

"apodictically."75
of a rational
science

that de
as ex

(scientia),

emplified by Christian Wolff.76 To fulfill this deductivist model, Kant

to establish
proposed
in
the
Critique
edge
transcendental
quire
philosophy
for properly

would

his

account

transcendental

of Pure Reason,
Kant
idealism.

establish

scientific

both

which

of human

Kant

that

proposed

the

knowl
to re

understood

transcendental

of and

the parameters
legitimacy
he
which
metaphysics,
(wissenschaftliche)

duly published as The Metaphysical

Foundations

ofNatural

Science

for short)
and 77^ Metaphysics
In turn,
of Morals.
were
to establish
to
the a priori principles
required
vi
This is a grand philosophical
physics.
ground and justify empirical
no
one
I
that
it very closely,
submit
could bet
sion. Having
examined
ter carry out this vision
than Kant did.77
this
of
aspect
However,

^Foundations"
the Foundations

serves
ultimately
epistemology
ist model
of "scientific"
justification,
model

bilist
dental

of justification

and

thus

to reinforce

in Kant's

embedded

deductiv
the

falli

of transcen

method

reflection.

Very

idealism
transcendental
briefly, Kant's
and
of transcendental,
metaphysical,

sequence
fails to prove
Reason,
Kant's

its own

to undermine

Kant's

and his

foundational

principles
empirical
to the Critique
central
of Pure
principle
event has a cause.
is that
The problem
addresses
in the Critique
expressly
of Pure Reason

the key causal

that every
namely,

analysis
causal principle,
the
only
general
ever, the causal principle
actually
ence
is the specific
causal
thesis,

73A766-7/B794-5.
74Onora
O'Neill,
toKant, 280-308.
75Bxxii, 765.

"Vindicating

that every

event

has

Reason,"

in The Cambridge

76Bxxxvi.

77
Westphal,

Kant's

a cause.

by the Analogies
required
event
that every physical

Transcendental

Proof,

chaps.

4-6.

How

of Experi
has an ex

Companion

WE PERCEIVE?
HOWDOES KANTPROVE
cause

Kant distinguished
these
causality).
(transeunt
in
that
where
he
also
the
Foundations,
only
recognized
on
cannot
be proven
transcendental
causal
thesis

ternal

physical
two principles
this
specific

for it also

alone,
order

grounds
dational

that his

reveals

Foundations

on our

but

With
metaphysics.
is jeopardized.
priority

requires

of philosophical
of Kant's proof

ful examination

nor

this, Kant's

foun

care
However,
in the
of the specific
causal principle
rests not on metaphysical
key premise
of
of hylozo
any instances
ignorance

empirical
Kant's
foundational
this,
as
are
the deductivist,
destroyed,
vision
of "scientific"
Kant's
grand
analysis,
ism. With

805

order

of philosophical

"scientific"

philosophy.
deductivist
model

aspirations
Neither

is

priority
embodied
Kant's

in
tran

of rational,
scientific
can
we
the
causal
need
and
prove
principle
apodictically
knowledge
cause.
event has an external
that every physical
use, namely,
physical
no
answer
to
Transcendental
idealism
Hume's
causal
provides
skepti
scendental

idealism

his

cism.

XI

Does

the failure

fort to skeptics?
dental
reflection,
cient

of

of Kant's
An

deductivist

extension

along the
the specific

lines

model

of Kant's
recommended

causal

provide
new method
herein,
In part,
use the

principle.
can
section
(above,
8): we
in
connection
with
principle
(in Beziehung
auf)
only in those cases where we can refer the specific

Kant's

proof
semantics

No.

spatio-temporal
causal principles

aid or com
of transcen
suffi
provides
this is due to
general

causal

particular
objects
to
causal principle
two
between
these

Once
the distinction
objects.
is recognized,
Kant's Transcendental

Deduction

and

can be revised
of Experience
in part by high
Analogies
accordingly,
a genu
of Kant's methods,
to provide
the fallibilist
aspects
lighting
transcendental
of
the
of
conclusion
Kant's
Refutation
of
inely
proof
This proof
is strongly
Idealism.
reinforced
two transcenden
by Kant's
content
tal proofs
of mental
externalism
sections
(above,
4-6, 8, 9).
Kant's
with
the
failure
of
both
Descartes
and
Kant's
fallibilism,
along
own
volved

deductivist
in global

efforts,
perceptual

help

show

that the infallibilist

skepticism
they are

are

far from

assumptions
or
innocent

in
inevi

a key roadblock
themselves
to
assumptions.
Indeed,
our
empirical
knowledge.
understanding
Global
the "whole of our per
perceptual
skepticism
challenges
In
out
the
Transcendental
Kant points
ceptual
experience."
Dialectic,
table

806

KENNETH R. WESTPHAL

of perceptual
is itself no object
experience"
of perceptual
No wonder
it cannot
be justified
experience.78
by re
course
as
a
to perception!
"whole
this
Furthermore,
"whole,"
alleged
an
sense.
of perceptual
is
at
best
in
technical
Kant's
Idea,
experience"
that

this putative

More

precisely,
no objective

"whole

a transcendent

it is inherently

we

to which

Idea,

can

the skeptical
validity.
Furthermore,
"hypotheses"
are all
to generate
"whole of perceptual
this alleged
experience"
in principle
to be cognitively
in principle,
transcendent;
they
designed
or refuted
or inquiry.
cannot
evidence
be verified
by any empirical

give
used

they are "hypotheses"

from genuine,
empirically

Consequently,
tinct in kind
Kant's
his

of

semantics

none

of these

criticisms

in name

and

only,

radically

usable

skeptical
reference

hypotheses.
are underscored
strategies

(section
8), which
nor the alleged
"whole

cognitive

dis

entail

by
that

of percep
skeptical
hypotheses,
to any particu
reference
admit of any determinate
tual experience,"
lars we can identify. Finally,
Kant's
fallibilism,
together with his tran
can be self-conscious
as
of our existence
that we
scendental
proof
of these

in time

determined

only

if in fact we
causally

of, spatio-temporal,
the skeptical
block

knowledge

are

aware

of, and
substances

active

have
in our

some
sur

from occasional
percep
generalization
to the possibility
It does
delusion.
of universal
perceptual
we
are
so by demonstrating
in which
that any world
per
altogether
can
no
a
be
self
in
which
human
world
is
deluded
being
ceptually
can
no
raise skeptical
human
In any such world,
conscious.
being
roundings,
tual error

doubts.

So

if we

are

alert

a close
skeptical
doubts,
to allay those
suffices
proof of realism
assume
that
simply
skeptics
perceptual

enough

transcendental
study of Kant's
Global
doubts
permanently.
we can be self-conscious
without
our minds.

Kant's

transcendental

to raise

being

conscious
of

outside
of anything
shows
just how

realism

proof
is. If Kant is right, global perceptual
this assumption
skep
portentous
even willful
on profound,
the
rests
ticism
question
self-ignorance:
to the question,
connected
is indeed
"What can I know?"79
closely
"What

is it to be human?"80

University

of East Anglia

78A483-4/B511-2.
79A805/B833.
80
Robert
A805/B833,
Logik, Ak 9:25. I am grateful to Robert Greenberg,
on
of
drafts
comments
earlier
for
Edwards
and
very helpful
Howell,
Jeffrey
this paper.