Who controls foreign policy in Pakistan?

| Dr Tariq Rahman

We know who does not! The Foreign Office certainly does not and the
civilian governments also do not. Or, if they do, they control those aspects of foreign
policy which do not deal with India, the United States and Kashmir. And if you classify
nuclear weapons as a foreign policy issue, then once again, the government does not
control them. So then, those who do control these crucial issues of foreign policy are
the top leadership of the army, the intelligence agencies and pressure groups in
Pakistan. There are bits of evidence in interviews, anecdotes and biographies given
by people about decision-making in the 1965 War and the 1971 military action in
Dhaka, as well as the long-drawn proxy war in Kashmir to prove the above assertions.
To cite but one example, Sartaj Aziz tells us in his book Between Dreams and Realities:
some Milestones in Pakistans History (OUP, 2009) that the disastrous Kargil
misadventure was taken by General Pervez Musharraf, who met him before he went to
India as foreign minister and again when he returned from there in order to ensure that
Aziz does not concede anything like withdrawal of troops from the forward locations in
Indian-held areas. In short, the foreign minister of Pakistan went to Delhi to defuse the
tension but with his hands tied behind his back (as the press put it). Moreover,
Musharraf held his briefing with the prime minister about Kargil after the event and not
before. And this usurpation of foreign policy is not something unusual. The military high
command thinks it is the sole guardian of national interest and, therefore, keeps making
policies which diplomats have to defend always a nightmare for their excellencies in
foreign capitals.
But now, it seems we have gone so overboard in inculcating anti-Americanism in our
people that eventhe army cannot fully control foreign policy. The army was not always
right about its capacity to controlthe genie which came out of the bottle. The militant
groups it allowed to be unleashed upon India after 1989 might have been tactically
controllable. But strategically speaking they had a worldview beyond just Kashmir. They
wanted an Islamic government and society as they interpreted Islam and in this they
were joined by other ideological visionaries such as the groups of armed warriors one
finds in al Qaeda or the Taliban. These are not ultimately controllable by the
army which still operates in the familiar world of the nation-state and a postcolonial
organisational structure. That is why these groups could not agree with the Musharraf
governments decision to participate in the War on Terror in Afghanistan. They turned
against Musharraf and the Pakistan Army, which itself is torn between supporting them
while also fighting them. But there are two wars in Afpak. First, against the American
occupation of Afghanistan; the second against the non-Islamic way of life and polity of
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The first is the one which is advertised by our media; the
second is ignored. Its significance is not realised, or not commented upon, because of
anti-Americanism which is so endemic as to block out Pakistans own long-term
interests.
The present crisis about the Nato supply line is an example of our public opinion holding
us hostage. It is in Pakistans interest to renegotiate the deal so as to gain more. But it

is not in Pakistans interest to create a situation where America decides it has had
enough of this country and is pushed into the arms of Pakistans rivals or use force to
punish Pakistan. If the Americans do not fight us but simply abandon us they will have
to pay more to fight this war. While the route through Russia and Central Asia is long
and costly, it is possible that America will start relying on it more and more leaving
Pakistan high and dry. The only gain for those who are fighting the Americans will be
that they will then leave by 2013 instead of 2014 and maybe abandon the idea of
making a permanent base in Afghanistan. But then Pakistan would then be sidelined in
the peace process and will stand to lose whatever foothold it may have in that country
after the American withdrawal. It is possible that the Taliban come to control
Afghanistan and they are so beholden to Pakistan for stopping the Nato supplies that
they act in a friendly manner later. But that they should do so anyway considering that
Pakistan has refused to take military action against many of the anti-American fighting
groups of Afghanistan. In any case, it is doubtful that any Afghan government, even the
Taliban, will recognise the Durand line or provide that kind of meaningful depth for
which the Pakistani military have almost bartered away our security.
What we will lose is a lot even without an overt war with the US. The army will lose its
constant supply of spare parts and weapons and the money which it needs to absorb
the costs of warfare. The government will face even more inflation, power riots and
harsher debt burden. Even more alarming is the isolation which we will find ourselves
in. And if we do not get bailed out by the world financial institutions, we will have a
crisis which no civilian government can endure unless it is a puppet of the military. In
short, both the army and the PPP government will probably want to come to terms with
the Americans but they are caught in the rhetoric they helped stir up or did not stop
effectively. Some say the paralysis is because of the militant threat to kill the members
of parliament who vote in favour of the restoration of Nato supplies. In my view, this in
itself would not be the biggest hurdle as such threats are always there but not everyone
is actually stopped from acting because of them. The biggest misconceived hurdle is
that Pakistani public opinion; the opposition or the religious parties or even the Taliban
are not as violently against the restoration of Nato supplies as the army and the
government are making out to be. So much so that they feel their power to take
decisions is seriously curtailed. This is the hole which we have dug out for ourselves.